Jurisdiction
18Section 149F of the Act concerns appeals with respect to building certificates.
19Section 149D(1)(a) of the Act states that the council must "... issue a building certificate upon application if it appears that:
(a) there is no matter discernible by the exercise of reasonable care and skill that would entitle the council, under this Act or the Local Government Act 1993 :
(i) to order the building to be demolished, altered, added to or rebuilt, or
(ii) to take proceedings for an order or injunction requiring the building to be demolished, altered, added to or rebuilt, or
(iii) to take proceedings in relation to any encroachment by the building onto land vested in or under the control of the council, or
(b) there is such a matter but, in the circumstances, the council does not propose to make any such order or take any such proceedings.
(2) If the council refuses to issue a building certificate, it must inform the applicant, by notice, of its decision and of the reasons for it.
(3) The reasons must be sufficiently detailed to inform the applicant of the work that needs to be done to enable the council to issue a building certificate.
(4) The council must not refuse to issue or delay the issue of a building certificate by virtue of the existence of a matter that would not entitle the council to make any order or take any proceedings of the kind referred to in subsection (1) (a).
20The council submits that the issue of the 121B Order is reason under s 149D(1)(a)(i) to refuse to issue the building certificate.
21Aggrieved by the decision of council not to issue a building certificate, the applicant has appealed to the Court, pursuant to s149F(1)(a) against that decision.
22Section 149F(3) of the Act states that the Court on hearing an appeal "... may do any one or more of the following:
( a) it may direct the council to issue a building certificate in such terms and on such conditions as the Court thinks fit,
(b) it may revoke, alter or confirm a notice under section 149C,
(c) it may make any other order that it considers appropriate."
23The applicant submits (at p 3 of its written submissions filed on 23 March 2011) that:
"...the EPA Act does not provide " explicit" guidance to the Council (or the Court on an appeal) as to what matters should or should not be considered in assessing an application for a building certificate. Instead the EPA Act provides only a duty to issue a certificate on satisfaction of a state of affairs (i.e. that there is no 'matter' which would entitle a Council to issue an order with respect to a structure) and a discretion that may be exercised even if the council is not satisfied of that state of affairs."
24Both parties submit that the power and the discretion that the Court has on appeal is wider than the duty available to the council in s 149D. In support of this submission, they rely on the Court's decision in Ireland (No1) and the several observations made by Bignold J at [44], [52], [58], [60-67] concerning the power of the Court to grant building certificates and at [69] the matters that the Court can take into account on appeal.
25It is also submitted that the Court's reasoning in Taipan Holdings Pty Pld v Sutherland [1999] NSWLEC 276 is relevant to this appeal. In that case the Court analyzed a "hypothetical development application" in order to determine that a building certificate should issue for an illegally built boat shed. At [118-119] the Court comments that the discretion in s 149F(3):
".... is virtually the same as those formulated by Kirby P in the following passage from his oft cited judgment in Warringah Shire Council v Sedivcic (1987) 10 NSWLR 335 where his Honor, speaking of the statutory discretion conferred on the Court by the EPA Act s124 (1) 'to make such orders as it thinks fit to remedy or restrain a breach of the Act" said at 342:
It is important to conclude by pointing out that the discretion is itself part of the statutory scheme. In this sense, the exercise of the discretion should not be seen as the illegitimate interference by judges in the even-handed application of planning law which local government have the responsibility of enforcing. Instead, it is an important part - a fulcrum as it were - of that planning law, designed to introduce into it the protection in reserve of salutary discretion. Because it exists in the Court, the discretion must also be considered by planners who invoke the Court's discretion. Because it is established by Parliament and is expressed in such broad terms, it is a legitimate and integral part of the overall scheme of planning legislation operating in this state. It cannot be ignored. It should not be unduly circumscribed by a gloss of cases.
The President in that passage was considering the discretion vested in this Court to decline in the exercise of discretion, to grant relief in a case where a breach of the Act had been established. I would respectfully adopt that line of reasoning and adopt it in its application to the statutory discretion concerning the issue of a building certificate".
26Paragraphs 19, 20 and 21 of the applicant's written submissions set out the process of environmental assessment, which the applicant submits should be undertaken by the Court in determining an appeal under s 149F of the EPA Act.
27Accepting, as the applicant submits, that there is discretion to regularize the sign ( Ireland ) it says that the Court could assess a notional development application (as discussed in Mineral Wealth Pty Ltd v Gosford City Council (2003) 127 LGERA 74) and Taipan . However, in doing so, it should appreciate that the discretion is wide and akin to the discretion in s 123 and s 124 of the Act, as discussed by the Court in Warringah Council v Sedevcic (1987) 10 NSWLR335 at [339-340] per Kirby P . The only constraint, according to the applicant, is the discretion should be limited to the issues raised by the parties in the contentions: Seagal v Waverley Council (2005) 64 NSWLR 177.
28As I said earlier, it is the applicant's submission that the discretion of the Court to grant a building certificate "...is itself part of the statutory scheme of planning in this State and so by granting of a certificate (given the long term presence of the sign and its lack of any environmental impacts) the Court would indeed be upholding the statutory planning scheme", at [4] of the applicant's submissions in reply dated 29 March 2011 (based on the Court's reasoning in Taipan ).
29The applicant submits that a notional development application is only one way of assessing whether to exercise the discretion to issue a building certificate. The circumstances of the individual case are pertinent to the exercise of the Court's wide discretion but those circumstances do not need to be exceptional. In this case it submits that the sign has no adverse environmental impacts and therefore does not offend the public interest or the planning scheme.
30The council agrees with the applicant's submission that the Court has the power to grant a building certificate in circumstances where the development is prohibited; but, submits the public interest, in preserving and maintaining the zoning and permissible uses, is highly relevant and it would require exceptional circumstances to override a general presumption in favor of upholding the zoning provisions. Council relies on the decisions of: Woollahra v Carr (1982) 47LGRA105 and North Sydney v Ekstein (1985) 54 LGRA 440 in support of its submission to uphold the planning scheme.
31Council's central submission is that the development is prohibited under the current LEP, and under SEPP64. It submits that there are "no exceptional circumstances" which would bring this sign within para 4.3.1 of the City of Sydney Signage and Advertising Development Control Plan 2005 (exhibit 3 folio175). The site is proposed to continue in a conservation area and its use for the proposed purpose is prohibited under cl 6 and cl 10 of SEPP64.
32The breach, according to the council is not trivial because it undermines the planning scheme and the heritage conservation area. The applicant has not claimed hardship or any disentitling conduct by the council. There is no related development the viability of which depends on this advertising panel. The sign is not permanent but subject to a lease. Therefore, the Court should uphold the planning scheme and not direct the issue of building certificate.
33While council agrees that the Court, in considering whether to exercise its discretion should take guidance from the case law; and, a consideration of the objects of the Act, it submits that there is no case law dealing with the issue of a building certificate in respect of prohibited development. In Ireland No 2 , Bignold J was dealing with a development which " ... had development consent been sought immediately prior to the time of erection it would have been permissible and in all probability been granted" at [37].
34Based on the evidence of Mr Quinn, council submits that the other signs in the Bridge Road commercial area are very different to the sign under review because it has no relationship to the development in the locality. In heritage terms Council relies on the evidence of Mr Poulton and submits that the sign has no heritage value, no relationship with the use of the terrace to which it is attached and no history. It is a stand-alone general advertising sign, which is prohibited under the LEP.
35Based on the evidence of its planning and heritage experts Council submits the sign has unacceptable environmental impacts and the Court should not exercise its discretion in this case to direct the issue of a building certificate.