Consideration
33 There is no doubt that the Court has power to hear early or preservation evidence. Section 46 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) provides that the Court may, for the purposes of any proceeding, order the examination of a person upon oath or affirmation before the Court at any place within Australia and may empower any party to the proceeding to give in evidence in the proceeding the testimony so taken. The practice of receiving early or preservation evidence in native title proceedings is well-established. It is expressly referred to in the Court's Native Title Practice Note and is contemplated by rr 34.120 and 34.126 within Div 34.7 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), which contains rules of procedure applicable to native title proceedings, including compensation proceedings.
34 The relevant issue on the current application is whether there is a sufficient justification for the Court to convene a hearing in Coober Pedy in March next year to receive Mr Crombie's evidence.
35 Applications for preservation evidence have historically arisen in the context of native title determination applications. The need for preservation evidence in such proceedings arises due to the lengthy delays in resolving claims once they have been filed and the likelihood that crucial witnesses may become incapacitated or die before having the opportunity to provide evidence: see, for example, Frazer and Others v State of Western Australia (2003) 128 FCR 458 (Frazer) at [30] (French J); Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v State of Western Australia (No 6) [2003] FCA 663 at [39] (Lindgren J); Rose (on behalf of the Kurnai Clans) v State of Victoria [2010] FCA 460 (Rose) at [25] (North J). Justice Mansfield explained the practice of receiving preservation evidence in Eringa No 1 Native Title Claim v State of South Australia (2007) FCA 182 as follows (at [15]):
Almost invariably (although not necessarily) preservation evidence in a claim under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) will be given by an indigenous person whose evidence is sought to be preserved to be available to the applicants if the claim proceeds to hearing. It is therefore a consensual process. The person being examined is generally available for cross-examination. That process enables a Court to see that the evidence has been able to be tested, and so to give the evidence appropriate weight.
36 In addition to hearing preservation evidence, the Court may grant leave to a party to adduce early evidence to "to give applicants an opportunity to tell their story to the Court at an early stage and to facilitate subsequent mediation" and "give some added impetus to the mediation process": Frazer at [30] and [31] (French J); see also Lovett at [16] (North J) and Rose at [26] (North J).
37 Similar circumstances may arise in the context of compensation applications. In so far as an application seeks compensation for cultural loss, it will be necessary for the applicant to prove such loss. That would ordinarily require evidence from individual members of the native title holding group concerning their physical and spiritual connection with the land and waters by their traditional laws and customs and the effects of the compensable acts on that connection. In such cases, it is possible that crucial witnesses may become incapacitated or die before having the opportunity to provide evidence, which creates the need for the taking of preservation evidence. If negotiations in the course of mediation become stalled over the question of cultural loss, the taking of early evidence with respect to that issue may give some "added impetus" to the negotiations.
38 Ultimately, decisions about the scheduling of preservation or early evidence must be guided by the overarching purpose of civil practice and procedure as stated in s 37M of the FCA Act. The Court must exercise its discretionary powers with respect to the management of civil proceedings in a way that best promotes the overarching purpose, which is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible. The overarching purpose includes the following objectives:
(a) the just determination of all proceedings before the Court;
(b) the efficient use of the judicial and administrative resources available for the purposes of the Court;
(c) the efficient disposal of the Court's overall caseload;
(d) the disposal of all proceedings in a timely manner; and
(e) the resolution of disputes at a cost that is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the matters in dispute.
39 As Mortimer J (as her Honour then was) observed in Agius v State of South Australia (No 4) [2017] FCA 361 (at [84] and [85]), determining where to draw lines in case management processes is not an exact science; while the just resolution of disputes requires that parties have a reasonable opportunity to present their case, this does not mean that a party is entitled to insist on presenting its case in a particular manner or on a particular timetable.
40 Conducting a hearing in Coober Pedy for a few days in March 2023 to take evidence from Mr Crombie will be a relatively expensive exercise for the Court and each party that wishes to participate in the hearing. A party requesting the Court to undertake such a hearing must demonstrate that the need for the hearing, having regard to the interests of justice, outweighs the costs involved.
41 On the basis of the evidence presently before me, I am not persuaded that there is a sufficient need to take early or preservation evidence from Mr Crombie on country having regard to the interests of justice. The evidence indicates that Mr Crombie is not seriously ill and there is no present risk of the Court being unable to hear Mr Crombie's evidence at a later point in time, if the matter fails to settle. With respect to mediation, it appears that the parties are actively engaged in negotiations, and each of the applicant and the State have engaged experts to provide evidence. I am not persuaded that there is an impasse between the parties that might be assisted by the taking of early evidence. For present purposes, it can be accepted that Mr Crombie is an important witness and informant for the applicant's expert evidence. As part of the mediation process, the applicant should be able to reduce Mr Crombie's principal evidence (to the extent it is relied on by the applicant's expert) to writing, whether in the form of a witness statement or affidavit, and provide the written evidence to the State. That process would be expected to assist negotiations in mediation.
42 The State's submissions indicate that the State will be in a better position to finalise its view as to cultural loss following receipt of its own expert anthropological report by the end of December 2023. There is a possibility that, at that time, the State's position may change and negotiations between the parties may stall. If that were to occur, the balance of considerations may alter and the applicant may be able to persuade the Court that the interests of justice favour the taking of early evidence from Mr Crombie (and possibly other witnesses) on country to facilitate further mediation.
43 Having regard to the above matters, I will not at this time make orders for the hearing of early evidence from Mr Crombie. Nor will I dismiss the applicant's interlocutory application. I will instead adjourn the application indefinitely. The applicant will have liberty to re-agitate the interlocutory application on the basis of additional evidence if, during January 2024 or at a later time, it becomes apparent that negotiations between the parties have stalled and mediation is likely to be assisted by the hearing of early evidence from Mr Crombie (or one or more other witnesses) on the issue of cultural loss.
I certify that the preceding forty-three (43) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice O'Bryan.