*The Purchaser also acknowledges that the vendor has advised the Purchaser that all of the financial information was compiled from trading figures downloaded by modem from Aromas Toowoomba to the Vendors Registered Office and that the financial information is true and correct to the best of the vendor's knowledge but has not been audited and the Purchaser has elected not to audit the financial information."
The words after the asterisk have been handwritten and initialled. Those words are in substitution for words which have been crossed out, which read "and waives any rights it has or may have against the Vendor in respect of the accuracy of the Financial Information or its reliance on the Financial Information".
63 The fact is that the detailed figures for Aromas Toowoomba for the period ended October 1995 and the computer generated Profit & Loss for Aromas Toowoomba for the period ended October 1995 are not true and correct, because the amount for bean sales had been seriously overstated. The error was caused by a misposting of the cash banked on 2 October in respect of September takings, and erroneously augments to a substantial degree the actual sale of coffee beans. In my opinion, it is not correct to say that the financial information contained in Schedule F was based on the trading figures from Aromas Toowoomba. The figures supplied for October 1995 and the Profit and Loss Account ending October 1995 did not reflect the actual trading for October , but included the erroneous posting of the September cash bankings as coffee bean sales. In my opinion, however, none of the respondents was aware of the error and consequently none of the respondents knew that the figures were false. That conclusion is reinforced in my opinion from the transparency of the error when compared with the October sales in the previous year and the year to date sales from the previous year. It would be a very silly thing to do to make such an obvious error deliberately and, in my judgment, while the figures for Aromas Toowoomba for the period ended October 1995 and the computer generated Profit & Loss for Aromas Toowoomba for the period ended October 1995 were erroneous, the error was not made deliberately, dishonestly or fraudulently by any person nor was there communication of it.
64 The several contractual acknowledgments are directed to displace any reliance that future performance would be a reflection of historical performance. Erroneous historical trading figures wee supplied to the prospective purchasers, and the contract as amended did not have the effect of denying to them rights based on that error. I am satisfied that Mr and Mrs Alroe relied on that erroneous information in their decision to purchase the business, and that the provision of the erroneous information was a factor in their decision. I am satisfied that the provision of the erroneous trading figures amounts to misleading and deceptive conduct in contravention of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act and was conduct which induced the first applicant to enter into the purchase contract and franchise agreement and to the giving of guarantees by the second and third applicants.
65 Mrs Alroe says that a week or so after the opening of the Coffee Club in Toowoomba on Wednesday, 22 November, her husband asked her "if we could get updated figures from Aromas to see what if any Coffee Club might be having on our figures". Mrs Alroe says that she telephoned Emma Hossack on 6 December about this and was told that no figures would be available for approximately two weeks until after the Administrator had signed off on the figures. Mrs Alroe in her evidence said that at that time she was not aware that there were daily takings figures that could be obtained. The conversation was consistent with a request for the figures for November as opposed to daily figures. I do not accept the contention on behalf of the applicants that there was a deliberate decision to conceal from Mrs Alroe the trading figures for the Aromas Toowoomba shop, which would reveal the significant impact the Coffee Club had on those takings in the first days of the Coffee Club's operation.
66 On 11 December 1995, an interview with Mrs Alroe appeared in the Toowoomba Chronicle in which she said that "the competition had been enjoying a honeymoon but that she was in business for the long term". In the Chronicle Entertainment Weekly is a quotation from Mrs Alroe saying that Aromas opened about two and a half years ago and it was really great for the first six months, and "that's the Aromas you want to operate".
67 At the stocktake after settlement on 11 December, Mrs Alroe says that she expected that $5000.00 would be enough to acquire the stock and that the amount on the stocktake "was way over the top". She was asked in cross-examination:
"It was made clear to you by her [a reference to Marise McGrory] that you were only obliged to take $5000.00 worth, to which she replied 'Yes'."
She admitted that within the first week she knew that her figures were not anything like those that she had expected. She said that she was expecting $12-$13,000.00 for the week and she thinks she got $9,000.00. Mrs Alroe admitted further that she had been informed by staff that the Coffee Club had had an enormous impact and that in early January the takings may have fallen by as much as 31%. She also admitted that she knew by the end of the second week that there were major problems with Jo's competence as a manager.
68 Importantly, Mrs Alroe says that in early January 1996 she became aware that the October takings were less than the figures that she had been shown by Aromas, by something of the order of about $6,500.00. She was asked by Mr Andrews, counsel for the respondents:
"And I suggest to you that if the October figures had been of any significance to you, any special significance, you'd have complained in January '96 as soon as you saw the error?---My husband told me to say nothing.
You appreciated in January '96, didn't you, that the October figure for beans had been inflated by about $6600?---In January, yes."
69 Also, on 6 February 1996 Mrs Alroe says that she rang the Toowoomba City Council assistant engineer and was advised that the roadworks which were commencing that day were not likely to be finished until August 1996.
70 On 13 April 1996, Elliotts MGW Pty Ltd, Chartered Accountants, calculated the adjusted net loss for the business for the period 11 December 1995 to 13 April 1996 of $3,608.00, excluding depreciation and wages to Mr and Mrs Alroe at commercial rates. Mrs Alroe says that later, in April 1996, after Aromas had come out of administration she decided to confront Marise regarding some issues and complained to her of Aromas lack of support and the representations which had been made to her before the purchase. On 19 April 1996, Mr Bryant wrote to Mrs Alroe and the letter included the following:
"The question of approaching Council regarding compensation has been raised before and you rejected out offer of help at that time. However, as it is now mid April and the works are likely to continue until the end of June, we are of the view that the Council's representation to us that we would only be effected (sic) for two months should be addressed. Marise is firmly of the opinion that the works are substantially effecting (sic) your business and we would be happy to seek compensation for you at our cost."
Also the letter said:
"We do agree that the opening of the Coffee Club has had an effect on your business, which you anticipated in your letter of offer, however, we feel the roadworks are equally to blame.
You were aware of both of these situations before you entered the franchise, and the price was significantly reduced on this account. At that time you were extremely positive about succeeding. We are still extremely positive and are certain that by working together we can succeed…."
The letter also stated:
"Enclosed you will find a weekly Franchise Report for you to complete. By sharing this information weekly, we will be able to assist you with your business."
71 Mrs Alroe said that it was not easy to find time to complete a reply to this letter, but replied on 30 April 1996. That letter commences:
"Your recent letter simply adds insult to injury and clearly shows Aromas refusal to face the reality of the situation in which I find myself…"
72 In respect of the offer of management assistance, Mrs Alroe said:
"I was handed a management disaster but I do not, and I repeat DO NOT have a management problem."
73 Concerning the Coffee Club and the roadworks, the letter said:
"You told me Coffee Club would have at most a 5% reducing to 2% effect on sales and laughed at me when I suggested it could be greater. In good faith I took your worst case scenario, doubled it and factored this into my offer. Are you seriously suggesting that I should have taken your worst case scenario as an experienced operator and quadrupled it? How could I factor in the effect of the roadworks when I was told that they would take two, not six, months? Besides, my factor translated into $10,000.00 not $30,000.00 in terms of price reduction.
Later:
"Your requirement that I complete a weekly franchise report, creates more paperwork for me when I am already overloaded with work
And later still:
"In spite of all the difficulties I face, I have a feeling that the business has turned the corner…"
74 On 30 April Mrs Alroe declined to supply weekly franchise reports. Subsequently there were discussions between the parties culminating in a letter of 28 August 1996 where Aromas indicated that it was not happy with "the performance and management of [the] franchise…".
75 On 30 August 1996 Cleary & Lee wrote to the company solicitor of Aromas in the following terms:
"proceedings are to be instituted in the Federal Court against Aromas Pty Ltd, Aromas Franchising Pty Ltd, the companies' directors and the relevant officers."
The letter indicated:
"…our clients will be seeking rescission of both the franchise and business contract…"
The letter said:
"We understand that you are aware of the nature of the dispute in that our client alleges that your clients made various representations regarding the business, Aromas Toowoomba, which they knew were untrue or became aware were untrue in circumstances where there was an obligation to disclose that the representations were untrue. Those representations which our client alleges were made are as follows:-
(a) that the business was trading profitably;
(b) the impact of sales on the opening of the Coffee Club would be a reduction in gross sales of no more than 5% reducing to 2%;
(c) Council roadworks in Margaret Street would affect the business for no more than two months;
(d) that the business had minor management problems but was essentially a capably run business supported by a competent and experienced franchisor;
(e) financial information attached to the business contract was correct;
(f) the stock at settlement together with the items referred to in special condition 45(d) of the business contract would not exceed an amount of $5,000.
…"
76 On 3 September 1996 Cleary & Lee wrote to Ms Hossack, which letter commenced:
"As the directors of our company advised you in July, they had preliminary advices from Senior Counsel that our client could expect to succeed in an action for damages against your companies but Counsel's considered advice was not received until Wednesday of last week…
And later the letter said:
"Please explain why a demand is now made for monthly reports when these have not been required previously and we understand are not required from other franchisees…."
77 The default notice was issued on 6 September 1996, and on 27 March 1997 a second default notice dated 10 March 1997 was served. This service was effected on a Thursday. The covering letter is dated 10 March 1997. The default notice is dated 27 March 1997 and signed by Mr Bryant and witnessed by Ms Hossack. On 23 April 1997 the solicitors for the respondents wrote that:
"… our clients totally reject your clients' claims as being without foundation and consider the only solution is for your clients to take on new management or sell the franchise to a third party."
The letter concluded:
"To assist in that regard, but with a complete reservation of existing and future rights, our client franchisor does not intend to terminate the franchise immediately but will merely cross-claim now for a declaration of its rights to do so."
78 As to the present situation in Toowoomba, Mrs Alroe said in an affidavit in October 1988:
"With the establishment and revamping of a number of cafes since 1995 competition for market share is much fiercer than it was in 1994/1995. In December 1995, there were 4 or 5 eateries and cafes in the immediate vicinity of Aromas Toowoomba. Today there are 15. Further, the expansion of the Clifford Gardens Shopping Centre, the Wilsonton Shopping Centre and the Myer Grand Central Complex which alone brought to the town an additional 120 retail shopping outlets to the city has seen a drastic reduction in the numbers of people frequenting that area of the city in which Aromas Toowoomba is located."
79 As to the alleged representation concerning management of Aromas Toowoomba, the pleaded representation is not made out. I am satisfied that the allegation of Mrs Alroe that she was told at the first meeting with Bryant and Hossack that the business was operating under competent management was simply not made. I prefer the recollection of Hossack of this conversation to the effect that Mrs Alroe was told by Mr Bryant that Joanne Jensen, the manager of Toowoomba, was a company trained manager who had some personal problems and was not managing the shop as well as he would like, but that with appropriate guidance she could be a good assistant manager. I am fortified in this conclusion by my acceptance of the evidence of Ms McGrory of her conversation with Mrs Alroe on 22 November 1995. I prefer Ms McGrory's evidence as earlier indicated on this aspect of the matter, supported as it is by the terms of the telephone conversation between Mrs Alroe and Ms Hossack, a reference to the fact that Mrs Alroe was "very happy with….Marise's suggestion on Jo", and Mrs Alroe's letter of 23 November 1995.
80 On the question of competition from the Coffee Club, it is clear that the Coffee Club detrimentally affected the trading figures of the first applicant for some considerable time. In my view there was nothing representational or having the flavour of a warranty or guarantee as to the effect of the Coffee Club on Aromas Toowoomba. Mr Bryant particularly expressed his opinion as to the likely effect, particularly after a 'honeymoon period'. That opinion, in my view, reflected his experience of competition in respect of a number of disparate Aromas shops in Brisbane, and the Park Road experience where there was a significant continuing effect on Aromas Park Road, which occurred in the materially different circumstances of a large number of similar establishments opening almost contemporaneously. The correspondence from Mrs Alroe makes it plain beyond argument that she was aware of the likely impact of the Coffee Club and took a much less sanguine view of the effects on Aromas Toowoomba than that expressed by Mr Bryant and the other employees of Aromas. It is significant in this respect that Mrs Alroe seems to acknowledge in her handwritten note of 2 May 1996 that the Coffee Club was "a competitor that had devastated them in a way they had never seen before". In the light of that evidence, I am not satisfied that there was any reliance by Mr or Mrs Alroe in the decision to purchase the business or any statements made by any of the respondents as to the likely effect, either in the short term or long term, of the Coffee Club on Aromas Toowoomba.
81 The position is similar in relation to the issue of roadworks. I am satisfied that Ms McGrory told Mrs Alroe that she had been informed that the roadworks would commence in late February and would occupy 8-10 weeks. Ms McGrory believed this and on reasonable grounds. There is just no evidence to suggest that any of the respondents knew or believed that the roadworks would last for more than 8-10 weeks. That the roadworks had a significant impact on takings is accepted. Mrs Alroe in particular bought in anticipation of a downturn caused by roadworks, but there is no evidence to establish that any conduct of any of the respondents caused the losses resulting from roadworks after the period of 8-10 weeks, nor is there any evidence to sheet home any loss or damage suffered as a result of the second lot of roadworks on the other side of Margaret Street at a later time. It was specifically submitted by counsel for the applicants that the file note EJH 86 by Ms Hossack relating to a conversation between Ms Hossack and Mrs Alroe on 21 November 1995 was constructed at a later date and is a fabrication. The contents of the diary note and the sheer improbability that such a fabrication would serve any useful purpose, supports my view in rejecting that submission.
82 As to the complaints concerning the accuracy and reliability of the 1995-96 budget, it is plain that the actual performance of the Toowoomba store was in disconformity with the budget predictions. In my view, there was never any representation that the actual performance was, or would be, in conformity with the budgeted estimates. On the other hand, I have earlier expressed my conclusion that the provision of the October Profit and Loss Report and of the October results constituted misleading and deceptive conduct in that the document represented that the Toowoomba shop had a gross profit of some $9,726.66 for the month of October, where in fact that figure was affected by the overstatement of some $6,500.00 worth of bean sales. This incorrect information was not supplied dishonestly or fraudulently, but nonetheless the trading performance of Aromas Toowoomba was a factor in the decision that the first applicant purchase the coffee shop business.
83 The other alleged misrepresentations can be disposed of shortly. I am not satisfied that the business was not trading profitably at the time that Mrs Alroe was told that at the meeting of 14 October, nor am I satisfied that that statement was untrue at the time of the contract or settlement of it. In my view, a representation that a business is trading profitably is not the same thing as a representation that a business would return 19.8% on a $325,000.00 investment. There was, moreover, never at any stage in the light of the special conditions of contract, any representation that the historical performance would be reflected in the future sales and profitability or that performance of Aromas Toowoomba would mirror the historical sales and profitability; what was represented was that the trading figures that had been supplied to the purchasers were the historical trading figures from Toowoomba, and that representation was false. I am not satisfied that there was any misrepresentation in the representation to Mrs Alroe at her first meeting that she would have full franchise support. Nor am I satisfied that there was a representation by Ms Hossack on 20 November 1995 to the effect that there was no other information that she was aware of that the Alroes needed to consider in order to form a decision as to whether or not to purchase the business. I have earlier indicated that I am not satisfied that there was any deliberate withholding of trading figures for November, withheld for the purpose of concealing the deteriorating trading position as a result of the opening of the Coffee Club.
84 It has not been shown that the third to sixth respondents aided or were directly knowingly concerned in the contravention of s 52 by the first and second respondents. I accept that before the human respondents can be said to have aided or been directly, knowingly concerned in contraventions, it is necessary that the applicants prove that that human respondent had knowledge of the essential facts constituting the contravention. In the circumstances of this case, that requirement means that it must be established that the natural respondent had knowledge of the falsity of the representation concerning the October bean sales.
85 In Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661, Mason ACJ, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ said at 668:
"Whilst Lucas was aware of the representations - indeed they were made by him - he had no knowledge of their falsity and could not for that reason be said to have intentionally participated in the contravention."
And their Honours said at 670:
"There can be no question that a person cannot be knowingly concerned in a contravention unless he has knowledge of the essential facts constituting the contravention."
86 Brennan J at 674 referred to the holding by the Full Court in Yorke v Lucas that knowledge was essential to liability under s 75B of the Trade Practices Act. The Full Court said [(1983) 49 ALR 672 at 680]:
"It follows that Mr Lucas could not be held to have contravened s 52 as an aider or abettor unless the Court is satisfied that he knew of the essential facts or matters constituting the contravention including knowledge that the relevant representations as to the weekly turnover of the record business and its gross profit were incorrect. The incorrectness of those representations is essential to support a finding of misleading or deceptive conduct. Mr Lucas had no actual knowledge whatever of their incorrectness and it is not suggested that the circumstances of the case warrant an inference of constructive knowledge on his part of the character of the conduct complained of."
Later at 674 Brennan J said:
"The distinction which their Honours drew between the liability of the Lucas company and the liability of its managing director stemmed from the view that knowledge of the falsity of the representations made by Mr Lucas was not an element in the contravention of s 52 by the Lucas company but knowledge of the falsity of the representation was a condition of any liability imposed by s 75B in respect of that contravention."
At 677 Brennan J said:
"…s 75B(a) does not extend liability for a s 52 contravention to a person who procures the corporation to engage in contravening conduct if that person is honestly ignorant of the circumstances that give that conduct a contravening character."
87 The applicants have not established that the third to sixth respondents knew of the falsity of the representation concerning the October bean sales at the time prior to settlement. That error, in my view, was discovered from the Aromas' viewpoint in January 1996, although each of the third to sixth respondents swore that they were not aware of that error until much later. I am satisfied that in any event Mr and Mrs Alroe were aware of that error from early January 1996 and were aware of that error prior to knowledge of it by the third to sixth respondents.
88 In the light of these findings, it is necessary to consider what orders the court would make pursuant to ss 82 and 87 of the Trade Practices Act. In my opinion, this is clearly a case where the court would not make orders akin to rescission pursuant to s 87 of the Act. Mr Alroe, a solicitor, in his evidence said that he held the view from the first week of trading in December 1995 that the applicants were entitled to rescission, and this view did not change between December 1995 to June 1996. By early 1996 each of Mr and Mrs Alroe knew that the bean sales for October was inflated. At the second week's trading, they knew that there were major problems with the management and by the end of the first week's trading that the figures were way below their expectations. On 6 February 1996 they knew that the roadworks would take 6 months not 2. Mrs Alroe understood in November 1995 that Aromas was solvent and capable of selling the shop to pay for debts and the applicants did not ever suggest terminating the franchise. Mrs Alroe expressed the belief on 30 April 1996 that "the business had turned the corner", a statement consistent with an intention to retain the business. Mr Alroe says that he made a deliberate decision not to confront the respondents about the October figures. The applicants say they briefed counsel in April 1996 and saw senior counsel in June 1996 and received his advice in August or early September. The first indication that the applicants would be seeking rescission was in a letter dated 30 August 1996, and the first application for rescission was on 29 November 1996 with the filing of these proceedings. This is almost exactly a year after Mr Alroe believed the applicants had a right to rescission. It is clear that there was a significant change in the trading environment between settlement of the contract in December 1995 and the filing of these proceedings. There has since, as Mrs Alroe explains, been a dramatic change in the trading environment between December 1995 and October 1998. The franchisor has been continuing to perform its obligations pursuant to the franchise, and at the end of the first block of evidence on 14 August 1998, the applicants declined to accept Aromas' offer to forego franchise fees in return for an undertaking that the applicants would operate under a name other than Aromas. Not only have the fittings and fixtures depreciated for more than three years, but the deliberate choice to make no complaint about the error in the October bean sales is a telling reason why orders akin to rescission ought not be made.
89 In Henjo Investments Pty Ltd v Collins Marrickville Pty Ltd (1988) 79 ALR 83, Burchett J said at 106:
"…for the reasons Lockhart J has given, this is simply not a matter in which the remedy of rescission is appropriate on any footing. Too long had elapsed and too much had happened, attributable to the actions and neglect of the respondent purchaser, for it to be right to attempt a disentanglement so dilatorily asked, and fraught with so many possibilities of injustice to other parties.
Section 52 should not be seen as a statutory charter of indulgence enabling a purchaser with a cause of action to keep delaying the crucial decision to affirm or disaffirm, nor does it confer a vague right to redress where an applicant does not prove in the normal way what damages are due. There is as much reason to require a vigilant response in respect of misleading conduct as there is under the general law in respect of a fraudulent misrepresentation."
90 In Alati v Kruger (1995) 94 CLR 216, rescission was allowed by the High Court, but in that case there was only a short period between the respondents taking possession of the business on 16 June and the issue of the writ on 29 June; there was no difficulty in repaying the Ł20 worth of stock that had been used, nor had there been any disentitling conduct by the purchaser, such as a deliberate choice to do nothing.
91 On discovery of the misrepresentations in January 1996, there was no request made to Aromas to arrange to take back the business or end the franchise. The letter claiming that rescission would be sought in June 1996 and the application filed in November 1996 seeking rescission from the court are to be contrasted with the absence of any demand in January 1996 that the status quo be restored.
92 In Munchies Management v Belperio (1988) 84 ALR 700, a business contract had been entered into on 14 November 1986 and settled on 19 January 1987. Three months later on 24 April 1987 the applicants by their solicitors gave notice:
"that they rescind the contract…and that our clients merely treat themselves as caretakers of the business and that all losses which they are incurring or have incurred since settlement have been and will be to your account."
The respondents wrote:
"Our clients do not accept your clients' rescission of the contract…We have instructions to accept service."
On 11 June 1987 the solicitors for the applicants wrote:
"We are instructed that in an attempt to avoid further financial loss, our clients intend to place the business…on the market….This action is not to be treated as an affirmation of the contract of purchase…"
93 The Full Court in Munchies (Fisher, Gummow and Lee JJ) said at 709:
"Under the general law, Mr and Mrs Belperio had had a choice open to them on discovery of the fraud practised upon them. They might have sought to recover, as damages for fraud, the difference between the price paid and the fair value of the business at the time of the contract, in accordance with the authorities to which we have already referred, but this would have involved affirming the purchase. Alternatively, they might have sought to avoid the purchase for fraud, thus rescinding in the sense described above."
[emphasis added]
94 In Civil Service Co-operative Society of Victoria Ltd v Byth (1914) 17 CLR 601 where the plaintiffs were held disentitled to rescission for misrepresentation because of delay after knowledge of the whole of the material facts, Isaacs J said at 614-615:
"…in so simple a case as a discovered misrepresentation, or, as the respondent Miss Tighe says, a 'cheat', it is almost an irresistible inference that a person sui juris, sound in mind and body, and of ordinary intelligence, would understand enough to ask to be released altogether if he so desired. If, however, he…were willing to take the chance…on the advent of more prosperous times bringing at the same time profits and interest, then it amounts to an election to stand by the contract…"
95 So far the cross-claim is concerned, cl 13 of the franchise agreement obliged the first applicant to furnish to Aromas Franchising monthly reports, an accountant's report by 30 September each year in the form of a financial statement for the preceding financial year, including external accountant's report, balance sheet and profit and loss statement prepared by an independent, qualified external accountant approved in writing by Aromas Franchising, and other reports, sales slips, order forms, records and calculations as Aromas Franchising may from time to time in writing reasonably require. On 6 September 1996, Aromas Franchising requested Anema to provide monthly reports by requiring compliance with cl 13B of the franchise agreements, ie, to provide monthly reports. By letter of 6 February 1997, Aromas Franchising requested Anema to furnish monthly reports, external accountant's reports and an annual budget. It is not in dispute that Anema failed and refused to furnish monthly reports. The franchise agreement defined an event of default to be the failure by Anema to conform to comply with any term of the agreement and the failure to remedy any breach within ten business days after notification by Aromas Franchising. By notice in writing of 27 March 1997 Aromas Franchising required Anema to remedy the breaches. These breaches were not remedied and Aromas Franchising seeks a declaration that it is entitled to terminate the franchise agreement.
96 To this claim the applicants say that the notice purportedly issued under the franchise agreement was issued solely for the collateral purpose to force the Alroes out of the business. They further say that the notices were defective in substance because they failed to identify the breaches and did not express an intention by the franchisor to terminate the franchise agreement if the breaches were not remedied.
97 In my opinion, it is not necessary to the validity of a notice of default that a franchisor state an intention to terminate the agreement. In Laurinda Pty Limited v Capalaba Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd (1989) 166 CLR 323, Mason CJ said at 638:
"For my part I agree with the suggestion made by Gibbs J that it is not necessary that the notice should state that the party will treat the contract as at an end in the event of non-compliance with the requirement stated in the notice and that it is sufficient if the notice indicates that the party giving it may choose to rely on his rights in that event. However, the notice must convey a definite and specific intent to require strict compliance with the terms of the contract within a reasonable time, so that the recipient will be made aware that the party giving the notice may elect to treat the contract as at an end at the conclusion of such reasonable time unless compliance is forthcoming."
98 I do not accept that the notices were sent solely for the collateral purpose of forcing the Alroes out of business or, indeed, that that was a purpose at all. In a sense, Mrs Alroe wanted to have her cake and eat it too. She wanted to conduct her business as an Aromas coffee shop but was very reluctant to comply with the requirements of the franchise agreement. In my opinion, the second respondent was entitled to insist on compliance with the franchise agreement, the first applicant was in breach of it and is entitled to the declaration sought on the cross-claim.
99 I turn now to consider the question of what loss and damage the applicants have suffered by reason of the contravention by the first respondent of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act. In Baillieu Knight Frank (Gold Coast) Pty Ltd v Susan Pender Jewellery Pty Ltd [1997] ATPR 41-542, Sackville, Kiefel & Finn JJ held at 43,525:
"Where a person, having been induced to enter a transaction by a misrepresentation, subsequently learns that the representation was false when made, a court might well be justified in holding that losses post-dating the person's knowledge cannot be attributed to the representation. For example, if a lessee who has entered a lease in reliance on a misrepresentation subsequently learns that the representation was false, but nonetheless consciously chooses to continue in possession, a court might conclude that any further losses were caused by the decision to retain possession rather than by the original representation."
100 The normal measure for damages in an action for deceit where the plaintiff has been induced by fraudulent misrepresentation to enter into a contract to purchase is the difference between the price paid and a fair value at the time of purchase: Ted Brown Quarries Pty Ltd v General Quarries (Gilston) Pty Ltd (1977) 16 ALR 23; Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1986) CLR 1 at 12. In Gould v Vaggelas (1985) 157 CLR 215, Gibbs CJ said at 221:
"This rule, is, with all respect, not quite as inflexible as Potts v Miller might suggest. There may be cases in which the purchaser continues to trade, either because he has no real alternative or because he has not become aware of the nature of the fraud, and in those circumstances incurs losses which are not represented by the difference between the price and value of the business…If the purchaser, besides paying more for the business than it was worth, has suffered additional losses which resulted directly from the fraud he ought to be compensated for them. Of course, the court must be satisfied that the loss did result directly from the fraud and not from some supervening cause such as the folly, error or misfortune of the purchaser himself, and must ensure that no additional compensation is given for losses when those losses, or the probability of their occurrence, has already been taken into account in determining the value of the business."
101 In Netaf Pty Ltd v Bikane Pty Ltd (1990) 26 FCR 305, Sheppard and Pincus JJ said at 308:
"These cases [Munchies Management Pty Ltd v Belperio and Henjo Investments Pty Ltd v Collins Marrickville Pty Ltd] illustrate the proposition that allowance of trading losses is by no means automatic, particularly in businesses of a kind where trade is particularly prone to fluctuation, as in restaurants (see Henjo Investments Pty Ltd v Collins Marrickville Pty Ltd (1988) 79 ALR 83 at 100). In our opinion, it may be very difficult to determine to what extent trading losses were a product of the 'inherent vice' of the business and to what extent they were avoidable by the purchaser…We reiterate that, where a purchase has been induced by misleading conduct, it is not enough, in order to recover losses subsequent to the purchase, to prove that but for the misleading conduct or as a partial consequence of it, the agreement to purchase would not have been made; that is so in every successful application of that kind. It is not the law that in every such case the party held to have been engaged in misleading conduct (who may have acted quite innocently) becomes the insurer of the other's success and prima facie liable to indemnify him against the consequences of the purchase."
Their Honours said at 309:
"It is a matter of common experience that, on a change of management, many businesses engaged in competitive activities do substantially worse and that some do substantially better; such reversals of fortune may be due to superior or inferior management, or to causes beyond management's control, such as the activities of competitors or suppliers. As we understand from the reasons of our brother, Wilcox J, his Honour is of the view that there is a prima facie right in a buyer such as the cross-appellant to recover trading losses and a loss on re-sale, subject to the possibility of that right being defeated if it is proved that reasonable steps were not taken to mitigate losses. We do not decide this appeal on that basis, but think that an applicant must prove each element of his loss….We respectfully express the view that the primary entitlement, on the authorities, is to the difference between the price and the value at the time of the purchase; the question whether further losses should be allowed is to be determined having regard to the circumstances of each individual case."
102 Whether the applicants should be awarded loss and damage in addition to the primary entitlement (being the difference in value between the price and the value at the time of purchase), it is useful to have regard to the observations by Macrossan CJ in Potts v Westpac Banking Corporation [1993] 1 Qd R 135, where the Chief Justice observed at 142-143:
"It cannot, in reason, be the position that once introduced to the risky world of foreign currency dealing, the plaintiffs were entitled, wholly at the defendant's expense, to stay involved in it indefinitely, in effect guaranteed against loss by the possibility of recourse to the defendant, while, on the other hand, being entitled to keep for themselves any profits which they might be fortunate enough to make."
And at 141:
"In the present case, no circumstances locked the plaintiffs into a continuation of foreign currency borrowing. The conclusion should be drawn that the effect of their free choice to stay in that market was, in a fair and practical sense, to break the chain of causation arising from their reliance on the misstatement made two years before. No doubt, the plaintiffs would have been prompted by a disinclination to accept the losses which had already been experienced, but still it appears that they freely chose to attempt to restore their damaged fortunes by staying in an unpredictable market, the risks of which had by that stage already been sharply brought home to them. Their decision to continue as they were and renew their loan was no more attributable to the initial bad advice than could be said of a decision which they might have made at that point to attempt to restore their position by buying or trading in shares or by gambling on horse races."
Dowsett J agreed with the judgment of Macrossan CJ.
103 In the present case the decision by Mr and Mrs Alroe to do nothing for many months after discovering the misrepresentation concerning the October bean sales to bring an end to the business contract and franchise agreement, is strong reason to say that in this case the applicants are entitled to the 'primary entitlement', namely, the difference between the price and the value at the time of purchase, and not entitled to any losses, if indeed there be any, on a full analysis, subsequent to January 1996.
104 The claim for damages for loss of a chance to invest elsewhere was described by counsel for the applicants on 14 October 1998:
"It is a claim for general damage. It is not a claim for special damages in the nature of Hungerford v Walker (1989) 171 CLR 125. Our case is not - and we have repeatedly told them this - not a case of the money being used in a specific way, it is just a claim that the money in general terms could have been used differently. For example, it could have been put in the bank. It is a claim for general damages."
105 In Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1992) 179 CLR 332, Brennan observed at 365:
"To prove the substantiality of a prospect of acquiring a benefit or of avoiding a detriment and what would have been the plaintiff's actions if the opportunity had been offered, it will usually be necessary to tender evidence to establish the plaintiff's objectives and the contingencies in the way of their achievement. Evidence of that kind will bear upon both the existence and the value of the lost opportunity."
Brennan J said at 368:
"A plaintiff seeking to prove the amount of a loss does not obtain the right to argue for a possibility by refraining from adducing evidence of the fact."
106 There is no evidence of what opportunity is said to be lost. It seems to me that if the applicants did suffer loss or damage by virtue of the conduct of the first applicant, they will be compensated by an award of interest for being deprived of that money from the time of settlement.
107 Concerning the claim for damages "for the substantial distress and vexation intentionally caused to them by the deliberate policy undertaken to force them out of the franchise and business", such distress has not been attempted to be quantified by the evidence but, in any event, such distress is not caused by conduct alleged to be in breach of the Act. In my opinion, no damages could be awarded under s 82 for any such distress or vexation because that would not be loss or damage by conduct of another person that was done in contravention of a provision of Part V of the Act. In my view, any distress or vexation of either human applicant was associated with the requirement by the second respondent that the first applicant comply with the obligations under the franchise agreement. I will not award any damages on this claim.
108 Concerning the claim that Mr and Mrs Alroe lost the opportunity to earn income from alternative employment, Mr Alroe on the evidence has lost nothing and I do not think that any insufficiency in respect of wages to Mrs Alroe were caused by any relevant misrepresentation. She chose to continue for nearly six months with the employment of Jo Jensen as manager while she herself performed long hours in managerial work and in my opinion no relevant misrepresentation was causative of any loss of this kind.
109 I turn finally to consider the difference between the price and value at the time of purchase. Mr Paul Vincent, a chartered accountant, partner of Vincents Chartered Accountants -Litigation Support reported that the loss suffered by the applicants consisted of a capital loss of between $155,000.00 and $177,000.00 and trading losses to date of $75,448.00. The $155,000.00 capital loss is obtained by deducting $140,000.00, being the apportionment in the purchase contract and verifying affidavit pursuant to s 54A(2) (Stamp Act 1894-1986 (Qld)) relating to the acquisition of a business, to tangible assets. Mr Vincent refers to a valuation at the request of Aromas on 5 April 1995, which valued tangible assets at $126,765.00. There is some evidence that the assets as at 9 July 1998 were $118,000.00. In the circumstances, I think it appropriate to proceed on the basis that the value of the tangible assets as at the date of purchase was $140,000.00.
110 Mr Vincent expressed the view that the business, on making appropriate adjustments, at the time of purchase was operating at "earnings before interest and tax" of $5,000.00 per annum, and it was therefore not appropriate to value the business at the purchase date on an earnings basis by capitalising the level of maintainable earnings by an appropriate capitalisation rate. The calculation of future maintainable earnings at $5,000.00 takes the figures for July to October from the documents in the purchase contract, but adds depreciation of $1220.00 per month and deducts a depreciation allowance of $2333.00 per month, and a further deduction for manager's remuneration of $3,750.00 per month. This involves double counting in respect of manager's remuneration, since Jo Jensen was being remunerated as a manager and this allowance is a very generous remuneration item for Mrs Alroe in addition to the salary for the manager, Jo Jensen. I am not satisfied that the business was trading at such a figure that the capitalisation method of valuation is not the appropriate method to apply.
111 I have earlier expressed my reasons for not allowing a sum for trading losses. From early January 1996 when the Alroes were aware of the error in the October bean sales, it seems to me that it is not fair to visit any trading losses that might be incurred subsequent to that date as loss or damage flowing from any s 52 conduct by Aromas. Any trading losses at least subsequent to that time flowed, amongst other things, from the decision by the Alroes to say nothing of their discovery to Aromas; any trading losses subsequent to that date owe a considerable amount as a matter of causation to the impact of the Coffee Club and the influence of the roadworks for which, in my opinion, the none of the respondents is liable.
112 Valuation evidence for the respondents was given by Mr Gil Wright. Mr Cooper for the applicants objected to the evidence of Mr Wright being received on two bases: the first that he was not a qualified expert, not being a valuer or accountant, and secondly, that his evidence was inadmissible hearsay. Mr Wright has been a practising business broker since 1975, obtaining a real estate agent's licence in 1979. He was elected as first Chairman of the Formation Committee of the Australian Business Brokers and Valuers Association, a Foundation Member and Chairman of the Brisbane Brokers Chapter of the Real Estate Institute of Queensland, and has conducted courses and given lectures on business market evaluation and appraisal to TAFE colleges as well as to professional bodies such as the Australian Society of CPA's and the Association of Taxation and Management Accountants. He was invited to deliver the business and hotel valuation lectures in the Specialist Valuation Unit of the Bachelor of Applied Science in Property Economics degree at the University of Technology in September 1998, and he has been engaged by government and semi-government departments, various shire councils, as well as a number of accountants and trade associations to give valuations of businesses. He is the director of what he says is the longest established specialist business brokerage and business valuation office in Queensland. I am quite satisfied that he is qualified as an expert in business valuation.
113 As to the submission that his evidence is inadmissible hearsay, Mr Wright and his firm have built a database from his own sales and the sales of other business brokers. With respect to his own sales, he requires information from the vendors of the historical earnings of the business before interest and tax and other relevant data, as well as the sale price of his own sales and of the sale price of sales conducted by other brokers. He has taken files from other brokers which they have maintained with respect to sales of property listed with them so that the information on files can be added to the data base.
114 Notwithstanding that the information on which Mr Wright relies for his valuation is not direct or firsthand, that information is not in my opinion inadmissible hearsay - s 69(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 is of importance in this regard.
115 In Pownall v Conlan Management 16 ACSR 227, Ipp J held that specific hearsay, by which is meant hearsay evidence of particular comparable transactions that are used to infer the value of a property that is directly in issue, which is not otherwise proved by direct evidence, cannot be used by the valuer. Megarry J in English Exporters (London) Ltd v Eldonwall Ltd [1973] 1 Ch 415 at 420 said:
"As an expert witness, the valuer is entitled to express his opinion about matters within his field of competence. In building up his opinions about values, he will no doubt have learned from transactions in which he has himself been engaged, and of which he could give first-hand evidence. But he will also have learned much from many other sources, including much of which he could give no first-hand evidence. Textbooks, journals, reports of auctions and other dealings, and information obtained from his professional brethren and others, some related to particular transactions and some more general and indefinite will all have contributed their share."
116 Much of the material on which Mr Wright relied was information of which he had direct knowledge, and the balance was supplied to him by persons who might reasonably be supposed to have had personal knowledge of the information. Pownall's Case antedates the Evidence Act 1995. In my opinion, the evidence given by Mr Wright is not inadmissible.
117 Mr Wright valued the franchise business as at 1 December 1995 and as at 11 December 1995 at $305,700.00, the submission then being made that the applicants had suffered no loss or damage as a result of the representation found. The value at which Mr Wright arrived is obtained from an estimated maintainable net profit of $80,998.00 which he capitalised at 25%, to give a rounded up market value of $324,000.00, from which he deducted stock, plant, fixtures, fittings and equipment and working capital to give a goodwill value of $165,700.00. The sum of $165,700.00 plus the value for plant, fixtures, fittings and equipment give the figure of $305,700.00.
118 Mr Wright had in April 1995 valued Aromas Toowoomba as an unbadged shop by applying a capitalisation rate of 2 of 50%. In the exercise for the December valuations he applied a capitalisation rate of 25%. Those valuations were as a badged shop. Mr Wright notes the observation by Professors F J Finn and D J H Watson in The Valuation of Business Entities University of Queensland, October 1984:
"The appropriate capitalisation rate or price to earnings ratio is typically based on industry norms in the market place and may be further adjusted to subjective assessments on the part of the person performing the valuation."
119 A capitalisation rate of 25% as an unbadged shop and 50% as a badged shop illustrates just how subjective and arbitrary the choice of a capitalisation rate can be and how crucially can such a rate affect the final valuation.
120 Moreover, the assessment of future maintainable profits can involve real problems. In The Valuation of Business Shares and Other Equity, 3rd ed, by Wayne Lonergan (1998), the learned author says at 33:
"The selection of an appropriate maintainable profits figures is a matter of judgment depending on the circumstances. For example, a company may be in a position of a short-term decline as a result of industry pressures or internal management problems. In such a situation, it is important to adopt a longer term view so as to discount any short-term irregularities in the company's profitability".
Too many FMP-based valuations are flawed in that they automatically employ historical profits as a proxy for FMP without undertaking sufficient critical examination of past performance and likely future events. An understanding of the future of a business is essential for an accurate valuation, yet is omitted when historical profits are used in isolation".
121 No account was made by Mr Wright in his estimation of gross monthly sales of $55,000.00 for the effect of competition from the Coffee Club either in the short or longer term or in respect of the roadworks.
122 In assessing the value of the business at settlement, I am prepared to follow the general methodology adopted by Mr Wright, but in several significant respects the components in that methodology which Mr Wright adopted are erroneous. First in relation to estimated maintainable gross sales, Mr Wright adopted a figure of $55,000.00 per calendar month for the December 1995 valuation and nearly $47,000.00 for a valuation as at 29 November 1996. The dramatic downturn in sales in December 1995 gave at least some indication of the impact of competition. It was known that there would be a negative impact as a result of roadworks. I cannot accept that $55,000.00 per month is a fair estimate of maintainable gross sales of Aromas coffee shop after settlement. When I have regard particularly to the monthly sales figures which appear in the chart and trend line for the 42 month period ending 31 May 1998, it seems to me that taking proper account of known future risks the estimatable maintainable gross sales could not be more than $50,000.00 per month, which very closely corresponds with the trend line in Mr Wright's chart dated 6.8.98.
123 As to the estimated maintainable gross profit, the industry range for coffee shops is from 54% to 67% with an average of 62%. Mr Wright adopted the historical gross profit levels achieved by the subject business which was higher than the industry average. He adopted a figure of 68.5% for his December valuations, a choice which enhances the valuation from the respondents' viewpoint. As to the estimated maintainable net profit, which involves a determination of the estimated maintainable direct business expenditure, in some items Mr Wright has adopted a constant annual figure for each of the periods at which a valuation was done by him. Thus, depreciation expense of $8,000.00 per annum is applied in each of his valuations, an accountant's fee of $2,000.00 per annum is adopted in each of his accounts. For cleaning and refuse disposal a fixed annual fee of $4,800.00 is adopted. However, for franchise and group advertising fees a percentage of 8% of estimated maintainable gross sales has been adopted. Actual rents after rent reviews has been applied in each case. A fixed $5,000.00 per annum has been applied for repairs and maintenance, yet wages and salaries, where the industry averages range from a low of 27% with a high of 35% with an average of 32% of gross sales, Mr Wright has adopted 28% of estimated maintainable gross sales. Notwithstanding the inconsistency of approach for the various items and the difficulty of precisely calculating what the figure would be on the method adopted by Mr Wright, it seems to me that the estimated maintainable direct business expenditure (based on estimated maintainable gross sales per annum of $50,000.00 per month, and an estimated maintainable gross profit margin of 67%) would be of the order of $340,000.00.
124 Adopting $50,000.00 as a fair estimated maintainable gross sales per month, and applying a gross profit margin of 67%, being the high of the industry average rather than 68.5% which Mr Wright applied, and adopting $340,000.00 as a genuine and fair assessment of the estimated maintainable direct business expenditure, the estimated maintainable net profit before tax, leasing and financing costs, after owner/operator/manager's salary, is $62,000.00, made up of 67% of $600,000.00, being $402,000.00, less $340,000.00. Applying Mr Wright's generous capitalisation rate of 4, or 25%, leads to a total open market value of $348,000.00, from which one has to deduct stock, plant, fixtures, fittings and equipment and working capital to arrive at a goodwill value of $89,700.00. If one adds to this the value of the tangible assets of $140,000.00, one derives a December valuation of the business at $229,700.00, which means that the difference between the price and the value of the business which the first applicant acquired is $66,300.00.
125 I will allow interest at 8% simple to reflect a fair compensation to the applicants for being deprived of the sum of $66,300.00 from December 1995 to date, which I round down to $16,500, making a total sum of $82,800.
126 I think it appropriate in the circumstances to give judgment for the first applicant against both the first and second respondents. I give judgment in the sum of $82,800.00 in favour of the first applicant against the first and second respondents. I dismiss the claims by the applicants against the third to sixth respondents inclusive. I declare that the second respondent is entitled to terminate the franchise agreement.
127 In the light of these reasons for judgment I will hear the parties on costs.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and twenty-seven (127) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice J E J Spender.