Relevant legislation
7Section 33C of Part 7 of the Commission Act contains a statutory prohibition on 'prohibited persons' applying for, undertaking or remaining in 'child-related employment'. Section 33E prohibits an employer from employing a 'prohibited person' in 'child-related employment'. Section 33D requires an employer to ascertain whether an employee is a 'prohibited person' if employing that person in 'child-related employment.'
8The term 'prohibited person' is defined in section 33B of the Commission Act. So far as it is relevant, subsection 33B(1)(a) provides that a 'prohibited person' means a person 'convicted of a serious sex offence' (i.e. an index offence). The word 'convicted' is defined in section 33(1) to include 'a finding that the charge for an offence is proven, or that a person is guilty of an offence, even though the court does not proceed to a conviction.'
9The term 'serious sex offence' is defined in subsection 33B(3) of the Commission Act. It relevantly means 'an offence involving sexual activity or acts of indecency that were committed in New South Wales and that were punishable by penal servitude or imprisonment for 12 months or more.' In this application, there is no dispute that the index offence of which ANE was convicted falls within this definition and therefore a 'serious sex offence'.
10The term 'child-related employment', is broadly defined in section 33(1) of the Act. It relevantly provides as follows:
child-related employment:
(a) means any employment of the following kind that primarily involves direct contact with children where that contact is not directly supervised by a person having the capacity to direct the person in the course of the employment:
(i) ...,
(ii) ...,
(iii) ...,
(iv) employment in detention centres (within the meaning of the Children (Detention Centres) Act 1987) and juvenile correctional centres (within the meaning of the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999),
(v) employment in refuges used by children,
(vi) ...,
(vii) employment in clubs, associations, movements, societies, institutions or other bodies (including bodies of a cultural, recreational or sporting nature) having a significant child membership or involvement,
(viii) employment in any religious organisation,
(ix) ...,
(x) ...,
11The word 'employment' is also broadly defined in subsection 33(1) to include 'performance of work as a volunteer for an organisation.' The word 'children' is defined in section 3 of the Commission Act to mean a person under the age of 18 years. Consequently, the word 'child' in Part 7 has been given the same meaning.
12The statutory prohibition in section 33C does not apply where the 'prohibited person' obtains an order under section 33H or 33I of the Commission Act declaring that Part 7 does not apply to the index offence of which the person has been convicted (including a finding of guilt) (see subsection 33B(2)). The Tribunal has jurisdiction to make such an order under section 33I of the Commission Act (see subsection 33I(1)). It also has the power to make an order subject to conditions (see 33I(6)).
13Section 33I of the Commission Act relevantly provides as follows:
33I IRC and ADT may make declarations concerning prohibited persons
On the application of a prohibited person, a relevant Tribunal may make an order declaring that this Division is not to apply to the person in respect of a specified offence.
A relevant tribunal is:
(a) the Industrial Relations Commission, or
(b) the Administrative Decisions Tribunal.
The Commission for Children and Young People is to be a party to any proceedings for an order under this section. The Commission may make submissions in opposition to or support of the making of the order.
An applicant must fully disclose to the relevant tribunal any matters relevant to the application.
If the relevant tribunal refuses to make an order under this section, the prohibited person is not entitled to make an application for an order under this section or section 33H in respect of that until after the period of five years from the date of the tribunal's refusal, unless the tribunal otherwise orders at the time of the refusal.
Orders under this section may be made subject to conditions.
The following applies to proceedings before the Administrative Decisions Tribunal under this section:
(a) the Tribunal may not award costs, and
(b) an appeal lies on a question of law to the Supreme Court of any party to the proceedings.
14Subsection 33G prescribes a number of offences for which a 'prohibited person' is not entitled to make an application for an order under section 33H or 33I. The index offence of which ANE was convicted is not an offence of this kind.
15Section 33J of the Commission Act sets out the matters that are to be considered by the Tribunal in determining an application by a 'prohibited person' under section 33I. That section provides as follows:
33J Matters to be considered in determining review applications
(1) The Commission or a relevant tribunal is not to make an order on a review application unless it is satisfied that the person the subject of the application does not pose a risk to the safety of children.
(2) In any proceedings for a review application, it is to be presumed, unless the applicant proves to the contrary, that the applicant poses a risk to the safety of children.
(3) In deciding whether or not to make an order in relation to a person, the Commission or a relevant tribunal is to take into account the following:
(a) the seriousness of the offences with respect to which the person is a prohibited person,
(b) the period of time since those offences were committed,
(c) the age of the person at the time those offences were committed,
(d) the age of each victim of the offences at the time they were committed,
(e) the difference in age between the prohibited person and each such victim,
(f) whether the person knew, or could reasonably have known, that the victim was a child,
(g) the prohibited person's present age,
(h) the seriousness of the prohibited person's total criminal record,
(i) such other matters as the Commission or tribunal considers relevant.
16Section 32 of the Commission Act provides that 'the safety and welfare of children and, in particular, protecting them from child abuse, is the paramount consideration in the operation of' Part 7.
17The Court of Appeal has recently confirmed that the exercise of the Tribunal's jurisdiction under section 33I of the Commission Act is protective and not punitive in nature: see Commission for Children and Young People v FZ [2011] NSWCA 111 per Young JA at [61]. That is, the purpose of this Act is not to impose additional punishment on a prohibited person, but to eliminate possible risks to children. The repealed Child Protection (Prohibited Employment) Act 1998 (Repealed Act) had a similar purpose: see R v Commission for Children and Young People [2002] NSWIRComm 101 at [130].
18The meaning of the word 'risk' was considered by Young CJ (in Equity) in Commission for Children and Young People v V [2002] NSWSC 949; 56 NSWLR 476, at [42]. His Honour's consideration was made in the context of subsection 9(4) o the Repealed Act. That subsection was in similar terms to subsection 33J(1) of the Commission Act, in that the Tribunal's discretion to make an order only arose where the Tribunal 'considered' the applicant did not pose a risk to children. However, the Repealed Act did not contain a statutory presumption of a risk of harm, an express onus on the applicant to prove that he/she did not pose a risk of harm as found in subsection 33J(2) of the Commission Act. Nor did the Repealed Act contain a provision in the terms of section 32 of the Commission Act. Nevertheless, His Honour's remarks in regard to the meaning of risk have continued to be cited, with approval, since the commencement of the provisions in Division 2 of Part 7of the Commission Act: see ADV v Commission for Children and Young People [2012] NSWADT 8, RD v Commissioner NSW Commission for Children and Young People [2011] NSWADT 140 at [10], RV v Commission for Children and Young People [2007] NSWADT 299 at [13] to [15], L v Commission for Children and Young People & anor [2008] NSWIRComm 195 at [31], FZ (supra) at [60],
19In V (supra), after citing with approval remarks made by Peterson J in L v Commission for Children and Young People [2001] NSWIR Comm 134 and Haylen J in R v Commission for Children and Young People [2002] NSWIRComm 101, Young JA said the following at [42]:
'42 ...[what] one is looking for is whether, in all the circumstances, there is a real and appreciable risk in the sense of a risk that is greater than the risk of any adult preying on a child. One, however, must link the word "risk" with the words that follow, namely, "to the safety of children". ...'
20At [43], His Honour rejected the contention of the respondent that 'children' in subsection 9(4) of the Repealed Act meant children generally. That is, His Honour rejected the proposition that the subsection should be read to mean that where an applicant is found to pose a risk to a section of children (i.e. female teenage children), there is a risk to children generally. His Honour said the subsection should be read to mean:
'43 ...a risk to the safety of children bearing in mind all the circumstances in which the prohibited person is likely to be employed. If a person is going to be employed amongst boy children, then the fact that he might be a risk to girl children may be quite irrelevant.
44 As against this, there is the fact that under the section a prohibited person is either declared to be a person to whom the Act does not apply, or else no declaration is made. The answer ... to this is that the power under s9(9) can be brought into play. That is, for instance, a declaration can be made subject, for instance to the condition that the declaration will cease to have effect if the person changes his or her current employment or if he or she commences to work with different types of children.'
21The essence of the remarks of His Honour Young JA, is that when considering risk, the ability to impose conditions should not be disregarded. That is, subsection 9(9) of the Repealed Act has been held to mean 'the imposition of relevant conditions [that] may make an applicant who would otherwise pose some risk to children into an applicant who does not pose a real unacceptable risk to children': see RV (supra) at [16].
22Subsection 33I(6) of the Commission Act has been construed to have the same effect. However, as I have already mentioned, this provision must be read together with the provision that presumes the applicant to be a risk to children by reason of the index offence and the applicant's onus to establish that he/she does not pose a risk to children. Accordingly, if the applicant seeks an order subject to conditions, the onus remains on the applicant to establish that with the imposition of conditions he does not pose a risk to children.
23I note that orders subject to conditions under section 33I of the Commission Act are seldom sought, or made: for example see ADV (supra) and RV (supra).