Anderson v Patersons Securities Ltd

Plaintiff's submissions

The plaintiff contends that the documents sought by the respective subpoenas are clearly relevant to an issue in the proceedings, namely, as to the capacity in which payments were received by each of Ms Garrett and Mr Renauf from Ashington Group Pty Limited (Ashington) (which includes, as wholly owned subsidiaries of Ashington, Ashington Capital Pty Limited (In Liquidation) (ACPL) and Ashington Management Pty Limited (In Liquidation) (AMPL)).
By letter dated 23 May 2019, the plaintiff's solicitors pointed to the allegations contained in the pleadings as to the employment by AMPL of Ms Garrett and Mr Renauf (as the Head of Funds Management and Head of Acquisitions and Planning, respectively) (see [18]-[19] of the amended statement of claim) and to the denial by Ms Garrett and Mr Renauf of those allegations (see [18]-[19] of the respective defences). It was said in the letter that there was also a live issue on Ms Garrett's evidence as to: when Ms Garrett commenced working with Ashington; when she left her previous employment (with an entity referred to as Valad, which I understand to be a reference to an entity named Valad Holdings or Valad Group Holdings); and when the "gardening leave" obligation Ms Garrett owed to Valad started and ended. It was there said that the documents sought by the subpoenas are relevant to the issue of the respective employment status of Ms Garrett and Mr Renauf with AMPL (as I understand it, the relevant issue being as to whether they worked as an employee or as a consultant).
In an affidavit affirmed 5 June 2019 by the plaintiff's solicitor (Ms Ng) (at [9]) the relevance of the documents sought is again put as being to the employment status of Ms Garrett and Mr Renauf and the date on which they commenced their employment with Ashington.
As to Ms Garrett, the plaintiff identifies the key allegations made against her in the proceedings as that she was an employee of Ashington during relevant periods during the 2009-2010 financial year, that as a result she owed fiduciary obligations to AMPL and ACPL and that she acted in breach of those obligations. It is noted that Ms Garrett has denied those allegations and, in particular, that she denies that she was an employee of Ashington during the relevant period.
The plaintiff says that, although Ms Garrett's tax return for the 2009-2010 financial year does not disclose any income earned with respect to the work she undertook for Ashington during that year, Ms Garrett's own evidence is that she did perform work for Ashington during that year and that she did receive payments from Ashington that were labelled "salary". The plaintiff perceives Ms Garrett's case to be that the work she performed for Ashington was in the capacity of an independent contractor, rather than as an employee.
The documents sought by the subpoena to TWF Partners are said to be documents that relevantly go to the question as to what payments Ms Garrett received from Ashington and in what capacity those payments were received, which the plaintiff says in turn goes to the issue as to whether or not Ms Garrett was employed by Ashington (as alleged by the plaintiff and denied by Ms Garrett). It is submitted that it could reasonably be expected that the working papers and supporting documents for Ms Garrett's tax return would provide evidence of: what payments Ms Garrett received during the financial year (including from Ashington); the capacity in which she received those payments; whether those payments constituted income and, if so, what type of income they may be. It is submitted that these are all factors that form part of the totality of the relationship that must be considered in deciding the question of employment.
As to Mr Renauf, again it is noted that the allegations made against him (and denied by Mr Renauf) are that he was an employee of Ashington during the 2009-2010 financial year and that, as such, he owed fiduciary obligations to Ashington. The plaintiff points to Mr Renauf's evidence that he considered himself to be "like an independent contractor" rather than an employee of Ashington, and that from April 2009 onwards he received from Ashington a monthly payment of $29,167 equivalent to the salary that was promised to him. It is noted that Mr Renauf's tax return shows salary or wages income in 2009-2010 of $22,080 and declares net personal services income of $141,940 (without indicating the source of that personal services income).
The plaintiff submits that it can reasonably be expected that the working papers and supporting documents sought by the subpoena to Eagle Financial Pty Ltd will evidence the source of the various items of income which Mr Renauf received and the capacity in which he received them, which in turn goes to the question of whether he received income from Ashington as salary (and, thus, as an employee) or on some other basis.
The plaintiff points to the breadth of the factors relevant to the multifactorial test as to whether there is a relationship of employment (referring to the decision of the High Court in Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16; [1986] HCA 1; and to the decision of Mummery J in Hall (Inspector of Taxes) v Lorimer [1992] 1 WLR 939 at 944, cited by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Lopez v Deputy Commissioner for Taxation (2005) 143 FCR 574; [2005] FCAFC 157 at [82]).
Thus, the plaintiff submits that there is a legitimate forensic purpose to support each of those subpoenas and that access should be granted to the documents produced in answer to those subpoenas.

Determination

As noted above, Ms Garrett and Mr Renauf accept that there is an issue in the proceedings as to whether they were employees of Ashington (specifically of AMPL) at the relevant time (it being their position that they were working under an arrangement that was not an employment arrangement but more akin to a consultancy arrangement); but they maintain that it is not apparent how the working documents that go behind an already obtained tax return could illuminate the question as to whether or not they were employees.
I have referred briefly above to the information disclosed on the respective tax returns, to which I was taken to in the course of argument. The plaintiff says that she has been unable to obtain any further relevant information from the liquidator of Ashington (see T 25/6/19 at 20.12) and emphasises that she is an individual (not the putative employer and not in possession of the company records).
In the course of oral submissions it emerged that what (perhaps amongst other things) the plaintiff is seeking to ascertain from the tax working papers is how the company treated the payments to Ms Garrett and Mr Renauf (for example, whether it withheld tax (consistently with an employment relationship), or did not withhold tax (more consistently with a consultancy arrangement, in relation to payments made to the individuals).
The plaintiff has pointed to the fact that, on Mr Renauf's evidence, in the 2009-2010 financial year he was doing work for Ashington but that his tax return does not disclose any salary or wages being received from Ashington in that particular year (but does disclose a large amount of personal services income, which the plaintiff suspects relates to the remuneration he received from Ashington). It is submitted that, in the absence of issuing the subpoena, the plaintiff "will perhaps never know whether that is the case".
Similarly, reference was made to the declaration in Ms Garrett's tax return of salary or wages from Valad Group Holdings, with no other substantial income declared except certain dividends (including a franked amount of $12,500 from High Street Consulting Pty Limited, a company that the plaintiff understands was effectively owned by Ms Garrett and her husband at the time and through which they undertook some consulting work). The plaintiff points to Ms Garrett's own evidence that she began receiving a payment described as "salary" from Ashington in or about mid‑September 2009 and says that it is that particular payment in which the plaintiff is interested (noting that it does not appear to be declared as salary in her 2010 tax return). It is said that the plaintiff is seeking any documents that may have been provided to Ms Garrett's tax advisor or tax accountant to determine what are the payments that Ms Garrett refers to in her affidavit evidence (in what form and to whom they were paid; and to ascertain whether Ms Garrett structured her relationship with Ashington through High Street Consulting Pty Limited or not).
During the adjournment from 20 June 2019 to 25 June 2019, as adverted to above, there was an attempt (unsuccessfully) to reach agreement as to the narrowing of the documents sought by the plaintiff under these subpoenas. In part, the difficulty faced by the plaintiff in articulating in a more targeted way what it is seeking by way of production from the tax advisers seems to me to flow from the fact that these documents have been sought in advance of any order for discovery (which might well have produced documents from Ms Garrett and Mr Renauf that would address the very matters that the plaintiff seeks here to clarify).
The plaintiff accepts that it would be objectionable to issue subpoenas in an attempt to subvert the Practice Note (in other words, to use the subpoena process as a means of trying to get discovery before the party would otherwise be entitled to discovery) but says that this is not what is here being sought to do. Rather, the plaintiff's position is that she has sought at a relatively early stage of the proceedings certain documents from third parties "in order to give plenty of time for those documents to be produced and the relevant documents looked at and the relevance of them determined going forward, particularly in light of the fact that there will be or likely be some form of disclosure at a later stage". That, however, to my mind simply highlights the inappropriateness of seeking a broad brush range of documents under a subpoena of this kind in advance of the ordinary disclosure process.
The plaintiff says that a fishing expedition is, in essence, an attempt to interrogate third parties in order to discover whether there is a case at all; but that what she is seeking here to do is not that, but is rather to obtain particular documents relating to a particular issue, which is in issue in this particular proceeding (namely, whether Ms Garrett and Mr Renauf were employees as the plaintiff claims or independent contractors). In that regard, I consider the most useful description of a fishing expedition to be that which I have previously quoted from Associated Dominions Assurance Society Pty Ltd v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1955) 72 WN (NSW) 250 at 254 (per Owen J): A "fishing expedition", in the sense in which the phrase has been used in the law, means, as I understand it, that a person who has no evidence that fish of a particular kind are in a pool desires to be at liberty to drag it for the purpose of finding out whether there are any there or not.
There seems to me to be some force to the complaint by Ms Garrett and Mr Renauf that it is mere speculation (or fishing) to suggest that there is anything in the working papers that would be likely materially to assist in the determination of an identified issue in the pleadings, at least to the extent that the plaintiff is seeking an unconfirmed set of working papers. Insofar as the plaintiff seeks the working papers of the tax agents to seek to "test" the declarations contained in the tax returns, as I understand, it what is meant is that the plaintiff wishes to see if there are any documents to shed light on what is comprised by certain of the entries or declarations contained in the tax returns.
It is accepted, as noted above, that the employment status of Ms Garrett and Mr Renauf is an issue (and perhaps a key issue) in the proceedings (because of the allegations that flow therefrom in terms of the relevant duties alleged to have been owed to ACPL and AMPL). What the plaintiff says it is seeking to do (by obtaining the tax agents' working papers) is to obtain what the plaintiff believes may be relevant evidence that goes to painting that accumulation of detail necessary to establish the existence of the alleged employment relationship. However, it has sought to obtain those documents by a very general description that would cover a whole raft of potential material (including documents presumably created as part of the internal working processes of the tax agents and documents that may relate to the individuals' own financial affairs quite beyond the scope of the allegations in the present proceedings).
Insofar as the tax agents are in possession of material supplied by Ms Garrett and Mr Renauf, that is material that one would assume could be obtained on the making of properly limited orders for disclosure in due course (and after compliance with the requirements of the Practice Note).
At this stage of the proceedings, I am not persuaded that it was appropriate for the plaintiff to engage in a process of seeking by way of subpoena documents that it might be thought likely could be obtained by way of discovery in the ordinary course. I note that, handed up as an aide memoire by Senior Counsel for Ms Garrett and Mr Renauf was a schedule that lists an extraordinary number of notices to produce and subpoenas apparently issued by the plaintiff to date in these proceedings (being only those of which Ms Garrett and Mr Renauf are aware), well in advance of the close of evidence and any discovery process. There is force to the complaint by Ms Garrett and Mr Renauf that, if the Practice Note as to disclosure is to have any force, it should be complied with by practitioners (and, I might add, enforced by the Court).
In the present case, I consider that while there may have been a legitimate forensic purpose in issuing a more targeted subpoena seeking particular documents relating to issues relevant to the employment status of Ms Garrett and Mr Renauf at the relevant time (such as records of tax withheld from payments made to them by Ashington or AMPL), the impugned subpoenas go much further than that. They operate as an intrusion into the private affairs of the individuals concerned (albeit that those individuals are parties to the proceedings) and they were issued at a time in advance of close of evidence and without any application for leave supported by material of the kind that would warrant an order for disclosure in advance of the close of evidence.
In the circumstances, therefore, I consider that the subpoenas should be set aside as an abuse of process and I will order the return of the documents produced in answer to those subpoenas.
There was no suggestion that costs orders in relation to the second and third defendants' notice of motion should not follow the event.

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (7 paragraphs)

Parties

Legislation Cited (1)

Cases Cited (12)

Cited By (2)