AMG17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

AMG17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection - [2017] FCA 1477 - FCA 2017 case summary — Zoe

Tribunal's decision 2 The applicant is a citizen of Malaysia. He lodged an application for a protection visa on 3 December 2015. The applicant claimed to fear relevant harm because of his involvement in protests in Malaysia with respect to water supply issues. The applicant claimed, in summary, that the police searched his home and threatened his family. On 19 February 2016, a delegate of the first respondent refused the visa application. On 17 March 2016, the applicant sought review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal). The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 11 November 2016. The Tribunal affirmed the decision of a delegate of the Minister refusing to grant the applicant a protection visa. The Tribunal rejected the applicant's credibility as a witness and his material factual claims. 3 In particular, the Tribunal held having found that the applicant was not a credible witness that it did not accept that he was involved in any way in any relevant protest. The Tribunal held that it did not accept that the applicant participated in a protest or wrote the protest letter that he claimed to have written; that his friend, Wan Song, had been arrested; or that the police had been looking for the applicant and asking for money. 4 Further, the Tribunal held that it did not accept that if the applicant returned to Malaysia, the police or the Malaysian Government, would arrest him, send him to prison, or harm him in any way for the reasons that the applicant claim before the Tribunal. The Tribunal further held, with respect to the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act), that, if the applicant were to return Malaysia there would not be a real chance that he would be subjected to persecution involving serious harm for any of the reasons specified in s 5J(1)(a) of the Act. 5 The Tribunal found that the applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution and is not a refugee. The Tribunal was therefore satisfied that the applicant was not a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) of the Act. For the same reasons, the Tribunal also rejected the applicant's claim under the complementary protection provisions in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.

[5]

The appeal 9 In this Court, the applicant seeks leave to appeal on three grounds. Those grounds, which include, understandably enough, grammatical errors, are as follows: 1. AAT did not identify the potential harm taken by Malaysia Government correctly. 2. AAT has doubted all the supporting documents provided by me which confused a lot. 3. AAT reviewed my case incorrectly. The tribunal hided the serious question of the persecution I will face if return Malaysia. 10 The applicant did not file or rely on any written submissions. At the hearing in this Court, the applicant was asked if he wished to make any submission in support of his application for leave to appeal. In response, he said, "If I am asked to sign my name, I just sign my name. I made a mistake at my first step. I can only continue with what I'm doing". In my view, those statements do not assist the applicant. In my view, none of the grounds contended for can possibly succeed if leave were to be granted, because each one of them is founded on the misconceived notion that this Court has any jurisdiction to engage in merits review of the Tribunal's decision. The Court does not have that jurisdiction: see by way of example only Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35-7; and see also Gupta v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 172 at [62] per Gilmour and Mortimer JJ, Logan J agreeing at [102]. Further, as counsel for the first respondent submitted, the proposed grounds do not seek to impugn the decision of the primary judge in any event. 11 For those reasons, in my view, the proposed grounds of appeal could not succeed. Accordingly, the applicant has not established that there is any purpose to be served by the granting of leave. Further, the applicant has not established that the decision of the primary judge is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered on appeal. Accordingly, the Court will order that the application be dismissed and that the applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, to be agreed or assessed. I certify that the preceding eleven (11) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice O'Callaghan.

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