AMACA PTY LIMITED (Formerly known as James Hardie & Coy Pty Limited) v THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES & ANOR

AMACA PTY LIMITED (Formerly known as James Hardie & Coy Pty Limited) v THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES & ANOR - [2004] NSWCA 124 - NSWCA 2004 case summary — Zoe

CATCHWORDS : NEGLIGENCE - Construction industry - Working environment with large amounts of asbestos dust - Negligent performance of statutory duties - Whether State owed a duty of care to employees to direct the employer to address unsafe working conditions - whether inspectors knew such conditions were unsafe - Whether knowledge of the State inspectors to be attributed to the State - Whether knowledge of an independent statutory corporation is to be attributed to the State - Whether circumstances fall into any of the specified exceptional categories identified in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424 - Whether circumstances analogous to those in Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1 or Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330. D Construction Safety Act 1912 Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989, s 32 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946, s 5 LEGISLATION CITED : Local Government Act 1958 (Vic) Occupation Health and Safety Act 2000 Scaffolding and Lifts Act 1912, ss 5, 13, 15 Scaffolding and Lifts Regulations 1950, regs 10, 13, 73 Stevedoring Industry Act 1956 (Cth), ss 17, 18 Amaca Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (2003) 199 ALR 596 Babcock International Ltd v Babcock Australia Ltd (2002) 56 NSWLR 51 Anns v Merton London Borough Council (1978) AC 728 Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1 Fowles v Eastern and Australian Steamship Company Limited [1916] 2 AC 556 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Limited v Ryan (2003) 211 CLR 540 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 Launceston Corporation v The Hydro-Electric Commission (1959) 100 CLR 654 Oceanic Crest Shipping Co v Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd [1986] WAR 88 Oceanic Crest Shipping Co v Pilbara Harbour Services Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 626 Parramatta City Council v Lutz (1988) 12 NSWLR 293 Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330 Revesz v The Commonwealth (1951) 51 SR (NSW) 63 CASES CITED : Rolls Royce Industrial Power (Pacific) Ltd v James Hardie & Coy Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 626 Romeo v Conservation Commissin (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 432 Rowling v Takaro Properties Limited [1988] AC 473 Scott v Green & Sons (1969) 1 WLR 301 Sheppard v Glossop Corporation (1921) 3 KB 132 State Authorities Superannuation Board v Commissioner of State Taxation (WA) (1996) 189 CLR 253 Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee v Gibson (2000) 20 NSWCCR 417 Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424 Tamlin v Hannaford [1950] 1 KB 18 "The Christiana" (1850) 13 ER 841 Vetter v Lake Macquarie City Council (2001) 202 CLR 439 Voli v Inglewood Shire Council (1963) 110 CLR 74 Wetzel v District Court of New South Wales (1998) 43 NSWLR 687 Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Limited [2004] HCA 16 Workington Harbour and Dock Board v Towerfield (owners) [1951] AC 112r AMACA PTY LIMITED (Formerly known as James Hardie & Coy Pty Limited) (Appellant) PARTIES : THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES (First Respondent) ROLLS ROYCE INDUSTRIAL POWER (PACIFIC) LIMITED (Formerly John Thompson (Australia) Pty Limited) (Second Respondent) FILE NUMBER(S) : CA 40852/99 F M Douglas QC/G M Watson SC (Appellant) COUNSEL : J M Ireland QC/J F Burn (First Respondent) No Appearance (Second Respondent) Allens Arthur Robinson (Appellant) SOLICITORS : I V Knight, Crown Solicitor (First Respondent) Hunt & Hunt (Second Respondent)

[8]

Monday 17 May 2004 AMACA PTY LIMITED (Formerly known as James Hardie & Coy Pty Limited) v THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES & ANOR FACTS: Between 1955 and 1961 Rolls Royce Industrial Power (Pacific) Limited ("Rolls Royce") was constructing a power station for the Electricity Commission of NSW (now "Pacific Power"). Rolls Royce employed Mr Hay as part of that construction. Mr Hay was exposed to asbestos dust and fibre and in 1993 contracted mesothelioma. The trial judge found that the conditions under which workers like Mr Hay were required to work were frequently, obviously and dangerously dusty. Under the Scaffolding and Lifts Act 1912, the State was empowered, through the Department of Labour and Industry, to inspect work sites and to give directions where it appeared that the manner of carrying out work was dangerous or the regulations under the Act were being contravened. The directions that could be given were those thought necessary to prevent accidents and to ensure compliance with the regulations. The NSW Department of Labour and Industry, through its inspectors had constant and regular access to the power station to inspect the conditions there. On 11 June 1958, Mr Jones, a scientific officer of the Division of Industrial Hygiene of the Department of Health and a temporary inspector of the Department of Labour and Industry, visited the power station. Mr Jones produced a report, which found that in only one area of the construction site did the asbestos fibre concentration exceed the recommended international standard. Mr Hay brought actions in the Dust Diseases Tribunal against Rolls Royce (as his employer) and Pacific Power (as owner and occupier of the building). These proceedings were settled. Both defendants, however, cross-claimed against James Hardie, the manufacturer and supplier of a number of the asbestos products used on the construction site. These claims resulted in James Hardie becoming liable for payment to Pacific Power (by consent) and Rolls Royce (by an order of contribution). James Hardie in turn cross-claimed against the State of New South Wales in respect of these payments. James Hardie's cross-claim against the State was dismissed by the trial judge (Curtis J) on the ground that it was not just and equitable that the State should contribute to the liability of James Hardie. This order was upheld by the Court of Appeal. An appeal to the High Court was allowed, so that the matter is now remitted to the Court of Appeal for hearing and determination conformably with the reasons of the High Court. HELD per Ipp JA (Mason P and McColl JA agreeing):

In the context of negligent performance of statutory duties, a clear and universal test for determining whether a duty of care arises has not been stated. Each case depends on its own circumstances and the totality of the circumstances must be weighed in the balance.
The judgment of Mason J in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424 is authority for the statement that, generally, a public authority, which is under no statutory obligation to exercise a power, owes no common law duty of care to do so. An authority may by its conduct, however, attract a duty of care that requires the exercise of the power. Such a duty may be attracted where an authority, in the exercise of its functions has created a danger; where the particular circumstances of an authority's occupation of premises or its ownership or control of a structure attracts to it a duty of care; or where a public authority acts so that others rely on it to take care for their safety.
The judgments in Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330, Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1 and Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Limited v Ryan (2003) 211 CLR 540 refine and expand the general propositions stated by Mason J in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424, and adapt them to the particular circumstances of the cases concerned. In particular, the following propositions can be drawn from the judgments: (a) The totality of the relationship between the parties is the proper basis for the determination of a duty of care; (b) The category of control that may contribute to the existence of a duty of care to exercise statutory powers includes control, generally of any situation that contains within it a risk of harm to others; (c) A duty of care does not arise merely because an authority has statutory powers, the exercise of which might prevent harm to others; (d) The existence of statutory powers and the mere prior exercise of those powers from time to time do not alone create a duty to exercise those powers in the future; (e) Knowledge that harm may result from a failure to exercise statutory powers is not itself sufficient to create a duty of care.
Curtis J did not find that the State inspectors observed that the dust was in excess of the Dreesen standard; that was a matter that was not capable of detection by the eye alone. In all the circumstances Curtis J did not hold, implicitly, that the State knew or ought to have known that brief and intermittent exposure to the quantities of dust observed by the inspectors might cause injury to workers.
"Effective line management" required control over the inspectors to be exercised through the Minister, the Under-Secretary and the Chief Inspector. The knowledge of the inspectors is to be attributed to the State.
Pacific Power is to be regarded as a distinct and separate statutory corporation, so that its knowledge is not to be attributed to the State itself.
However, even assuming the relevant knowledge on the part of the State, the circumstances of this case do not fall into any of the specified exceptional categories identified in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424 that would attract a duty of care.

[13]

The duty of care issue 3 Between 1955 and 1961 Rolls Royce Industrial Power (Pacific) Limited ("Rolls Royce") was constructing the Wallerawang power station for the Electricity Commission of New South Wales (now Pacific Power). During that period Rolls Royce employed Mr Warren Hay as a fitter's assistant and, in that capacity, Mr Hay worked on the construction of the power station. There, Mr Hay was exposed to asbestos dust and fibre. In 1993 he contracted mesothelioma. 4 Mr Hay brought an action in the Dust Diseases Tribunal against Rolls Royce (his employer) and Pacific Power (the owner and occupier of the power station), claiming damages for personal injuries. Rolls Royce and Pacific Power cross-claimed against each other. On 27 June 1994 the proceedings, including the cross-claims, were settled. A consent judgment was granted in favour of Mr Hay against each of Rolls Royce and Pacific Power in the sum of $185,000 inclusive of costs. 5 Some of the products containing asbestos that were used in the construction of the power station were manufactured and supplied by the appellant (to which I shall refer as "James Hardie"). Each of Pacific Power and Rolls Royce brought cross-claims against James Hardie claiming contributions to the damages each had become obliged to pay Mr Hay. 6 Pacific Power's cross-claim against James Hardie was settled by a payment by James Hardie to Pacific Power. Rolls Royce's cross-claim against James Hardie (and a cross-claim by James Hardie against Rolls Royce) proceeded to trial and each recovered an order for a contribution of 50% from the other. 7 Prior to judgment in the contribution proceedings between Rolls Royce and James Hardie, the latter cross-claimed against the State. In that cross-claim, James Hardie claimed from the State an order for contribution in respect of any sum which it might be ordered by the Dust Diseases Tribunal to pay by way of contribution to Rolls Royce and in respect of the payment by James Hardie to Pacific Power. 8 The trial judge in the contribution proceedings between James Hardie and the State (Curtis J) held that it was not just and equitable that the State should contribute to the liability of James Hardie. The Court of Appeal upheld this finding (Rolls Royce Industrial Power (Pacific) Ltd v James Hardie & Coy Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 626). James Hardie appealed to the High Court and the appeal was allowed (Amaca Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (2003) 199 ALR 596). The orders made by the Court of Appeal were set aside and the matter was remitted to the Court of Appeal for further hearing and determination conformably with the reasons of the High Court (see Amaca Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales at 602, [27]). 9 The High Court identified two errors in the reasons of the trial judge, namely: "First, the reasons given for concluding that it was not just and equitable that the State should contribute to the liability of James Hardie were irrelevant. That James Hardie was a commercial enterprise pursuing profit and the State a polity raising revenue by taxation are not considerations relevant to their respective responsibilities to contribute to the damage sustained by the injured plaintiff. Secondly, and no less fundamentally, the assumption which the trial judge made about the State's liability was an insufficient basis for deciding what order should be made in the contribution claim against the State. The making of assumptions and the acceptance of concessions for the purpose of litigation is sometimes an appropriate and efficient way to proceed. It may allow a court to sever irrelevant or immaterial questions to permit it to concentrate on those issues that are legally essential to the decision. However, this was not a case where such a shortcut could be taken. What was assumed was that the State had breached the duty of care which it owed the injured plaintiff. But neither the duty nor the breach was identified with any particularity. Without identifying the duty owed, and the breach or breaches committed, it was not, and is not, possible to identify the extent of that party's responsibility for the damage. Nor is it possible to say that that party should be exempted from liability despite it having breached the duty which it owed the plaintiff. 10 The High Court went on to say: … there may be some question about whether the Court of Appeal, and therefore this Court, could undertake a review of the factual question of breach. But it is clear that the Court of Appeal did have power to determine whether, on the facts found at trial, the State did owe the injured plaintiff a duty of care. That was a question of law. If the Court of Appeal had identified the errors of law which the trial judge made, it would then have been appropriate, and in this case necessary, for the Court of Appeal to go on to consider whether the claim for contribution should have failed on the ground, urged by the State, that the State owed no duty of care to the injured plaintiff. The Court of Appeal should now consider that question." 11 The question whether the State owed a duty of care to Mr Hay arises by reason of s 5 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946, which governs James Hardie's claim for contribution. That section provides: "(1) Where damage is suffered by any person as a result of a tort (whether a crime or not): … (c) Any tort-feasor liable in respect of that damage may recover contribution from any other tort-feasor who is, or would if sued had been, liable in respect of the same damage, whether as a joint tort-feasor or otherwise, so, however, that no person shall be entitled to recover contribution under this section from any person entitled to be indemnified by that person in respect of the liability in respect of which the contribution is sought. (2) In any proceedings for contribution under this section the amount of the contribution recoverable from any person shall be such as may be found by the court to be just and equitable having regard to the extent of that person's responsibility for the damage; and the court shall have power to exempt any person from liability to make contribution, or to direct that the contribution to be recovered from any person shall amount to a complete indemnity." 12 Thus, James Hardie's claim for contribution depends on whether the State was a tortfeasor which, if sued, would have been liable to Mr Hay. Hence, the need to determine whether, on the facts found at trial, the State owed Mr Hay a duty of care. Mr Douglas QC (who together with Mr Watson SC appeared for James Hardie) adopted, as the scope of the duty of care contended for by James Hardie, the duty described by McHugh J (with whom Gleeson CJ agreed) in Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1 at 45, [112], namely: "… a continuing duty of care … in the exercise of [the Stevedoring Authority's] statutory functions, duties and powers to take reasonable care to avoid foreseeable risks of injury to the health of the Plaintiff."

[14]

Only the duty of care issue to be determined at this stage - the powers of the court 13 The parties accept that should this Court determine that the State owed a duty of care to Mr Hay, the matter should be remitted to the Dust Diseases Tribunal pursuant to s 32 of the Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 to enable the Tribunal to determine the issues of breach, causation and damages which would then arise (including any necessary factual findings in that connection). 14 On the other hand, a finding that the State owed no duty of care to Mr Hay would be determinative of the claim for contribution made by James Hardie against the State. 15 The duty of care issue comes before this Court as an appeal pursuant to s 32 of the Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989. It is therefore an appeal on a "point of law" and the powers of this Court are limited to correcting decisions on a point of law (see Vetter v Lake Macquarie City Council (2001) 202 CLR 439 at 464, [70] per Kirby J). This was common ground between the parties. It is therefore not for this Court to make factual findings not made by the trial judge. 16 In determining the duty of care issue, as a point of law, the following observations of the High Court are pertinent: "The trial judge came to no final conclusion about whether the State owed a duty of care to the injured plaintiff and he did not decide what the scope or content of any such duty might be. Accordingly, it may be said that such findings of fact as he made about what the State did or did not do were not made with any definition of duty in mind. It follows that it may not be clear whether all the findings of fact that might bear upon any question of breach of duty were made at trial. If not all necessary findings about breach were made at trial, and if it became necessary to compare the respective degrees of responsibility of James Hardie and the State of the damage suffered by the injured plaintiff, the trial judge's reasons would have provided an insufficient factual platform for doing so." 17 These comments are also applicable to the issue whether the State owed a duty of care to Mr Hay.

[15]

The legal principles relevant to the determination of the duty of care contended for 18 The determination whether the State owed Mr Hay a duty of care as asserted by James Hardie depends upon a proper understanding (and the application) of the principles laid down in Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330, Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee, Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Limited v Ryan (2003) 211 CLR 540 and other decisions dealing with the negligent performance of statutory duties. 19 A clear and universal test for determining whether a duty of care arises has not been laid down. Each case depends on its own circumstances and the totality of the circumstances must be weighed in the balance. Depending on the facts, different factors have different degrees of significance. Nevertheless, Pyrenees, Crimmins and Graham Barclay Oysters point to and delineate the path that is to be followed. 20 The statements of approach of the members of the High Court in these leading authorities have to be seen in the context of the issues in each. There were singular and distinctive aspects about all these cases. Thus, the reasoning of the various justices cannot properly be understood without regard to the different facts in each case. Moreover, both James Hardie and the State sought to rely on these authorities in part and to distinguish them in part. The arguments presented by counsel in this regard, again, can only be understood by reference to the different facts in the cases in question. Accordingly, the facts in each must be closely analysed. 21 It is appropriate to commence the discussion on this topic by repeating Mason J's remarks in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424. These remarks were referred to on a number of occasions in Pyrenees, Crimmins and Graham Barclay Oysters and are an important part of the discussion of the duty of care issue in those cases. His Honour said (at 459-461): "Generally speaking, a public authority which is under no statutory obligation to exercise a power comes under no common law duty of care to do so: see Revesz v The Commonwealth (1951) 51 SR (NSW) 63. But an authority may by its conduct place itself in such a position that it attracts a duty of care which calls for exercise of the power. A common illustration is provided by the cases in which an authority in the exercise of its functions has created a danger, thereby subjecting itself to a duty of care for the safety of others which must be discharged by an exercise of its statutory powers or by giving a warning … That it is the conduct of the authority in creating the danger that attracts the duty of care is demonstrated by Sheppard v Glossop Corporation (1921) 3 KB 132. There the highway authority was under no duty of care with respect to lighting, though the danger was foreseeable, because it did not create the danger. Having statutory power to make provision for the lighting of streets, it placed a lamp at a dangerous point in a street, the danger not being of its making, but extinguished the lamp at 9.00 pm in accordance with a general resolution applying to all streets in the borough. The authority was held not liable on the footing that the statute imposed no obligation to light, that the Authority having begun to light was under no obligation to continue to do so, and that having done nothing to make the street dangerous, it was under no obligation to give warning of the danger. Atkin LJ (at 51) explained earlier cases in which under the same statute local authorities had been liable for not lighting by stating that the local authorities had created the dangers which were responsible for the plaintiffs' injuries." There are other situations in which an authority's occupation of premises … or its ownership or control of a structure in a highway or of a public place … attracts to it a duty of care. In these cases the statute facilitates the existence of a common law duty of care. In the words of Lord Denning MR in Scott v Green & Sons [(1969) 1 WLR 301 at 304]: 'The statute does not by itself give rise to a civil action, but it forms the foundation on which the common law can build a cause of action.' As [ Voli v Inglewood Shire Council (1963) 110 CLR 74] demonstrates, the breach of the common law duty may arise from the failure of the authority's officers to ascertain that the statutory requirements are satisfied. There, the officers who examined the plans and specifications of the shire hall failed to ascertain that the authority's by-laws relating to public buildings had been infringed with the result that a stage collapsed and injured the plaintiff. The authority and its architect were held liable. Liability of this kind extends to liability for damage which is attributable to the positive and wrongful act of another … And then there are situations in which a public authority, not otherwise under a relevant duty, may place itself in such a position that others rely on it to take care for their safety so that the authority comes under a duty of care calling for positive action. Such a relationship has been held to arise where a person, by practice or past conduct upon which other persons come to rely, creates a self-imposed duty to take positive action to protect the safety or interests of another or at least to warn him that he or his interests are at risk …" 22 Nothing in Pyrenees, Crimmins and Graham Barclay Oysters is materially inconsistent with Mason J's remarks. What is significant for the purposes of this appeal are the following propositions, drawn from Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman: (a) Generally, a public authority, which is under no statutory obligation to exercise a power, owes no common law duty of care to do so. (b) An authority may by its conduct, however, attract a duty of care that requires the exercise of the power. (c) Three categories are identified in which the duty of care may so be attracted. (i) Where an authority, in the exercise of its functions, has created a danger. (ii) Where the particular circumstances of an authority's occupation of premises or its ownership or control of a structure attracts to it a duty of care. In these cases the statute facilitates the existence of a duty of care. (iii) Where a public authority acts so that others rely on it to take care for their safety. 23 Mason J did not suggest that the categories of circumstances in which an authority may attract a duty of care are closed. Later cases, which are in accord with the general propositions laid down in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman, have extended the categories to situations where an authority has control over a particular situation that carries with it a risk of harm of which the authority knows or should know. That is to say, where an authority has such control, a duty of care may (not, I stress, must) be recognised. 24 I turn now to Pyrenees. A fire destroyed premises (a shop and a residence at 70 Neill Street, Beaufort) occupied by tenants and damaged an adjoining shop (72 Neill Street) owned by Mr and Mrs Day. The fire was caused by a latent defect in the chimney of the premises at 70 Neill Street that were occupied by tenants. About two years earlier the fire authority had advised the then tenants at 70 Neill Street that the fireplace was unsafe to use and notified the Shire Council to that effect. A Council building inspector inspected the premises and found that there was a latent defect in the fireplace creating a substantial risk of fire. The inspector wrote a letter to the then tenants at 70 Neill Street stating that it was imperative that the fireplace should not be used unless fully repaired. The former tenants did nothing however and did not communicate the contents of the letter to the owner. The Council took no further steps in relation to the fireplace. It had statutory powers under the Local Government Act 1958 (Vict) to ensure compliance with its letter, but did not exercise those powers. 25 The shop owners (Mr and Mrs Day) succeeded at the trial but the tenants failed. The Court of Appeal did not disturb the trial judge's findings. The High Court dismissed the Council's appeal against the decision in favour of the shop owners and by a majority upheld the tenants' appeal. 26 Brennan CJ founded his decision on a public law duty on the part of the Council. Toohey, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ held that the Council was in breach of a duty of care owed to the shop owners. Brennan CJ on the same public law ground upheld the tenants' appeal. Gummow and Kirby JJ held that the Council was in breach of a duty of care owed to the tenants. Toohey and McHugh JJ were in the minority on this aspect, being of the view that there was general reliance by the shop owners on the Council to take steps to remove the danger of which it was aware and had power to remove, but there was no such reliance by the tenants. 27 Two differing strands of reasoning, relevant to this appeal, can be identified in Pyrenees. The first is exemplified by the following remarks of McHugh J (at 372, [115]): "Given the extensive powers of the Council, its entry into the field of inspection on this occasion, if not other occasions, its actual knowledge of the danger to the health and property of the occupiers of [the street] and, at the least, its imputed knowledge that residents of the shire generally relied on it to protect them from the dangers arising from the use or condition of premises, the Council owed a duty of care to Mr and Mrs Day."

[16]

McHugh J considered that the tenants of the premises where the fire occurred (70 Neill Street) were not in the position of vulnerability of Mr and Mrs Day (at 72 Neill Street) and it was not reasonable for them to rely on the Council to exercise its powers to protect them from defects in their own premises. 28 It is to be noted that in Graham Barclay Oysters McHugh J said (at 581-582, [94]): "I do not regard Pyrenees as a 'control' case. Rather it is a case where the Council came under a duty of care because it knew of the risk of harm to specific individuals, it had power to take steps to eliminate the risk and importantly, at an earlier stage, had given directions to eliminate the risk." 29 What is the relevance of the earlier giving of directions? If Pyrenees was not a "control" case, the giving of directions, on the Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman analysis, could only attract a duty of care if they created a danger or gave rise to reliance. 30 The remarks of McHugh J in Graham Barclay Oysters cast light on what his Honour meant in Pyrenees when he referred to the importance to be attributed to the Council's actions in giving directions to eliminate the risk. His Honour said (at 580, [91]): "The powers and functions of the government of a polity are generally invested for the benefit of the general public. In the absence of a statutory direction, the mere existence of such a power in that government imposes no duty to exercise it for the protection of others. In that respect, its situation is analogous to a private citizen who, absent special circumstances, has no duty to take affirmative action to protect another person from harm … Nor does the bare fact that the Executive government has exercised its powers from time to time create any duty to exercise its powers. Such exercises of power do not constitute 'control' of an activity in the sense that that expression is used in the law of torts. They are merely particular exercises of powers that were invested in the Executive government for the benefit of the general public to be exercised at the discretion of the Executive government. Unless a particular exercise of power has increased the risk of harm to an individual, the Executive government of a polity does not ordinarily owe any common law duty to take reasonable care as to when and how it exercises its powers. No doubt circumstances may arise where conduct of the government, short of increasing a risk of harm, creates a duty of care. But such cases are less likely to arise than in the case of other public authorities. In particular, knowledge of specific risks of harm or the exercise of powers in particular situations is less likely to be a factor in creating a duty than in the case of an ordinary public authority. This is because the powers and functions of the Executive government are conferred for the benefit of the public generally and not for the benefit of individuals."

[17]

Despite his Honour's view that, generally, no duty of care arises from the mere exercise of powers, McHugh J appears to recognise the possibility (albeit an unlikely one) of "conduct of the government, short of increasing a risk of harm, creat[ing] a duty of care". 31 In summary, the first strand of the reasoning in Pyrenees emphasises the sole and actual knowledge of the Council of the risk of serious harm to identifiable individuals, the power of the Council to intervene, and the prior (but inadequate) intervention by the Council to eliminate the risk. 32 The second strand in Pyrenees is exemplified by the following remarks of Gummow J (at 389, [168]): "The Shire had statutory powers, exercisable from time to time, to pursue the prevention of fire at No 70 [Neill Street]. This statutory enablement of the Shire 'facilitate[d] the existence of a common law duty of care' ( Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424 at 460), but the touchstone of what I would hold to be its duty was the Shire's measure of control of the situation including its knowledge, not shared by [the tenants] or by the Days, that, if the situation were not remedied, the possibility of fire was great and damage to the whole row of shops might ensue (cf Parramatta City Council v Lutz (1988) 12 NSWLR 293 at 328). The Shire had a duty of care 'to safeguard others from a grave danger of serious harm', in circumstances where it was 'responsible for its continued existence and [was] aware of the likelihood of others coming into proximity of the danger and [had] the means of preventing it or of averting the danger or of bringing it to their knowledge' [citation omitted]." 33 The reference by Gummow J to the passage in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman at 460 is important as it indicates how the "statutory enablement of the Shire" could facilitate the existence of a common law duty of care. 34 Gummow J's reference to Parramatta City Council v Lutz (1988) 12 NSWLR 293 at 328 is to the dissenting judgment of McHugh JA where his Honour said: "In principle, there is much to be said for the view that a public authority should be under a duty to take affirmative action when the control of conduct or activities has been ceded to it by common understanding or when it receives some benefit from the conduct or activities. If in addition to the right of control the authority knows or ought to know of conduct or activities which may foreseeably give rise to a risk of harm to an individual, the authority should be under a duty to prevent that harm. Just as a teacher who has control of a classroom has a duty to prevent pupils from injuring others, so a public authority with legal or de facto control of a social situation should have a duty to take affirmative action to prevent harm to others. The touchstone of affirmative duty would be control and not the possession of any discretionary statutory powers. Failure to exercise such powers would go to breach of duty, but the common law duty would arise from actual or ceded control."

[19]

In this passage their Honours point to control, as the touchstone again, together with the Council's sole knowledge of the risk and the prior exercise by the Council of its powers. As regards the latter element, it echoes the reference by McHugh J to the Council giving directions to eliminate the risk. 38 Thus, the second strand of the reasoning in Pyrenees based the recognition of a duty of care on the part of the Council on a significant and special measure of control, a degree of seriousness of the risk, and a vulnerability of the owners and occupiers of the premises. 39 The differences between the two strands are not of major significance and are basically matters of emphasis. 40 I turn now to Crimmins. Mr Crimmins, a registered waterside worker, was employed between 1961 and 1965 by various stevedoring entities which were registered employers in the port of Melbourne. In 1997 he was diagnosed as suffering from mesothelioma caused by inhalation of asbestos fibres. During the period of his employment he was exposed to asbestos dust. He claimed damages from the successor to the liabilities and obligations of the Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority. He contended that the Authority was under a continuous duty from 1956 to 1977 in the exercise of its statutory functions, duties and powers to take reasonable care to avoid foreseeable risks of injury to his health. 41 The High Court held by majority (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ dissenting) that the Authority owed Mr Crimmins a common law duty of care to protect him from reasonably foreseeable risks of injury arising from his employment by registered stevedores. 42 The Authority did not employ Mr Crimmins. It had, however, certain disciplinary powers over workers including Mr Crimmins. These powers included power to cancel or suspend registration. Once a worker was assigned to a wharf, he was subject to the direction of the employer who supplied the safety equipment required by an award. The Authority was generally ignorant of the structure or size of the ships to which workers were allocated and of the nature of the cargoes to be handled. 43 The statutory function of the Authority included, by s 17 of the Stevedoring Industry Act 1956 (Cth) the regulation of the performance of stevedoring operations and the conduct of waterside workers, the training of persons in stevedoring operations, the encouragement of employers to introduce safe methods and practices and the encouragement of safe working in stevedoring operations. 44 Section 18(1) of the Stevedoring Industry Act provided that, for the purpose of the performance of its functions under s 17, "the Authority may, subject to this section, make such orders, and do all such other things, as it sees fit." 45 McHugh J (with whom Gleeson CJ agreed), observed (at 34, [79]) that common law courts "have long been cautious in imposing affirmative common law duties of care on statutory authorities." His Honour referred to the remarks of Mason J in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman at 459-460 (and to which Gummow J referred at 389 in Pyrenees) which I have quoted above. 46 McHugh J, in finding that the Authority owed Mr Crimmins a duty of care to exercise statutory powers, relied on the element of control on the part of the Authority, Mr Crimmins' "special" vulnerability, and the relevant knowledge of the Authority. The following passages make this clear.

[22]

And at 43-44, [108]: "The Authority knew that the workers were being directed to work on ships where there could be a significant risk of injury to the workers from the use of equipment and machinery, the stowage of cargo and the hazardous nature of the materials which the workers had to handle. It also knew that it was directing the waterside workers to participate in transient, casual employment on the waterfront - a factor recognised in s 25(B) of the Act. In this context, the power of the Authority to direct the waterside workers as to when and where they must work placed them in a very real position of vulnerability. The casual nature of the employment, employment sometimes lasting only for a few hours, was likely to mean that employers did not have the same incentives to protect their employees from harm as do employers who must utilise the same work force day after day." 47 Gaudron J based her finding (that a duty of care existed) on similar grounds. Her Honour emphasised the casual nature of Mr Crimmins' employment, the lack of incentive to his employers to take care for his safety, the hazardous nature of the work, the Authority's knowledge of the hazards of asbestos, the fact that the Authority was in a position to take various steps (short of making orders having the force of law) to control or minimise those risks, and the powerful degree of control the Authority could exercise over workers and employers, including the power to register employers, to apply to the Commonwealth Industrial Court for their de-registration and to institute proceedings against an employer for statutory offences. 48 There is one other aspect of her Honour's reasons to which I should draw attention. Her Honour said (at 20-21, [31]-[32]): "Different considerations apply with respect to the Authority's power under s 18(1) of the [ Industry Act ] to make orders, although not its power to 'do all such other things, as [the Authority thought] fit'. The power to do all such other things as the Authority thought fit necessarily extended to doing those things that were essential for and, also, those things that were conducive to the performance of its functions … And unlike the power to make orders, the power to do those things was not confined by succeeding sub-sections requiring consultations with interested organisations. There is, thus, nothing in the [ Industry Act ] to exclude the common law in relation to the power to 'do all such other things, as [the Authority thought] fit'. The critical consideration in relation to the Authority's order-making power under s 18(1) of the [ Industry Act ] is that, if made, orders would have had the force of law (section 20(1)(c) of the [ Industry Act ]. It is, thus, appropriate to characterise the power to make orders as legislative in nature. There is considerable incongruity in the notion that the common law might impose a duty of care in relation to the exercise or non-exercise of a power that is legislative in nature … Indeed, so incongruous is that notion that I am of the view that, as a matter of necessary implication, s 18 is to be construed as excluding the operation of the common law in relation to the Authority's exercise or non-exercise of its power to make orders." 49 Hayne J was of a similar view, saying (at 100, [288]): "As I have said, the Authority could have required the use of respirators only by making a general order under s 18. The Authority owed no common law duty of care to the deceased worker in deciding whether or not to exercise that quasi legislative power." 50 I find it difficult to draw any material distinction between the powers of the Authority in Crimmins to make orders and the power of the State in the present case to give directions under s 15 of the Scaffolding and Lifts Act 1912. Counsel did not pay particular attention to this point, however, and as a decision on the issue is not essential to the final conclusion to which I have come, I shall say no more about it. 51 As I have mentioned, Gummow J (at 61, [166]) observed that "[In some cases] the powers vested by statute in a public authority may give to it such a significant and special measure of control over the safety of the person or property of the plaintiff as to oblige it to exercise its powers to avert danger or to bring the danger to the knowledge of the plaintiff." 52 In Graham Barclay Oysters Callinan J (at 663, [317]) said that Crimmins stood apart from other cases where a duty of care had been upheld. He said: "Whilst it was a case in which the Court effectively treated powers and functions as giving rise to duties of care, the factual and statutory contexts were both very special. What distinguished the powers and functions there was that if they were not in fact exercised, then the industry which was a uniquely organised one, would hardly have been able to function at all, or with any degree of efficiency …" 53 Crimmins has always been regarded as a "very special" case. There can be little doubt that it has to be regarded as a "control" case of a unique kind. Its uniqueness lies in the degree of control that the Authority had over the actual entering into of contracts of employment, the conditions of work, and the conduct of both workers and employers. The vulnerability of the workers has also to be regarded as "special". Their very employment in practical terms was in the hands of the Authority and they were only casual workers with relatively weak bargaining power. 54 Before going to Graham Barclay Oysters it is worth noting that in Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512 (the next High Court decision dealing with the negligent exercise of statutory powers) Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ, after referring to Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman, Pyrenees, and Crimmins adopted the test of a "significant and special measure of control" (the phrase used by Gummow J in Crimmins (at 61, [166]) Their Honours said (at 558-559, [102]): "The decisions of this Court in [ Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman , Pyrenees , Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 432 and Crimmins ] are important for this litigation. Whatever may be the general significance today in tort law of the distinction between misfeasance and non-feasance, it has become more clearly understood that, on occasions, the powers vested by statute in a public authority may give it such a significant and special measure of control over the safety of the person or property of citizens as to impose upon the authority a duty of care. This may oblige the particular authority to exercise those powers to avert a danger to safety or to bring the danger to the knowledge of citizens otherwise at hazard from the danger. In this regard, the factor of control is of fundamental importance …" 55 I now turn to Graham Barclay Oysters itself. This case concerned claims by consumers who had contracted hepatitis A after eating oysters from Wallis Lake. The waters of the lake had been polluted by human faecal contamination which in turn contaminated the oysters. The plaintiff consumers contended that the local council for the area and the State of New South Wales were liable to them in negligence for the harm suffered. The High Court held that neither the Council nor the State owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs. The members of the High Court (by reason of the facts of the case) drew virtually no distinction between the position of the Council and the State. Generally, the Court held, as the headnote states, that: "Government decisions about the proper extent of regulation of private or commercial behaviour, or of a particular industry, are inappropriate for judicial review."

[24]

Similarly, as regards the Council, Gleeson CJ said (at 564, [39]): "The powers conferred upon the Council, insofar as they are presently relevant, were conferred for the benefit of the public generally; not for the protection of a specific class of persons …" 57 McHugh J observed, generally (at 576, [81]): "A public authority has no duty to take reasonable care to protect other persons merely because the legislature has invested it with a power whose exercise could prevent harm to those persons. Thus, in most cases, a public authority will not be in breach of a common law duty by failing to exercise a discretionary power that is vested in it for the benefit of the general public … But if the authority has used its powers to intervene in a field of activity and increased the risk of harm to persons, it will ordinarily come under a duty of care ... So also, if it knows or ought to know that a member of the public relies on it to exercise its power to protect his or her interests, the common law may impose a duty of care on the authority ( Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman at 461, per Mason J)." 58 McHugh also found that the powers of the State did not constitute control in the relevant sense (at 581, [93]). Of significance to the present appeal is his Honour's remark (at 582, [95]): "Knowledge or imputed knowledge that harm may result from a failure to take affirmative action is not itself sufficient to create an affirmative duty of care". 59 Gummow and Hayne JJ regarded two factors as being of vital importance (see at 596, [144]). First, the fact that the Council (like the Council in Pyrenees) was the only party with actual knowledge of the potential source of harm (namely, the progressive deterioration of the sewerage infrastructure which imperilled the purity of the waters of Wallis Lake). Secondly, the fact that the Council had extensive statutory powers to prevent or to redress that deterioration and to mitigate the effects of any pollution. Their Honours said (at 596, [145]): "[T]he co-existence of knowledge of a risk of harm and power to avert or to minimise that harm does not, without more, give rise to a duty of care at common law. The totality of the relationship between the parties, not merely the foresight and capacity to act on the part of one of them, is the proper basis upon which a duty of care may be recognised. Were it otherwise, any recipient of statutory powers to licence, supervise or compel conduct in a given field, would, upon gaining foresight of some relevant risk, owe a duty of care to those ultimately threatened by that risk to act to prevent or minimise it."

[27]

Their Honours had earlier stated (at 596, [145]): "[T]he common law should be particularly hesitant to recognise such a duty where the relevant authority is empowered to regulate conduct relating to or impacting on a risk-laden field of endeavour which is populated by self-interested commercial actors who themselves possess some power to avert those risks." 62 Kirby J found that it was not reasonable to conclude that the State and the Council owed a duty to exercise their respective powers for the protection of consumers like the plaintiffs. 63 Callinan J held that the plaintiffs failed against the Council and the State as these bodies did not have the requisite degree of control over the area in question. In addition, his Honour said (at 665, [324]): "What distinguished the source of danger in Pyrenees is not present here: its precise identification by the Council and inadequate attempts by it to remove it. The massive obligation of the State to which a contrary view would give rise is a relevant and important circumstance to which I should have regard, and which, although not decisive, weighs in the balance." 64 The judgments in Pyrenees, Crimmins and Graham Barclay Oysters are variations on the themes in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman. The variations do not represent a significant departure from anything that was said by Mason J in that case. The later judgments refine (and, as I have noted in [23] above, in one respect expand) the general propositions laid down by Mason J and adapt them to the particular circumstances of the cases concerned. A duty of care was recognised in Pyrenees and Crimmins because of the exceptional circumstances in each; not because a radically new principle was laid down. 65 In summary, the following propositions can be drawn from Pyrenees, Crimmins and Graham Barclay Oysters: (a) The totality of the relationship between the parties is the proper basis for the determination of a duty of care. (b) The category of control that may contribute to the existence of a duty of care to exercise statutory powers includes control, generally, of any situation that contains within it a risk of harm to others. (c) A duty of care does not arise merely because an authority has statutory powers, the exercise of which might prevent harm to others. (d) The existence of statutory powers and the mere prior exercise of those powers from time to time do not, without more, create a duty to exercise those powers in the future. (e) Knowledge that harm may result from a failure to exercise statutory powers is not itself sufficient to create a duty of care.

[28]

The facts of the case to which this Court may have regard 66 The trial judge, Curtis J, made several findings of fact that are relevant to this appeal. As appears below, however, some facts that might be thought to be relevant to the duty of care issue were not determined. 67 At the Wallerawang power station, Mr Hay worked in the installation and ducting of coal crushing mills. Curtis J found that, during the course of Mr Hay's employment, the conditions under which workers, in that area, were required to work were "frequently, obviously, and dangerously dusty". It is to be noted that this particular finding is not a finding that the dust included asbestos. 68 The mills were situated at ground level. They were below some boilers and steam piping. The boilers rose to a height of 125 feet above ground level. Men working above Mr Hay applied most of the asbestos lagging. 69 Mr Hay gave evidence, which Curtis J pointed out was unchallenged, as follows: "'[When asbestos sheets were sawn,] fine asbestos particles could be seen everywhere in the atmosphere and sometimes the ground was white with particles which were so concentrated they looked like snow flakes. It was common to pick up the asbestos lagging and throw it to the ground at which clouds of dust would rise from the sheeting. I recall that asbestos particles were constantly in our clothes and hair". 70 Mr Hay said that, on a daily basis, when the asbestos was being cut and installed, asbestos dust fell to the ground. At the end of the day most of the workers had asbestos dust all over their overalls. They were not provided with any masks or respiratory equipment. No warnings were given to the workers and they were not directed to take any precautions. 71 There was unchallenged evidence of debris showering on to workers below when scaffolding was dismantled. There was no attempt to stop the material from falling on the workers and there was constant dust in the air whilst the laggers worked in the vicinity. When the laggers worked above, debris fell and when this happened asbestos dust and fibre showered down upon the workers below the scaffolding like "snow". 72 Curtis J found: "There is no doubt that the conditions at Wallerawang were deplorable … [P]hotographic evidence confirms that it was not a tidy site. Obviously, dust and debris were allowed to drift freely through the premises and accumulate on the floor only to be recirculated in the atmosphere by passing feet and breezes entering the workplace. Men working in the vicinity of or below the laggers were repeatedly subjected to significant dust exposure."

[29]

Again, these are not express findings that the dust included asbestos. I think it implicit, however, having regard to the unchallenged evidence on which the finding was based, that his Honour was referring to significant asbestos dust exposure. 73 In 1942 an article entitled "The Occupational Disease Hazard: Evaluation in the Field" was published by Dr Warren A Cook in the Journal of Occupational Medicine. Dr Cook described work practices that created a cloud of asbestos in the air which "even the most casual observer would not miss" and recommended that if that exposure were for only 20 minutes a day a respirator should be worn. He warned: "In the case of asbestos dust condition, our evaluation of the exposure should be based on the knowledge that the present toxic limit for asbestos is five million particles per cubic foot of air. This is a very small concentration, so small in fact that the condition may look good even to a critical eye and still present an exposure greater than this low limit. … [I]n the case of asbestos dust … the toxic limit is so low that the only safe procedure is to have recourse to actual dust determinations." 74 Curtis J found, after referring to the article by Dr Cook, that : "It is quite obvious that the conduct of [Rolls Royce] at Wallerawang in permitting the appalling conditions to obtain fell far short of the standards expected of a reasonable employer." 75 Curtis J later turned to the position of the State. He considered that the construction of the Wallerawang power station was a governmental activity, although it was carried out through what is now Pacific Power, namely, an independently constituted statutory corporation. He pointed out that the Department of Labour and Industry through its inspectors had constant and regular access to the power station site. 76 Curtis J noted that the site manager described the access as follows: "The Electricity Commissioner had inspectors and engineers on site continuously. The DLI had inspectors frequently. They checked on safety standards, equipment and so on. There was never any warning of visits by the Department of Labour and Industry. Sometimes, there could be two visits in one week and then there may be a gap of three weeks before I saw them again. They would make sure that the planks were the right size, scaffolding correct and so on. They were more concerned about the system of work rather than the products used." 77 There was a live issue at the trial as to what the inspectors observed when they visited the site. Curtis J said: "It is reasonable to suppose that these inspectors did from time to time observe concentrations of visible dust which must have been in excess of the Dreesen standard and men there working without respiratory protection." 78 The reference to the Dreesen standard is important as Curtis J found that, throughout the period of Mr Hay's employment at Wallerawang, the State knew that exposure to concentrations of asbestos dust in excess of the Dreesen standard was dangerous. 79 In my view, in saying, "It is reasonable to suppose that these inspectors did from time to time observe concentrations of visible dust … " Curtis J was making a factual finding as to what the inspectors observed. The word "suppose" is properly to be understood as "infer". 80 There is a difficulty, however, in understanding precisely what this finding means. There can be no doubt that it means at least that the inspectors did from time to time observe concentrations of visible dust and men working on the site without respiratory protection. Having regard to the evidence recounted by Curtis J concerning the "white particles" that fell like "snowflakes", the finding as to the knowledge of the inspectors, I think, implicitly, was a finding that the inspectors must have known that the dust included asbestos dust. The dust they observed, after all, was the dust as described by Mr Hay and the other workers who testified. Having regard to the reasons of Curtis J, as a whole, I consider that his Honour held, implicitly, that the inspectors must have known that the dust they observed included asbestos dust. 81 I do not think, however, that Curtis J found, implicitly or otherwise, that the inspectors observed that the dust was in excess of the Dreesen standard; that is a matter that is not capable of detection by the eye alone. 82 Curtis J made no express finding as to whether the inspectors knew or should have known of Dr Cook's 1942 report. Moreover, his Honour made no express finding as to whether, merely from their observations on the site, the inspectors knew or should have known that the quantity of asbestos dust they observed could be seriously harmful to those who were exposed to it. 83 In considering whether Curtis J made any implicit findings in this regard, the following evidence, recounted by his Honour, must be borne in mind. The New South Wales Department of Health formed a division of industrial hygiene in 1923. As early as 1927 a report by the Division to the Minister referred to asbestosis as a dust disease. A 1938 report to the Minister cited findings that: "Because clear cut cases of asbestosis were found only in dust concentrations exceeding five million particles per cubic foot and because they were not found at lower dust concentration, five million particles per cubic foot may be regarded tentatively as the threshold value for asbestos dust exposure until better data are available."

[30]

The information in the State's possession included a report by the Director General of Public Health in 1948 which warned that intermittent exposure to asbestos for about five minutes on each occasion, two or three times a week, gave rise to such danger that a substitute should be used. 84 According to the 1938 report, lectures and demonstrations about the "problems with dust and ventilation" were given periodically to groups of persons including factory inspectors. 85 Curtis J found that, by 1949, the Division was aware of the perils associated with asbestos and, in particular: "[T]he State through the Division of Industrial Hygiene was at the time of Mr Hay's employment at Wallerawang cognisant of all the information concerning the risks of asbestos inhalation currently available to experts in the field of Australia, the United Kingdom and America. 86 It does not necessarily follow, however, from the findings his Honour made, and the evidence to which he referred, that he found, implicitly, that the inspectors knew or should have known that the asbestos dust they observed was of a quantity sufficient to be harmful to the workers. 87 A further factor relevant to this issue is a report, described as the "Jones report," and his Honour's observations in connection with it. 88 Mr Trevor Jones was a scientific officer of the Division of Industrial Hygiene of the Department of Health and, also, a (temporary) inspector of the Department of Labour and Industry appointed under the Scaffolding and Lifts Act 1912. 89 On 11 June 1958, Mr Jones visited Wallerawang at the request of the power station site committee representing the combined unions employed on the project. Mr Jones was familiar with the then medical and scientific knowledge concerning the dangers of asbestos. He inspected the site and carried out dust sampling. On 28 August 1958 Mr Jones wrote a report of his visit to the director of the Division of Industrial Hygiene, and sent copies to the Department of Labour and Industry, Rolls Royce, the Wallerawang Power Station Site Committee, and the State Electricity Commission. 90 Mr Jones reported in relation to the laggers' work as follows: "The work area was well ventilated being towards the open end of the partly constructed station. Samples for asbestos exposure were taken in the laggers' breathing zones during application of 'high temp' insulation to a straight pipe and again when doing a curved section. A further sample was taken on the gallery below this position to assess possible exposure here. Only intermittent work is done at such positions. The gallery floors are of open mesh steel. There was no covering to prevent insulating material from falling through. About twelve laggers were doing this work at various levels. The results of the tests are included in the table." 91 Mr Jones set out the results of the air sampling he had taken. He had taken samples in five different areas. In only one area did the sample reflect asbestos fibre concentration above the recommended international standard of five million particles per cubic foot. This was in connection with the operation of "applying the 'Hi-Temp' insulation to pipe bonds". The result here was asbestos fibre concentration of 13 millions of particles per cubic foot. 92 Mr Jones commented on the results as follows: "The majority of these results are below the recommended international standard of five million particles per cubic foot. In one case, however, that of applying the 'Hi Temp' insulation to pipe bonds in the open power station the dust concentration was in excess of this standard. Owing to the short duration of this work, and its intermittency, it is not anticipated that any physiological response has yet occurred to those employed on the lagging of curved section of pipes with 'Hi Temp' insulation. However, it is considered that these employees should be supplied with efficient respiratory protection (dust respirators) when required to do this curved insulation which requires much cutting and scrapping of the blocks. It is also suggested that any employee who has had more than five years employment at such work, should be x-rayed as a precautionary measure." 93 Curtis J observed that when Mr Jones reported on his inspection "he did so as a man abreast of current medical and scientific literature on the dangers of asbestos". Nevertheless, Curtis J noted, Mr Jones testified that he believed that only "prolonged exposure" was a source of real risk. It was put to Mr Jones: "The overwhelming view among persons such as yourself, I want to suggest, that you were aware of, was that the concern was the fear of asbestosis by prolonged exposure of workers."

[32]

His Honour commented: "I have had some difficulty reconciling the evidence of the workers with the findings of Mr Jones … Mr Jones measured one position only at the site as having a concentration of dust exceeding five million particles per cubic foot and he does not appear to have noticed the conditions described by the men, or a haze … It appears probable that before Mr Jones attended upon the site for his measurements, the lagging work may have been temporarily suspended or that his inspection was early in the day before the dust had accumulated in the air." 95 Curtis J made no finding that Mr Jones' evidence was not credible, and no suggestion was made to this Court to that effect. His Honour made no further attempt to resolve the apparent conflict between Mr Jones' report and the evidence of Mr Hay and the workers. It does seem, however, that his Honour accepted that Mr Jones did not actually know that a brief exposure to a concentration of asbestos dust above the Dreesen standard could cause serious injury. 96 Mr Jones' beliefs as to the lack of danger from brief exposure to asbestos seem to have been shared by the government departments to which he was attached (including the inspectors). Nevertheless, information was in the possession of the State to the effect that a brief exposure to a concentration of asbestos dust, above the Dreesen standard, could cause serious injury. 97 Curtis J made no express finding that, prior to the Jones report, the inspectors (and the State) knew or should have known that a brief exposure to asbestos might cause injury. On the findings made by the judge, and the evidence recounted by him, it is not open to infer that he made an implicit finding to this effect. 98 His Honour also made no express finding that, after the receipt and distribution of the Jones report, the State knew or ought to have known that a brief exposure to asbestos might cause serious injury. The question arises whether he made an implicit finding to that effect. 99 A copy of the Jones report was given to Mr Bill Slade, an inspector appointed pursuant to the Scaffolding and Lifts Act 1912. During the relevant period, Mr Slade was the liaison officer of the Department of Labour and Industry who met each week with officers of the Division of Industrial Hygiene to discuss matters of common interest. Mr Jones described the system as follows: "[A]t the weekly meeting, our reports would be handed to Mr Slade and we would point out any recommendations that were to be made in those reports to overcome particular problems, which he then would take back to the department and a direction would be issued to the employer to do something about it and that would be then the responsibility of either one of the inspectors of head office or one of the regional inspectors that were scattered throughout Sydney and the state." 100 The standard practice during 1958 was that "all reports that were produced in the period from the previous meeting were passed over to the liaison inspector and any matters needing attention by the DLI were highlighted and discussed". 101 It is common ground that after the distribution of the Jones report the State knew of the information contained therein. 102 That information was, relevantly, only to the effect that, at the site, the Dreesen standard was exceeded in one area alone, namely, in connection with the operation of "applying the 'Hi Temp' insulation to pipe bonds". This not the area where Mr Hay was working. Although it is possible that the asbestos dust in the offending area could have drifted down to where Mr Hay was working, Mr Jones' tests revealed that the air in Mr Hay's area was below the Dreesen standard. 103 As I have mentioned, the judge accepted that, because of the "short duration of this work, and its intermittency" Mr Jones did not consider that the asbestos dust in the offending area constituted a danger. 104 In all the circumstances I do not think that Curtis J held, implicitly, that, before or after receipt of the Jones report, the State knew or ought to have known that brief and intermittent exposure to the quantities of dust observed by the inspectors at the Wallerawang power station site might cause injury to workers. His Honour did not address these questions. 105 I shall proceed, however, by assuming (but without deciding) that, at all relevant times before the distribution of the Jones report, the inspectors actually knew that exposure to the quantities of dust observed by them at the Wallerawang power station site might cause harm to workers. I discuss below whether such assumed knowledge by the inspectors prior to the Jones report is to be attributed to the State. 106 I shall also assume that at all relevant times after the distribution of the Jones report the State knew that exposure to the quantities of dust at the Wallerawang power station site might cause harm to workers.

[33]

The statutory regime 107 The relevant powers of the State for the purposes of this appeal were those contained in the Scaffolding and Lifts Act 1912 (the Scaffolding and Lifts Act 1912 was renamed the Construction Safety Act 1912. This Act was then repealed and replaced by the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000). 108 Section 5 of the Act provided: "The Governor may, for carrying out the provisions of this Act, appoint such inspectors as he may deem necessary. One of such inspectors shall be appointed Chief Inspector of Scaffolding and Lifts. The Chief Inspector so appointed shall have and may exercise and discharge in or in relation to any district in which this Act has effect for the time being, the powers, authorities, duties and functions conferred and imposed by or under this Act on the Chief Inspector. Each inspector so appointed shall have and may exercise and discharge in or in relation to any district in which this Act has effect for the time being, the powers, authorities, duties and functions conferred and imposed by or under this Act on an inspector." 109 The Scaffolding and Lifts Regulations 1950 provided that the qualifications of the Chief Inspector and of every Inspector were to be such as determined from time to time by the Public Service Board of New South Wales. 110 Regulation 10 provided: "The Chief Inspector shall, subject to the direction and control of the Under Secretary, Department of Labour and Industry and Social Welfare, be responsible for the regulation and supervision of the duties of inspectors." 111 It is common ground that work being carried out by Mr Hay was "building work" within the meaning of the Act. 112 Section 13 of the Act provided: "Every inspector shall have power - (a) to inspect and examine any … plant or gear constructed or used, or in course of construction, or any building work … in any district, and for that purpose may enter any building, place or premise at all reasonable times; (b) to make such examination and inquiries as he thinks necessary to ascertain whether the requirements of this Act are being or have been complied with." 113 Section 15 provided: "(1) Where it appears to an inspector - (a) that … the manner of carrying out any building work … would be dangerous to human life or limb; or (b) that with regard to … any building work … in any district, the regulations made under this Act are not being complied with, he may give such directions in writing to … the owner, contractor, person in charge or apparently in charge of such building work … as he thinks necessary in order to prevent accidents or to ensure a compliance with such regulations; and such person shall, unless notice of appeal is given as hereinafter provided, forthwith carry out such directions. (2) Where an inspector gives any directions under subsection one of this section for the reason set forth in paragraph (a) of that subsection he may at the time of giving such directions or subsequently thereto order - (a) … (b) … (c) order the contractor or person in charge or apparently in charge of any building work … in respect of which such directions are given to discontinue such work. Any order or variation thereof given under this sub-section shall unless sooner revoked have effect until such directions have or any order on appeal therefrom has been complied with. … (3) Any directions given under subsection one of this section or any order given under subsection two of this section may be varied from time to time or revoked. (4) The person to whom any directions have been given under this section may within twenty-four hours after such directions have been given to him appeal against such directions to the Minister. Notice of such appeal shall be given to the inspector. The Minister shall refer the appeal to such Board of reference, constituted under section 5A of this Act, as he considers appropriate to hear the appeal. Such Board of Reference shall hear the appeal with all reasonable despatch at such time and place as it causes to be notified to the appellant and the inspector. The Board of Reference shall report its findings to the Minister who may make such order as he thinks fit. Every such order of the Minister shall be final and conclusive. (5) Any person who fails to comply: - (a) with any direction or order given to him by an inspector pursuant to this section; or (b) with any order made by the Minister pursuant to this section, shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding one hundred pounds." 114 Regulation 13 provided: "An inspector shall have power to: … (c) direct …. the contractor or person in charge or apparently in charge of any building work … to take such measures and furnish such equipment and assistance as the inspector may require to facilitate any inspection, and such person shall forthwith carry out such directions." 115 Regulation 73 provided: "Any person who directly or by his servants or agents carries out any building work shall take all measures that appear necessary or advisable to minimise accident risk and to prevent injury to the health of persons engaged in such building work and for this purpose, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, he shall - … (9) cause all working places and approaches thereto to be adequately ventilated by the circulation of fresh air the ventilation to be such as to render harmless all fumes, dust or other impurities that may be injurious to health, generated or produced by any means in any such working place and approach; (10) where in connection with any chipping, grinding, cleaning, spraying or manipulation of any material, there is given off any dust or fume of such a character and to such extent, as to be likely to be injurious to the health of persons employed, take all practicable measures either by securing adequate ventilation or by the provision and use of respirators or otherwise to prevent inhalation of such dust or fume. Only respirators of a type approved by the Chief Inspector shall be used for this purpose." 116 Essentially, the power on which James Hardie relies is that which was contained in s 15. This gave power to inspectors to give directions where it appeared to them that the manner of carrying out work would have been dangerous or where the regulations under the Act were being contravened. The directions may have been given to the owner, contractor or person in charge of the work. The directions that inspectors were empowered to give were directions that they thought necessary "to prevent accidents to ensure a compliance with such regulations". 117 Regulation 73(9) is of particular relevance to this case. It required the contractor or person in charge of building work to cause all working places to be ventilated adequately by the circulation of fresh air and to cause the ventilation to be such as to render harmless all dust injurious to health generated in the working place. Regulation 73 further provided that, where dust injurious to the health of persons employed is given off, the contractor or person in charge was obligated to "take all practicable measures either by securing adequate ventilation or by the provision and use of respirators or otherwise to prevent inhalation of such dust or fume." 118 The Act provided for a sanction in the event of non-compliance with a direction given by an inspector. In terms of s 15(5), any person who failed to comply with a direction given to him by an inspector pursuant to s 15 was liable to a penalty (of one hundred pounds). 119 Plainly, one of the main purposes of the Act was to empower inspectors to take steps to prevent workers being employed in ways potentially dangerous to them (including where workers were employed in areas that were potentially dangerous because of dust generated on the work site).

[35]

For this reason, his Honour concluded that no duty of care as contended for by James Hardie could arise. 121 His Honour considered that this issue was determined by Oceanic Crest Shipping Co v Pilbara Harbour Services Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 626. He referred particularly to the following observation by Gibbs CJ (at 639): "Even though the person who committed the tort was employed under a contract of service, the employer will not be liable if the tortfeasor was executing an independent duty which the law cast upon him." 122 Oceanic Crest concerned the question whether the employer of a pilot employed to provide pilotage services for vessels entering or leaving the port of Dampier was vicariously liable for the negligence of the pilot. By a majority the High Court held that the employer was not so liable as the pilot was a public officer executing an independent duty. Underlying the ruling of the majority was the proposition that a pilot was "an independent professional man in discharging his skilled duties" (per Earl Loreburn in Fowles v Eastern and Australian Steamship Company Limited [1916] 2 AC 556 at 562, quoted by Gibbs CJ in Oceanic Crest at 635-636). 123 Curtis J equated, in effect, the duties carried out by the inspectors when they visited the power station site with the duties of the pilot in Oceanic Crest. Mr Ireland QC (who together with Mr Burn appeared for the State) supported this finding and submitted further that, as the inspectors were carrying out independent discretionary duties, whatever knowledge they gained in the course of their duties in visiting the site could not be attributed to the State. 124 I am unable to accept that the duties of the inspectors are analogous to those of the pilot. The line of managerial command to which inspectors were subject was contained in the Scaffolding and Lifts Act 1912 and the regulations under the Act. Inspectors were appointed by the Governor. A Chief Inspector was appointed from the ranks of the inspectors. The Chief Inspector was responsible for the regulation and supervision of the duties of inspectors. The Chief Inspector, in turn, was subject to the direction and control of the Under-Secretary, Department of Labour and Industry and Social Welfare. Thus, the Minister, through the Under-Secretary, exercised control over the inspectors. 125 There can be no doubt, in my view, that - under this line of management - the Minister would have been entitled to instruct the Under-Secretary to ensure that an inspector visit a particular site and put a stop to a particular work practice the Minister considered to be dangerous. The Under-Secretary, in turn, would have been entitled - as part of his or her power to direct and control the Chief Inspector - to repeat those instructions to the Chief Inspector, who, as part of his or her power to regulate and supervise the inspectors, would have been entitled to pass on such instructions to them. 126 In Wetzel v District Court of New South Wales (1998) 43 NSWLR 687 Mason P said (at 688): "A system of responsible ministerial government is a key element in our polity. Executive power is made accountable, by various means, to the organs of representative government: Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 559. In concept, there is a clear distinction between the exercise of public and private authority or power. Control of the former, politically, is ensured through 'line management' accountability; and, legally, through strict adherence to rule of law principles. Effective line management permits, indeed requires, control to be exercised through ministers, department heads or senior executive officers, and thereafter through the public sector pursuant to the mechanisms provided (in this State) by the Public Sector Management Act 1988. Parliament is free to establish executive bodies that are accountable to none but itself and the courts. But the constitutional principles I have referred to mean that the onus rests clearly upon those who would construe a grant of legislative authority to do a ministerial act as conferring an independent discretion that can ignore (lawful) policy directives issued with the authority of a minister."

[37]

The Chief Justice went on to say (at 96): "In short, the master remains in command of the ship and he is under a duty to take over the navigation of the ship if in his judgment the conduct of the pilot is bringing the ship into danger. But the occasions upon which the master is called upon to exercise that reserve of authority either by interfering with the conduct of the ship or by taking the navigation out of the hands of a competent pilot are rare and should the master exercise that reserve authority he must justify his action: see Workington Harbour and Dock Board v Towerfield (owners) [1951] AC 112 at 141." 131 Thus, the measure of discretion afforded to a pilot is far greater than that afforded to an inspector. 132 In my opinion, Curtis J erred in deciding by reference to the principle laid down by the High Court in Oceanic Crest that the Scaffolding and Lifts Act 1912 only conferred power on inspectors to control "risk producing activity at Wallerawang" and that the inspectors "were not subject to Ministerial control or direction in the performance of their duties". 133 Having come to this conclusion, it follows that I would not uphold Mr Ireland's submission that the knowledge of the inspectors cannot be attributed to the State. I would add that this conclusion is supported by Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee v Gibson (2000) 20 NSWCCR 417 at 429, [33] per Mason P; see also the remarks of Gaudron J in Crimmins at 23, [41]. 134 It is convenient at this point to deal with an argument raised peripherally by Mr Douglas. He submitted that the knowledge of the inspectors of Pacific Power (that is, not the State inspectors referred to in [133] previously) should be attributed to the State. Mr Douglas argued this issue but faintly and did not, in his oral submissions, refer to or identify the knowledge of the Pacific Power inspectors that he submitted was to be attributed to the State. 135 In Babcock International Ltd v Babcock Australia Ltd (2002) 56 NSWLR 51 (at 61) it was held that even if the Electricity Commission was a representative of the Crown (and no view was expressed in this regard) the Electricity Commission was not the representative of the Crown for all purposes and was not deemed to be the Crown. In my reasons in that case (with which Sheller JA and Heydon JA agreed) I referred to Tamlin v Hannaford [1950] 1 KB 18, Launceston Corporation v The Hydro-Electric Commission (1959) 100 CLR 654 and State Authorities Superannuation Board v Commissioner of State Taxation (WA) (1996) 189 CLR 253 and said (at 61): "[These cases] emphasise the distinct and separate nature of statutory corporations such as the Electricity Commission. They emphasise that the mere fact that corporations of this kind are under the control of a Minister of the Crown does not mean that they are to be regarded as part of the Crown. From their tenor it can be said there is no good reason in policy or principle for attributing to a statutory corporation knowledge of Ministers of the Crown whose duties are unrelated to the corporation and who have no direct statutory connection with it. Thus, even if the Electricity Commission was the agent of the Crown for the purposes of supplying electricity and related matters it does not follow that the Electricity Commission was the representative of the Crown in other matters, including matters of health. There is nothing in the nature of the position of the Minister who had powers of direction and control over the Electricity Commission that warrants attributing to him or her the knowledge of other Ministers of the Crown or government departments whose functions differ from the supply of electricity. There is nothing in the Electricity Commission Act itself that carries the remotest suggestion that the knowledge of other Ministers of the Crown should be attributed to the Electricity Commission. There is no reason not to treat the Electricity Commission as an independent entity, unconnected with Ministers of the Crown other than the Minister having the control and direction of the Commission under s 7 of the Act." 136 Applying the same reasoning, I am of the opinion that, as Pacific Power is to be regarded as a distinct and separate statutory corporation, the knowledge of Pacific Power is not to be attributed to the State itself.

[39]

Did the State owe Mr Hay a duty of care? 140 I start the inquiry from the standpoint that, generally, a public authority, which is under no statutory obligation to exercise a power, owes no common law duty of care to do so. A common law duty of care will, however, arise when an authority, by its conduct, acts in a manner that requires the exercise of the power. The totality of the relationship between the parties has to be taken into account in determining whether a duty of care is to be recognised. The mere fact that statutory powers are provided and the authority concerned knows that harm may result from a failure to take affirmative action is insufficient to create an affirmative duty of care. 141 None of the specific exceptional categories identified in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman are categories into which the circumstances of this case fall. James Hardie's argument, however, is that the State attracted a duty of care, as the circumstances of the case are analogous to those in Pyrenees, or in Crimmins. 142 There was, undoubtedly, a power on the part of the State to direct Mr Hay's employer, Rolls Royce, to take appropriate remedial steps to prevent the inhalation by Mr Hay of asbestos dust. But the power of the State in this respect and the degree of control exercised by it differed significantly from the control exercisable by the Council in Pyrenees and the Authority in Crimmins. 143 The State was not the sole entity with knowledge of the potential dangers of the asbestos dust on the power station site. Rolls Royce and James Hardie (and, presumably, Pacific Power) had no less knowledge than the State. This fundamentally distinguishes this case from Pyrenees. 144 The control exercised by the State in this case came nowhere near the extraordinary degree of control exercisable by the Authority in Crimmins. The two are not comparable. The State had no power to direct Mr Hay where to work, and did not direct Mr Hay to work in a transient and casual employment - factors regarded in Crimmins as being of great importance. Mr Hay was not working in an industry that was a "uniquely organised one" (per Callinan J in Graham Barclay Oysters at 663, [317]). 145 Moreover, in this case, the State was empowered to regulate conduct in a situation where, in the words of Gummow and Hayne JJ in Graham Barclay Oysters (at 596, [145]), the field of endeavour was "populated by self-interested commercial actors who themselves possess some power to avert those risks". Rolls Royce and James Hardie, themselves, had ample power to avert the risks. The position of Pacific Power must also be taken into account (bearing in mind that it, too, was held liable to Mr Hay). 146 There was a tier of commercial entities in whom primary control over the activities of Mr Hay (in the case of Rolls Royce) and the hazardous products with which he was required to work (in the case of Rolls Royce and James Hardie) was vested. 147 Rolls Royce as employer owed Mr Hay the ordinary duty to provide a safe system of work. This duty of care is fundamental to the employment relationship. Rolls Royce had day-to-day control over the workplace and intimate and direct knowledge of what was taking place on site. Rolls Royce controlled and directed the activities of Mr Hay himself. The State did not have that degree of power and control. The practical capacity of the State to prevent danger to Mr Hay was substantially less than that of Rolls Royce. James Hardie, as manufacturer and supplier of the asbestos product, also had greater practical capacity than the State to prevent harm to Mr Hay. So had Pacific Power, as owner and occupier of the power station site. 148 I come to the issue of prior intervention to eliminate the risk. 149 In Pyrenees, the Council, on 12 August 1988, sent a letter to the occupier of the premises where the fireplace was situated drawing attention to the fire hazard constituted thereby. The letter concluded: "It is therefore imperative that the abovementioned fireplaces be not used any circumstances unless: - (a) Structurally sound repairs are made to make the chimneys and fireplaces safe. (b) General repairs are made to mortar and brickwork to make the walls heat resistant and prevent smoke leakage. (c) Alternatively, repair the fireplaces structurally and seal both fireplaces openings permanently and discontinue the use." 150 Brennan CJ (at [340, [11]), Toohey J (at 353, [47-49]) and Gummow J (at 383-384, [151]) accepted that, in sending the letter of 12 August 1988, the Council exercised the power conferred upon it by the relevant legislation. I have drawn attention to the fact that in Graham Barclay Oysters McHugh J (at 581, [94]) said that the Council had come under a duty of care in Pyrenees "because it knew of the risk of harm to specific individuals, it had power to take steps to eliminate the risk and importantly, at an earlier stage, had given directions to eliminate the risk". The giving of "directions", to which his Honour referred, was the sending of the letter. Kirby J (at 631, [249]) took into account that, by inspecting the premises and sending the letter, the Council had embarked upon preventative action in the exercise of its statutory powers.

[40]

151 Thus, in Pyrenees, in addition to the inspection by the Council, there had been a positive exercise of its powers to compel affirmative action (an exercise that proved to be inadequate). 152 In the present case, Mr Douglas argued that the State had "embarked upon the exercise of their powers by going along and inspecting [the premises and] getting a report". By the "report" he was referring to the Jones report. He submitted that the Jones report was a "warning signal like the letter in Pyrenees". 153 The Jones report, however, was not akin to the letter to the Council in Pyrenees. Although it set out recommendations (that were not implemented), it was not a document that called for or was capable of compelling affirmative action on the part of Rolls Royce or anyone else. It was not a statutory direction to eliminate the risk (as the letter in Pyrenees was). 154 The acts of the State relied on by James Hardie did not increase the risk of harm to any person, and did not engender in any relevant person a sense of reliance on the State. In my view, they are not of particular significance in determining whether a duty of care arose. 155 There are other factors that militate against the recognition of a duty of care in this case. 156 As in Graham Barclay Oysters, this is a case "where the duty allegedly is owed not to industry participants but to the ultimate consumer" (see Gummow and Hayne JJ at 596, [144-145] and 610, [185]). This is, in itself, a factor to be taken into account. The reality is that, practically speaking, the State can only be liable if the employer is liable. The claim by James Hardie is an attempt by the manufacturer and supplier, a party directly responsible (with others) for the injury suffered by Mr Hay, to redirect the cost to it of having to pay part of Mr Hay's damages. Of course, James Hardie is perfectly entitled to assert such a claim, but the overall picture is such that the need to recognise a duty of care by the State to Mr Hay is less than compelling from a social point of view. 157 In Woolcock Street Investments Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ said in regard to the vulnerability of a plaintiff in cases where a duty of care to avoid economic loss has been held to have been owed (at [23]): "'Vulnerability', in this context, is not to be understood as meaning only that the plaintiff was likely to suffer damage if reasonable care was not taken. Rather, 'vulnerability' is to be understood as a reference to the plaintiff's inability to protect itself from the consequences of a defendant's want of reasonable care, either entirely or at least in a way which would cast the consequences of loss on the defendant."

[42]

159 A further factor is that the duty contended for is a duty to control the conduct of third persons. As was said in Woolcock Street Investments by Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ (at [89]): "The common law has always been reluctant to impose a duty to control others." 160 In Parramatta City Council v Lutz Kirby P referred (at 308) to the judgment of the Privy Council in Rowling v Takaro Properties Limited [1988] AC 473. In that case Lord Keith referred to the danger of imposing excessive burdens on public authorities. Kirby P discussed his Lordship's remarks in the following terms: "Lord Keith of Kinkel referred to a number of circumstances from which he concluded that it would not be appropriate to impose a legal duty of care on the Minister in negligence … Whilst it was to be hoped that, as a general rule, imposition of liability in negligence would lead to a higher standard of care in the performance of the relevant type of act, sometimes not only might this not be so but the imposition of liability might even lead to harmful consequences (at [502]): '… the cure may be worse than the disease. There are reasons for believing that this may be so in cases where liability is imposed [upon] local authorities whose building inspectors have been negligent in relation to the inspection of foundations, as in the case of Anns v Merton London Borough Council (1978) AC 728 itself; because there is a danger that the building inspectors of some local authorities may react to that decision by simply increasing, unnecessarily, the requisite depth of foundations, thereby imposing a very substantial and unnecessary financial burden [upon] members of the community … " In the present case, it was urged that, if local government authorities acted prematurely in issuing demolition orders and were too rigid and inflexible in enforcing such orders once made, (lest they be held liable in negligence for the subsequent losses caused to ratepayers during any delay) the result could be unnecessary interference by such authorities in the normal prerogatives of property owners. It could provide oppressive administration, contrary to recent beneficial developments in administrative law in Australia both by statute and in the courts. 161 Considerations of this kind arise in this case. A finding that there is a duty of care may lead to the giving of premature and unnecessary directions and would be an incentive to not inspect particular buildings where it is known that hazards to workers are not self-evident and may be hard to find. 162 In all the circumstances I do not think that a duty of care as contended for by James Hardie should be imposed (that is, even assuming actual knowledge of the State at all relevant times of the possibility that a brief exposure to asbestos might cause the workers serious harm). 163 I propose that the appeal be dismissed with costs. 164 McCOLL JA: I have read Ipp JA's reasons. I agree with them and the orders he proposes. **********

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Judgment (43 paragraphs)

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Cases Cited (19)