(3) If the answer to that question is "no", the third question is, is Uwoykand entitled, as a matter of law, to insist upon those matters being included in the consent determination?
36 The answer to the second question was plainly in the negative.
37 I am satisfied that Uwoykand is not entitled, as a matter of law, to insist upon the matters proposed by the respondent in para (a)([d]) and proposed para 3(h)(i) of its written submissions being included in the consent determination.
38 First, the respondent has not advanced any persuasive arguments supporting any finding that it would be entitled to insist upon those matters being included in the consent determination.
39 The high point of the submissions for the respondent in respect of proposed para (a)([d]) can be found in the following submissions:
MR WATERS: Yes, your Honour. So I was emphasising the need - I mean - the biosecurity requirement is but one instance of some justification for the giving of notice of some kind as to intended presence of the land, so that compliance can be achieved. But it's also - it's going to be important for the activities or contemplated activities of both the pastoralists, my client, and the native title holders. For example, the placement of cattle that are calving in an area that's going to be occupied for the purpose of hunting may be something - certainly, something should be avoided and can be avoided simply by some degree of interaction that involves notice and cooperation.
We're not trying to stifle use. We're not trying to dominate out of existence the native title rights. My client is simply trying to ensure that if a fire is seen, or people are seen camping, it will have some idea who they might be. If it has received notice that they are Wakaman people, then its concerns may be relieved. If it hasn't received notice, it's left wondering, as has been the case, who the people are and by what authority they purport to be on the property. Conversely, if the native title holders want to come on the property, it's in their interests to know that it - their presence won't be disturbed by mustering or activities at - on that occasion.
(transcript 21 July 2023 pp 47-48)
40 Later, Mr Waters continued:
…there is, in my submission, no good reason why something of the kind proposed in paragraph 3(a) of our submissions cannot and should not be capable of being bedded down very swiftly.
It, in my submission, is in the interests of all concerned, and in the interests of justice, in that Mr O'Gorman has identified the potential - or some of the potential shortcomings in other means of enforcement, through police and so forth. I will say a little bit more about that in a minute, but it's my submission that the reasonableness of what is, on its face, put forward in 3(a), demands negotiation in good faith. Leaving aside issues of timing, it would be a matter raised - if raised in mediation, that it would be perfunctory and perhaps indicative of a want of good faith, for a party to simply say, "We're not going to say why, but we simply don't" - "aren't going to talk about that." "It's not going to be put on the agenda."
And that's really the response that we've had. Now, that has been married up with perhaps poor articulation of our position. It has been married up with people taking entrenched positions and busying themselves preparing lengthy affidavits, but it remains the case that the issue is not a complicated one, and it's one that has been dealt with time and again. And I'm inviting your Honour to see some degree of benefit and wisdom in averting the sort of controversies that might happen down the track - or I should say will happen, because if parties don't know what each other are up to, or what expectations each other hold, there is going to be a worsening of relationships, rather than an improvement.
(transcript p 49)
41 In summary, Uwoykand submitted that it would be reasonable for proposed para (a)([d]) to be included in the s 87A Agreement and subsequently the consent determination, because there would be "some degree of benefit and wisdom in averting the sort of controversies that might happen down the track".
42 Notwithstanding the capacity of the parties to agree upon the term as proposed by the respondent, this argument falls far short of an entitlement on the part of Uwoykand to have such a term included in the proposed consent determination (see observations of Mansfield J, albeit in a different context, in Brown at [26]).
43 Second, no argument of substance has been advanced by Uwoykand that its interests would not be protected by the s 87A Agreement, which Uwoykand has had in final draft form since 18 April 2023 (and to which it previously indicated agreement through its lawyer Mr Cameron).
44 I further note s 44H of the Native Title Act, which provides:
Rights conferred by valid leases etc.
To avoid doubt, if:
(a) the grant, issue or creation of a lease, licence, permit or authority is valid (including because of any provision of this Act); and
(b) the lease, licence, permit or authority requires or permits the doing of any activity (whether or not subject to any conditions); and
(ba) an activity is done in accordance with the lease, licence, permit or authority and any such conditions;
then:
(c) the requirement or permission, and the doing of the activity, prevail over any native title rights and interests and any exercise of those rights and interests, but do not extinguish them; and
(d) the existence and exercise of the native title rights and interests do not prevent the doing of the activity; and
(e) native title holders are not entitled to compensation under this Act for the doing of the activity.
Note 1: Any compensation to which the native title holders may be entitled under this Act for the grant of the lease, licence, permit or authority may take into account the doing of the activity.
Note 2: This section is not intended to imply that the person carrying on the activity is not subject to the laws of a State or Territory.
45 Section 24AA also provides:
…
Activities etc. prevail over native title
(7) To avoid doubt, section 44H provides that a valid lease, licence, permit or authority, and any activity done under it, prevail over any native title rights and interests and their exercise.
46 Section 44H was examined in detail by the Full Court in De Rose v State of South Australia (No 2) (2005) 145 FCR 290; [2005] FCAFC 110 in the following terms:
159 Section 44H of the NTA does not alter this conclusion. In our view, s 44H is not intended to apply where the rights granted under a lease extinguish the very native title rights and interests which are affected by the 'doing of any activity' in accordance with the lease. If s 44H applied in that situation, it would contradict s 23G(1)(b)(i) of the NTA which confirms the extinguishment of native title rights and interests in the same circumstances. Given the elaborate scheme of Div 2B of Part 2 of the NTA and corresponding State and Territory legislation confirming past extinguishment of native title, it is hardly likely that s 44H was intended to prevail over s 23G(1)(b)(i).
160 In any event, s 44H is concerned with the non-extinguishment of native title rights and interests by reason of 'an activity' done in accordance with a lease or other instrument. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Native Title Amendment Bill 1997 (Cth) ('Explanatory Memorandum') (pars 6.21-6.28) distinguishes between rights and interests granted and activities performed in accordance with the instrument granting those rights and interests. The Explanatory Memorandum gives two examples of such activities. One relates to 'irrigation activities' conducted pursuant to an irrigation licence (pars 6.26-6.27) and the other to prospecting for minerals on land affected by native title (par 6.28). The Explanatory Memorandum refers to both of these activities as 'physical actions'.
161 The Explanatory Memorandum identifies the concern that s 44H seeks to address as the possible need, following the decision in Wik, for pastoral lessees 'to obtain the agreement of native title holders in order to control activities under their lease, such as construct a dam' (par 6.21). Section 44H is said to be:
'intended to ensure that, provided the lease is valid in accordance with the NTA, the lessee is able to carry on activities under the lease notwithstanding native title.'
162 The Explanatory Memorandum supports a construction of s 44H that restricts its operation to activities carried out in accordance with rights and interests granted under a lease and not to the rights and interests granted by the lease. In the present context, that construction would enable the lessee to use the land for any activity that is necessary or incidental to constructing improvements on the land. The lessee's right to carry out those activities would thus prevail over, but not extinguish, any conflicting native title rights and interests. But s 44H would not prevent the right granted under the lease to construct and use the improvement (that is, the house, dam, airstrip or other improvement) from extinguishing native title. However, in view of the conclusion that s 44H does not apply to the rights in question in the present case, it is unnecessary to form a final view on this question of construction.
163 Given that conclusion, it is also not necessary to decide whether (as the State submitted) s 44H applies only to an activity done after the commencement of the NTAA 1998, which introduced s 44H into the NTA. The better view, however, would seem to be that s 44H is not intended to be so limited.
164 The fact that s 44H of the NTA is expressed in the present tense does not imply that the provision is not to apply to events occurring before the date of its commencement: NTA, s 250. Item 17(2) of Sch 5 to the NTAA 1998 states that s 44H applies, inter alia, to the grant of a lease at any time, whether before or after the commencement of the section. It is true, as the Solicitor-General pointed out, that Item 17(2) (unlike Item 17(1) in relation to s 24GC) does not explicitly state that s 44H applies to activities undertaken at any time. On the other hand Item 17(2) does not seek to override s 250 by stating explicitly that s 44H is not intended to apply to activities undertaken before the commencement of the NTAA 1998. If Item 17(2) was intended to distinguish between the grant of a lease (or some other interest) and the doing of an activity required or permitted by the lease, it might have been expected to say so explicitly. Finally, as s 24GC explicitly applies only to leases granted on or before 23 December 1996 there was no need for Item 17(1) to deal with leases, as opposed to activities, prior to the commencement of the section.
165 The State's argument on retrospectivity may have more force if s 44H was located in Div 3 of Part 2 of the NTA, which is headed 'Future acts etc and native title'. The section is, however, placed in Div 4 of Part 2, headed 'Other provisions relating to native title'. It is so placed notwithstanding the oddity that s 24AA, which purports to give an overview of Div 3, summarises in subsection (7) (albeit not quite accurately) the effect of s 44H.
47 To the extent that activities of Uwoykand could conflict with proposed activities of members of the Wakaman Applicant, s 44H would appear to grant precedence to Uwoykand as the registered holder of a pastoral lease, and is supportive of the position that the interests of Uwoykand are to that extent protected.
48 Further, in relation to proposed para 3(h)(i), insofar as the s 87A Agreement describes the nature of the interest of Uwoykand, it does so in Schedule 2 to that Agreement by reference to the pastoral lease held by Uwoykand the subject of proposed para 3(h)(i). At the hearing, a copy of the relevant Title to the pastoral lease of Uwoykand was tendered, describing the Registered Lessee as follows:
Dealing No: 719441408 04/06/2019
UWOYKAND CORPORATION PTY LTD A.C.N. 629 167 737 TRUSTEE
UNDER INSTRUMENT 719441408
49 Ms Longbottom at the hearing submitted that the lease, in terms, picks up the trust. Plainly this is correct. Mr Waters submitted in turn:
MR WATERS: Yes, I understand. Yes. Look, my submission would simply be that clarity in one location is desirable. The small step of describing the trust in the determination, rather than leaving it to be found by reference to the certificate of title, is avoidable with a handful of typed characters. That's all I can say. I mean, it's quite true that anyone with a lawyer will be able to conduct a search and so forth. It's not going to be lost, but the people that will be accessing the land will not, necessarily, have access to that sort of assistance.
HER HONOUR: And the people accessing the land need to know it's a trust because---
MR WATERS: Because there will be - the beneficiaries of the trust are entitled to use the land, and it is not - in includes some Wakaman People, but it doesn't include every Wakaman person, and it includes some people that are not Wakaman.
HER HONOUR: All right. Thank you.
MR WATERS: So the existence of the trust explains some degree of usage beyond that of the corporate trustee.
HER HONOUR: Well, I imagine that anybody who does not have a relationship with Uwoykand - would imagine that they're not the beneficiaries of the trust and not covered by that aspect of the interests asserted by Uwoykand. Surely, that would be the case.
MR WATERS: It may be. It's not an issue that I seek to agitate further.
(transcript pp 66-67)
50 In my view Uwoykand has no legal entitlement to the desirability of "clarity in one location" in the s 87A Agreement, referable to the existence of the relevant trust, as submitted by Uwoykand.
51 I am not satisfied that Uwoykand is entitled to insist, as a matter of law, on either para (a)([d]) or proposed para 3(h)(i) of its written submissions being included in the s 87A Agreement or subsequent consent determination.