CONSIDERATION OF ALPHAPHARM'S SUBMISSIONS
81 Alphapharm's submissions followed this path:
The claim has been construed in the Decision to be akin to the "pure or isolated or separated" enantiomer. This is a claim to a pharmaceutical substance limited by a requirement as to purity. Accordingly it is not a claim to a pharmaceutical substance per se.
A claim limited by the requirement, that it be separated or isolated or pure, is not a claim to the substance itself but rather to the substance defined in a particular environment as having been subjected to a particular process.
Accordingly it is not a claim to the substance itself as required by s 70(2)(a) of the Act (Prejay Holdings Ltd v Commissioner of Patents (2003) 57 IPR 424 at [24]).
As the claim was not a claim to the pharmaceutical substance per se, it is outside the operation of s 70(2)(a) of the Act and does not entitle Lundbeck to an extension of term.
82 Alphapharm submits that, because of the evidence accepted by Lindgren J that a skilled person looking at the structure of citalopram would have recognised the presence of two enantiomers and would have been able to depict them, a claim to the enantiomer per se would necessarily have been invalid. Alphapharm then submits that in order to find that the (+)-enantiomer citalopram was novel, Lindgren J and Bennett and Middleton JJ construed the claim as being not to the enantiomer itself but rather to the enantiomer further defined or limited by the requirement that it be separated or isolated or pure. This ignores the wording of the claim, which does not import, in terms, the limitation that it be "isolated" (cf D'Arcy v Myriad Genetics Inc (2014) 313 ALR 627 at [1]).
83 It also ignores the reasoning of each of Lindgren J, Bennett and Middleton JJ in concluding that the racemate did not anticipate the (+)-enantiomer. This was not because the claim should be read as being to the isolated enantiomer but, as explained in the Decision at [193]-[195], the disclosure of the racemate was not a disclosure to the skilled addressee of the (+)-enantiomer. As explained at [193], the skilled addressee would have understood that (±)-citalopram (the racemate) consisted of the (+)-enantiomer and the (-)-enantiomer and would have been able to identify the formulae for the enantiomers but would not have known in the absence of experimentation which was the (+)-enantiomer and which was the (-)-enantiomer. That is, there was no prior disclosure of the enantiomer independently existing. As Bennett J explained at [194], the skilled addressee knew that the racemate could be resolved into the enantiomers but there was nothing to tell him or her to do so. It could not even be said that there were clear and unmistakable directions to obtaining the enantiomers. Accordingly, it does not follow that a claim to the enantiomer per se would necessarily have been invalid.
84 Alphapharm makes it clear that it is not contending that the racemate does not contain the pharmaceutical substance (+)-citalopram for the purposes of s 70(3)(a) of the Act. For the purposes of this appeal, Alphapharm's contention is that the claim, as construed by the Full Court, is not a claim to a pharmaceutical substance per se for the purposes of s 70(2).
85 Alphapharm says that the Lundbeck Full Court made no finding, as set out by the primary Judge, that the isolated (+)-enantiomer was the pharmaceutical substance per se and submits that this leads to the distinction that it contends for between the (+)-enantiomer itself and the isolated (or separated or pure) (+)-enantiomer. Further, says Alphapharm, the primary Judge was in error in suggesting that the isolated (+)-enantiomer is contained in Cipramil.
86 As explained above, Alphapharm's submissions in this regard do not accord with the reasons of the majority of the Lundbeck Full Court.
87 Alphapharm relies upon the reasoning of Emmett J, in dissent in the Lundbeck Full Court, in particular where his Honour said (at [61]) '[The claim] by itself simply identifies the substance, in whatever surroundings it may exist'. Accordingly, his Honour found that the invention so far as claimed in the claim was anticipated by the racemate. However, that part of Emmett J's reasoning came with a qualification where his Honour said 'putting aside how the relevant and skilled addressee might understand the reference in [the claim], [the claim] by itself simply identifies the substance, in the surroundings where it may exist'. This qualification changes the impact of his Honour's reasoning. The construction of the claim as accepted by the majority did not put that understanding aside.
88 Alphapharm also contends that Lundbeck had submitted in the Lundbeck Full Court that the requirement of 'separated or isolated or pure' was part of the text of the claim perceived by reading 'the (+) symbol'. It relies upon the fact that this submission was accepted by Lindgren J at [119] and [123] and on the emphasis on the (+) symbol in Bennett J's reasons. However, again, Alphapharm ignores Bennett J's reasoning generally and specifically in rejecting a limitation as to purity (at [157]). Similarly, Middleton J stated that he was not reading into the claim a limitation of "independently existing" (at [252]). However, Alphapharm submits that this is because Lindgren J and Bennett and Middleton JJ considered that the integer or limitation did not need to be read into the claim as it was already part of the claim. Alphapharm also submits that separation, isolation and purification each refers to a process so that the claim is not to the enantiomer in itself, which it repeats would not have been novel, but only to the enantiomer when separated or isolated or purified.
89 On the basis that the claim does import a limitation, in effect an additional integer, Alphapharm relies upon Prejay where the Full Court said at [24] that 'for a substance to fall within s 70(2)(a) it must itself be the subject of a claim' and it is not enough that it appears in a claim in combination with other integers or as part of the description of a method or process. This, the Full Court said, was implementation of a policy to confine extensions to patents that claim invention of a substance itself. However, Alphapharm then submits that the Patent does not "claim invention of a substance itself" but rather claims invention in the separation, isolation or purification of the substance. This, it should be pointed out, strays into the language of a method claim. Alphapharm submits that, while the subject matter of Prejay and of Boehringer were different, the subject matter of this claim does not conform with the reasoning and policy as to what constitutes a pharmaceutical substance per se.
90 In the Boehringer appeal, the Full Court, in the course of the reasons, set out Heerey J's conclusions about the critical issue. That included a statement by his Honour that, for the purposes of s 70, the type of claim to a pharmaceutical product that is subject to extension rights is 'a new and inventive product alone' and that s 70(2)(a) makes extension rights available when the claim is for a pharmaceutical substance as such, as opposed to a substance forming part of a method or process. It is of interest that the respondent's submissions in that case, as recorded by the Full Court (at [35]) in the context of what constitutes a pharmaceutical substance per se, refers to 'the pharmaceutical substance, standing alone'. This was in the context of a pharmaceutical substance in combination with a device but it does demonstrate the understandable use of words like "alone" or "isolated" or "separated" or "pure" - not to add an integer to the claim but to explain the difference between a new pharmaceutical substance and a pharmaceutical substance in combination with something else.
91 In seeking to describe the difference between the racemate containing the two enantiomers and the claim to one of the enantiomers, Bennett and Middleton JJ used expressions such as "pure", "isolated" and "separated", the same language used by Lindgren J. Another way of describing the subject matter of the claim was 'specific reference to the (+)-enantiomer, distinct from the (-)-enantiomer and not as present in the racemate mixture' (the Decision at [131]). In seeking to differentiate between the racemate and the (+)-enantiomer, the word "itself" could just as easily have been used and would have carried the same meaning in context.
92 Justices Bennett and Middleton did not read into the claim an additional integer, nor did they add something to the words of the claim. Their reasoning was that the claim is to the (+)-enantiomer and nothing else. The term "pharmaceutical substance per se" simply means the pharmaceutical substance "in itself". In Boehringer, Heerey J observed that per se meant 'by or in itself' 'intrinsically' or 'essentially' (at [7]). The Full Court approved that approach on appeal (at [37]).
93 Semantics aside, it is clear that the claim describes a pharmaceutical substance per se. The substance was, as explained by Lindgren J at [536], a new chemical entity. The racemate and the (+)-enantiomer had different physico-chemical interactions manifested in different pharmacodynamics and pharmacokinetics (the Decision at [234]). The claim is to (+)-citalopram, irrespective of how it is produced. The isolated (+)-enantiomer plainly qualifies as a pharmaceutical substance per se and the primary Judge was correct in concluding that it satisfies s 70(2)(a) of the Act.
94 As pointed out by Lundbeck, Alphapharm's submission that Bennett and Middleton JJ construed the claim to include an additional integer or a limitation, such that the claim was no longer to the (+)-enantiomer as a pharmaceutical substance per se, is wholly inconsistent with their Honours' conclusion that the subject matter of the claim satisfied s 70(2)(a) of the Act, such that Lundbeck was entitled to an extension of term based upon Cipramil but not on Lexapro.