15. I was not clear as to the precise manner in which these various clauses were relied upon. Certainly the assumption that the provisions of Clause 3.4 which specifically exclude the tenant from any liability to carry out capital repairs does not as a matter of logic imply that the landlord as the passage from Redfern and Cassidy already quoted is in the teeth of such a view. To consider a hypothetical lease in which there is simply no covenant to repair at all by either party, the non-existence of such a covenant cannot be taken as implying that either the landlord or the tenant is contractually obliged to the other to carry out necessary repairs. If a repair is necessary then either it will not be carried out at all or the one party or the other party will, consulting its commercial interest, carry out the repair; but the existence of the impasse viz. the need for a repair which neither party is contractually obliged to undertake does not imply an obligation upon either party to do it, so the absence of a covenant by the landlord to repair or carry out any capital works and the existence of a covenant by the tenant to repair, but not to carry out capital works, simply means that neither party is obliged to carry out the capital works, nor in my view is Clause 8.1 of the lease relevant. It provides for the suspension of "a fair portion of the rent and outgoings" "if the premises are damaged so that they cannot be used for the permitted use". This clause is part of an entire section dealing with "destruction or damage". This section in my view is intended to cope with the rule presumed for many years that a lease of real estate could not be frustrated or at any rate that it was frustrated only in the most extraordinary of circumstances. Generally a lease of real estate would not be regarded as frustrated merely because the buildings on the land were destroyed. This accords with the heading "destruction or damage". In context the entire section and Clause 8.1 is intended to deal with destruction or damage which supervenes after the lease. Here the complaint is that the premises were unfit from the start. Admittedly, the words of the clause being "if the premises are damaged". They could grammatically refer to damage which occurred before the commencement of the lease and persists as at the commencement of the lease. In context however I believe that is an unlikely construction. In any event, there is no complaint that these premises have been "damaged", merely that they are unfit. The general complaint has been described by Mr Hamilton as "dilapidation". The thrust of the complaint is that the premises were either not constructed adequately for use as a restaurant or whatever their initial adequacy they have in effect worn out and fallen into disrepair. Without conceding that the other boiler plate clauses relied upon by Mr Hamilton would on their own imply an obligation of repair or improvement upon the landlord and the argument to that effect is in my view negated by the special covenants contained in the 1996 lease which in my view cast the burden of seeing to the fitness of the premises for a restaurant upon the tenant. They do this in two ways, first, by obliging the tenant to "fit-out" the premises as a restaurant and secondly, by negating any responsibility on the part of the landlord for a series of statutory requirements.