8 The handwriting is that of the deceased. The evidence is clear that "Mum and Dad" refers to the plaintiffs. In her affidavit sworn 26 July 2007, Mrs Costa, one of the plaintiffs and the deceased's mother, said, "Robert was fond of writing down compositions, poems and his thoughts. He saved most of what he wrote. He often called what he had written his 'good writing'."
9 On the evidence the only asset of the deceased of value was his house, 14 Beckett Street, Gillieston Heights. I should state that I have some difficulty with the evidence of assets. There must have been some contents in the house, but perhaps they had no value.
10 The deceased suffered from schizophrenia. He had various hospital admissions as a result and was admitted to the Maitland Mental Health Unit from 24 May 2006 to 9 June 2006 when he was discharged on a community treatment order. However, there is nothing to suggest he was not fully aware of what he was doing when he wrote the document propounded.
11 For the requirements of s18A to be satisfied there must be (i) a document; (ii) which purports to embody the testamentary intentions of the deceased; and (iii) which the deceased intended without more to constitute his will (Hatsatouris v Hatsatouris [2001] NSWCA 408 which really only states what the legislation requires). All the cases on the section and its equivalent in other states depend upon their own facts.
12 This is a somewhat difficult case not made easier through the absence of a contradictor. The Solicitor to the Public Trustee in a letter to the plaintiffs' solicitors said:
The Public Trustee would not enter an appearance and act as contradictor without funds and he would require the plaintiffs to pay $5,000 and an indemnity against further costs before taking part.
13 The court cannot force a defendant to appear but it is fair to say that had the Public Trustee appeared as a contradictor it would have been of considerable assistance to the court, and it is at least likely that had he appeared the costs of the Public Trustee would have been ordered to be paid out of the estate. It seems extraordinary to ask the plaintiffs to fund the costs of the Public Trustee as defendant in circumstances where, unless there was no likelihood the s18A application would fail, the Public Trustee was and remains the executor of a will, which will be admitted to probate if the s18A claim fails, and as such has a responsibility to the beneficiaries under that will.
14 There is a document. It does embody the wishes of the deceased as to who should get his house on his death. It is more likely than not that it was written in the last hours of the deceased's life. According to the evidence, he had nothing to give except his writings, which he valued, and his house. He stated what he wanted to happen to them.
15 The question to decide is whether the deceased intended the document to operate as his will. The facts going to support a positive finding are the place where the document was located and the fact it was made at a time when death was imminent. The facts against this are that the wording is precatory and not dispositive; that as the deceased had made a valid will in 1995 he knew the requirements for a valid will; that there is no signature on the document; and the way in which the writing runs down the paper indicating it was expressing emotions and not legal intentions.
16 It could be said that the deceased might not have thought there could be any difference between saying "I want you have my home" and "I give my home to you". It could also be said that a man about to take his life is unlikely to bring to mind the requirements for execution of a will and, in any event, he would not have been able to arrange execution. This last matter does not of course deal with the problem of the absence of his signature.
17 Although the facts are very simple, and the evidence is confined to the facts I have stated, I reserved the decision as I have found this a difficult and of course sad case where, for obvious reasons, the court would like to find for the document. Although his was a dissenting judgment Mahoney JA in Re Estate of Masters; Hill v Plummer (1994) 33 NSWLR 446 said at p455:
For the section to operate, the Court must be satisfied that the intention was that the document operate, in the sense to which I shall refer, as an actual act in the law.