Alawadi v Widad Kamel Farhan trading as The Australian Arabic Panorama Newspaper

The extrinsic facts relied upon by the plaintiff

1. The extrinsic facts relied upon by the plaintiff may be summarised as follows: 1. The plaintiff provides services described as "spiritual" (i.e. supernatural) therapy services, based in part on Islamic teachings, from his home in Sydney. He has advertised those services in the Arabic language in radio broadcasts since 2006 and advertised them in the newspaper for which the defendant is an editor, as well as other newspapers, since approximately February 2002. The plaintiff charges for these consultations fees which generally range between $1,000 to $5,000. The plaintiff relies upon: 1. The "Spiritual Services Fact"; 2. The "Islamic Spiritual Services Fact"; 3. The fact that he provides these services in Sydney, at a prestige location, in a home office in a particular format and for a particular price; 4. That these services are unique. 1. The uniqueness of the plaintiff's services are pleaded as follows in the Statement of Particulars filed on 9 December 2015: "1 (ix) The plaintiff is: a. the only provider of Islamic Spiritual Services in Sydney. b. the only, or at least the most prominent, provide of Islamic Spiritual Services who advertises: i. on radio, in Arabic; or ii. in Arabic-language newspaper. (The Uniqueness Facts)" 1. The plaintiff provides the following particulars of identification of specific people who identified the plaintiff (Statement of Particulars filed on 9 December 2015, paragraph 3): "3 The people, currently known to the plaintiff to have identified the plaintiff as a consequence of reading the 4th matter complained of are the following persons: (i) Ms Akabar Ghobar of Greystane, Sydney NSW. (ii) Mr Sabah Al Nashi of Preston, Sydney NSW. (iii) Mr Lahib Hermiz of Bossley Park, Sydney NSW."
2. The four remaining matters complained of are as follows: 1. The fourth matter complained of, namely the publication in Panorama on 10 July 2014 - The publication dated 10 July 2014 headed "Real Stories: The Hidden was greater", which was translated by a NAATI accredited translator on 8 August 2014, a copy of which translation is Annexure D to the statement of claim. 2. This publication describes the circumstances in which a gentleman identified as "Mr M L" consulted the plaintiff professionally about family problems, describing the treatment afforded to him by the plaintiff in satirical and disparaging terms. 3. The fifth matter complained of, namely the publication dated 2 October 2014 - The publication dated 2 October 2014 headed "Consul General in Sydney Refutes the Allegations recently propagated and prejudicing the Consulate General in Sydney", which was translated by a NAATI accredited translator on 20 October 2014 and which is Annexure E to the statement of claim. 4. This publication, Mr Rollinson acknowledges, contains no reference whatsoever to magic or to treatment of any kind. It is an article about the Consul General refuting allegations that he personally backed and supported the activities of a person who "in the past weeks" had published photographs of himself with the Consul in support of claims that the Consul General personally backed him and supported his activities, a claim the Consul disputed. 5. The sixth matter complained of dated 6 November 2014 - The publication dated 6 November 2014 headed "The Iraqi Ambassador in Australia seeks the help of a juggler to decode the talismans of the Embassy's scandals in Canberra", translated by a NAATI accredited translator on 15 November 2014, which is Annexure F to the statement of claim. 6. This publication relates to the Ambassador for Iraq to Australia, Mr Muayyad Saleh's involvement in a "scandal" in the Iraqi Embassy in Canberra, and in particular to a "brawl" with the First Secretary, Ms Layla Ahmed Kadhim. Mr Saleh is described as consulting a "magician" to "silence and muzzle the information media". It is illustrated with a cartoon of a man in a mask, wearing gloves, and dressed in formal attire, including a bow tie and tails 7. The eighth matter complained of dated 21 May 2015 - The publication dated 21 May 2015 headed "The Moaning of the People's Playground. Any threat I receive increases my determination, insistence… even madness", translated by a NAATI accredited translator on 25 May 2015, which is Annexure H to the statement of claim. 8. This publication is written by a person identified as Tareq Al-Haris, who thanks persons for letters and messages he/she received from persons "who supported my previous article", which article specifically stated "To hell with information media represented by a sorcerer and swindler". There is a six month gap between the sixth and eighth publications and the phrase "To hell with information media represented by a sorcerer and swindler" does not appear in the 6 November 2014 article.

Has identification been sufficiently particularised?

1. I propose to deal out of turn, both with the matters complained of and with Ms Amato's submissions, by reason of an important concession made by Mr Rollinson in the course of argument, namely that the fifth matter complained of, the publication of 2 October 2014 contains no reference whatsoever to "magic", "magicians" or any service, unique or otherwise, offered by the plaintiff.
2. On that basis, Ms Amato made an application that the contents of the fifth matter complained of be struck out by reason of failure to comply with the requirements for proper particulars of identification as enunciated by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Younan v Nationwide News Pty Ltd.
3. The particulars for the fifth matter complained of are as follows: "The 5th Matter Complained Of Particulars of Identification: Extrinsic Facts 1 The plaintiff relies on the following extrinsic facts: (i) The plaintiff provides Services described as spiritual (i.e. supernatural) therapy services (the Spiritual Services Fact). (ii) Prior to 2 October 2014, the plaintiff had prominently published on a Facebook site multiple photos of himself together with the Iraqi Consul General: a. On 12 April 2014, three (3) photographs of the Consul General and the Plaintiff together with other people at the Assyrian Sports & Cultural [sic] were published on the Plaintiff's Facebook page. b. On 14 April 2014, a photograph of the Consul General, a lady and the Plaintiff at the 'Assyrian Sports & Cultural Club' was published on the Plaintiff's Facebook page. c. On 17 April 2014, two (2) photographs of the Consul General, the Plaintiff and other people at the Assyrian Sports & Cultural Club were published on the Plaintiff's Facebook page. d. On 30 August 2014, the Plaintiff was 'tagged' (i.e. his name added as a label) on a photo of the Consul General and six (6) other people including Reverend Yousif Al Jazrawi and the Plaintiff during a visit to the Iraqi Consulate. (iii) The plaintiff had prior to 2 October 2014 said on radio that he had an association with the Iraqi Consul General, on the following occasions (on the following radio stations): a. In or about late March 2014 on 'FM 2000' on Monday between 10.00am and 12.00pm. This segment was replayed on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday between 3.00pm and 4.00pm. b. In or about mid-April 2014, on 'FM 2000' on Monday between 10.00am and 12.00pm. This segment was replayed on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday between 3.00pm and 4.00pm. c. In August 2014, on 'FM 2000' on Monday between 10.00am and 12.00pm. This segment is replayed on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday between 3.00pm and 4.00pm. d. In or about September 2014, on 'FM 2000' on Monday between 10.00am and 12.00pm. This segment is replayed on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday between 3.00pm and 4.00pm. (iv) Pictures showing the plaintiff together with the Consult [sic] General were published in Arabic language newspapers prior to 2 October 2014, including in in [sic] the El telegraph Newspaper, Al Iraqia and the El Herald (the latter, published on 26 April 2014). (v) That the defendant had already criticised the plaintiff in the 4th matter complained of (the Campaign Fact). Particulars of Identification: Additional facts, matters and circumstances 2 The plaintiff was identified by those readers of the 5th Matter Complained of, who were aware of: (i) The Spiritual Services Fact and one or more of the other extrinsic facts particularised above in 1(ii)-(iv); and (ii) The Spiritual Services Fact and the extrinsic fact pleaded in 1(v) above (together with the particulars of identification above in connection with the 4th matter complained of, set out at paragraph [2] at page (3) above). Particulars of Identification: Specific people who identified the Plaintiff 3 The people, currently known to the plaintiff to have identified the plaintiff as a consequence of reading the 5th matter complained of are the following persons: (i) Ms Akabar Ghobar of Greystane, Sydney NSW. (ii) Mr Sabah Al Nashi of Preston, Sydney NSW. (iii) Mr Lahib Hermiz of Bossley Park, Sydney NSW. (iv) Mr Ghassan Dandachli of Greenacre, Sydney NSW."
4. The absence of any reference to magic or to the plaintiff's profession means that the only basis upon which the plaintiff can say he is identified is that he was shown in photographs with the Consul. Any claim for identification based on the fourth matter complained of and/or the particulars of spiritual services must, as Mr Rollinson acknowledged, fall away entirely.
5. This means that, on the issue of identification, all that the plaintiff can point to is that he was photographed with Mr Dawood and these photographs appeared on Facebook (there is no suggestion that the text accompanying those photographs played any role in identification).
6. The difficulty the plaintiff has, in relying upon the Facebook photographs, is the long time gap between the publications on social media and the matter complained of. Ms Amato submitted that the nature of social media is such that the publication of a photograph even one or two weeks beforehand, let alone six months beforehand (as is the case here), must rob the content of any such identifying fact of all of its immediacy and most of its relevance to subsequent identification.
7. Taking these delays into account, the only "photograph" with any immediacy to the publication of this matter complained of is that on 30 August 2014 (approximately a month before publication of the matter complained of), the plaintiff was "tagged" (i.e. his name was added as a label) on an existing photograph of the plaintiff and six other persons during a visit to the Iraqi Consulate. This means that the only particular upon which the plaintiff is able to rely upon for this publication is that a photograph of the plaintiff in the Consul's office with a number of other persons was tagged a month beforehand.
8. What would the ordinary sensible reader make of this fact? The Court of Appeal explained the requirements in relation to the ordinary sensible reader in Younan v Nationwide News Pty Ltd at [17]-[19] as follows: "[17] Secondly, for a plaintiff to succeed he or she is required to prove that not only were there readers of the article who, on the basis of the extrinsic facts of which they had knowledge, believed it to be referring to the plaintiffs, but also that those persons were "ordinary sensible readers" who could reasonably have come to that conclusion (Steele at 374). [18] Whether identification has been established at trial is a question of fact, in the case of a jury trial, for the jury. Whether the evidence is capable of establishing it is a question of law (Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] AC 116 at 121). Thus it is a question of law for the judge "to decide whether on the evidence an ordinary sensible man could draw an inference that the article referred to the plaintiff" (Universal Communication Network v Chinese Media Group (Aust) Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 1; Aust Torts Reports 81-932 at [43] quoting Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 1239 at 1245). Unless an affirmative answer can be given to the question of law, the case should not, in the case of a jury trial, be left to the jury (Steele at 364 - 5). [19] On the assumption that the present plaintiffs' pleading and particulars defined the ambit of the evidence that they would be able to lead at the trial, the analogous question of law of whether the plaintiffs' allegations were, if proved by evidence, capable of proving the identification element of the plaintiffs' cause of action was able to be determined prior to the trial, with a view to dismissal of the proceedings if the answer was in the negative. This was the course taken by the primary judge, utilising the provisions of UCPR Pt 28 allowing for separate determination of questions arising in proceedings. As explained by Hunt J in Love v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 112 at 122 and following, in the defamation context, as in others, this procedure is distinct from the court's jurisdiction to strike out proceedings as manifestly groundless (or indeed to give summary judgment) where the principles stated in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69; 112 CLR 125 (and more recently in Spencer v The Commonwealth [2010] HCA 28; 241 CLR 118) are applicable. That jurisdiction is presently to be found in UCPR Pt 13, concerned with summary disposal, and UCPR r 14.28, concerning the striking out of pleadings."
9. In the present case, the mere fact that the plaintiff appears in a photograph with the Consul General Mr Dawood, in his office, a month beforehand, is insufficient, without more, for the ordinary sensible reader to come to the conclusion that the plaintiff was identified or identifiable in the matter complained of.
10. There are other problems with the particulars of identification. Although the names of the persons identifying the plaintiff are provided, the facts and matters which led them to identify the plaintiff are not set out. The plaintiff in his affidavit refers to conversations with these persons, but these conversations cast no light upon how it is that these persons arrived at such a conclusion, or when they did so. If they did so on the basis of the "magic" particulars of identification (i.e. by importing facts which are not able to be relied upon) that identification would not be valid.
11. Applying the test in Younan v Nationwide News Pty Ltd, the plaintiff has failed to establish that he can be identified in the 2 October 2014 publication. The fifth matter complained of should accordingly be struck out.
12. In the event that I have erred in this finding, I note that I would have applied my findings in relation to the other four grounds relied upon by Ms Amato for the remaining publications.
13. As I am dealing out of turn with the adequacy of particulars of identification, I next propose to consider the remaining three publications, although the same application was not made in relation to each of these by reason of the failure of Mr Rollinson to make a similar concession.

The publications of 6 November 2014 and 21 May 2015

1. Each of these publications refers to a "magician". However, there is no suggestion that anyone called on the plaintiff's professional services as a magician or caster of spells.
2. The publication of 6 November 2014 gives a series of very precise description of a meeting on Saturday 1 November 2014 ("last Saturday") at "one of the grand hotels of Sydney" (not the plaintiff's place of business) between Mr Saleh and others for the purpose of discussing how to deal with a dispute he was having with the First Secretary of the Consulate, Ms Kadhim. The identity of the "magician" is described as having been kept a secret, but being common knowledge because a number of photographs show him "at several functions and in full detail".
3. The services of this "magician" were employed to "silence and muzzle the information media" or alternatively to help the Consul to obtain someone to defend him "in case of need or necessity". What is being talked about here is magic of a very different kind to that practised by the plaintiff in the course of his professional activities.
4. The publication of 25 May 2014 similarly refers to "intruders on the information and media field including the sorcerers, the magicians, the swindlers and the illiterates who do not know the difference between the subject, the object and the predicate" and to the "information media represented by a sorcerer and a swindler" in relation to Mr Saleh's activities.
5. I am satisfied that each of the matters complained of is not describing the actual performance of spiritual services, but is making remarks of a generalised sarcastic nature by describing attempts to muzzle the media concerning Mr Saleh's activities by a media "magician".
6. The particulars of readers who identified the plaintiff, set out at pages 8 and 10 of Exhibit 2, are of no assistance. These merely state that those persons who are identified by name and suburb each read each of the matters complained of and, by some unidentified process, identified the plaintiff. The only other additional information that I can glean from these particulars is that two of the same names appear as the readers who identified the plaintiff in both publication.
7. Finally, I note that the publication of 6 November 2014 contains a cartoon of someone who appears to be a magician wearing formal evening attire, including what appear to be a long coat, cummerbund and "tails" of the kind not uncommonly worn by magicians. The plaintiff does not suggest that he wear such attire when performing his services, and there is no claim by the persons who assert they identified the plaintiff that they did so by reason of this cartoon resembling the plaintiff's appearance in any way. I also note that he appears to be wearing a mask. There is no suggestion that the plaintiff wore any of this attire in the course of providing his services to his clients.
8. In addition, any claim that the 21 May 2015 matter complained of can rely upon any material set out in the publication of 6 November 2014 (the "Campaign Fact") is not adequately explained, beyond the commonality of the reference to Mr Saleh. Any claim for identification in the eighth matter complained of by reason of the plaintiff being identifiable in the sixth matter complained of must also fail.
9. Particulars of magic aside, the particulars of identification based on photographs and contact between the plaintiff and Mr Saleh (entitled "Ambassador Public Association Facts") are particularly weak for each of these publications. The plaintiff can only point to photographs of himself with the Ambassador on the plaintiff's Facebook page on 9 April and 22 July 2013 and to a radio interview with the Ambassador on 9 April 2013. This is a gap of over one and a half years for the first publication, and over two years for the second publication, which, not only in the circumstances of the nature of social media but generally, is so distant as to be incapable of constituting identification.
10. The test imposed by Younan v Nationwide News Pty Ltd is a very high one. Only in plain and obvious cases would a court strike out proceedings on the basis that identification has not been established.
11. Nevertheless, as is the case with the fifth matter complained of, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has failed to establish any of the particulars of identification have any connection, whether temporal or otherwise, with the identity of the plaintiff in the matter complained of. Conformably with the principles in Younan v Nationwide News Pty Ltd, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has failed to establish particulars of identification capable of identifying him in either the sixth or the eighth matter complained of.
12. In the event that I have erred in this regard, I note my findings in relation to these publications on the remaining bases put forward by Ms Amato as is set out below.

The fourth matter complained of

1. As I indicated in my earlier judgment, this publication clearly identifies an unnamed provider of services of the kind provided by the plaintiff. It is replete with references to the provision of services described in the particulars of identification. Identification is adequately pleaded in relation to this claim.
2. This brings me to a consideration of the bases upon which Ms Amato submits that, whether or not adequate particulars of identification have been supplied, the proceedings should be struck out and dismissed.

Delay - The "reluctant gladiator": Kang v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2015] NSWCA 375

1. Part of my earlier reluctance to dismiss these proceedings initially arose from the circumstances in which an appeal from McCallum J's judgment in Kang v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2015] NSWSC 893 had been heard and reserved at the time I was hearing this application. That judgment has since been handed down and the Court of Appeal has endorsed her Honour's careful analysis of the circumstances in which a "reluctant gladiator" (who has been "less than frank both in seeking directions from the court and in his explanation for his subsequent failure to comply with those very directions" may result in dismissal of the whole claim: Kang v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2015] NSWCA 375.
2. In the course of affirming the judgment at first instance, the Court referred to s 61 Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), Bi v Mourad [2010] NSWCA 17 and Ghosh v NineMSN Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 334, decisions relied upon by Ms Amato. Nevertheless, the court reiterated that "dismissal of proceedings is a remedy of last resort and that it is an extreme measure" (at [17]; Hans Pet Constructions Pty Ltd v Cassar [2009] NSWCA 230 at [52] per Young JA) because dismissal of proceedings involves a rejection of the plaintiff's case without the merits being adjudged.
3. Ms Amato has cited a series of factors indicative of the plaintiff either himself or through his legal advisers being "less than frank" in relation to these proceedings. This include the curious reliance upon the essential nature of Arabic documents contained in what the statement of claim refers to as "Schedule @@@", a series of advertisements which, it now transpires, have little or nothing to do with identification. Secondly, Ms Amato notes that these advertisements, initially argued to be central to the plaintiff's case, were not in the possession of the plaintiff's legal representatives when proceedings were commenced, as well as now being wholly disregarded.
4. There are other unexplained issues, such as the claim that the translator required long periods of time to translate material, although the dates on translations of the matters complained of show that these were prepared within days of publication for each matter complained of.
5. Where there is delay of a substantial nature in the commencement of proceedings, as has been the case here (two matters being statute-barred), absolute frankness to the court is essential. The delay in these proceedings is, however, short, and largely explained by the oversights and delays of the plaintiff's solicitors.
6. I am of the view, however, that the circumstances in which lack of frankness would result in the dismissal of a claim would have to be extreme. Courts have traditionally been reluctant to strike out claims because of misconduct by a party. For example, it was irrelevant, in Raja v Van Hoogstraten [2002] All E R 74, that the defendant's employees were convicted of murdering the plaintiff in reprisal after he commenced proceedings (the defendant's conviction for manslaughter was overturned on appeal). Similarly, it was irrelevant, in Powell v Boladz [2003] All E R 131; Powell v UK (2000) 30 EHRR CD 362 that police had clear evidence of destruction of documents and forgery by medical staff to defeat claims for medical negligence and defamation (at [33] - [34]); these were issues for the trial (at [52]).
7. While I note that the courts in Australia took a sterner view of destruction of documents in Palavi v Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd (2012) 84 NSWLR 523 and Palavi v Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 274, that does not open the door to a generalised claim that lack of frankness with the court should result in the case being dismissed at a summary level.
8. Accordingly, I would not be prepared to strike out, either individually or collectively, the remaining four claims in these proceedings, on the basis of the principles explained by McCallum J in Kang v Australian Broadcasting Corporation. I note that McCallum J in Kang v Australian Broadcasting Corporation had what her Honour referred to as compelling evidence of lack of frankness with the court. In the present case there is evidence of delay and incompetence, both by the plaintiff and his legal representatives, but the plaintiff has not been cross-examined on his affidavit and I do not propose to make adverse credit findings in those circumstances.

The expiry of the limitation period

1. The nature of defamation proceedings is such that applications for amendment are commonly made after the one-year limitation period has expired. While delay is a factor to take into account in the bringing of such applications, the fact that a limitation period has now expired as a result is not, of itself, a separate basis for the summary dismissal of proceedings. It is merely another indicia of delay.

Prejudice

1. The circumstances in which a complaint of prejudice could be made have been dealt with in a series of decisions under the repealed legislation. The most commonly cited of these is Hoser v Hartcher [1999] NSWSC 1060 where the plaintiff commenced proceedings and thereafter took no steps for more than three years, during which time he was in prison on a charge of perjury. The defendant, a Minister in the government at the time of publication of the matter complained of, was no longer the Minister at the time the proceedings were reactivated; the party of which he was a member was no longer in power, the department had been reorganised and witnesses and documents were unavailable. None of this evidence of actual prejudice was persuasive to the court.
2. It will be seen from this decision that a very high degree of prejudice is required for proceedings to be dismissed. Where the claim is ostensible prejudice (as is the case here) proceedings which are otherwise capable of going forward should be dismissed. It may, however, be a factor of some weight where other and greater factors come into play.
3. This brings me to the final issue, namely the ambit of s 60 and of proportionality.

Proportionality

1. I am satisfied that the plaintiff is incapable, on his second attempt of providing particulars of identification sufficient to identify him in three of the four remaining publications. However, it is now common, in Australia, for defamation proceedings to be brought for publications to only one person, as was the case in Cush v Dillon; Boland v Dillon (2011) 243 CLR 298; there were three District Court trials (one of which was a s 7A jury trial and one a retrial on limited issues) and four appeals, and the costs for the $5,000 damages awarded seem hard to justify. (In addition to being a publication to only one person, the proceedings were commenced outside the limitation period and an application for extension of time had to be brought: Cush v Dillon; Boland v Dillon (No 2) [2007] NSWDC 7).
2. Apart from these limited publication issues, the challenges to the claims brought by the plaintiff do not fall within the very limited bases upon which proportionality issues should be determined in accordance with the warnings of Macfarlan JA in Ghosh v Ninemsn Pty Ltd. In the absence of legislation mirroring s 1 Defamation Act 2013 (UK), there is little that a court can do.
3. There is, however, an additional argument in support of proportionality. I propose to strike out the fifth, sixth and eighth matters complained of on the basis that the plaintiff has failed, despite being given a final opportunity to do so, particulars which are sufficient to enable the plaintiff to be identified. I have given consideration as to whether, in circumstances where six of the plaintiff's claims have been struck out and one abandoned, the issue of proportionality should be applied to the remaining publication.
4. It is not to the plaintiff's credit that he brought two statute-barred claims, or that he had to abandon a third claim, or that I have struck out another four claims. That does not, however, render the sole remaining claim an abuse of process. I would not strike out the fourth matter complained of on this basis.
5. A second basis for proportionality issues arises from the fact that the fourth matter complained of is unusually accurate in its facts, in that the accuracy of most if not all of the statements of fact is relied upon as being capable of identifying the plaintiff. If the statements of fact are accurate, how can the publication be actionable?
6. What gives rise to the defamatory stings is the interpretation by the author of those facts, in that he paints a picture of the plaintiff performing a ridiculous and embarrassing witchcraft ritual and then grossly overcharging for it.
7. It may well be that, at trial, defences such as honest opinion have a strong prospect of success, this being a factor relevant to proportionality. However, the mere fact that a plaintiff appears to have a weak case, or is likely to be awarded nominal or even contemptuous damages, does not warrant the striking out of the whole of the proceedings, and I accordingly decline to do so.

The future conduct of this litigation

1. What further orders should be made in these proceedings? Should the plaintiff be granted leave to amend the statement of claim in order to delete the six claims which have been struck out, as well as the claim which has been abandoned, and/or to provide the proper particulars of identification of the sole remaining claim?
2. The plaintiff has to date carefully avoided any application for leave to amend in any way. Taking into account the history of these proceedings, I am not prepared to grant leave of a general kind, or indeed any kind, without hearing from the parties. The plaintiff's current inadequate pleadings make it impossible for me to do more than to note that one of his eight claims has survived summary dismissal. What is to happen next (including any argument as to the form and capacity of imputations) will be a matter for the parties to make appropriate submissions.

Costs

1. I have not been addressed on the issue of costs.
2. The plaintiff has had seven of his eight claims struck out. In view of the significant success the defendant has had in this litigation, I have made a costs order in the defendant's favour, with liberty to apply. This will enable the parties to bring such applications for costs as they may consider appropriate.

Orders 1. The plaintiff's claims for defamation arising from the fifth matter complained of (paragraphs 15 - 16 of the statement of claim), the sixth matter complained of (paragraphs 17 - 18) and eighth matter complained of (paragraphs 23 - 24) are struck out and dismissed. 2. Plaintiff pay defendant's costs, with liberty to apply in relation to specific costs orders.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 05 April 2016