Alamdo Holdings Pty Limited v The Hills Shire Council
[2012] NSWLEC 1302
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Land and Environment Court (NSW)
Decision date
2012-04-12
Catchwords
- Development Application - change of use from a warehouse/office to bulky goods premises
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Catchwords
Judgment (9 paragraphs)
Judgment 1After the Court's list clerk had notified the parties by telephone that I was handing down my judgment in this development appeal, the law changed. The Hills Local Environmental Plan 2012 (LEP 2012) was made and commenced on 5 October 2012. 2At the time of reserving my judgment the prevailing planning instrument had been The Hills Local Environmental Plan 2005 (LEP 2005) and the draft The Hills Local Environmental Plan 2010 (LEP 2010) had been exhibited but not made. As this application is now caught by the savings provision in cl1.8A of LEP 2012 I granted leave, on 18 October 2012, to reopen the hearing to allow the parties an opportunity to address me about the statutory framework against which this application must now be assessed. 3The answer to that question requires an interpretation of the savings provision in cl1.8A of LEP 2012. In order to understand the parties competing submissions about that issue it is necessary to appreciate that the savings provision as made in cl1.8A of LEP 2012 is different to that proposed in the exhibited draft LEP 2010 in evidence at the earlier hearing. The draft provision directed the Court to determine the application - "... as if a development application has been made before the commencement of this Plan in relation to land to which this Plan applies and the application has not been finally determined before that commencement, the application must be determined as if this Plan had been exhibited but had not commenced." (Emphasis added) 4The effect of this type of saving provision is dealt with in the applicant 's written submissions (AWS) dated 18 October 2012 at paragraphs 4 - 7. It states: "In Terrace Tower Holdings Pty Ltd v Sutherland Shire Council (2003) 129LGERA 195, the Court of Appeal authoritative construed a savings clause to this effect. The savings clause in the Sutherland 2000 LEP provided that, despite the repeal of the 1993 LEP, that LEP applied to pending development applications "as if this Plan had been exhibited but had not been made": [35]. That is, on all fours with proposed cl.1.8A in the proposed 2012 LEP. This kind of savings provision invited consideration of whether the draft Sutherland LEP (as it was then known) was certain and imminent. That question, the Court of Appeal held, was answered by the making of the draft LEP. Once it was certain and imminent, the Court moved to consider whether the proposed development would undermine the objectives of the new LEP: [6], [7], [50]-[57]. The Court of Appeal anchored its decision in the second limb of the savings provision, which has been quoted above: [51] "it remained a draft instrument as far as the proposal was concerned, by virtue of the command in the transitional provision"; "the argument was that none of the LEP 2000 was relevant or applicable under the transitional provision. This submission fails to recognise the second part of the transitional provision or the stream of case law forming the background against which its terms are properly to be construed. The transitional provision requires the LEP 2000 to be taken into account, albeit on the basis that it is not to be regarded as 'made'. In other words, the decision was driven by the words in the savings clause that specifically addressed the position of the later LEP: "the application must be determined as if this Plan had been exhibited but had not commenced". That was the direction to which the Court of Appeal referred." 5The applicant submits however, that the above position must be contrasted with the savings provision expressed in cl1.8A of LEP 2012, which states: "If a development application has been made before the commencement of this Plan in relation to land to which this Plan applies and the application has not been finally determined before that commencement, the application must be determined as if this Plan had not commenced" (Emphasis added) 6I set out below the terms of s 79C of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (the Act). The section details the matters for consideration when determining a development application on appeal under s 97 (1) of the Act. "79C Evaluation (1) Matters for consideration-general In determining a development application, a consent authority is to take into consideration such of the following matters as are of relevance to the development the subject of the development application: (a) the provisions of: (i) any environmental planning instrument, and (ii) any proposed instrument that is or has been the subject of public consultation under this Act and that has been notified to the consent authority (unless the Director-General has notified the consent authority that the making of the proposed instrument has been deferred indefinitely or has not been approved), and (iii) any development control plan, and (iiia) any planning agreement that has been entered into under section 93F, or any draft planning agreement that a developer has offered to enter into under section 93F, and (iv) the regulations (to the extent that they prescribe matters for the purposes of this paragraph), and (v) any coastal zone management plan (within the meaning of the Coastal Protection Act 1979), that apply to the land to which the development application relates, (b) the likely impacts of that development, including environmental impacts on both the natural and built environments, and social and economic impacts in the locality, (c) the suitability of the site for the development, (d) any submissions made in accordance with this Act or the regulations, (e) the public interest." 7It is the applicant's submission that the savings provision found in cl1.8A directs the Court not to consider the LEP 2012 in its determination of the present development application. In acknowledging that the 2012 LEP has been made under s 59 (2) of the Act at the date of determination the applicant asks the Court to accept that the made LEP ceases to be a proposed instrument within s 79C (1) (a)(ii) of the Act. In directing the consent authority to treat it as not having been commenced for the purposes of this application the applicant contends that LEP 2012 cannot be considered as an environmental planning instrument under s 79C (1) (a)(i) of the Act. Therefore, it contends that the Court has no authority to take it into account in its assessment under s 79C (1)(a)(i) or (ii). While the applicant concedes that the 2012 LEP is relevant as an aspect of the public interest under s 79c(1)(e), it submits that by its terms cl 1.8A speaks against the instrument operating to prohibit the present application. 8The applicant submits that in contrast with the earlier draft of the savings provision (which mirrored the terms considered by the Court in Terrace Towers) cl1.8A as made does not direct the Court to ignore the making of the LEP and treat it as an exhibited draft. On the contrary cl1. 8A acknowledges the fact that LEP 2012 is made but directs the Court to treat it as if it had not commenced. If it is not commenced then according to the applicant it has not repealed the LEP 2005, which must then continue to operate. In support of this submission the applicant relies on s 29 of the Interpretation Act 1987, a repealing provision does not take effect until the provision substituting for them commences. 9It is the applicant's case that the savings provision in the LEP 2012 seeks to ensure that there is no prejudice to a pending development application caught by cl1.8A. It directs that LEP 2012 is to be treated as if it is not in force or effect. 10The applicant submits its interpretation of the savings provision is consistent with the fundamental legal principle that a law that is said to not commence has no operation, (subject to the Interpretation Act 1987 provisions, which enable an instrument to be made under that law, to take effect when the law itself commences). It refers the Court to the decision of Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dingnan (1931) 46 CLR 73 and the principle that a law which has been repealed is taken never to have operated. 11The applicant relies on the fundamental distinction between the draft and the final versions of the LEP to submit that the only applicable instrument in this case by dint of the saving provision is the LEP 2005. The applicant submits that in omitting the direction to consider the LEP 2012 "as if it had been exhibited but not made" from the savings clause there is an express intention that the law as declared in Terrace Towers should not apply. 12By directing the Court to have regard to its making but to treat it as not having commenced the applicant contends that LEP 2012 simply has no legal status or application to this case under s79C (a) (i) and (ii) and is of no determinative weight under the public interest. 13The applicant invites the Court to recognize the fundamental distinction between the making of an LEP and its commencement as observed in the Interpretation Act 1987. At paragraphs 11 - 12 of the applicant's written submissions it deals with this issue. It submits under s 39 of the Interpretation Act, a statutory rule may be commenced after it has been made and parts of a statutory rule may be commenced at different times. Under s 29, a repealing provision does not take effect until the provision substituting them commences. The applicant contends that the same can be said for the making of LEPS under s 33A of the Act. The terminology refers to the making of the instrument and s 34 (5) refers to the commencement upon publication on the NSW legislation website or on a later date specified in the LEP. An LEP is not deemed to be made on the date on which it is published rather it is when the Minister makes it: s 53 (1); s 59 (2). 14Clause 1.8A does not refer to the making of the LEP by directing that it be considered as an exhibited draft as was the case in Terrace Towers. On the contrary cl1.8A acknowledges that the LEP 2012 is made but not to have commenced for the purposes of this pending development application. 15The applicant relevantly asks what is the consequence for s 79C considerations? 16Section 79C(1)(a)(ii) requires consideration of "any proposed instrument". The LEP 2012 does not fall within this category because at the date of my determination the LEP 2012 is made. Under s 79C (1)(a)(i) the Court is required to take into account the provisions of any environmental planning instrument. If the Court takes into account the LEP 2012 then those provisions include the savings provision in cl1.8A and they clearly direct that for this application the LEP 2012 is to be treated as having not been commenced and therefore of no legal effect. 17The Council disagrees. It contends that the Court must adopt a practical approach to the interpretation of cl1.8A and accept that the clause directs the LEP 2012 to be treated as an exhibited proposed instrument, which is imminent and certain. It submits that the clause should be interpreted in line with the authority in Terrace Towers and be given significant weight under s 79C (1)(a)(ii). 18It argues it falls squarely within the Court of Appeal's reasoning in Terrace Towers. The Council affirmed it's reliance on the evidence given during the hearing and does not seek to call any other additional evidence in the event that I adopt the applicant's interpretation of cl1.8A.