reasoning
17 Although the applicant filed written submissions, they did little to elucidate the grounds on which the applicant seeks review of the RRT's decision. Nor, it must be said, was the case advanced substantially in oral submissions.
18 As I followed the submissions, it was contended that the RRT had erred by failing to refer to material that was before the delegate at the time he or she rejected the application for a protection visa. The contention appeared to be that the RRT was bound to refer specifically to this material, regardless of its relevance to the claims made by the applicant. A failure to do so, so it was said, contravened the requirement in s 414(1) of the Migration Act that the RRT "must review" the delegate's decision. The applicant's counsel did not suggest that any of the material before the delegate was inconsistent with the findings of fact made by the RRT. Indeed, it was not even suggested that any of the material was favourable to the account of events given by the applicant.
19 The material before the delegate included (as the delegate's decision makes clear) the United Nations High Commission for Refugees Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status; J C Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (1991); and the High Court's decision in Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1990) 169 CLR 379. (As it happens, the RRT's decision does refer to Chan v Minister in its reasons.) The other material before the delegate consisted of country information from a variety of sources relating to Bangladesh. As I have indicated, it was not suggested that any of this material was of assistance to the applicant.
20 The applicant's counsel did not support his submission by reference to authority. This is not surprising, as there is no basis for a contention that the RRT is obliged to refer to material before the delegate irrespective of whether it bears on any issue material to the RRT's deliberations. One consequence of the submission, if it were to be accepted, is that the RRT would be compelled to refer to every text book or decision cited or relied on by the delegate even if none of them had any bearing on the factual or other claims advanced by the applicant before the RRT. There is nothing in the language of s 414(1) that supports such a contention. And it is difficult to reconcile with the more specific requirement in s 430(1)(d) of the Migration Act, the terms of which are extracted at [22] below.
21 Counsel for the applicant put forward what seemed to be a variation of the first submission. He contended that the RRT should have mentioned that it placed no weight on material that was before the delegate. As I understood the contention, it was that the RRT's failure to do so contravened either s 414(1) or s 430(1) of the Migration Act.
22 Section 430(1) provides as follows:
"Where the Tribunal makes it decision on a review, the Tribunal must prepare a written statement that:
(a) sets out the decision of the Tribunal on the review; and
(b) sets out the reasons for the decision; and
(c) sets out the findings on any material questions of fact; and
(d) refers to the evidence or any other material on which the findings of fact were based."
Counsel did not identify which of the paragraphs of s 430(1) on which he relied for this submission.
23 The operation of s 430(1) of the Migration Act has recently been considered by the Full Court in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Singh [2000] FCA 845. The majority in that case held, inter alia, that there is no requirement in s 430(1) that the RRT give reasons for rejecting or attaching no weight to evidence or other material which would tend to undermine any finding it has made. The only qualification to this proposition is that, if one of the reasons which actually induced the RRT to come to a decision was that it decided to reject or place no weight on particular material, then s 430(1)(b) requires disclosure of that element of the reasoning process: see Baban v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1341 (FC), at [15].
24 In the light of Singh, it can hardly be plausibly maintained that there is some obligation on the RRT to refer specifically to material that played no part in its reasoning process and did not bear on its findings of fact. It is also to be borne in mind that McHugh J in Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407, said this (at [423]):
If the primary decision-maker has stated that he or she does not believe a particular witness, no detailed reasons need to be given as to why that particular witness was not believed. The Tribunal must give the reasons for its decision, not the subset of reasons why it accepted or rejected individual pieces of evidence.
That statement was adopted and applied by the majority of the court in Singh at [56].
25 It was not suggested that the Tribunal had failed to address the issues before it, nor was it suggested that the Tribunal had failed to set out its finding on material questions of fact.
26 It follows, in my opinion, that the challenge to the decision of the Tribunal fails and the application must therefore be dismissed, with costs.
I certify that the preceding twenty-six (26) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice SACKVILLE.