IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
18 The applicant proceeded with an application for review of the Tribunal's decision in the Federal Circuit Court by application lodged on 23 February 2016. The grounds of the application, as advanced and argued by counsel on behalf of the applicant were as follows:
The Tribunal erred by:
(a) misapplying the test for determining whether the applicant is a person to whom Australia has obligations under the convention; and/or
(b) failed to address an aspect of the applicant's claims by failing to consider whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of his ethnicity (Hazara) or religion (Shia Muslim) in the reasonably foreseeable future as distinct from the present or immediate future (emphasis added).
19 The primary argument for the applicant in the Federal Circuit Court was that his case was analogous to that considered by Justice North in MZYXR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 252. In particular, it was alleged that Tribunal in the applicant's case had directed itself to the 'current security situation' and the question of whether, at present, Shias and Hazaras faced systemic targeting, rather than to an assessment of risk in the foreseeable future. It was argued for the applicant that this conclusion followed from the failure of the Tribunal to refer in its reasons to pieces of country information that spoke in terms of future risk, including country information referring to the planned withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan. It was argued for the applicant that the Tribunal's conclusion (at [30]) that employed the language of 'reasonably foreseeable future' was best understood as a 'formulaic reference' rather than indicating the Tribunal had properly understood and discharged a statutory function.
20 The Federal Circuit Court extensively examined the Tribunal's reasons and the country information in a decision delivered on 4 July 2016. Close regard was paid to the applicant's argument based on MZYXR. The primary judge referred, amongst other things (at [9]), of the Tribunal decision record noting that it had identified the issue in the present case as being whether the applicant was a person in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations being assessed upon the facts as they exist when the decision was made by requiring a consideration of the matter in relation to the reasonably foreseeable future.
21 The primary judge also noted that:
(a) the decision of MZYXR was distinguishable based on the reasoning that was adopted in that case and the structure of the report by the Tribunal, including the particular findings of the Tribunal relied upon by the Court as indicating error (at [23]);
(b) from reference in the Tribunal's reasons to the question that the Tribunal had to determine being framed (at [15]), as well as the focus on the reasonably foreseeable future in the body of the Tribunal's reasons in more than five places, the primary judge was unable to accept the submission that the Tribunal failed to address the issue of the reasonably foreseeable future in determining the applicant's fear of persecution and whether it was well-founded; and
(c) on a fair reading of the Tribunal's decision (at [26]-[29]), the Tribunal was taking into account the future situation and not simply addressing a confinement to the present existing fact. In those paragraphs the Tribunal said:
26. I have considered carefully the country information submitted by the agents as to the situation for Hazara Shias in Afghanistan and Kabul and the overall current security situation in Afghanistan and Kabul. In making my findings, I have given considerable weight to reports by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) as these are authoritative, recent and the Department has been specifically charged with the provision of this advice to the Australian government. In its September 2015 report, DFAT stated that they are not aware of any credible evidence that everyday Shia Muslims are systematically targeted on the basis of their religious affiliation and that they assessed that Sunni-Shia sectarian violence is infrequent, although occasional violence does occur. They also stated that Hazaras had made significant gains (albeit from a small base) since the Taliban were removed from power in 2001. They stated that while conditions for Hazaras had greatly improved since 2001, they still face some societal discrimination. They stated that they had no evidence to suggest that Hazaras are systematically targeted in insurgent attacks on the basis of their ethnicity alone and that with the exception of kidnappings, Hazaras are not currently at any greater risk of violence than other ethnic groups in Afghanistan. They assess that Hazaras travelling by road between Kabul and the Hazarajat face a risk that is greater than other ethnic groups though it is unclear whether this is due to ethnic targeting or as a result of the high numbers of Hazaras travelling on this route. They state though that kidnappings of Hazaras are relatively rare in a country-wide context. This overall view of the level of general threat posed to the Hazara community is supported by Professor Amin Saikal of ANU [Saikal, Amin 2012, 'Afghanistan: The Status of the Shi'ite Hazara Minority', Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, March, Vol.32, No.1, pp.80-87].
27. A Hazara Issues Paper issued by the Department of Immigration in March 2015 stated:
Hazaras in Kabul have not been systematically targeted by insurgent attacks or other ethnic groups since 2001 because of their ethnicity or religion, apart from one deadly attack aimed on a Shia mosque in 2011 where many of the victims were Hazaras [Department of Immigration, Afghanistan: Hazaras Issues Paper, March 2015].
…
Although the reports note a high level of attacks in and around Kabul, most target government and international personnel and no reports suggest that Hazaras and Shias are being disproportionately targeted by these attacks.
In 2014, analysis of attacks in Kabul by insurgents [see European Country of Origin Information Network 2015, General Security Situation in Afghanistan and Events in Kabul, 12 January http://www.ecoi.net/news/188769::afghanistan/101.general-security-situation-in-afghanistan-and-events-in-kabul.htm] found that insurgents targeted Afghan military personnel, police officers, political figures and foreigners, as well as government buildings, hotels and embassies [European Country of Origin Information Network 2015, General Security Situation in Afghanistan and Events in Kabul, 12 January].
28. DFAT stated in September 2015 that the government maintains effective, but not absolute control in major urban areas, particular [sic] Kabul. DFAT also specifically reported in relation to Kabul in September 2015:
2.29 Insurgents regularly conduct high-profile attacks in Kabul. DFAT assesses that the primary targets for insurgent attacks are government institutions, political figures, Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF), personnel from the Resolute Support mission (the NATO-led mission that replaced the International Security Assistance Force or ISAF on 1 January 2015), other security services, and international organisations. Such attacks often cause significant casualties amongst civilian bystanders in addition to those being targeted. Kabul has seen a marked increase in the number of incidents in 2015 compared to the corresponding period in 2014. According to a Resolute Support mission report for January-April 2015, insurgent attacks in Kabul have increased by around 60 per cent compared with the same period in 2014.
2.30 Representative examples include the series of bombings against employees (including prosecutors and judges) of the Ministry of Justice in May 2015, which killed at least 11 people and injured dozens more; an attack on the Park Palace guesthouse in May 2015 that killed five people, including foreigners; and a car bomb attack near the Ministry of Finance in Kabul which killed eight people and wounded 37 more. Kabul International Airport has been attacked on a number of occasions, with a rocket attack in 2014 landing on the runway apron. Attacks also occur in the vicinity of the airport, including in May 2015 when a European Union vehicle was hit by a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, killing at least three people and injuring 18 others. On 22 June 2015, the National Parliament building in Kabul was attacked by the Taliban. A suicide vehicle detonated outside the building, followed by gunfire. Twelve people were reportedly killed, including six Taliban gunmen and the suicide bomber, with at least 21 more people injured in the attack. In August 2015, a series of attacks resulted in an estimated 355 civilian casualties (deaths and injuries), the largest number of civilian casualties in a single day since data collection started in 2009.
2.31 The ANDSF and international forces have put in place a range of counter-measures to prevent and respond to insurgent attacks in Kabul. There are numerous checkpoints along highways leading to Kabul, at major intersections and at government and international institutions within Kabul. These provide a deterrent to insurgent attacks by increasing the risk that insurgents will be detected prior to undertaking attacks in Kabul. ANDSF are quick to respond to insurgent attacks when they occur. Nonetheless, violent attacks within the city are common [Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, DFAT Thematic Report, Conditions in Kabul, 18 September 2015].
29. I have taken into account the reports of regular insurgency attacks on Kabul taken place but these need to be seen in the context that Kabul has a population of four million and that the government maintains effective control of Kabul and has a range of counter-measures in place to prevent and respond to insurgent attacks. I have taken into account that the primary targets for insurgent attacks are government institutions, political figures, military, other security services and international organisations and that such attacks often cause significant casualties amongst civilian bystanders. I am of the view that the available country information considered as a whole indicates that the chance or risk of the applicant being seriously or significantly harmed in such a circumstance would be best described as remote, and not a real chance or real risk. Furthermore, on the available country information, I consider the risk of getting harmed in an attack by insurgents is one faced by the population generally and not the applicant personally: s.36(2B)(c) of the Act.
22 The primary judge concluded that the Tribunal properly engaged with the question that it was required to address and as such as the adverse findings by the Tribunal were open to it and not the subject of any jurisdictional error.
23 His Honour decided there was no constructive failure to exercise the Tribunal's jurisdiction and no jurisdictional error by misapplying the relevant test or failing to address the applicant's claims.