Exercise of discretion
29 First, as I have already mentioned, the Ngarrindjeri Native Title Claim has now been on foot since 1998, a few days short of 19 years. That is a very long time for an application to go undetermined. It is also a very long period in which Mr Birtwistle-Smith could have brought earlier his application for joinder, and yet it was made only on 31 August 2017, and after the Court had made the arrangements for the consent determination in Ngarrindjeri Part A. The NT Act does not contain any time limitation for the bringing of applications for the determination of native title, so that it is open to the First Nations of the South East to bring their application now. However, that does not mean that the time which elapses before an application for joinder is brought may not be significant in relation to the relief which an applicant seeks in relation to the conduct of other native title claims. That is to say, the time which Mr Birtwistle-Smith has had over the preceding 19 years in which to bring his present application is, in my opinion, a very pertinent consideration. In that respect, I note that in Wakka Wakka People (No 2) v State of Queensland [2005] FCA 1578, Kiefel J regarded an elapse of approximately 16 years in the bringing of an application for joinder to be a relevant matter for the exercise of the discretion.
30 Secondly, the only explanation provided by Mr Birtwistle-Smith for the timing of his application is that contained in [12] of Mr Jantke's affidavit made on 30 August 2017. In that paragraph, Mr Jantke deposed:
[12] This application has been lodged at this time in the proceedings because my clients have only recently lodged their native title claims and have only recently considered the impact of the recognition of their apical ancestors in the proposed determination in the Ngarrindjeri Native Title Claim upon their claimed native title rights and interests. Furthermore it appears likely that the matter of Ngarrindjeri apical ancestors has not to this point been considered sufficiently by the respondents in this proceeding.
31 The first sentence of that paragraph contains a frank acknowledgement by Mr Jantke that the explanation for the lateness of the interlocutory application for joinder lies with Mr Birtwistle-Smith himself and his fellow applicants in the claims by the First Nations of the South East. They have only recently considered the potential significance of the apical ancestors claimed by the Ngarrindjeri, having only recently filed their own claims. Mr Jantke does not assert any lack of awareness by Mr Birtwistle-Smith of the Ngarrindjeri Native Title Claim, nor of its progress within the Court, nor of the identity of the apical ancestors named in the Ngarrindjeri Native Title application. Mr Jantke does not attribute Mr Birtwistle-Smith's omission to bring the application sooner to any conduct by the parties in the Ngarrindjeri Native Title Claim.
32 It may be overstating things to say that the existence of the Ngarrindjeri Native Title Claim is a matter of notoriety. It seems fair, however, for the Court to infer that its existence is well known. The application has been in the public domain and the subject of numerous attendances in the Court, both at directions hearings, case management hearings and at the Native Title Callover. SANTS, the representative body for native title claims in South Australia, has been a party to the Ngarrindjeri Native Title Claim since 2008 and has participated in the various hearings just mentioned.
33 Mr Jantke deposed in the second sentence of [12] that it appeared likely that the matter of the Ngarrindjeri apical ancestors had not to date been considered sufficiently by the Respondents in the proceeding. I note that Mr Jantke does not depose to any matter of fact to support the conclusion there expressed, nor provide any basis for the opinion, if it be an opinion, which he expresses. There is no reason, in my assessment, for the Court to infer that the applicant and the respondent parties to the application, including SANTS itself, have not given appropriate attention to the listed apical ancestors in the Ngarrindjeri claim.
34 Thirdly, there is a significant prospect of prejudice to the existing parties in relation to Ngarrindjeri Part A if the joinder is allowed. Counsel for Mr Birtwistle-Smith referred to the potential in that event for there to be a round of negotiations concerning the identity of the apical ancestors, a conference of experts and ultimately for a trial to resolve disputed issues of fact. The very existence of that prospect, and the delay associated with it, illustrates the potential detriment to the parties in Ngarrindjeri Part A presently. That is especially so, given the significant work which has been done to date in preparing the matter for the consent determination.
35 I accept, on the basis on which I am proceeding, namely, that Mr Birtwistle-Smith does have an interest of a relevant kind, that he may suffer some detriment if joinder is not allowed. I take that into account as a significant matter. At the same time, I take into account that it is not inevitable that the pursuit by the First Nations of the South East of a claim based in part on the five disputed apical ancestors will give rise to an issue of abuse of process, let alone that such an issue would be resolved adversely to the First Nations of the South East.
36 I take into account in that respect that counsel for the Ngarrindjeri Applicants today has stated openly that those persons will not be making any objection to the First Nations of the South East relying upon the five disputed apical ancestors in their proceedings. That, of course, does not preclude some other party raising the same objection, but I regard it as a significant matter nevertheless.
37 I also consider it appropriate when considering the potential detriment to Mr Birtwistle-Smith, to take into account that, to an extent, the matters on which he relies have been brought upon himself by the relative lateness with which he has brought his application for the joinder.
38 There are other aspects of Mr Birtwistle-Smith's conduct which point against a favourable exercise of the discretion. It seems that the first notice of the claim by the First Nations of the South East occurred on or shortly after the filing of the application on 7 July 2017. Until that time the parties in the Ngarrindjeri Native Title Claim had, as I understand Mr Sumner's affidavit, not been aware that any such claim was foreshadowed. They had not been able to adjust their conduct in the litigation accordingly and were proceeding, it seems, diligently to comply with the Court's timetable and to ready themselves for the anticipated consent determination.
39 The absence of any previous notice seems particularly significant when regard is had to two matters. First, Mr Graham, the anthropologist employed by SANTS, has deposed that he commenced his research on behalf of the First Nations of the South East in August 2016 and that research has been of an active kind since then. Presumably he received the instructions within SANTS some time before August 2016. Secondly, there is the absence of any mention of the prospect of such a claim at the various directions hearings, case management hearings and callovers which have occurred since then. There is no explanation provided as to why it would not have been possible for Mr Birtwistle-Smith or SANTS to have given some forewarning to the Court and to the parties of the prospect of such a claim.
40 At the hearing on 27 July 2017, neither SANTS nor Mr Birtwistle-Smith raised any objection to the Court putting in place the timetable for the consent determination to which I referred earlier. Instead, both the Court and the parties were permitted to proceed on the basis that a consent determination could be made in December 2017. It is difficult to think that there could have been any misconception on the part of Mr Birtwistle-Smith or his representatives on 27 July concerning the plan for there to be a consent determination regarding Ngarrindjeri Part A in December 2017. It is pertinent that SANTS, the representative body for native title holders, did not raise any objection to the Court making the arrangements for the consent determination.
41 So far I have not mentioned Ngarrindjeri Part B. My focus has been on Ngarrindjeri Part A. I am not satisfied that an exercise of the discretion favours the joinder of Mr Birtwistle-Smith with respect to Ngarrindjeri Part B. The only orders relating to the conduct of that matter so far have been the order for the mediation to which I referred earlier, but I think that it is appropriate to anticipate that an order will be made in due course for Ngarrindjeri Part B and the First Nations of the South East claim (insofar as it overlaps Ngarrindjeri Part B) to be dealt with in the one proceeding. That is the requirement of s 67 of the NT Act. The issues which Mr Birtwistle-Smith wishes to agitate can, on my understanding, be agitated conveniently in the context of that single proceeding in due course without him being joined to the Ngarrindjeri claim for the purposes of participation in that claim.
42 Finally, I take into account the public interest in proceedings in this Court, including native title proceedings, being conducted with efficiency and economy. Sections 37M and 37N of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) reflect that public interest and apply as much to native title proceedings as they do to proceedings of other kinds. I consider it appropriate, to take into account the public interest just mentioned and the overarching purpose mentioned in ss 37M and 37N in the determination of the current application.
43 For these reasons, I am not satisfied that it would be in the interests of justice to accede to the application of Mr Birtwistle-Smith, even assuming, as I have said, that he does have a requisite interest.
44 Accordingly, the interlocutory application filed on 31 August 2017 is dismissed.
45 The matter is adjourned to the case management conference on 20 October 2017, and otherwise for the consent determination on 14 December 2017.
I certify that the preceding forty-five (45) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice White.