regard to the interim listing and the conservation order,
notwithstanding the provisions of Section 42 of the City of
Adelaide
Development Control Act?'
We think yes to all three questions, for the following reasons
... "
31. It is unnecessary
now to set out the grounds upon which the advice of the
Council's solicitors is based as those grounds are dealt with elsewhere in
these reasons.
Application Again Referred to Minister
32. In consequence of the advice it received the Committee resolved that the
application be referred to the Minister pursuant to the provisions of s.24(4)
of the City Act. The Council adopted the resolution of the Planning and
Environment Committee at its meeting on 17 June 1991. The matter was referred
to the Minister in accordance with the resolution and
on 20 June 1991 the City
Manager wrote to ADC informing it of that step.
ADC Commences This Action
33. On 26 June 1991 ADC commenced
this action, seeking declarations and other
ancillary remedies. Shortly stated, the declarations sought by ADC were to
the effect
that the Minister had not acted in accordance with the procedures
prescribed in the Heritage Act so that both the entry on the Interim
List and
the conservation order made on 30 May 1991 were invalid; that the Council was
not required to refer the application to the
Minister pursuant to s.24(4) of
the City Act; and that, if ADC obtained all necessary approvals under the City
Act and the Building
Act, 1976 to construct the hotel and to demolish Gawler
Chambers, it can implement the approvals notwithstanding the entry on the
Interim List and the conservation order. For her part, the Minister responded
on 15 August 1991 by making a fresh entry of Gawler
Chambers on the Interim
List pursuant to s.15 of the Heritage Act. On 19 August, the Minister issued
a conservation order pursuant
to s.22 of the Heritage Act. The parties
acknowledge that the entry of Gawler Chambers on the Interim List on 15 August
and the
making of the second conservation order on 19 August were done in
accordance with the provisions of the Heritage Act. When this
action was
called on for hearing, counsel for the Minister sought leave to withdraw as
the Minister did not wish to present any argument
in relation in the issues as
between ADC and the Council. Leave was granted.
34. Given that ADC acknowledges that there is now
a valid entry of Gawler
Chambers on the Interim List and a valid conservation order in respect of the
building, the questions remaining
for decision are whether the Council was
required to refer the application to the Minister in accordance with s.24(4)
of the City
Act and whether, if ADC obtains all necessary approvals, it will
be able to proceed to demolish Gawler Chambers and build the hotel
notwithstanding the existence of the conservation order. I deal first with the
latter question.
The Effect of the Conservation Order
35. Expressed another way, the question is whether the entry on the Interim
List and the conservation order, both of which were
made after ADC had lodged
its application for planning consent with the Council, have the effect of
preventing the Council from considering
and determining the application and,
if the Council grants consent, preventing ADC from acting in accordance with
the consent. The
resolution of this question turns on the terms of s.42(1) of
the City Act. For convenience, I repeat its terms:
"(1) Where
an application is made under this Act for approval
to undertake a Development, the law to be applied by the relevant
authority
in deciding the application, and the law to be applied in
resolving any issues arising from the decision in any proceedings
(whether brought under this Act or not), is the law in force as at
the time the application was made."
36. Mr Rudd, who
appeared for the Council, acknowledged that the effect of
s.42(1) was that the law to be applied by the Council in determining the
application was the law in force on the date when the application was lodged.
However, he contended, the entry on the Interim List
and the making of the
conservation order did not effect a change in the law. They were, he said, no
more than an exercise of the
powers vested in the Minister by the Heritage
Act, which was a law in force on 21 November 1990. The exercise of those
powers by
the Minister did not change the law: it did no more than effect a
change in the factual situation to which the relevant law applied.
This
argument misunderstands the effect of the exercise by the Minister of her
powers.
37. When, pursuant to the Heritage Act, a building is entered on the Register
or
Interim List and a conservation order is made by the Minister, the entry
and the conservation order effect a change in the law to
which the owner of
the building will be subject. Until an entry is made, the owner of the
building is not subject to the provisions
of the Heritage Act and is at
liberty to develop the building as he thinks fit provided he complies with
such other laws as are applicable.
However, once a building is entered on the
Register or Interim List, the owner then becomes subject to the operation of
the Heritage
Act. The effect of the entry is to impose on the owner of the
building a legislative regime to which he had not been subject before
the
entry. For example, but for the entry of an application to alter or demolish
a building in the City does not have to be referred
to either the Minister or
to the City of Adelaide Planning Commission pursuant to s.24 of the City Act,
unless it otherwise will
directly affect a State heritage item. Were it not
for the entry, the Minister would not be able to make a conservation order
pursuant
to either s.21 or s.22. Were it not for the entry and the making of
a conservation order, s.24 of the Heritage Act would not prohibit
the
demolition of a building. In other words, the entry alters the rights and
obligations of the owner of the building. The rights
and obligations before
the entry are different from those after the entry. The entry, therefore,
effects a change in the law which
shall apply in respect of the building.
38. It is to be noted that s.42(1) provides two occasions for the operation
of the law in
force at the time of the application. First, it is the law to be
applied by the relevant planning authority when considering and
determining
the application for planning consent. Second, it is the law to be applied in
resolving any issues arising from the decision
in any proceedings, whether
brought under the City Act or not (emphasis added). The width in which this
second limb is expressed
makes it clear that the holder of the planning
consent is able to utilise that consent notwithstanding a change in the law.
39.
As to the purpose and effect of s.42(1), I respectfully adapt some
observations made by Jacobs J when speaking of s.57(1), the equivalent
provision in the Planning Act to s.42(1). The first part of s.42(1) expressly
directs attention to the decision-making process.
When he makes his
application, an applicant for planning approval is entitled to know the law by
reference to which his application
will be determined and to frame and prepare
his application accordingly. If the application is to be affected, and
perhaps defeated,
by a subsequent alteration to the law, that would give to
the alteration to the law a retrospective operation which is objectionable
in
principle unless clearly authorised by statute. An applicant is entitled to
regulate his affairs on the faith of the planning
law in force as at the date
of the application: c.f District Council of Munno Para v. Remove-All Rubbish
Co Pty Ltd (1985) 41 SASR 188, 205. The effect of s.42(1) is that, when an
applicant for planning approval lodges his application, the law by reference
to which
the application is to be decided crystallises: it is the law then in
force. It would represent an exercise in futility if a planning
authority was
obliged to consider the application according to the law in force at the date
of the application, but the successful
applicant could be frustrated from
enjoying the benefit of the consent by reason of a change in the law and would
even be subject
to penalty pursuant to s.24 of the Heritage Act if he
demolished the building. For that reason, s.42(1) goes on to provide in the
second limb that the law in force at the date of the application will be
relevant in resolving any issues which arise out of that
consent.
40. Thus s.42(1) has the following operation in this action. On 21 December
1990, when ADC lodged its application with
the Council to redevelop the Gawler
Chambers site, there was no entry of Gawler Chambers on either the Register or
the Interim List.
There was then no provision of the Heritage Act which
governed the question of the demolition of Gawler Chambers. The law which
prevented demolition of Gawler Chambers was the City Act. By virtue of the
first limb of s.42(1), ADC is entitled to require the
Council to deal with its
application on the footing that Gawler Chambers is not subject to the Heritage
Act and there is no conservation
order which prevents its demolition.
41. If ADC obtains all necessary consents, the question whether it can enjoy
the benefit of
those consents and demolish Gawler Chambers without committing
a breach of s.24 of the Heritage Act is an issue arising from the
decision to
grant the planning consent and, as such, will be resolved by applying the
second limb of s.42(1). According to the law
to which it was subject at the
time of the application, ADC could demolish Gawler Chambers if it received
planning approval for its
proposed development. Though the Heritage Act was in
force, ADC was not subject to it because Gawler Chambers was not listed as a
heritage item. By virtue of s.42(1), if ADC obtains consent it can,
therefore, enjoy the benefit of that consent and, notwithstanding
the
subsequent entry on the Interim List and the making of the conservation order,
demolish Gawler Chambers without committing a
breach of s.24. That is a
consequence of the fact that s.42(1) enables an applicant to enjoy the benefit
of a planning approval according
to the terms of the law in force at the time
of the application. In short, s.42(1) cloaks both the application and, if it
is granted,
the planning consent with a kind of immunity from a change in the
law after the application has been lodged. Its effect is to invest
the holder
of the planning consent with power to proceed in accordance with that consent
notwithstanding a change in the law. The
effect of s.42(1) would be
frustrated if the entry on the Interim List and the making of the conservation
order had the effect of
preventing ADC from proceeding in accordance with its
planning consent.
42. ADC seeks, among its prayers for relief, an order in
the nature of
mandamus to compel the Council to hear and determine the application according
to law. Mr Rudd submitted that the
Court, in the exercise of its discretion,
should not make the order. That, he said, would require the Council to approve
a development
which, by dint of the conservation order, would involve the
commission of an unlawful act, namely, the demolition of Gawler Chambers
in
breach of s.24 of the Heritage Act. He relied on the general rule that a
valid consent or licence cannot be granted to perform
an unlawful act: see
Redbridge London Borough Council v. Jaques (1971) WLR 1604. For the reasons
already expressed, the effect of the second limb of s.42(1) is that, if the
Council does grant planning approval
to the proposed development, ADC can
proceed without being in breach of s.24 of the Heritage Act. The grant of
consent does not,
therefore, authorise the commission of an unlawful act and
the Council should hear and determine the application.
43. Mr Rudd also
contended that the purpose of Part V of the Heritage Act
would be frustrated if conservation orders did not operate where a planning
authority was in the process of considering an application for planning
approval. The Minister might only learn of an intention
to alter or demolish
a State heritage item once the application had been made. Whatever force there
might be in that contention,
it must yield to the clear words of s.42(1). In
any event, extensive controls exist in the City Act to ensure that proper
consideration
is given to the question whether the development of a State
heritage item should be permitted. In particular, the proposal must
be
approved by the Council and the Council cannot grant its approval without the
concurrence of the City Planning Commission which
must have regard to any
views expressed by the Minister.
Is Referral Again to the Minister Required?
44. The next question is whether
the Council is required to deal with the
application pursuant to s.24(4) and (5) of the City Act, which provide:-
"(4) Each application
under this section in relation to a
Development that will directly affect, or has directly affected, an
item of State heritage
must be referred by the Council to the
Minister responsible for State heritage.
(5) The Council cannot approve a Development
that will
directly affect, or has directly affected, an item of State
heritage without the concurrence of the Commission."
The resolution of this question turns on the meaning of the expression which
is common to each provision, namely, "a Development
that will directly affect,
or has directly affected, an item of State heritage".
45. The expression " will directly affect" in this
context is not a term of
art. It means to have an immediate effect upon or to have an immediate
influence upon: see the definitions
of "directly" and "affect" and "affected"
in the Oxford English Dictionary and the Macquarie Dictionary. I am conscious
that in attempting
to define the expression, I am resorting to synonyms but
the subsections are, I think, intended to apply when the proposal will produce
an effect upon or have some consequence for an item of State heritage. The
expression "will directly affect" suggests a causal relationship
between the
proposed development and a heritage item. The effect could be detrimental or
beneficial. The word "directly" requires
that the causal effect of the
proposed development be direct or immediate: it is intended to exclude that
which is indirect or remote.
In legislation such as the Heritage Act, the
expression "will directly affect" should receive a more liberal interpretation
that
it might receive in other contexts. The effect may not, therefore, be
limited to physical effects. It is, I think, wide enough
to include an effect
upon a heritage item such as overshadowing. It is wide enough also to include
an effect occurring during the
period of the works necessary for construction
as well as an effect caused by the completed development. Thus, there may be
a direct
effect in the case of adjoining sites, where the development may
involve an excavation which affects the rights of support of an
adjoining
heritage building. Whether a proposal will directly affect a heritage item
will be a question of fact and degree in every
case and each case will have to
be considered in the light of its own facts and circumstances. Where it is
not clear from the plans
whether the proposal will directly affect the
heritage item, it would be proper for the Council to make enquiries of the
applicant
to determine that question.
46. Where the proposed development is in respect of a building which is an
item of State heritage, it is clear
the proposal will directly affect the item
and the Council is required to proceed in accordance with s.24(4) and s.24(5).
The Council
must, therefore, refer such an application to the Minister and
must not approve the application unless it receives the concurrence
of the
City Planning Commission. For the reasons already given, Gawler Chambers was
not an item of State heritage at the time of
the application and so the
Council does not have to comply with subsections (4) and (5) of s.24 by reason
only of the subsequent
entry of Gawler Chambers on the Interim List.
47. However, the expression "will directly affect" is not, I think, limited
to proposals
to develop items of State heritage. If that were so, the
draftsman would have expressed subsections (4) and (5) of s.24 of the City
Act
in different terms, for example, by providing that the subsections operate
"where a development of an item of State heritage
is proposed". Thus the
Council must also comply with subsections (4) and (5) where, say, a proposed
development will directly affect
another building which is an item of State
heritage.
48. The fact that a proposed development will directly affect a heritage item
is, of course, not a reason for refusing approval; it is no more than a
criterion which determines whether the proposal should be
referred to the
Minister and should require the concurrence of the City Planning Commission
before the Council approves the application.
It is a means of ensuring that
the relevant planning authorities can take appropriate steps, if any are
required, to protect heritage
items.
49. In this case, it appears that the Council has proceeded on the footing
that a proposed development will directly affect
an item of State heritage if
the development is on a site adjoining the heritage item. On 4 January 1991
the Council referred ADC's
development application to the Minister because it
was to be erected on a site adjoining the site of the Queen Adelaide Club.
The
Council does not appear to have considered whether there is any other
respect in which the proposal will directly affect the heritage
item.
50. The mere fact that a proposed development adjoins a heritage item does
not necessarily mean that the proposal directly
affects a heritage item. The
proposal could involve internal reconstruction of a building which would not
affect an adjoining heritage
item. There may, of course, be other cases where
the proposal will directly affect an adjoining heritage item. That will be a
consequence,
not of the fact that the proposed development adjoins the
heritage item, but of the nature of the development or the works involved
in
the development. The reference on 4 January was not made because the ADC
proposal will directly affect the Queen Adelaide Club
but because their
respective buildings were on adjoining sites.
51. I find that, when on 3 June 1991 the Council resolved to refer
the ADC
proposal to the Minister pursuant to s.24(4) of the City Act, the Council
acted on the advice of its solicitors to that effect.
The Council had sought
advice from its solicitors because of the fact of the entry of Gawler Chambers
on the Interim List and the
making of the conservation order. There was no
other occasion which called for the matter to be referred again to the
Minister other
than the fact of the entry on the Interim List and the making
of the conservation order. For the reasons already given, that was
not a
proper ground to refer the application yet again to the Minister.
52. Mr Hayes QC, who appeared for ADC, contended that the
Council had,
therefore, acted wrongly in referring the ADC proposal to the Minister on 4
January 1991 and on 17 June 1991. He contends
that there is nothing in the
agreed facts and documents which discloses whether the Council has considered
whether there is any other
reason why the ADC proposal will directly affect
the Queen Adelaide Club. He submitted that the proposal should be referred
back to the Council for
it to determine whether the proposal will directly
affect the Queen Adelaide Club. I am not prepared to find that the Council
should
not have referred the proposal to the Minister. It is clear from the
plans submitted by ADC that the proposed hotel will overshadow
the Club, which
is the kind of direct effect contemplated by s.24(4) and (5). Thus, although
the basis for referring the proposal
to the Minister on 4 January and on 17
June was wrong, there were other grounds for doing so. The Council,
therefore, has acted
properly in referring the application to the Minister on
both occasions. In her reply on 15 March 1991, the Minister expressed the
view
that the ADC proposal will not directly affect the Queen Adelaide Club and
said that she did not wish to make any representations
should the proposal be
referred to her under the City Act. The proposal has now been referred to her
under the City Act. Presumably,
the Minister will express the same view as
those contained in her letter of 15 March. There is an element of futility in
the matter
being twice referred to her. The Council should have framed its
referral to the Minister under all relevant headings to avoid unnecessary
delay. The Minister is required to deal with the matter expeditiously: see
s.24a(2) of the City Act, and no great delay should be
occasioned if the
Minister acts in accordance with her statutory obligations.
53. It is scarcely necessary to add that, for the
reasons already given, it
will also be necessary for the Council pursuant to s.24(5) to seek the
concurrence of the City Planning
Commission.
54. So far as the Commission's obligations to comply with subsections (4) and
(5) of s.24 of the City Act are concerned,
the position might therefore be
summarised as follows. The Council was required to refer the ADC proposal to
the Minister pursuant
to s.24(4). The Council must seek the concurrence of
the City Planning Commission in accordance with s.24(5). In deciding whether
to concur in the approval by the Council of the development pursuant to s.24a
of the City Act, the City Planning Commission must
have regard to the views
expressed by the Minister on the question whether the ADC proposal will
directly affect the Queen Adelaide
Club. The Commission is not bound by s.24a
to have regard to the Minister's views as to the desirability of preserving
Gawler Chambers.
Conclusion
55. ADC no longer seeks all the declarations and orders initially sought in
this summons. Since these proceedings were
commenced, events have occurred
which have rendered unnecessary some of the relief then sought. In all the
circumstances, the most
appropriate course is to publish these reasons and
hear the parties as to the terms of the orders which ought to be made.