It seems to me that the terms of the mortgage in the present case are sufficiently distinguishable from the position in Queensland Mines .
52 One of the earlier cases discussed was Consolidated Trust Co Limited v Naylor (1936) 55 CLR 423. The issue in that case was whether a transfer of mortgage operated to give the transferee the right to sue a surety on a covenant of guarantee contained in the instrument of mortgage. The Court considered the terms of both s 51 and s 52 Real Property Act. Section 52 provides:
"(1) By virtue of every such transfer, the right to sue upon any mortgage or other instrument and to recover any debt, sum of money, annuity, or damages thereunder (notwithstanding the same may be deemed or held to constitute a chose in action), and all interest in any such debt, sum of money, annuity, or damages shall be transferred so as to vest the same at law as well as in equity in the transferee thereof.
…"
53 The judgment of Dixon and Evatt JJ said (at 434):
"The statute is concerned with dealings in land and it is because a mortgage involves such a dealing that the statute prescribes how mortgages may be transferred and with what consequences. It is concerned with the mortgage transaction in its entirety as it affects the land, and, therefore, extends to the personal liability of the mortgagor for the mortgage debt because that liability is intimately connected with the rights of property arising out of the mortgage transaction. A surety's obligation stands in a different relation to the dealing. His liability is introduced by way of additional security. It is personal and, except as a result of subrogation, does not directly or indirectly affect the land. … In relation to transfers of mortgage secs. 51 and 52 should be understood as dealing only with rights, powers, privileges, debts and sums of money affecting the mortgage transaction as between mortgagor and mortgagee.
54 In Numeth v Reachcord Pty Ltd (1998) 9 BPR 16, 557 at 16561 Young J, following Naylor, held that although s 52 did not pass the benefit of a guarantee, it was otherwise comprehensive and"
"indefeasibility does apply to the estate which is transferred and any rights which are so intimately connected with the estate transferred that they cannot be severed. In view of s 52, that must include the assignment of the debt."
55 In my opinion, by virtue of the terms of the mortgage in the present case and by reason of ss 51 and 52 Real Property Act as elucidated in Naylor and Numeth, the debt from Property Developers to Eurofinance was (subject to questions of notice) assigned to the Plaintiff. If, however, I am wrong in that view, the various documents to which I have referred show sufficiently that the loan was taken over by the Plaintiff acting through its Manager, AIF2. The documents show that Eurofinance was repaid the amount it was owed by virtue of the fresh funds that were obtained from the Plaintiff. These funds were obtained under a facility that the Manager, AIF2 had with the Plaintiff. The documents identified in paras 25, 26, 27, 28, 30 and 31 above sufficiently disclose that the lender repaying Eurofinance was Adelaide Bank and that AIF2 was, under a facility arrangement, managing that loan for Adelaide Bank. In those circumstances there was an assignment of the debt to the Plaintiff.
56 Moreover, clause 4.01(e) of the Memorandum incorporated into the Mortgage identified an occurrence of default as a failure of Property Developers "to pay any person … any money by due date". If, as the Defendants submit, the debt was not assigned to the Plaintiff but to AIF2, there was a failure to pay the money to AIF2, and by that default the undoubted Mortgagee, the Plaintiff, (as a result of the registration of the Transfer of Mortgage) was entitled to possession.
57 Even assuming, however, that there was an assignment of the debt from Eurofinance to the Plaintiff, it does not appear that express notice in writing has been given to Property Developers, and certainly not before the proceedings commenced. Only 2 letters were faxed from the Plaintiff's solicitors to any of the Defendants on 21 August 2008. Both were marked "Att: Michael Phontos" and only the second of them was or purported to be, a notice pursuant to s 12 Conveyancing Act 1919. The text of that letter is set out above in para 38. On its face it was not addressed to the first Defendant. In terms it was marked for the attention of Michael Phontos, the Second Defendant and it said that it notified him "as guarantor". The other letter asked Mr Phontos to confirm that he acted for Property Buiders, presumably so the Plaintiff's solicitors would know if they could serve him with the s 12 notice addressed to Property Builders.
58 He did not apparently respond but the Statement of Claim was then issued followed by the service of a number of further letters in the same form as that set out in para 38 above but all addressed to Mr Phontos and all referred to notifying him as the guarantor.
59 It is clear that it is not until express notice in writing is given under s 12 that the assignee obtains the legal right and the legal remedy to the debt: McIntosh v Shashoua (1931) 46 CLR 494 at 514-515; International Leasing Corp Ltd v Aiken [1967] 2 NSWR 427 at 448. The Plaintiff did not, therefore, have any legal right or remedy in respect of the debt nor, a fortiori, to a right to possession against the First Defendant based on that debt.