Action Workforce Pty Ltd v DHL Exel Supply Chain

The proceedings in the District Court

1. On 16 February 2015 Sony commenced proceedings in the District Court, claiming damages for the losses it suffered. It named DHL as first defendant and Action Workforce as second defendant. Its claim against Action Workforce was framed in negligence; its claim against DHL alleged both negligence and breach of contract. Its claim in contract specifically pleaded DHL's contractual obligations under cl 3.1(a), cl 3.1(b)(iii), (v), (ix) and (x), and cl 9.4 of the Warehousing Agreement.
2. DHL filed a cross-claim, naming Action Workforce as cross-defendant. It pleaded a claim in contract, in reliance upon the indemnity clause in the Service Agreement (cl 11.1). It asserted that the damage to Sony's property was caused by the negligence of Ms Tia. It also pleaded a cause of action in negligence, repeating the assertion that Sony's losses had been caused by Ms Tia's negligence, for which Action Workforce was vicariously liable.
3. Action Workforce filed a defence to the cross-claim. It denied that Ms Tia had been negligent. It denied that cl 11.1 of the Service Agreement obliged it to indemnify DHL for any liability it had to Sony. Specifically in response to the claim in negligence, it relied upon ss 34 and 35 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), asserting that Sony's claim was an "apportionable claim" for the purpose of those provisions.
4. On 10 January 2017 DHL settled Sony's claim against it by agreeing to pay $270,000. Action Workforce also settled Sony's claim against it, agreeing to pay $300,000. The terms of both settlements were incorporated in a single Deed dated 30 January 2017.
5. The matter was listed for hearing in the District Court on 30 January 2017. All that then remained outstanding were the issues raised by the cross-claim and the defence to the cross-claim. Action Workforce filed an amended defence to the cross-claim. It pleaded (additionally to what had been pleaded in the original defence) that DHL was in breach of cl 12.1 of the Service Agreement (that required DHL to maintain sufficient insurance "to provide coverage for the indemnities given" in the Service Agreement). It invoked cl 8.1 of the Warehousing Agreement (to which Action Workforce was not a party), and pleaded that DHL's failure to defend Sony's proceedings against it (DHL) by relying on cl 8.2 constituted a failure to mitigate its loss. Action Workforce also pleaded that, by reason of cl 8.2, DHL was not liable to Sony, and that DHL's payment to Sony was not made "as a result of or in connection with" any negligent act or omission of Action Workforce, and was therefore not within the terms of cl 11.1(b) of the Service Agreement.
6. DHL filed a reply to Action Workforce's defence to the cross-claim. It asserted, in response to the plea of failure to mitigate, that it had acted reasonably in reaching the settlement it did with Sony.
7. An Agreed Statement of Facts, to which were annexed, inter alia, the various legal advices that DHL had received was put before the primary judge. Two witnesses, both employees of DHL, provided affidavits and gave oral evidence. The case proceeded primarily on documentary evidence. The primary judge gave judgment on 6 April 2017.

The primary judgment

1. At the outset of the reasons, the primary judge outlined four "points of controversy", reflecting how the case had been litigated. She identified the four points as: 1. the circumstances in which the forklift struck the pipe. (DHL asserted that this occurred by reason of the negligence of Ms Tia, for whose acts Action Workforce was vicariously liable; Action Workforce asserted that it was caused by the negligence of DHL. It seems that Action Workforce sought to make a case that DHL was negligent, in the design or layout of the warehouse, the dimensions of the forklift, or in failure to afford adequate supervision of Ms Tia); 2. the proper construction of cl 11.1 of the Service Agreement, in the light of Action Workforce's contention that DHL was, within the meaning of s 34 of the Civil Liability Act, a concurrent wrongdoer; 3. the proper construction of DHL's contractual obligation to insure (cl 12.1 of the Service Agreement); and 4. DHL's obligation to mitigate its damage. (Action Workforce maintained, in accordance with its pleading, that, under cl 8.2 of the Warehousing Agreement, Sony was obliged, in the first instance, to claim its losses from its insurer, and that DHL's failure to defend Sony's claim against it on that basis constituted failure to mitigate.)
2. The primary judge resolved these controversies as follows.

Points of controversy 1 and 2:

1. The primary judge found that Ms Tia was negligent in the manner in which she operated the forklift, by failing to keep a proper lookout, and by failing to exercise reasonable care in the operation of the forklift, that her negligence caused the damage to Sony's property, and that Action Workforce was vicariously liable for her negligence.
2. She found no relevant breach of duty or negligence on the part of DHL.
3. Both aspects of the first point of controversy were therefore resolved in favour of DHL. The consequence was that the second point of controversy, whether DHL was a concurrent wrongdoer, and any implication that such a finding might have had for the construction and application of cl 11.1(b), evaporated. However, her Honour considered whether, if she were wrong and negligence was established against DHL, that would have affected the operation of cl 11.1. She accepted a submission to the effect that the language of cl 11.1 did not permit a construction that allowed Action Workforce to escape its obligation to indemnify DHL by reason of any negligence on the part of DHL. The payment made by DHL to Sony was made, within the words of cl 11.1: "… as a result of or in connection with … any negligent act or omission" of Action Workforce's employee. The second point of controversy (on the hypothesis that DHL had been negligent) was therefore also resolved in favour of DHL.

Point of controversy 3:

1. The third point of controversy revolved around cl 12.1 of the Warehousing Agreement, requiring DHL to ensure that it maintained sufficient insurance to provide coverage for "the indemnities given in this Agreement".
2. The construction of cl 12.1 advanced on behalf of Action Workforce was that "the indemnities given in this Agreement" against which DHL was obliged to insure extended to the indemnity provided for by cl 11.1 - that is, DHL was obliged to provide insurance coverage for the indemnity that Action Workforce gave to DHL against negligent acts of its (that is, Action Workforce's) own employees. The pleading in the amended defence to the cross-claim was as follows: "By reason of cl 12.1 of the Agreement [DHL] was obliged to effect insurance to provide coverage on behalf of [Action Workforce] which provides [Action Workforce] with cover for [Action Workforce's] indemnity obligations under 11.1 of the Agreement."
3. In other words, on Action Workforce's contention, cl 12.1 of the Service Agreement required DHL to insure Action Workforce against Action Workforce's own indemnity liability to DHL. Her Honour (unsurprisingly) rejected that contention.

Point of controversy 4: mitigation of loss

1. Although cll 8.1 and 8.2 of the Warehousing Agreement were pleaded in the context of the assertion of failure to mitigate, the essence of Action Workforce's claim was that those clauses gave DHL a (complete) defence against Sony's claim by requiring Sony first to claim redress from its insurer. Essential to that proposition was that DHL was not negligently responsible for Sony's losses. That was because cl 8.2 placed the obligation to claim on the insurance policy on Sony: "… except to the extent that any loss, damage, cost or expense is caused by the negligence, wilful misconduct, or unlawful act [or] omission of DHL, its employees, agents or sub-contractors." It was accepted that Action Workforce was, for the purposes of cl 8.2, DHL's sub-contractor.
2. Again unsurprisingly, the primary judge rejected Action Workforce's contention that cl 8.2 afforded DHL a complete defence to Sony's claim, and its contention that its failure to rely on that defence constituted a failure to mitigate. In the light of the finding that DHL had not been negligent, Action Workforce's contention was plainly untenable.
3. Also relevant to the mitigation question was DHL's plea (in reply) that it acted reasonably in reaching the settlement with Sony that it did. The primary judge accepted that that was so.
4. All issues having been resolved in favour of DHL, the primary judge gave judgment against Action Workforce in the amount of $418,189.50.

The appeal and cross-appeal

1. Four grounds of appeal were pleaded. They are as follows: "1. The trial judge erred in failing to find that a cause of the damage to Sony's products was the negligence of [DHL]. 2. The trial judge should have found that a cause of the damage to Sony's products was the negligence of [DHL]. 3. The trial judge erred in finding that on the proper interpretation of the [Warehousing Agreement] [DHL] was liable to Sony and therefore entered into a reasonable settlement with Sony. 4. The trial judge should have found that on the proper interpretation of the [Warehousing Agreement] (including clause 10.6) [DHL] was not liable to Sony for the damage to Sony's products and therefore [DHL's] settlement with Sony was not a result of or in connection with any negligent act of [Action Workforce] or its employees within the meaning of clause 11.1(b) of the Services Agreement between [Action Workforce] and [DHL]."
2. Reliance by Action Workforce on cl 10.6 of the Warehousing Agreement was (as it had to be, given the clause's clear meaning) abandoned.
3. The ground of cross-appeal pleaded was: "1 In the event that the appeal is allowed on grounds 3 and/or 4 of [Action Workforce's] notice of appeal, [DHL] says that the Court should still determine what a reasonable settlement of the claim by Sony against [DHL] would have been; and that settlement would be [DHL's] loss."
4. At the hearing of the appeal, counsel for Action Workforce identified as the substantial question raised by the appeal what he asserted to be the failure of the primary judge to make two essential findings. The findings concerned the construction of cll 3.1 and 8.2 of the Warehousing Agreement. Neither is reflected in the pleaded grounds of appeal, and neither was mentioned in Action Workforce's written submissions.

Resolution

1. Despite the length of the preceding exposition, the issues on the appeal may be disposed of with expedition. The first two grounds of appeal challenge the finding of the primary judge that Action Workforce had not established that the damage to Sony's property had been caused by DHL's negligence. Although, as required, written submissions were filed on behalf of Action Workforce, no submission was directed to identification of any error in the approach taken by the primary judge, nor to establishing any basis upon which DHL could or should have been found to have been negligent. Nothing further was advanced in oral argument. These grounds must be rejected.
2. By Ground 3 as formulated, Action Workforce appears to make a two-pronged attack on the primary judgment. By the first, it complains of a finding that, on the proper construction of the Warehousing Agreement, DHL was liable to Sony for the damage to Sony's property. Nowhere in the Notice of Appeal nor in the submissions did Action Workforce identify the precise finding or passage in the primary judgment of which it complains. It is, however, implicit in the judgment that the primary judge proceeded on the basis that DHL was so liable.
3. The written submissions referred to Sony's claim that DHL was in breach of various parts of cl 3 of the Warehousing Agreement and contended: "… it is difficult to see how Sony may have succeeded [in negligence] if it did not succeed in contract. When one looks at the contractual obligations allegedly breached by DHL it is difficult to see how DHL is likely to have been found liable to Sony - importantly, absent a finding that DHL itself was culpable (which the trial judge did not so find)."
4. The submission went on to refer to cl 10.6 of the Warehousing Agreement, but reliance on that clause was subsequently abandoned. There was no further explication of the assertion that it "is difficult to see how DHL" could be found to have been liable to Sony. It appears that this was the context in which a new complaint (not reflected in the grounds of appeal) was sought to be advanced - the asserted failure on the part of the primary judge to make relevant findings, whether of fact or law. An argument was put, for the first time, that the obligations spelled out in cl 3.1 were not absolute, but qualified by a requirement of reasonableness. Thus, for example, the requirement in cl 3.1(b)(iii), that DHL keep Sony's products secure and protected against damage, was to be read as a requirement that DHL take reasonable steps to ensure the security of the products. The requirement, under cl 3.1(b)(ix) that DHL use reasonable endeavours to protect the products from legal process was cited in support.
5. Far from affording such support, the inclusion in one sub-clause of a condition that reasonable endeavours be used highlights the absence of such a condition in the other sub-clauses of cl 3.1(b). I would reject the construction proposed.
6. In any event, no argument as to that construction was made to the primary judge. Nor was any issue raised concerning the reasonableness of the manner in which DHL stored the goods, or evidence adduced to establish the reasonableness of DHL's conduct with respect to the custody of Sony's goods.
7. Having regard to those parts of cl 3.1 extracted above, particularly cl 3.1(b)(iii), of the Warehousing Agreement upon which reliance was placed by Sony, I do not have any difficulty in seeing how DHL could have been found liable to Sony. In any event, Sony's claim against DHL under cl 9.4, which obliged DHL to reimburse Sony for damage to its products caused by any act or omission of DHL or its sub-contractors, was unanswerable.
8. The second prong of Ground 3 as pleaded complains of the finding that the settlement reached by DHL with Sony was reasonable. It may be noted that the finding that the settlement was reasonable arose in the context of the primary judge's consideration of Action Workforce's pleading that DHL, by failing to rely on cl 8.2 of the Service Agreement, failed to mitigate its damage. A fair reading of par 5 of DHL's reply to the amended defence, however, could suggest that DHL intended to rely on the reasonableness of its settlement in response to Action Workforce's denial of indemnity under cl 11.1.
9. The language of cl 11.1 includes no express requirement of reasonableness. However, as Giles JA observed in BNP Paribas v Pacific Carriers Ltd [2005] NSWCA 72 at [186]-[187], where, as here, an indemnifier (in that case, an insurer) has breached the contract by denying liability, the indemnified party can recover in a claim for damages the amount of a reasonable settlement: see also [13] (Handley JA) to the same effect. The requirement that the settlement be reasonable derives from general principles of causation, remoteness and mitigation, as those principles in this context. The primary judge found that the settlement was reasonable. The only argument advanced in opposition to that finding was that, since DHL was not liable to Sony, the settlement could not have been reasonable. That is answered by the immediately preceding conclusions, that, under cl 3.1 and cl 9.4, DHL was liable.
10. Action Workforce's submission quoted above appears to contemplate that DHL might be liable to Sony only if it were found to have been negligent. As mentioned earlier, Sony's first claim against DHL was in contract, in reliance in particular on certain provisions of cl 3.1 and cl 9.4 of the Warehousing Agreement. There was every reason to anticipate (as DHL was advised from the beginning) that DHL would be found liable in contract. No further argument was directed to the proposition that there was error in the primary judge's assessment that DHL's settlement with Sony was reasonable.
11. Ground 3 must be rejected.
12. Ground 4 depended on a proposition that is in direct contradiction to the premise of Grounds 1 and 2 - that DHL was not liable (presumably, either in contract or tort) to Sony. Following receipt of DHL's written submissions, Action Workforce (correctly) abandoned reliance on cl 10.6 of the Warehouse Agreement. On what basis it was contended that DHL was not liable to Sony was not spelled out in the submissions. The relevant submission was: "15 It follows that the settlement amount of $270,000 was not a liability which was a result of or had the requisite connection with the matters prescribed by cl 11.1(b) of the Services Agreement. DHL 'incurred the settlement' as a volunteer. That submission is supported by the reasons of the trial judge in finding, in substance, the absence of negligence on the part of DHL."
13. The submission misconstrues the language of cl 11.1. The clause is not concerned with whether DHL was or was not negligent, or even in breach of its contractual obligations to Sony. What it provides is an indemnity given by Action Workforce to DHL in respect of: "All liability, loss, damages, costs and expenses … awarded against or incurred or paid by DHL as a result of or in connection with: (b) any negligent act or omission of [Action Workforce] or its employees … in connection with the performance of the services."
14. At the hearing, counsel maintained the proposition that, on the proper construction of cl 11.1(b), Action Workforce could not be required to indemnify DHL to the extent that any "liability, loss, damages, costs [or] expenses" were caused by DHL's own negligence. Two simple answers rebut this proposition. The first is that it is inconsistent with the language of the clause. The second is that, in any event, the primary judge found no "negligent act or omission" on the part of DHL. Even if the construction advanced were correct (which it is not), it does not, on the facts here, avail Action Workforce.
15. In those circumstances, it is unnecessary to consider two additional grounds (raised for the first time during oral argument) concerning the asserted failure of the primary judge to make findings concerning cll 3.1 and 8.2 of the Service Agreement. I would, in any event, have rejected the grounds. The finding that Action Workforce was negligent, and the accepted position that Action Workforce was a sub-contractor of DHL, have the result that the exception to cl 8.2 applied. Sony was not obliged under that clause first to make a claim on its insurance policy.
16. It is unnecessary to deal with the cross-appeal, which should be dismissed.
17. The orders I propose are: (1) Appeal dismissed; (2) Cross-appeal dismissed; (3) Appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

Endnotes

1. Tcpt, 21/11/17, p 33(40).
2. [2014] NSWSC 1959 at [2005]-[2015].
3. Statement of Claim, par 24.
4. Statement of Claim, par 28.
5. (2014) 251 CLR 640; [2014] HCA 7 at [35] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ).
6. (2015) 256 CLR 104; [2015] HCA 37 at [47] (French CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ).
7. (2014) 89 NSWLR 633; [2014] NSWCA 184 at [69]ff (Leeming JA, Ward and Emmett JJA agreeing).
8. Notice of appeal, ground 3.
9. Unity Insurance Brokers Pty Ltd v Rocco Pezzano Pty Ltd (1998) 192 CLR 603; [1998] HCA 38.

Amendments 12 December 2017 - substitute "DHL Supply" with "DHL Exel Supply": coversheet DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 12 December 2017