The second contention was based upon the provisions of cl. 9 and rr. 10 and 11 and, to some extent, on the provisions of cll. 9, 17, 21 and 23. The first of these provisions, which deals with benefits to dependants of deceased members gives rise to considerable difficulty. Its substance has already been set out and the difficulty arises from the fact that the clause is said to leave the amount of the benefit in each case to the discretion of the trustees. The amount to be paid is to be "not less" than the amount, calculated in accordance with the procedure laid down by the rules, which would have been payable to such member if he had left the employ of the company on the date of his death. However, the calculation of the amount payable to a member if he leaves the employ of the company depends upon whether he leaves with or without the written consent and approval of the company. As already pointed out, if he leaves without consent before attaining sixty-five years he is not entitled to anything but if with consent his entitlement falls to be determined under r. 11. The first point is whether "the procedure laid down in the Rules" (cl. 9) is the procedure prescribed by r. 10 or r. 11. On the whole I think that the quoted expression in cl. 9, contemplating, as it does, that a payment shall be made to the dependants of a deceased member whatever his age at the time of death, refers to r. 11. But, even so, there is a residual objection for under that rule the dependant's entitlement is to be the amount of the retiring allowance computed in the manner provided by the rules as if he had reached the retiring age on the date of leaving the company's service less such deduction (if any) as the company may recommend and the trustees may in their absolute discretion think fit to deduct but not exceeding the amount recommended by the company to be deducted. The respondent sees this circumstance as a serious defect in the deed. It establishes a fund, it is said, and, inter alia, purports to give to the dependants of a deceased member a right to a benefit upon his death but the right to receive it is, in effect, left in the successive discretions of the company and the trustees. It is, of course, not necessary in order to answer the description of a "fund from which such benefits, pensions or allowances are to be provided" (s. 66) that it should provide, in addition to pensions or retiring allowances to employees, benefits for the dependants of deceased employees. But such provision is usual and, if it is made, the section requires as a condition of its operation that the right to receive such benefits shall be fully secured. But what does s. 66 mean when it specifies as a condition of its operation that "the rights of the employees or dependants to receive the benefits, pensions or allowances are fully secured"? Somewhat different answers have been given to this question but assuming that the fund answers the description contained in the earlier part of the section the initial question must be: What are the rights conferred - in this case by the deed - upon employees and their dependants? The next question is, in my view, whether the fund has been constituted in such a way that the right to receive the benefits provided by the deed are "fully secured"? The intention of this provision, found, as it is, in the Income Tax and Social Services Contribution Assessment Act, is to deny the character of a deduction to any employer's contribution to such a fund if the fund itself remains, either directly or indirectly, under his control or within his disposition so that the rights of his employees and their dependants to receive the benefits provided by the scheme are liable to be defeated at his option. I do not wish to suggest that this exhaustively describes the effect of the provisions but it is clear that what must be "fully secured" are the rights to receive the benefits as defined by the deed (cf. Metropolitan Gas Co. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1] ). Holding this view, I am of the opinion that the argument of the respondent touches only the question of the definition of the rights given by the deed and is, in no way, relevant to the question whether those rights, or the rights to receive the benefits provided, are fully secured.