{"id":"C2024A00130","name":"Surveillance Legislation (Confirmation of Application) Act 2024","slug":"surveillance-legislation-confirmation-of-application-act-2024","collection":"act","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":"130 of 2024","makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":436422,"registerId":"C2024A00130-fast-fetch-1775953622968","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-12","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"Surveillance Legislation (Confirmation of Application) Act 2024","content":"---\nmeta-content-style-type: text/css\nmeta-content-type: application/xhtml+xml; charset=utf-8\n---\n\n![Commonwealth Coat of Arms of Australia](image.001.png)\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nSurveillance Legislation (Confirmation of Application) Act 2024\n\nNo. 130, 2024\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nAn Act to confirm the application of surveillance device and related legislation, and for related purposes\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nContents\n\n1 Short title\n\n2 Commencement\n\n3 Objects\n\n4 Definitions\n\n5 Confirmation information was not obtained by interception\n\n6 Confirmation information was obtained under a warrant\n\n7 Application of this Act to proceedings\n\n8 Compensation for acquisition of property\n\n \n\n![Commonwealth Coat of Arms of Australia](image.002.png)\n\n \n\n \n\nSurveillance Legislation (Confirmation of Application) Act 2024\n\nNo. 130, 2024\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nAn Act to confirm the application of surveillance device and related legislation, and for related purposes\n\n[Assented to 10 December 2024]\n\nThe Parliament of Australia enacts:\n\n1  Short title\n\n  This Act is the Surveillance Legislation (Confirmation of Application) Act 2024.\n\n2  Commencement\n\n (1) Each provision of this Act specified in column 1 of the table commences, or is taken to have commenced, in accordance with column 2 of the table. Any other statement in column 2 has effect according to its terms.\n\n \n\n- Commencement information\n- Column 1 Column 2 Column 3\n- Provisions Commencement Date/Details\n- 1. The whole of this Act The day after this Act receives the Royal Assent. 11 December 2024\n\n\nNote: This table relates only to the provisions of this Act as originally enacted. It will not be amended to deal with any later amendments of this Act.\n\n (2) Any information in column 3 of the table is not part of this Act. Information may be inserted in this column, or information in it may be edited, in any published version of this Act.\n\n3  Objects\n\n  The object of this Act is to support public trust and confidence in the application of surveillance device and related legislation to newer technologies by:\n\n (a) confirming that information obtained under specified warrants issued under the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 was not intercepted while passing over a telecommunications system; and\n\n (b) confirming that information obtained in reliance on specified warrants issued under the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 or the Crimes Act 1914 was obtained under a warrant issued under the relevant Act.\n\n4  Definitions\n\n  In this Act:\n\nAustralian law has the same meaning as in the Evidence Act 1995.\n\ndo a thing includes:\n\n (a) make a decision (however described); and\n\n (b) exercise a power, perform a function, comply with an obligation or discharge a duty; and\n\n (c) do anything else;\n\nand purport to do a thing has a corresponding meaning.\n\nintercepting a communication passing over a telecommunications system has the same meaning as in the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 and intercepted while passing over a telecommunications system has a corresponding meaning.\n\nrelevant warrant means:\n\n (a) one of the following warrants issued, or purportedly issued, under the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 to a law enforcement officer of the Australian Federal Police:\n\n (i) surveillance device warrant (Australian Federal Police reference SD7584) issued on 16 October 2018 and as extended from time to time;\n\n (ii) surveillance device warrant (Australian Federal Police reference SD7611) issued on 24 October 2018 and as extended from time to time;\n\n (iii) computer access warrant (Australian Federal Police reference SDC0003) issued on 5 April 2019 and as extended from time to time;\n\n (iv) computer access warrant (Australian Federal Police reference SDC0019) issued on 17 March 2020;\n\n (v) computer access warrant (Australian Federal Police reference SDC0020) issued on 17 March 2020 and as varied or extended from time to time;\n\n (vi) computer access warrant (Australian Federal Police reference SDC0032) issued on 4 December 2020 and as extended from time to time;\n\n (vii) computer access warrant (Australian Federal Police reference SDC0035) issued on 3 March 2021 and as varied or extended from time to time; or\n\n (b) one of the following warrants issued, or purportedly issued, under section 3E of the Crimes Act 1914 to a constable of the Australian Federal Police:\n\n (i) search warrant for search of a premises located at 6 National Circuit Barton ACT 2600 issued on 30 July 2021 at the ACT Magistrates Court;\n\n (ii) search warrant (Downing Centre Local Court NSW reference 2021/1955) for search of a premises located at 48 Pirrama Road Pyrmont NSW 2009 issued on 5 August 2021;\n\n (iii) search warrant (Downing Centre Local Court NSW reference 1978/2021) for search of a premises located at 48 Pirrama Road Pyrmont NSW 2009 issued on 10 August 2021;\n\n (iv) search warrant (Downing Centre Local Court NSW reference 3133/2021) for search of a premises located at 2 Park Street Sydney NSW 2000 issued on 22 December 2021.\n\n5  Confirmation information was not obtained by interception\n\n (1) Information, or a record obtained under, or purportedly under, a relevant warrant, is taken for all purposes:\n\n (a) not to have been, and always not to have been, intercepted while passing over a telecommunications system; and\n\n (b) not to have been, and always not to have been, information or a record obtained by intercepting a communication passing over a telecommunications system.\n\n (2) To avoid doubt, anything done, or anything purported to have been done, by a person that would have been wholly, or partly, invalid or unlawful except for subsection (1) is taken for all purposes to be valid and lawful and to have always been valid and lawful, despite any effect that may have on the accrued rights of any person.\n\n (3) Without limiting subsection (1) or (2), evidence that, except for subsection (1), would have been wholly, or partly, obtained:\n\n (a) in contravention of an Australian law or in consequence of a contravention of an Australian law; or\n\n (b) improperly or in consequence of an impropriety;\n\nis taken for all purposes not to have been, and always not to have been, obtained:\n\n (c) in contravention of an Australian law or in consequence of a contravention of an Australian law; or\n\n (d) improperly or in consequence of an impropriety.\n\n6  Confirmation information was obtained under a warrant\n\n (1) Information, or a record, obtained in reliance, or purported reliance, on a relevant warrant is taken for all purposes to have been, and to always have been, obtained under:\n\n (a) in the case of a relevant warrant referred to in subparagraph (a)(i) or (ii) of the definition of relevant warrant in section 4—a surveillance device warrant issued under Division 2 of Part 2 of the Surveillance Devices Act 2004; or\n\n (b) in the case of a relevant warrant referred to in any other subparagraph of paragraph (a) of the definition of relevant warrant in section 4—a computer access warrant issued under section 27C of the Surveillance Devices Act 2004; or\n\n (c) in the case of a relevant warrant referred to in paragraph (b) of the definition of relevant warrant in section 4—a search warrant issued under Part IAA of the Crimes Act 1914.\n\n (2) To avoid doubt, anything done, or anything purported to have been done, by a person that would have been wholly, or partly, invalid or unlawful except for subsection (1) is taken for all purposes to be valid and lawful and to have always been valid and lawful, despite any effect that may have on the accrued rights of any person.\n\n (3) Without limiting subsection (1) or (2), evidence that, except for subsection (1), would have been wholly, or partly, obtained:\n\n (a) in contravention of an Australian law or in consequence of a contravention of an Australian law; or\n\n (b) improperly or in consequence of an impropriety;\n\nis taken for all purposes not to have been, and always not to have been, obtained:\n\n (c) in contravention of an Australian law or in consequence of a contravention of an Australian law; or\n\n (d) improperly or in consequence of an impropriety.\n\n7  Application of this Act to proceedings\n\n  For the purposes of applying this Act in relation to civil or criminal proceedings, this item applies in relation to:\n\n (a) civil and criminal proceedings instituted on or after the commencement of this Act; and\n\n (b) civil and criminal proceedings instituted before commencement, being proceedings that are concluded:\n\n (i) before the commencement of this Act; or\n\n (ii) on or after the commencement of this Act.\n\n8  Compensation for acquisition of property\n\n (1) If:\n\n (a) apart from this section, the operation of this Act would result in an acquisition of property (within the meaning of paragraph 51(xxxi) of the Constitution) from a person otherwise than on just terms (within the meaning of that paragraph); and\n\n (b) the acquisition would be invalid because of paragraph 51(xxxi) of the Constitution;\n\nthe Commonwealth is liable to pay a reasonable amount of compensation to the person.\n\n (2) If the Commonwealth and the person do not agree on the amount of the compensation, the person may institute proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia or the Supreme Court of a State or Territory for the recovery from the Commonwealth of such reasonable amount of compensation as the court determines.\n\n \n\n[Minister’s second reading speech made in—\n\nHouse of Representatives on 21 November 2024\n\nSenate on 28 November 2024]\n\n(158/24)\n\n \n","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":6,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"The Act retroactively alters the legal status of specified information and validates past conduct by deeming that the material was not intercepted and was obtained under lawful warrants, thereby changing how evidence and acquisition issues would be treated under pre‑existing law. This shifts legal consequences for admissibility and potential constitutional acquisition compared to how the law would operate absent the Act (see ss.5–6 and s.8)."},"complexity_factors":["Retroactive deeming of legal character for information and actions — broad 'for all purposes' effect (s.5(1), s.6(1))","Interaction and cross‑reference with multiple statutes (Surveillance Devices Act 2004, Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, Crimes Act 1914, Evidence Act 1995) (s.4 definitions; ss.5–6)","Narrow, specific list of warrants covered (detailed in s.4) requiring factual matching to determine applicability","Evidentiary consequences — removes certain defences and exclusion arguments by deeming evidence not obtained by interception or unlawfully (s.5(3), s.6(3))","Temporal scope covering proceedings before and after commencement, and concluded proceedings (s.7) — raises questions about finality and reliance interests","Constitutional property issue and compensation mechanics requiring Commonwealth liability and potential court proceedings (s.8)","Potentially significant discretion and factual inquiry for courts to apply the deeming provisions to concrete cases (ss.5–7)"],"plain_english_summary":"This Act retrospectively declares that certain items of information obtained under specified Australian Federal Police warrants were not intercepted while passing over a telecommunications system and were obtained under valid warrants, and treats actions taken in reliance on those warrants as always lawful. It affects people whose communications or data were accessed, the AFP and prosecutors, and courts deciding admissibility; it also creates a route for compensation if the deeming would amount to an acquisition of property (see ss.5–8)."},"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"A positive credit balance is required for all requests, including BYOK, so fallback providers remain available. Add credits at https://vercel.com/d?to=%2F%5Bteam%5D%2F%7E%2Fai%3Fmodal%3Dtop-up to continue.","source":"analysis-cron"},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":4,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The legislation remains tightly scoped to its original purpose. It validates only the 11 specifically identified warrants and does not expand general surveillance powers or create broad new authorities. The narrow, warrant-specific drafting indicates the Act was designed solely to remedy potential technical defects in these particular operations, not to alter the broader surveillance framework."},"complexity_factors":["Retrospective validation mechanism with constitutional safeguards (section 8 compensation clause)","Precise enumeration of 11 specific warrants with unique reference numbers, dates, and locations in the definitions section","Nested deeming provisions creating legal fictions ('taken for all purposes', 'always not to have been')","Cross-references to four separate Acts: Surveillance Devices Act 2004, Crimes Act 1914, Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, and Evidence Act 1995","Dual confirmation structure (sections 5 and 6) addressing both negative confirmation (not interception) and positive confirmation (valid warrant)","Application to both pending and future proceedings with specific temporal rules in section 7"],"plain_english_summary":"This law is a **legal fix for past surveillance operations** conducted by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) between 2018 and 2021.\n\n**What it does:**\nThe Act **retrospectively validates** evidence gathered under 11 specific warrants that the AFP obtained under surveillance and search warrant laws. These warrants involved:\n- **Surveillance device warrants** and **computer access warrants** issued under the *Surveillance Devices Act 2004*\n- **Search warrants** issued under the *Crimes Act 1914*\n\nThe problem being solved: Some of this evidence might have been collected in ways that technically breached the *Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979* (Australia's phone-tapping law). This Act declares that **the evidence was NOT illegally intercepted**, and **was properly obtained under valid warrants**.\n\n**Key effects:**\n- The evidence is deemed lawful **for all purposes**, including court cases already underway or yet to start\n- Any actions taken by police that would have been illegal without this law are now deemed **valid and lawful**\n- This applies **retrospectively** — it changes the legal status of things that already happened\n\n**Who it affects:**\n- Primarily **people who were subject to these 11 specific warrants** (locations in Canberra, Sydney, and Pyrmont)\n- Anyone whose court case involves evidence from these operations\n- The AFP, which avoids having evidence ruled inadmissible\n\n**Why it matters:**\nThis is a **safety net law**. Without it, serious criminal prosecutions could collapse if courts ruled the evidence was illegally obtained. It protects \"accrued rights\" (legal rights that have already come into existence) by ensuring the evidence remains usable, while also providing a compensation mechanism if anyone's property rights were unfairly affected."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/surveillance-legislation-confirmation-of-application-act-2024","history":"/api/acts/surveillance-legislation-confirmation-of-application-act-2024/history","analysis":"/api/acts/surveillance-legislation-confirmation-of-application-act-2024/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/surveillance-legislation-confirmation-of-application-act-2024/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/surveillance-legislation-confirmation-of-application-act-2024/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/surveillance-legislation-confirmation-of-application-act-2024/documents"}}