{"id":"C1939A00036","name":"Sulphur Bounty Act 1939","slug":"sulphur-bounty-act-1939","collection":"act","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"repealed","isInForce":false,"actNumber":"36 of 1939","makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":4099,"registerId":"commonwealth-C1939A00036-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-03-30","status":"Repealed","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"Sulphur Bounty Act 1939","content":"SULPHUR BOUNTY.\n\nNo. 36 of 1939.\n\nAn Act to provide for the Payment of a Bounty on the Production of Sulphur.\n\n\\[Assented to 26th September, 1939.\\]\n\n\\[Date of commencement 24th October, 1939.\\]\n\nPreamble.\n\nBE it enacted by the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, the Senate, and the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Australia, for the purpose of appropriating the grant originated in the House of Representatives, as follows:—\n\nShort title.\n\n1. This Act may be cited as the Sulphur Bounty Act 1939.\n\nRepeal.\n\n2. The Sulphur Bounty Act 1923 is repealed.\n\nDefinitions.\n\n3.—(1.) In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears—\n\n“authorized person” means any person authorized in writing by the Minister in respect of the matter in relation to which the expression is used;\n\n“Collector” means the Collector of Customs for a State;\n\n“Comptroller-General” means the Comptroller-General of Customs;\n\n“duty of Customs” means a duty of Customs chargeable in pursuance of any Customs Tariff or of any Customs Tariff proposal introduced into the House of Representatives;\n\n  \n\n“factory” means any premises appointed by the Minister as a factory for the purposes of this Act;\n\n“imported cost”, in respect of any financial year or part thereof in which sulphur or sulphuric acid is produced, means such amount as the Minister determines to be the average cost in Australian currency on the wharf at the port of importation (including insurance, external freight and exchange at telegraphic transfer rates) of all sulphur which during that financial year or part thereof is imported into the States of New South Wales, Victoria or South Australia directly from overseas;\n\n“sulphur” means sulphur of a purity of not less than ninety-nine per centum.\n\n(2.) The sulphur equivalent of sulphuric acid shall—\n\n(a) be calculated to a purity of not less than ninety-nine per centum;\n\n(b) be determined in the prescribed manner; and\n\n(c) be based upon the recovery of sulphur from sulphuric acid calculated to a strength of one hundred per centum.\n\nAppropriation.\n\n4. There shall be payable out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund, which is hereby appropriated accordingly, the bounty specified in this Act.\n\nLimit of annual bounty.\n\n5.—(1.) The total amount of bounty paid under this Act in respect of sulphur or sulphuric acid produced during any one financial year shall not exceed the sum of One hundred and ten thousand pounds, nor, during that part of the financial year preceding the first complete financial year of the period during which this Act is in operation or succeeding the last complete financial year of that period, exceed a sum which bears the same proportion to One hundred and ten thousand pounds as that part of a complete financial year bears to a complete financial year:\n\nProvided that, when the maximum amount of bounty which may be paid in respect of any financial year or part thereof has not been paid in that year or part, the unpaid balance, or any portion thereof, may be paid in any subsequent financial year or part thereof in addition to the maximum amount in respect of that subsequent financial year or part.\n\n(2.) Where the total amount available in pursuance of this section for the payment of bounty in respect of any financial year or part thereof is insufficient for the payment in full of all valid claims for bounty in respect of that financial year or part thereof, the bounty otherwise payable under this Act in respect of each of those claims shall be reduced to an amount which bears the same proportion to the amount of the claim as the total amount of bounty available in respect of that financial year or part thereof bears to the total amount of valid claims in respect of that financial year or part.\n\n  \n\n(3.) If the Minister is of the opinion that the total amount of bounty available in pursuance of this section for the payment of bounty in respect of any financial year or part thereof will be insufficient for the payment in full of all valid claims in respect of that financial year or part, he may withhold payment of the whole or any part of all bounties otherwise payable under this Act in respect of that financial year or part until he has ascertained the total amount of valid claims in respect of that financial year or part.\n\nTo whom bounty payable.\n\n6. The bounty shall, subject to this Act, be payable to the manufacturer of the sulphur or sulphuric acid.\n\nSpecification of bounty.\n\n7. The bounty under this Act shall be payable in respect of—\n\n(a) sulphur produced from Australian materials; and\n\n(b) the sulphur equivalent of sulphuric acid produced from zinc concentrates, iron pyrites and spent oxide of Australian origin,\n\nwhich, during a period of five years, commencing on the date of the commencement of this Act, have been produced in a factory in accordance with the prescribed conditions for sale for use in the Commonwealth.\n\nRates of bounty.\n\n8.—(1.) The rate of bounty payable under this Act in respect of sulphur produced, or the sulphur equivalent of sulphuric acid produced, during any financial year or part thereof shall, subject to this Act be—\n\n(a) when the imported cost during that financial year or part thereof is Six pounds per ton—One pound seven shillings per ton;\n\n(b) when the imported cost during that financial year or part exceeds Six pounds per ton—One pound seven shillings per ton less one shilling per ton for every shilling by which the imported cost exceeds Six pounds per ton; or\n\n(c) when the imported cost during that financial year or part thereof is less than Six pounds per ton—One pound seven shillings per ton plus one shilling per ton for every shilling by which the imported cost is less than Six pounds per ton:\n\nProvided that the rate of bounty shall not in any case exceed One pound sixteen shillings per ton.\n\n(2.) Where sulphur of a purity of less than ninety-nine per centum is produced, the rate of bounty determined in accordance with subsection (1.) of this section shall be reduced to an amount which bears the same proportion to that rate as the actual purity of the sulphur bears to one hundred per centum.\n\n(3.) If the rate of duty of Customs applicable to sulphur is increased above the rate applicable to sulphur on the date of the commencement of this Act, the Minister shall forthwith cause to be made such reduction in the rate of bounty payable in respect of sulphur or the sulphur equivalent of sulphuric acid produced in a factory on or after the date of the increase as is equivalent to that increase.\n\n  \n\n(4.) Where, after the rate of bounty has been reduced in pursuance of sub-section (3.) of this section, any reduction or increase occurs in the rate of duty of Customs in respect of sulphur, the Minister shall forthwith cause to be made in respect of sulphur produced thereafter such increase or reduction, as the case may be, in the rate of bounty theretofore payable as is equivalent to that reduction or increase in the rate of duty:\n\nProvided that nothing in this sub-section shall authorize any increase in the rate of bounty so as to exceed the rate of One pound sixteen shillings per ton.\n\nReduction of bounty where profits exceed ten per centum per annum.\n\n9.—(1.) Where the net profit of a manufacturer from the manufacture and sale of sulphur and sulphuric acid during any financial year or part thereof exceeds the rate of ten per centum per annum on the capital actually used by the manufacturer in that manufacture and sale, the Minister may withhold from the manufacturer payment of bounty in respect of sulphur produced and the sulphur equivalent of sulphuric acid produced during that financial year or part thereof, and may recover any bounty which has been paid in respect thereof.\n\n(2.) Where the payment of any bounty has resulted or would result in the net profit of a manufacturer, after taking the bounty into account, from the manufacture and sale of sulphur and sulphuric acid during any financial year or part thereof exceeding the rate of ten per centum per annum on the capital actually used by the manufacturer in that manufacture and sale, the Minister may—\n\n(a) require the manufacturer to refund the portion of the bounty paid to him which has resulted in the net profit, after taking the bounty into account, having exceeded the rate of ten per centum per annum on that capital, and that portion shall thereupon be recoverable; or\n\n(b) withhold from the manufacturer payment of such further bounty as would result in the net profit, after taking the bounty into account, exceeding the rate of ten per centum per annum on that capital.\n\n(3.) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where the Minister finds that a manufacturer has, after taking into account the bounty which would, but for this section, have been payable to him, made a net profit which has exceeded the rate of ten per centum per annum on the capital actually used in the manufacture and sale of sulphur and sulphuric acid, the Minister may, in taking action under this section, make such allowance as he, in his absolute discretion, thinks fit in respect of any net profit of less than ten per centum per annum, or any loss, which the manufacturer may have made during any previous financial year or part thereof (after taking into account the bounty paid to him in respect of that financial year or part thereof) during which this Act is in operation.\n\n  \n\n(4.) For the purposes of this section, the Minister may—\n\n(a) determine what amount of capital is from time to time actually used, and what amount of net profit is derived thereon, by any manufacturer in the manufacture and sale of sulphur and sulphuric acid; and\n\n(b) determine, and include with the amount of capital actually used and net profit thereon derived by the manufacturer, any amount of capital actually used and the net profit thereon derived by any other person (whether subsidiary to or affiliated with the manufacturer or not) in the distribution or sale of sulphur or sulphuric acid to users thereof.\n\n(5.) In the determination under sub-section (4.) of this section of the amount of net profit derived by a manufacturer from the manufacture and sale of sulphur and sulphuric acid, income tax assessed under any Act or State Act shall not be deducted from the profit so derived by that manufacturer.\n\nGood quality essential.\n\n10. Bounty shall not be paid in respect of any sulphur or the sulphur equivalent of any sulphuric acid unless the Comptroller-General is satisfied that the sulphur or sulphuric acid, as the case may be, is of good and merchantable quality.\n\nFactories to be appointed by Minister.\n\n11.—(1.) Where, in the opinion of the Minister, sulphur or sulphuric acid is, or is proposed to be, manufactured at premises under such conditions as are from time to time prescribed, he shall appoint those premises as a factory for the purposes of this Act.\n\n(2.) The Minister may require any person applying for the appointment of his premises as a factory under this section to furnish information as to the nature of the business or proposed business, the marketing possibilities of the sulphur or sulphuric acid, and such other matters as the Minister thinks fit.\n\nSeparate accounts.\n\n12.—(1.) A manufacturer shall keep, to the satisfaction of the Minister, separate accounts, books and documents showing from time to time, in relation to sulphur or the sulphur equivalent of sulphuric acid subject to bounty, the capital actually used in, and the costs of, the manufacture and sale of the sulphur or sulphuric acid, the selling prices and revenue from sales thereof, and the profits derived from the manufacture and sale.\n\n(2.) A manufacturer shall, in respect of each half-year ending on the thirty-first day of December and each financial year ending on the thirtieth day of June respectively, furnish to the Comptroller-General a balance-sheet, profit and loss account, manufacturing account and trading account, and such other information in relation to the manufacture and sale of sulphur or sulphuric acid subject to bounty as the Minister requires.\n\n(3.) The accounts and information so furnished, together with the stocks of sulphur and sulphuric acid recorded therein as having been held at the end of each such period, shall be certified by the manufacturer and his auditor to be true and correct in every particular.\n\n  \n\nStocktaking and inspection of manufacture and accounts.\n\n13.—(1.) Any authorized person may, at all reasonable times, enter upon any factory or premises where sulphur or sulphuric acid, in respect of which bounty has been paid or claimed, is manufactured or stored, and may—\n\n(a) inspect or take stock of the sulphur or sulphuric acid therein;\n\n(b) inspect the process of manufacture of the sulphur or sulphuric acid;\n\n(c) take samples of the sulphur or sulphuric acid; and\n\n(d) inspect the accounts, books and documents relating to the manufacture and sale of the sulphur or sulphuric acid.\n\n(2.) The manufacturer and the owner or occupier of the premises shall provide the authorized person with all reasonable facilities and assistance to enable him to give effect to any or all of the matters specified in sub-section (1.) of this section.\n\nPenalty (for any contravention of this sub-section): Fifty pounds.\n\nPower to require persons to answer questions and produce documents.\n\n14.—(1.) The Comptroller-General, a Collector or any authorized person may, by notice in writing, require any person whom he believes to be capable of giving any information in relation to the manufacture or sale of sulphur or sulphuric acid to attend before him at the time and place named in the notice, and then and there to answer questions and to produce to him such accounts, books and documents in relation to the manufacture or sale as the Comptroller-General, Collector or authorized person thinks necessary.\n\n(2.) The Comptroller-General, the Collector or any authorized person to whom any accounts, books or documents are produced in pursuance of this section may make and take away copies of or extracts from those accounts, books or documents.\n\n(3.) No person shall be excused from answering any question or producing any accounts, books or documents, when required so to do under this section, on the ground that the answer to the question or the production of the accounts, books or documents might tend to criminate him or make him liable to a penalty; but his answer shall not be admissible in evidence against him in any civil or criminal proceeding other than a proceeding for an offence against this Act.\n\n(4.) Where a manufacturer has failed to attend or to answer any question or to produce any accounts, books or documents, when required so to do under this section, the Minister may, if he thinks fit, withhold payment of any bounty payable to the manufacturer until he has attended, answered the question or furnished the required accounts, books or documents, as the case may be.\n\nPower to examine on oath.\n\n15. The Comptroller-General, a Collector or any authorized person may administer an oath to any person required to attend before him in pursuance of section fourteen of this Act and may examine such person upon oath.\n\nAffirmation in lieu of oath.\n\n16.—(1.) Where any person required to attend before the Comptroller-General, a Collector or authorized person in pursuance of section fourteen of this Act conscientiously objects to take an oath,\n\n  \n\nhe may make an affirmation that he conscientiously objects to take an oath, and that he will state the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, to all questions that may be asked him.\n\n(2.) An affirmation so made shall be of the same force and effect, and shall entail the same penalties, as an oath.\n\nPenalty for refusing to answer questions, &c.\n\n17. Any person who refuses or fails—\n\n(a) to attend before the Comptroller-General, a Collector or an authorized person;\n\n(b) to be sworn or to make an affirmation; or\n\n(c) to answer questions or produce accounts, books or documents,\n\nwhen so required in pursuance of this Act, shall be guilty of an offence.\n\nPenalty: Fifty pounds.\n\nSecurity for compliance with Act.\n\n18. The Minister may require any manufacturer to give security by bond, guarantee or cash deposit, or by all or any of these methods, for due compliance by him with the provisions of this Act and the regulations or for the performance of any undertaking given by him in pursuance of this Act or the regulations.\n\nBounty not payable unless Act compiled with.\n\n19. No bounty shall be authorized to be paid in respect of any sulphur or sulphuric acid unless the manufacturer furnishes proof to the satisfaction of the Minister that the requirements of this Act and the regulations have been substantially complied with.\n\nOffences.\n\n20.—(1.) Any person who—\n\n(a) obtains any bounty which is not payable;\n\n(b) obtains payment of any bounty by means of any false or misleading statement; or\n\n(c) presents to any officer or other person doing duty in relation to this Act or the regulations any account, book or document, or makes to any such officer or person any statement, which is false in any particular,\n\nshall be guilty of an offence.\n\nPenalty: Five hundred pounds or imprisonment for twelve months.\n\n(2.) Where a person is convicted under sub-section (1.) of this section, the Court may, in addition to imposing a penalty under that sub-section, order the person to refund to the Minister the amount of any bounty wrongfully obtained.\n\nReturn for Parliament.\n\n21.—(1.) A return shall be prepared, not later than the thirty-first day of August of each year, and shall be laid before each House of the Parliament within fifteen sitting days of that House after the preparation of the return.\n\n(2.) The return shall set forth in respect of the preceding financial year—\n\n(a) the name and address of each manufacturer to whom bounty was paid;\n\n  \n\n(b) the total amount of bounty paid to each manufacturer and the quantity and value of sulphur and the sulphur equivalent of sulphuric acid on which bounty was paid; and\n\n(c) such other particulars as are prescribed.\n\nRegulations.\n\n22. The Governor-General may make regulations not inconsistent with this Act, prescribing all matters which by this Act are required or permitted to be prescribed, or which are necessary or convenient to be prescribed, for carrying out or giving effect to this Act, and in particular for prescribing—\n\n(a) the form in which applications for bounty shall be made;\n\n(b) the conditions to be observed by manufacturers in respect of giving notice of their intention to claim bounty and the time or times within which applications for bounty shall be lodged with the Collector;\n\n(c) the conditions of manufacture of sulphur or sulphuric acid at factories; and\n\n(d) penalties not exceeding Fifty pounds for any breach of the regulations.","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"issue_detection":{"absurdities":[{"type":"self_contradicting","section":"Section 8(2)","severity":"high","reasoning":"Section 3(1) defines 'sulphur' as sulphur of a purity of not less than 99%. Section 8(2) explicitly provides for a reduced bounty rate where 'sulphur of a purity of less than ninety-nine per centum is produced.' This is internally incoherent: the sub-section purports to operate on sub-99% sulphur, yet that substance categorically falls outside the Act's definition of 'sulphur' and therefore cannot attract any bounty in the first place. The provision is either entirely otiose or contradicts the foundational definition.","confidence":0.92,"description":"Bounty is payable on sulphur of less than 99% purity, but sulphur is defined in Section 3(1) as requiring a purity of not less than 99%. Sulphur below 99% purity is not 'sulphur' within the Act's own definition, so Section 8(2) purports to apply a reduced bounty rate to a substance that legally does not exist under the Act."},{"type":"other","section":"Section 7","severity":"medium","reasoning":"The Act creates a bounty for production during a defined five-year window but then allows payment of unpaid balances in subsequent financial years without clearly stating whether the compliance, inspection, and penalty provisions (ss 12–20) remain operative after the production period closes. A manufacturer could argue that obligations to keep accounts or submit to inspection no longer apply once the five-year period has passed, yet the Crown may still be processing claims.","confidence":0.72,"description":"The bounty period is fixed at five years from the date of commencement (24 October 1939), yet Section 5(1) provides for payment of unpaid balances in 'any subsequent financial year or part thereof' beyond the bounty period, and Section 5(1) also contemplates periods 'succeeding the last complete financial year of that period.' These carry-forward payments are triggered by production that must occur within the five-year window, but the machinery for collecting and paying bounties — including the August return under Section 21 — may extend beyond that window, creating ambiguity about whether the Act's administrative apparatus (accounts, inspections, penalties) continues to operate after the production period ends."},{"type":"impossible_compliance","section":"Section 8(1)(b)","severity":"medium","reasoning":"The base rate is £1 7s (27 shillings) per ton. For every shilling the imported cost exceeds £6, one shilling is deducted. Once the imported cost reaches £7 7s/ton (27 shillings above £6), the rate reaches zero. If the imported cost exceeds that figure, the formula yields a negative number. The Act does not include a floor of zero for this calculation, and the proviso only caps the maximum at £1 16s. The Act is silent on what happens at zero or below, creating genuine compliance uncertainty.","confidence":0.88,"description":"The rate reduction formula in Section 8(1)(b) can mathematically produce a zero or negative bounty rate. At an imported cost of £1 7s above £6/ton (i.e., £7 7s/ton), the bounty would be reduced by 27 shillings against a base of 27 shillings, yielding zero. Above that imported cost, the formula produces a negative bounty — i.e., a levy on the manufacturer — which is plainly not the legislative intent and which the Act provides no mechanism to enforce or cap at zero."},{"type":"circular_definition","section":"Section 9(1) and 9(2)","severity":"medium","reasoning":"The Minister must determine whether profit (including bounty) exceeds 10% to decide how much bounty to recover. But recovering bounty reduces profit, which changes whether and how much recovery is warranted, which changes the profit figure again. The Act does not prescribe an iterative or fixed-point methodology, so the determination has no logically stable stopping point. Section 9(3) partially addresses this by permitting the Minister to consider prior years, but does not resolve the circular dependency in the current-year calculation.","confidence":0.81,"description":"Section 9(1) allows the Minister to withhold bounty where profits exceed 10% per annum on capital, and to recover bounty already paid. Section 9(2) similarly allows recovery of the portion that caused the 10% threshold to be exceeded. However, the bounty itself is a component of the net profit calculation. Withholding or recovering the bounty will reduce the net profit, which may then fall below 10%, retroactively undoing the very trigger for the recovery — creating a circular calculation that has no stable equilibrium."},{"type":"self_contradicting","section":"Section 5(1) proviso","severity":"medium","reasoning":"Section 5(1) establishes an annual cap of £110,000 as a control on total bounty expenditure. The proviso then allows any number of prior-year unpaid balances to be paid on top of that cap in the same year. If, hypothetically, the cap was never reached for four consecutive years, all four years' unpaid balances could be discharged in year five alongside that year's full £110,000, multiplying the annual outlay by a factor of five. This defeats the evident budgetary purpose of the cap.","confidence":0.85,"description":"The proviso allows unpaid bounty balances from one year to be paid in a subsequent year 'in addition to the maximum amount in respect of that subsequent financial year.' This means the effective ceiling in any given year is potentially unlimited, as multiple years of unpaid balances could accumulate and all become payable simultaneously in a single subsequent year, rendering the £110,000 annual cap practically meaningless."}],"contradictions":[{"severity":"high","section_a":"Section 3(1) — definition of 'sulphur'","section_b":"Section 8(2)","confidence":0.92,"description":"Section 3(1) defines 'sulphur' as requiring a purity of not less than 99%. Section 8(2) expressly contemplates 'sulphur of a purity of less than ninety-nine per centum' and sets a reduced bounty rate for it. If sub-99% material is not 'sulphur' within the Act, Section 8(2) can never apply to anything; if Section 8(2) is to have any effect, the definition in Section 3(1) must be read as not exhaustive, which then undermines the definitional architecture of the entire Act."},{"severity":"medium","section_a":"Section 7 — specification of bounty (five-year production period)","section_b":"Section 5(1) proviso — carry-forward of unpaid balances","confidence":0.74,"description":"Section 7 restricts bounty eligibility to sulphur produced during a defined five-year period. The proviso to Section 5(1) allows unpaid balances from any year to be discharged in 'any subsequent financial year or part thereof,' which may fall outside that five-year window. This creates tension: is the carry-forward a continued operation of the Act after the production period, and if so, which other provisions (compliance obligations, inspection rights, penalties) remain alive? The Act is silent."},{"severity":"high","section_a":"Section 9(1) — Minister may withhold or recover entire bounty where profits exceed 10%","section_b":"Section 9(2) — Minister may recover only the portion of bounty that caused profits to exceed 10%","confidence":0.87,"description":"Section 9(1) empowers the Minister to withhold 'payment of bounty in respect of sulphur produced… during that financial year' in its entirety and to recover 'any bounty which has been paid in respect thereof' — suggesting a full withholding or clawback power. Section 9(2) limits recovery to only 'the portion of the bounty paid… which has resulted in the net profit… having exceeded the rate of ten per centum per annum.' These are inconsistent remedies: s9(1) is all-or-nothing while s9(2) is proportionate, and the Act provides no principle for choosing between them when both are enlivened by the same facts."},{"severity":"medium","section_a":"Section 19 — bounty not payable unless Act 'substantially complied with'","section_b":"Section 10 — bounty not payable unless Comptroller-General satisfied as to quality","confidence":0.78,"description":"Section 19 makes payment conditional on the Minister being satisfied of 'substantial compliance' with the Act and regulations. Section 10 makes it independently conditional on the Comptroller-General being satisfied as to quality. The two gatekeepers are different officers with no prescribed hierarchy. It is unclear whether the Minister's satisfaction under s19 can override the Comptroller-General's dissatisfaction under s10, or vice versa — and whether 'substantially complied with' in s19 can encompass a failure to meet the quality standard in s10."}]},"summary":{"complexity_score":5,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This Act is a direct replacement of the Sulphur Bounty Act 1923 and stays firmly within the same original purpose: subsidising domestic sulphur production. It updates rates, conditions, and enforcement mechanisms but does not expand into new policy areas. The scope is tightly confined to sulphur and sulphuric acid manufactured from Australian materials at approved factories. There is no evidence of scope creep beyond the original intent."},"complexity_factors":["7 defined terms in section 3, some with multi-part technical definitions (e.g. 'imported cost', 'sulphur equivalent')","Sliding-scale bounty rate formula in section 8 with a cap, requiring arithmetic calculation against a variable (imported cost)","Bounty rate further adjusted by customs duty movements, creating layered conditional logic (ss 8(3) and 8(4))","Annual cap with proportional reduction mechanism if total claims exceed available funds (s 5(2))","Profit claw-back provisions in section 9 involving nested conditions, ministerial discretion, multi-year averaging, and related-party attribution","Multiple enforcement mechanisms operating in parallel: inspections (s 13), compelled questioning under oath (ss 14–17), security bonds (s 18), and withholding of payment (s 14(4))","Cross-references between sections (e.g. s 8 references s 7, s 19 references regulations, s 9 references financial year definitions)","Old pre-decimal currency (pounds, shillings) adds cognitive load for modern readers"],"plain_english_summary":"## Sulphur Bounty Act 1939 — Plain English Summary\n\n### What does this law do?\nThis Act sets up a **government subsidy (\"bounty\") system** to financially support Australian manufacturers who produce sulphur or sulphuric acid from Australian raw materials. Think of it as the government paying local producers a top-up payment per tonne of sulphur they make, to help them compete against cheaper imported sulphur.\n\nThe Act replaced an earlier version from 1923, updating the rules and rates.\n\n---\n\n### Who does it affect?\n- **Sulphur and sulphuric acid manufacturers** in Australia who produce from Australian-origin materials (such as zinc concentrates, iron pyrites, and spent oxide)\n- **The federal government**, which funds the bounty from the Consolidated Revenue Fund (the main government bank account)\n- **Importers** of sulphur, whose pricing influences the bounty rate\n\n---\n\n### Key features of the law\n\n**Who gets paid?**\nOnly manufacturers who produce sulphur or sulphuric acid at an officially **approved factory** (premises formally appointed by the Minister), using Australian materials, and selling the product for use within Australia.\n\n**How much is the bounty?**\nThe rate per tonne is tied to the **cost of imported sulphur** — essentially, when imported sulphur is cheap, the local producer gets a bigger top-up; when imported sulphur is expensive, the top-up is smaller. The rate adjusts by one shilling per tonne for every shilling the import price moves above or below £6 per tonne, but **can never exceed £1 16s per tonne** (£1.80 in old money).\n\nThe rate also adjusts if government customs duty (an import tax) on sulphur changes — if the duty goes up, the bounty goes down by an equivalent amount, so manufacturers don't get a double benefit.\n\n**Is there a cap?**\nYes — the **total annual bounty is capped at £110,000**. If there are more valid claims than money available, each manufacturer's payment is cut proportionally (like splitting a pizza into smaller slices when more people show up).\n\n**Profit limits apply:**\nIf a manufacturer makes more than a **10% annual profit** on the capital they've invested in the business, the government can **claw back** all or part of the bounty. The bounty is meant to help struggling producers, not to pad already-healthy profits.\n\n**Quality control:**\nBounty is only paid on sulphur that meets a **minimum 99% purity standard** and is certified as being of good commercial quality.\n\n**Compliance and oversight:**\n- Manufacturers must keep **detailed, audited accounts** covering costs, revenues, and profits\n- Government inspectors have the right to **enter factories, inspect production, take samples, and examine records** at any reasonable time\n- The Comptroller-General of Customs (a senior customs official) can **summon people to answer questions under oath**\n- Manufacturers must provide **security** (a bond, guarantee or cash deposit) to ensure they comply with the rules\n\n**Penalties:**\n- Refusing to cooperate with inspectors or answer questions: **£50 fine**\n- Fraudulently obtaining bounty or making false statements: **£500 fine or 12 months' imprisonment** (plus repayment of wrongfully obtained money)\n\n**Transparency:**\nEach year, a public report must be tabled in Parliament listing **every manufacturer who received bounty**, how much they got, and how much sulphur they produced.\n\n---\n\n### Why does it matter?\nThis law reflects **Depression-era and wartime economic policy** — using government subsidies to nurture a domestic sulphur industry, which was strategically important for manufacturing explosives, fertilisers, and industrial chemicals. By tying the bounty to import prices, the government ensured it only subsidised local production when it genuinely needed help to compete, rather than handing out money unconditionally."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/sulphur-bounty-act-1939","history":"/api/acts/sulphur-bounty-act-1939/history","analysis":"/api/acts/sulphur-bounty-act-1939/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/sulphur-bounty-act-1939/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/sulphur-bounty-act-1939/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/sulphur-bounty-act-1939/documents"}}