{"id":"BILL-TAS-public-accounts-committee-amendment-bill-2025-49-of-2025","name":"Public Accounts Committee Amendment Bill 2025","slug":"public-accounts-committee-amendment-bill-2025","collection":"bill","jurisdiction":"tas","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":"2025-01-01","administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":446200,"registerId":"BILL-TAS-public-accounts-committee-amendment-bill-2025-49-of-2025:current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2025-01-01","status":"in_force","reasons":null,"registeredAt":"2026-05-08T16:48:47.217Z"},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"retrieval-0001","sectionType":"document_chunk","heading":"Document excerpt 1","content":"# Public Accounts Committee Amendment Bill 2025\n\n[Bill 49]-VI\nTASMANIA\n__________\nPUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE AMENDMENT\nBILL 2025\n__________\nCONTENTS\n1. Short title\n2. Commencement\n3. Principal Act\n4. Section 2 amended (Constitution of Committee)\n5. Section 4 amended (Proceedings of Committee)\n6. Repeal of Act\n\n2\n\n[Bill 49] 3\nPUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE AMENDMENT\nBILL 2025\nThis Public Bill originated in the House of Assembly, and, having this day passed, is\nnow ready for presentation to the Legislative Council for its concurrence.\nLAURA ROSS, Clerk of the House\n23 September 2025\n(Brought in by the Premier, the Honourable Jeremy Page\nRockliff)\nA BILL FOR\nAn Act to amend the Public Accounts Committee Act 1970\nBe it enacted by Her Excellency the Governor of Tasmania, by\nand with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council and\nHouse of Assembly, in Parliament assembled, as follows:\n1. Short title\nThis Act may be cited as the Public Accounts\nCommittee Amendment Act 2025.\n2. Commencement\nThis Act commences on the day on which this\nAct receives the Royal Assent.\n\nPublic Accounts Committee Amendment Act 2025\nAct No. of 2025\ns. 3\n4\n3. Principal Act\nIn this Act, the Public Accounts Committee Act\n1970* is referred to as the Principal Act.\n4. Section 2 amended (Constitution of Committee)\nSection 2 of the Principal Act is amended by\nomitting subsection (3) and substituting the\nfollowing subsections:\n(3) The Committee is to consist of 8\nmembers, of whom –\n(a) four are to be members of the\nLegislative Council; and\n(b) four are to be members of the\nHouse of Assembly.\n(3A) Of the members of the Committee\nreferred to in subsection (3)(b), at least\none member of any political party that\nhas 3 or more members in the House of\nAssembly is to be a member of the\nCommittee.\n5. Section 4 amended (Proceedings of Committee)\nSection 4(1) of the Principal Act is amended by\nomitting “four” and substituting “6”.\n_______________________________________________________________\n*No. 54 of 1970\n\nPublic Accounts Committee Amendment Act 2025\nAct No. of 2025\ns. 6\n5\n6. Repeal of Act\nThis Act is repealed on the first anniversary of\nthe day on which it commenced.\nGovernment Printer, Tasmania","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":4,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The Bill is procedural: it changes who sits on the Public Accounts Committee and the numerical threshold for proceedings, but it does not add new powers, duties or functions to the committee. It therefore does not expand the statutory scope of the Committee’s role beyond oversight and scrutiny under the Principal Act; it only alters composition and operation for a fixed one-year period."},"complexity_factors":["Very short Bill: 3 substantive amendments plus a sunset clause","Amendment to composition: replaces s.2(3) and inserts a new s.2(3A)","Ambiguous drafting in s.2(3A) about whether the requirement is per eligible party or simply requires at least one eligible-party member overall","Cross-reference to Principal Act s.4(1) without reproducing context — effect depends on existing text (likely quorum or voting threshold)","Temporal limit (sunset clause) meaning the change is temporary, raising transitional planning needs","Potential combinatorial constraint: only 4 House seats available while multiple parties may meet the 3+ threshold, creating appointment conflicts in practice"],"plain_english_summary":"**What this law changes (mechanics)\n\n- Changes the make-up of the Parliament's Public Accounts Committee. Under the amended section 2(3) the committee will have 8 members: 4 from the Legislative Council and 4 from the House of Assembly (see new s.2(3)).\n- Adds a requirement that, of the four House of Assembly members, \"at least one member of any political party that has 3 or more members in the House of Assembly is to be a member of the Committee\" (new s.2(3A)).\n- Increases a numerical threshold in section 4(1) of the existing Act by replacing the word \"four\" with \"6\" (this is most likely changing the number needed for meetings or decisions — commonly a quorum or voting threshold) (s.5).\n- The entire amendment Act automatically expires one year after it starts (sunset clause) (s.6).\n\nWho this affects\n\n- Members of Parliament: party leaders and whips will have to nominate or allocate committee places to meet the new composition and representation requirement (s.2(3)–(3A)).\n- Parties with at least 3 members in the House of Assembly: they are guaranteed at least one seat on the committee (s.2(3A)).\n- The Parliament’s administrative officers who manage committee appointments and schedules (because of the change in size and numerical thresholds).\n- Indirectly, the executive, advisers and government contractors: the Public Accounts Committee oversees public spending, so changes in the committee’s composition and operation can affect the intensity, timing and focus of financial oversight.\n\nWhy it matters (purpose claims and practical effects)\n\n- The text suggests a purpose of widening membership and ensuring representation of any party with a minimum presence in the lower house (s.2(3)–(3A)). If accepted, that will mechanically guarantee party representation on the committee.\n- Raising the figure in s.4(1) from \"four\" to \"6\" increases the number of members required for the committee to proceed (likely the quorum or a voting threshold). This makes it harder to meet or carry business without broader attendance or agreement.\n\nCosts, incentives and trade-offs (how behaviour and resources change)\n\n- Who pays: principally parliamentary budgets (member time, administration) and the opportunity cost of MPs’ time. Indirect economic actors (government departments, contractors) may face changes in oversight intensity.\n- Who decides: party leaderships and whips decide which MPs fill committee spots; the committee’s ability to act depends on members attending (s.2(3)–(3A); s.4(1)).\n- Behavioural changes: parties with 3+ members will push to nominate a member for the committee; parties and members will face stronger incentives to ensure attendance because the higher threshold (6) makes meetings more vulnerable to absence or strategic boycotts.\n- Trade-offs: guaranteeing seats to parties with at least 3 members increases representativeness for those parties but reduces the appointing freedom of party leaders and may constrain the balance of party representation that would otherwise be negotiated. A higher attendance threshold raises the standard for legitimate decisions but increases the risk of deadlock or delay.\n- Implementation risks and ambiguity: the phrasing of s.2(3A) can be read in more than one way (see below). If multiple parties meet the 3+ threshold and there are more such parties than available House-of-Assembly slots, practical conflicts can arise when appointing members.\n\nEffects on markets and private actors\n\n- The amendments are procedural and do not directly change procurement, regulation or services. Any effect on private firms comes indirectly via changed parliamentary oversight of public spending: a differently composed committee or a committee that meets less or more often could alter the timing, focus or intensity of inquiries that affect suppliers and contractors.\n\nOther practical points\n\n- The amendment is temporary: it automatically expires one year after commencement (s.6). That limits long-run legal structure changes and suggests a time-limited policy experiment.\n- The amendment does not change the committee’s statutory powers or introduce new duties — it only changes composition and numerical meeting thresholds.\n\nAmbiguities to note\n\n- The new s.2(3A) is open to interpretation. It could require that for each political party that has 3 or more lower‑house members, at least one of that party must sit on the committee (a per‑party requirement). Or it could be read as requiring that at least one member on the committee belong to some party that has 3+ members (a weaker, aggregate requirement). That difference matters operationally and could require judicial or procedural interpretation.\n- The effect of changing \"four\" to \"6\" in s.4(1) depends on what s.4(1) currently governs (quorum, voting majority, or other procedural threshold). The amendment text does not restate s.4(1), so administrators will need to read the Principal Act to confirm the precise consequence.\n\nNet mechanical effect in one sentence\n\n- For one year, the Public Accounts Committee will be larger (8 members), will guarantee representation for parties with at least 3 lower‑house members (as written), and will require a higher number of members to proceed (\"6\" rather than \"four\"), increasing representational guarantees while raising coordination requirements (ss.2–6)."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/public-accounts-committee-amendment-bill-2025","history":"/api/acts/public-accounts-committee-amendment-bill-2025/history","analysis":"/api/acts/public-accounts-committee-amendment-bill-2025/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/public-accounts-committee-amendment-bill-2025/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/public-accounts-committee-amendment-bill-2025/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/public-accounts-committee-amendment-bill-2025/documents"}}