{"id":"C1936A00006","name":"Prune Bounty Act 1936","slug":"prune-bounty-act-1936","collection":"act","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"repealed","isInForce":false,"actNumber":"6 of 1936","makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":3778,"registerId":"commonwealth-C1936A00006-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-03-30","status":"Repealed","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"Prune Bounty Act 1936","content":"PRUNE BOUNTY.\n\nNo. 6 of 1936.\n\nAn Act to provide for the Payment of a Bounty on the Export of Prunes from the Commonwealth.\n\n\\[Assented to 20th March, 1936.\\]\n\nPreamble.\n\nBE it enacted by the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, the Senate, and the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Australia, for the purpose of appropriating the grant originated in the House of Representatives, as follows:—\n\nShort title.\n\n1. This Act may be cited as the Prune Bounty Act 1936.\n\nDefinitions.\n\n2. In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears—\n\n“bounty” means bounty under this Act;\n\n“the Secretary” means the Secretary of the Department of Commerce of the Commonwealth.\n\nBounty to be paid.\n\n3. There shall be payable, out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund, which is hereby appropriated accordingly, the bounty specified in this Act.\n\nSpecification of bounty.\n\n4. The bounty shall be payable in respect of prunes exported from the Commonwealth during the year One thousand nine hundred and thirty-five, in respect of which the provisions of the Commerce (General Exports) Regulations (being Statutory Rules 1926, No. 22, as amended to the date of the export of the prunes) were complied with.\n\nRate of bounty.\n\n5.—(1.) Bounty shall be payable at the rate of Three farthings for each pound of prunes exported.\n\n(2.) The weight of any prunes, as at the date of export, shall, for the purposes of this Act, be such as is ascertained in the prescribed manner.\n\nPayee of bounty.\n\n6.—(1.) The bounty shall be payable to the grower of the fruit from which the prunes were produced.\n\n(2.) The quantity of prunes in respect of which bounty shall be payable to a grower shall be—\n\n(a) where the prunes in respect of which bounty is claimed have been exported by or on behalf of the grower—such quantity as is certified by the prescribed authority within the meaning of the Dried Fruits Act 1928–1935 to have been so exported; and\n\n(b) where the prunes in respect of which bounty is claimed have been exported by or on behalf of any person other than the grower—such quantity as is ascertained in the prescribed manner.\n\n  \nCondition of payment.\n\n7. A payment of bounty shall not be made under this Act unless the claimant for that bounty has lodged an application therefor with the Secretary on or before the thirtieth day of June, One thousand nine hundred and thirty-six.\n\nOffences.\n\n8. A person shall not—\n\n(a) obtain or attempt to obtain payment of any bounty which is not payable;\n\n(b) obtain or attempt to obtain payment of any bounty by means of any false or misleading statement; or\n\n(c) present to any officer or other person doing duty in relation to this Act or the regulations any document, or make to any such officer or person any statement, which is false in any particular.\n\nPenalty: One hundred pounds or imprisonment for one year.\n\nPower to call for information.\n\n9.—(1.) The Minister, or any person thereto authorized in writing by him, may, by notice in writing, call upon any person to furnish to him within such time as is specified in the notice, such books and documents and such information as the Minister or that authorized person thinks necessary in relation to compliance with this Act or the regulations made thereunder or any suspected contravention thereof.\n\n(2.) Any person who, without reasonable excuse (proof whereof shall lie upon him) fails, after receipt of a notice under the last preceding sub-section, to comply with the requirements of the notice shall be guilty of an offence.\n\nPenalty: One hundred pounds or imprisonment for one year.\n\n(3.) Where any person who has so failed to furnish the books, documents or information is a claimant for bounty, the Minister may, if he thinks fit, withhold payment of any bounty payable to the claimant until he has furnished the required books, documents or information.\n\nReturn to be laid before Parliament.\n\n10. A report upon the working of this Act, and a return setting forth—\n\n(a) the amount of bounty paid under this Act; and\n\n(b) such other particulars as are prescribed,\n\nshall be prepared in the month of September, One thousand nine hundred and thirty-six, and shall be laid before each House of the Parliament within fifteen sitting days of that House after the thirtieth day of September, One thousand nine hundred and thirty-six.\n\nRegulations.\n\n11. The Governor-General may make regulations, not inconsistent with this Act, prescribing all matters which by this Act are required or permitted to be prescribed, or which are necessary or convenient to be prescribed, for carrying out or giving effect to this Act, and in particular for prescribing penalties not exceeding Fifty pounds or imprisonment for a period not exceeding three months for any offence against the regulations.","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"summary":{"complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This Act is entirely consistent with its original intent. It was conceived, enacted, and structured as a narrow, one-off export bounty scheme for prune growers covering a single year (1935). It has no amending history that expanded its reach, and by design it expired operationally by 30 June 1936 when the claims window closed. There is no evidence of scope creep — the legislation did exactly what it said on the tin and nothing more."},"complexity_factors":["Only 2 defined terms in the interpretation section ('bounty' and 'the Secretary') — minimal definitional complexity","Single-purpose, time-limited legislation covering one commodity and one calendar year (1935 exports only)","Cross-references to only two external instruments: the Commerce (General Exports) Regulations and the Dried Fruits Act 1928–1935","Straightforward conditional logic: bounty is payable if export occurred in 1935, regulations were complied with, and application lodged by 30 June 1936","No nested exceptions or layered provisions — each section addresses a single, discrete matter","Short at 11 sections with no schedules or complex tables"],"plain_english_summary":"## Prune Bounty Act 1936\n\nThis is a short, one-off piece of legislation that **pays a cash bonus (called a \"bounty\") to Australian prune growers** who exported their prunes during 1935. Think of it as a government export incentive — a reward for selling Australian prunes overseas.\n\n### Who does it affect?\n- **Prune growers** who exported prunes from Australia during the calendar year 1935 and complied with the relevant export regulations at the time.\n\n### What does it actually do?\n\n- **Sets the payment rate:** Growers were entitled to receive **three farthings (an old currency unit — roughly three-quarters of a penny) for every pound of prunes exported**. This was a small per-unit subsidy to make Australian prunes more competitive on international markets.\n- **Limits who can claim:** Only the **grower of the fruit** — not a trader or exporter — could receive the bounty payment.\n- **Sets a hard deadline:** Any grower wanting to claim had to **lodge their application with the Secretary of the Department of Commerce by 30 June 1936**. Miss the deadline, miss the money.\n- **Draws the money from public funds:** The bounty is paid from the Consolidated Revenue Fund (the main Commonwealth government account).\n- **Prevents fraud:** It is an offence to falsely claim a bounty, make misleading statements, or present false documents. The penalty is a £100 fine or one year in prison.\n- **Gives the government information powers:** The Minister could compel any person to hand over books, documents, or information relevant to a claim. Failing to comply without a reasonable excuse is also a criminal offence.\n- **Requires a parliamentary report:** A full report on how much was paid and to whom had to be prepared in September 1936 and tabled before both Houses of Parliament — a basic transparency measure.\n\n### Why does it matter?\nThis Act reflects a common government tool of the 1930s Depression era: using **export bounties to support struggling agricultural industries**. It is extremely narrow in scope — it applies only to prunes, only to 1935 exports, and expired effectively by mid-1936. It is largely of historical interest today, showing how the Commonwealth supported rural industries during a period of significant economic hardship."},"issue_detection":{"absurdities":[{"type":"circular_definition","section":"Section 2 – Definition of 'bounty'","severity":"medium","reasoning":"A definition that defines a term by reference to itself is logically vacuous. A reader who does not already know what 'bounty' means is no better informed after reading the definition. While the substantive provisions (ss 3–5) do flesh out the concept, the definition itself is a classic circular tautology and provides no independent content.","confidence":0.97,"description":"The definition of 'bounty' is entirely circular: 'bounty means bounty under this Act.' This definition conveys zero information and provides no guidance as to what 'bounty' actually means."},{"type":"retroactive_impossibility","section":"Section 4 – Specification of bounty","severity":"medium","reasoning":"The Act came into force in March 1936 but the bounty-triggering event (export during 1935) predates the Act entirely. While retrospective bounty schemes are not inherently unlawful, the condition in s 4 that exporters must have complied with the Commerce (General Exports) Regulations 'as amended to the date of the export of the prunes' means compliance was assessed against rules that existed in 1935 — before this Act existed. No exporter could have acted in 1935 with knowledge of this Act's requirements, making it logically impossible for the Act to have prospectively motivated any compliant behaviour. The bounty is effectively a windfall payment rather than an incentive, which undermines any compliance-based rationale.","confidence":0.82,"description":"The Act was assented to on 20 March 1936, yet it purports to pay a bounty on prunes exported during the calendar year 1935 — a period that had entirely concluded before the Act even existed. Exporters in 1935 could not have known a bounty scheme would be created, and no prospective compliance with this Act was possible for that export period."},{"type":"retroactive_impossibility","section":"Section 7 – Condition of payment","severity":"low","reasoning":"While not logically impossible in isolation, the combination of a retrospective bounty period (all of 1935) and a hard deadline of 30 June 1936 creates a practical impossibility for anyone who was unaware of the Act or received notice late. If regulations prescribing the 'prescribed manner' for ascertaining weight or quantity (ss 5(2), 6(2)(b)) were not made promptly after assent, claimants could find themselves unable to satisfy the prescribed conditions before the deadline expires — through no fault of their own.","confidence":0.75,"description":"The Act was assented to on 20 March 1936, yet it requires claimants to lodge their application with the Secretary on or before 30 June 1936 — giving applicants only approximately three months from assent. More critically, the bounty is for exports that occurred throughout all of 1935, meaning claimants had no notice of the scheme during the export year and are now given a short, fixed window to claim retrospectively."},{"type":"other","section":"Section 10 – Return to be laid before Parliament","severity":"low","reasoning":"The drafting creates a minor internal timing oddity: preparation must occur in September, but the tabling obligation is pegged to a date after the end of September. The report could theoretically be prepared on 30 September and tabled the next sitting day after that date, which works. But if prepared earlier in September, nothing formally compels earlier tabling. This is a low-severity drafting quirk rather than a genuine impossibility.","confidence":0.65,"description":"The section requires a report to be 'prepared in the month of September 1936' and then laid before each House 'within fifteen sitting days after the thirtieth day of September 1936.' If the report must be prepared during September but cannot be laid before Parliament until after 30 September, there is a narrow but real timing tension: the report could be finalised on, say, 29 September, but the 15-sitting-day clock does not start until after 30 September — meaning Parliament effectively cannot receive it until October at the earliest. This is harmless in practice but creates a one-day gap where the report exists but cannot yet be tabled."},{"type":"impossible_compliance","section":"Section 11 – Regulations","severity":"high","reasoning":"The Act creates a bounty payable only if claims are lodged by 30 June 1936, but key elements of valid claims — the 'prescribed manner' for ascertaining weight (s 5(2)) and quantity (s 6(2)(b)) — are left entirely to regulations. There is no fallback mechanism if regulations are not made in time. A claimant who wished to comply had no guarantee that the prescribed manner would ever be specified before the deadline. This creates a structural impossibility: the Act demands compliance with a process it has not itself defined and delegates definition to an instrument whose timely enactment is not guaranteed.","confidence":0.85,"description":"Several operative provisions of the Act depend on 'prescribed' matters (e.g., 'prescribed manner' in ss 5(2) and 6(2)(b), 'prescribed authority' in s 6(2)(a), 'prescribed' particulars in s 10(b)) that can only be defined by regulations made under s 11. However, the Act itself provides no default or fallback if such regulations are never made. Given the hard deadline of 30 June 1936 in s 7, if the Governor-General delayed making regulations, compliance with the prescribed conditions would become impossible before the claim deadline expired."}],"contradictions":[{"severity":"low","section_a":"Section 4 – Bounty payable for exports during 1935","section_b":"Section 7 – Application must be lodged by 30 June 1936","confidence":0.7,"description":"Section 4 fixes the bounty-triggering period as the calendar year 1935, which predates the Act. Section 7 then imposes a forward-looking deadline of 30 June 1936 for lodging claims. These two provisions are not directly contradictory, but they create an internal tension: the Act treats 1935 exports as the qualifying event while simultaneously constructing a 1936 administrative process, meaning the entire compliance framework operates in a different temporal dimension from the qualifying conduct it is meant to reward."},{"severity":"medium","section_a":"Section 6(2)(a) – Quantity certified by 'prescribed authority' under Dried Fruits Act 1928–1935","section_b":"Section 11 – Regulations power","confidence":0.8,"description":"Section 6(2)(a) refers to the 'prescribed authority within the meaning of the Dried Fruits Act 1928–1935' for certifying export quantities where the grower exports directly. Section 6(2)(b) requires the 'prescribed manner' (defined by regulations under s 11) for all other cases. This creates an asymmetry: one certification pathway is outsourced to a separate Act's machinery, while the other depends entirely on regulations that may or may not be made. If those regulations are never made, s 6(2)(b) claimants have no lawful pathway to certification, while s 6(2)(a) claimants do — creating an unequal and potentially arbitrary distinction between otherwise similarly situated growers."},{"severity":"low","section_a":"Section 8 – Offences (penalty: £100 or 1 year imprisonment)","section_b":"Section 11 – Regulations (penalty cap: £50 or 3 months imprisonment)","confidence":0.72,"description":"Section 8 creates offences under the Act itself with a maximum penalty of £100 or one year's imprisonment. Section 11 empowers the Governor-General to create offences by regulation, but caps those regulatory penalties at £50 or three months' imprisonment — exactly half the monetary penalty and one quarter of the imprisonment term available under s 8. While this hierarchy is not logically contradictory per se, it creates the anomaly that a regulatory offence (a mere breach of administrative rules) could conceivably overlap in conduct with a s 8 offence, leaving the selection of which provision to prosecute under as the sole determinant of the maximum penalty — a potential source of inconsistency and prosecutorial arbitrariness."}]}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/prune-bounty-act-1936","history":"/api/acts/prune-bounty-act-1936/history","analysis":"/api/acts/prune-bounty-act-1936/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/prune-bounty-act-1936/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/prune-bounty-act-1936/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/prune-bounty-act-1936/documents"}}