{"id":"prescription-act-1832-imp","name":"Prescription Act 1832 (Imp)","slug":"prescription-act-1832-imp","collection":"act","jurisdiction":"wa","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":106234,"registerId":"wa-prescription-act-1832-imp-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-03","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"Prescription Act 1832 (Imp)","content":"![Crest]()Western Australia\n\nPrescription Act 1832 (Imp)\n\nWestern Australia\n\nPrescription Act 1832 (Imp)\n\nContents\n\n[1.] Claims to right of common and other profits *a prendre*, not to be defeated after 30 years’ enjoyment by showing the commencement; after 60 years’ enjoyment the right to be absolute, unless had by consent or agreement 1\n\n2. In claims of right of way or other easement the periods to be 20 years and 40 years 2\n\n4. Before‑mentioned periods to be deemed those next before suits for claims to which such periods relate 3\n\n5. In actions on the case the claimant may allege his right generally, as at present: In pleas to trespass and other pleadings, where party used to allege his claim from time immemorial, the period mentioned in this Act may be alleged; and exceptions or other matters to be replied specially 3\n\n6. Restricting the presumption to be allowed in support of claims herein provided for 4\n\n7. Proviso for infants, etc. 4\n\n8. What time to be excluded in computing the term of 40 years appointed by this Act 4\n\n9. Not to extend to Scotland or Ireland 5\n\n10. Commencement of Act 5\n\n11. Act may be amended 5\n\nNotes\n\nCompilation table 6\n\n  \n\nWestern Australia\n\nPrescription Act 1832 (Imp)\n\nAn Act for shortening the Time of Prescription in certain Cases. 3\n\nPreamble\n\nWhereas the expression ‘Time immemorial, or time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary,’ is now by the law of England in many cases considered to include and denote the whole period of time from the reign of King Richard the First, whereby the title to matters that have been long enjoyed is sometimes defeated by showing the commencement of such enjoyment, which is in many cases productive of inconvenience and injustice;\n\nfor remedy thereof be it enacted by the King’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same,\n\n##### [1.] Claims to right of common and other profits *a prendre*, not to be defeated after 30 years’ enjoyment by showing the commencement; after 60 years’ enjoyment the right to be absolute, unless had by consent or agreement\n\n[T]hat no claim which may be lawfully made at the common law, by custom, prescription, or grant, to any right of common or other profit or benefit to be taken and enjoyed from or upon any land of our sovereign lord the King, his heirs or successors, or any land being parcel of the Duchy of Lancaster or of the Duchy of Cornwall, or of any ecclesiastical or lay person, or body corporate, except such matters and things as are herein specially provided for, and except tithes, rent, and services, shall, where such right, profit, or benefit shall have been actually taken and enjoyed by any person claiming right thereto without interruption for the full period of thirty years, be defeated or destroyed by showing only that such right, profit, or benefit was first taken or enjoyed at any time prior to such period of thirty years, but nevertheless such claim may be defeated in any other way by which the same is now liable to be defeated; and when such right, profit, or benefit shall have been so taken and enjoyed as aforesaid for the full period of sixty years, the right thereto shall be deemed absolute and indefeasible, unless it shall appear that the same was taken and enjoyed by some consent or agreement expressly made or given for that purpose by deed or writing.\n\n##### 2. In claims of right of way or other easement the periods to be 20 years and 40 years\n\nAnd be it further enacted, that no claim which may be lawfully made at the common law, by custom, prescription, or grant, to any way or other easement, or to any watercourse, or the use of any water, to be enjoyed or derived upon, over, or from any land or water of our said lord the King, his heirs or successors, or being parcel of the Duchy of Lancaster, or of the Duchy of Cornwall, or being the property of any ecclesiastical or lay person, or body corporate, when such way or other matter as herein last before mentioned shall have been actually enjoyed by any person claiming right thereto without interruption for the full period of twenty years, shall be defeated or destroyed by showing only that such way or other matter was first enjoyed at any time prior to such period of twenty years, but nevertheless such claim may be defeated in any other way by which the same is now liable to be defeated; and where such way or other matter as herein last before mentioned shall have been so enjoyed as aforesaid for the full period of forty years, the right thereto shall be deemed absolute and indefeasible, unless it shall appear that the same was enjoyed by some consent or agreement expressly given or made for that purpose by deed or writing.\n\n[**3.** Deleted in WA: 1 & 2 Edw VII No. 29 s. 5.] 4\n\n##### 4. Before‑mentioned periods to be deemed those next before suits for claims to which such periods relate\n\nAnd be it further enacted, that each of the respective periods of years hereinbefore mentioned shall be deemed and taken to be the period next before some suit or action wherein the claim or matter to which such period may relate shall have been or shall be brought into question, and that no act or other matter shall be deemed to be an interruption, within the meaning of this statute, unless the same shall have been or shall be submitted to or acquiesced in for one year after the party interrupted shall have had or shall have notice thereof, and of the person making or authorising the same to be made.\n\n##### 5. In actions on the case the claimant may allege his right generally, as at present: In pleas to trespass and other pleadings, where party used to allege his claim from time immemorial, the period mentioned in this Act may be alleged; and exceptions or other matters to be replied specially\n\nAnd be it further enacted, that in all actions upon the case and other pleadings, wherein the party claiming may now by law allege his right generally, without averring the existence of such right from time immemorial, such general allegation shall still be deemed sufficient, and if the same shall be denied, all and every the matters in this Act mentioned and provided, which shall be applicable to the case, shall be admissible in evidence to sustain or rebut such allegation; and that in all pleadings to actions of trespass, and in all other pleadings wherein before the passing of this Act it would have been necessary to allege the right to have existed from time immemorial, it shall be sufficient to allege the enjoyment thereof as of right by the occupiers of the tenement in respect whereof the same is claimed for and during such of the periods mentioned in this Act as may be applicable to the case, and without claiming in the name or right of the owner of the fee, as is now usually done; and if the other party shall intend to rely on any proviso, exception, incapacity, disability, contract, agreement, or other matter hereinbefore mentioned, or on any cause or matter of fact or of law not inconsistent with the simple fact of enjoyment, the same shall be specially alleged and set forth in answer to the allegation of the party claiming, and shall not be received in evidence on any general traverse or denial of such allegation.\n\n##### 6. Restricting the presumption to be allowed in support of claims herein provided for\n\nAnd be it further enacted, that in the several cases mentioned in and provided for by this Act, no presumption shall be allowed or made in favour or support of any claim, upon proof of the exercise or enjoyment of the right or matter claimed for any less period of time or number of years than for such period or number mentioned in this Act as may be applicable to the case and to the nature of the claim.\n\n##### 7. Proviso for infants, etc.\n\nProvided also, that the time during which any person otherwise capable of resisting any claim to any of the matters before mentioned shall have been or shall be an infant, idiot, *non compos mentis*, feme covert, or tenant for life, or during which any action or suit shall have been pending, and which shall have been diligently prosecuted, until abated by the death of any party or parties thereto, shall be excluded in the computation of the periods hereinbefore mentioned, except only in cases where the right or claim is hereby declared to be absolute and indefeasible.\n\n##### 8. What time to be excluded in computing the term of 40 years appointed by this Act\n\nProvided always, and be it further enacted, that when any land or water upon, over, or from which any such way or other convenient watercourse or use of water shall have been or shall be enjoyed or derived hath been or shall be held under or by virtue of any term of life, or any term of years exceeding three years from the granting thereof, the time of the enjoyment of any such way or other matter as herein last before mentioned, during the continuance of such term, shall be excluded in the computation of the said period of forty years, in case the claim shall within three years next after the end or sooner determination of such term be resisted by any person entitled to any reversion expectant on the determination thereof.\n\n##### 9. Not to extend to Scotland or Ireland\n\nAnd be it further enacted, that this Act shall not extend to Scotland or Ireland.\n\n##### 10. Commencement of Act\n\nAnd be it further enacted, that this Act shall commence and take effect on the first day of Michaelmas term now next ensuing.\n\n##### 11. Act may be amended\n\nAnd be it further enacted, that this Act may be amended, altered, or repealed during this present session of Parliament.\n\nNotes\n\n1 This is a compilation of the *Prescription Act 1832 (Imp)*. The following table contains information about that Act and any previous reprints.\n\nCompilation table\n\n| **Short title** | **Number and year** | **Assent** | **Commencement** |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| *Prescription Act 1832 (Imp)* 2 | 1832 (2 and 3 Will. IV c. 71) | 1 Aug 1832 | 11 Apr 1836 (adopted by *Imperial Acts Adopting Act 1836*) |\n| *Light and Air Act 1902* s. 5 | 1902 (1 and 2 Edw. VII No. 29 | 19 Feb 1902 | 19 Feb 1902 |\n| **Reprinted as at 26 Oct 1999** | | | |\n\n\n2 Adopted in WA by *Imperial Acts Adopting Act 1836* (preamble, item 9).\n\n(6 Will. IV No. 4) [Assent 11 April 1836]\n\n3 The short title *Prescription Act 1832* was given to this Imperial Act by the *Short Titles Act 1896* (UK).\n\nFor other information about this Imperial Act see *Halsbury’s Statutes of England*, Fourth Edition, Vol 13, p 701.\n\n4 I.e. section 3 repealed in so far as it was part of the law of WA by the *Light and Air Act 1902*, s. 5 [Assent 19 February 1902].\n","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"summary":{"complexity_score":1,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"Scope cannot be assessed — the content provided is a website error/redirect page, not the text of the Prescription Act 1832 itself. No legislative content was available for comparison against original intent."},"complexity_factors":["No actual legislative text was provided — the source material is a website error page, not legislation","Cannot assess the complexity of the underlying Act from the content supplied","The Prescription Act 1832 itself would normally score higher (likely 6-7) due to its archaic Imperial origins, common law interactions, and property law implications, but this cannot be assessed from the provided content"],"plain_english_summary":"The Prescription Act 1832 is a historic Imperial statute adopted into Western Australian law that governs prescriptive rights — rights acquired by long, continuous, and open use (for example, longstanding rights of way). The WA web page for the Act has moved or been removed; search the site or contact the Parliamentary Counsel’s Office to locate it. \n\nIt matters to property owners and anyone asserting long‑term use rights over land."},"issue_detection":{"absurdities":[],"contradictions":[]},"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"A positive credit balance is required for all requests, including BYOK, so fallback providers remain available. Add credits at https://vercel.com/d?to=%2F%5Bteam%5D%2F%7E%2Fai%3Fmodal%3Dtop-up to continue.","source":"analysis-cron"},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":5,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The Act remains within its original purpose of shortening prescription timeframes and replacing the \"time immemorial\" rule with fixed statutory periods. Local modifications (the adoption into Western Australian law and the local repeal of one provision by the Light and Air Act 1902) narrow particular applications but do not expand the Act's core substantive scope beyond that original purpose."},"complexity_factors":["Short statute but multiple distinct prescriptive regimes: profits a prendre (30/60 years) and easements/ways/water (20/40 years) (ss1–2)","Several substantive exceptions carved out (tithes, rent, services excluded; written consent/deed defeats indefeasibility in s1–s2)","Rules for computation and what constitutes interruption require factual inquiry and evidentiary proof (s4)","Pleading and evidentiary changes impose procedural specificity (s5–s6) — defendants must plead exceptions specially","Multiple exclusion categories for computation (infancy, mental incapacity, pending suits) add conditional logic (s7)","Special exclusion for time held under life/term of years in water/easement claims (s8)","Historical/adoptive context and later local modification (s3 repealed locally) increases interpretive cross‑reference","Archaic language and cross‑reference to common law presumptions require judicial interpretation","Interaction with property contracts and deeds (written consent vs. implied enjoyment) creates interface with conveyancing practice"],"plain_english_summary":"**What this law does (mechanically)\n\n- Sets fixed statutory time periods after which certain long‑used rights over land become protected from being defeated simply by showing when they began.  Specifically:\n  - Rights to take profits a prendre (things taken from land, e.g. grazing, cutting turf): if enjoyed without interruption for 30 years they cannot be defeated by proof of an earlier start; after 60 years such rights are treated as absolute unless they arose by written consent (s1).\n  - Rights of way and other easements (including some water rights): the corresponding periods are 20 years and 40 years (s2).\n- Explains how to measure those periods: the relevant period is the time immediately before a suit is brought (s4); what counts as an \"interruption\" is limited (an act is not an interruption unless it is submitted to or acquiesced in for one year after notice) (s4).\n- Changes pleading practice: claimants can allege enjoyment for the statutory period instead of alleging enjoyment \"from time immemorial\"; defendants who rely on exceptions (like explicit agreements or incapacity) must plead them specifically (s5).\n- Limits presumptions: no presumption in favour of a claim can be made from a shorter period than the statutory one (s6).\n- Allows certain times to be excluded when counting the period (infancy, mental incapacity, pending suits properly prosecuted, some life or long fixed‑term tenancies for water/way claims) (s7, s8).\n- Does not apply to Scotland or Ireland (s9).\n\nWhy the law says it was made (the Act's stated purpose)\n\n- The preamble says the statute was intended to remove the need to prove a right \"from time immemorial\" (an old common‑law fiction tied to the reign of King Richard I) and to avoid the injustice of title being defeated merely by proving an earlier start date.\n\nWho it affects\n\n- People who claim long‑used rights over land (claimants): occupiers, neighbours, farmers, utilities or others who use a way, watercourse, or take resources from another's land.\n- Landowners whose land is subject to those uses (respondents): private owners, Crown land, Duchies, ecclesiastical bodies and corporate owners are all in scope as listed (s1–s2).\n- Courts and litigants: changes pleading and evidentiary practice (s4–s6).\n\nWhy it matters (practical effects and mechanics of incentives)\n\n- Certainty and reduced litigation about ancient origins: by fixing statutory periods (20/40 or 30/60 years), the Act makes it harder for a defendant to win solely by proving an earlier starting date; claimants can rely on long use rather than proving an origin story.\n- Shifts evidential and strategic burdens: claimants can short‑circuit the \"time immemorial\" technicality (s5); defendants must now raise specific defences (e.g. written consent) or risk losing on the statutory timeline (s1–s2, s5).\n- Risk of loss to owners who did not record or preserve their objection: owners who tolerate long use without timely action (and without written reservations) face the concrete risk that their ability to resist will be curtailed after the relevant period ends (s4, s8).\n- Administrative and proof costs rest on users and owners differently: prospective claimants must assemble evidence of continuous, uninterrupted use for the statutory period; owners who wish to prevent accrual of indefeasible rights must document consent or take prompt, properly notified steps to interrupt (s1–s4).\n\nTrade‑offs, implementation risks and compliance burdens\n\n- Trade‑off: the Act trades a reduction in disputes about ancient origins for a statutory rule that can produce a sudden loss of challenge rights for owners who do not act in time. That shifts value from legal title technicalities to demonstrable, long‑continued use.\n- Evidence and facts of interruption: the Act narrows when an act counts as an interruption (acquiescence for one year after notice is required) (s4), so factual disputes over what constitutes notice, acquiescence or interruption will remain. Courts will still decide these questions in individual cases.\n- Exclusions complicate calculations: periods of infancy, mental incapacity, or pending suits properly prosecuted are excluded (s7), and certain life/long‑term tenancies exclude time from counting toward a 40‑year easement period (s8). Those exceptions require specific factual proof and may generate litigation about when the clock runs.\n- Interaction with documentation: the Act preserves the power of express written agreements or deeds to prevent prescription from becoming absolute (s1, s2). Parties who want to avoid the statutory effect can record clear deeds.\n- Effect on businesses: companies relying on long‑used access or resource rights (utilities, agricultural processors, etc.) gain clearer protection if use has been long‑continued; conversely, businesses selling or developing land face a risk that unasserted long uses become entrenched rights.\n\nNet operational picture (who pays, who decides, what behaviour changes)\n\n- Who pays: costs are diffuse — current landowners pay potential loss of ability to resist claims if they tolerate use; claimants incur evidence costs to prove long continuous use. Courts will incur the usual adjudication costs.\n- Who decides: courts decide whether statutory periods and exceptions are satisfied on the facts; parties can avoid statutory indefeasibility by written deed or by timely, notified interruption.\n- Behavioural effects: claimants are incentivised to gather and present continuous‑use evidence; landowners are incentivised to monitor and record objections or to create express written reservations to preserve rights.\n\nHow this compares to the pre‑statute common law claim\n\n- The Act replaces the \"time immemorial\" requirement for practical pleading and evidential purposes with definite statutory timeframes, while leaving open other legal ways a claim may be defeated (s1–s2). It therefore narrows one procedural route for defeating long‑use claims but preserves the remainder of the common law and written‑consent exceptions.\n\nRelevant local detail\n\n- This is the 1832 Imperial Prescription Act as adopted into Western Australian law by later adopting legislation. One provision (section 3) has been removed in Western Australia by later local statute (Light and Air Act 1902). The Act does not apply to Scotland or Ireland (s9).\n\n(References: sections cited are those of the Prescription Act 1832 as reprinted/adopted for Western Australia.)"},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":4,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The legislation remains focused on its original purpose: establishing fixed time periods for acquiring prescriptive rights to land. While it has been amended in Western Australia (notably the deletion of section 3 regarding light and air rights by the Light and Air Act 1902), the core scope regarding common rights, easements, and profits à prendre remains unchanged from the 1832 original intent."},"complexity_factors":["Multiple parallel limitation periods (20/40 years for easements vs 30/60 years for profits à prendre) with different legal consequences","Complex provisos in sections 7 and 8 creating exceptions to the limitation periods based on status of parties (infants, mental incapacity, married women, life tenants) and lease terms","Archaic legal terminology requiring translation ('feme covert', 'non compos mentis', 'profits à prendre', 'reversion expectant')","Cross-references between sections (e.g., section 4 defines how periods are calculated for claims mentioned in sections 1 and 2)","Conditional logic: rights become 'absolute and indefeasible' only after the longer period AND only if not based on written consent","Specific exclusion for Scotland and Ireland (section 9) creating territorial complexity","Procedural provisions (section 5) governing how claims must be pleaded in court with special pleading rules","Deleted section 3 (repealed by later WA legislation) creating gaps in numbering and requiring historical knowledge"],"plain_english_summary":"This is an old English law from 1832 that was later adopted in Western Australia. It deals with **prescription** — a legal way of acquiring rights to use someone else's land simply by using it openly and continuously for a long time without permission.\n\n**What it does:**\nBefore this Act, people had to prove they'd been using land \"since time immemorial\" (legally defined as before 1189) to establish these rights. This Act created fixed time limits instead:\n\n- **Rights to take things from land** (like grazing animals on common land, or taking wood or fish — called \"profits à prendre\"): After **30 years** of continuous use, nobody can defeat your claim just by showing you started after 1189. After **60 years**, your right becomes absolute and can't be challenged (unless you had written permission).\n\n- **Rights of way** (paths across land) and **other easements** (like water rights): After **20 years** of continuous use, your claim can't be defeated just by showing you started after 1189. After **40 years**, your right becomes absolute (again, unless you had written permission).\n\n**Key protections:**\n- The clock stops running if the landowner is a child, person with mental incapacity, married woman (under old law), life tenant, or if there's a pending court case\n- If someone interrupts your use, you have **one year** to object before it counts as breaking your continuous use\n- For the 40-year period for easements, time doesn't count if the land was leased for more than 3 years and the landlord objects within 3 years after the lease ends\n\n**Why it matters:**\nThis Act made it much easier to prove long-standing land use rights. Instead of proving nearly 650 years of continuous use, people only need to prove 20-60 years depending on the right. It still affects property disputes in Western Australia today, particularly rural properties with shared access roads, water rights, or grazing arrangements."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/prescription-act-1832-imp","history":"/api/acts/prescription-act-1832-imp/history","analysis":"/api/acts/prescription-act-1832-imp/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/prescription-act-1832-imp/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/prescription-act-1832-imp/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/prescription-act-1832-imp/documents"}}