{"id":"police-informants-royal-commission-implementation-monitor-act-2021","name":"Police Informants Royal Commission Implementation Monitor Act 2021","slug":"police-informants-royal-commission-implementation-monitor-act-2021","collection":"act","jurisdiction":"vic","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":176356,"registerId":"vic-police-informants-royal-commission-implementation-monitor-act-2021-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-05","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"Police Informants Royal Commission Implementation Monitor Act 2021","content":"Version No. 003\n\n**Police Informants Royal Commission Implementation Monitor Act 2021**\n\n**No. 34 of 2021**\n\nVersion incorporating amendments as at  \n2 February 2024\n\n**TABLE OF PROVISIONS**\n\n*Section Page*\n\nPart 1—Preliminary 1\n\n1 Purposes 1\n\n2 Commencement 1\n\n3 Definitions 1\n\n4 Act binds the Crown 4\n\n5 Responsible agencies 4\n\nPart 2—The Police Informants Royal Commission Implementation Monitor 5\n\n6 Establishment 5\n\n7 Appointment 5\n\n8 Remuneration and allowances 6\n\n9 Reappointment 6\n\n10 Acting appointment 6\n\n11 Vacancy, resignation or suspension 7\n\n12 Suspension and removal 7\n\n13 Independence 8\n\n14 Immunity 8\n\n15 Functions 9\n\n16 Attorney-General may request advice 11\n\n17 Powers 11\n\n18 Power to require information to be given 11\n\n19 Duty to cooperate 12\n\n20 Responsible agency may give information without prior request 12\n\n21 Constraints on access to information not to apply 13\n\n22 Use and disclosure of information 14\n\n23 Freedom of Information Act 1982 not to apply 14\n\n24 Secretary may provide assistance 15\n\n25 Validity of acts and decisions 15\n\nPart 3—Reporting 16\n\n26 Implementation reports 16\n\n27 Attorney-General progress reports 18\n\n28 Tabling of progress reports 18\n\nPart 4—Review of this Act 20\n\n29 Review of this Act 20\n\n══════════════\n\nEndnotes 21\n\n1 General information 21\n\n2 Table of Amendments 23\n\n3 Explanatory details 24\n\n**Version No.** **003**\n\n**Police Informants Royal Commission Implementation Monitor Act 2021**\n\n**No. 34 of 2021**\n\nVersion incorporating amendments as at  \n2 February 2024\n\n**The Parliament of Victoria enacts:**\n\nPart 1—Preliminary\n\n\t1 Purposes\n\nThe main purposes of this Act are—\n\n(a) to establish the Police Informants Royal Commission Implementation Monitor; and\n\n(b) to provide for the functions, powers and duties of a Police Informants Royal Commission Implementation Monitor.\n\n\t2 Commencement\n\nThis Act comes into operation on the day after the day on which it receives the Royal Assent.\n\n\t3 Definitions\n\nIn this Act—\n\n***business day*** means a day other than a Saturday, a Sunday or a public holiday within the meaning of the **Public Holidays Act 1993**;\n\n***cabinet document*** has the same meaning as in section 28(1)(a) to (d) of the **Freedom of Information Act 1982**;\n\nS. 3 def. of *Chief Commis-sioner* inserted by No. 50/2021 s. 134(1).\n\n***Chief Commissioner*** means the Chief Commissioner of Police appointed under section 17 of the **Victoria Police Act 2013**;\n\n***Implementation Monitor*** means a Police Informants Royal Commission Implementation Monitor appointed under section 7;\n\n***implementation report*** means a  report prepared by the Implementation Monitors under section 26;\n\nS. 3 def. of *Office of the Special Investigator* inserted by No. 50/2021 s. 134(1), repealed by No. 31/2023 s. 64.\n\n* * * * *\n\n***progress report*** means a report prepared by the Attorney-General under section 27;\n\n***RCMPI recommendation*** means a recommendation made in the Report  \nof the Royal Commission into the Management of Police Informants delivered to the Governor on 30 November 2020;\n\nS. 3 def. of *responsible agency* amended by No. 50/2021 s. 134(2).\n\n***responsible agency*** means any of the following that are required to carry out the implementation of a RCMPI recommendation—\n\n(a) in relation to the Department of Justice and Community Safety, the Secretary;\n\n(b) in relation to the Department of Premier and Cabinet, the Secretary to the Department of Premier and Cabinet;\n\n(c) in relation to Victoria Police, the Chief Commissioner;\n\n(d) in relation to the Office of Public Prosecutions, the Director of Public Prosecutions appointed under section 87AB of the **Constitution Act 1975**;\n\n(e) the Public Interest Monitor within the meaning of the **Public Interest Monitor Act 2011**;\n\n(f) the IBAC within the meaning of the **Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011**;\n\n(g) in relation to the Victorian Government Solicitor's Office, the Victorian Government Solicitor;\n\n(h) the Victorian Legal Services Commissioner (including in their capacity as chief executive officer of the Victorian Legal Services Board)  within the meaning of the **Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014**;\n\n(i) the Law Institute of Victoria Limited ACN 075 475 731;\n\n(j) the Victorian Bar Inc, an association incorporated under the **Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012**;\n\n(k) an entity specified in an order under section 5;\n\n***Royal Commission***  ***into the Management of Police Informants*** means the inquiry conducted by the Commissioners appointed under section 5 of the **Inquiries Act 2014** by the Letters Patent dated 13 December 2018 and the amendments to the Letters Patent dated 7 February 2019, copies of which were published in the Government Gazette on those dates;\n\n***Secretary*** means Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety;\n\n***Victoria Police*** means the body established by section 6 of the **Victoria Police Act 2013**.\n\n\t4 Act binds the Crown\n\nThis Act binds the Crown in right of Victoria and, to the extent that the legislative power of the Parliament permits, the Crown in all its other capacities.\n\n\t5 Responsible agencies\n\n(1) On the recommendation of the Attorney-General, the Governor in Council, by order published in the Government Gazette, may specify an entity to be a responsible agency.\n\n(2) Before the Attorney-General recommends that an order under subsection (1) be made, the Attorney-General must—\n\n(a) obtain the consent of the entity to be specified as a responsible agency; and\n\n(b) consult each Implementation Monitor.\n\nPart 2—The Police Informants Royal Commission Implementation Monitor\n\n\t6 Establishment\n\n(1) There is established an entity known as the Police Informants Royal Commission Implementation Monitor.\n\n(2) The Police Informants Royal Commission Implementation Monitor is constituted by one or 2 Implementation Monitors appointed under section 7.\n\n\t7 Appointment\n\n(1) Subject to subsection (2), the Governor in Council, on the recommendation of the Attorney‑General, may appoint a person as a Police Informants Royal Commission Implementation Monitor.\n\n(2) A person is eligible to be an Implementation Monitor if the Attorney-General is satisfied that the person has—\n\n(a) a strong understanding of complex  \nmulti-agency environments; and\n\n(b) knowledge of, or experience in, the subject matters relevant to the implementation of the RCMPI recommendations.\n\n(3) An Implementation Monitor holds office—\n\n(a) for the term specified in the Implementation Monitor's instrument of appointment, not exceeding 4 years; and\n\n(b) on the terms and conditions (including remuneration and allowances) determined by the Governor in Council.\n\n\t8 Remuneration and allowances\n\n(1) An Implementation Monitor is entitled to be paid the remuneration and allowances that are determined by the Governor in Council and specified in the instrument of appointment.\n\n(2) The remuneration of an Implementation Monitor cannot be reduced during the Implementation Monitor's term of office unless the Implementation Monitor consents  \nto the reduction.\n\n\t9 Reappointment\n\nAn Implementation Monitor may be reappointed for a further term or terms, each not exceeding  \n4 years.\n\n\t10 Acting appointment\n\n(1) The Attorney-General, by instrument, may appoint a suitable person to act as an Implementation Monitor for a period of up to 3 months if—\n\n(a) the office of an Implementation Monitor is vacant; or\n\n(b) an Implementation Monitor is absent; or\n\n(c) an Implementation Monitor is for any other reason unable to perform the duties of the office.\n\n**Note**\n\nSection 41AA of the **Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984** provides for the powers in relation to an acting appointment.\n\n(2) The Attorney-General may only make one acting appointment under subsection (1) in relation to an Implementation Monitor before an appointment under section 7 must be made.\n\n\t11 Vacancy, resignation or suspension\n\nAn Implementation Monitor ceases to hold office if the Implementation Monitor—\n\n(a) resigns by notice in writing delivered to the Governor in Council; or\n\n(b) becomes insolvent; or\n\n(c) is convicted of an indictable offence or an offence that, if committed in Victoria, would be an indictable offence; or\n\n(d) nominates for election for the Parliament of Victoria or of the Commonwealth or of another State or a Territory; or\n\n(e) is appointed to a judicial office  in Victoria, the Commonwealth, or in another State or a Territory;\n\n(f) is suspended or removed from office under section 12.\n\n\t12 Suspension and removal\n\n(1) On the recommendation of the Attorney-General, the Governor in Council, by order, may suspend an Implementation Monitor from office on any  \nof the following grounds—\n\n(a) misconduct (whether or not in connection with the carrying out of the duties of an Implementation Monitor);\n\n(b) neglect of duty;\n\n(c) inability to perform the duties of an Implementation Monitor;\n\n(d) any other ground on which the Implementation Monitor is unfit to hold office.\n\n(2) The Attorney-General must cause to be tabled in each House of Parliament a full statement of the grounds of suspension within 7 sitting days of that House after the suspension.\n\n(3) The Implementation Monitor must be removed from office by the Governor in Council if each House of Parliament, within 20 sitting days after the day when the statement is tabled in the House, declares by resolution that the Implementation Monitor ought to be removed from office.\n\n(4) The Governor in Council must remove the suspension and restore the Implementation Monitor to office unless each House makes a declaration of the kind specified in subsection (3) within the time specified in that subsection.\n\n(5) If the Implementation Monitor is suspended from office under subsection (1), the Implementation Monitor is taken not to be an Implementation Monitor during the period of suspension.\n\n\t13 Independence\n\n(1) An Implementation Monitor is not subject to the direction or control of any person in respect of the performance and exercise of the Implementation Monitor's functions, powers or duties.\n\n(2) An Implementation Monitor is not subject to the direction or control of any person in respect of the content of an implementation report.\n\n\t14 Immunity\n\n(1) An Implementation Monitor is not personally liable for anything necessarily or reasonably done or omitted to be done in good faith—\n\n(a) in the performance of a function or the exercise of a power under this Act; or\n\n(b) in the reasonable belief that the act or omission was in the course of the performance of a function or the exercise of a power under this Act.\n\n(2) Any liability resulting from an act or omission that, but for subsection (1), would attach to an Implementation Monitor attaches instead to the State.\n\n\t15 Functions\n\n(1) An Implementation Monitor has the following functions—\n\n(a) to monitor and assess the adequacy and progress of the implementation of the RCMPI recommendations by responsible agencies at any time until the implementation of the RCMPI recommendations is complete;\n\n(b) to access written information from and attend meetings of the administrative taskforce known as the Implementation Taskforce within the Department of Justice and Community Safety;\n\n(c) to provide written or oral advice to a responsible agency about any measures the Implementation Monitor considers would support the adequate implementation of a RCMPI recommendation by that responsible agency;\n\n(d) to request regular reports from Victoria Police on its progress in fulfilling its ongoing disclosure obligations to potentially affected persons identified by the Royal Commission into the Management of Police Informants;\n\n(e) together with the other Implementation Monitor (if applicable), to report to the Attorney-General on—\n\n(i) the progress of the implementation of the RCMPI recommendations by responsible agencies; and\n\n(ii) the adequacy of that implementation; and\n\nS. 15(1)(e)(iii) amended by Nos 50/2021 s. 135(a), 31/2023 s. 65(a).\n\n(iii) what further measures may be required to ensure the RCMPI recommendations are fully implemented within the specified timeframes.\n\nS. 15(1)(f)(g) inserted by No. 50/2021 s. 135(b), repealed by No. 31/2023 s. 65(b).\n\n* * * * *\n\n(2) An Implementation Monitor has any other function conferred on the Implementation Monitor by or under this Act or any other Act.\n\n(3) An Implementation Monitor, in performing the Implementation Monitor's functions, must have regard to—\n\n(a) to the RCMPI recommendations; and\n\n(b) any advice or report provided  by a responsible agency on the implementation of a RCMPI recommendation, including—\n\n(i) any impediments to implementation; and\n\n(ii) whether any measures have been taken by the responsible agency to overcome those impediments; and\n\n(c) whether a genuine attempt has been made by a responsible agency to comply with the timeframes for implementation of the RCMPI recommendations; and\n\n(d) any interdependencies or external processes that might affect a responsible agency's timely implementation of a RCMPI recommendation; and\n\n(e) any measures taken by a responsible agency to manage or respond to the interdependencies or external processes referred to in paragraph (d).\n\n(4) A responsible agency must respond in writing to any written advice provided under subsection (1)(c).\n\n\t16 Attorney-General may request advice\n\n(1) The Attorney-General may request an Implementation Monitor to provide written or oral advice on any issue relating to the implementation of a RCMPI recommendation.\n\n(2) An Implementation Monitor must comply with a request under subsection (1).\n\n\t17 Powers\n\nAn Implementation Monitor has all the powers necessary to perform the Implementation Monitor's functions.\n\n\t18 Power to require information to be given\n\n(1) For the purposes of carrying out functions or exercising powers under this Act or any other Act, an Implementation Monitor, by written notice, may require a responsible agency or a person acting on behalf of a responsible agency to give to the Implementation Monitor any information—\n\n(a) relating to the responsible agency's implementation of the RCMPI recommendations; and\n\n(b) that the Implementation Monitor reasonably believes is necessary to perform the Implementation Monitor's functions.\n\n(2) The responsible agency or the person acting on behalf of the responsible agency must give the information to the Implementation Monitor within 21 days after receiving a notice under subsection (1) unless—\n\n(a) the Implementation Monitor has agreed to allow an extension of time for the giving of the information; or\n\n(b) the Implementation Monitor has agreed that the responsible agency is not able to give the information.\n\n\t19 Duty to cooperate\n\nA responsible agency or a person acting on behalf of a responsible agency must comply with any reasonable request made by an Implementation Monitor, or any person assisting the Implementation Monitor, that has been made for the purposes of performing the functions or exercising the powers of the Implementation Monitor.\n\n\t20 Responsible agency may give information without prior request\n\nA responsible agency or a person acting on behalf of a responsible agency  may give to an Implementation Monitor without prior request any information or documents relevant to the implementation of a RCMPI recommendation.\n\n\t21 Constraints on access to information not to apply\n\n(1) An obligation to maintain secrecy or privilege, or any other restriction on the disclosure of information (including a cabinet document) by a responsible agency, imposed by or under an Act or rule of law, does not apply to information given under section 18(2), 19 or 20.\n\n(2) A responsible agency or a person acting on behalf of a responsible agency, when giving information to an Implementation Monitor, must identify for the Implementation Monitor any information that is subject to—\n\n(a) an obligation to maintain secrecy or privilege; or\n\n(b) any restriction on its disclosure.\n\n(3) An Implementation Monitor or any other person must not disclose or communicate, except to another person performing duties under this Act, information provided by a responsible agency that is subject to—\n\n(a) an obligation on the responsible agency to maintain secrecy or privilege; or\n\n(b) any restriction on its disclosure by the responsible agency.\n\n(4) Nothing in subsection (3) prevents an Implementation Monitor from disclosing or communicating information—\n\n(a) to a person assisting the Implementation Monitor in the performance of the Implementation Monitor's functions; or\n\n(b) to another Implementation Monitor.\n\n\t22 Use and disclosure of information\n\n(1) The Implementation Monitor must not use or disclose confidential or personal information obtained or received in the course of, or as a result of, the performance of the functions of the Implementation Monitor except as permitted by this Act.\n\n(2) Nothing in subsection (1) prevents an Implementation Monitor from disclosing—\n\n(a) the identity of a person if—\n\n(i) the person has consented to the disclosure of the information; or\n\n(ii) information relating to the person's identity is already in the public domain; or\n\n(b) confidential or personal  information—\n\n(i) to a person assisting the Implementation Monitor in the performance of the Implementation Monitor's functions; or\n\n(ii) to another Implementation Monitor.\n\n\t23 Freedom of Information Act 1982 not to apply\n\n(1) An Implementation Monitor is not, and cannot be declared to be, a prescribed authority for the purposes of the **Freedom of Information Act 1982**.\n\n(2) The **Freedom of Information Act 1982** does not apply to the Department of Justice and Community Safety in relation to a document that is received or stored by the Department of Justice and Community Safety solely on behalf of the Implementation Monitor for the purposes of this Act.\n\n(3) In this section—\n\n***document*** has the same meaning as in the **Freedom of Information Act 1982**.\n\n\t24  Secretary may provide assistance\n\nAn Implementation Monitor, together with the other Implementation Monitor (if applicable), may request the Secretary to provide any assistance that is reasonably necessary to enable an Implementation Monitor to perform functions under this Act, including the provision of staff and facilities.\n\n\t25 Validity of acts and decisions\n\nAn act or a decision of an Implementation Monitor is not invalid merely because of a defect or irregularity in, or in connection with, the appointment of the Implementation Monitor.\n\nPart 3—Reporting\n\n\t26 Implementation reports\n\n(1) An Implementation Monitor must prepare an implementation report for each of the following reporting periods—\n\n(a) 30 November 2020 to 30 June 2021;\n\n(b) 1 July to 30 June in any subsequent year until the implementation of the RCMPI recommendations is complete.\n\n(2) An Implementation Monitor may prepare additional implementation reports as required.\n\n(3) For the purposes of this section, if there are 2 Implementation Monitors, the implementation report must be prepared jointly.\n\n(4) Each implementation report must specify or include—\n\n(a) the progress of responsible agencies in implementing the RCMPI recommendations in the relevant reporting period; and\n\n(b) an assessment of the adequacy of that implementation; and\n\n(c) advice as to what further measures may be required to ensure the RCMPI recommendations are fully implemented within the specified timeframes.\n\n(5) If an Implementation Monitor intends to include in an implementation report the following information, the Implementation Monitor must first provide an opportunity to respond in accordance with subsection (6)—\n\n(a) information that is adverse to a person or responsible agency;\n\n(b) information that the Implementation Monitor has obtained from a responsible agency in the performance of the Implementation Monitor's functions under this Act or any other Act.\n\n(6) Before including the information specified in subsection (5) in an implementation report, the Implementation Monitor must—\n\n(a) give the person or responsible agency at least 14 days to respond; and\n\n(b) if the information intended to be included in the implementation report is adverse to the person or responsible agency, fairly set out any response given under paragraph (a) in the report.\n\n(7) An Implementation Monitor must ensure that an implementation report does not contain information that the Implementation Monitor reasonably believes would—\n\n(a) reveal sensitive law enforcement methods; or\n\n(b) prejudice an ongoing police investigation, or a prosecution or an appeal; or\n\n(c) prejudice an ongoing IBAC investigation, prosecution or appeal; or\n\n(d) prejudice the safety or security of any person; or\n\n(e) disclose a deliberation or decision of Cabinet that has not been officially published; or\n\n(f) be otherwise contrary to the public interest.\n\n(8) An Implementation Monitor must give a copy of each implementation report to the Attorney-General each year by 30 September.\n\n(9) The Attorney-General may give a copy of an implementation report provided under subsection (8) to—\n\n(a) the Premier; and\n\n(b) the Minister responsible for administering the **Victoria Police Act 2013**.\n\n\t27 Attorney-General progress reports\n\n(1) The Attorney-General must prepare a report on the progress of the implementation of the RCMPI recommendations for each of the following reporting periods—\n\n(a) 30 November 2020 to 30 June 2021;\n\n(b) 1 July to 30 June in any subsequent year until the implementation of the RCMPI recommendations is complete.\n\n(2) A progress report may include a copy of an implementation report provided to the Attorney‑General under section 26.\n\n\t28 Tabling of progress reports\n\n(1) The Attorney-General must give a copy of each progress report to the clerk of each House of Parliament by the later of—\n\n(a) each year by 30 November; or\n\n(b) within 60 days after receiving an implementation report.\n\n(2) The clerk of each House must table the progress report in the House on the next sitting day of the House.\n\n(3) If the Attorney-General proposes to give a copy of the progress report in accordance with subsection (1) when the Parliament is in recess, the Attorney‑General must—\n\n(a) give at least  one business day's notice of the Attorney-General's intention to do so to the clerk of each House; and\n\n(b) give a copy of the progress report to the clerk of each House on the day indicated in the notice.\n\n  (4) The clerk of each House must—\n\n(a) notify each member of the House of the receipt of a notice under subsection (3)(a) on the same day that the clerk receives that notice; and\n\n(b) give a copy of the progress report to each member of the House as soon as practicable after the report is received under subsection (3)(b); and\n\n(c) table a copy of the progress report in the House on the next sitting day of the House.\n\n(5) Each progress report that is given to the clerks under this section is taken to have been published by order, or under the authority, of the Houses of Parliament.\n\n(6) The publication under this section of each progress report is absolutely privileged and the provisions of sections 73 and 74 of the **Constitution Act 1975** and of any other enactment or rule of law relating to the publication of the proceedings of the Houses of Parliament apply to and in relation to the publication of that report as if it were a report to which those sections applied and had been published by the Government Printer under the authority of the Parliament.\n\n(7) For the purposes of this section, Parliament is in recess when each House stands adjourned to a date to be fixed by the presiding officer of that House.\n\nPart 4—Review of this Act\n\n\t29 Review of this Act\n\nThe Attorney-General must cause a review of the operation of this Act to be undertaken as soon as practicable after the fifth anniversary of the day this Act came into operation.\n\n ══════════════\n\nEndnotes\n\n1 General information\n\nSee [www.legislation.vic.gov.au](http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au) for Victorian Bills, Acts and current Versions of legislation and up-to-date legislative information.\n\n*Minister's second reading speech—*\n\n*Legislative Assembly: 23 June 2021*\n\n*Legislative Council: 5 August 2021*\n\nThe long title for the Bill for this Act was \"A Bill for an Act to establish the Police Informants Royal Commission Implementation Monitor and for other purposes.\"\n\nThe **Police Informants Royal Commission Implementation Monitor Act 2021** was assented to on 14 September 2021 and came into operation on 15 September 2021: section 2.\n\nINTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION ACT 1984 (ILA)\n\nStyle changes\n\nSection 54A of the ILA authorises the making of the style changes set out in Schedule 1 to that Act.\n\nReferences to ILA s. 39B\n\nSidenotes which cite ILA s. 39B refer to section 39B of the ILA which provides that where an undivided section or clause of a Schedule is amended by the insertion of one or more subsections or subclauses, the original section or clause becomes subsection or subclause (1) and is amended by the insertion of the expression \"(1)\" at the beginning of the original section or clause.\n\nInterpretation\n\nAs from 1 January 2001, amendments to section 36 of the ILA have the following effects:\n\n• Headings\n\nAll headings included in an Act which is passed on or after 1 January 2001 form part of that Act. Any heading inserted in an Act which was passed before 1 January 2001, by an Act passed on or after 1 January 2001, forms part of that Act. This includes headings to Parts, Divisions or Subdivisions in a Schedule; sections; clauses; items; tables; columns; examples; diagrams; notes or forms. See section 36(1A)(2A).\n\n• Examples, diagrams or notes\n\nAll examples, diagrams or notes included in an Act which is passed on or after 1 January 2001 form part of that Act. Any examples, diagrams or notes inserted in an Act which was passed before 1 January 2001, by an Act passed on or after 1 January 2001, form part of that Act. See section 36(3A).\n\n• Punctuation\n\nAll punctuation included in an Act which is passed on or after 1 January 2001 forms part of that Act. Any punctuation inserted in an Act which was passed before 1 January 2001, by an Act passed on or after 1 January 2001, forms part of that Act. See section 36(3B).\n\n• Provision numbers\n\nAll provision numbers included in an Act form part of that Act, whether inserted in the Act before, on or after 1 January 2001. Provision numbers include section numbers, subsection numbers, paragraphs and subparagraphs. See section 36(3C).\n\n• Location of \"legislative items\"\n\nA \"legislative item\" is a penalty, an example or a note. As from 13 October 2004, a legislative item relating to a provision of an Act is taken to be at the foot of that provision even if it is preceded or followed by another legislative item that relates to that provision. For example, if a penalty at the foot of a provision is followed by a note, both of these legislative items will be regarded as being at the foot of that provision. See section 36B.\n\n• Other material\n\nAny explanatory memorandum, table of provisions, endnotes, index and other material printed after the Endnotes does not form part of an Act.  \nSee section 36(3)(3D)(3E).\n\n2 Table of Amendments\n\nThis publication incorporates amendments made to the **Police Informants Royal Commission Implementation Monitor Act 2021** by Acts and subordinate instruments.\n\n–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––\n\n**Special Investigator Act 2021, No. 50/2021**\n\n| Assent Date: | 30.11.21 |\n| --- | --- |\n| Commencement Date: | Ss 134, 135 on 1.12.21: s. 2 |\n| Current State: | This information relates only to the provision/s amending the **Police Informants Royal Commission Implementation Monitor Act 2021** |\n\n\n**Special Investigator Repeal Act 2023, No. 31/2023**\n\n| Assent Date: | 8.11.23 |\n| --- | --- |\n| Commencement Date: | Ss 64, 65 on 2.2.24: Special Gazette (No. 687) 19.12.23 p. 1 |\n| Current State: | This information relates only to the provision/s amending the **Police Informants Royal Commission Implementation Monitor Act 2021** |\n\n\n–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––\n\n3 Explanatory details\n\nNo entries at date of publication.","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":4,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"The original Act established the Monitor with functions related to both the Royal Commission recommendations AND the work of the Special Investigator (who was examining criminal conduct related to the informant scandal). Amendments in 2021 expanded the scope to include Special Investigator matters, but the 2023 repeal of the Special Investigator Act removed those functions, returning the Monitor to its original, narrower focus on Royal Commission implementation only. The scope has therefore contracted back to its original purpose after a temporary expansion."},"complexity_factors":["Straightforward structure with only 4 Parts and 29 sections","Limited cross-referencing—primarily references to the Royal Commission report and a handful of other Acts (Freedom of Information Act 1982, Victoria Police Act 2013, etc.)","11 defined terms in section 3, most with clear statutory references","Some conditional logic in sections 18-21 regarding information disclosure and secrecy overrides, but not deeply nested","Procedural requirements for reporting (sections 26-28) with specific timeframes and consultation requirements","Amendment history visible in the text (inserted/repealed markers) indicating some evolution but not excessive complexity"],"plain_english_summary":"This Victorian law creates an independent watchdog called the **Police Informants Royal Commission Implementation Monitor** to make sure the government actually follows through on recommendations from a major inquiry into police informants.\n\n**What happened before this law:**\nIn 2020, a Royal Commission (a high-level government inquiry) found serious problems with how Victoria Police managed informants—most notoriously involving Nicola Gobbo, a lawyer who also acted as a police informant while representing clients. The Commission made dozens of recommendations to fix the system.\n\n**What this law does:**\n\n*   **Creates the Monitor:** Establishes one or two independent \"Implementation Monitors\" appointed by the Governor in Council (on the Attorney-General's advice). These are senior figures with experience in complex government environments.\n*   **Tracks progress:** The Monitor oversees whether government agencies—Victoria Police, the Department of Justice, the Office of Public Prosecutions, and others—are properly implementing the Royal Commission's recommendations.\n*   **Has real power:** The Monitor can demand information from agencies, attend meetings of the government's internal taskforce, and give advice on what needs to be done. Agencies must cooperate and respond to requests.\n*   **Bypasses secrecy:** Agencies must hand over information even if it's normally secret or privileged (though the Monitor must keep it confidential). The Monitor is also exempt from Freedom of Information laws.\n*   **Reports publicly:** The Monitor produces annual reports assessing whether recommendations are being implemented properly and on time. The Attorney-General must table these in Parliament.\n\n**Who it affects:**\n\n*   **Government agencies:** Victoria Police, the Department of Justice and Community Safety, the Office of Public Prosecutions, IBAC (the anti-corruption body), and others listed in the Act.\n*   **The public:** Anyone with an interest in police accountability and the integrity of the criminal justice system.\n\n**Why it matters:**\nWithout this Monitor, there would be no independent oversight to ensure the government fixes the systemic problems identified by the Royal Commission. The Monitor acts as a guarantee that the recommendations won't be ignored or delayed indefinitely, and provides transparency through public reporting."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":4,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The Act remains narrowly focused on establishing an independent Monitor to track and assess implementation of the Royal Commission into the Management of Police Informants (RCMPI) recommendations. Amendments recorded in the Version history show temporary insertions and later repeals (for example, provisions tied to a Special Investigator that were later repealed), and the Act preserves an order‑making power to add responsible agencies (s 5). Those changes adjust which entities are within the Monitor's remit but do not broaden the core statutory purpose beyond monitoring, information compulsion, reporting and advice. Therefore the statutory scope (monitoring implementation of RCMPI recommendations) has not materially changed from the original intent; the changes are adjustments to coverage and procedural detail rather than an expansion into new policy areas."},"complexity_factors":["Relatively short Act (29 sections across 4 Parts)","Approximately 15 defined terms in the interpretation section (several cross‑referencing other Acts)","Multiple cross‑references to other statutes (Freedom of Information Act 1982, Victoria Police Act 2013, IBAC Act 2011, Public Interest Monitor Act 2011, Constitution Act 1975, etc.)","Conditional appointment and acting‑appointment rules with time limits (ss 7, 10)","Suspension and removal procedure with prescribed parliamentary timelines and requirements (s 12)","Layered information‑disclosure rules: statutory compulsion to provide material (s 18), statutory override of secrecy/privilege obligations (s 21(1)), and statutory limits on further disclosure by the Monitor (s 21(3)–(4), s 22)","FOI exclusion for the Monitor and documents held solely for the Monitor (s 23) — creates an exception to a general transparency regime","Reporting cycles with specific historical and annual reporting periods and procedural tabling rules including recess handling (ss 26–28)","Immunity and liability transfer to the State (s 14) adds a non‑standard liability allocation"],"plain_english_summary":"**What this law does (mechanics first)\n\n- Establishes an independent office called the Police Informants Royal Commission Implementation Monitor (the Implementation Monitor). (ss 6–7)\n- Allows one or two Implementation Monitors to be appointed by the Governor in Council on the Attorney‑General's recommendation, for terms up to 4 years, with limited acting appointments and reappointment rules. (ss 6–11)\n- Gives the Monitor broad powers to obtain information from named \"responsible agencies\" (and any entity added by order), require responses within 21 days, attend an internal implementation taskforce, and provide written or oral advice. (ss 5, 15–20)\n- Suspends ordinary secrecy and privilege obligations for material provided to the Monitor (so agencies must disclose information to the Monitor), but places limits on further disclosure by the Monitor. (ss 18, 21–22)\n- Excludes the Monitor and certain documents the Monitor holds from the Freedom of Information Act 1982. (s 23)\n- Requires the Monitor to produce periodic implementation reports assessing progress and adequacy of implementing the Royal Commission into the Management of Police Informants (RCMPI) recommendations, and requires the Attorney‑General to prepare and table progress reports to Parliament. (ss 26–28)\n- Protects the Monitor with immunity for acts done in good faith, and shifts any resulting liability to the State. (s 14)\n- Confers independence in the performance of the Monitor's functions (not subject to direction or control as to the exercise of functions or the content of implementation reports). (s 13)\n\nWho this affects\n\n- The Monitor and any assistants who work for that office (appointments, immunity, and reporting duties apply). (ss 7, 14, 24)\n- \"Responsible agencies\" required to implement RCMPI recommendations: a defined list including Department of Justice and Community Safety, Victoria Police, Office of Public Prosecutions, IBAC, Public Interest Monitor, Victorian Government Solicitor, Victorian Legal Services Commissioner, the Law Institute of Victoria and the Victorian Bar — plus any entity added by order. These agencies must cooperate, supply information, and respond to written advice. (s 3(definition), ss 5, 18–20)\n- Parliament and the public (indirectly): the Attorney‑General must table progress reports in Parliament; the Monitor's reports are provided to the Attorney‑General and may be included in the tabling. (ss 26–28)\n\nWhy it matters (official purpose, then practical effects)\n\n- Officially, the Act exists to monitor and assess whether the RCMPI recommendations are being implemented and whether that implementation is adequate. (s 1, s 15)\n\n- Practical effects and implementation mechanics to note:\n  - Information flow and compliance: agencies lose certain legal excuses for withholding information from the Monitor (secrecy or privilege does not apply to material given under the Act) and therefore must supply internal material or identify why they cannot. (ss 18, 21)\n  - Confidentiality control: while agencies must disclose protected material to the Monitor, the Monitor is constrained from further disclosure except in specified circumstances; however the Monitor and related documents are excluded from FOI, limiting third‑party access to those materials. (ss 21–23)\n  - Accountability channel: the Monitor reports to the Attorney‑General and the Attorney‑General must table progress reports in Parliament, creating a public accountability loop while preserving sensitive operational safeguards. (ss 26–28)\n  - Appointment and political balance: the Monitor is appointed by the Governor in Council on the Attorney‑General's recommendation and can be suspended by the Governor in Council on the Attorney‑General's recommendation; removal requires resolution of both Houses within a specified timeframe (procedural checks exist). (ss 7, 12)\n  - Resource and operational cost: the State funds Monitor remuneration and support; the Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety may provide staff and facilities on request. (ss 8, 24)\n\nCosts, incentives, trade‑offs and risks (concrete mechanisms)\n\n- Who pays: remuneration, administrative support and the operational costs of responding to information requests are borne by the State (Treasury/department budgets). (ss 8, 24)\n- Who decides: the Attorney‑General selects candidates to recommend for appointment and may request advice from the Monitor; the Governor in Council makes the formal appointment. (ss 7, 16)\n- Compliance burden and opportunity cost: responsible agencies must allocate staff time to provide information, prepare written responses to advice, and produce reports. That shifts agency resources from other tasks to compliance and may slow other projects. (ss 18–20, 15(1)(c), 15(3)(b))\n- Transparency trade‑off: the Act requires reporting to Parliament (public accountability) but restricts FOI access to materials held for the Monitor and limits external disclosure of sensitive material. The mechanism trades wider public access for operational confidentiality. (ss 23, 26–28)\n- Independence versus political control: the Monitor is legally independent in carrying out functions and in report content (s 13), but appointment, suspension and removal involve executive and parliamentary mechanisms that create political touchpoints (s 7, s 12). This structure balances independence in operation with political responsibility for appointment and oversight.\n- Enforcement and compliance risk: the Monitor can require information and has a statutory duty to be provided information (s 18–19), but the Act stops short of specifying criminal penalties for non‑compliance; instead it relies on statutory compulsion and the political/administrative consequences of failing to cooperate. (ss 18–19)\n- Concentrated benefits, diffuse costs: the principal beneficiaries are the legal system, affected individuals identified by the Royal Commission and users of justice processes who rely on correct implementation. Costs are dispersed across the public sector and borne by taxpayers; agencies directly shoulder the administrative compliance burden. (ss 15, 26)\n\nKey practical points to watch when implementing the Act\n\n- The Monitor's reports must avoid revealing law‑enforcement methods, prejudicing prosecutions or IBAC investigations, public safety, or unpublished Cabinet deliberations (reporting redactions are mandated). (s 26(7))\n- Agencies must identify information they believe is subject to secrecy or privilege when handing it over to the Monitor (s 21(2)); the Monitor must then restrict onward disclosure (s 21(3)).\n- The Act permits the Attorney‑General to request advice on implementation issues and compels the Monitor to comply (s 16), guaranteeing an advisory channel into executive decision‑making.\n\nRelevant sections cited: establishment and appointment (ss 6–11), powers and information compulsion (ss 17–20), limits on secrecy and disclosure (ss 21–23), reporting (ss 26–28), immunity and independence (ss 13–14)."},"issue_detection":{"absurdities":[],"contradictions":[]},"summary":{"complexity_score":4,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"Based on the available text, the Act appears consistent with its stated purpose: implementing an oversight mechanism for Royal Commission recommendations. There is no evident scope creep or deviation from the original intent. The Act is narrowly focused on monitoring implementation rather than expanding into broader police oversight or legal profession regulation."},"complexity_factors":["Requires understanding of the broader Royal Commission context to fully appreciate the Act's purpose","Oversight and monitoring legislation can involve layered accountability mechanisms (reporting chains, powers of the monitor, timeframes)","Interaction with other existing legislation governing Victoria Police, legal profession regulation, and public sector accountability","Scope and powers of the Implementation Monitor role may carry technical legal definitions","Limited legislative text provided makes full complexity assessment difficult — the document appears truncated or metadata-heavy rather than containing full operative provisions"],"plain_english_summary":"The Act creates an independent Implementation Monitor to oversee and publicly report on how Victoria Police, government agencies and the legal profession implement the Royal Commission’s recommendations arising from the Lawyer X scandal. It’s an accountability mechanism to ensure promised reforms affecting lawyers, victims and the public are actually delivered rather than forgotten."},"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"Unauthenticated. Configure AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY or use a provider module. Learn more: https://ai-sdk.dev/unauthenticated-ai-gateway","source":"analysis-cron"}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/police-informants-royal-commission-implementation-monitor-act-2021","history":"/api/acts/police-informants-royal-commission-implementation-monitor-act-2021/history","analysis":"/api/acts/police-informants-royal-commission-implementation-monitor-act-2021/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/police-informants-royal-commission-implementation-monitor-act-2021/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/police-informants-royal-commission-implementation-monitor-act-2021/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/police-informants-royal-commission-implementation-monitor-act-2021/documents"}}