{"id":"C2025A00069","name":"National Environmental Protection Agency Act 2025","slug":"national-environmental-protection-agency-act-2025","collection":"act","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":"69 of 2025","makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":436453,"registerId":"C2025A00069-fast-fetch-1775953647871","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-12","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"National Environmental Protection Agency Act 2025","content":"---\nmeta-content-style-type: text/css\nmeta-content-type: application/xhtml+xml; charset=utf-8\n---\n\n![Commonwealth Coat of Arms of Australia](image.001.png)\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nNational Environmental Protection Agency Act 2025\n\nNo. 69, 2025\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nAn Act to establish the National Environmental Protection Agency, and for related purposes\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nContents\n\nPart 1—Preliminary\n\n1 Short title\n\n2 Commencement\n\n3 Object\n\n4 Simplified outline of this Act\n\n5 Definitions\n\n6 Crown to be bound\n\n7 Extension to external Territories\n\nPart 2—National Environmental Protection Agency\n\nDivision 1—Introduction\n\n8 Simplified outline of this Part\n\nDivision 2—National Environmental Protection Agency\n\n9 Establishment of National Environmental Protection Agency\n\n10 Constitution of NEPA\n\n11 Function of NEPA\n\nDivision 3—The Chief Executive Officer\n\n12 The Chief Executive Officer\n\n13 Functions of the CEO\n\n14 Independence of the CEO\n\nPart 3—Responsibilities in relation to functions\n\nDivision 1—Introduction\n\n15 Simplified outline of this Part\n\nDivision 2—Statement of expectations and statement of intent\n\n16 Minister’s statement of expectations\n\n17 Statement of intent\n\nDivision 3—Registers\n\n18 Registers\n\n19 Definition of registrable decision\n\n20 Register of registrable decisions\n\n21 Registers of prescribed matters\n\n22 Suspension of registers\n\n23 Certain information not required to be published on registers\n\nPart 4—Information and confidentiality\n\nDivision 1—Introduction\n\n24 Simplified outline of this Part\n\nDivision 2—Information gathering\n\n25 CEO may request information, advice or documents\n\nDivision 3—Use and disclosure of relevant information\n\nSubdivision A—Authorised disclosures by the CEO\n\n26 Disclosure of relevant information to Commonwealth entities\n\n27 Disclosure of relevant information to State or Territory government body\n\n28 Disclosure for the purposes of law enforcement\n\n29 Disclosure to reduce serious risk to human health\n\n30 Disclosure to reduce serious risk to the environment\n\nSubdivision B—Authorised use and disclosure by entrusted persons\n\n31 Use and disclosure for the purposes of an Act\n\n32 Use and disclosure for the administration or governance of NEPA\n\n33 Use and disclosure for the purposes of an Act administered by the Minister\n\n34 Use and disclosure for the purposes of assisting the Head of Environment Information Australia\n\n35 Use or disclosure for the purposes of international obligations\n\n36 Publicly available information\n\n37 Person to whom information relates\n\n38 Use and disclosure with consent\n\n39 Person who provided information\n\n40 Summaries or statistics\n\n41 Disclosure to a court, tribunal etc.\n\nSubdivision C—Civil penalties\n\n42 Unauthorised use or disclosure of protected information—entrusted person\n\n43 Unauthorised use or disclosure of protected information—official of a Commonwealth entity\n\nPart 5—Appointment of the CEO and engagement of staff etc.\n\nDivision 1—Introduction\n\n44 Simplified outline of this Part\n\nDivision 2—Appointment of the CEO etc.\n\n45 Appointment of the CEO\n\n46 Acting appointments\n\n47 Terms and conditions\n\n48 Remuneration\n\n49 Leave of absence\n\n50 Other paid work\n\n51 Resignation\n\n52 Termination of appointment\n\nDivision 3—Staff\n\n53 Staff\n\n54 Persons assisting NEPA\n\nDivision 4—Advisory group\n\n55 CEO may establish advisory group\n\n56 CEO may publish advice\n\n57 CEO must consider advice\n\nPart 6—Miscellaneous\n\n58 Simplified outline of this Part\n\n59 Delegation by the CEO\n\n60 Annual report\n\n61 Periodic reviews of the administration of NEPA\n\n62 Enforcement of civil penalty provisions\n\n63 Rules\n\n \n\n![Commonwealth Coat of Arms of Australia](image.002.png)\n\n \n\n \n\nNational Environmental Protection Agency Act 2025\n\nNo. 69, 2025\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nAn Act to establish the National Environmental Protection Agency, and for related purposes\n\n[Assented to 1 December 2025]\n\nThe Parliament of Australia enacts:\n\nPart 1—Preliminary\n\n \n\n1  Short title\n\n  This Act is the National Environmental Protection Agency Act 2025.\n\n2  Commencement\n\n (1) Each provision of this Act specified in column 1 of the table commences, or is taken to have commenced, in accordance with column 2 of the table. Any other statement in column 2 has effect according to its terms.\n\n \n\n- Commencement information\n- Column 1 Column 2 Column 3\n- Provisions Commencement Date/Details\n- 1. The whole of this Act 1 July 2026. 1 July 2026\n\n\nNote: This table relates only to the provisions of this Act as originally enacted. It will not be amended to deal with any later amendments of this Act.\n\n (2) Any information in column 3 of the table is not part of this Act. Information may be inserted in this column, or information in it may be edited, in any published version of this Act.\n\n3  Object\n\n  The object of this Act is to establish the National Environmental Protection Agency to support the delivery of accountable, efficient, outcomes‑focused and transparent environmental regulatory decision‑making.\n\n4  Simplified outline of this Act\n\nThis Act establishes NEPA, short for the National Environmental Protection Agency, and provides for the appointment of the CEO of NEPA.\n\nThe CEO has the functions conferred on the CEO by this Act and a number of other environmental laws mentioned in section 13. The CEO also has functions of advising and assisting the Minister in relation to any of the Minister’s functions and powers under those laws.\n\nThe Minister may give the CEO a statement of the Minister’s expectations for the CEO and NEPA. However, the Minister’s statement of expectations cannot affect the CEO’s independence by directing the CEO in the performance or exercise of the CEO’s functions or powers. The CEO must respond to any statement of expectations with a statement of intent.\n\nThe CEO may establish an advisory group to advise and assist the CEO in relation to the CEO’s functions and powers. The CEO must consider any advice received but is not bound by the advice.\n\nThis Act also contains a regime for the use and disclosure of information obtained under any Act conferring functions on the CEO. There are civil penalties for the use or disclosure of protected information in certain circumstances.\n\n5  Definitions\n\n  In this Act:\n\nadvisory group means the group established by the CEO under subsection 55(1).\n\nCEO: see section 12.\n\ncivil penalty provision has the same meaning as in the Regulatory Powers Act.\n\nCommonwealth entity has the same meaning as in the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013.\n\nCommonwealth reserve has the same meaning as in the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999.\n\nconservation zone has the same meaning as in the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999.\n\nentrusted person means:\n\n (a) the CEO; or\n\n (b) a member of the staff referred to in section 53; or\n\n (c) a person whose services are made available to NEPA under section 54; or\n\n (d) a person engaged under section 23 of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 by the CEO under a written agreement to assist in, or advise in relation to, the performance of the CEO’s functions; or\n\n (e) a person employed or engaged by a person mentioned in paragraph (d) of this definition to assist in, or advise in relation to, the performance of the CEO’s functions; or\n\n (f) any other person prescribed by the rules.\n\nenvironment has the same meaning as in the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999.\n\nmatter protected by a provision of Part 3 of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 has the same meaning as in that Act.\n\nNEPA: see subsection 9(1).\n\nofficial has the same meaning as in the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013.\n\npaid work means work for financial gain or reward (whether as an employee, a self‑employed person or otherwise).\n\nprotected information: relevant information obtained by an entrusted person is protected information if disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to:\n\n (a) if the disclosure is by the entrusted person—found an action by a person (other than the Commonwealth) for breach of a duty of confidence; or\n\n (b) prejudice the effective working of government; or\n\n (c) prejudice the prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution or punishment of one or more offences; or\n\n (d) endanger a person’s life or physical safety; or\n\n (e) prejudice the protection of public safety or the environment.\n\nregistrable decision: see section 19.\n\nRegulatory Powers Act means the Regulatory Powers (Standard Provisions) Act 2014.\n\nrelevant information means information obtained or generated by an entrusted person under, or in accordance with:\n\n (a) this Act or an instrument made under this Act; or\n\n (b) an Act or an instrument that confers functions on the CEO; or\n\n (c) the Regulatory Powers Act to the extent that it applies in relation to an Act mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b).\n\nrules means rules made under section 63.\n\nstatement of expectations means the statement issued by the Minister under section 16.\n\nState or Territory government body means:\n\n (a) a Department of State of a State or Territory; or\n\n (b) an agency of a State or Territory; or\n\n (c) an authority of a State or Territory.\n\n6  Crown to be bound\n\n  This Act binds the Crown in each of its capacities.\n\n7  Extension to external Territories\n\n  This Act extends to every external Territory.\n\nPart 2—National Environmental Protection Agency\n\nDivision 1—Introduction\n\n8  Simplified outline of this Part\n\nThis Part establishes the office of the CEO of NEPA. It also establishes NEPA for the purposes of assisting the CEO in the performance of the CEO’s functions. The CEO is the accountable authority of NEPA.\n\nDivision 2—National Environmental Protection Agency\n\n9  Establishment of National Environmental Protection Agency\n\n (1) The National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) is established by this section.\n\n (2) For the purposes of the finance law (within the meaning of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013):\n\n (a) NEPA is a listed entity; and\n\n (b) the CEO is the accountable authority of NEPA; and\n\n (c) the following persons are officials of NEPA:\n\n (i) the CEO;\n\n (ii) the staff referred to in section 53;\n\n (iii) persons whose services are made available to NEPA under section 54; and\n\n (d) the purposes of NEPA include:\n\n (i) the function of NEPA referred to in section 11; and\n\n (ii) the functions of the CEO referred to in section 13.\n\n10  Constitution of NEPA\n\n  NEPA consists of:\n\n (a) the CEO; and\n\n (b) the staff referred to in section 53; and\n\n (c) persons whose services are made available to NEPA under section 54.\n\n11  Function of NEPA\n\n  The function of NEPA is to assist the CEO in the performance of the CEO’s functions.\n\nDivision 3—The Chief Executive Officer\n\n12  The Chief Executive Officer\n\n  There is to be a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of NEPA.\n\n13  Functions of the CEO\n\n (1) The CEO has the functions conferred on the CEO by the following laws:\n\n (a) this Act;\n\n (b) the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999;\n\n (c) the Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) Act 1981;\n\n (d) the Hazardous Waste (Regulation of Exports and Imports) Act 1989;\n\n (e) the Ozone Protection and Synthetic Greenhouse Gas (Import Levy) Act 1995;\n\n (f) the Ozone Protection and Synthetic Greenhouse Gas Management Act 1989;\n\n (g) the Ozone Protection and Synthetic Greenhouse Gas (Manufacture Levy) Act 1995;\n\n (h) the Product Emissions Standards Act 2017;\n\n (i) the Recycling and Waste Reduction Act 2020;\n\n (j) the Underwater Cultural Heritage Act 2018;\n\n (k) the Regulatory Powers Act to the extent that it applies in relation to an Act mentioned in any of paragraphs (a) to (j);\n\n (l) a legislative instrument made under an Act, or under provisions of an Act, mentioned in any of paragraphs (a) to (k).\n\n (2) The CEO also has the following functions:\n\n (a) to advise and assist the Minister in relation to the exercise of any powers, or the performance of any functions, of the Minister under laws that confer functions on the CEO;\n\n (b) to monitor and audit the operation of the following instruments made under or entered into in accordance with the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999:\n\n (i) declarations made under section 33 of that Act;\n\n (ii) declarations made under section 36H of that Act;\n\n (iii) bilateral agreements;\n\n (iv) bioregional plans;\n\n (c) to make recommendations to the Minister in relation to opportunities to improve regulation under laws that confer functions on the CEO;\n\n (d) any other functions that are conferred on the CEO by:\n\n (i) the rules; or\n\n (ii) any other law of the Commonwealth;\n\n (e) to do anything incidental or conducive to the performance of the above functions.\n\n (3) The CEO has power to do all things necessary or convenient to be done for or in connection with the performance of the CEO’s functions.\n\n14  Independence of the CEO\n\n  Subject to this Act and any other Act, the CEO has discretion in the performance or exercise of the CEO’s functions or powers and is not subject to direction by any person in relation to the performance or exercise of those functions or powers.\n\nPart 3—Responsibilities in relation to functions\n\nDivision 1—Introduction\n\n15  Simplified outline of this Part\n\nThe Minister may give the CEO a statement of the Minister’s expectations for the CEO and NEPA. The CEO must respond to any such statement of expectations with a statement of intent.\n\nThe CEO must establish and maintain on NEPA’s website registers containing information in relation to certain decisions of the CEO (called registrable decisions) and any other matters prescribed by the rules that relate to a law mentioned in section 13.\n\nDivision 2—Statement of expectations and statement of intent\n\n16  Minister’s statement of expectations\n\n (1) The Minister may, at any time, prepare and give a written statement (a statement of expectations) to the CEO that sets out the Minister’s expectations for the CEO and NEPA.\n\n (2) A statement of expectations cannot direct the CEO in the performance or exercise of the CEO’s functions or powers.\n\n (3) In preparing a statement of expectations, the Minister must:\n\n (a) have regard to any matters prescribed by the rules; and\n\n (b) prepare the statement in accordance with any requirements prescribed by the rules.\n\n (4) As soon as practicable after giving a statement of expectations to the CEO, the Minister must arrange for it to be published on the Department’s website.\n\n (5) A statement of expectations replaces any previous statement of expectations.\n\n (6) A statement of expectations is not a legislative instrument.\n\n17  Statement of intent\n\n (1) If the Minister issues a statement of expectations, the CEO must prepare and give the Minister a written response (a statement of intent).\n\n (2) In preparing a statement of intent, the CEO must:\n\n (a) have regard to any matters prescribed by the rules; and\n\n (b) prepare the statement in accordance with any requirements prescribed by the rules.\n\n (3) The CEO must publish a statement of intent on NEPA’s website as soon as practicable after it is given to the Minister.\n\n (4) A statement of intent is not a legislative instrument.\n\nDivision 3—Registers\n\n18  Registers\n\n (1) The CEO must establish and maintain the following registers:\n\n (a) a register of registrable decisions;\n\n (b) a register of any other matters prescribed by the rules that relate to a law mentioned in section 13.\n\n (2) A register is to be maintained by electronic means.\n\n (3) A register is to be made available for inspection on NEPA’s website.\n\n (4) A register is not a legislative instrument.\n\n19  Definition of registrable decision\n\n  A decision of the CEO is a registrable decision if the decision is prescribed as a registrable decision by:\n\n (a) for a decision under an Act—that Act or the rules; or\n\n (b) for a decision under a legislative instrument—the rules.\n\n20  Register of registrable decisions\n\n  The rules may make provision in relation to the register of registrable decisions, including (without limitation) the information in relation to registrable decisions that the CEO must publish on the register.\n\nNote 1: The rules may, for example, prescribe that the CEO must publish the name of any person in relation to whom a registrable decision is made.\n\nNote 2: The CEO is not required to publish certain sensitive information: see section 23.\n\n21  Registers of prescribed matters\n\n  The rules may make provision in relation to a register of any matter prescribed as mentioned in paragraph 18(1)(b), including (without limitation) the information in relation to the matter that the CEO must publish on the register.\n\nNote 1: The rules may, for example, prescribe that the CEO must publish the name of a person with a particular connection to the prescribed matter.\n\nNote 2: The CEO is not required to publish certain sensitive information: see section 23.\n\n22  Suspension of registers\n\n (1) The CEO may suspend the operation of a register if the CEO is satisfied:\n\n (a) the suspension is required so that maintenance can be carried out; or\n\n (b) it is prudent to suspend the operation of the register in order to:\n\n (i) ensure the integrity of the register; or\n\n (ii) prevent, mitigate or minimise abuse of the register; or\n\n (iii) prevent, mitigate or minimise criminal activity involving the register.\n\n (2) If the CEO suspends the operation of a register:\n\n (a) the CEO must publish a notice on NEPA’s website informing the public of the suspension; and\n\n (b) the CEO may defer taking action in relation to the register until the suspension ends.\n\n23  Certain information not required to be published on registers\n\n  The CEO is not required to publish information on a register if the CEO considers that publishing the information would, or could be reasonably expected to:\n\n (a) endanger public safety; or\n\n (b) cause damage to a matter protected by a provision of Part 3 of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999; or\n\n (c) cause damage to the security, defence or international relations of Australia.\n\nPart 4—Information and confidentiality\n\nDivision 1—Introduction\n\n24  Simplified outline of this Part\n\nEntrusted persons can use or disclose certain information (called relevant information) in accordance with this Part.\n\nEntrusted persons and certain other persons may be liable to a civil penalty if they use or disclose protected information other than in accordance with this Part.\n\nDivision 2—Information gathering\n\n25  CEO may request information, advice or documents\n\n  The CEO may, in writing, request information, advice or documents that relate to the performance of the CEO’s functions, or the exercise of the CEO’s powers, from any person or body.\n\nDivision 3—Use and disclosure of relevant information\n\nSubdivision A—Authorised disclosures by the CEO\n\n26  Disclosure of relevant information to Commonwealth entities\n\n  The CEO may disclose relevant information to a Commonwealth entity if the CEO is satisfied the disclosure is for the purposes of assisting the entity to perform its functions or exercise its powers.\n\n27  Disclosure of relevant information to State or Territory government body\n\n  The CEO may disclose relevant information to a State or Territory government body if:\n\n (a) the CEO reasonably believes that the disclosure of the information is necessary for the purposes of:\n\n (i) performing functions or exercising powers of the CEO; or\n\n (ii) the administration of a State or Territory law; and\n\n (b) the State or Territory government body has undertaken not to use or disclose the information except in accordance with an agreement that:\n\n (i) is in force between the Commonwealth and the State or Territory; and\n\n (ii) applies in relation to the information; and\n\n (c) the CEO is satisfied that the information will be used and disclosed only in accordance with the agreement.\n\n28  Disclosure for the purposes of law enforcement\n\n (1) The CEO may disclose relevant information to a body mentioned in subsection (2) if:\n\n (a) the CEO reasonably believes that the disclosure of the information is necessary for:\n\n (i) the enforcement of the criminal law; or\n\n (ii) the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty; or\n\n (iii) the protection of public revenue; and\n\n (b) the functions of the body include that enforcement or protection.\n\n (2) The bodies are the following:\n\n (a) a Commonwealth entity;\n\n (b) a State or Territory government body;\n\n (c) the Australian Federal Police;\n\n (d) the police force or police service of a State or Territory.\n\n29  Disclosure to reduce serious risk to human health\n\n  The CEO may disclose relevant information if the CEO reasonably believes that the disclosure is necessary to prevent or lessen a serious risk to human health.\n\n30  Disclosure to reduce serious risk to the environment\n\n  The CEO may disclose relevant information if the CEO reasonably believes that the disclosure is necessary to prevent or lessen a serious risk to the environment.\n\nSubdivision B—Authorised use and disclosure by entrusted persons\n\n31  Use and disclosure for the purposes of an Act\n\n  An entrusted person may use or disclose relevant information if the use or disclosure is for the purposes of this Act or another Act that confers functions on the CEO.\n\n32  Use and disclosure for the administration or governance of NEPA\n\n  An entrusted person may use or disclose relevant information if the use or disclosure is for the purposes of the administration or governance of NEPA.\n\n33  Use and disclosure for the purposes of an Act administered by the Minister\n\n  An entrusted person may:\n\n (a) use relevant information; or\n\n (b) disclose relevant information to the Minister or the Department;\n\nif the use or disclosure is for the purposes of an Act administered by the Minister.\n\n34  Use and disclosure for the purposes of assisting the Head of Environment Information Australia\n\n  An entrusted person may:\n\n (a) use relevant information; or\n\n (b) disclose relevant information to the Head of Environment Information Australia;\n\nif the use or disclosure is for the purposes of assisting the Head of Environment Information Australia perform their functions or exercise their powers.\n\nNote: Relevant information may also be disclosed to the Head of Environment Information Australia under other sections of this Act: see, for example, section 31 or 33.\n\n35  Use or disclosure for the purposes of international obligations\n\n  An entrusted person may use or disclose relevant information if the use or disclosure is for the purposes of Australia meeting its international obligations.\n\n36  Publicly available information\n\n  An entrusted person may use or disclose relevant information if the information has already been lawfully made available to the public.\n\n37  Person to whom information relates\n\n  An entrusted person may disclose relevant information to the person to whom the information relates.\n\n38  Use and disclosure with consent\n\n  An entrusted person may use or disclose relevant information that relates to a person if:\n\n (a) the person has consented to the use or disclosure; and\n\n (b) the use or disclosure is in accordance with that consent.\n\n39  Person who provided information\n\n  An entrusted person may disclose relevant information to the person who provided the information.\n\n40  Summaries or statistics\n\n  An entrusted person may disclose:\n\n (a) summaries of relevant information; or\n\n (b) statistics derived from relevant information;\n\nif those summaries or statistics do not enable the identification of a person.\n\n41  Disclosure to a court, tribunal etc.\n\n (1) An entrusted person may disclose relevant information to a court exercising federal jurisdiction.\n\n (2) An entrusted person may disclose relevant information to:\n\n (a) a court; or\n\n (b) a tribunal, authority or person that has the power to require the answering of questions or the production of documents;\n\nfor the purposes of the enforcement of a law of the Commonwealth or to assist the court, tribunal, authority or person to make or review an administrative decision that is required or authorised to be made or reviewed under a law of the Commonwealth.\n\nSubdivision C—Civil penalties\n\n42  Unauthorised use or disclosure of protected information—entrusted person\n\nUnauthorised use or disclosure\n\n (1) A person is liable to a civil penalty if:\n\n (a) the person is, or has been, an entrusted person; and\n\n (b) the person has obtained relevant information in the person’s capacity as an entrusted person; and\n\n (c) the information is protected information; and\n\n (d) the person uses or discloses the information.\n\nCivil penalty: 200 penalty units.\n\nExceptions\n\n (2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the use or disclosure is authorised or required by:\n\n (a) this Act; or\n\n (b) any other law of the Commonwealth; or\n\n (c) a prescribed law of a State or a Territory.\n\nNote: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matters in this subsection: see section 96 of the Regulatory Powers Act.\n\n43  Unauthorised use or disclosure of protected information—official of a Commonwealth entity\n\n  A person is liable to a civil penalty if:\n\n (a) the person is, or has been, an official of a Commonwealth entity that is not NEPA; and\n\n (b) the person has obtained relevant information in the person’s capacity as an official of the entity; and\n\n (c) the information is protected information that was disclosed to the entity under section 26; and\n\n (d) the person uses or discloses the information other than for the purpose for which it was disclosed to the entity.\n\nCivil penalty: 200 penalty units.\n\nPart 5—Appointment of the CEO and engagement of staff etc.\n\nDivision 1—Introduction\n\n44  Simplified outline of this Part\n\nThis Part provides for the appointment of the CEO of NEPA and deals with the terms and conditions of the appointment. It contains provisions concerning the staff of NEPA and certain other persons whose services can be made available to assist NEPA.\n\nThis Part also gives the CEO the power to establish an advisory group to advise and assist the CEO in relation to the CEO’s functions and powers. The CEO must consider any advice received but is not bound by the advice.\n\nDivision 2—Appointment of the CEO etc.\n\n45  Appointment of the CEO\n\nAppointment by the Governor‑General\n\n (1) The CEO is to be appointed by the Governor‑General by written instrument.\n\nQualifications for appointment\n\n (2) A person must not be appointed as the CEO unless the Minister is satisfied that:\n\n (a) the person has knowledge of, or experience in, both of the following matters:\n\n (i) public sector administration or governance;\n\n (ii) regulation; and\n\n (b) the person has knowledge of, or experience in, one or more of the following:\n\n (i) conservation of biodiversity;\n\n (ii) ecologically sustainable development;\n\n (iii) heritage;\n\n (iv) Indigenous affairs;\n\n (v) law;\n\n (vi) law enforcement;\n\n (vii) natural resource management;\n\n (viii) any other matters prescribed by the rules; and\n\n (c) the person does not have any interests, pecuniary or otherwise, that conflict or could conflict with the proper performance of the CEO’s functions.\n\nPeriod and basis of appointment\n\n (3) The CEO is to be appointed on a full‑time basis.\n\n (4) The CEO must not be reappointed more than once.\n\n (5) The CEO holds office for the period specified in the instrument of appointment. The period must not exceed 5 years.\n\n46  Acting appointments\n\n (1) The Minister may, by written instrument, appoint a person to act as the CEO:\n\n (a) during a vacancy in the office of CEO (whether or not an appointment has previously been made to the office); or\n\n (b) during any period, or during all periods, when the CEO:\n\n (i) is absent from duty or from Australia; or\n\n (ii) is, for any reason, unable to perform the duties of the office.\n\nNote: For rules that apply to acting appointments, see sections 33AB and 33A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.\n\n (2) A person is not eligible for appointment to act as the CEO unless the person is eligible for appointment as the CEO under section 45.\n\n47  Terms and conditions\n\n  The CEO holds office on the terms and conditions (if any) in relation to matters not covered by this Act that are determined by the Minister.\n\n48  Remuneration\n\n (1) The CEO is to be paid the remuneration that is determined by the Remuneration Tribunal. If no determination of that remuneration by the Tribunal is in operation, the CEO is to be paid the remuneration that is prescribed under subsection (4).\n\n (2) The CEO is to be paid the allowances that are prescribed under subsection (4).\n\n (3) This section has effect subject to the Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973.\n\n (4) The Minister may, by legislative instrument, prescribe:\n\n (a) remuneration for the purposes of subsection (1); and\n\n (b) allowances for the purposes of subsection (2).\n\n49  Leave of absence\n\n (1) The CEO has the recreation leave entitlements that are determined by the Remuneration Tribunal.\n\n (2) The Minister may grant the CEO leave of absence, other than recreation leave, on the terms and conditions as to remuneration or otherwise that the Minister determines.\n\n50  Other paid work\n\n  The CEO must not engage in paid work outside the duties of the CEO’s office without the Minister’s approval.\n\n51  Resignation\n\n (1) The CEO may resign the CEO’s appointment by giving the Governor‑General a written resignation.\n\n (2) The resignation takes effect on the day it is received by the Governor‑General or, if a later day is specified in the resignation, on that later day.\n\n52  Termination of appointment\n\n  The Governor‑General may terminate the appointment of the CEO:\n\n (a) for misbehaviour; or\n\n (b) if the CEO is unable to perform the duties of the CEO’s office because of physical or mental incapacity; or\n\n (c) if the CEO:\n\n (i) becomes bankrupt; or\n\n (ii) applies to take the benefit of any law for the relief of bankrupt or insolvent debtors; or\n\n (iii) compounds with the CEO’s creditors; or\n\n (iv) makes an assignment of the CEO’s remuneration for the benefit of the CEO’s creditors; or\n\n (d) if the CEO is absent, except on leave of absence, for 14 consecutive days or for 28 days in any 12 months; or\n\n (e) if the CEO engages, except with the Minister’s approval, in paid work outside the duties of the CEO’s office (see section 50); or\n\n (f) if the CEO fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with section 29 of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (which deals with the duty to disclose interests) or rules made for the purposes of that section.\n\nDivision 3—Staff\n\n53  Staff\n\n (1) The staff of NEPA must be persons engaged under the Public Service Act 1999.\n\n (2) For the purposes of the Public Service Act 1999:\n\n (a) the CEO and the APS employees assisting the CEO together constitute a Statutory Agency; and\n\n (b) the CEO is the Head of that Statutory Agency.\n\n54  Persons assisting NEPA\n\n  NEPA may be assisted by:\n\n (a) officers and employees of Agencies (within the meaning of the Public Service Act 1999); or\n\n (b) officers and employees of authorities of the Commonwealth; or\n\n (c) officers and employees of a State or Territory; or\n\n (d) officers and employees of authorities of a State or Territory;\n\nwhose services are made available to NEPA in connection with the performance of any of its functions.\n\nDivision 4—Advisory group\n\n55  CEO may establish advisory group\n\nCEO may establish advisory group\n\n (1) The CEO may, by written instrument, establish an advisory group to provide the CEO, at the CEO’s request, advice or assistance in relation to the performance of the CEO’s functions and the exercise of the CEO’s powers.\n\n (2) The advice or assistance may be provided by:\n\n (a) any single member of the group; or\n\n (b) any combination of members of the group; or\n\n (c) the group as a whole.\n\nMembers of the group\n\n (3) The members of the group are to be appointed by the CEO by written instrument.\n\nNote: Members may be reappointed: see section 33AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.\n\n (4) The CEO may appoint as many members as the CEO considers appropriate.\n\n (5) The CEO must not appoint a person under subsection (3) unless the CEO is satisfied that the person has the relevant skills, expertise or Indigenous cultural knowledge.\n\nOther matters\n\n (6) The CEO must determine the terms and conditions of appointment of the members.\n\n (7) The CEO may determine:\n\n (a) the group’s terms of reference; and\n\n (b) the procedures to be followed by the group or its members in providing advice or assistance.\n\n (8) If the CEO determines terms of reference under paragraph (7)(a), the CEO must publish the terms of reference on NEPA’s website as soon as practicable afterwards.\n\n (9) An instrument made under subsection (1) or (3) is not a legislative instrument.\n\n56  CEO may publish advice\n\n  If the advisory group or any one or more of its members provides advice to the CEO in relation to the performance of the CEO’s functions or the exercise of the CEO’s powers, the CEO may publish the advice on NEPA’s website if the CEO considers it appropriate to do so.\n\n57  CEO must consider advice\n\n  If the advisory group or any one or more of its members provides advice to the CEO in relation to a decision to be made by the CEO:\n\n (a) the CEO must consider the advice when making the decision; but\n\n (b) the CEO is not bound by the advice.\n\nPart 6—Miscellaneous\n\n \n\n58  Simplified outline of this Part\n\nThis Part deals with miscellaneous matters.\n\n59  Delegation by the CEO\n\n (1) The CEO may, in writing, delegate all or any of the CEO’s functions or powers under any of the laws mentioned in subsection 13(1) to:\n\n (a) a member of the staff referred to in section 53 who meets the requirements in subsection (3); or\n\n (b) a person whose services are made available to NEPA under section 54 and who meets the requirements in subsection (3); or\n\n (c) an individual who is engaged, or employed or engaged by a person engaged, under section 23 of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 by the CEO under a written agreement to assist in, or advise in relation to, the performance of the CEO’s functions, and who meets the requirements in subsection (3); or\n\n (d) for a function or power the performance or exercise of which directly or indirectly relates (including in a way described in subsection 7(1A) of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975) to the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park—any of the following:\n\n (i) the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority;\n\n (ii) the Chief Executive Officer of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority;\n\n (iii) a member of the staff of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority who meets the requirements in subsection (3); or\n\n (e) for a function or power the performance or exercise of which directly or indirectly relates to a Commonwealth reserve or a conservation zone—either of the following:\n\n (i) the Director of National Parks;\n\n (ii) an APS employee in the Department who meets the requirements in subsection (3).\n\nNote: Sections 34AA to 34A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 contain provisions relating to delegations.\n\n (2) Despite subsection (1), the CEO must not delegate a function or power of the CEO under Part 19C (rulings) of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999.\n\n (3) A person meets the requirements in this subsection if the person:\n\n (a) is an SES employee or acting SES employee; or\n\n (b) holds, or is acting in, a position that is equivalent to a position occupied by an SES employee; or\n\n (c) holds, or is acting in, an Executive Level 1 or 2, or equivalent, position.\n\nNote: The expressions SES employee and acting SES employee are defined in section 2B of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.\n\n (4) In performing a delegated function or exercising a delegated power, the delegate must comply with any written directions of the CEO.\n\n (5) Subsection (4) does not apply in relation to a delegate to whom a function or power is delegated as mentioned in paragraph (1)(e).\n\n60  Annual report\n\n  The annual report prepared by the CEO and given to the Minister under section 46 of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 for a period must be published on NEPA’s website as soon as practicable after the report is first tabled in a House of the Parliament.\n\n61  Periodic reviews of the administration of NEPA\n\nRequirement to conduct reviews\n\n (1) The Minister must cause independent reviews of the administration of NEPA to be conducted in accordance with this section.\n\nMatters review must consider\n\n (2) Without limiting subsection (1), a review must consider, in relation to the period since the previous review was completed under this section:\n\n (a) whether, and to what extent, NEPA has supported the delivery of accountable, efficient, outcomes‑focused and transparent environmental regulatory decision‑making; and\n\n (b) whether, and to what extent, the CEO and NEPA have met the expectations set out in any statements of expectations given by the Minister in the period; and\n\n (c) any other matters the Minister directs the review to consider.\n\nFrequency of reviews\n\n (3) The first review must be completed within 5 years after the commencement of this section.\n\n (4) Each subsequent review must be completed within 5 years after the completion of the previous review.\n\n (5) For the purposes of subsections (3) and (4), a review is completed on the day after the day the report of the review is given to the Minister.\n\nReport of review\n\n (6) The person or persons who conduct a review must give the Minister a written report of the review.\n\n (7) As soon as practicable after the Minister receives the report, the Minister must arrange for:\n\n (a) a copy to be given to the CEO; and\n\n (b) a copy to be published on the Department’s website.\n\n (8) The Minister must also arrange for a copy of the report to be tabled in each House of the Parliament, within 15 sitting days of that House after the Minister receives the report.\n\nResponse to recommendations\n\n (9) If the report includes recommendations, the CEO must:\n\n (a) prepare a response to each recommendation, as soon as practicable after receiving a copy of the report from the Minister; and\n\n (b) arrange for the response to be tabled in each House of the Parliament, within 6 months of the day a copy of the report is tabled in that House; and\n\n (c) publish the response on NEPA’s website, as soon as practicable after a copy of the report is first tabled in a House of the Parliament.\n\n62  Enforcement of civil penalty provisions\n\nEnforcement of civil penalty provisions\n\n (1) Each civil penalty provision of this Act is enforceable under Part 4 of the Regulatory Powers Act.\n\nNote: Part 4 of the Regulatory Powers Act allows a civil penalty provision to be enforced by obtaining an order for a person to pay a pecuniary penalty for the contravention of the provision.\n\nAuthorised applicant\n\n (2) For the purposes of Part 4 of the Regulatory Powers Act, the CEO is an authorised applicant in relation to the civil penalty provisions of this Act.\n\nRelevant court\n\n (3) For the purposes of Part 4 of the Regulatory Powers Act, each of the following courts is a relevant court in relation to the civil penalty provisions of this Act:\n\n (a) the Federal Court of Australia;\n\n (b) the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2);\n\n (c) a court of a State or Territory that has jurisdiction in relation to the matter.\n\nExtension to external Territories\n\n (4) Part 4 of the Regulatory Powers Act, as that Part applies in relation to the civil penalty provisions of this Act, extends to every external Territory.\n\n63  Rules\n\n (1) The Minister may, by legislative instrument, make rules prescribing matters:\n\n (a) required or permitted by this Act to be prescribed by the rules; or\n\n (b) necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect to this Act.\n\n (2) To avoid doubt, the rules may not do the following:\n\n (a) create an offence or civil penalty;\n\n (b) provide powers of:\n\n (i) arrest or detention; or\n\n (ii) entry, search or seizure;\n\n (c) impose a tax;\n\n (d) set an amount to be appropriated from the Consolidated Revenue Fund under an appropriation in this Act;\n\n (e) directly amend the text of this Act.\n\n \n\n[Minister’s second reading speech made in—\n\nHouse of Representatives on 30 October 2025\n\nSenate on 24 November 2025]\n\n(94/25)\n\n \n","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"Unauthenticated. Configure AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY or use a provider module. Learn more: https://ai-sdk.dev/unauthenticated-ai-gateway","source":"analysis-cron"},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":7,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"Compared to the Act’s stated object (to establish NEPA to support accountable, efficient, outcomes‑focused and transparent environmental regulatory decision‑making (section 3)), the enacted provisions expand the instrument well beyond a narrow establishment measure. The Act not only creates the CEO and NEPA (sections 9–12) but also centralises operational functions across multiple existing Commonwealth environmental laws (section 13), introduces a detailed information‑gathering and disclosure regime (sections 25–41), public registers with publication rules and exceptions (sections 18–23), civil penalties for misuse of protected information (sections 42–43) and broad delegation and rule‑making powers (sections 59, 63). Those features give NEPA a substantial coordinating, transparency and enforcement role across a suite of laws rather than merely providing administrative support. This represents a meaningful broadening of scope from simply establishing an agency to creating a cross‑cutting regulatory hub with information‑sharing and compliance tools."},"complexity_factors":["Approximately 18–20 defined terms in the interpretation section (see section 5).","Cross‑references to at least 9 external Acts and instruments (e.g. Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999; Regulatory Powers Act; Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013; Public Service Act 1999; Acts Interpretation Act 1901; Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975; Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973) (see section 13 and other provisions).","Multiple decision registers with rule‑made scope and publication exceptions (nested conditions in sections 18–23).","Detailed information‑use and disclosure regime with many permitted pathways and specific exceptions (sections 25–41), including a multi‑pronged statutory definition of \"protected information\" (section 5).","Civil penalty regime cross‑linked to the Regulatory Powers Act and enforced through court processes (sections 42–43, 62).","Delegation regime that creates multiple classes of delegates (internal SES/EL staff, APS staff, external authorities including GBRMPA and Director of National Parks) with an explicit non‑delegable exception (section 59).","Ministerial statement of expectations and CEO statement of intent that interact with CEO independence (sections 16–17, 14) — introduces conditional publication and procedural requirements governed by rules.","Broad rule‑making power (section 63) that can fill in substantive detail but is explicitly constrained (cannot create offences, taxes or amend the Act), increasing reliance on secondary instruments.","Appointment, remuneration and termination provisions for the CEO impose multiple eligibility and procedural conditions including a single reappointment limit and maximum term (sections 45–52)."],"plain_english_summary":"**What this law does (mechanics first)**\n\n- Establishes a new Commonwealth agency called the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) and a statutory Chief Executive Officer (CEO) who is the accountable authority for NEPA (sections 9–13).\n- Confers on the CEO functions and powers across a specified list of existing environmental laws (for example, the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 and several related Acts) and any instruments made under those laws (section 13(1)).\n- Gives the CEO broad operational powers to request information, advice or documents from any person where relevant to the CEO’s functions (section 25) and sets out detailed rules for how that information may be used and disclosed (sections 26–41).\n- Requires the CEO to maintain searchable online registers of certain decisions and other prescribed matters related to the CEO’s functions, but allows the CEO to withhold publication where doing so would endanger public safety, protected environmental matters, or national security (sections 18–23).\n- Creates civil‑penalty liability for entrusted persons and certain Commonwealth officials who improperly use or disclose protected information (200 penalty units) (sections 42–43). \"Entrusted person\" is defined broadly to include the CEO, NEPA staff, persons seconded in to assist NEPA, contractors and other prescribed persons (definitions and section 5).\n- Provides detail on appointment, terms, remuneration, leave, resignation and termination of the CEO, including qualification requirements, a single reappointment limit and a maximum 5‑year term (sections 45–52).\n- Makes NEPA staff Australian Public Service employees and allows NEPA to be assisted by officers from Commonwealth, State or Territory agencies (sections 53–54). The CEO may establish an advisory group, publish that advice and must consider advice when making decisions though not be bound by it (sections 55–57).\n- Allows the Minister to issue a written statement of expectations for NEPA, which the CEO must respond to with a published statement of intent; the Minister’s statement cannot direct the CEO’s exercise of functions (sections 16–17, 14).\n- Permits the CEO to delegate functions to senior APS staff, certain external bodies (including the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority and Director of National Parks for functions relating to their areas) and limits some delegations (section 59).\n- Establishes obligations for periodic independent reviews of NEPA’s administration and requires publication and parliamentary tabling of review reports and responses (section 61).\n- Authorises the Minister to make rules (legislative instruments) to prescribe matters under the Act, with explicit limits on what rules may not do (section 63).\n\n**Who is affected**\n\n- Commonwealth government: creates a new listed Commonwealth entity (NEPA) and assigns the CEO as its accountable authority for finance and governance purposes (sections 9–10). The Minister retains some supervisory instruments (statements of expectation) but not direct control over operational decisions (sections 14, 16).\n- NEPA staff and persons seconded to NEPA: become entrusted persons with obligations and potential civil‑penalty exposure for unauthorised disclosures (sections 5, 42–43, 53–54).\n- Businesses, individuals and other public bodies that interact with NEPA: may be required to supply information, and certain decisions about them may be published on NEPA’s online registers (sections 25, 18–21). The rules may require publication of names or other details unless exclusion grounds apply (section 20, 23).\n- State and Territory agencies: can receive information from the CEO subject to agreements and safeguards; NEPA may coordinate with them (section 27).\n- Courts, tribunals and law‑enforcement bodies: able to receive relevant information under specified conditions (sections 28, 41).\n\n**Why it matters (official rationale and then practical effects, trade‑offs and risks)**\n\nOfficially, the Act’s object is to establish NEPA to support accountable, efficient, outcomes‑focused and transparent environmental regulatory decision‑making (section 3). Mechanically, it centralises operational responsibilities in a single CEO with cross‑Act functions (section 13) and establishes transparency mechanisms (registers, annual reports, published statements of intent and review reports). That design aims to coordinate environmental regulation across multiple Commonwealth laws while providing public visibility of decisions.\n\nTrade‑offs, costs and incentives (practical lens):\n\n- Concentration of functions. The CEO is given functions across many existing laws (section 13). This centralisation can reduce fragmentation (single point of accountability) but also creates a single point of operational control that may become a bottleneck or produce coordination costs with other agencies.\n\n- Information collection and compliance costs. The CEO may request documents from any person (section 25). Regulated parties will face compliance costs to search, collate and provide information, and potential reputational costs from register publication (sections 18–21). The rules may expand what must be published (section 63). These are recurring administrative burdens for business and individuals.\n\n- Publication and privacy trade‑offs. The Act requires registers and publication of statements (sections 16–21) but allows the CEO to withhold sensitive material that could endanger safety, protected environmental matters or national security (section 23). The statutory balance leaves considerable discretion to the CEO about what is published, creating both transparency and privacy/operational security trade‑offs.\n\n- Information sharing and enforcement. The Act authorises disclosure to Commonwealth and State bodies, courts and law enforcement for certain purposes (sections 26–29, 41). This facilitates enforcement and intergovernmental cooperation, but increases pathways by which protected information can travel — the Act mitigates risk by mandating agreements with State bodies (section 27) and attaching civil penalties for misuse (sections 42–43).\n\n- Civil‑penalty backstop and deterrence. Entrusted persons face civil penalties (200 penalty units) for unauthorised disclosure of protected information (section 42). That creates legal risk and a compliance incentive for staff and contractors. Enforcement of those penalties is through the Regulatory Powers Act (section 62), meaning civil enforcement is available rather than criminal prosecution in many cases.\n\n- Ministerial oversight versus operational independence. The Minister may issue a statement of expectations and require a response (sections 16–17), and the Minister determines some appointment terms (section 47). However, the CEO is explicitly granted operational independence in performing functions (section 14). This structure separates strategic direction from operational decision‑making, but the Minister’s expectations and rule‑making powers (section 63) can shape practice and priorities.\n\n- Delegation and use of external expertise. The CEO may delegate many functions to senior APS staff, other Commonwealth authorities and specified bodies related to particular areas (for example, Great Barrier Reef authorities or Director of National Parks) (section 59). That permits flexibility and leveraging of existing expertise but also creates multiple hands in decision‑making and potential legal complexity about where accountability lies.\n\nImplementation risks and opportunity costs:\n\n- Administrative cost to Commonwealth: establishing NEPA, staffing it with SES/AP S employees and maintaining IT registers and information security will require appropriation and ongoing funding (sections 9, 53, 18). The rules may permit more obligations to be prescribed, adding future resourcing needs (section 63).\n- Compliance burden on private sector and NGOs: information production, legal review for sensitivity, and responding to registers/publication risk will impose costs on regulated entities (section 25; sections 18–21).\n- Capture and incentives: the Act creates concentrated decision‑making (single CEO) and a broad advisory group power (section 55). The Act requires the CEO to consider advice (section 57), but advisers are not binding; nevertheless, the composition and influence of advisers may shape outcomes.\n- Legal and coordination complexity: the CEO’s functions attach to many existing Acts and instruments (section 13). That cross‑Act footprint increases legal complexity, interpretation risk and the need for clear agreements with other agencies (sections 26–27, 59).\n\nEffects on markets, businesses and individual choice (light market‑liberal lens):\n\n- Private enterprise and compliance costs: firms subject to Commonwealth environmental regulation will face additional reporting and potential public disclosure obligations that can affect transaction costs, contractual risk and reputation. The Act does not create direct market interventions (taxes, price controls) but raises regulatory compliance costs (sections 25, 18–21).\n- Competition and ownership: the Act does not directly restructure markets or change ownership rights. However, centralised regulatory decisions and public registers could indirectly affect competitiveness via reputational effects and regulatory timing.\n- Contract freedom and speech: the Act limits unauthorised disclosure by entrusted persons (civil penalties in sections 42–43), which constrains internal disclosure of certain information and therefore can affect communications and contract negotiations where confidentiality is relevant. The Act preserves lawful public information and permits disclosure with consent (sections 36, 38).\n\nWho pays, who decides, and how behaviour changes (concrete):\n\n- Who pays: the Commonwealth funds NEPA (establishment, staff and systems). Regulated persons and organisations bear compliance costs of information requests and possible reputational costs from register publication (sections 9, 25, 18–21).\n- Who decides: the CEO makes operational decisions and is the accountable authority (sections 9, 12–14). The Minister may set expectations and the rules; the CEO responds with a statement of intent (sections 16–17). Delegation and advisory mechanisms add others into decision processes (sections 55–59).\n- Behavioural change: regulated entities will likely increase record‑keeping and legal review for information provided to NEPA; entrusted persons will adopt stricter information‑handling protocols to avoid civil penalties; and other agencies will negotiate information‑sharing agreements when receiving NEPA material (sections 25, 42–43, 27).\n\n**Key sections to read for operational detail**\n- Functions and powers across other Acts: section 13\n- CEO independence and ministerial expectations: sections 14, 16–17\n- Information powers and limits: sections 25–41 and definition of protected information in section 5\n- Registers and publication obligations: sections 18–23\n- Civil penalties and enforcement framework: sections 42–43, 62\n- Delegation and inter‑agency arrangements: section 59\n- Rule‑making power and its limits: section 63\n\n"},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":5,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The legislation appears consistent with its original intent as stated in the long title and object clause. It establishes NEPA as a consolidated environmental regulator without significant mission creep. The scope remains focused on: (1) creating the agency, (2) appointing the CEO, (3) information management, and (4) accountability mechanisms. The extensive references to other environmental laws in section 13(1) are necessary to transfer existing functions rather than expand them."},"complexity_factors":["Moderate cross-referencing: The Act imports definitions and concepts from at least 6 other major Acts (EPBC Act, Public Governance Act, Regulatory Powers Act, Public Service Act, etc.)","Nested conditional logic in information disclosure provisions: Sections 26-41 create a detailed permissions matrix for when protected information can be shared, with multiple overlapping categories (public safety, law enforcement, international obligations, etc.)","Delegated legislative power: Section 63 allows extensive rule-making, with 20+ specific points where rules are referenced but not yet written (registrable decisions, advisory group procedures, etc.)","Dual enforcement mechanisms: Civil penalties (200 units) apply to both NEPA insiders (entrusted persons) and outsiders (Commonwealth officials), with different tests for each","Complex appointment and delegation framework: CEO appointment has 6 specific qualification requirements, 6 termination grounds, and delegation rules that vary by function (Great Barrier Reef vs Commonwealth reserves vs general powers)","Statutory agency mechanics: The Act must interface with PGPA Act finance law, Public Service Act employment framework, and Remuneration Tribunal pay scales simultaneously"],"plain_english_summary":"**What this law does:**\n\nThis Act creates a new federal body called the **National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA)** — essentially Australia's new national environmental regulator. It puts one agency and one Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in charge of enforcing a wide range of environmental laws that were previously scattered across different departments.\n\n**Who it affects:**\n\n- **Businesses and developers** who need approvals under environmental laws (like the EPBC Act)\n- **State and Territory governments** who work with NEPA on environmental decisions\n- **The public**, who can now access registers of environmental decisions online\n- **Anyone handling environmental information** — there are strict rules about confidentiality\n\n**Key things the law sets up:**\n\n- **NEPA** — a new statutory agency with its own staff, budget, and legal identity\n- **A single CEO** appointed by the Governor-General for up to 5 years (can be reappointed once) who runs the show and has independence from political direction\n- **Consolidated powers** — the CEO now handles functions under 10+ different environmental laws, including:\n  - Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (the big one)\n  - Sea dumping, hazardous waste, ozone protection, recycling, and heritage laws\n- **Transparency requirements** — public registers of environmental decisions, annual reports, and \"statements of expectations\" from the Minister that must be publicly responded to\n- **Information protection** — strict civil penalties (fines up to 200 penalty units, roughly $50,000+) for unauthorised disclosure of sensitive environmental information\n- **Advisory group** — the CEO can set up expert panels, including people with Indigenous cultural knowledge\n\n**Why it matters:**\n\nThis is a major structural reform. Instead of environmental decisions being made by bureaucrats inside the Environment Department, there's now an independent statutory agency with its own CEO, clearer accountability, and public transparency requirements. The CEO has legal independence — the Minister can set broad expectations but cannot direct specific decisions. This is designed to make environmental regulation more \"accountable, efficient, outcomes-focused and transparent\" (the Act's stated object)."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/national-environmental-protection-agency-act-2025","history":"/api/acts/national-environmental-protection-agency-act-2025/history","analysis":"/api/acts/national-environmental-protection-agency-act-2025/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/national-environmental-protection-agency-act-2025/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/national-environmental-protection-agency-act-2025/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/national-environmental-protection-agency-act-2025/documents"}}