{"id":"C1949A00020","name":"National Emergency (Coal Strike) Act 1949","slug":"national-emergency-coal-strike-act-1949","collection":"act","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"repealed","isInForce":false,"actNumber":"20 of 1949","makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":4333,"registerId":"commonwealth-C1949A00020-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-03-30","status":"Repealed","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"National Emergency (Coal Strike) Act 1949","content":"NATIONAL EMERGENCY (COAL STRIKE).\n\nNo. 20 of 1949.\n\nAn Act to prohibit, during the period of National Emergency caused by the present General Strike in the Coal-mining Industry, the Contribution, Receipt or Use of Funds by Organizations registered under the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904–1948 for the purpose of assisting or encouraging the Continuance of that Strike and for other purposes.\n\n\\[Assented to 29th June, 1949.\\]\n\nPreamble\n\nWHEREAS there arose out of certain demands by organizations of employees in the coal-mining industry certain industrial disputes existing in the State of New South Wales and extending beyond the limits of that State:\n\nAnd whereas, in order to enforce compliance with those demands, and in contravention of the principles of conciliation and arbitration for which provision is made in the Constitution and in the laws of the Commonwealth, a general strike in the coal-mining industry was decided upon on the sixteenth day of June, and commenced on the twenty-seventh day of June, One thousand nine hundred and forty-nine:\n\nAnd whereas that strike is prejudicing or interfering with the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community and has caused a grave national emergency:\n\nAnd whereas it is desirable that the disputes referred to in this preamble should be settled by means of conciliation or arbitration by the tribunals established by law for the purpose:\n\nAnd whereas it is desirable that measures should be taken to make unlawful the contribution, receipt or use of funds by organizations for the purpose of assisting or encouraging the continuance of that strike:\n\nBe it therefore enacted by the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, the Senate, and the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Australia, as follows:—\n\nShort title.\n\n1. This Act may be cited as the National Emergency (Coal Strike) Act 1949.\n\n  \n\nCommencement.\n\n2. This Act shall come into operation on the day on which it receives the Royal Assent.\n\nDefinitions.\n\n3.—(1.) In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears—\n\n“branch”, in relation to an organization, includes a section, district or lodge of the organization or of a branch of the organization;\n\n“officer”, in relation to an organization or branch of an organization, includes a trustee or agent of that organization or branch;\n\n“organization” means an organization registered under the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904–1948;\n\n“participating organization” means an organization which, by some or all of its members, is taking part in the strike;\n\n“prescribed-authority” means the Chief Judge of the Court or the Coal Industry Tribunal, and includes a Judge of the Court or an industrial authority or industrial tribunal (whether of the Commonwealth or of a State) appointed by the Chief Judge to be a prescribed authority for the purposes of this Act;\n\n“the Court” means the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration;\n\n“the Registrar” means the Industrial Registrar or a Deputy Industrial Registrar holding office under the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904–1948;\n\n“the strike” means the general strike in the coal-mining industry which began on the twenty-seventh day of June, One thousand nine hundred and forty-nine.\n\n(2.) For the purposes of this Act, a payment or receipt, or a promise to make a payment, by a branch of an organization shall be deemed to be a payment or receipt, or a promise to make a payment; by that organization.\n\nProhibition of certain payments by participating organizations.\n\n4. Subject to this Act, a participating organization shall not make, or promise to make, any payment for the purpose of assisting or encouraging, directly or indirectly, the continuance of the strike.\n\nPenalty: One thousand pounds.\n\nProhibition of certain receipts by or on behalf of participating organizations.\n\n5. Subject to this Act, any of the following organizations or persons, that is to say—\n\n(a) a participating organization;\n\n(b) a member of the committee of management of a participating organization or of a branch of a participating organization;\n\n(c) a member, officer or employee of a participating organization or of a branch of a participating organization; or\n\n(d) a person acting on behalf of, or in the interests of, a participating organization or of a branch of a participating organization,\n\n  \n\nshall not receive a payment or benefit from any person for the purpose of assisting or encouraging, directly or indirectly, the continuance of the strike.\n\nPenalty: Where the offence is committed by an organization or other body corporate, One thousand pounds; in any other case, One hundred pounds or imprisonment for six months, or both.\n\nProhibition of certain payments by non-participating organizations.\n\n6. Subject to this Act, an organization (not being a participating organization) shall not make, or promise to make, a payment to or for the benefit of—\n\n(a) a participating organization;\n\n(b) a member of the committee of management of a participating organization or a branch of a participating organization;\n\n(c) a member, officer or employee of a participating organization or of a branch of a participating organization; or\n\n(d) a person acting on behalf of, or in the interests of, a participating organization or of a branch of a participating organization,\n\nfor the purpose of assisting or encouraging, directly or indirectly, the continuance of the strike.\n\nPenalty: One thousand pounds.\n\nAuthorized payments and receipts.\n\n7. Where a prescribed authority is satisfied that a payment or receipt, or class of payments or receipts, is not for the purpose of assisting or encouraging, directly or indirectly, the continuance of the strike, the authority may authorize that payment or receipt, or class of payments or receipts, and a payment or receipt so authorized, or included in a class so authorized, shall be deemed not to be prohibited by any provision of this Act.\n\nCourt may order repayment of certain payments.\n\n8.—(1.) Where the Court is satisfied, upon the application of the Registrar—\n\n(a) that, at any time on or after the sixteenth day of June, One thousand nine hundred and forty-nine, and before the commencement of this Act, money has been received or paid, and the receipt or payment of that money would, if this Act had been in force at the time when the money was received or paid, have been in contravention of section five or six of this Act; or\n\n(b) that, at any time after the commencement of this Act, money has been received or paid in contravention of either of those sections,\n\nthe Court may order the repayment of that money by the person to whom, or the organization to which, the money was paid to the person from whom, or the organization from which, it was received.\n\n(2.) An order under this section may be enforced in the manner provided by section sixty-one of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904–1948 and for that purpose the Registrar may do any act which could be done by the person or organization to whom or to which the money has been ordered to be repaid, in the name of and on behalf of that person or organization.\n\n  \n\n(3.) The jurisdiction of the Court under this section may be exercised by a single Judge.\n\nInjunctions.\n\n9.—(1.) The Court shall have jurisdiction to make such orders for injunctions as it thinks necessary for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the provisions of this Act.\n\n(2.) The jurisdiction of the Court under this section may be exercised by a single Judge.\n\nInspection of books of organizations.\n\n10.—(1.) The Registrar, or a person authorized by the Registrar to act under this section, may, for the purpose of ascertaining whether there has been a non-compliance with any of the provisions of this Act—\n\n(a) inspect any books, documents or other papers of an organization or branch of an organization;\n\n(b) for the purpose of any such inspection, enter, with such assistance as he considers necessary, any premises used or occupied by the organization or branch of the organization in which he believes any such books, documents or papers to be;\n\n(c) require a person to produce or deliver to him, in accordance with the requirement, any such books, documents or papers in the possession or under the control of that person;\n\n(d) take possession of any such books, documents or papers;\n\n(e) retain any such books, documents or papers; and\n\n(f) require a person to furnish to him such information as he specifies in relation to any matter to which this Act applies.\n\n(2.) A person shall not—\n\n(a) refuse or fail to comply with a requirement under this section; or\n\n(b) obstruct or hinder the Registrar or any other person in the exercise of his powers under this section.\n\nPenalty: One hundred pounds or imprisonment for six months or both.\n\nLiability of officers for offences of organizations.\n\n11. Where an organization has committed an offence against this Act, every person who, at the time of the commission of the offence, was a member of the committee of management, or an officer, of the organization or of a branch of the organization shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence, unless he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he used all due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence, and shall, upon conviction, be punishable by a fine not exceeding One hundred pounds or imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or both.\n\nProof of purpose of payments and receipts.\n\n12. In any prosecution for an offence against this Act, a payment or receipt, or a promise to make a payment, shall, unless the contrary is proved, be deemed to have been a payment or receipt, or a promise to make a payment, for the purpose of assisting or encouraging directly or indirectly, the continuance of the strike.\n\n  \n\nRegulations.\n\n13.—(1.) The Governor-General may make regulations, not inconsistent with this Act, prescribing all matters which are necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect to this Act and, in particular, for prescribing penalties for offences against the regulations not exceeding—\n\n(a) in the case of an offence by an organization or other body corporate—a fine of One thousand pounds; and\n\n(b) in any other case—a fine of One hundred pounds or imprisonment for a term of six months, or both.\n\n(2.) The regulations may provide that the operation of any of the provisions of this Act which apply to or in relation to an organization shall extend to or in relation to any other body which is a participant in the strike and the operation of those provisions shall extend accordingly.\n\nTermination of Act.\n\n14. Immediately after the termination of the strike, the Governor-General shall make a Proclamation that the strike has terminated and thereupon this Act shall be deemed to have been repealed.","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"summary":{"complexity_score":5,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This Act is a tightly scoped emergency measure with a single, clearly stated purpose: to prohibit the financial support of the 1949 coal miners' strike. Every provision — the prohibitions, enforcement powers, inspection rights, court jurisdiction, and automatic repeal — is directly and exclusively tied to that singular objective. The regulation-making power in section 13(2) could theoretically extend coverage to non-registered bodies, which nudges slightly beyond the core target of registered unions, but this remains within the overall purpose of cutting off strike funding. The Act does not drift into broader industrial relations reform, permanent institutional change, or unrelated subject matter. Its scope is consistent with its stated original intent from preamble to termination clause."},"complexity_factors":["Reversed burden of proof in section 12 adds a legally significant conditional element","Retrospective operation of section 8 (back to 16 June 1949, before the Act commenced) creates temporal complexity","Multiple layers of prohibited conduct across sections 4, 5, and 6, with overlapping categories of persons caught","'Prescribed authority' definition is multi-tiered, including delegated appointment by the Chief Judge","Regulation-making power in section 13(2) can extend the Act's operation to non-registered bodies, dynamically expanding scope","Automatic repeal mechanism in section 14 creates an unusual self-terminating legislative structure","Cross-references to Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904–1948 for enforcement mechanisms (section 8(2))","Officer liability provision (section 11) creates deemed guilt with a due diligence defence, adding conditional logic","Distinction between 'participating' and 'non-participating' organisations requires factual assessment throughout"],"plain_english_summary":"## National Emergency (Coal Strike) Act 1949\n\n### What is this law about?\n\nThis Act was an **emergency response** to a major national crisis: a general strike by coal miners that began in late June 1949. Because coal was essential to powering the nation's industry, the strike caused severe disruption to everyday life across Australia. The law was designed to financially strangle the strike by making it **illegal to fund it**.\n\n---\n\n### Who does it affect?\n\nThe Act primarily targets **registered industrial organisations** (think: formally registered trade unions) and their members, officers, and agents. It also catches ordinary individuals acting on behalf of those unions.\n\n---\n\n### What does it actually do?\n\nThe law creates a web of financial prohibitions:\n\n- **Striking unions** (called \"participating organisations\") cannot make or promise **any payment** that would help keep the strike going — directly or indirectly.\n- **Anyone associated with a striking union** (members, committee members, officers, employees, or people acting on its behalf) cannot **receive money or benefits** from anyone for the purpose of keeping the strike alive.\n- **Non-striking unions** are also prohibited from sending money or benefits to striking unions or anyone connected to them, if the purpose is to sustain the strike.\n\nIn plain terms: **no union could bankroll the strike, and no one could receive strike support funds.**\n\n---\n\n### Key enforcement tools\n\n- A **\"prescribed authority\"** (a senior judge or tribunal official) could **authorise specific payments** that had nothing to do with sustaining the strike — for example, legitimate welfare payments.\n- The **Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration** (the industrial court of the day) could order that money already paid in breach of the law be **paid back**, even for payments made before the Act commenced (back to 16 June 1949).\n- The Court could also issue **injunctions** (court orders forcing or stopping certain behaviour) to ensure compliance.\n- The **Industrial Registrar** (a government official overseeing union registrations) had broad powers to **inspect union books and records**, enter premises, seize documents, and demand information.\n\n---\n\n### Penalties\n\n- **Unions and companies** that broke the rules faced fines of up to **£1,000** (a very significant sum in 1949).\n- **Individual people** faced fines of up to **£100 or six months' jail, or both**.\n- **Union officers and committee members** were automatically treated as guilty if their union broke the law — unless they could prove they didn't know about it or actively tried to prevent it.\n\n---\n\n### A notable feature: reversed burden of proof\n\nUsually in Australian law, the prosecution must prove you're guilty. This Act **flipped that around**: any payment was *assumed* to be for the purpose of supporting the strike **unless the accused could prove otherwise**. This was a significant (and controversial) departure from normal legal principles.\n\n---\n\n### How did it end?\n\nThe Act had a built-in sunset mechanism: the moment the strike ended, the Governor-General was required to issue a formal proclamation, and the Act would **automatically be treated as repealed**. It was always designed as a temporary, crisis measure — not permanent law."},"issue_detection":{"absurdities":[{"type":"retroactive_impossibility","section":"Section 8(1)(a)","severity":"high","reasoning":"Parties who made or received payments between 16–27 June 1949 (before the Act's commencement on 29 June) could not possibly have known their conduct was prohibited — because it wasn't. The Act had not yet been passed, let alone assented to. Ordering repayment of those funds treats lawful historical conduct as if it were unlawful, creating a retroactive legal obligation that was literally impossible to comply with at the time. While the Act cleverly frames this as a civil repayment order rather than a criminal penalty (avoiding the worst constitutional concerns), the retroactive reach still imposes a significant legal burden — loss of funds — on conduct that was perfectly legal when it occurred. It is worth noting that the strike itself only commenced on 27 June, so the 16 June date in this section (the date the strike was 'decided upon') captures an even earlier period before the strike had physically started.","confidence":0.95,"description":"The Court is empowered to order repayment of money received or paid before this Act commenced — i.e., between 16 June 1949 and 29 June 1949 — on the basis that such conduct 'would have' contravened sections 5 or 6 if the Act had been in force. This imposes retroactive legal consequences for conduct that was entirely lawful at the time it occurred."},{"type":"impossible_compliance","section":"Section 14","severity":"medium","reasoning":"The repeal mechanism is entirely contingent on executive action — the Governor-General's Proclamation — with no fallback, no defined trigger criteria, no judicial oversight, and no timeframe beyond 'immediately'. 'Immediately' is not enforceable against the Governor-General. If the Governor-General delays or refuses to issue the Proclamation even after the strike has objectively ended, the Act remains on foot with all its prohibitions and penalties. There is no mechanism for any court or person to compel the Proclamation. The Act thus contains within itself the seeds of permanent operation despite purporting to be temporary emergency legislation.","confidence":0.88,"description":"The Act requires the Governor-General to make a Proclamation 'immediately after the termination of the strike', upon which the Act is deemed repealed. However, the Act nowhere defines what constitutes 'termination of the strike', nor does it specify who determines that the strike has terminated or by what process. The Governor-General has sole and unreviewable discretion to decide when — or indeed whether — to issue the Proclamation, meaning the Act could theoretically remain in force indefinitely if the Governor-General simply declines to act."},{"type":"other","section":"Section 12","severity":"medium","reasoning":"The reverse onus is extraordinarily broad. There is no qualifying language limiting the presumption to payments that have some superficial connection to the strike. Any payment by a participating organisation, or to any person connected with one, is presumed to be for the purpose of assisting the strike. This effectively criminalises all financial activity of participating organisations and their members unless each individual transaction is individually justified. While reverse onus provisions are not unknown in Australian law, applying one this broadly to all payments without any threshold nexus requirement is logically extreme and creates near-impossible compliance burdens for mundane transactions.","confidence":0.82,"description":"Section 12 creates a reverse onus of proof: every payment or receipt is presumed to have been made for the purpose of assisting the strike unless the accused proves otherwise. Combined with the broad definitions in sections 4–6, this means that any financial transaction whatsoever — including routine administrative payments entirely unrelated to the strike — is presumed to be an offence the moment it is identified. A participating organisation cannot pay its electricity bill, its rent, or its stationery supplier without those payments being presumptively criminal."},{"type":"other","section":"Section 3(1) — definition of 'participating organization'","severity":"medium","reasoning":"Union organisations have many members, and it is entirely plausible that individual members may join a strike contrary to their organisation's official position. Under this definition, a single dissident member who walks off the job could expose the entire organisation — and all of its officers — to the full weight of sections 4, 5, 6, 11, and 12. This is logically perverse: the organisation is penalised for the independent conduct of an individual member over whom it may have no practical control, and it is presumed (per section 12) that all its financial transactions are strike-assistance unless proven otherwise.","confidence":0.85,"description":"A 'participating organization' is defined as one which, 'by some or all of its members, is taking part in the strike.' This means an organisation becomes a 'participating organisation' — and thereby subject to severe prohibitions and penalties — if even a single one of its members joins the strike as an individual, regardless of whether the organisation itself has authorised or endorsed strike action."},{"type":"other","section":"Section 11","severity":"medium","reasoning":"Section 11 creates deemed guilt — not merely a reverse evidentiary onus, but an actual deeming of guilt — for persons who may have had no involvement whatsoever in the offending conduct. An officer of a branch in Western Australia who knew nothing of a payment made by a branch in Queensland is automatically guilty unless they can affirmatively prove innocence. Combined with the broad definition of 'participating organisation' in section 3(1) (triggered by even one member striking), this could sweep in thousands of union officials who had zero involvement in the strike. This is a logical absurdity: guilt is assumed as a default legal state.","confidence":0.87,"description":"Every member of a committee of management or officer of a participating organisation 'shall be deemed to be guilty' of the organisation's offence unless they prove their own innocence — a full statutory reversal of the presumption of innocence in criminal proceedings, applied to all officers indiscriminately."}],"contradictions":[{"severity":"medium","section_a":"Section 4 (prohibition on participating organisations making payments)","section_b":"Section 7 (prescribed authority may authorise payments)","confidence":0.78,"description":"Section 4 flatly prohibits a participating organisation from making any payment for the purpose of assisting or encouraging the strike. Section 7 allows a prescribed authority to authorise payments where satisfied they are 'not for the purpose of assisting or encouraging the strike.' However, section 4's prohibition is specifically directed at payments made for strike-assistance purposes, while section 7's authorisation mechanism is for payments that are NOT for that purpose — meaning section 7 cannot authorise the very payments section 4 prohibits. Section 7 thus provides a permission mechanism that, by its own terms, only applies to payments that were never prohibited in the first place, rendering it redundant as a safety valve for sections 4 and 6."},{"severity":"high","section_a":"Section 8(1)(a) (retroactive repayment orders for pre-commencement conduct)","section_b":"Section 2 (Act commences on day of Royal Assent, 29 June 1949)","confidence":0.93,"description":"Section 2 states the Act commences on the day of Royal Assent (29 June 1949), which ordinarily means its prohibitions operate from that date forward. Section 8(1)(a) then reaches back to 16 June 1949 to impose repayment obligations for conduct predating commencement. This creates a direct tension between the prospective commencement provision and the retroactive civil remedy — the Act simultaneously begins on 29 June and imposes legal consequences for acts as far back as 16 June."},{"severity":"medium","section_a":"Section 5 (prohibition on receiving payments — applies to individual members and employees of participating organisations)","section_b":"Section 11 (liability of officers for offences of organisations)","confidence":0.75,"description":"Section 5 creates individual criminal liability for members, officers, and employees of participating organisations who personally receive payments. Section 11 deems those same officers guilty of the organisation's offence under section 4 (making payments) unless they prove innocence. An officer of a participating organisation therefore simultaneously faces: (a) personal liability for receiving payments under section 5, and (b) deemed guilt for the organisation making payments under section 11. This means the same officer can be on both sides of a single prohibited transaction — guilty of both making and receiving the same payment — creating a logical impossibility in the offence structure."},{"severity":"medium","section_a":"Section 12 (presumption that all payments are for strike-assistance purposes)","section_b":"Section 7 (prescribed authority may authorise payments not for strike-assistance purposes)","confidence":0.8,"description":"Section 12 presumes that every payment is for the purpose of assisting the strike unless the contrary is proved. Section 7 allows a prescribed authority to authorise payments that are 'not for the purpose of assisting the strike.' If section 12's presumption applies, then logically every payment presented to a prescribed authority for authorisation is presumed to be a strike-assistance payment — meaning the authority would be asked to authorise something that is (presumptively) the very thing the Act prohibits, rather than something outside the prohibition. The two provisions pull in opposite directions about the default characterisation of any given payment."}]}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/national-emergency-coal-strike-act-1949","history":"/api/acts/national-emergency-coal-strike-act-1949/history","analysis":"/api/acts/national-emergency-coal-strike-act-1949/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/national-emergency-coal-strike-act-1949/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/national-emergency-coal-strike-act-1949/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/national-emergency-coal-strike-act-1949/documents"}}