{"id":"BILL-r7425","name":"National Commission for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children and Young People Bill 2026","slug":"national-commission-for-aboriginal-and-torres-strait-islander-children-and-young-people-bill-2026","collection":"bill","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":446046,"registerId":"commonwealth-BILL-r7425-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-05-05","status":"royal_assent","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[],"analysis":{"summary":{"status_summary":"The Act received royal assent on 26 March 2026 and commences on 1 July 2026.","complexity_score":5,"likely_questions":["What information can the Commissioner require from non-government organisations?","When must the independent review of the Act be completed and tabled?"],"complexity_factors":["Specific cultural and community involvement requirements for the Commissioner's appointment","Information gathering powers enforceable by civil penalties and provisions for fee-based advisory services"],"plain_english_summary":"The Act creates the National Commission and a statutory National Commissioner — an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander person accepted by their community — to promote the rights, safety and wellbeing of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children and young people (under 25).  \n\nIt gives the Commissioner independent powers to advise government, coordinate systemic reform, conduct inquiries, compel information (with limited self‑incrimination protection), charge fees for advisory work, and report annually. The law begins 1 July 2026 and requires a review after three years."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":7,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This Act largely codifies and formalises the role, powers and independence of the National Commissioner and the National Commission that existed as an Executive Agency, rather than substantially broadening its original purpose. It converts an existing Executive Agency to a Statutory Agency, sets statutory appointment and independence arrangements, and embeds information‑gathering, reporting and confidentiality regimes (sections 33, 24, 39–46). \n\nThere are two notable expansions relative to some familiar commissioner models: (1) an explicit fee‑for‑service power to provide advisory services to non‑government clients (section 23), which is a novel commercial role for a Commonwealth commissioner; and (2) rules power permitting incorporation of external instruments into rules (section 63), which increases delegated rule‑making flexibility. These are additions to the formal statutory architecture but do not represent a fundamental repurposing of the Commissioner’s core object to advance the rights, interests and wellbeing of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children and young people (section 3)."},"complexity_factors":["Six Parts with ~65 substantive sections (multi‑topic structure: powers, inquiries, staffing, information, regulatory enforcement, rules)","Multiple defined terms with special meanings (e.g. ‘protected information’, ‘relevant information’, ‘entrusted person’, ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children and young people’)","Extensive cross‑references to other Commonwealth laws (PGPA Act, Regulatory Powers (Standard Provisions) Act 2014, Criminal Code Act 1995, Privacy Act 1988, Acts Interpretation Act 1901)","Layered exceptions and safeguards in information regime (notice exceptions for government entities, self‑incrimination carve‑outs, authorised disclosure pathways)","Civil penalty regime enforced via an external Act (Regulatory Powers Act Part 4) rather than internal sanctioning","Criminal offence for misuse of protected information with multiple authorisations in Division 4 (nested conditions for lawful disclosure)","Delegation and rule‑making powers allowing subdelegation and incorporation of external documents (section 63) increasing interpretive complexity","Procedural time limits and administrative reporting requirements (e.g. 14‑day minimum for notices, annual report items, 3‑year independent review)","Selection and appointment rules combine ministerial appointment with community‑designed selection process and merit requirements (multi‑actor selection chain)"],"plain_english_summary":"**What this law does (mechanics first)**\n\n- Creates a statutory office called the National Commissioner for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children and Young People (the Commissioner) and continues the National Commission (the Commission) as a Commonwealth statutory agency whose job is to assist the Commissioner (sections 10, 33). \n\n- Sets out the Commissioner’s functions: promote the rights, interests, development, safety and wellbeing of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children and young people (defined as persons under 25), advise the Commonwealth, commission research, run educational programs, undertake public advocacy, coordinate across governments, conduct inquiries and make recommendations (section 11; section 17). \n\n- Gives the Commissioner broad operational powers to do “all things necessary or convenient” to perform those functions and expressly protects the Commissioner from direction by ministers in the exercise of those powers (sections 12, 15). \n\n- Provides an information‑gathering power: the Commissioner may issue written notices requiring non‑government persons and organisations to provide information, produce documents or appear to answer questions; failure to comply attracts civil penalties (section 39–43; section 41). Notices to Australian government entities are limited so they do not authorise production of personal information without consent (39(3)). \n\n- Removes the ordinary privilege against self‑incrimination for individuals required to answer Commissioner notices but bars the use of compelled answers as evidence against that person in criminal proceedings (section 44). \n\n- Creates criminal and civil limits on the handling of information obtained under the Act: entrusted persons (Commissioner, staff, consultants and persons assisting) must not misuse “protected information”; unauthorised use or disclosure can attract imprisonment or fines, subject to listed authorisations for use and disclosure (sections 45–46; sections 47–54). \n\n- Allows the Commissioner to make written recommendations after inquiries and to request a written response from the person or body the recommendation targets; however, the Bill does not create a statutory requirement that all entities must respond (section 17). \n\n- Permits the Commission to provide advisory services to non‑government clients and to charge fees for such services; fees are recoverable by the Commonwealth (section 23). The Finance Minister may make accounting directions to implement fee handling (section 62). \n\n- Sets out appointment, reappointment and eligibility rules for the Commissioner: appointment by the Minister but the appointee must be an Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander accepted by their community and selected via a process that involves Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and public advertising; terms are full‑time, up to 5 years, reappointment allowed but total time not to exceed 7 years (section 24–26). \n\n- Prescribes governance and accountability mechanics: the Commissioner is the accountable authority under the PGPA Act (section 33), must include specified material in the Commission’s annual report (section 61), and the Minister must commission an independent review of the Act starting three years after commencement (section 64). \n\n- Provides protections and delegations: the Commissioner and staff have statutory immunity for acts done in good faith under the Act (section 58); the Minister and Commissioner may delegate certain powers (sections 59–60); the Minister may make rules by legislative instrument, including incorporating external documents into rules in specified ways (sections 65, 63).\n\n**Who the law affects and how**\n\n- Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children and young people (under 25): the Act is explicitly directed at promoting their best interests, cultural identity and wellbeing (sections 3, 14).\n\n- The Commissioner and Commission staff: gain statutory office, powers (including information‑gathering and disclosure authorities), protections from ministerial direction and legal immunity for acts done in good faith (sections 10–16, 39–47, 58).\n\n- Non‑government persons and organisations (individuals, businesses, non‑government bodies): can be required to supply information, documents and appear to answer questions; failure to comply can incur civil penalties (sections 39–43, 56).\n\n- Australian government entities and officials: may make information referrals to the Commissioner and may be recipients of disclosures, but notices do not authorise the production of personal information without consent and civil penalties do not apply to government entities in the same way (section 39(3); section 41). \n\n- Private sector advisors and consultancies: the Commission may offer fee‑for‑service advisory work to non‑government clients (section 23), which creates a new, Commonwealth‑backed supplier of specialist Indigenous child‑policy advice.\n\n**Why it matters (stated purpose and practical tests)**\n\nStated purpose: the Act is intended to establish an independent, permanent national statutory Commissioner and Commission to drive coordination, accountability, research and advocacy on systemic issues affecting Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children and young people (section 3; explanatory memorandum). \n\nTesting that purpose against practical effects and trade-offs:\n\n- Accountability mechanism vs. enforceability: the Commissioner can conduct inquiries and publish recommendations and ask for written responses (section 17). That creates transparency and reputational pressure on governments and other institutions, but the Act stops short of imposing mandatory statutory obligations on states or other bodies to implement reforms or to reply in all cases. The Act therefore creates an oversight and advocacy lever rather than direct compulsion of policy changes (section 17). \n\n- Information powers vs. privacy and compliance burden: the Commissioner’s notice power (section 39) gives real investigatory reach over private persons and organisations (civil penalties for non‑compliance—section 41), and the privilege against self‑incrimination is limited (section 44). To manage privacy and harm risks the Act: (a) criminalises wrongful use or disclosure of ‘protected information’ by entrusted persons (section 45); (b) specifies authorised disclosure pathways (sections 47–54); and (c) limits compulsory production of personal information from government entities (39(3)). These layered rules balance investigatory power with confidentiality but impose compliance obligations on respondents and strong duties on Commission personnel. \n\n- Independence and democratic control: the Commissioner is appointed by the Minister (section 24) but the Act requires Indigenous selection criteria and involvement in designing the selection process (section 24(5)–(6). Once appointed, the Commissioner has statutory independence from direction in performing functions (section 15). This divides decision‑making: the executive (Minister) appoints, Parliament sets the role, but operational discretion rests with the Commissioner. That design reduces ministerial control over day‑to‑day outputs while keeping appointment and review levers with government. \n\n- Public service resourcing and opportunity cost: the Act establishes an ongoing statutory agency funded from Commonwealth appropriations and empowered to charge fees for non‑government advisory work (section 33; section 23). The Act itself does not allocate a specific budget; operational costs fall on the Commonwealth budget (section 62 sets out accounting directions). Charging for advisory services is novel for a national commissioner and creates potential competition with private consultancies for non‑government advisory engagements (section 23). \n\n- Bureaucratic discretion and rule‑making risk: the Minister may make rules (section 65), and rules may incorporate external materials (section 63). That allows detailed procedural design by rule rather than primary legislation and can create complex delegated instruments that change practice over time. The Act requires publication when rules incorporate other instruments (63(3)). \n\n**Concrete behavioural changes the Act will impose**\n\n- Organisations and individuals (non‑government) asked by the Commissioner will generally need to gather and provide information within 14 days and may have to appear and answer questions (sections 40(3)–(4); 41; 43). \n\n- Entrusted persons (staff, consultants) will be subject to criminal penalties if they misuse or disclose protected information outside authorised channels (sections 45–46). \n\n- The Commissioner will be able to publicise findings and reports without ministerial approval (section 15(2); section 16). \n\n**Key statutory provisions to note**\n\n- Selection and Indigenous requirement for appointment: section 24(5)–(6).\n- Information‑gathering powers and civil penalties for non‑compliance: sections 39–43, 56.\n- Self‑incrimination protections and evidentiary limits: section 44.\n- Criminal offence for misuse of protected information and authorised disclosure pathways: sections 45–54.\n- Fee‑for‑service advisory role and debt recovery: section 23.\n- Ministerial rules power and incorporation of external materials: sections 65 and 63.\n- Independence clause and immunity for good faith acts: sections 15 and 58.\n\n**Immediate implementation and accountability mechanics**\n\n- The Commissioner is appointed by the Minister subject to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander selection criteria (section 24). The Commission operates as a listed non‑corporate Commonwealth entity with the Commissioner as accountable authority under the PGPA Act (section 33). The Minister must commission an independent review of the Act starting three years after commencement and table the review and a government response (section 64)."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/national-commission-for-aboriginal-and-torres-strait-islander-children-and-young-people-bill-2026","history":"/api/acts/national-commission-for-aboriginal-and-torres-strait-islander-children-and-young-people-bill-2026/history","analysis":"/api/acts/national-commission-for-aboriginal-and-torres-strait-islander-children-and-young-people-bill-2026/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/national-commission-for-aboriginal-and-torres-strait-islander-children-and-young-people-bill-2026/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/national-commission-for-aboriginal-and-torres-strait-islander-children-and-young-people-bill-2026/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/national-commission-for-aboriginal-and-torres-strait-islander-children-and-young-people-bill-2026/documents"}}