{"id":"C1952A00001","name":"Ministers of State Act 1952","slug":"ministers-of-state-act-1952","collection":"act","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":"1 of 1952","makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":1035,"registerId":"C2023C00452","compilationNumber":"12","startDate":"2023-11-29","status":"InForce","reasons":[{"affect":"Amend","markdown":"sch 1 (items 1, 2) of the [Ministers of State Amendment Act 2023](/C2023A00104)","dateChanged":null,"amendedByTitle":null,"affectedByTitle":{"name":"Ministers of State Amendment Act 2023","year":2023,"number":104,"titleId":"C2023A00104","provisions":"sch 1 (items 1, 2)","seriesType":"Act","optionalSeriesNumber":null}}],"registeredAt":"2023-12-04T12:59:11.280Z"},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"Short title","content":"#### 1 Short title\n\n  This Act may be cited as the Ministers of State Act 1952.","sortOrder":0},{"sectionNumber":"2","sectionType":"section","heading":"Commencement","content":"#### 2 Commencement\n\n  This Act shall be deemed to have come into operation on 1st January, 1952.","sortOrder":1},{"sectionNumber":"4","sectionType":"section","heading":"Number of Ministers","content":"#### 4 Number of Ministers\n\n  The number of the Ministers of State must not exceed:\n    (a) in the case of those designated, when appointed by the Governor‑General, as Parliamentary Secretary—12; and\n    (b) in the case of those not so designated—30.\n\n> Note: For the annual limit on the sum payable for the salaries of Ministers of State, see section 55 of the Parliamentary Business Resources Act 2017.","sortOrder":2},{"sectionNumber":"5","sectionType":"section","heading":"Notification of certain matters relating to Executive Councillors","content":"#### 5 Notification of certain matters relating to Executive Councillors\n\n  Choosing, summoning and swearing of an Executive Councillor\n  (1) If the Governor‑General has chosen, summoned and sworn an Executive Councillor as a member of the Federal Executive Council under section 62 of the Constitution, the Official Secretary to the Governor‑General must by notifiable instrument:\n    (a) notify that the Executive Councillor has been so chosen, summoned and sworn; and\n    (b) specify:\n    (i) the name of the Executive Councillor; and\n    (ii) the day (the swearing day) on which the Executive Councillor was so chosen, summoned and sworn.\n  (2) The notifiable instrument under subsection (1):\n    (a) must be made as soon as practicable after the swearing day; and\n    (b) may comprise a copy of the instrument (the section 62 instrument) made by the Governor‑General notifying that the Governor‑General has chosen, summoned and sworn the Executive Councillor as a member of the Federal Executive Council under section 62 of the Constitution.\n  (3) The validity of a section 62 instrument is not affected by any failure to comply with subsections (1) and (2).\n  Revocation of Executive Councillor’s membership of the Federal Executive Council\n  (4) If the Governor‑General revokes an Executive Councillor’s membership of the Federal Executive Council, the Official Secretary to the Governor‑General must by notifiable instrument:\n    (a) notify that the Executive Councillor’s membership of the Federal Executive Council has been revoked by the Governor‑General; and\n    (b) specify:\n    (i) the name of the former Executive Councillor; and\n    (ii) the day (the revocation day) on which the revocation occurred.\n  (5) The notifiable instrument under subsection (4):\n    (a) must be made as soon as practicable after the revocation day; and\n    (b) may comprise a copy of the instrument (the section 62 revocation instrument) made by the Governor‑General revoking the Executive Councillor’s membership of the Federal Executive Council.\n  (6) The validity of a section 62 revocation instrument is not affected by any failure to comply with subsections (4) and (5).","sortOrder":3},{"sectionNumber":"6","sectionType":"section","heading":"Notification of appointment of officer to administer a department of State of the Commonwealth etc.","content":"#### 6 Notification of appointment of officer to administer a department of State of the Commonwealth etc.\n\n  Appointment of an officer to administer a department of State of the Commonwealth\n  (1) If the Governor‑General appoints an officer to administer a department of State of the Commonwealth under section 64 of the Constitution, the Official Secretary to the Governor‑General must by notifiable instrument:\n    (a) notify that the officer has been so appointed by the Governor‑General; and\n    (b) specify:\n    (i) the name of the officer; and\n    (ii) the name of the department of State of the Commonwealth; and\n    (iii) the day (the appointment day) on which the officer was so appointed.\n  (2) The notifiable instrument under subsection (1):\n    (a) must be made as soon as practicable after the appointment day; and\n    (b) may comprise a copy of the instrument (the section 64 instrument) made by the Governor‑General appointing the officer to administer the department of State of the Commonwealth under section 64 of the Constitution.\n  (3) The validity of a section 64 instrument is not affected by any failure to comply with subsections (1) and (2).\n  Revocation of appointment of an officer to administer a department of State of the Commonwealth\n  (4) If the Governor‑General revokes an appointment made under section 64 of the Constitution that an officer administer a department of State of the Commonwealth, the Official Secretary to the Governor‑General must by notifiable instrument:\n    (a) notify that the appointment of the officer has been revoked by the Governor‑General; and\n    (b) specify:\n    (i) the name of the officer; and\n    (ii) the name of the department of State of the Commonwealth; and\n    (iii) the day (the revocation day) on which the revocation occurred.\n  (5) The notifiable instrument under subsection (4):\n    (a) must be made as soon as practicable after the revocation day; and\n    (b) may comprise a copy of the instrument (the section 64 revocation instrument) revoking the appointment of the officer to administer the department of State of the Commonwealth under section 64 of the Constitution.\n  (6) The validity of a section 64 revocation instrument is not affected by any failure to comply with subsections (4) and (5).","sortOrder":4},{"sectionNumber":"6A","sectionType":"section","heading":"Notification of direction that Minister of State holds an office etc.","content":"#### 6A Notification of direction that Minister of State holds an office etc.\n\n  Direction that a Minister of State holds an office\n  (1) If the Governor‑General directs that a Minister of State holds an office under section 65 of the Constitution, the Official Secretary to the Governor‑General must by notifiable instrument:\n    (a) notify that the Governor‑General has directed that the Minister of State holds the office; and\n    (b) specify:\n    (i) the name of the Minister of State; and\n    (ii) the name of the office; and\n    (iii) the day (the direction day) on which the Governor‑General so directed.\n  (2) The notifiable instrument under subsection (1):\n    (a) must be made as soon as practicable after the direction day; and\n    (b) may comprise a copy of the instrument (the section 65 instrument) made by the Governor‑General directing that a Minister of State holds an office under section 65 of the Constitution.\n  (3) The validity of a section 65 instrument is not affected by any failure to comply with subsections (1) and (2).\n  Revocation of direction that a Minister of State holds an office\n  (4) If the Governor‑General revokes a direction made under section 65 of the Constitution that a Minister of State holds an office, the Official Secretary to the Governor‑General must by notifiable instrument:\n    (a) notify that the direction that the Minister of State holds the office has been revoked by the Governor‑General; and\n    (b) specify:\n    (i) the name of the Minister of State; and\n    (ii) the name of the former office; and\n    (iii) the day (the revocation day) on which the revocation occurred.\n  (5) The notifiable instrument under subsection (4):\n    (a) must be made as soon as practicable after the revocation day; and\n    (b) may comprise a copy of the instrument (the section 65 revocation instrument) made by the Governor‑General revoking the direction that the Minister of State holds an office under section 65 of the Constitution.\n  (6) The validity of a section 65 revocation instrument is not affected by any failure to comply with subsections (4) and (5).","sortOrder":5},{"sectionNumber":"7","sectionType":"section","heading":"Regulations","content":"#### 7 Regulations\n\n  The Governor‑General may make regulations prescribing matters:\n    (a) required or permitted by this Act to be prescribed; or\n    (b) necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect to this Act.","sortOrder":6}],"analysis":{"issue_detection":{"absurdities":[{"type":"retroactive_impossibility","section":"Section 2","severity":"low","reasoning":"A statute cannot literally commence before it exists. The deeming provision papers over the logical impossibility by treating a past date as the operative commencement. This is a common legislative technique but it is logically absurd on its face: the Act is deemed to have been law before Parliament passed it, meaning any obligations it creates were theoretically binding on persons before those persons could have known the law existed. In practice the gap is likely trivial (the Act was passed early in 1952), but the logical flaw is real.","confidence":0.85,"description":"The Act purports to have 'come into operation on 1st January, 1952' despite being enacted in 1952 itself. The use of 'shall be deemed to have come into operation' is a retroactive legal fiction — it asserts a commencement date that, at the moment of enactment, had already passed."},{"type":"other","section":"Section 3 (absent)","severity":"low","reasoning":"Sequential section numbering is a fundamental drafting convention that aids in statutory interpretation and cross-referencing. The absence of section 3 with no explanatory note (e.g., '[Repealed]') creates unnecessary ambiguity about whether content has been omitted. Courts and practitioners cannot easily determine whether the gap is intentional, repealed, or an error in the reproduced text.","confidence":0.7,"description":"The Act jumps from section 2 directly to section 4 — section 3 is entirely missing from the text. This creates a structural gap in the numbering which, while possibly explained by a historical repeal, leaves the legislation internally incoherent as presented."},{"type":"self_contradicting","section":"Sections 5(3), 5(6), 6(3), 6(6), 6A(3), 6A(6)","severity":"medium","reasoning":"The Act goes to considerable length imposing mandatory duties on the Official Secretary ('must by notifiable instrument... notify'). However, it then immediately stipulates that non-compliance with those duties has zero effect on the validity of the underlying instrument. The result is a legal obligation with no consequence attached to its breach — a 'must' that functions as a 'should'. This is internally self-contradicting: Parliament imposes a mandatory duty while simultaneously excising any legal bite from that duty. The Official Secretary is legally obliged to act but faces no enforceable consequence for failing to do so, and no third party can challenge the underlying instrument on the basis of non-notification.","confidence":0.95,"description":"Each of these subsections declares that the validity of the Governor-General's instruments is NOT affected by any failure to comply with the notification obligations imposed by the preceding subsections. This renders the notification obligations effectively unenforceable and legally meaningless."},{"type":"impossible_compliance","section":"Section 4","severity":"medium","reasoning":"The numerical limit in 4(a) is predicated on a designation that is entirely within the Governor-General's discretion at the moment of appointment. Since 4(b) separately caps non-designated Ministers at 30, a government could — within the literal terms of the Act — simply appoint all ministers without the Parliamentary Secretary designation, making the 12-person cap in 4(a) a dead letter. The two sub-limits do not add up to a single combined cap, nor is there a provision preventing designation from being withheld strategically. The provision appears to create a meaningful constraint but is structurally hollow.","confidence":0.75,"description":"Section 4(a) caps 'Parliamentary Secretaries' at 12, but the designation as 'Parliamentary Secretary' is made at the time of appointment by the Governor-General. There is no mechanism in this Act preventing the Governor-General from simply not designating Ministers as Parliamentary Secretaries, thereby routing all appointments through the uncapped category in section 4(b), rendering the cap in 4(a) trivially circumventable."}],"contradictions":[{"severity":"high","section_a":"Section 5(1)–(2) (mandatory notification duty on the Official Secretary)","section_b":"Section 5(3) (validity unaffected by non-compliance)","confidence":0.95,"description":"Section 5(1) imposes a mandatory obligation ('must') on the Official Secretary to issue a notifiable instrument after an Executive Councillor is sworn in. Section 5(3) then provides that the validity of the Governor-General's section 62 instrument is not affected by any failure to comply with that mandatory obligation. The same internal contradiction is replicated for revocations in ss 5(4)–(6), for departmental appointments in ss 6(1)–(3) and 6(4)–(6), and for office directions in ss 6A(1)–(3) and 6A(4)–(6). In each case, Parliament simultaneously commands compliance and declares non-compliance inconsequential, draining the mandatory language of legal force."},{"severity":"low","section_a":"Section 2 (deemed commencement 1 January 1952)","section_b":"Section 1 (short title citing the Act as the 'Ministers of State Act 1952')","confidence":0.8,"description":"The Act is titled and cited as a 1952 Act and deemed to commence on 1 January 1952, yet it was physically enacted after that date. This creates a minor but real temporal contradiction: the Act's own commencement provision asserts an operative date prior to the Act's legal existence, meaning that for the period between 1 January 1952 and the actual date of royal assent, the Act was simultaneously 'in force' (by deeming) and non-existent (in fact)."}]},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The supplied text presents the Act's original operative provisions: a short title and commencement (sections 1–2), numerical limits on ministers (section 4), specified notification duties and their exceptions (sections 5, 6, 6A), and a power to make regulations (section 7). The text contains no amendments or language within the supplied material indicating a change from the Act's original scope; therefore there is no evidence in the supplied text that the Act's scope has been changed."},"complexity_factors":["Multiple parallel notification regimes (sections 5, 6 and 6A) with similar but separate wording, increasing drafting repetition.","Cross‑references to Constitution sections 62, 64 and 65 embedded in the notification requirements (sections 5, 6, 6A), requiring readers to check constitutional provisions for full effect.","Use of subjective timing standard \"as soon as practicable\" (see subsections such as 5(2)(a)), which creates administrative discretion and interpretive uncertainty.","Clauses preserving validity despite noncompliance (for example section 5(3), 6(3), 6A(3)), which reduce legal risk but add a compliance‑vs‑validity trade‑off to interpret.","A cross‑statute note linking the numerical limit to an annual salary limit in another Act (note to section 4), creating inter‑legislative dependency.","A regulation‑making power (section 7) that permits future detail to be added outside the Act, shifting some complexity into delegated instruments."],"plain_english_summary":"The Act caps how many Ministers of State and Parliamentary Secretaries can be appointed, requires the Official Secretary to the Governor‑General to publish (by notifiable instrument) the Governor‑General’s executive decisions on Executive Council membership, departmental appointing officers and ministerial directions, and preserves the legal validity of those instruments even if publication is delayed. It gives the Governor‑General power to make regulations. It affects the Governor‑General, the Official Secretary and prospective ministers and matters for transparency and executive staffing."},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The legislation remains tightly focused on its original purpose: limiting ministerial numbers and providing procedural transparency for executive appointments. While it has been amended over time (notably adding section 6A in 2013 to cover section 65 of the Constitution, and updating the Parliamentary Secretaries cap from 12 to various numbers before settling back at 12), these changes have refined rather than expanded the core scope. The Act has not grown to regulate substantive ministerial powers, policy-making, or departmental operations."},"complexity_factors":["Short statute with only 7 sections (excluding the repealed section 3)","Minimal defined terms — only standard procedural terms like 'notifiable instrument' and 'Official Secretary'","Highly repetitive structure: sections 5, 6, and 6A follow an identical pattern (appointment notification, timing requirement, validity safeguard, then revocation notification with the same structure)","No cross-references to other legislation except a single note pointing to the Parliamentary Business Resources Act 2017 regarding salaries","Straightforward conditional logic: simple 'if X happens, then Y must be done' triggers without nested exceptions","Clear constitutional anchoring: explicitly references sections 62, 64, and 65 of the Constitution, making the source of power transparent"],"plain_english_summary":"This law sets the rules for how many government ministers Australia can have and ensures the public is told when ministers are appointed or removed.\n\n**What it does:**\n- **Caps the size of the ministry**: Australia can have no more than 30 regular ministers, plus up to 12 \"Parliamentary Secretaries\" (now usually called Assistant Ministers — these are junior ministerial roles that help senior ministers).\n- **Requires public notification**: When the Governor-General (who acts on the Prime Minister's advice) appoints someone to the Federal Executive Council, makes them a minister, or gives them a specific job, the Official Secretary must publish a formal notice. The same applies when these appointments are cancelled.\n\n**Who it affects:**\n- **The Prime Minister and government**: They must work within the 30+12 minister limit.\n- **The Governor-General and Official Secretary**: They must publish notices about appointments and removals.\n- **The public**: Anyone can see who has been appointed to what role through these published notices.\n\n**Why it matters:**\nThis law keeps the executive government transparent and prevents the ministry from ballooning to an unwieldy size. The notification requirements ensure there's a clear public record of who is exercising government power at any given time — important for accountability and the rule of law."},"summary":{"complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"The original 1952 Act was primarily a simple salary and numbers measure — it set ministerial pay and capped ministry size. Over time, the salary provisions were removed and relocated to separate legislation (now the Parliamentary Business Resources Act 2017), while sections 5, 6, and 6A were added to impose public notification obligations for a wide range of Governor-General actions relating to ministerial and Executive Council appointments. The Act has shifted from a narrow salary/numbers cap into a broader administrative transparency and public notification framework, representing a meaningful expansion of its original purpose."},"complexity_factors":["Short act with only five operative sections","Repetitive parallel structure across sections 5, 6, and 6A — each covering appointment and revocation in near-identical terms, adding volume but not genuine complexity","Cross-references to three sections of the Constitution (ss. 62, 64, 65) and one external Act (Parliamentary Business Resources Act 2017), requiring readers to consult outside instruments","Modest use of defined terms — 'swearing day', 'revocation day', 'appointment day', 'direction day', 'notifiable instrument' — but none are particularly technical","Conditional logic is straightforward: if X happens, then Y must follow, with a simple carve-out for validity in case of non-compliance","No nested exceptions, no schedules, no regulatory detail beyond a bare regulation-making power"],"plain_english_summary":"## Ministers of State Act 1952 — Plain English Summary\n\n**What is this law about?**\n\nThis Act sets the rules for how Australia's federal Ministers (the politicians who run government departments) and other senior executive figures are appointed, notified, and counted. It has two main jobs:\n\n---\n\n**1. Capping the number of Ministers**\n\nThe Act puts a hard limit on how many Ministers the government can have at any one time:\n- **Up to 12 Parliamentary Secretaries** (junior ministers who assist senior ministers)\n- **Up to 30 other Ministers** (everyone else in the ministry)\n\nThis matters because it prevents any government from bloating the ministry without limit. Note that the *salaries* those ministers can collectively receive is capped elsewhere — in a separate law called the Parliamentary Business Resources Act 2017.\n\n---\n\n**2. Requiring public notification of key appointments**\n\nWhen the Governor-General (the Crown's representative in Australia, who formally makes these appointments on the advice of the Prime Minister) takes certain actions, the **Official Secretary to the Governor-General** must publish a formal public notice (called a \"notifiable instrument\" — essentially an official legal announcement registered on the federal legislation register). This is required for:\n\n- **Swearing in an Executive Councillor** (a member of the Federal Executive Council — the formal body of current and former ministers that advises the Governor-General)\n- **Revoking an Executive Councillor's membership** of that Council\n- **Appointing a minister to run a government department** (e.g. appointing someone as the minister responsible for the Department of Health)\n- **Revoking such a ministerial appointment**\n- **Directing that a Minister holds a particular office** (e.g. designating which specific title or role a minister carries)\n- **Revoking such a direction**\n\nIn each case, the notice must record the person's name and the relevant date, and must be published as soon as practicable.\n\n---\n\n**Important safeguard:** If the Official Secretary *fails* to publish these notices on time, the underlying appointment or revocation is still **legally valid**. The notification requirement is about transparency and public record-keeping — it doesn't affect the legal reality of who has been appointed.\n\n---\n\n**Who does this affect?**\n\n- **Ministers of State** and **Parliamentary Secretaries** (directly — it caps how many of them there can be)\n- **The Governor-General and the Official Secretary** (who must publish the notices)\n- **The Australian public** (who benefit from transparent, publicly registered records of who is running the country)\n\n---\n\n**Why does it matter?**\n\nThis Act is a foundational piece of constitutional machinery. It turns the Constitution's broad powers over ministerial appointments into a transparent, publicly accessible system. Without it, there would be no legal cap on ministry size and no obligation to publicly record who has been sworn in, appointed, or removed — meaning Australians would have no reliable official record of exactly who is in government at any given time."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ministers-of-state-act-1952","history":"/api/acts/ministers-of-state-act-1952/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ministers-of-state-act-1952/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ministers-of-state-act-1952/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ministers-of-state-act-1952/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ministers-of-state-act-1952/documents"}}