{"id":"qld:act-1974-075","name":"Limitation of Actions Act 1974","slug":"limitation-of-actions-act-1974","collection":"act","jurisdiction":"qld","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":"75 of 1974","makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":105054,"registerId":"qld-act-1974-075-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-03","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"pt.1","sectionType":"part","heading":"Preliminary","content":"# Preliminary","sortOrder":0},{"sectionNumber":"sec.1","sectionType":"section","heading":"Short title","content":"### sec.1 Short title\n\nThis Act may be cited as the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 .","sortOrder":1},{"sectionNumber":"sec.2","sectionType":"section","heading":"Commencement","content":"### sec.2 Commencement\n\nThis Act shall commence on 1 July 1975.","sortOrder":2},{"sectionNumber":"sec.3","sectionType":"section","heading":null,"content":"### Section sec.3\n\ns 3 om 23 November 1993 RA s 36","sortOrder":3},{"sectionNumber":"sec.5","sectionType":"section","heading":"Interpretation","content":"### sec.5 Interpretation\n\nIn this Act—\naction includes any proceeding in a court of law.\nCrown includes not only the Crown in the right of the State but also, so far as the legislative power of Parliament permits, the Crown in all its other capacities.\ndamage includes loss of life and personal injury.\nencumbrance means a charge on land created for the purpose of securing the payment of an annuity or sum of money other than a loan.\nencumbrancee includes a person not being a mortgagee for whose benefit an estate or interest in land is charged with an annuity or sum of money other than a loan and also a person entitled to the benefit of an encumbrance or to require payment or discharge thereof.\nland includes corporeal hereditaments, rentcharges and any legal or equitable estate or interest therein, including an interest in the proceeds of the sale of land held upon trust for sale but, save as is provided in this definition, does not include an incorporeal hereditament.\nmortgage includes a charge or lien on property for securing money or money’s worth but does not include a possessory lien on goods nor a binding effect on the property arising under a writ of execution against the property.\nmortgagee includes a person claiming a mortgage through an original mortgagee.\nmortgagor includes a person claiming property subject to a mortgage through an original mortgagor.\npersonal estate does not include chattels real.\ns 5 def personal estate sub 1996 No. 5 s 8 sch\npersonal injury includes a disease and an impairment of a person’s physical or mental condition.\npersonal property does not include chattels real.\ns 5 def personal property sub 1996 No. 5 s 8 sch\nrent includes a rentcharge and a rentservice.\nrentcharge means any annuity or periodical sum of money charged upon or payable out of land save a rentservice or interest on a mortgage on land.\nship includes every description of vessel used in navigation not propelled by oars.\ntrust has the meaning given by the Trusts Act 1973 .\ns 5 def trust sub 1996 No. 5 s 8 sch\ntrustee has the meaning given by the Trusts Act 1973 .\ns 5 def trustee sub 1996 No. 5 s 8 sch\ntrust for sale means in relation to land an immediate binding trust for sale, whether or not exercisable at the request or with the consent of any person, and with or without a power at discretion to postpone the sale.\nFor the purposes of this Act, a person shall be taken to be under a disability while the person is an infant or of unsound mind.\nFor the purposes of subsection (2) , but without prejudice to the generality thereof, a person shall be presumed conclusively to be of unsound mind—\nwhile the person is an involuntary patient under the Mental Health Act 2016 ; or\nwhile the person is a forensic disability client under the Forensic Disability Act 2011 ; or\nwhile the person is detained in an authorised mental health service under an order of the court or in safe custody under an order given by the Governor in the name of Her Majesty, under section 647 of the Criminal Code .\nA person shall be taken to claim through another person if the person became entitled by, through, under or by the act of that other person to the right claimed, but a person becoming entitled to an estate or interest by virtue of a special power of appointment shall not be taken to claim through the appointor.\nA reference in this Act to a right of action to recover land includes a reference to a right to enter into possession of the land or, in the case of a rentcharge, to distrain for arrears of rent and a reference to the bringing of such an action includes a reference to the making of such an entry or distress.\nA reference in this Act, in the case of a rentcharge—\nto the possession of land—shall be read and construed as a reference to receipt of the rent; or\nto the date of dispossession or discontinuance of possession of land—shall be read and construed as a reference to the date the rent was last received.\nIn part 3 , a reference to a right of action includes a reference to—\na cause of action; and\na right to receive money secured by a mortgage or charge on property or to recover proceeds of the sale of land; and\na right to receive a share or interest in the personal estate of a deceased person;\nand a reference to the date of accrual of a right of action—\nshall, in the case of an action for an account, be read and construed as a reference to the date on which the matter arose in respect of which the account is claimed; and\nshall, in the case of an action upon a judgment, be read and construed as a reference to the date on which the judgment became enforceable; and\nshall, in the case of an action to recover arrears of rent or interest or damages in respect thereof, be read and construed as a reference to the date on which the rent or interest became due.\ns 5 amd 1978 No. 73 s 5 (5) (a) sch 1 pt E; 2000 No. 16 s 590 sch 1 pt 2 ; 2008 No. 53 s 18 ; 2010 No. 42 s 214 sch ; 2011 No. 13 s 210 ; 2016 No. 5 s 923 sch 4\n(sec.5-ssec.1) In this Act— action includes any proceeding in a court of law. Crown includes not only the Crown in the right of the State but also, so far as the legislative power of Parliament permits, the Crown in all its other capacities. damage includes loss of life and personal injury. encumbrance means a charge on land created for the purpose of securing the payment of an annuity or sum of money other than a loan. encumbrancee includes a person not being a mortgagee for whose benefit an estate or interest in land is charged with an annuity or sum of money other than a loan and also a person entitled to the benefit of an encumbrance or to require payment or discharge thereof. land includes corporeal hereditaments, rentcharges and any legal or equitable estate or interest therein, including an interest in the proceeds of the sale of land held upon trust for sale but, save as is provided in this definition, does not include an incorporeal hereditament. mortgage includes a charge or lien on property for securing money or money’s worth but does not include a possessory lien on goods nor a binding effect on the property arising under a writ of execution against the property. mortgagee includes a person claiming a mortgage through an original mortgagee. mortgagor includes a person claiming property subject to a mortgage through an original mortgagor. personal estate does not include chattels real. s 5 def personal estate sub 1996 No. 5 s 8 sch personal injury includes a disease and an impairment of a person’s physical or mental condition. personal property does not include chattels real. s 5 def personal property sub 1996 No. 5 s 8 sch rent includes a rentcharge and a rentservice. rentcharge means any annuity or periodical sum of money charged upon or payable out of land save a rentservice or interest on a mortgage on land. ship includes every description of vessel used in navigation not propelled by oars. trust has the meaning given by the Trusts Act 1973 . s 5 def trust sub 1996 No. 5 s 8 sch trustee has the meaning given by the Trusts Act 1973 . s 5 def trustee sub 1996 No. 5 s 8 sch trust for sale means in relation to land an immediate binding trust for sale, whether or not exercisable at the request or with the consent of any person, and with or without a power at discretion to postpone the sale.\n(sec.5-ssec.2) For the purposes of this Act, a person shall be taken to be under a disability while the person is an infant or of unsound mind.\n(sec.5-ssec.3) For the purposes of subsection (2) , but without prejudice to the generality thereof, a person shall be presumed conclusively to be of unsound mind— while the person is an involuntary patient under the Mental Health Act 2016 ; or while the person is a forensic disability client under the Forensic Disability Act 2011 ; or while the person is detained in an authorised mental health service under an order of the court or in safe custody under an order given by the Governor in the name of Her Majesty, under section 647 of the Criminal Code .\n(sec.5-ssec.4) A person shall be taken to claim through another person if the person became entitled by, through, under or by the act of that other person to the right claimed, but a person becoming entitled to an estate or interest by virtue of a special power of appointment shall not be taken to claim through the appointor.\n(sec.5-ssec.5) A reference in this Act to a right of action to recover land includes a reference to a right to enter into possession of the land or, in the case of a rentcharge, to distrain for arrears of rent and a reference to the bringing of such an action includes a reference to the making of such an entry or distress.\n(sec.5-ssec.6) A reference in this Act, in the case of a rentcharge— to the possession of land—shall be read and construed as a reference to receipt of the rent; or to the date of dispossession or discontinuance of possession of land—shall be read and construed as a reference to the date the rent was last received.\n(sec.5-ssec.7) In part 3 , a reference to a right of action includes a reference to— a cause of action; and a right to receive money secured by a mortgage or charge on property or to recover proceeds of the sale of land; and a right to receive a share or interest in the personal estate of a deceased person; and a reference to the date of accrual of a right of action— shall, in the case of an action for an account, be read and construed as a reference to the date on which the matter arose in respect of which the account is claimed; and shall, in the case of an action upon a judgment, be read and construed as a reference to the date on which the judgment became enforceable; and shall, in the case of an action to recover arrears of rent or interest or damages in respect thereof, be read and construed as a reference to the date on which the rent or interest became due.\n- (a) while the person is an involuntary patient under the Mental Health Act 2016 ; or\n- (b) while the person is a forensic disability client under the Forensic Disability Act 2011 ; or\n- (c) while the person is detained in an authorised mental health service under an order of the court or in safe custody under an order given by the Governor in the name of Her Majesty, under section 647 of the Criminal Code .\n- (a) to the possession of land—shall be read and construed as a reference to receipt of the rent; or\n- (b) to the date of dispossession or discontinuance of possession of land—shall be read and construed as a reference to the date the rent was last received.\n- (a) a cause of action; and\n- (b) a right to receive money secured by a mortgage or charge on property or to recover proceeds of the sale of land; and\n- (c) a right to receive a share or interest in the personal estate of a deceased person;\n- (d) shall, in the case of an action for an account, be read and construed as a reference to the date on which the matter arose in respect of which the account is claimed; and\n- (e) shall, in the case of an action upon a judgment, be read and construed as a reference to the date on which the judgment became enforceable; and\n- (f) shall, in the case of an action to recover arrears of rent or interest or damages in respect thereof, be read and construed as a reference to the date on which the rent or interest became due.","sortOrder":4},{"sectionNumber":"sec.6","sectionType":"section","heading":"Application to Crown","content":"### sec.6 Application to Crown\n\nSubject to subsections (3) and (4) , this Act binds the Crown and the Crown has the benefit of this Act.\nFor the purposes of this Act, an action by or against the Crown includes an action by or against an officer of the Crown as such or a person acting on behalf of the Crown.\nThis Act does not apply to—\na prosecution by the Crown for an offence against any Act; or\nan action by the Crown—\nfor the recovery of a fee, tax, duty or other sum of money or interest on a fee, tax, duty or other sum of money; or\nin respect of the forfeiture of a ship.\nNotwithstanding any law or enactment now or heretofore in force in the State, the right, title or interest of the Crown to or in any land shall not be and shall be deemed not to have been in any way affected by reason of any possession of such land adverse to the Crown for any period whatever.\ns 6 amd 2010 No. 42 s 214 sch\n(sec.6-ssec.1) Subject to subsections (3) and (4) , this Act binds the Crown and the Crown has the benefit of this Act.\n(sec.6-ssec.2) For the purposes of this Act, an action by or against the Crown includes an action by or against an officer of the Crown as such or a person acting on behalf of the Crown.\n(sec.6-ssec.3) This Act does not apply to— a prosecution by the Crown for an offence against any Act; or an action by the Crown— for the recovery of a fee, tax, duty or other sum of money or interest on a fee, tax, duty or other sum of money; or in respect of the forfeiture of a ship.\n(sec.6-ssec.4) Notwithstanding any law or enactment now or heretofore in force in the State, the right, title or interest of the Crown to or in any land shall not be and shall be deemed not to have been in any way affected by reason of any possession of such land adverse to the Crown for any period whatever.\n- (a) a prosecution by the Crown for an offence against any Act; or\n- (b) an action by the Crown— (i) for the recovery of a fee, tax, duty or other sum of money or interest on a fee, tax, duty or other sum of money; or (ii) in respect of the forfeiture of a ship.\n- (i) for the recovery of a fee, tax, duty or other sum of money or interest on a fee, tax, duty or other sum of money; or\n- (ii) in respect of the forfeiture of a ship.\n- (i) for the recovery of a fee, tax, duty or other sum of money or interest on a fee, tax, duty or other sum of money; or\n- (ii) in respect of the forfeiture of a ship.","sortOrder":5},{"sectionNumber":"sec.7","sectionType":"section","heading":"Saving of other limitations","content":"### sec.7 Saving of other limitations\n\nSubject to sections 11 (2) and 43A , this Act does not apply to an action or arbitration for which a limitation period is fixed by or under an enactment other than this Act.\ns 7 amd 1996 No. 5 s 8 sch ; 2010 No. 9 s 24","sortOrder":6},{"sectionNumber":"sec.8","sectionType":"section","heading":"Provisions as to actions already barred and pending actions","content":"### sec.8 Provisions as to actions already barred and pending actions\n\nSave as is provided in sections 31 and 32 , nothing in this Act—\nenables an action to be brought that was barred before the commencement of this Act by an enactment repealed by this Act, save so far as the cause of action or right of action may be revived by an acknowledgment or part payment made in accordance with this Act; or\naffects an action or arbitration commenced before the commencement of this Act or the title to property that is the subject of such an action or arbitration.\nThe time for bringing proceedings in respect of a cause of action that arose before the commencement of this Act shall, if it has not then expired, expire at the time when it would have expired—\napart from this Act; or\nif this Act had at all material times been in force;\nwhichever is the later.\nSave as is provided in this section, nothing in this Act affects an action if the cause of action upon which that action is founded arose before the commencement of this Act.\ns 8 amd 2010 No. 42 s 214 sch\n(sec.8-ssec.1) Save as is provided in sections 31 and 32 , nothing in this Act— enables an action to be brought that was barred before the commencement of this Act by an enactment repealed by this Act, save so far as the cause of action or right of action may be revived by an acknowledgment or part payment made in accordance with this Act; or affects an action or arbitration commenced before the commencement of this Act or the title to property that is the subject of such an action or arbitration.\n(sec.8-ssec.2) The time for bringing proceedings in respect of a cause of action that arose before the commencement of this Act shall, if it has not then expired, expire at the time when it would have expired— apart from this Act; or if this Act had at all material times been in force; whichever is the later.\n(sec.8-ssec.3) Save as is provided in this section, nothing in this Act affects an action if the cause of action upon which that action is founded arose before the commencement of this Act.\n- (a) enables an action to be brought that was barred before the commencement of this Act by an enactment repealed by this Act, save so far as the cause of action or right of action may be revived by an acknowledgment or part payment made in accordance with this Act; or\n- (b) affects an action or arbitration commenced before the commencement of this Act or the title to property that is the subject of such an action or arbitration.\n- (a) apart from this Act; or\n- (b) if this Act had at all material times been in force;","sortOrder":7},{"sectionNumber":"pt.2","sectionType":"part","heading":"Periods of limitation for different classes of actions","content":"# Periods of limitation for different classes of actions","sortOrder":8},{"sectionNumber":"sec.9","sectionType":"section","heading":"Application","content":"### sec.9 Application\n\nThis part applies subject to part 3 .","sortOrder":9},{"sectionNumber":"sec.10","sectionType":"section","heading":"Actions of contract and tort and certain other actions","content":"### sec.10 Actions of contract and tort and certain other actions\n\nThe following actions shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the cause of action arose—\nsubject to section 10AA , an action founded on simple contract or quasi-contract or on tort where the damages claimed by the plaintiff do not consist of or include damages in respect of personal injury to any person;\nan action to enforce a recognisance;\nan action to enforce an award;\nan action to recover a sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment, other than a penalty or forfeiture or sum by way of a penalty or forfeiture.\nAn action for an account shall not be brought in respect of a matter that arose more than 6 years before the commencement of the action.\nAn action upon a deed shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.\nSubsection (3) does not affect an action in respect of which a shorter period of limitation is prescribed by any other provision of this Act.\nAn action shall not be brought upon a judgment after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the judgment becomes enforceable.\nFor the purposes of subsection (4) , a judgment of a court of a place outside the State becomes enforceable on the date on which the judgment becomes enforceable in the place where the judgment is given.\nAn action to recover a penalty or forfeiture or sum by way of a penalty or forfeiture shall not be brought after the expiration of 2 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.\nIn subsection (5) —\npenalty does not include a fine to which a person is liable on conviction of a criminal offence.\nThis section—\ndoes not apply to a cause of action within the Admiralty jurisdiction of the court that is enforceable in rem; and\ndoes not apply to a claim for specific performance of a contract or deed or for an injunction or other equitable relief, save so far as any provision thereof may be applied by the court by analogy in the same manner as the corresponding enactment repealed by this Act has heretofore applied.\ns 10 amd 2005 No. 55 s 48 sch 4 ; 2010 No. 42 s 214 sch ; 2023 No. 27 s 285\n(sec.10-ssec.1) The following actions shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the cause of action arose— subject to section 10AA , an action founded on simple contract or quasi-contract or on tort where the damages claimed by the plaintiff do not consist of or include damages in respect of personal injury to any person; an action to enforce a recognisance; an action to enforce an award; an action to recover a sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment, other than a penalty or forfeiture or sum by way of a penalty or forfeiture.\n(sec.10-ssec.2) An action for an account shall not be brought in respect of a matter that arose more than 6 years before the commencement of the action.\n(sec.10-ssec.3) An action upon a deed shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.\n(sec.10-ssec.3A) Subsection (3) does not affect an action in respect of which a shorter period of limitation is prescribed by any other provision of this Act.\n(sec.10-ssec.4) An action shall not be brought upon a judgment after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the judgment becomes enforceable.\n(sec.10-ssec.4A) For the purposes of subsection (4) , a judgment of a court of a place outside the State becomes enforceable on the date on which the judgment becomes enforceable in the place where the judgment is given.\n(sec.10-ssec.5) An action to recover a penalty or forfeiture or sum by way of a penalty or forfeiture shall not be brought after the expiration of 2 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.\n(sec.10-ssec.5A) In subsection (5) — penalty does not include a fine to which a person is liable on conviction of a criminal offence.\n(sec.10-ssec.6) This section— does not apply to a cause of action within the Admiralty jurisdiction of the court that is enforceable in rem; and does not apply to a claim for specific performance of a contract or deed or for an injunction or other equitable relief, save so far as any provision thereof may be applied by the court by analogy in the same manner as the corresponding enactment repealed by this Act has heretofore applied.\n- (a) subject to section 10AA , an action founded on simple contract or quasi-contract or on tort where the damages claimed by the plaintiff do not consist of or include damages in respect of personal injury to any person;\n- (b) an action to enforce a recognisance;\n- (c) an action to enforce an award;\n- (d) an action to recover a sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment, other than a penalty or forfeiture or sum by way of a penalty or forfeiture.\n- (a) does not apply to a cause of action within the Admiralty jurisdiction of the court that is enforceable in rem; and\n- (b) does not apply to a claim for specific performance of a contract or deed or for an injunction or other equitable relief, save so far as any provision thereof may be applied by the court by analogy in the same manner as the corresponding enactment repealed by this Act has heretofore applied.","sortOrder":10},{"sectionNumber":"sec.10AA","sectionType":"section","heading":"Defamation actions","content":"### sec.10AA Defamation actions\n\nAn action on a cause of action for defamation must not be brought after the end of a limitation period of 1 year running from the date of the publication of the matter complained of.\nThe 1-year limitation period referred to in subsection (1) is taken to have been extended as provided by subsection (3) if a concerns notice is given to the proposed defendant on a day (the notice day ) within the period of 56 days before the limitation period expires.\nThe limitation period is extended for an additional period of 56 days minus any days remaining after the notice day until the 1-year limitation period expires.\nAssume a concerns notice is given 7 days before the limitation period expires. This means that there are 6 days left after the notice day before the period expires. Consequently, this subsection would operate to extend the limitation period by 56 minus 6 days, that is, 50 days.\nIn this section—\nconcerns notice see the Defamation Act 2005 , section 12A (1) .\ndate of the publication , in relation to the publication of matter in electronic form, means the day on which the matter was first uploaded for access or sent electronically to a recipient.\ns 10AA ins 2005 No. 55 s 48 sch 4\namd 2021 No. 13 s 29\n(sec.10AA-ssec.1) An action on a cause of action for defamation must not be brought after the end of a limitation period of 1 year running from the date of the publication of the matter complained of.\n(sec.10AA-ssec.2) The 1-year limitation period referred to in subsection (1) is taken to have been extended as provided by subsection (3) if a concerns notice is given to the proposed defendant on a day (the notice day ) within the period of 56 days before the limitation period expires.\n(sec.10AA-ssec.3) The limitation period is extended for an additional period of 56 days minus any days remaining after the notice day until the 1-year limitation period expires. Assume a concerns notice is given 7 days before the limitation period expires. This means that there are 6 days left after the notice day before the period expires. Consequently, this subsection would operate to extend the limitation period by 56 minus 6 days, that is, 50 days.\n(sec.10AA-ssec.4) In this section— concerns notice see the Defamation Act 2005 , section 12A (1) . date of the publication , in relation to the publication of matter in electronic form, means the day on which the matter was first uploaded for access or sent electronically to a recipient.","sortOrder":11},{"sectionNumber":"sec.10AB","sectionType":"section","heading":"Defamation actions—single publication rule","content":"### sec.10AB Defamation actions—single publication rule\n\nThis section applies if—\na person (the first publisher ) publishes matter to the public that is alleged to be defamatory (the first publication ); and\nthe first publisher or an associate of the first publisher subsequently publishes (whether or not to the public) matter that is substantially the same.\nAny cause of action for defamation against the first publisher or an associate of the first publisher in respect of the subsequent publication is taken to have accrued on the date of the first publication for the purposes of determining when—\nthe limitation period applicable under section 10AA begins; or\nthe 3-year period referred to in section 32A (2) begins.\nSubsection (2) does not apply in relation to the subsequent publication if the manner of that publication is materially different from the manner of the first publication.\nIn determining whether the manner of a subsequent publication is materially different from the manner of the first publication, the considerations to which the court may have regard include (but are not limited to)—\nthe level of prominence that a matter is given; and\nthe extent of the subsequent publication.\nThis section does not limit the power of a court under section 32A to extend the limitation period applicable under section 10AA .\nIn this section—\nassociate , of a first publisher, means—\nan employee of the publisher; or\na person publishing matter as a contractor of the publisher; or\nan associated entity, within the meaning of the Corporations Act , section 50AAA , of the publisher (or an employee or contractor of the associated entity).\ndate of the first publication , in relation to the publication of matter in electronic form, means the day on which the matter was first uploaded for access or sent electronically to a recipient.\npublic includes a section of the public.\ns 10AB ins 2021 No. 13 s 30\n(sec.10AB-ssec.1) This section applies if— a person (the first publisher ) publishes matter to the public that is alleged to be defamatory (the first publication ); and the first publisher or an associate of the first publisher subsequently publishes (whether or not to the public) matter that is substantially the same.\n(sec.10AB-ssec.2) Any cause of action for defamation against the first publisher or an associate of the first publisher in respect of the subsequent publication is taken to have accrued on the date of the first publication for the purposes of determining when— the limitation period applicable under section 10AA begins; or the 3-year period referred to in section 32A (2) begins.\n(sec.10AB-ssec.3) Subsection (2) does not apply in relation to the subsequent publication if the manner of that publication is materially different from the manner of the first publication.\n(sec.10AB-ssec.4) In determining whether the manner of a subsequent publication is materially different from the manner of the first publication, the considerations to which the court may have regard include (but are not limited to)— the level of prominence that a matter is given; and the extent of the subsequent publication.\n(sec.10AB-ssec.5) This section does not limit the power of a court under section 32A to extend the limitation period applicable under section 10AA .\n(sec.10AB-ssec.6) In this section— associate , of a first publisher, means— an employee of the publisher; or a person publishing matter as a contractor of the publisher; or an associated entity, within the meaning of the Corporations Act , section 50AAA , of the publisher (or an employee or contractor of the associated entity). date of the first publication , in relation to the publication of matter in electronic form, means the day on which the matter was first uploaded for access or sent electronically to a recipient. public includes a section of the public.\n- (a) a person (the first publisher ) publishes matter to the public that is alleged to be defamatory (the first publication ); and\n- (b) the first publisher or an associate of the first publisher subsequently publishes (whether or not to the public) matter that is substantially the same.\n- (a) the limitation period applicable under section 10AA begins; or\n- (b) the 3-year period referred to in section 32A (2) begins.\n- (a) the level of prominence that a matter is given; and\n- (b) the extent of the subsequent publication.\n- (a) an employee of the publisher; or\n- (b) a person publishing matter as a contractor of the publisher; or\n- (c) an associated entity, within the meaning of the Corporations Act , section 50AAA , of the publisher (or an employee or contractor of the associated entity).","sortOrder":12},{"sectionNumber":"sec.10A","sectionType":"section","heading":"Actions to recover tax","content":"### sec.10A Actions to recover tax\n\nDespite section 10 (1) (d) or (5) , an action to recover an amount paid as tax that is recoverable because of the invalidity of an Act or a provision of an Act must be started within 1 year after the day of payment.\nSubsection (1) does not apply to the recovery of an amount that would, assuming the Act or provision had been valid, have nevertheless represented an overpayment of tax.\nThe period of limitation prescribed by subsection (1) can not be extended and, if an action for the recovery of an amount is not brought within the period, the right to recover the amount ends.\nDespite section 7 , if this section and another Act are inconsistent, this section prevails over the other Act to the extent of the inconsistency.\nIn this section—\ninvalid Act or provision of an Act includes an Act or provision of an Act that would be invalid apart from section 9 (Act to be interpreted not to exceed Parliament’s legislative power) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 .\npay a tax means pay the tax voluntarily or under compulsion (whether or not the tax is paid under a mistake of law or fact), and includes recover the tax by legal proceeding.\ntax means—\na tax, fee, duty, levy, charge or other impost under, or purportedly under, an Act; or\na penalty in relation to a tax, fee, duty, levy, charge or other impost under, or purportedly under, an Act.\ns 10A ins 1993 No. 64 s 3\namd 1996 No. 5 s 8 sch\n(sec.10A-ssec.1) Despite section 10 (1) (d) or (5) , an action to recover an amount paid as tax that is recoverable because of the invalidity of an Act or a provision of an Act must be started within 1 year after the day of payment.\n(sec.10A-ssec.2) Subsection (1) does not apply to the recovery of an amount that would, assuming the Act or provision had been valid, have nevertheless represented an overpayment of tax.\n(sec.10A-ssec.3) The period of limitation prescribed by subsection (1) can not be extended and, if an action for the recovery of an amount is not brought within the period, the right to recover the amount ends.\n(sec.10A-ssec.4) Despite section 7 , if this section and another Act are inconsistent, this section prevails over the other Act to the extent of the inconsistency.\n(sec.10A-ssec.5) In this section— invalid Act or provision of an Act includes an Act or provision of an Act that would be invalid apart from section 9 (Act to be interpreted not to exceed Parliament’s legislative power) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 . pay a tax means pay the tax voluntarily or under compulsion (whether or not the tax is paid under a mistake of law or fact), and includes recover the tax by legal proceeding. tax means— a tax, fee, duty, levy, charge or other impost under, or purportedly under, an Act; or a penalty in relation to a tax, fee, duty, levy, charge or other impost under, or purportedly under, an Act.\n- (a) a tax, fee, duty, levy, charge or other impost under, or purportedly under, an Act; or\n- (b) a penalty in relation to a tax, fee, duty, levy, charge or other impost under, or purportedly under, an Act.","sortOrder":13},{"sectionNumber":"sec.11","sectionType":"section","heading":"Actions in respect of personal injury","content":"### sec.11 Actions in respect of personal injury\n\nNotwithstanding any other Act or law or rule of law, an action for damages for negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or a provision made by or under a statute or independently of a contract or such provision) in which damages claimed by the plaintiff consist of or include damages in respect of personal injury to any person or damages in respect of injury resulting from the death of any person shall not be brought after the expiration of 3 years from the date on which the cause of action arose.\nHowever, a right of action relating to personal injury resulting from a dust-related condition is not subject to a limitation period under an Act or law or rule of law.\nTo remove any doubt, it is declared that personal injury resulting from a dust-related condition does not include personal injury resulting from smoking or other use of tobacco products or exposure to tobacco smoke.\nIn this section—\ndust-related condition see the Civil Liability Act 2003 , schedule 2 .\ns 11 amd 1981 No. 87 s 9 ; 2010 No. 9 s 25\n(sec.11-ssec.1) Notwithstanding any other Act or law or rule of law, an action for damages for negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or a provision made by or under a statute or independently of a contract or such provision) in which damages claimed by the plaintiff consist of or include damages in respect of personal injury to any person or damages in respect of injury resulting from the death of any person shall not be brought after the expiration of 3 years from the date on which the cause of action arose.\n(sec.11-ssec.2) However, a right of action relating to personal injury resulting from a dust-related condition is not subject to a limitation period under an Act or law or rule of law.\n(sec.11-ssec.3) To remove any doubt, it is declared that personal injury resulting from a dust-related condition does not include personal injury resulting from smoking or other use of tobacco products or exposure to tobacco smoke.\n(sec.11-ssec.4) In this section— dust-related condition see the Civil Liability Act 2003 , schedule 2 .","sortOrder":14},{"sectionNumber":"sec.11A","sectionType":"section","heading":"No limitation period for actions for child abuse","content":"### sec.11A No limitation period for actions for child abuse\n\nAn action for damages relating to the personal injury of a person resulting from the abuse of the person when the person was a child—\nmay be brought at any time; and\nis not subject to a limitation period under an Act or law or rule of law.\nThis section applies whether the claim for damages is brought in tort, in contract, under statute, or otherwise.\nThis section applies to an action for damages—\narising under the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 , section 64 ; or\nthat has survived on the death of a person for the benefit of the person’s estate under the Succession Act 1981 , section 66 .\nThis section does not limit—\nany inherent, implied or statutory jurisdiction of a court; or\nany other powers of a court under the common law or any other Act (including a Commonwealth Act), rule of court or practice direction.\nThis section does not limit a court’s power to summarily dismiss or permanently stay proceedings if the lapse of time has a burdensome effect on the defendant that is so serious that a fair trial is not possible.\nIn this section—\nabuse , of a child, means—\nsexual abuse or serious physical abuse of the child; or\npsychological abuse of the child perpetrated in connection with sexual abuse or serious physical abuse of the child.\ns 11A ins 2016 No. 59 s 4\namd 2019 No. 34 s 11\n(sec.11A-ssec.1) An action for damages relating to the personal injury of a person resulting from the abuse of the person when the person was a child— may be brought at any time; and is not subject to a limitation period under an Act or law or rule of law.\n(sec.11A-ssec.3) This section applies whether the claim for damages is brought in tort, in contract, under statute, or otherwise.\n(sec.11A-ssec.4) This section applies to an action for damages— arising under the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 , section 64 ; or that has survived on the death of a person for the benefit of the person’s estate under the Succession Act 1981 , section 66 .\n(sec.11A-ssec.5) This section does not limit— any inherent, implied or statutory jurisdiction of a court; or any other powers of a court under the common law or any other Act (including a Commonwealth Act), rule of court or practice direction. This section does not limit a court’s power to summarily dismiss or permanently stay proceedings if the lapse of time has a burdensome effect on the defendant that is so serious that a fair trial is not possible.\n(sec.11A-ssec.6) In this section— abuse , of a child, means— sexual abuse or serious physical abuse of the child; or psychological abuse of the child perpetrated in connection with sexual abuse or serious physical abuse of the child.\n- (a) may be brought at any time; and\n- (b) is not subject to a limitation period under an Act or law or rule of law.\n- (a) arising under the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 , section 64 ; or\n- (b) that has survived on the death of a person for the benefit of the person’s estate under the Succession Act 1981 , section 66 .\n- (a) any inherent, implied or statutory jurisdiction of a court; or\n- (b) any other powers of a court under the common law or any other Act (including a Commonwealth Act), rule of court or practice direction.\n- (a) sexual abuse or serious physical abuse of the child; or\n- (b) psychological abuse of the child perpetrated in connection with sexual abuse or serious physical abuse of the child.","sortOrder":15},{"sectionNumber":"sec.12","sectionType":"section","heading":"Actions in cases of successive conversions and extinction of title of owners of converted goods","content":"### sec.12 Actions in cases of successive conversions and extinction of title of owners of converted goods\n\nWhere a cause of action in respect of the conversion or wrongful detention of a chattel has accrued to any person and before the person recovers possession of the chattel a further conversion or wrongful detention takes place, an action shall not be brought in respect of the further conversion or detention after the expiration of 6 years from the accrual of the cause of action in respect of the original conversion or detention.\nWhere a cause of action to which subsection (1) applies has accrued to any person and the period prescribed for bringing that action or any action in respect of which a further conversion or wrongful detention referred to in subsection (1) has expired and the person has not during that period recovered possession of the chattel, the title of that person to the chattel shall be extinguished as against a purchaser, mortgagee or other person having a title to or an interest in the chattel bona fide for value.\nWhere, before the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed by this Act for an action in respect of the further conversion or wrongful detention of a chattel, such an action is brought, the expiration of the period of limitation does not affect the right or title of the plaintiff to the chattel—\nfor the purposes of the action; or\nso far as the right or title is established in the action.\n(sec.12-ssec.1) Where a cause of action in respect of the conversion or wrongful detention of a chattel has accrued to any person and before the person recovers possession of the chattel a further conversion or wrongful detention takes place, an action shall not be brought in respect of the further conversion or detention after the expiration of 6 years from the accrual of the cause of action in respect of the original conversion or detention.\n(sec.12-ssec.2) Where a cause of action to which subsection (1) applies has accrued to any person and the period prescribed for bringing that action or any action in respect of which a further conversion or wrongful detention referred to in subsection (1) has expired and the person has not during that period recovered possession of the chattel, the title of that person to the chattel shall be extinguished as against a purchaser, mortgagee or other person having a title to or an interest in the chattel bona fide for value.\n(sec.12-ssec.3) Where, before the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed by this Act for an action in respect of the further conversion or wrongful detention of a chattel, such an action is brought, the expiration of the period of limitation does not affect the right or title of the plaintiff to the chattel— for the purposes of the action; or so far as the right or title is established in the action.\n- (a) for the purposes of the action; or\n- (b) so far as the right or title is established in the action.","sortOrder":16},{"sectionNumber":"sec.13","sectionType":"section","heading":"Actions to recover land","content":"### sec.13 Actions to recover land\n\nAn action shall not be brought by a person to recover land after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the right of action accrued to the person or, if it first accrued to some person through whom the person claims, to that person.","sortOrder":17},{"sectionNumber":"sec.14","sectionType":"section","heading":"Accrual of right of action in cases of present interests in land","content":"### sec.14 Accrual of right of action in cases of present interests in land\n\nWhere the person bringing an action to recover land or some person through whom the person claims has been in possession thereof and has, while entitled thereto, been dispossessed or discontinued possession, the right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date of the dispossession or discontinuance.\nWhere a person brings an action to recover land of a deceased person, whether under a will or on intestacy and the deceased person was on the date of death in possession of the land or, in the case of a rentcharge created by will or taking effect upon the person’s death, in possession of the land charged and was the last person entitled to the land to be in possession thereof, the right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date of death.\nWhere a person brings an action to recover land, being an estate or interest in possession assured otherwise than by will to the person or some person through whom the person claims by a person who on the date when the assurance took effect was in possession of the land or, in the case of a rentcharge created by the assurance, in possession of the land charged and no person has been in possession of the land by virtue of the assurance, the right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date when the assurance took effect.\n(sec.14-ssec.1) Where the person bringing an action to recover land or some person through whom the person claims has been in possession thereof and has, while entitled thereto, been dispossessed or discontinued possession, the right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date of the dispossession or discontinuance.\n(sec.14-ssec.2) Where a person brings an action to recover land of a deceased person, whether under a will or on intestacy and the deceased person was on the date of death in possession of the land or, in the case of a rentcharge created by will or taking effect upon the person’s death, in possession of the land charged and was the last person entitled to the land to be in possession thereof, the right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date of death.\n(sec.14-ssec.3) Where a person brings an action to recover land, being an estate or interest in possession assured otherwise than by will to the person or some person through whom the person claims by a person who on the date when the assurance took effect was in possession of the land or, in the case of a rentcharge created by the assurance, in possession of the land charged and no person has been in possession of the land by virtue of the assurance, the right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date when the assurance took effect.","sortOrder":18},{"sectionNumber":"sec.15","sectionType":"section","heading":"Accrual of right of action in cases of future interests in land","content":"### sec.15 Accrual of right of action in cases of future interests in land\n\nSubject to this section, the right of action to recover land in a case where the estate or interest claimed was an estate or interest in reversion or remainder or any other future estate or interest and no person has taken possession of the land by virtue of the estate or interest claimed shall be deemed to have accrued on the date on which the estate or interest fell into possession by the determination of the preceding estate or interest.\nIf the person entitled to the preceding estate or interest was not in possession of the land on the date of the determination thereof, action shall not be brought by the person entitled to the succeeding estate or interest after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the right of action accrued to the person entitled to the preceding estate or interest or 6 years from the date on which the right of action accrued to the person entitled to the succeeding estate or interest whichever period last expires.\nA person shall not bring an action to recover an estate or interest in land under an assurance taking effect after the right of action to recover the land had accrued to the person by whom the assurance was made or some person through whom the person claimed or some person entitled to a preceding estate or interest unless the action is brought within the period during which the person by whom the assurance was made could have brought an action.\nWhere a person is entitled to an estate or interest in land in possession and, while so entitled, is also entitled to a future estate or interest in that land and the person’s right to recover the estate or interest in possession is barred under this Act, action shall not be brought by that person or by a person claiming through the person in respect of the future estate or interest unless, in the meantime, possession of the land has been recovered by a person entitled to an intermediate estate or interest.\n(sec.15-ssec.1) Subject to this section, the right of action to recover land in a case where the estate or interest claimed was an estate or interest in reversion or remainder or any other future estate or interest and no person has taken possession of the land by virtue of the estate or interest claimed shall be deemed to have accrued on the date on which the estate or interest fell into possession by the determination of the preceding estate or interest.\n(sec.15-ssec.2) If the person entitled to the preceding estate or interest was not in possession of the land on the date of the determination thereof, action shall not be brought by the person entitled to the succeeding estate or interest after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the right of action accrued to the person entitled to the preceding estate or interest or 6 years from the date on which the right of action accrued to the person entitled to the succeeding estate or interest whichever period last expires.\n(sec.15-ssec.3) A person shall not bring an action to recover an estate or interest in land under an assurance taking effect after the right of action to recover the land had accrued to the person by whom the assurance was made or some person through whom the person claimed or some person entitled to a preceding estate or interest unless the action is brought within the period during which the person by whom the assurance was made could have brought an action.\n(sec.15-ssec.4) Where a person is entitled to an estate or interest in land in possession and, while so entitled, is also entitled to a future estate or interest in that land and the person’s right to recover the estate or interest in possession is barred under this Act, action shall not be brought by that person or by a person claiming through the person in respect of the future estate or interest unless, in the meantime, possession of the land has been recovered by a person entitled to an intermediate estate or interest.","sortOrder":19},{"sectionNumber":"sec.16","sectionType":"section","heading":"Provisions in cases of land held in trust","content":"### sec.16 Provisions in cases of land held in trust\n\nSubject to the provisions of section 27 (1) , this Act shall apply to equitable interests in land including interests in the proceeds of the sale of land held upon trust for sale in like manner as they apply to legal estates and accordingly a right of action to recover the land shall, for the purposes of this Act but not otherwise, be deemed to accrue to a person entitled in possession to an equitable interest in the like manner and circumstances and on the same date as it would accrue if the person’s interest were a legal estate in the land.\nWhere land is held by a trustee upon trust including a trust for sale and the period prescribed by this Act for the bringing of an action to recover the land by the trustee has expired, the estate of the trustee shall not be extinguished if and so long as the right of action to recover the land of any person entitled to a beneficial interest in the land or in the proceeds of sale has not accrued or has not been barred by this Act, but if and when every such right has been so barred the estate of the trustee shall be extinguished.\nWhere land is held upon trust including a trust for sale, an action to recover the land may be brought by the trustee on behalf of any person entitled to a beneficial interest in possession in the land or in the proceeds of sale whose right of action has not been barred by this Act, notwithstanding that the right of action of the trustee would, apart from this provision, have been barred by this Act.\nWhere land held upon trust for sale is in the possession of a person entitled to a beneficial interest in the land or in the proceeds of sale, not being a person solely and absolutely entitled thereto, a right of action to recover the land shall be deemed for the purposes of this Act not to accrue during such possession to any person in whom the land is vested as trustee or to any person entitled to a beneficial interest in the land or in the proceeds of sale.\n(sec.16-ssec.1) Subject to the provisions of section 27 (1) , this Act shall apply to equitable interests in land including interests in the proceeds of the sale of land held upon trust for sale in like manner as they apply to legal estates and accordingly a right of action to recover the land shall, for the purposes of this Act but not otherwise, be deemed to accrue to a person entitled in possession to an equitable interest in the like manner and circumstances and on the same date as it would accrue if the person’s interest were a legal estate in the land.\n(sec.16-ssec.2) Where land is held by a trustee upon trust including a trust for sale and the period prescribed by this Act for the bringing of an action to recover the land by the trustee has expired, the estate of the trustee shall not be extinguished if and so long as the right of action to recover the land of any person entitled to a beneficial interest in the land or in the proceeds of sale has not accrued or has not been barred by this Act, but if and when every such right has been so barred the estate of the trustee shall be extinguished.\n(sec.16-ssec.3) Where land is held upon trust including a trust for sale, an action to recover the land may be brought by the trustee on behalf of any person entitled to a beneficial interest in possession in the land or in the proceeds of sale whose right of action has not been barred by this Act, notwithstanding that the right of action of the trustee would, apart from this provision, have been barred by this Act.\n(sec.16-ssec.4) Where land held upon trust for sale is in the possession of a person entitled to a beneficial interest in the land or in the proceeds of sale, not being a person solely and absolutely entitled thereto, a right of action to recover the land shall be deemed for the purposes of this Act not to accrue during such possession to any person in whom the land is vested as trustee or to any person entitled to a beneficial interest in the land or in the proceeds of sale.","sortOrder":20},{"sectionNumber":"sec.17","sectionType":"section","heading":"Accrual of right of action in cases of forfeiture or breach of condition","content":"### sec.17 Accrual of right of action in cases of forfeiture or breach of condition\n\nA right of action to recover land by virtue of a forfeiture or breach of condition shall be deemed to have accrued on the date on which the forfeiture was incurred or the condition broken, but where such right has accrued to a person entitled to an estate or interest in reversion or remainder and the land was not recovered by virtue thereof, the right of action to recover the land shall be deemed not to have accrued to that person until the person’s estate or interest fell into possession as if no forfeiture or breach of condition had occurred.","sortOrder":21},{"sectionNumber":"sec.18","sectionType":"section","heading":"Accrual of right of action in cases of certain tenancies","content":"### sec.18 Accrual of right of action in cases of certain tenancies\n\nA tenancy at will shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be determined at the expiration of a period of 1 year from the commencement thereof unless it has previously been determined and accordingly the right of action of the person entitled to land subject to the tenancy shall be deemed to have accrued on the date of its determination.\nA tenancy from year to year or other period without a lease in writing shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be determined at the expiration of the first year or other period and accordingly the right of action of the person entitled to the land subject to the tenancy shall be deemed to have accrued on the date of its determination.\nWhere rent has subsequently been received in respect of a tenancy to which subsection (2) applies, the right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the rent was last received.\nWhere a person is in possession of land by virtue of a lease in writing by which a rent of not less than $2 per annum is reserved and the rent is received by some person wrongfully claiming to be entitled to the land in reversion immediately expectant on the determination of the lease and no rent is subsequently received by the person rightfully so entitled, the right of action of the last named person to recover the land shall be deemed to have accrued on the date when the rent was first received by the person wrongfully claiming and not on the date of the determination of the lease.\ns 18 amd 2023 No. 23 s 123\n(sec.18-ssec.1) A tenancy at will shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be determined at the expiration of a period of 1 year from the commencement thereof unless it has previously been determined and accordingly the right of action of the person entitled to land subject to the tenancy shall be deemed to have accrued on the date of its determination.\n(sec.18-ssec.2) A tenancy from year to year or other period without a lease in writing shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be determined at the expiration of the first year or other period and accordingly the right of action of the person entitled to the land subject to the tenancy shall be deemed to have accrued on the date of its determination.\n(sec.18-ssec.2A) Where rent has subsequently been received in respect of a tenancy to which subsection (2) applies, the right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the rent was last received.\n(sec.18-ssec.3) Where a person is in possession of land by virtue of a lease in writing by which a rent of not less than $2 per annum is reserved and the rent is received by some person wrongfully claiming to be entitled to the land in reversion immediately expectant on the determination of the lease and no rent is subsequently received by the person rightfully so entitled, the right of action of the last named person to recover the land shall be deemed to have accrued on the date when the rent was first received by the person wrongfully claiming and not on the date of the determination of the lease.","sortOrder":22},{"sectionNumber":"sec.19","sectionType":"section","heading":"Right of action not to accrue or continue unless there is adverse possession","content":"### sec.19 Right of action not to accrue or continue unless there is adverse possession\n\nA right of action to recover land shall be deemed not to accrue unless the land is in the possession of some person in whose favour the period of limitation can run ( adverse possession ) and where under the provisions of this Act such right of action is deemed to accrue on a certain date and no person is in adverse possession on that date, the right of action shall be deemed not to accrue unless and until adverse possession is taken of the land.\nWhere a right of action to recover land has accrued and thereafter, before the right is barred, the land ceases to be in adverse possession, the right of action shall no longer be deemed to accrue unless and until the land is again taken into adverse possession.\nFor the purpose of this section—\npossession of land subject to a rentcharge by a person (other than the person entitled to the rentcharge) who does not pay the rent shall be deemed to be adverse possession of the rentcharge; and\nreceipt of rent, under a lease by a person wrongfully claiming in accordance with section 18 (3) the land in reversion, shall be deemed to be adverse possession of the land.\n(sec.19-ssec.1) A right of action to recover land shall be deemed not to accrue unless the land is in the possession of some person in whose favour the period of limitation can run ( adverse possession ) and where under the provisions of this Act such right of action is deemed to accrue on a certain date and no person is in adverse possession on that date, the right of action shall be deemed not to accrue unless and until adverse possession is taken of the land.\n(sec.19-ssec.2) Where a right of action to recover land has accrued and thereafter, before the right is barred, the land ceases to be in adverse possession, the right of action shall no longer be deemed to accrue unless and until the land is again taken into adverse possession.\n(sec.19-ssec.3) For the purpose of this section— possession of land subject to a rentcharge by a person (other than the person entitled to the rentcharge) who does not pay the rent shall be deemed to be adverse possession of the rentcharge; and receipt of rent, under a lease by a person wrongfully claiming in accordance with section 18 (3) the land in reversion, shall be deemed to be adverse possession of the land.\n- (a) possession of land subject to a rentcharge by a person (other than the person entitled to the rentcharge) who does not pay the rent shall be deemed to be adverse possession of the rentcharge; and\n- (b) receipt of rent, under a lease by a person wrongfully claiming in accordance with section 18 (3) the land in reversion, shall be deemed to be adverse possession of the land.","sortOrder":23},{"sectionNumber":"sec.20","sectionType":"section","heading":"Redemption actions","content":"### sec.20 Redemption actions\n\nWhere a mortgagee of land has been in possession of any of the mortgaged land for a period of 12 years, an action to redeem the land of which the mortgagee has been in possession shall not thereafter be brought by the mortgagor or a person claiming through the mortgagor.","sortOrder":24},{"sectionNumber":"sec.21","sectionType":"section","heading":"Right of action not preserved by formal entry or continual claim","content":"### sec.21 Right of action not preserved by formal entry or continual claim\n\nFor the purposes of this Act, a person shall be deemed not to have been in possession of land by reason only of having made a formal entry thereon, and a continual or other claim upon or near land shall not preserve a right of action to recover the land.","sortOrder":25},{"sectionNumber":"sec.22","sectionType":"section","heading":"Application of limitation as between joint owners","content":"### sec.22 Application of limitation as between joint owners\n\nWhen 1 or more of several persons entitled to land or rent as coparceners, joint tenants or tenants in common has or have been in possession or receipt of the entirety or more than his, her or their undivided share or shares of such land or of the profits thereof or of such rent for his, her or their own benefit or for the benefit of any person or persons other than the person or persons entitled to the other share or shares of the same land or rent, such possession or receipt shall be deemed not to have been the possession or receipt of or by such last mentioned person or persons or any of them.","sortOrder":26},{"sectionNumber":"sec.23","sectionType":"section","heading":"Administration to date back to death","content":"### sec.23 Administration to date back to death\n\nFor the purposes of the provisions of this Act with respect to actions for the recovery of land, an administrator of the estate of a deceased person shall be deemed to claim as if there had been no interval of time between the death of the deceased person and the grant of the letters of administration.","sortOrder":27},{"sectionNumber":"sec.24","sectionType":"section","heading":"Extinction of title after expiration of period of limitation","content":"### sec.24 Extinction of title after expiration of period of limitation\n\nSubject to section 17 , subsection (2) of this section and the Real Property Act 1861 , where the period of limitation prescribed by this Act within which a person may bring an action to recover land (including a redemption action) has expired, the title of that person to the land shall be extinguished.\nWhere an action to recover land is brought before the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed by this Act, the expiration of that period does not affect the right or title of the plaintiff to the land—\nfor the purposes of the action; and\nso far as the right or title is established in the action.\ns 24 amd 2010 No. 42 s 214 sch\n(sec.24-ssec.1) Subject to section 17 , subsection (2) of this section and the Real Property Act 1861 , where the period of limitation prescribed by this Act within which a person may bring an action to recover land (including a redemption action) has expired, the title of that person to the land shall be extinguished.\n(sec.24-ssec.2) Where an action to recover land is brought before the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed by this Act, the expiration of that period does not affect the right or title of the plaintiff to the land— for the purposes of the action; and so far as the right or title is established in the action.\n- (a) for the purposes of the action; and\n- (b) so far as the right or title is established in the action.","sortOrder":28},{"sectionNumber":"sec.25","sectionType":"section","heading":"Actions to recover rent","content":"### sec.25 Actions to recover rent\n\nAn action shall not be brought nor a distress made to recover arrears of rent or damages in respect thereof after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the arrears became due.","sortOrder":29},{"sectionNumber":"sec.26","sectionType":"section","heading":"Actions to recover money secured by mortgage or charge or to recover proceeds of the sale of land","content":"### sec.26 Actions to recover money secured by mortgage or charge or to recover proceeds of the sale of land\n\nAn action shall not be brought to recover a principal sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge on property whether real or personal nor to recover proceeds of the sale of land after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the right to receive the money accrued.\nA foreclosure action in respect of mortgaged personal property shall not be brought after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the right to foreclose accrued, but if after that date the mortgagee was in possession of the mortgaged property, the right to foreclose on the property that was in the mortgagee’s possession shall, for the purposes of this subsection, be deemed not to have accrued until the date on which the mortgagee’s possession discontinued.\nThe right to receive a principal sum of money secured by the mortgage or other charge and the right to foreclose on the property subject to the mortgage or charge shall be deemed not to accrue so long as that property comprises a future interest or a life assurance policy that has not matured or been determined.\nThe provisions of this section do not apply to a foreclosure action in respect of mortgaged land, but the provisions of this Act with respect to an action to recover land apply to such an action.\nAn action to recover arrears of interest payable in respect of a sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge or payable in respect of proceeds of the sale of land or to recover damages in respect of such arrears shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the interest became due.\nNotwithstanding subsection (5) —\nwhere a prior mortgagee or encumbrancee has been in possession of the property charged and an action is brought within 1 year of the discontinuance of such possession by the subsequent encumbrancee—the subsequent encumbrancee may recover by that action all the arrears of interest that fell due during the period of possession by the prior encumbrancee or damages in respect thereof, although the period exceeded 6 years; or\nwhere the property subject to the mortgage or charge comprises a future interest or life assurance policy and it is a term of the mortgage or charge that arrears of interest be treated as part of the principal sum of money secured by the mortgage or charge—interest shall be deemed not to become due before the right to receive the principal sum of money has accrued or is deemed to have accrued.\nThis section does not apply to a mortgage or charge on a ship.\ns 26 amd 2010 No. 42 s 214 sch\n(sec.26-ssec.1) An action shall not be brought to recover a principal sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge on property whether real or personal nor to recover proceeds of the sale of land after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the right to receive the money accrued.\n(sec.26-ssec.2) A foreclosure action in respect of mortgaged personal property shall not be brought after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the right to foreclose accrued, but if after that date the mortgagee was in possession of the mortgaged property, the right to foreclose on the property that was in the mortgagee’s possession shall, for the purposes of this subsection, be deemed not to have accrued until the date on which the mortgagee’s possession discontinued.\n(sec.26-ssec.3) The right to receive a principal sum of money secured by the mortgage or other charge and the right to foreclose on the property subject to the mortgage or charge shall be deemed not to accrue so long as that property comprises a future interest or a life assurance policy that has not matured or been determined.\n(sec.26-ssec.4) The provisions of this section do not apply to a foreclosure action in respect of mortgaged land, but the provisions of this Act with respect to an action to recover land apply to such an action.\n(sec.26-ssec.5) An action to recover arrears of interest payable in respect of a sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge or payable in respect of proceeds of the sale of land or to recover damages in respect of such arrears shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the interest became due.\n(sec.26-ssec.5A) Notwithstanding subsection (5) — where a prior mortgagee or encumbrancee has been in possession of the property charged and an action is brought within 1 year of the discontinuance of such possession by the subsequent encumbrancee—the subsequent encumbrancee may recover by that action all the arrears of interest that fell due during the period of possession by the prior encumbrancee or damages in respect thereof, although the period exceeded 6 years; or where the property subject to the mortgage or charge comprises a future interest or life assurance policy and it is a term of the mortgage or charge that arrears of interest be treated as part of the principal sum of money secured by the mortgage or charge—interest shall be deemed not to become due before the right to receive the principal sum of money has accrued or is deemed to have accrued.\n(sec.26-ssec.6) This section does not apply to a mortgage or charge on a ship.\n- (a) where a prior mortgagee or encumbrancee has been in possession of the property charged and an action is brought within 1 year of the discontinuance of such possession by the subsequent encumbrancee—the subsequent encumbrancee may recover by that action all the arrears of interest that fell due during the period of possession by the prior encumbrancee or damages in respect thereof, although the period exceeded 6 years; or\n- (b) where the property subject to the mortgage or charge comprises a future interest or life assurance policy and it is a term of the mortgage or charge that arrears of interest be treated as part of the principal sum of money secured by the mortgage or charge—interest shall be deemed not to become due before the right to receive the principal sum of money has accrued or is deemed to have accrued.","sortOrder":30},{"sectionNumber":"sec.27","sectionType":"section","heading":"Actions in respect of trust property","content":"### sec.27 Actions in respect of trust property\n\nA period of limitation prescribed by this Act shall not apply to an action by a beneficiary under a trust, being an action—\nin respect of a fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was a party or privy; or\nto recover from the trustee trust property or the proceeds thereof in the possession of the trustee, or previously received by the trustee and converted to the trustee’s use.\nSubject to subsection (1) , an action by a beneficiary to recover trust property or in respect of a breach of trust, not being an action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by any other provision of this Act, shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the right of action accrued.\nNotwithstanding subsection (2) , the right of action shall be deemed not to have accrued to a beneficiary entitled to a future interest in the trust property until the interest fell into possession.\nA beneficiary as against whom there would be a good defence under this Act shall not derive any greater or other benefit from a judgment or order obtained by any other beneficiary than the beneficiary could have obtained if the beneficiary had brought the action and this Act had been pleaded in defence.\n(sec.27-ssec.1) A period of limitation prescribed by this Act shall not apply to an action by a beneficiary under a trust, being an action— in respect of a fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was a party or privy; or to recover from the trustee trust property or the proceeds thereof in the possession of the trustee, or previously received by the trustee and converted to the trustee’s use.\n(sec.27-ssec.2) Subject to subsection (1) , an action by a beneficiary to recover trust property or in respect of a breach of trust, not being an action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by any other provision of this Act, shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the right of action accrued.\n(sec.27-ssec.2A) Notwithstanding subsection (2) , the right of action shall be deemed not to have accrued to a beneficiary entitled to a future interest in the trust property until the interest fell into possession.\n(sec.27-ssec.3) A beneficiary as against whom there would be a good defence under this Act shall not derive any greater or other benefit from a judgment or order obtained by any other beneficiary than the beneficiary could have obtained if the beneficiary had brought the action and this Act had been pleaded in defence.\n- (a) in respect of a fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was a party or privy; or\n- (b) to recover from the trustee trust property or the proceeds thereof in the possession of the trustee, or previously received by the trustee and converted to the trustee’s use.","sortOrder":31},{"sectionNumber":"sec.28","sectionType":"section","heading":"Actions claiming personal estate of a deceased person","content":"### sec.28 Actions claiming personal estate of a deceased person\n\nSubject to section 27 (1) , an action in respect of a claim to the personal estate of a deceased person or to a share or interest in that estate, whether under a will or on intestacy, shall not be brought after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the right to receive the share or interest accrued and an action to recover arrears of interest in respect of a legacy or damages in respect of such arrears shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the interest became due.","sortOrder":32},{"sectionNumber":"pt.3","sectionType":"part","heading":"Extension of periods of limitation","content":"# Extension of periods of limitation","sortOrder":33},{"sectionNumber":"sec.29","sectionType":"section","heading":"Extension in cases of disability","content":"### sec.29 Extension in cases of disability\n\nIf on the date on which a right of action accrued whether before or after the commencement of this Act for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act the person to whom or for whose benefit it accrued was under a disability, the action may be brought at any time before the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the person ceased to be under a disability or died, whichever event first occurred, notwithstanding that the period of limitation has expired.\nNotwithstanding subsection (1) —\nwhere a right of action that has accrued to a person under a disability accrues on the death of that person while still under a disability to another person under a disability—a further extension of time shall not be allowed by reason of the disability of the second person; and\nan action to recover land or money charged on land shall not be brought by virtue of this section by a person after the expiration of 30 years from the date on which the right of action accrued to that person or a person through whom the person claims; and\nan action to recover damages in respect of personal injury or damages in respect of injury resulting from the death of any person shall not be brought by a person after the expiration of 3 years from the date on which that person ceased to be under a disability or died, whichever event first occurred.\nThis section does not apply—\nin a case where the right of action first accrued to a person (not under a disability) through whom the person under a disability claims; or\nto an action to recover a penalty or forfeiture or sum by way of a penalty or forfeiture by virtue of an enactment save where the action is brought by an aggrieved party.\ns 29 amd 1981 No. 87 s 10 ; 2010 No. 42 s 214 sch\n(sec.29-ssec.1) If on the date on which a right of action accrued whether before or after the commencement of this Act for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act the person to whom or for whose benefit it accrued was under a disability, the action may be brought at any time before the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the person ceased to be under a disability or died, whichever event first occurred, notwithstanding that the period of limitation has expired.\n(sec.29-ssec.2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) — where a right of action that has accrued to a person under a disability accrues on the death of that person while still under a disability to another person under a disability—a further extension of time shall not be allowed by reason of the disability of the second person; and an action to recover land or money charged on land shall not be brought by virtue of this section by a person after the expiration of 30 years from the date on which the right of action accrued to that person or a person through whom the person claims; and an action to recover damages in respect of personal injury or damages in respect of injury resulting from the death of any person shall not be brought by a person after the expiration of 3 years from the date on which that person ceased to be under a disability or died, whichever event first occurred.\n(sec.29-ssec.3) This section does not apply— in a case where the right of action first accrued to a person (not under a disability) through whom the person under a disability claims; or to an action to recover a penalty or forfeiture or sum by way of a penalty or forfeiture by virtue of an enactment save where the action is brought by an aggrieved party.\n- (a) where a right of action that has accrued to a person under a disability accrues on the death of that person while still under a disability to another person under a disability—a further extension of time shall not be allowed by reason of the disability of the second person; and\n- (b) an action to recover land or money charged on land shall not be brought by virtue of this section by a person after the expiration of 30 years from the date on which the right of action accrued to that person or a person through whom the person claims; and\n- (c) an action to recover damages in respect of personal injury or damages in respect of injury resulting from the death of any person shall not be brought by a person after the expiration of 3 years from the date on which that person ceased to be under a disability or died, whichever event first occurred.\n- (a) in a case where the right of action first accrued to a person (not under a disability) through whom the person under a disability claims; or\n- (b) to an action to recover a penalty or forfeiture or sum by way of a penalty or forfeiture by virtue of an enactment save where the action is brought by an aggrieved party.","sortOrder":34},{"sectionNumber":"sec.30","sectionType":"section","heading":"Interpretation","content":"### sec.30 Interpretation\n\nFor the purposes of this section and sections 31 , 32 , 33 and 34 —\nthe material facts relating to a right of action include the following—\nthe fact of the occurrence of negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty on which the right of action is founded;\nthe identity of the person against whom the right of action lies;\nthe fact that the negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty causes personal injury;\nthe nature and extent of the personal injury so caused;\nthe extent to which the personal injury is caused by the negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty;\nmaterial facts relating to a right of action are of a decisive character if but only if a reasonable person knowing those facts and having taken the appropriate advice on those facts, would regard those facts as showing—\nthat an action on the right of action would (apart from the effect of the expiration of a period of limitation) have a reasonable prospect of success and of resulting in an award of damages sufficient to justify the bringing of an action on the right of action; and\nthat the person whose means of knowledge is in question ought in the person’s own interests and taking the person’s circumstances into account to bring an action on the right of action;\na fact is not within the means of knowledge of a person at a particular time if, but only if—\nthe person does not know the fact at that time; and\nas far as the fact is able to be found out by the person—the person has taken all reasonable steps to find out the fact before that time.\nIn this section—\nappropriate advice , in relation to facts, means the advice of competent persons qualified in their respective fields to advise on the medical, legal and other aspects of the facts.\ns 30 amd 1996 No. 5 s 8 sch\n(sec.30-ssec.1) For the purposes of this section and sections 31 , 32 , 33 and 34 — the material facts relating to a right of action include the following— the fact of the occurrence of negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty on which the right of action is founded; the identity of the person against whom the right of action lies; the fact that the negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty causes personal injury; the nature and extent of the personal injury so caused; the extent to which the personal injury is caused by the negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty; material facts relating to a right of action are of a decisive character if but only if a reasonable person knowing those facts and having taken the appropriate advice on those facts, would regard those facts as showing— that an action on the right of action would (apart from the effect of the expiration of a period of limitation) have a reasonable prospect of success and of resulting in an award of damages sufficient to justify the bringing of an action on the right of action; and that the person whose means of knowledge is in question ought in the person’s own interests and taking the person’s circumstances into account to bring an action on the right of action; a fact is not within the means of knowledge of a person at a particular time if, but only if— the person does not know the fact at that time; and as far as the fact is able to be found out by the person—the person has taken all reasonable steps to find out the fact before that time.\n(sec.30-ssec.2) In this section— appropriate advice , in relation to facts, means the advice of competent persons qualified in their respective fields to advise on the medical, legal and other aspects of the facts.\n- (a) the material facts relating to a right of action include the following— (i) the fact of the occurrence of negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty on which the right of action is founded; (ii) the identity of the person against whom the right of action lies; (iii) the fact that the negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty causes personal injury; (iv) the nature and extent of the personal injury so caused; (v) the extent to which the personal injury is caused by the negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty;\n- (i) the fact of the occurrence of negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty on which the right of action is founded;\n- (ii) the identity of the person against whom the right of action lies;\n- (iii) the fact that the negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty causes personal injury;\n- (iv) the nature and extent of the personal injury so caused;\n- (v) the extent to which the personal injury is caused by the negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty;\n- (b) material facts relating to a right of action are of a decisive character if but only if a reasonable person knowing those facts and having taken the appropriate advice on those facts, would regard those facts as showing— (i) that an action on the right of action would (apart from the effect of the expiration of a period of limitation) have a reasonable prospect of success and of resulting in an award of damages sufficient to justify the bringing of an action on the right of action; and (ii) that the person whose means of knowledge is in question ought in the person’s own interests and taking the person’s circumstances into account to bring an action on the right of action;\n- (i) that an action on the right of action would (apart from the effect of the expiration of a period of limitation) have a reasonable prospect of success and of resulting in an award of damages sufficient to justify the bringing of an action on the right of action; and\n- (ii) that the person whose means of knowledge is in question ought in the person’s own interests and taking the person’s circumstances into account to bring an action on the right of action;\n- (c) a fact is not within the means of knowledge of a person at a particular time if, but only if— (i) the person does not know the fact at that time; and (ii) as far as the fact is able to be found out by the person—the person has taken all reasonable steps to find out the fact before that time.\n- (i) the person does not know the fact at that time; and\n- (ii) as far as the fact is able to be found out by the person—the person has taken all reasonable steps to find out the fact before that time.\n- (i) the fact of the occurrence of negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty on which the right of action is founded;\n- (ii) the identity of the person against whom the right of action lies;\n- (iii) the fact that the negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty causes personal injury;\n- (iv) the nature and extent of the personal injury so caused;\n- (v) the extent to which the personal injury is caused by the negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty;\n- (i) that an action on the right of action would (apart from the effect of the expiration of a period of limitation) have a reasonable prospect of success and of resulting in an award of damages sufficient to justify the bringing of an action on the right of action; and\n- (ii) that the person whose means of knowledge is in question ought in the person’s own interests and taking the person’s circumstances into account to bring an action on the right of action;\n- (i) the person does not know the fact at that time; and\n- (ii) as far as the fact is able to be found out by the person—the person has taken all reasonable steps to find out the fact before that time.","sortOrder":35},{"sectionNumber":"sec.30A","sectionType":"section","heading":null,"content":"### Section sec.30A\n\ns 30A ins 2005 No. 43 s 6\nom 2010 No. 9 s 26","sortOrder":36},{"sectionNumber":"sec.31","sectionType":"section","heading":"Ordinary actions","content":"### sec.31 Ordinary actions\n\nThis section applies to actions for damages for negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or a provision made by or under a statute or independently of a contract or such provision) where the damages claimed by the plaintiff for the negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty consist of or include damages in respect of personal injury to any person or damages in respect of injury resulting from the death of any person.\nWhere on application to a court by a person claiming to have a right of action to which this section applies, it appears to the court—\nthat a material fact of a decisive character relating to the right of action was not within the means of knowledge of the applicant until a date after the commencement of the year last preceding the expiration of the period of limitation for the action; and\nthat there is evidence to establish the right of action apart from a defence founded on the expiration of a period of limitation;\nthe court may order that the period of limitation for the action be extended so that it expires at the end of 1 year after that date and thereupon, for the purposes of the action brought by the applicant in that court, the period of limitation is extended accordingly.\nThis section applies to an action whether or not the period of limitation for the action has expired—\nbefore the commencement of this Act; or\nbefore an application is made under this section in respect of the right of action.\ns 31 amd 1981 No. 87 s 11\n(sec.31-ssec.1) This section applies to actions for damages for negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or a provision made by or under a statute or independently of a contract or such provision) where the damages claimed by the plaintiff for the negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty consist of or include damages in respect of personal injury to any person or damages in respect of injury resulting from the death of any person.\n(sec.31-ssec.2) Where on application to a court by a person claiming to have a right of action to which this section applies, it appears to the court— that a material fact of a decisive character relating to the right of action was not within the means of knowledge of the applicant until a date after the commencement of the year last preceding the expiration of the period of limitation for the action; and that there is evidence to establish the right of action apart from a defence founded on the expiration of a period of limitation; the court may order that the period of limitation for the action be extended so that it expires at the end of 1 year after that date and thereupon, for the purposes of the action brought by the applicant in that court, the period of limitation is extended accordingly.\n(sec.31-ssec.3) This section applies to an action whether or not the period of limitation for the action has expired— before the commencement of this Act; or before an application is made under this section in respect of the right of action.\n- (a) that a material fact of a decisive character relating to the right of action was not within the means of knowledge of the applicant until a date after the commencement of the year last preceding the expiration of the period of limitation for the action; and\n- (b) that there is evidence to establish the right of action apart from a defence founded on the expiration of a period of limitation;\n- (a) before the commencement of this Act; or\n- (b) before an application is made under this section in respect of the right of action.","sortOrder":37},{"sectionNumber":"sec.32","sectionType":"section","heading":"Surviving actions","content":"### sec.32 Surviving actions\n\nThis section applies to actions founded on negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty, for damages for personal injury that have survived on the death of a person for the benefit of the person’s estate under section 66 of the Succession Act 1981 .\nWhere on application to a court by a person claiming to have a right of action to an action to which this section applies, it appears to the court—\nthat a material fact of a decisive character relating to the right of action was not within the means of knowledge of the deceased person or the applicant until a date after the commencement of the year last preceding the expiration of the period of limitation for the action; and\nthat there is evidence to establish the right of action, apart from a defence founded on the expiration of a period of limitation;\nthe court may order that the period of limitation for the action be extended so that it expires at the end of 1 year after that date and thereupon, for the purposes of the action brought by the deceased or the applicant in that court, the period of limitation is extended accordingly.\nFor the purposes of this section, the material facts of a decisive character do not include facts relating only to—\ndamages not recoverable by the applicant; or\nfuneral expenses of the deceased.\nThis section applies to an action whether or not a period of limitation for the action has expired—\nbefore the commencement of this Act; or\nbefore an application is made under this section in respect of the right of action.\ns 32 amd 1981 No. 87 s 12 ; 2010 No. 42 s 214 sch\n(sec.32-ssec.1) This section applies to actions founded on negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty, for damages for personal injury that have survived on the death of a person for the benefit of the person’s estate under section 66 of the Succession Act 1981 .\n(sec.32-ssec.2) Where on application to a court by a person claiming to have a right of action to an action to which this section applies, it appears to the court— that a material fact of a decisive character relating to the right of action was not within the means of knowledge of the deceased person or the applicant until a date after the commencement of the year last preceding the expiration of the period of limitation for the action; and that there is evidence to establish the right of action, apart from a defence founded on the expiration of a period of limitation; the court may order that the period of limitation for the action be extended so that it expires at the end of 1 year after that date and thereupon, for the purposes of the action brought by the deceased or the applicant in that court, the period of limitation is extended accordingly.\n(sec.32-ssec.3) For the purposes of this section, the material facts of a decisive character do not include facts relating only to— damages not recoverable by the applicant; or funeral expenses of the deceased.\n(sec.32-ssec.4) This section applies to an action whether or not a period of limitation for the action has expired— before the commencement of this Act; or before an application is made under this section in respect of the right of action.\n- (a) that a material fact of a decisive character relating to the right of action was not within the means of knowledge of the deceased person or the applicant until a date after the commencement of the year last preceding the expiration of the period of limitation for the action; and\n- (b) that there is evidence to establish the right of action, apart from a defence founded on the expiration of a period of limitation;\n- (a) damages not recoverable by the applicant; or\n- (b) funeral expenses of the deceased.\n- (a) before the commencement of this Act; or\n- (b) before an application is made under this section in respect of the right of action.","sortOrder":38},{"sectionNumber":"sec.32A","sectionType":"section","heading":"Defamation actions","content":"### sec.32A Defamation actions\n\nA person claiming to have a cause of action for defamation may apply to the court for an order extending the limitation period for the cause of action.\nThe court may extend the limitation period to a period of up to 3 years running from the date of the alleged publication of the matter if the plaintiff satisfies the court that it is just and reasonable to allow an action to proceed.\nIn determining whether to extend the limitation period, the court is to have regard to all of the circumstances of the case and in particular to—\nthe length of, and the reasons for, the plaintiff’s delay; and\nif a reason for the delay was that some or all of the facts relevant to the cause of action became known to the plaintiff after the limitation period expired—\nthe day on which the facts became known to the plaintiff; and\nthe extent to which the plaintiff acted promptly and reasonably once the plaintiff knew whether or not the facts might be capable of giving rise to an action; and\nthe extent, having regard to the delay, to which relevant evidence is likely to be unavailable or less cogent than if the action had been brought within the limitation period.\nAn order for the extension of a limitation period, and an application for an order for the extension of a limitation period, may be made under this section even though the limitation period has already ended.\ns 32A ins 2005 No. 55 s 48 sch 4\namd 2021 No. 13 s 31\n(sec.32A-ssec.1) A person claiming to have a cause of action for defamation may apply to the court for an order extending the limitation period for the cause of action.\n(sec.32A-ssec.2) The court may extend the limitation period to a period of up to 3 years running from the date of the alleged publication of the matter if the plaintiff satisfies the court that it is just and reasonable to allow an action to proceed.\n(sec.32A-ssec.3) In determining whether to extend the limitation period, the court is to have regard to all of the circumstances of the case and in particular to— the length of, and the reasons for, the plaintiff’s delay; and if a reason for the delay was that some or all of the facts relevant to the cause of action became known to the plaintiff after the limitation period expired— the day on which the facts became known to the plaintiff; and the extent to which the plaintiff acted promptly and reasonably once the plaintiff knew whether or not the facts might be capable of giving rise to an action; and the extent, having regard to the delay, to which relevant evidence is likely to be unavailable or less cogent than if the action had been brought within the limitation period.\n(sec.32A-ssec.4) An order for the extension of a limitation period, and an application for an order for the extension of a limitation period, may be made under this section even though the limitation period has already ended.\n- (a) the length of, and the reasons for, the plaintiff’s delay; and\n- (b) if a reason for the delay was that some or all of the facts relevant to the cause of action became known to the plaintiff after the limitation period expired— (i) the day on which the facts became known to the plaintiff; and (ii) the extent to which the plaintiff acted promptly and reasonably once the plaintiff knew whether or not the facts might be capable of giving rise to an action; and\n- (i) the day on which the facts became known to the plaintiff; and\n- (ii) the extent to which the plaintiff acted promptly and reasonably once the plaintiff knew whether or not the facts might be capable of giving rise to an action; and\n- (c) the extent, having regard to the delay, to which relevant evidence is likely to be unavailable or less cogent than if the action had been brought within the limitation period.\n- (i) the day on which the facts became known to the plaintiff; and\n- (ii) the extent to which the plaintiff acted promptly and reasonably once the plaintiff knew whether or not the facts might be capable of giving rise to an action; and","sortOrder":39},{"sectionNumber":"sec.33","sectionType":"section","heading":"Prior bar ineffective","content":"### sec.33 Prior bar ineffective\n\nWhere after the expiration of a period of limitation to which this part applies, the period of limitation is extended by order under this part, the prior expiration of the period of limitation has no effect for the purposes of this Act.","sortOrder":40},{"sectionNumber":"sec.34","sectionType":"section","heading":"Practice","content":"### sec.34 Practice\n\nAn application under this part may be made ex parte but the court or a judge may require that notice of the application be given to any person to whom it or the judge thinks it proper that notice should be given.\nWhere under this part a question arises as to the means of knowledge of a deceased person, the court may have regard to the conduct and statements oral or in writing of the deceased person.\n(sec.34-ssec.1) An application under this part may be made ex parte but the court or a judge may require that notice of the application be given to any person to whom it or the judge thinks it proper that notice should be given.\n(sec.34-ssec.2) Where under this part a question arises as to the means of knowledge of a deceased person, the court may have regard to the conduct and statements oral or in writing of the deceased person.","sortOrder":41},{"sectionNumber":"sec.35","sectionType":"section","heading":"Fresh accrual of action on acknowledgment or part payment","content":"### sec.35 Fresh accrual of action on acknowledgment or part payment\n\nWhere there has accrued a right of action (including a foreclosure action) to recover land or a right of a mortgagee of personal property to bring a foreclosure action in respect of the property, and—\nthe person in possession of the land or personal property acknowledges the title of the person to whom the right of action has accrued; or\nin the case of a foreclosure or other action by a mortgagee—the person in possession referred to in paragraph (a) or the person liable for the mortgage debt makes any payment in respect thereof, whether of principal or interest;\nthe right shall be deemed to have accrued on and not before the date of the acknowledgment or payment.\nWhere a mortgagee is, by virtue of the mortgage, in possession of mortgaged land and receives a sum in respect of the principal or interest of the mortgage debt or acknowledges the title of the mortgagor or the mortgagor’s equity of redemption, an action to redeem the land in the mortgagee’s possession may be brought at any time before the expiration of 12 years from the date of the payment or acknowledgment.\nWhere a right of action has accrued to recover a debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim, or a claim to the personal estate of a deceased person or to a share or interest therein and the person liable or accountable therefor acknowledges the claim or makes a payment in respect thereof, the right shall be deemed to have accrued on and not before the date of the acknowledgment or the last payment.\nNotwithstanding subsection (1) , a payment of a part of the rent or interest due at any time shall not extend the period for claiming the remainder then due, but a payment of interest shall be treated as a payment in respect of the principal debt.\n(sec.35-ssec.1) Where there has accrued a right of action (including a foreclosure action) to recover land or a right of a mortgagee of personal property to bring a foreclosure action in respect of the property, and— the person in possession of the land or personal property acknowledges the title of the person to whom the right of action has accrued; or in the case of a foreclosure or other action by a mortgagee—the person in possession referred to in paragraph (a) or the person liable for the mortgage debt makes any payment in respect thereof, whether of principal or interest; the right shall be deemed to have accrued on and not before the date of the acknowledgment or payment.\n(sec.35-ssec.2) Where a mortgagee is, by virtue of the mortgage, in possession of mortgaged land and receives a sum in respect of the principal or interest of the mortgage debt or acknowledges the title of the mortgagor or the mortgagor’s equity of redemption, an action to redeem the land in the mortgagee’s possession may be brought at any time before the expiration of 12 years from the date of the payment or acknowledgment.\n(sec.35-ssec.3) Where a right of action has accrued to recover a debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim, or a claim to the personal estate of a deceased person or to a share or interest therein and the person liable or accountable therefor acknowledges the claim or makes a payment in respect thereof, the right shall be deemed to have accrued on and not before the date of the acknowledgment or the last payment.\n(sec.35-ssec.4) Notwithstanding subsection (1) , a payment of a part of the rent or interest due at any time shall not extend the period for claiming the remainder then due, but a payment of interest shall be treated as a payment in respect of the principal debt.\n- (a) the person in possession of the land or personal property acknowledges the title of the person to whom the right of action has accrued; or\n- (b) in the case of a foreclosure or other action by a mortgagee—the person in possession referred to in paragraph (a) or the person liable for the mortgage debt makes any payment in respect thereof, whether of principal or interest;","sortOrder":42},{"sectionNumber":"sec.36","sectionType":"section","heading":"Formal provisions as to acknowledgment and part payment","content":"### sec.36 Formal provisions as to acknowledgment and part payment\n\nEvery acknowledgment referred to in section 35 shall be in writing and signed by the person making the acknowledgment.\nAny acknowledgment or payment may be made by the agent of the person by whom it is required to be made under section 35 and shall be made to the person or to an agent of the person whose title or claim is being acknowledged or, as the case may be, in respect of whose claim the payment is being made.\n(sec.36-ssec.1) Every acknowledgment referred to in section 35 shall be in writing and signed by the person making the acknowledgment.\n(sec.36-ssec.2) Any acknowledgment or payment may be made by the agent of the person by whom it is required to be made under section 35 and shall be made to the person or to an agent of the person whose title or claim is being acknowledged or, as the case may be, in respect of whose claim the payment is being made.","sortOrder":43},{"sectionNumber":"sec.37","sectionType":"section","heading":"Effect of acknowledgment or part payment on a person other than the maker or recipient","content":"### sec.37 Effect of acknowledgment or part payment on a person other than the maker or recipient\n\nAn acknowledgment of the title to land or mortgaged personalty by a person in possession thereof shall bind all other persons in possession during the ensuing period of limitation.\nA payment in respect of a mortgage debt by the mortgagor or a person in possession of the mortgaged property shall, so far as any right of the mortgagee to foreclose or otherwise to recover the property is concerned, bind all other persons in possession of the mortgaged property during the ensuing period of limitation.\nWhere 2 or more mortgagees are, by virtue of the mortgage, in possession of the mortgaged land, an acknowledgment of the mortgagor’s title or of the mortgagor’s equity of redemption by 1 of the mortgagees shall bind the mortgagee and the mortgagee’s successors only and shall not bind any other mortgagee or the mortgagee’s successors and where the mortgagee by whom the acknowledgment is given is entitled to a part of the mortgaged land and not to an ascertained part of the mortgage debt, the mortgagor shall be entitled to redeem that part of the land on payment with interest of the part of the mortgage debt that bears the same proportion to the whole of the debt as the value of the part of the land bears to the value of the whole of the mortgaged land.\nWhere there are 2 or more mortgagors and the title or right to redemption of 1 of the mortgagors is acknowledged, the acknowledgment shall be deemed to have been made to all the mortgagors.\nAn acknowledgment of a debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim shall bind the acknowledger and the acknowledger’s successors but not any other person.\nNotwithstanding subsection (5) , an acknowledgment made after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for the bringing of an action to recover the debt or other claim shall not bind a successor on whom the liability devolves on the determination of a preceding estate or interest in property under a settlement taking effect before the date of the acknowledgment.\nA payment made in respect of a debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim shall bind all persons liable in respect thereof.\nNotwithstanding subsection (6) , a payment made after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for the bringing of an action to recover the debt or other claim shall not bind a person other than the person making the payment and the person’s successors and shall not bind a successor on whom the liability devolves on the determination of the preceding estate or interest in property under a settlement taking effect before the date of payment.\nAn acknowledgment by 1 of the several personal representatives of a claim to the personal estate of a deceased person or to a share or interest therein or a payment by 1 of the several personal representatives in respect of such claim shall bind the estate of the deceased person.\nIn this section—\nsuccessor in relation to a mortgagee or person liable in respect of a debt or claim means the mortgagee’s or person’s personal representatives and any other person on whom the rights under the mortgage or, as the case may be, the liability in respect of the debt or claim devolve, whether on death or bankruptcy or the disposition of property or the determination of a limited estate or interest in settled property or otherwise.\n(sec.37-ssec.1) An acknowledgment of the title to land or mortgaged personalty by a person in possession thereof shall bind all other persons in possession during the ensuing period of limitation.\n(sec.37-ssec.2) A payment in respect of a mortgage debt by the mortgagor or a person in possession of the mortgaged property shall, so far as any right of the mortgagee to foreclose or otherwise to recover the property is concerned, bind all other persons in possession of the mortgaged property during the ensuing period of limitation.\n(sec.37-ssec.3) Where 2 or more mortgagees are, by virtue of the mortgage, in possession of the mortgaged land, an acknowledgment of the mortgagor’s title or of the mortgagor’s equity of redemption by 1 of the mortgagees shall bind the mortgagee and the mortgagee’s successors only and shall not bind any other mortgagee or the mortgagee’s successors and where the mortgagee by whom the acknowledgment is given is entitled to a part of the mortgaged land and not to an ascertained part of the mortgage debt, the mortgagor shall be entitled to redeem that part of the land on payment with interest of the part of the mortgage debt that bears the same proportion to the whole of the debt as the value of the part of the land bears to the value of the whole of the mortgaged land.\n(sec.37-ssec.4) Where there are 2 or more mortgagors and the title or right to redemption of 1 of the mortgagors is acknowledged, the acknowledgment shall be deemed to have been made to all the mortgagors.\n(sec.37-ssec.5) An acknowledgment of a debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim shall bind the acknowledger and the acknowledger’s successors but not any other person.\n(sec.37-ssec.5A) Notwithstanding subsection (5) , an acknowledgment made after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for the bringing of an action to recover the debt or other claim shall not bind a successor on whom the liability devolves on the determination of a preceding estate or interest in property under a settlement taking effect before the date of the acknowledgment.\n(sec.37-ssec.6) A payment made in respect of a debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim shall bind all persons liable in respect thereof.\n(sec.37-ssec.6A) Notwithstanding subsection (6) , a payment made after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for the bringing of an action to recover the debt or other claim shall not bind a person other than the person making the payment and the person’s successors and shall not bind a successor on whom the liability devolves on the determination of the preceding estate or interest in property under a settlement taking effect before the date of payment.\n(sec.37-ssec.7) An acknowledgment by 1 of the several personal representatives of a claim to the personal estate of a deceased person or to a share or interest therein or a payment by 1 of the several personal representatives in respect of such claim shall bind the estate of the deceased person.\n(sec.37-ssec.8) In this section— successor in relation to a mortgagee or person liable in respect of a debt or claim means the mortgagee’s or person’s personal representatives and any other person on whom the rights under the mortgage or, as the case may be, the liability in respect of the debt or claim devolve, whether on death or bankruptcy or the disposition of property or the determination of a limited estate or interest in settled property or otherwise.","sortOrder":44},{"sectionNumber":"sec.38","sectionType":"section","heading":"Postponement in cases of fraud or mistake","content":"### sec.38 Postponement in cases of fraud or mistake\n\nWhere in an action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act—\nthe action is based upon the fraud of the defendant or the defendant’s agent or of a person through whom he or she claims or his or her agent; or\nthe right of action is concealed by the fraud of a person referred to in paragraph (a) ; or\nthe action is for relief from the consequences of mistake;\nthe period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud or, as the case may be, mistake or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.\nNothing in this section enables an action to be brought to recover or enforce a charge against or set aside a transaction affecting property that—\nin the case of fraud—has been purchased for valuable consideration by a person who was not a party to the fraud and did not at the time of the purchase know or have reason to believe that a fraud had been committed; or\nin the case of mistake—has been purchased for valuable consideration subsequently to the transaction in which the mistake was made by a person who did not know or have reason to believe that the mistake had been made.\n(sec.38-ssec.1) Where in an action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act— the action is based upon the fraud of the defendant or the defendant’s agent or of a person through whom he or she claims or his or her agent; or the right of action is concealed by the fraud of a person referred to in paragraph (a) ; or the action is for relief from the consequences of mistake; the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud or, as the case may be, mistake or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.\n(sec.38-ssec.2) Nothing in this section enables an action to be brought to recover or enforce a charge against or set aside a transaction affecting property that— in the case of fraud—has been purchased for valuable consideration by a person who was not a party to the fraud and did not at the time of the purchase know or have reason to believe that a fraud had been committed; or in the case of mistake—has been purchased for valuable consideration subsequently to the transaction in which the mistake was made by a person who did not know or have reason to believe that the mistake had been made.\n- (a) the action is based upon the fraud of the defendant or the defendant’s agent or of a person through whom he or she claims or his or her agent; or\n- (b) the right of action is concealed by the fraud of a person referred to in paragraph (a) ; or\n- (c) the action is for relief from the consequences of mistake;\n- (a) in the case of fraud—has been purchased for valuable consideration by a person who was not a party to the fraud and did not at the time of the purchase know or have reason to believe that a fraud had been committed; or\n- (b) in the case of mistake—has been purchased for valuable consideration subsequently to the transaction in which the mistake was made by a person who did not know or have reason to believe that the mistake had been made.","sortOrder":45},{"sectionNumber":"sec.39","sectionType":"section","heading":"Costs","content":"### sec.39 Costs\n\nIn dealing with the costs of an action to which this part applies and that is commenced after the expiration of the period of limitation otherwise prescribed by this Act but before the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed by section 29 the court shall, in every case where costs may be awarded to the plaintiff, before awarding such costs, take into consideration—\nwhether reasonable diligence has been shown in the circumstances in commencing the action; and\nwhether delay in commencing the action has prejudiced or may prejudice the defendant.\n- (a) whether reasonable diligence has been shown in the circumstances in commencing the action; and\n- (b) whether delay in commencing the action has prejudiced or may prejudice the defendant.","sortOrder":46},{"sectionNumber":"sec.40","sectionType":"section","heading":"Contribution between tortfeasors","content":"### sec.40 Contribution between tortfeasors\n\nAn action for contribution under the Law Reform Act 1995 , section 6 (c) shall not be brought after the expiration of the first of the following periods to expire—\na period of limitation of 2 years running from the date on which the right of action for contribution first accrues to the plaintiff or to a person through whom the plaintiff claims;\na period of limitation of 4 years running from the date of the expiration of the period of limitation for the principal action.\nFor the purposes of subsection (1) (a) , the date on which a right of action for contribution first accrues is—\nif the plaintiff in the action for contribution or a person through whom the plaintiff claims is liable in respect of the damage for which contribution is claimed by judgment in a civil action or by arbitral award—the date on which the judgment is given or the award made whether or not in the case of a judgment the judgment is afterwards varied as to quantum of damages; or\nif, in a case to which paragraph (a) does not apply, the plaintiff in the action for contribution or a person through whom the plaintiff claims makes an agreement with a person having a right of action for the damage for which the right of action for contribution arises, which agreement fixes, as between the parties to the agreement, the amount of the liability in respect of that damage of the plaintiff in the action for contribution or a person through whom the plaintiff claims—the date on which the agreement is made.\nIn subsection (1) (b) —\nthe period of limitation for the principal action means the period of limitation prescribed by this Act or by any other enactment (including an enactment repealed by this Act) for the action for the liability in respect of which contribution is sought.\nNothing in this section affects the construction of the Law Reform Act 1995 , section 6 .\ns 40 amd 2002 No. 34 s 74 sch 6\n(sec.40-ssec.1) An action for contribution under the Law Reform Act 1995 , section 6 (c) shall not be brought after the expiration of the first of the following periods to expire— a period of limitation of 2 years running from the date on which the right of action for contribution first accrues to the plaintiff or to a person through whom the plaintiff claims; a period of limitation of 4 years running from the date of the expiration of the period of limitation for the principal action.\n(sec.40-ssec.2) For the purposes of subsection (1) (a) , the date on which a right of action for contribution first accrues is— if the plaintiff in the action for contribution or a person through whom the plaintiff claims is liable in respect of the damage for which contribution is claimed by judgment in a civil action or by arbitral award—the date on which the judgment is given or the award made whether or not in the case of a judgment the judgment is afterwards varied as to quantum of damages; or if, in a case to which paragraph (a) does not apply, the plaintiff in the action for contribution or a person through whom the plaintiff claims makes an agreement with a person having a right of action for the damage for which the right of action for contribution arises, which agreement fixes, as between the parties to the agreement, the amount of the liability in respect of that damage of the plaintiff in the action for contribution or a person through whom the plaintiff claims—the date on which the agreement is made.\n(sec.40-ssec.3) In subsection (1) (b) — the period of limitation for the principal action means the period of limitation prescribed by this Act or by any other enactment (including an enactment repealed by this Act) for the action for the liability in respect of which contribution is sought.\n(sec.40-ssec.4) Nothing in this section affects the construction of the Law Reform Act 1995 , section 6 .\n- (a) a period of limitation of 2 years running from the date on which the right of action for contribution first accrues to the plaintiff or to a person through whom the plaintiff claims;\n- (b) a period of limitation of 4 years running from the date of the expiration of the period of limitation for the principal action.\n- (a) if the plaintiff in the action for contribution or a person through whom the plaintiff claims is liable in respect of the damage for which contribution is claimed by judgment in a civil action or by arbitral award—the date on which the judgment is given or the award made whether or not in the case of a judgment the judgment is afterwards varied as to quantum of damages; or\n- (b) if, in a case to which paragraph (a) does not apply, the plaintiff in the action for contribution or a person through whom the plaintiff claims makes an agreement with a person having a right of action for the damage for which the right of action for contribution arises, which agreement fixes, as between the parties to the agreement, the amount of the liability in respect of that damage of the plaintiff in the action for contribution or a person through whom the plaintiff claims—the date on which the agreement is made.","sortOrder":47},{"sectionNumber":"pt.4","sectionType":"part","heading":"General","content":"# General","sortOrder":48},{"sectionNumber":"sec.41","sectionType":"section","heading":"Application to arbitrations","content":"### sec.41 Application to arbitrations\n\nThis Act shall apply to arbitrations in the same manner as it applies to actions.\nNotwithstanding any term in an agreement to arbitrate to the effect that a cause of action shall not accrue in respect of a matter required by the agreement to be referred until an award is made under the agreement, the cause of action shall, for the purposes of this Act (whether in its application to arbitrations or to other proceedings), be deemed to have accrued in respect of such matter at the time when it would have accrued but for that term in the agreement.\nFor the purposes of this Act, an arbitration shall be deemed to commence when one party to the arbitration serves on the other party or parties a notice requiring the other party or parties to appoint an arbitrator or to agree to the appointment of an arbitrator or, where the agreement to arbitrate provides that the reference shall be to a person named or designated in the agreement, requiring the party or parties to submit the dispute to the person so named or designated.\nA notice pursuant to subsection (3) may be served in any of the following ways—\nby delivering it to the person to whom it is directed;\nby leaving it at the usual or last known place of abode or business in the State of the person to whom it is directed;\nby sending it by registered post to the person to whom it is directed at the person’s usual or last known place of abode or business in the State;\nas well as in any other way specified in the agreement to arbitrate.\nWhere the court orders that an award be set aside, it may further order that the period between the commencement of the arbitration and the date of the order be excluded in computing the time prescribed by this Act for the commencement of proceedings (including an arbitration) with respect to the dispute referred.\nThis section applies to an arbitration under an Act or rules of court as well as to an arbitration pursuant to an agreement to arbitrate and subsections (3) and (4) have effect, in relation to an arbitration under an Act, as if for the references to the agreement to arbitrate there were substituted references to such of the provisions of the Act or of any order, scheme, rules, regulations or by-laws made thereunder as relate to the arbitration.\ns 41 amd 2010 No. 42 s 214 sch\n(sec.41-ssec.1) This Act shall apply to arbitrations in the same manner as it applies to actions.\n(sec.41-ssec.2) Notwithstanding any term in an agreement to arbitrate to the effect that a cause of action shall not accrue in respect of a matter required by the agreement to be referred until an award is made under the agreement, the cause of action shall, for the purposes of this Act (whether in its application to arbitrations or to other proceedings), be deemed to have accrued in respect of such matter at the time when it would have accrued but for that term in the agreement.\n(sec.41-ssec.3) For the purposes of this Act, an arbitration shall be deemed to commence when one party to the arbitration serves on the other party or parties a notice requiring the other party or parties to appoint an arbitrator or to agree to the appointment of an arbitrator or, where the agreement to arbitrate provides that the reference shall be to a person named or designated in the agreement, requiring the party or parties to submit the dispute to the person so named or designated.\n(sec.41-ssec.4) A notice pursuant to subsection (3) may be served in any of the following ways— by delivering it to the person to whom it is directed; by leaving it at the usual or last known place of abode or business in the State of the person to whom it is directed; by sending it by registered post to the person to whom it is directed at the person’s usual or last known place of abode or business in the State; as well as in any other way specified in the agreement to arbitrate.\n(sec.41-ssec.5) Where the court orders that an award be set aside, it may further order that the period between the commencement of the arbitration and the date of the order be excluded in computing the time prescribed by this Act for the commencement of proceedings (including an arbitration) with respect to the dispute referred.\n(sec.41-ssec.6) This section applies to an arbitration under an Act or rules of court as well as to an arbitration pursuant to an agreement to arbitrate and subsections (3) and (4) have effect, in relation to an arbitration under an Act, as if for the references to the agreement to arbitrate there were substituted references to such of the provisions of the Act or of any order, scheme, rules, regulations or by-laws made thereunder as relate to the arbitration.\n- (a) by delivering it to the person to whom it is directed;\n- (b) by leaving it at the usual or last known place of abode or business in the State of the person to whom it is directed;\n- (c) by sending it by registered post to the person to whom it is directed at the person’s usual or last known place of abode or business in the State;","sortOrder":49},{"sectionNumber":"sec.41A","sectionType":"section","heading":"Defamation actions—effect of limitation law concerning electronic publications on other laws","content":"### sec.41A Defamation actions—effect of limitation law concerning electronic publications on other laws\n\nThis section applies in respect of any requirement under section 10AA or 10AB for the date of publication of a matter in electronic form to be determined by reference to the day on which the matter was first uploaded for access or sent electronically to a recipient.\nA requirement to which this section applies is relevant only for the purpose of determining when a limitation period begins and for no other purpose.\nWithout limiting subsection (2) , a requirement to which this section applies is not relevant for—\nestablishing whether there is a cause of action for defamation; or\nthe choice of law to be applied for a cause of action for defamation.\ns 41A ins 2021 No. 13 s 32\n(sec.41A-ssec.1) This section applies in respect of any requirement under section 10AA or 10AB for the date of publication of a matter in electronic form to be determined by reference to the day on which the matter was first uploaded for access or sent electronically to a recipient.\n(sec.41A-ssec.2) A requirement to which this section applies is relevant only for the purpose of determining when a limitation period begins and for no other purpose.\n(sec.41A-ssec.3) Without limiting subsection (2) , a requirement to which this section applies is not relevant for— establishing whether there is a cause of action for defamation; or the choice of law to be applied for a cause of action for defamation.\n- (a) establishing whether there is a cause of action for defamation; or\n- (b) the choice of law to be applied for a cause of action for defamation.","sortOrder":50},{"sectionNumber":"sec.42","sectionType":"section","heading":"Provisions as to set-off or counterclaim","content":"### sec.42 Provisions as to set-off or counterclaim\n\nFor the purposes of this Act, a claim by way of set-off or counterclaim shall be deemed to be a separate action and to have been commenced on the same date as the action in which the set-off or counterclaim is pleaded.","sortOrder":51},{"sectionNumber":"sec.43","sectionType":"section","heading":"Acquiescence","content":"### sec.43 Acquiescence\n\nNothing in this Act affects the equitable jurisdiction of a court to refuse relief on the ground of acquiescence or otherwise.","sortOrder":52},{"sectionNumber":"sec.43A","sectionType":"section","heading":"Characterisation of limitation laws","content":"### sec.43A Characterisation of limitation laws\n\nIn this section—\nlimitation law means a law (including, but not limited to, this Act) that provides for the limitation or exclusion of any liability or the barring of a right of action for a claim by reference to the time when a proceeding on, or the arbitration of, the claim is started.\nA limitation law of the State is to be regarded as part of the substantive law of the State.\nThis section applies to a cause of action that arose before the commencement of this section but does not apply to a proceeding started before the commencement.\ns 43A ins 1996 No. 5 s 8 sch\n(sec.43A-ssec.1) In this section— limitation law means a law (including, but not limited to, this Act) that provides for the limitation or exclusion of any liability or the barring of a right of action for a claim by reference to the time when a proceeding on, or the arbitration of, the claim is started.\n(sec.43A-ssec.2) A limitation law of the State is to be regarded as part of the substantive law of the State.\n(sec.43A-ssec.3) This section applies to a cause of action that arose before the commencement of this section but does not apply to a proceeding started before the commencement.","sortOrder":53},{"sectionNumber":"pt.5","sectionType":"part","heading":"Transitional provisions","content":"# Transitional provisions","sortOrder":54},{"sectionNumber":"sec.44","sectionType":"section","heading":"Transitional provision for Civil Liability (Dust Diseases) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2005","content":"### sec.44 Transitional provision for Civil Liability (Dust Diseases) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2005\n\nSection 30A, as inserted by the Civil Liability (Dust Diseases) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2005 , applies in relation to all actions whether the right of action accrued before or after the commencement of this section unless—\njudgment has been given in relation to the action; or\nthe action has settled or been discontinued; or\nan application to extend the period of limitation for the action under this Act has been refused.\ns 44 prev s 44 ins 1993 No. 64 s 4\nexp 23 November 1994 (see s 45)\npres s 44 ins 2005 No. 43 s 7\n- (a) judgment has been given in relation to the action; or\n- (b) the action has settled or been discontinued; or\n- (c) an application to extend the period of limitation for the action under this Act has been refused.","sortOrder":55},{"sectionNumber":"sec.45","sectionType":"section","heading":"Transitional provision for Defamation Act 2005","content":"### sec.45 Transitional provision for Defamation Act 2005\n\nThe new limitation law applies to the publication of any defamatory matter to which the Defamation Act 2005 applies.\nThe existing limitation law continues to apply to any cause of action to which the existing law of defamation continues to apply under the Defamation Act 2005 , section 49 .\nIn this section—\nexisting law of defamation has the same meaning as in the Defamation Act 2005 , section 49 .\nexisting limitation law means the provisions of this Act that applied in relation to the limitation period for defamation actions immediately before the commencement of this section.\nnew limitation law means sections 10AA and 32A as inserted by the Defamation Act 2005 .\ns 45 prev s 45 ins 1993 No. 64 s 4\nexp 23 November 1994 (see s 45)\npres s 45 (prev s 44) ins 2005 No. 55 s 48 sch 4\nrenum 2007 No. 37 s 162 sch\n(sec.45-ssec.1) The new limitation law applies to the publication of any defamatory matter to which the Defamation Act 2005 applies.\n(sec.45-ssec.2) The existing limitation law continues to apply to any cause of action to which the existing law of defamation continues to apply under the Defamation Act 2005 , section 49 .\n(sec.45-ssec.3) In this section— existing law of defamation has the same meaning as in the Defamation Act 2005 , section 49 . existing limitation law means the provisions of this Act that applied in relation to the limitation period for defamation actions immediately before the commencement of this section. new limitation law means sections 10AA and 32A as inserted by the Defamation Act 2005 .","sortOrder":56},{"sectionNumber":"sec.46","sectionType":"section","heading":"Transitional provision for Corrective Services and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2008","content":"### sec.46 Transitional provision for Corrective Services and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2008\n\nThe Corrective Services and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2008 , section 18 only applies in relation to a cause of action arising after the commencement of this section.\ns 46 ins 2008 No. 53 s 19","sortOrder":57},{"sectionNumber":"sec.47","sectionType":"section","heading":"Transitional provision for Civil Liability and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2010","content":"### sec.47 Transitional provision for Civil Liability and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2010\n\nSection 11(2) applies to a right of action relating to personal injury resulting from a dust-related condition whether the right of action accrued before or after the commencement of this section.\nHowever, subsection (1) does not apply if—\njudgment has been given in the action; or\nthe action has been settled or discontinued; or\nan application before the commencement of this section to extend the period of limitation applying to the action before the commencement was refused by a court.\nIn this section—\ncourt includes—\na court in a place outside Queensland, including outside Australia; and\nthe Dust Diseases Tribunal of New South Wales established under the Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 (NSW) .\ns 47 ins 2010 No. 9 s 30\n(sec.47-ssec.1) Section 11(2) applies to a right of action relating to personal injury resulting from a dust-related condition whether the right of action accrued before or after the commencement of this section.\n(sec.47-ssec.2) However, subsection (1) does not apply if— judgment has been given in the action; or the action has been settled or discontinued; or an application before the commencement of this section to extend the period of limitation applying to the action before the commencement was refused by a court.\n(sec.47-ssec.3) In this section— court includes— a court in a place outside Queensland, including outside Australia; and the Dust Diseases Tribunal of New South Wales established under the Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 (NSW) .\n- (a) judgment has been given in the action; or\n- (b) the action has been settled or discontinued; or\n- (c) an application before the commencement of this section to extend the period of limitation applying to the action before the commencement was refused by a court.\n- (a) a court in a place outside Queensland, including outside Australia; and\n- (b) the Dust Diseases Tribunal of New South Wales established under the Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 (NSW) .","sortOrder":58},{"sectionNumber":"sec.48","sectionType":"section","heading":"Transitional provision for Limitation of Actions (Child Sexual Abuse) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2016","content":"### sec.48 Transitional provision for Limitation of Actions (Child Sexual Abuse) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2016\n\nSection 11A applies to an action for damages whether the right of action accrued before or after the commencement of that section (the commencement ).\nAn action on a previously barred right of action may be brought even if—\na limitation period previously applying to the right of action has expired; or\nanother action has been started in the right of action but not finalised before the commencement; or\nanother action was started in the right of action and discontinued before the commencement; or\na judgment was given in relation to the right of action on the ground that a limitation period applying to the right of action had expired; or\nan action in the right of action was dismissed on the ground that a limitation period applying to the right of action had expired.\nIf an action on a previously barred right of action is brought after the commencement, the court hearing the action may, if the court decides it is just and reasonable to do so, do either or both of the following—\nset aside a judgment given in relation to the right of action on the ground that a limitation period applying to the right of action had expired;\ntake into account any amounts paid or payable as damages or costs under the judgment.\nThe Supreme Court may, on application, set aside a judgment under this section even though the Supreme Court is not hearing the action.\nHowever, a court, other than the Supreme Court, may not set aside another court’s judgment under this section.\nAn action may be brought on a previously settled right of action if a court, by order on application, sets aside the agreement effecting the settlement on the grounds it is just and reasonable to do so.\nIf a court makes an order under subsection (5A) for a previously settled right of action—\neach associated agreement is void despite any Act, law or rule of law; and\na party to an associated agreement voided under paragraph (a) may not seek to recover money paid by, or for, the party under the agreement.\nHowever, a court hearing an action on a previously settled right of action may—\nwhen awarding damages in relation to the action—take into account any amounts paid or payable as consideration under an associated agreement voided under subsection (5B)(a); and\nwhen awarding costs in relation to the action—take into account any amounts paid or payable as costs under an associated agreement voided under subsection (5B)(a).\nIn this section—\nassociated agreement , for a previously settled right of action, means—\nthe agreement effecting the settlement; or\nany other agreement, other than a contract of insurance, related to the settlement.\npreviously barred right of action means a right of action for an action to which section 11A applies that was not maintainable immediately before the commencement because a limitation period applying to the right of action had expired.\npreviously settled right of action means a right of action for an action to which section 11A applies that was settled before the commencement but after a limitation period applying to the right of action had expired.\ns 48 ins 2016 No. 59 s 5\n(sec.48-ssec.1) Section 11A applies to an action for damages whether the right of action accrued before or after the commencement of that section (the commencement ).\n(sec.48-ssec.2) An action on a previously barred right of action may be brought even if— a limitation period previously applying to the right of action has expired; or another action has been started in the right of action but not finalised before the commencement; or another action was started in the right of action and discontinued before the commencement; or a judgment was given in relation to the right of action on the ground that a limitation period applying to the right of action had expired; or an action in the right of action was dismissed on the ground that a limitation period applying to the right of action had expired.\n(sec.48-ssec.3) If an action on a previously barred right of action is brought after the commencement, the court hearing the action may, if the court decides it is just and reasonable to do so, do either or both of the following— set aside a judgment given in relation to the right of action on the ground that a limitation period applying to the right of action had expired; take into account any amounts paid or payable as damages or costs under the judgment.\n(sec.48-ssec.4) The Supreme Court may, on application, set aside a judgment under this section even though the Supreme Court is not hearing the action.\n(sec.48-ssec.5) However, a court, other than the Supreme Court, may not set aside another court’s judgment under this section.\n(sec.48-ssec.5A) An action may be brought on a previously settled right of action if a court, by order on application, sets aside the agreement effecting the settlement on the grounds it is just and reasonable to do so.\n(sec.48-ssec.5B) If a court makes an order under subsection (5A) for a previously settled right of action— each associated agreement is void despite any Act, law or rule of law; and a party to an associated agreement voided under paragraph (a) may not seek to recover money paid by, or for, the party under the agreement.\n(sec.48-ssec.5C) However, a court hearing an action on a previously settled right of action may— when awarding damages in relation to the action—take into account any amounts paid or payable as consideration under an associated agreement voided under subsection (5B)(a); and when awarding costs in relation to the action—take into account any amounts paid or payable as costs under an associated agreement voided under subsection (5B)(a).\n(sec.48-ssec.6) In this section— associated agreement , for a previously settled right of action, means— the agreement effecting the settlement; or any other agreement, other than a contract of insurance, related to the settlement. previously barred right of action means a right of action for an action to which section 11A applies that was not maintainable immediately before the commencement because a limitation period applying to the right of action had expired. previously settled right of action means a right of action for an action to which section 11A applies that was settled before the commencement but after a limitation period applying to the right of action had expired.\n- (a) a limitation period previously applying to the right of action has expired; or\n- (b) another action has been started in the right of action but not finalised before the commencement; or\n- (c) another action was started in the right of action and discontinued before the commencement; or\n- (d) a judgment was given in relation to the right of action on the ground that a limitation period applying to the right of action had expired; or\n- (e) an action in the right of action was dismissed on the ground that a limitation period applying to the right of action had expired.\n- (a) set aside a judgment given in relation to the right of action on the ground that a limitation period applying to the right of action had expired;\n- (b) take into account any amounts paid or payable as damages or costs under the judgment.\n- (a) each associated agreement is void despite any Act, law or rule of law; and\n- (b) a party to an associated agreement voided under paragraph (a) may not seek to recover money paid by, or for, the party under the agreement.\n- (a) when awarding damages in relation to the action—take into account any amounts paid or payable as consideration under an associated agreement voided under subsection (5B)(a); and\n- (b) when awarding costs in relation to the action—take into account any amounts paid or payable as costs under an associated agreement voided under subsection (5B)(a).\n- (a) the agreement effecting the settlement; or\n- (b) any other agreement, other than a contract of insurance, related to the settlement.","sortOrder":59},{"sectionNumber":"sec.49","sectionType":"section","heading":"Transitional provision for Civil Liability and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2019","content":"### sec.49 Transitional provision for Civil Liability and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2019\n\nSection 48 applies as if—\na reference in the section to section 11A were a reference to section 11A as amended by the 2019 amendment; and\na reference in the section to the commencement of section 11A were a reference to the commencement of the 2019 amendment.\nSubsection (1) does not limit the operation of section 48 apart from this section.\nIn this section—\n2019 amendment means the Civil Liability and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2019 , section 11 .\ns 49 ins 2019 No. 34 s 12\n(sec.49-ssec.1) Section 48 applies as if— a reference in the section to section 11A were a reference to section 11A as amended by the 2019 amendment; and a reference in the section to the commencement of section 11A were a reference to the commencement of the 2019 amendment.\n(sec.49-ssec.2) Subsection (1) does not limit the operation of section 48 apart from this section.\n(sec.49-ssec.3) In this section— 2019 amendment means the Civil Liability and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2019 , section 11 .\n- (a) a reference in the section to section 11A were a reference to section 11A as amended by the 2019 amendment; and\n- (b) a reference in the section to the commencement of section 11A were a reference to the commencement of the 2019 amendment.","sortOrder":60},{"sectionNumber":"sec.50","sectionType":"section","heading":"Transitional provision for Defamation (Model Provisions) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2021","content":"### sec.50 Transitional provision for Defamation (Model Provisions) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2021\n\nThe amendment made to section 10AA by the Defamation (Model Provisions) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2021 applies in relation to the publication of defamatory matter after the commencement of the amendment.\nSection 10AB, as inserted by the Defamation (Model Provisions) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2021 , applies in relation to the publication of defamatory matter after the commencement of the section, subject to subsection (3).\nSection 10AB extends to a first publication before the commencement of the section, but only in respect of subsequent publications after the commencement.\nSection 32A, as amended by the Defamation (Model Provisions) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2021 , applies in relation to the publication of defamatory matter after the commencement of the section.\ns 50 ins 2021 No. 13 s 33\n(sec.50-ssec.1) The amendment made to section 10AA by the Defamation (Model Provisions) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2021 applies in relation to the publication of defamatory matter after the commencement of the amendment.\n(sec.50-ssec.2) Section 10AB, as inserted by the Defamation (Model Provisions) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2021 , applies in relation to the publication of defamatory matter after the commencement of the section, subject to subsection (3).\n(sec.50-ssec.3) Section 10AB extends to a first publication before the commencement of the section, but only in respect of subsequent publications after the commencement.\n(sec.50-ssec.4) Section 32A, as amended by the Defamation (Model Provisions) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2021 , applies in relation to the publication of defamatory matter after the commencement of the section.","sortOrder":61},{"sectionNumber":"sec.51","sectionType":"section","heading":"Transitional provision for Property Law Act 2023","content":"### sec.51 Transitional provision for Property Law Act 2023\n\nThe amendments made to section 10(3) and (6)(b) by the Property Law Act 2023 apply in relation to a deed only if the deed is made after the commencement.\ns 51 ins 2023 No. 27 s 286","sortOrder":62},{"sectionNumber":"pt.6","sectionType":"part","heading":null,"content":"","sortOrder":63},{"sectionNumber":"pt.7","sectionType":"part","heading":null,"content":"","sortOrder":64}],"analysis":{"summary":{"complexity_score":8,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"The Act has materially expanded beyond its original 1974 scope through successive amendments. Most significantly: (1) the complete removal of limitation periods for child abuse claims was added in 2016 and expanded in 2019 — a major policy shift not contemplated in the original Act; (2) dust-related disease claims were exempted from all limitation periods; (3) defamation-specific provisions including the single publication rule and concerns notice mechanism were inserted in 2005 and 2021, reflecting the internet age; (4) the tax recovery limitation (s.10A) was inserted in 1993 following court decisions on invalid taxes. The original Act was a general codification of limitation periods, but it has evolved into a hybrid instrument with targeted policy interventions for specific categories of harm."},"complexity_factors":["Multiple different limitation periods applying to different categories of claims, requiring careful classification of the nature of the dispute","Numerous exceptions and carve-outs (child abuse, dust diseases, fraud by trustees, Crown land) that override the general rules","Complex rules for when time starts running, particularly for future interests in land, tenancies at will, rentcharges, and trust property","Interaction with multiple other Acts (Civil Liability Act 2003, Mental Health Act 2016, Defamation Act 2005, Succession Act 1981, Trusts Act 1973, Real Property Act 1861, Corporations Act)","Sophisticated extension mechanisms requiring court applications and assessment of subjective/objective knowledge standards ('means of knowledge', 'decisive character')","Special rules for vulnerable persons (disabilities, infants) including absolute outer limits and chain-of-disability provisions","Adverse possession rules for land with intricate rules about when possession counts and when it resets the clock","Single publication rule and concerns notice mechanism for defamation adding procedural complexity","Acknowledgment and part-payment provisions that can restart limitation periods","Crown immunity carve-outs and the interaction between State and federal legislative power","Archaic legal terminology (hereditaments, rentcharges, coparceners, chattels real, encumbrancee) requiring specialist knowledge to interpret","Significant amendments over decades creating layered provisions that must be read together"],"plain_english_summary":"## What is this law?\n\nThe *Limitation of Actions Act 1974* (Queensland) is a foundational law that sets **strict deadlines** — called limitation periods — for how long you have to sue someone. Once the deadline passes, you generally lose your right to take legal action, no matter how valid your claim is.\n\n## Who does it affect?\n\nVirtually **everyone** in Queensland — individuals, businesses, and government — across a wide range of disputes including:\n- Personal injury claims (car accidents, workplace injuries, medical negligence)\n- Contract and debt disputes\n- Property and land ownership disputes\n- Defamation (being publicly defamed)\n- Trust and estate disputes\n- Mortgage and debt recovery\n\n## Key deadlines to know\n\n| Type of claim | Time limit |\n|---|---|\n| Personal injury (negligence, breach of duty) | **3 years** from when the injury occurred |\n| Contract or general tort (non-injury) | **6 years** from when the dispute arose |\n| Defamation (being defamed) | **1 year** from publication (extendable to 3 years) |\n| Recovering land (adverse possession/property disputes) | **12 years** |\n| Enforcing a court judgment | **12 years** |\n| Recovering mortgage debt | **12 years** |\n| Penalties and forfeitures | **2 years** |\n| Recovering unlawfully paid tax | **1 year** |\n\n## Important exceptions — some claims have **no time limit**\n\n- **Child abuse claims**: If you were abused as a child (sexually, physically, or psychologically in connection with such abuse), you can sue at **any time**, regardless of how long ago it happened.\n- **Dust-related diseases** (like mesothelioma from asbestos exposure): No time limit applies.\n- **Fraud by a trustee**: No time limit if a trustee committed fraud.\n\n## What if you didn't know about the harm?\n\nThe law has some flexibility. For personal injury claims, a court can **extend the deadline** if you didn't know (and couldn't reasonably have known) key facts about your injury or who was responsible until close to or after the deadline. You must apply to the court for this extension.\n\n## Special rules for vulnerable people\n\n- **Children and people with a mental illness**: The clock generally doesn't start running (or is extended) while a person is a minor (under 18) or has a serious mental health condition. Once they recover or reach adulthood, they typically have extra time to sue.\n\n## The Crown (government)\n\nThe Act applies to the government too, but with key exceptions — the government **cannot** lose its rights to Crown land through someone else occupying it (adverse possession), and there are no time limits on the government recovering taxes, duties, or pursuing criminal prosecutions.\n\n## Defamation — special rules for the internet age\n\nFor online content, the 1-year clock starts from when material was **first uploaded**, not every time someone views it (the 'single publication rule'). If you send a formal concerns notice to the publisher within the last 56 days of your deadline, you may get extra time.\n\n## Restarting the clock\n\nIf the person who owes you money or owns property **acknowledges the debt in writing** or makes a part payment, the limitation period can restart from that point.\n\n## Why does this matter to you?\n\n**Act quickly** — missing a deadline almost always means permanently losing your right to sue, even if you have a strong case. If you think you may have a legal claim, seek legal advice as soon as possible."},"kimi_summary":{"_metrics":{"provider":"moonshot","completionTokens":3242},"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":7,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"The Act has expanded significantly beyond its original 1974 scope as a standard limitation statute. Major policy-driven expansions include: (1) complete removal of limitation periods for child sexual abuse (section 11A) with retrospective transitional provisions allowing revival of previously barred claims; (2) exclusion for dust-related conditions (section 11(2)); (3) a specialised defamation regime including the single publication rule for electronic media (sections 10AA, 10AB); and (4) complex transitional provisions (sections 44-51) that effectively rewrite historical limitation rules for specific victim classes."},"complexity_factors":["Multiple limitation periods (1, 2, 3, 6, 12 years, and no limit) with different triggers for different claim types","15+ technical defined terms in section 5 alone (encumbrance, rentcharge, corporeal hereditaments, chattels real, etc.)","Extensive cross-referencing to at least 10 other statutes including the Mental Health Act 2016, Defamation Act 2005, Civil Liability Act 2003, and Trusts Act 1973","Nested exceptions and caps: extensions for disability are themselves limited (30-year absolute cap for land, 3-year cap for personal injury)","Complex accrual rules for land (sections 14-19) involving future interests, reversions, remainders, and adverse possession","Sophisticated transitional machinery (sections 44-51) governing retrospective application, particularly for child abuse and dust diseases, including power to set aside previous judgments","Interaction with equitable principles—section 43 preserves equitable defenses like acquiescence while section 27 creates no-limitation zones for fraudulent trusts","Single publication rule for defamation (section 10AB) with conditional application based on whether subsequent publications are 'materially different'"],"plain_english_summary":"**What it does:** This Act sets legal deadlines—called *limitation periods*—for starting court cases in Queensland. If you miss the deadline, you generally lose your right to sue forever, regardless of how strong your case is. It covers everything from car accidents to unpaid debts and land disputes.\n\n**The countdown:** Time usually starts ticking from the date the *cause of action accrues* (legal jargon for when the wrong happened or when you first had the right to sue).\n\n**Key deadlines:**\n- **1 year:** Defamation (suing someone for damaging your reputation). This can be extended by 56 days if you send a formal “concerns notice” before the year expires.\n- **3 years:** Personal injury claims (negligence, accidents, medical malpractice). \n- **6 years:** Most contract disputes, unpaid debts, property damage, and rent arrears.\n- **12 years:** Claims based on *deeds* (special formal contracts), court judgments, recovering land, and claims against deceased estates.\n- **No limit:** Claims for child sexual abuse—survivors can sue at any time, even decades later. Also, claims for *dust-related conditions* (like asbestosis or mesothelioma) have no time limit.\n\n**When the clock stops or restarts:**\n- **Disability:** If you were under 18 or of *unsound mind* (legally unable to manage your affairs) when the incident happened, the clock pauses until you turn 18 or recover, subject to maximum caps (30 years for land, 3 years for personal injury).\n- **Fraud or mistake:** If someone hides their wrongdoing, time doesn’t start until you discover (or should have discovered) the fraud.\n- **Acknowledgment:** If a debtor admits they owe the money in writing or makes a part payment, the clock restarts from that date.\n\n**Special rules for land:** Recovering land has complex rules about *adverse possession* (when someone squats on your land) and future interests (when you inherit land later). If you don’t claim land within 12 years, your title can be *extinguished* (legally wiped out).\n\n**Who it affects:** Anyone who might sue or be sued in Queensland—injured people, property owners, lenders chasing mortgages, businesses chasing debts, and survivors of historical abuse.\n\n**Why it matters:** It provides certainty so people aren’t sued decades after an event when evidence is lost. But it also balances justice for vulnerable people (with extensions for disability) and removes barriers for survivors of serious abuse or industrial diseases."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":8,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"The statutory scope has been modified since the original enactment by a series of later amendments and transitional provisions that add, remove or change limitation rules for particular classes of claim. Examples in the text include: the insertion of a no-limitation rule for child-abuse personal-injury claims (sec.11A) and transitional rules permitting actions on previously barred child-abuse claims (sec.48); defamation-specific limitation and single-publication rules and extensions (secs.10AA, 10AB, 32A) together with transitional application rules (secs.45, 50); changes affecting dust-related conditions and their limitation treatment (sec.11(2) and transitional sec.47); and later amendments affecting accrual and deed-related timing (see sec.51 for Property Law Act 2023 effect). These amendments and the multiple transitional provisions (secs.44–51) show the statutory field of limitation law in the Act has been adjusted over time to create new exceptions, shorter or longer limitation windows, and specific procedural mechanisms."},"complexity_factors":["Multiple, class-specific limitation periods (1, 2, 3, 6, 12 years) with different accrual rules (secs.10, 11, 13, 26).","Detailed accrual rules for land (present vs future interests, tenancies, adverse possession) spread across secs.14–19.","Numerous exceptions and extensions (disability sec.29; fraud/mistake sec.38; discovery-based court extensions secs.30–32, 32A) producing case-by-case fact inquiries.","Formal requirements that affect operation (written signed acknowledgments restart the clock — secs.35–36) and binding effects on successors and persons in possession (sec.37).","Special, non-time-limited classes (no limitation for child-abuse personal-injury claims — sec.11A(1)) and limitations that cannot be extended (e.g. certain tax recoveries under sec.10A(3)).","Interplay with other statutes and transitional amendments (numerous amendment and transitional sections, e.g. secs.44–51; sec.7 preserves other enactment-based limitation periods).","Court discretion and procedural variation (ex parte applications, evidence standards, judicial balancing of prejudice and diligence — secs.31–34, 39), creating outcome variability.","Specific rules for defamation and electronic publication with notice/extension mechanisms (secs.10AA, 10AB, 32A, 41A) that interact with external defamation law (Defamation Act) and publisher practices."],"plain_english_summary":"# What this Act does (mechanically)\n\nThis Act sets fixed time limits (\"limitation periods\") for starting civil proceedings or arbitrations in many different classes of claim and prescribes rules about when a right of action is taken to have arisen (the accrual date). If a limitation period expires, the claimant is generally barred from suing and, in some cases, the claimant’s title or right is extinguished (see, for example, sections 10, 11, 13, 24 and 26).\n\nKey limitation periods and accrual rules (selected):\n\n- Simple contract, many torts and similar claims: 6 years from accrual (sec.10(1)).\n- Personal injury (negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty where damages include personal injury or death): 3 years from accrual (sec.11(1)).\n- Defamation: 1 year from publication, with statutory extension and special rules for electronic publication and repeated publications (secs.10AA, 10AB, 41A, 32A).\n- Recovery of land: 12 years from accrual (sec.13); special accrual rules for present and future interests, tenancies, adverse possession and trustees (secs.14–19, 16, 18).\n- Actions to recover money secured by mortgage or charge: generally 12 years for principal and 6 years for arrears of interest (sec.26).\n- Penalties or forfeitures: 2 years (sec.10(5)).\n- Some classes are excluded from limitation (for example, child-abuse personal-injury claims have no limitation period — sec.11A(1)).\n\nHow rights can be extended, postponed or restarted (mechanics):\n\n- Disability: if the claimant was under a disability when the right accrued, the claimant generally has up to 6 years from the date the disability ends or the person dies to start an action (sec.29).\n- Discovery / delayed knowledge: the court may extend limitation for personal-injury claims where decisive material facts were not within the claimant’s means of knowledge until late (sec.31) and for surviving personal-injury claims (sec.32). The statute defines what counts as \"material facts\" and when a fact is within a person’s means of knowledge (sec.30).\n- Fraud or mistake: the limitation period does not start until the plaintiff discovers or with reasonable diligence could have discovered the fraud or mistake (sec.38).\n- A written acknowledgment or part payment by the opposing party restarts the accrual date (secs.35–36). Formal writing and signature are required for acknowledgments (sec.36(1)). Payments and acknowledgments can bind successors or persons in possession in specified ways (sec.37).\n- Courts have express powers to extend limitation periods (see secs.31, 32, 32A) and may hear applications ex parte but can require notice (sec.34). Costs orders in extended-time cases must take diligence and prejudice into account (sec.39).\n\nWho the rules affect and who decides\n\n- Plaintiffs (claimants): must start actions within the prescribed time or show an applicable extension/exception (many provisions in Parts 2–3; see secs.10–11A, 29–39).\n- Defendants: obtain the statutory defence of limitation when a period has expired; may also be affected if a successor or purchaser gains title when a claimant’s rights are extinguished (secs.24, 12).\n- Courts: have discretion to extend limitation periods in defined circumstances (secs.31, 32, 32A), to treat arbitrations as actions for limitation purposes (sec.41), and to refuse relief on equitable grounds such as acquiescence (sec.43).\n- The Crown: the Act binds the Crown subject to stated exceptions (sec.6); some Crown actions (for tax recovery, prosecutions, certain forfeitures) are excluded (sec.6(3)).\n\nConcrete behavioural and legal effects you can expect\n\n- Claimants have a built-in incentive to investigate and start proceedings promptly or to preserve evidence, because delay risks being barred (see the various limitation periods in Part 2 and the discovery/means-of-knowledge tests in secs.30–32).\n- Defendants and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and successors may obtain legal finality and extinguishment of earlier claims after statutory periods (secs.12, 24, 26). That changes the legal value of titles and secured interests by making long-dormant claims less enforceable.\n- A written acknowledgment or part payment by an adverse party will reset time limits (secs.35–36). That creates a clear compliance/formality requirement for parties who wish to preserve or restart claims.\n- For publishers and others involved in publication (including electronic publication), the Act imposes short limitation periods for defamation and specific rules about when a publication is \"deemed\" to have occurred for limitation purposes (secs.10AA, 10AB, 41A). Courts may extend defamation limitation up to 3 years if just and reasonable (sec.32A).\n- Trustees and beneficiaries face special rules: certain trust claims for fraud or conversion are not subject to limitation (sec.27(1)), while other trust claims are subject to a 6-year period with accrual timing dependent on possession (secs.16, 27).\n\nCosts, incentives, trade-offs and implementation frictions (mechanisms, not value judgments)\n\n- Certainty vs reopening: limitation periods supply temporal certainty (extinguishment, sec.24), but statutory exceptions (fraud/mistake sec.38, disability sec.29) and court powers to extend (secs.31, 32, 32A) allow some late claims. That trade-off is implemented through specified legal tests (secs.30–32).\n- Compliance burden and formality: some changes require formal steps to preserve or restart claims (a signed written acknowledgment restarts the clock — secs.35–36). Publishers must pay attention to electronic publication dates for defamation (secs.10AA, 41A) and to concerns notices under the Defamation Act where relevant (sec.10AA(2)).\n- Concentrated benefits and diffuse costs: purchasers, mortgagees and successors obtain definitive protection when a prior claimant’s title is extinguished (secs.12, 24, 26); claimants face the concentrated cost of losing a right unless an exception applies. The Act sets out who bears those legal risks in concrete terms.\n- Judicial discretion and variability: courts exercise case-by-case discretion to extend time or set aside past judgments in particular transitional cases (see sec.48 for previously barred child-abuse claims). This creates a predictable legal mechanism (court application and judicial assessment under statutory tests) but means outcomes depend on judicial assessment of facts and the statutory criteria (secs.31–34, 48).\n\nHow the Act interacts with other laws\n\n- The Act preserves limitations fixed by other enactments unless displaced by specific provisions here (sec.7). It also contains special override or characterisation rules (e.g. sec.10A prevails over inconsistent Acts for tax recovery in specified circumstances; sec.43A treats limitation law as part of substantive law of the State).\n- Arbitration is treated as an action for limitation purposes (sec.41), so contractual dispute-resolution clauses cannot be used to defeat accrual timing in limitation (sec.41(2)–(3)).\n\nSelected provisions to check for operational detail: sec.6 (Crown), sec.10 (general 6‑year rule), secs.10AA–10AB and 32A (defamation), sec.11 and sec.11A (personal injury and child abuse exceptions), secs.14–19 (accrual for land and adverse possession), secs.35–37 (acknowledgment and part payment), sec.38 (fraud and mistake), secs.29–34 (extensions and court practice), secs.24 and 26 (extinguishment, mortgages), sec.27 (trusts), sec.41 and 41A (arbitrations and electronic publication), sec.43A (characterisation)."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/limitation-of-actions-act-1974","history":"/api/acts/limitation-of-actions-act-1974/history","analysis":"/api/acts/limitation-of-actions-act-1974/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/limitation-of-actions-act-1974/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/limitation-of-actions-act-1974/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/limitation-of-actions-act-1974/documents"}}