{"id":"qld:act-1995-lra","name":"Law Reform Act 1995","slug":"law-reform-act-1995","collection":"act","jurisdiction":"qld","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":"lra of 1995","makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":104714,"registerId":"qld-act-1995-lra-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-03","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"pt.1","sectionType":"part","heading":"Preliminary","content":"# Preliminary","sortOrder":0},{"sectionNumber":"sec.1","sectionType":"section","heading":"Short title","content":"### sec.1 Short title\n\nThis Act may be cited as the Law Reform Act 1995 .\ns 1 sub 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1","sortOrder":1},{"sectionNumber":"sec.2","sectionType":"section","heading":"Act is, in part, a consolidation","content":"### sec.2 Act is, in part, a consolidation\n\nThis Act, as in force at the commencement of this section, is, in part, a consolidation of provisions of the Law Reform (Abolition of the Rule of Common Employment) Act 1951 (the existing provisions ) and provisions relocated from the following Acts (the relocated provisions )—\nLaw Reform (Tortfeasors Contribution, Contributory Negligence, and Division of Chattels) Act 1952\nLaw Reform (Husband and Wife) Act 1968\nVoluntary Aid in Emergency Act 1973 .\nThe Act is also a consolidation of provisions of the law about the age of majority and the legal capacity of persons whose relationship is husband and wife.\nTo remove any doubt, it is declared that the relocated provisions were not re-enacted by the Statute Law Revision Act (No. 2) 1995 , but merely moved (without re-enactment) from the Act s in which they were enacted to this Act.\nWithout limiting subsections (1) and (3) and to further remove any doubt, it is also declared that the relocation to this Act of the relocated provisions did not impliedly repeal or amend, or otherwise affect the operation of, the existing provisions, the relocated provisions or the provisions of any other law and, in particular, did not affect the meaning or effect that the existing or relocated provisions, or the provisions of the other law, had because of the respective times when they were enacted.\nIn addition, it is declared that the relocation did not—\naffect any jurisdiction or power of a court or judge; or\naffect any principle or rule of law or equity; or\naffect any right, privilege or liability; or\nrevive anything not existing or in force.\ns 2 ins 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1\namd 1996 No. 79 s 66 ; 2002 No. 74 s 90 sch\n(sec.2-ssec.1) This Act, as in force at the commencement of this section, is, in part, a consolidation of provisions of the Law Reform (Abolition of the Rule of Common Employment) Act 1951 (the existing provisions ) and provisions relocated from the following Acts (the relocated provisions )— Law Reform (Tortfeasors Contribution, Contributory Negligence, and Division of Chattels) Act 1952 Law Reform (Husband and Wife) Act 1968 Voluntary Aid in Emergency Act 1973 .\n(sec.2-ssec.2) The Act is also a consolidation of provisions of the law about the age of majority and the legal capacity of persons whose relationship is husband and wife.\n(sec.2-ssec.3) To remove any doubt, it is declared that the relocated provisions were not re-enacted by the Statute Law Revision Act (No. 2) 1995 , but merely moved (without re-enactment) from the Act s in which they were enacted to this Act.\n(sec.2-ssec.4) Without limiting subsections (1) and (3) and to further remove any doubt, it is also declared that the relocation to this Act of the relocated provisions did not impliedly repeal or amend, or otherwise affect the operation of, the existing provisions, the relocated provisions or the provisions of any other law and, in particular, did not affect the meaning or effect that the existing or relocated provisions, or the provisions of the other law, had because of the respective times when they were enacted.\n(sec.2-ssec.5) In addition, it is declared that the relocation did not— affect any jurisdiction or power of a court or judge; or affect any principle or rule of law or equity; or affect any right, privilege or liability; or revive anything not existing or in force.\n- • Law Reform (Tortfeasors Contribution, Contributory Negligence, and Division of Chattels) Act 1952\n- • Law Reform (Husband and Wife) Act 1968\n- • Voluntary Aid in Emergency Act 1973 .\n- (a) affect any jurisdiction or power of a court or judge; or\n- (b) affect any principle or rule of law or equity; or\n- (c) affect any right, privilege or liability; or\n- (d) revive anything not existing or in force.","sortOrder":2},{"sectionNumber":"pt.2","sectionType":"part","heading":"Abolition of rule of common employment","content":"# Abolition of rule of common employment","sortOrder":3},{"sectionNumber":"sec.3","sectionType":"section","heading":"Defence of common employment abolished","content":"### sec.3 Defence of common employment abolished\n\nIt shall not be a defence to an employer who is sued in respect of any injury or damage caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of a person employed by him or her, that that person was at the time the injury or damage was caused in common employment with the person suffering that injury or damage.\nAny provision contained in a contract of service or apprenticeship, or in an agreement collateral thereto (including a contract or agreement entered into before the commencement of this section), shall be void in so far as it would have the effect of excluding or limiting any liability of the employer in respect of personal injuries caused to the person employed or apprenticed by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of any persons in common employment with him or her.\ns 3 amd 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1\n(sec.3-ssec.1) It shall not be a defence to an employer who is sued in respect of any injury or damage caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of a person employed by him or her, that that person was at the time the injury or damage was caused in common employment with the person suffering that injury or damage.\n(sec.3-ssec.2) Any provision contained in a contract of service or apprenticeship, or in an agreement collateral thereto (including a contract or agreement entered into before the commencement of this section), shall be void in so far as it would have the effect of excluding or limiting any liability of the employer in respect of personal injuries caused to the person employed or apprenticed by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of any persons in common employment with him or her.","sortOrder":4},{"sectionNumber":"sec.4","sectionType":"section","heading":"Application to Crown","content":"### sec.4 Application to Crown\n\nThis part binds the Crown and instrumentalities of the Crown.\ns 4 amd 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1","sortOrder":5},{"sectionNumber":"pt.3","sectionType":"part","heading":"Tortfeasors contribution and contributory negligence","content":"# Tortfeasors contribution and contributory negligence","sortOrder":6},{"sectionNumber":"pt.3-div.1","sectionType":"division","heading":"Preliminary","content":"## Preliminary","sortOrder":7},{"sectionNumber":"sec.4A","sectionType":"section","heading":"Application of part","content":"### sec.4A Application of part\n\nThis part applies subject to the Civil Liability Act 2003 .\ns 4A ins 2003 No. 16 s 111 sch 1","sortOrder":8},{"sectionNumber":"sec.5","sectionType":"section","heading":"Definitions for pt 3","content":"### sec.5 Definitions for pt 3\n\nIn this part—\ncourt means, in relation to any claim, the court or arbitrator by or before whom the claim falls to be determined.\ndamage includes loss of life and personal injury.\ndependant means any person for whose benefit an action could be brought under the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 , part 10 .\ns 5 def dependant amd 2011 No. 45 s 161\nfault ...\ns 5 def fault amd 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1\nom 2001 No. 65 s 4 (1)\nwrong means an act or omission that—\ngives rise to a liability in tort for which a defence of contributory negligence is available at common law; or\namounts to a breach of a contractual duty of care that is concurrent and coextensive with a duty of care in tort.\ns 5 def wrong ins 2001 No. 65 s 4 (2)\ns 5 (prev 1952 1 Eliz 2 No. 42 s 4) amd 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1\nreloc 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1\n- (a) gives rise to a liability in tort for which a defence of contributory negligence is available at common law; or\n- (b) amounts to a breach of a contractual duty of care that is concurrent and coextensive with a duty of care in tort.","sortOrder":9},{"sectionNumber":"pt.3-div.2","sectionType":"division","heading":"Proceedings against, and contribution between, tortfeasors","content":"## Proceedings against, and contribution between, tortfeasors","sortOrder":10},{"sectionNumber":"sec.6","sectionType":"section","heading":"Proceedings against, and contribution between, joint and several tortfeasors","content":"### sec.6 Proceedings against, and contribution between, joint and several tortfeasors\n\nWhere damage is suffered by any person as a result of a tort (whether a crime or not) the following apply—\njudgment recovered against any tortfeasor liable in respect of that damage shall not be a bar to an action against any other person who would, if sued, have been liable as a joint tortfeasor in respect of the same damage;\nif more than 1 action is brought in respect of that damage by or on behalf of the person by whom it was suffered, or for the benefit of the estate, or of the dependants of that person, against tortfeasors liable in respect of the damage (whether as joint tortfeasors or otherwise)—the sums recoverable under the judgments given in those actions by way of damages shall not in the aggregate exceed the amount of the damages awarded by the judgment first given; and in any of those actions, other than that in which judgment is first given, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to costs unless the court is of opinion that there was reasonable ground for bringing the action;\nany tortfeasor liable in respect of that damage may recover contribution from any other tortfeasor who is, or would if sued have been, liable in respect of the same damage, whether as a joint tortfeasor or otherwise, so, however, that no person shall be entitled to recover contribution under this section from any person entitled to be indemnified by the person in respect of the liability in respect of which the contribution is sought.\ns 6 (prev 1952 1 Eliz 2 No. 42 s 5) amd 1994 No. 85 s 12 sch\nreloc 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1\namd 2010 No. 42 s 214 sch ; 2011 No. 45 s 162\n- (a) judgment recovered against any tortfeasor liable in respect of that damage shall not be a bar to an action against any other person who would, if sued, have been liable as a joint tortfeasor in respect of the same damage;\n- (b) if more than 1 action is brought in respect of that damage by or on behalf of the person by whom it was suffered, or for the benefit of the estate, or of the dependants of that person, against tortfeasors liable in respect of the damage (whether as joint tortfeasors or otherwise)—the sums recoverable under the judgments given in those actions by way of damages shall not in the aggregate exceed the amount of the damages awarded by the judgment first given; and in any of those actions, other than that in which judgment is first given, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to costs unless the court is of opinion that there was reasonable ground for bringing the action;\n- (c) any tortfeasor liable in respect of that damage may recover contribution from any other tortfeasor who is, or would if sued have been, liable in respect of the same damage, whether as a joint tortfeasor or otherwise, so, however, that no person shall be entitled to recover contribution under this section from any person entitled to be indemnified by the person in respect of the liability in respect of which the contribution is sought.","sortOrder":11},{"sectionNumber":"sec.7","sectionType":"section","heading":"Amount of contribution and power of the court","content":"### sec.7 Amount of contribution and power of the court\n\nIn any proceedings for contribution under this division the amount of the contribution recoverable from any person shall be such as may be found by the court to be just and equitable having regard to the extent of that person’s responsibility for the damage; and the court shall have power to exempt any person from liability to make contribution, or to direct that the contribution to be recovered from any person shall amount to a complete indemnity.\ns 7 (prev 1952 1 Eliz 2 No. 42 s 6) amd 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1\nreloc 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1","sortOrder":12},{"sectionNumber":"sec.8","sectionType":"section","heading":"Additional definitions for div 2","content":"### sec.8 Additional definitions for div 2\n\nIn this division—\njudgment first given means—\nfor a judgment reversed on appeal—the first judgment given that is not later reversed on appeal; or\nfor a judgment varied on appeal—the judgment as varied.\ns 8 (prev 1952 1 Eliz 2 No. 42 s 8) amd 1994 No. 85 s 12 sch\nsub 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1\nreloc 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1\ns 8 def child om 2011 No. 45 s 163\ns 8 def parent om 2011 No. 45 s 163\ns 8 def spouse sub 2002 No. 74 s 90 sch\nom 2011 No. 45 s 163\n- (a) for a judgment reversed on appeal—the first judgment given that is not later reversed on appeal; or\n- (b) for a judgment varied on appeal—the judgment as varied.","sortOrder":13},{"sectionNumber":"sec.9","sectionType":"section","heading":"Application of division","content":"### sec.9 Application of division\n\nThis division does not—\napply to a tort committed before 12 January 1953; or\nThis is the commencement date of the Law Reform (Tortfeasors Contribution, Contributory Negligence, and Division of Chattels) Act 1952 .\naffect a criminal prosecution against a person; or\nrender enforceable an agreement for indemnity that would not otherwise have been enforceable.\nHowever, subsection (1) (c) does not apply to a claim for contribution or any liability arising from that claim if—\nthe Law Reform (Tortfeasors Contribution, Contributory Negligence, and Division of Chattels) Act 1952 , repealed section 7 , would have applied to the claim apart from its repeal; and\nthe act or omission giving rise to the claim happened before 1 June 1968.\nThis is the commencement date of the Law Reform (Husband and Wife) Act 1968 .\ns 9 (prev 1952 1 Eliz 2 No. 42 s 9) sub 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1\nreloc 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1\n(sec.9-ssec.1) This division does not— apply to a tort committed before 12 January 1953; or This is the commencement date of the Law Reform (Tortfeasors Contribution, Contributory Negligence, and Division of Chattels) Act 1952 . affect a criminal prosecution against a person; or render enforceable an agreement for indemnity that would not otherwise have been enforceable.\n(sec.9-ssec.2) However, subsection (1) (c) does not apply to a claim for contribution or any liability arising from that claim if— the Law Reform (Tortfeasors Contribution, Contributory Negligence, and Division of Chattels) Act 1952 , repealed section 7 , would have applied to the claim apart from its repeal; and the act or omission giving rise to the claim happened before 1 June 1968. This is the commencement date of the Law Reform (Husband and Wife) Act 1968 .\n- (a) apply to a tort committed before 12 January 1953; or Editor’s note— This is the commencement date of the Law Reform (Tortfeasors Contribution, Contributory Negligence, and Division of Chattels) Act 1952 .\n- (b) affect a criminal prosecution against a person; or\n- (c) render enforceable an agreement for indemnity that would not otherwise have been enforceable.\n- (a) the Law Reform (Tortfeasors Contribution, Contributory Negligence, and Division of Chattels) Act 1952 , repealed section 7 , would have applied to the claim apart from its repeal; and\n- (b) the act or omission giving rise to the claim happened before 1 June 1968. Editor’s note— This is the commencement date of the Law Reform (Husband and Wife) Act 1968 .","sortOrder":14},{"sectionNumber":"pt.3-div.3","sectionType":"division","heading":"Contributory negligence","content":"## Contributory negligence","sortOrder":15},{"sectionNumber":"sec.10","sectionType":"section","heading":"Apportionment of liability in case of contributory negligence","content":"### sec.10 Apportionment of liability in case of contributory negligence\n\nIf a person (the claimant ) suffers damage partly because of the claimant’s failure to take reasonable care ( contributory negligence ) and partly because of the wrong of someone else—\na claim in relation to the damage is not defeated because of the claimant’s contributory negligence; and\nthe damages recoverable for the wrong are to be reduced to the extent the court considers just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage.\nSubsection (1) does not operate to defeat any defence arising under a contract.\nIf a contract or enactment providing for the limitation of liability applies to the claim, the amount of damages recoverable by the claimant because of subsection (1) is not to exceed the maximum limit applying to the claim.\nWhere damages are recoverable by any person by virtue of subsection (1) subject to such reduction as is therein mentioned, the court shall find and record the total damages which would have been recoverable if the claimant had not been guilty of contributory negligence.\nDivision 2 shall apply in any case where 2 or more persons are liable or would, if they had all been sued, be liable by virtue of subsection (1) in respect of the damage suffered by any person.\nWhere any person dies as the result partly of his or her own failure to take reasonable care and partly of the wrong of any other person or persons, and accordingly if an action were brought for the benefit of the estate under the Succession Act 1981 , section 66 the damages recoverable would be reduced under subsection (1) , any damages recoverable in an action brought for the benefit of the dependants of that person under the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 , part 10 must be reduced to a proportionate extent.\nCivil Proceedings Act 2011 , part 10 (Wrongful death proceedings)\nWhere, in any case to which subsection (1) applies, one of the persons responsible for the damage avoids liability to any other such person or the person’s personal representative by pleading the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 or another Act limiting the time within which proceedings may be taken, the person shall not be entitled to recover any damages or contributions from that other person or representative by virtue of the said subsection.\nWhere any case to which subsection (1) applies is tried with a jury, the jury shall determine the total damages which would have been recoverable if the claimant had not been guilty of contributory negligence and the extent to which those damages are to be reduced.\ns 10 (prev 1952 1 Eliz 2 No. 42 s 10) amd 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1\nreloc 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1\namd 2001 No. 65 s 5 ; 2011 No. 45 s 164\n(sec.10-ssec.1) If a person (the claimant ) suffers damage partly because of the claimant’s failure to take reasonable care ( contributory negligence ) and partly because of the wrong of someone else— a claim in relation to the damage is not defeated because of the claimant’s contributory negligence; and the damages recoverable for the wrong are to be reduced to the extent the court considers just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage.\n(sec.10-ssec.2) Subsection (1) does not operate to defeat any defence arising under a contract.\n(sec.10-ssec.2A) If a contract or enactment providing for the limitation of liability applies to the claim, the amount of damages recoverable by the claimant because of subsection (1) is not to exceed the maximum limit applying to the claim.\n(sec.10-ssec.3) Where damages are recoverable by any person by virtue of subsection (1) subject to such reduction as is therein mentioned, the court shall find and record the total damages which would have been recoverable if the claimant had not been guilty of contributory negligence.\n(sec.10-ssec.4) Division 2 shall apply in any case where 2 or more persons are liable or would, if they had all been sued, be liable by virtue of subsection (1) in respect of the damage suffered by any person.\n(sec.10-ssec.5) Where any person dies as the result partly of his or her own failure to take reasonable care and partly of the wrong of any other person or persons, and accordingly if an action were brought for the benefit of the estate under the Succession Act 1981 , section 66 the damages recoverable would be reduced under subsection (1) , any damages recoverable in an action brought for the benefit of the dependants of that person under the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 , part 10 must be reduced to a proportionate extent. Civil Proceedings Act 2011 , part 10 (Wrongful death proceedings)\n(sec.10-ssec.6) Where, in any case to which subsection (1) applies, one of the persons responsible for the damage avoids liability to any other such person or the person’s personal representative by pleading the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 or another Act limiting the time within which proceedings may be taken, the person shall not be entitled to recover any damages or contributions from that other person or representative by virtue of the said subsection.\n(sec.10-ssec.7) Where any case to which subsection (1) applies is tried with a jury, the jury shall determine the total damages which would have been recoverable if the claimant had not been guilty of contributory negligence and the extent to which those damages are to be reduced.\n- (a) a claim in relation to the damage is not defeated because of the claimant’s contributory negligence; and\n- (b) the damages recoverable for the wrong are to be reduced to the extent the court considers just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage.","sortOrder":16},{"sectionNumber":"sec.11","sectionType":"section","heading":"Application of division","content":"### sec.11 Application of division\n\nThis division does not apply to a case if the acts or omissions giving rise to the claim happened before 12 January 1953.\nThis is the commencement date of the Law Reform (Tortfeasors Contribution, Contributory Negligence, and Division of Chattels) Act 1952 .\ns 11 (prev 1952 1 Eliz 2 No. 42 s 12) sub 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1\nreloc 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1","sortOrder":17},{"sectionNumber":"pt.4","sectionType":"part","heading":"Civil remedies between persons whose relationship is husband and wife","content":"# Civil remedies between persons whose relationship is husband and wife","sortOrder":18},{"sectionNumber":"sec.12","sectionType":"section","heading":"Actions in tort between husband and wife","content":"### sec.12 Actions in tort between husband and wife\n\nSubject to the provisions of this section, each of the parties to a marriage shall have the like right of action in tort against the other as if they were not married.\nWhere an action in tort is brought by one of the parties to a marriage against the other during the subsistence of the marriage, the court may stay the action if it appears that no substantial benefit would accrue to either party from the continuation of the proceedings.\nIn subsection (1) —\nparties to a marriage includes reference to persons who were parties to a marriage that has been annulled or dissolved.\ns 12 (prev 1968 No. 15 s 2 ) amd 1989 No. 81 s 4 ; 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1\nreloc 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1\n(sec.12-ssec.1) Subject to the provisions of this section, each of the parties to a marriage shall have the like right of action in tort against the other as if they were not married.\n(sec.12-ssec.2) Where an action in tort is brought by one of the parties to a marriage against the other during the subsistence of the marriage, the court may stay the action if it appears that no substantial benefit would accrue to either party from the continuation of the proceedings.\n(sec.12-ssec.3) In subsection (1) — parties to a marriage includes reference to persons who were parties to a marriage that has been annulled or dissolved.","sortOrder":19},{"sectionNumber":"sec.13","sectionType":"section","heading":"Spouse’s remedy for loss or impairment of consortium","content":"### sec.13 Spouse’s remedy for loss or impairment of consortium\n\nThis section applies if a person causes injury to another by wrongful act, neglect or default, whether or not the injury results in death.\nThe person is liable in damages to the injured person’s spouse for loss or injury suffered by the spouse because of the loss or impairment of consortium.\nThe damages must be assessed in the same way as in a claim by a husband for damages in tort for loss or impairment of consortium.\nA husband can only recover the damages mentioned in this section under either the common law or this section but not both.\ns 13 (prev 1968 No. 15 s 3 ) sub 1989 No. 81 s 5\nreloc 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1\nsub 2010 No. 9 s 22\n(sec.13-ssec.1) This section applies if a person causes injury to another by wrongful act, neglect or default, whether or not the injury results in death.\n(sec.13-ssec.2) The person is liable in damages to the injured person’s spouse for loss or injury suffered by the spouse because of the loss or impairment of consortium.\n(sec.13-ssec.3) The damages must be assessed in the same way as in a claim by a husband for damages in tort for loss or impairment of consortium.\n(sec.13-ssec.4) A husband can only recover the damages mentioned in this section under either the common law or this section but not both.","sortOrder":20},{"sectionNumber":"sec.14","sectionType":"section","heading":"Application of part","content":"### sec.14 Application of part\n\nThis part shall not be construed to confer a right of action in respect of a wrongful act, neglect or default that occurred—\nbefore 1 June 1968, where the application of section 12 is in question; or\nbefore 1 January 1985, where the application of section 13 is in question.\ns 14 prev s 14 ins 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1\npres s 14 (prev 1968 No. 15 s 4 ) sub 1989 No. 81 s 6\namd 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1\nreloc 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1\namd 2010 No. 42 s 214 sch\n- (a) before 1 June 1968, where the application of section 12 is in question; or\n- (b) before 1 January 1985, where the application of section 13 is in question.","sortOrder":21},{"sectionNumber":"pt.5","sectionType":"part","heading":"Voluntary aid in emergency","content":"# Voluntary aid in emergency","sortOrder":22},{"sectionNumber":"sec.15","sectionType":"section","heading":"Definitions for pt 5","content":"### sec.15 Definitions for pt 5\n\nIn this part—\ninjured person includes a person suffering or apparently suffering from an illness.\nmedical practitioner ...\ns 15 def medical practitioner sub 2001 No. 7 s 302 sch 2\nom 2010 No. 14 s 124 sch\nnurse means a person registered under the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law to practise in the nursing profession, other than as a student.\ns 15 def nurse sub 2010 No. 14 s 124 sch\namd 2017 No. 32 s 87 (2) s ch 1 pt 2\ns 15 (prev 1973 No. 56 s 2 ) amd 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1\nreloc 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1","sortOrder":23},{"sectionNumber":"sec.16","sectionType":"section","heading":"Protection of medical practitioners and nurses and other prescribed persons","content":"### sec.16 Protection of medical practitioners and nurses and other prescribed persons\n\nLiability at law shall not attach to a medical practitioner, nurse or other person prescribed under a regulation in respect of an act done or omitted in the course of rendering medical care, aid or assistance to an injured person in circumstances of emergency—\nat or near the scene of the incident or other occurrence constituting the emergency; or\nwhile the injured person is being transported from the scene of the incident or other occurrence constituting the emergency to a hospital or other place at which adequate medical care is available;\nif—\nthe act is done or omitted in good faith and without gross negligence; and\nthe services are performed without fee or reward or expectation of fee or reward.\ns 16 (prev 1973 No. 56 s 3 ) amd 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1\nreloc 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1\namd 1997 No. 82 s 3 sch ; 2010 No. 42 s 214 sch\n- (a) at or near the scene of the incident or other occurrence constituting the emergency; or\n- (b) while the injured person is being transported from the scene of the incident or other occurrence constituting the emergency to a hospital or other place at which adequate medical care is available;\n- (c) the act is done or omitted in good faith and without gross negligence; and\n- (d) the services are performed without fee or reward or expectation of fee or reward.","sortOrder":24},{"sectionNumber":"pt.6","sectionType":"part","heading":"Age of majority","content":"# Age of majority","sortOrder":25},{"sectionNumber":"sec.17","sectionType":"section","heading":"What is age of majority","content":"### sec.17 What is age of majority\n\nThe age of majority is 18 years.\ns 17 ins 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1","sortOrder":26},{"sectionNumber":"pt.7","sectionType":"part","heading":"Legal capacity of persons whose relationship is husband and wife","content":"# Legal capacity of persons whose relationship is husband and wife","sortOrder":27},{"sectionNumber":"sec.18","sectionType":"section","heading":"Capacity","content":"### sec.18 Capacity\n\nA married person has a legal personality that is independent, separate and distinct from the legal personality of the person’s husband or wife.\nA married person has the same legal capacity that the person would have if the person were unmarried.\ns 18 ins 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1\namd 2002 No. 74 s 90 sch\n(sec.18-ssec.1) A married person has a legal personality that is independent, separate and distinct from the legal personality of the person’s husband or wife.\n(sec.18-ssec.2) A married person has the same legal capacity that the person would have if the person were unmarried.","sortOrder":28},{"sectionNumber":"pt.8","sectionType":"part","heading":"Attachment of wages","content":"# Attachment of wages","sortOrder":29},{"sectionNumber":"sec.18A","sectionType":"section","heading":"Wages of public service employees may be attached","content":"### sec.18A Wages of public service employees may be attached\n\nA court may, in a proceeding, order the attachment or charging of the salary or wages of a public service employee or other employee of the State to satisfy a debt, liability, action or other amount ordered by the court to be paid.\nAlso, the registrar of a court may order the attachment or charging of the salary or wages of a public service employee or other employee of the State to satisfy a debt, liability, action or other amount ordered by the court to be paid.\nThis section has effect despite any other Act or rule of law to the contrary.\ns 18A ins 1996 No. 79 s 68\namd 2000 No. 58 s 2 sch\n(sec.18A-ssec.1) A court may, in a proceeding, order the attachment or charging of the salary or wages of a public service employee or other employee of the State to satisfy a debt, liability, action or other amount ordered by the court to be paid.\n(sec.18A-ssec.2) Also, the registrar of a court may order the attachment or charging of the salary or wages of a public service employee or other employee of the State to satisfy a debt, liability, action or other amount ordered by the court to be paid.\n(sec.18A-ssec.3) This section has effect despite any other Act or rule of law to the contrary.","sortOrder":30},{"sectionNumber":"pt.9","sectionType":"part","heading":"Miscellaneous","content":"# Miscellaneous","sortOrder":31},{"sectionNumber":"sec.19","sectionType":"section","heading":"Regulation-making power","content":"### sec.19 Regulation-making power\n\nThe Governor in Council may make regulations under this Act.\ns 19 ins 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1","sortOrder":32},{"sectionNumber":"sec.20","sectionType":"section","heading":"References to certain Acts and provisions","content":"### sec.20 References to certain Acts and provisions\n\nIn an Act or document, a reference to any of the following Acts may, if the context permits, be taken to be a reference to this Act, and a reference (whether express or implied) to a provision of any of the following Acts that was located to this Act may, if the context permits, be taken to be a reference to the corresponding provision of this Act—\nLaw Reform (Tortfeasors Contribution, Contributory Negligence, and Division of Chattels) Act 1952\nLaw Reform (Husband and Wife) Act 1968\nVoluntary Aid in Emergency Act 1973 .\nIn an Act or document, a reference to the Law Reform (Abolition of the Rule of Common Employment) Act 1951 is a reference to this Act.\ns 20 ins 1995 No. 58 s 4 sch 1\n(sec.20-ssec.1) In an Act or document, a reference to any of the following Acts may, if the context permits, be taken to be a reference to this Act, and a reference (whether express or implied) to a provision of any of the following Acts that was located to this Act may, if the context permits, be taken to be a reference to the corresponding provision of this Act— Law Reform (Tortfeasors Contribution, Contributory Negligence, and Division of Chattels) Act 1952 Law Reform (Husband and Wife) Act 1968 Voluntary Aid in Emergency Act 1973 .\n(sec.20-ssec.2) In an Act or document, a reference to the Law Reform (Abolition of the Rule of Common Employment) Act 1951 is a reference to this Act.\n- • Law Reform (Tortfeasors Contribution, Contributory Negligence, and Division of Chattels) Act 1952\n- • Law Reform (Husband and Wife) Act 1968\n- • Voluntary Aid in Emergency Act 1973 .","sortOrder":33},{"sectionNumber":"pt.10","sectionType":"part","heading":"Transitional provision for Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Amendment Act 2001","content":"# Transitional provision for Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Amendment Act 2001","sortOrder":34},{"sectionNumber":"sec.21","sectionType":"section","heading":"Amendments about contributory negligence to have retrospective effect","content":"### sec.21 Amendments about contributory negligence to have retrospective effect\n\nThe provisions of part 3, divisions 1 and 3 apply to a wrong that happened before the commencement as if the provisions, in their form as amended by the amending Act, had been in force when the wrong happened.\nHowever, the provisions, as in force before the commencement, continue to apply to a wrong if any of the following apply—\nthe wrong relates to a WorkCover damages injury sustained before 1 July 2001 for which final relief has not been granted by a court before the commencement;\na proceeding about the wrong—\nwas started before the commencement; and\nfinal relief has not been granted by the court before the commencement;\na court has, before the commencement, granted final relief for the wrong;\nthe persons responsible for the damage have, before the commencement, entered into an agreement to settle claims arising from the wrong, including an agreement about liability only.\nSubsection (2)(a) applies whether or not a proceeding has been started about the wrong.\nFor a proceeding for subsection (2)(a) or (b), any rule, regulation or other law that would have been applicable to the proceeding had the amending Act not been enacted continues to apply to the proceeding as if the amending Act had not been enacted.\nIn this section—\namending Act means the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Amendment Act 2001 .\ncommencement means the commencement of this section.\nfinal relief , for a wrong, means a judgment or decision about the wrong, including a judgment or decision about liability only, whether or not an appeal has been made against the judgment or decision.\nproceeding means a proceeding before a court.\nWorkCover damages injury means an injury within the meaning of the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 for which the injured person has an entitlement to damages under that Act.\ns 21 ins 2001 No. 65 s 6\n(sec.21-ssec.1) The provisions of part 3, divisions 1 and 3 apply to a wrong that happened before the commencement as if the provisions, in their form as amended by the amending Act, had been in force when the wrong happened.\n(sec.21-ssec.2) However, the provisions, as in force before the commencement, continue to apply to a wrong if any of the following apply— the wrong relates to a WorkCover damages injury sustained before 1 July 2001 for which final relief has not been granted by a court before the commencement; a proceeding about the wrong— was started before the commencement; and final relief has not been granted by the court before the commencement; a court has, before the commencement, granted final relief for the wrong; the persons responsible for the damage have, before the commencement, entered into an agreement to settle claims arising from the wrong, including an agreement about liability only.\n(sec.21-ssec.3) Subsection (2)(a) applies whether or not a proceeding has been started about the wrong.\n(sec.21-ssec.4) For a proceeding for subsection (2)(a) or (b), any rule, regulation or other law that would have been applicable to the proceeding had the amending Act not been enacted continues to apply to the proceeding as if the amending Act had not been enacted.\n(sec.21-ssec.5) In this section— amending Act means the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Amendment Act 2001 . commencement means the commencement of this section. final relief , for a wrong, means a judgment or decision about the wrong, including a judgment or decision about liability only, whether or not an appeal has been made against the judgment or decision. proceeding means a proceeding before a court. WorkCover damages injury means an injury within the meaning of the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 for which the injured person has an entitlement to damages under that Act.\n- (a) the wrong relates to a WorkCover damages injury sustained before 1 July 2001 for which final relief has not been granted by a court before the commencement;\n- (b) a proceeding about the wrong— (i) was started before the commencement; and (ii) final relief has not been granted by the court before the commencement;\n- (i) was started before the commencement; and\n- (ii) final relief has not been granted by the court before the commencement;\n- (c) a court has, before the commencement, granted final relief for the wrong;\n- (d) the persons responsible for the damage have, before the commencement, entered into an agreement to settle claims arising from the wrong, including an agreement about liability only.\n- (i) was started before the commencement; and\n- (ii) final relief has not been granted by the court before the commencement;","sortOrder":35}],"analysis":{"issue_detection":{"absurdities":[{"type":"self_contradicting","section":"sec.13(3) and sec.13(4)","severity":"medium","reasoning":"Section 13 was substituted in 2010 to extend consortium claims to both spouses, yet subsection (3) still defines the assessment benchmark exclusively by reference to a husband's claim, and subsection (4) only prevents a 'husband' from double-recovering under common law and statute. A wife who obtains damages under s13 is not expressly barred from also pursuing a common law claim, creating an asymmetry that is internally inconsistent with the gender-neutral intent of the 2010 amendment.","confidence":0.82,"description":"Section 13(3) directs that damages for a spouse's loss of consortium 'must be assessed in the same way as in a claim by a husband for damages in tort for loss or impairment of consortium', while section 13(4) then restricts recovery to 'a husband', effectively using a gender-neutral assessment standard but then limiting the double-recovery prevention rule to husbands only, implying wives face no such restriction."},{"type":"other","section":"sec.21(2)(c)","severity":"low","reasoning":"A transitional provision that preserves a legal regime for cases already finally resolved serves no operative legal function. Once final relief is granted, no further determination of liability or damages is required; accordingly the choice between old and new law is moot. The provision appears to have been included out of caution but produces a logical absurdity in that it purports to govern legal proceedings that have, by definition, concluded.","confidence":0.75,"description":"Section 21(2)(c) provides that the old pre-amendment provisions continue to apply where 'a court has, before the commencement, granted final relief for the wrong.' However, if final relief has already been granted, there are no live proceedings to which any version of the law could be applied. The subsection preserves the old law for a situation in which no further legal action is possible, rendering the provision entirely otiose."},{"type":"self_contradicting","section":"sec.21(1) and sec.21(2)(c)","severity":"low","reasoning":"Both the new law (s21(1)) and the preserved old law (s21(2)) operate retrospectively on pre-commencement wrongs. The structure is not itself impossible, but it produces the curious result that the choice between two competing retrospective legal regimes depends on procedural facts (whether proceedings were started, settled, or finally determined) rather than substantive ones, raising fairness and consistency concerns internal to the Act.","confidence":0.65,"description":"Section 21(1) gives the amended provisions retrospective effect for wrongs that happened before commencement, but section 21(2)(c) then reverts to the old law where a court has already granted final relief. The combination means that where the matter is finished, the old law applies, and where it is ongoing, the new law applies retrospectively — but the old law is also applied retrospectively under s21(2), creating a situation where both old and new law are simultaneously retrospective."},{"type":"other","section":"sec.16","severity":"low","reasoning":"While this is a deliberate policy choice, it produces a structural oddity: the same Act that imposes liability for contributory negligence (pt.3) and abolishes immunity for employers (pt.2) simultaneously removes liability for negligent professionals assisting emergencies. The immunity standard ('without gross negligence') means ordinary negligence causing death or serious harm during an emergency attracts no liability whatsoever, which sits in tension with the Act's broader pro-accountability framework.","confidence":0.55,"description":"Section 16 provides immunity from liability for acts done 'without gross negligence.' This creates the logical absurdity that the provision protects a medical practitioner who is negligent (but not grossly so) while rendering aid at an emergency — meaning the Act affirmatively removes liability for ordinary negligence in a context where victims are least able to consent to substandard care."},{"type":"impossible_compliance","section":"sec.9(2)","severity":"medium","reasoning":"Courts and practitioners must assess whether a repealed provision 'would have applied' to a claim, without that provision being in force or reproduced in this Act. Although the Act's consolidation framework preserves some continuity, the express reliance on a repealed section without reproducing its text creates interpretive difficulties that border on practical impossibility for claims in that historical window.","confidence":0.7,"description":"Section 9(2) carves out an exception to s9(1)(c) — which prevents enforcement of otherwise-unenforceable indemnity agreements — by reference to 'repealed section 7' of the Law Reform (Tortfeasors Contribution, Contributory Negligence, and Division of Chattels) Act 1952. The only way to determine whether that repealed section would have applied is by consulting legislation that no longer exists, making practical compliance with the exception potentially impossible."}],"contradictions":[{"severity":"low","section_a":"sec.12(1)","section_b":"sec.13(2) and sec.13(3)","confidence":0.72,"description":"Section 12(1) grants each party to a marriage the same right of action in tort against the other 'as if they were not married', treating spouses as legally independent. However, section 13(2)-(3) simultaneously creates a cause of action that is exclusively predicated on the marital relationship (loss of consortium), which is a right that exists only because of marriage. The Act therefore both treats marriage as legally irrelevant (s12) and as the sole basis for a distinct cause of action (s13) within the same Part."},{"severity":"medium","section_a":"sec.18(2)","section_b":"sec.13(2)","confidence":0.78,"description":"Section 18(2) in Part 7 provides that a married person has 'the same legal capacity that the person would have if the person were unmarried.' However, section 13(2) in Part 4 confers on a married person a cause of action for loss of consortium that is only available by virtue of being married — a capacity that an unmarried person does not have. Section 18(2) therefore cannot be literally true as applied across the whole Act."},{"severity":"medium","section_a":"sec.21(1)","section_b":"sec.21(2)(b)","confidence":0.85,"description":"Section 21(1) applies the amended provisions retrospectively to wrongs happening before commencement. Section 21(2)(b) then provides that the old (pre-amendment) provisions continue to apply where a proceeding was started before commencement and final relief has not been granted. This means that for the same pre-commencement wrong, whether the new or old law applies depends entirely on whether a proceeding happened to have been commenced, producing inconsistent legal treatment of identical wrongs based solely on a procedural accident."},{"severity":"low","section_a":"sec.10(1)(a)","section_b":"sec.10(2)","confidence":0.6,"description":"Section 10(1)(a) declares that a claim 'is not defeated because of the claimant's contributory negligence.' Section 10(2) then states that subsection (1) 'does not operate to defeat any defence arising under a contract.' A contractual defence could, in practice, defeat a claim notwithstanding the plaintiff's partial fault — meaning a claim that s10(1)(a) says cannot be defeated by contributory negligence can in fact be defeated by a contractual term, creating a situation where the protection in s10(1)(a) is undermined by s10(2) in ways that could produce outcomes indistinguishable from defeating a claim for contributory negligence."},{"severity":"low","section_a":"sec.2(4)","section_b":"sec.2(3)","confidence":0.58,"description":"Section 2(3) declares that the relocated provisions 'were not re-enacted... but merely moved (without re-enactment).' Section 2(4) then declares the relocation 'did not... affect the meaning or effect that the existing or relocated provisions... had because of the respective times when they were enacted.' If the provisions retain the meaning and effect they had at the time of original enactment, they must be interpreted as if still in their original Acts — yet they now appear in a different Act with a different legislative context, potentially altering their meaning. The two subsections are in tension: one says the provisions keep their original character, but the other (by placing them in a new consolidated Act) necessarily changes the interpretive context in which they appear."}]},"summary":{"complexity_score":6,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"The original source Acts each had a narrow, single-topic scope (e.g., common employment, tortfeasors, husband and wife remedies, emergency aid). The 1995 consolidation significantly broadened scope by combining these into one Act and adding new provisions on age of majority (Part 6), legal capacity of married persons (Part 7), and attachment of public service wages (Part 8). The 1996 addition of Part 8 in particular — allowing courts to garnish government employee wages — represents a meaningful expansion beyond the original civil liability reform intent of the predecessor Acts."},"complexity_factors":["Consolidation of multiple pre-existing Acts spanning decades (1951–1973), requiring understanding of legislative history","Interaction with and subordination to the Civil Liability Act 2003, meaning this Act's operation depends on reading another Act","Transitional provisions in Part 10 with multiple conditional scenarios determining which version of the law applies to past wrongs","Cross-references to numerous other Queensland statutes (Succession Act 1981, Civil Proceedings Act 2011, Limitation of Actions Act 1974, WorkCover Queensland Act 1996)","Technical legal concepts including tortfeasor contribution, contributory negligence apportionment, consortium, and attachment of wages","Temporal complexity — different commencement dates for different provisions (1953, 1968, 1985) affect which rules apply to historical events","The 'common employment' doctrine requires background knowledge of abolished common law to understand what was changed","Layering of subsections with internal cross-references (e.g., s.10 subsections referring back to each other and to Division 2)"],"plain_english_summary":"## Queensland's Law Reform Act 1995 — What It Does and Why It Matters\n\nThis Queensland Act is essentially a legal housekeeping exercise that consolidates (combines) several older reform laws into one place, while also making some important substantive changes to everyday legal rights. Here's what it actually does:\n\n### 1. Workplace Injuries — You Can Sue Your Employer for a Colleague's Fault\nUnder old common law, if a co-worker injured you at work, you couldn't sue your employer — this was called the 'common employment' defence. This Act **abolishes that defence entirely**. If a workmate injures you through negligence, your employer can be held responsible. Any contract clause trying to limit this protection is void (has no legal effect).\n\n### 2. Multiple People at Fault — How Blame is Shared\nIf several people ('tortfeasors' — people who commit a legal wrong causing harm) all contributed to your injury, this Act sets the rules:\n- You can sue more than one wrongdoer, even after winning against one of them\n- But your total payout across all lawsuits can't exceed what the first court awarded you\n- Each wrongdoer can seek a financial contribution from the others based on their share of the blame\n\n### 3. You Were Partly at Fault Too — 'Contributory Negligence'\nIf you were *partly* responsible for your own injury (e.g., you weren't wearing a seatbelt), you used to get nothing. Now, your compensation is simply **reduced** by your share of the blame — you don't lose everything. Courts decide what's fair.\n\n### 4. Spouses Can Sue Each Other\nMarried people can now sue each other in civil law (called 'tort') just like any two strangers could. Previously, spouses had limited legal standing against each other. If your spouse injures you, you have the same rights as anyone else. Also, if someone injures your spouse, you may claim compensation for the loss of your spouse's companionship and support ('consortium').\n\n### 5. Good Samaritans Are Protected\nIf a doctor, nurse, or other prescribed healthcare professional stops to help someone in an emergency (at the scene or during transport to hospital), they **cannot be sued** for that help — as long as they acted in good faith, without gross negligence, and did not charge a fee.\n\n### 6. Age of Majority Is 18\nThe Act formally states that the age of majority (the age at which you become a legal adult) is **18 years**.\n\n### 7. Married People Have Full Legal Independence\nA married person has completely separate legal identity from their spouse. Marriage does not limit your legal capacity to enter contracts, own property, or take legal action.\n\n### 8. Government Employees' Wages Can Be Garnished\nIf a public servant owes a court-ordered debt, a court (or court registrar) can order their wages to be 'attached' — meaning money is taken directly from their pay to satisfy the debt. This overrides any other laws that might have protected government wages from such orders.\n\n### Who Does This Affect?\nPractically everyone in Queensland at some point — workers injured on the job, people involved in accidents, married couples, medical volunteers, and anyone owed money by a government employee."},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":5,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"Originally enacted in 1995 as a consolidation statute to tidy up four separate Acts from 1951-1973, the legislation has grown beyond pure consolidation. Part 8 (attachment of wages, added 1996) and Part 10 (transitional provisions for 2001 amendments) introduced substantive new law rather than merely relocating existing provisions. The Act has also become increasingly interdependent with modern statutes like the Civil Liability Act 2003 and Civil Proceedings Act 2011, effectively functioning as a hub for tort law coordination rather than a simple repository of historical reforms."},"complexity_factors":["Multiple historical consolidation events requiring cross-references to repealed Acts (1951, 1952, 1968, 1973 Acts)","Retrospective and transitional provisions with multiple cut-off dates (12 January 1953, 1 June 1968, 1 January 1985, 1 July 2001)","Nested conditional logic in section 21 (transitional provisions) with four alternative conditions and sub-conditions","Interaction with multiple external statutes (Civil Liability Act 2003, Civil Proceedings Act 2011, Succession Act 1981, Limitation of Actions Act 1974, WorkCover Queensland Act 1996)","Defined terms section with some terms omitted over time (fault, medical practitioner) creating legislative archaeology","Dual application rules in Part 3 Division 2 with exception to exception in section 9(2) regarding indemnity agreements","Jury trial provisions in section 10(7) creating parallel procedural tracks"],"plain_english_summary":"This Act is a consolidation of several older Queensland laws that modernised various legal rules. It does four main things:\n\n**1. Protects injured workers (Part 2)**\n- Abolishes the old \"common employment\" rule, which let employers avoid responsibility when one worker injured another. Now employers can be sued for injuries caused by their employees to co-workers.\n- Stops employers from using contracts to avoid this liability.\n\n**2. Sorts out liability when multiple people are at fault (Part 3)**\n- If several people (tortfeasors) cause the same damage, you can sue them separately, but you can't get more total compensation than the first judgment awarded.\n- People who are sued can claim contribution from other responsible parties to share the costs fairly.\n- If the injured person was also partly at fault (contributory negligence), they can still claim damages, but the amount is reduced based on their share of responsibility.\n\n**3. Lets married couples sue each other (Part 4)**\n- Spouses can sue each other in tort (civil wrongs) just like strangers can, though courts can stop the case if there's no real benefit.\n- Either spouse can claim damages for loss of \"consortium\" (companionship and services) if the other is injured.\n\n**4. Protects Good Samaritans (Part 5)**\n- Doctors, nurses and other prescribed people who give emergency medical help without payment are protected from being sued, unless they act with \"gross negligence\" (very serious carelessness).\n\n**Other provisions:**\n- Sets the age of majority at 18 (Part 6).\n- Confirms married people have separate legal identities and capacity (Part 7).\n- Allows courts to garnish (attach) public servants' wages to pay debts (Part 8)."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":7,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The Act was drafted and declared to be, in part, a consolidation that relocated provisions from earlier Law Reform Acts without re‑enacting or changing their meaning or effect (s 2(1)–(5)).  In other words, the relocation itself was not intended to alter scope, jurisdiction, rights or liabilities. Subsequent amending legislation has altered substantive provisions (for example, amendments to contributory negligence applied with transitional rules under s 21 and operation of part 3 is subject to the Civil Liability Act 2003 at s 4A), but the consolidation step set out in s 2 did not change the original substantive scope."},"complexity_factors":["Consolidation of multiple earlier Acts with explicit non‑alteration declarations (s 2) — requires cross‑checking historical provisions.","Interplay with other statutes (Civil Liability Act 2003 at s 4A; WorkCover definitions in s 21) — legal effect depends on statutory interactions.","Wide judicial discretion to apportion contribution and to determine \"just and equitable\" shares (s 7) — fact‑intensive determinations increase unpredictability.","Contributory negligence regime requires recording hypothetical total damages and proportional reductions (s 10) — procedural and evidentiary complexity.","Temporal exclusions and savings for pre‑existing events and proceedings (ss 9, 11, 14, 21) — retrospective application and carve‑outs complicate applicability.","Multiple actors with decision authority: courts, juries, registrars (s 10(7), s 18A(2)) and the Governor in Council via regulations (s 19) — dispersed discretion.","Voidance of contract terms limiting employer liability (s 3(2)) interacts with established contract drafting and insurance markets — requires adjustment in commercial practice.","Specific liability immunities for emergency volunteers conditioned on \"good faith\" and absence of gross negligence (s 16) — raises standards‑of‑proof questions."],"plain_english_summary":"### What this Act does, who it affects, and how it works (plain English)\n\n- Mechanical changes and key rules\n  - Abolishes the old \"common employment\" defence so employers cannot avoid liability simply because the injured worker and the person whose act caused the injury were in the same employment (see s 3(1)).  Any contract term that would exclude or limit that employer liability is void to that extent (s 3(2)).\n  - Makes the Crown and its instrumentalities subject to the same rule (s 4).\n  - Sets out how people who each contributed to a single injury share liability: a person who pays can seek contribution from other tortfeasors and the court decides what is \"just and equitable\" having regard to responsibility (ss 6–7).  The division contains definitions and time‑cutoffs (ss 5, 8–11).\n  - Establishes that where a claimant was partly at fault (contributory negligence) damages are not barred but must be reduced proportionately as the court considers just and equitable; courts (or juries) must record the total damages that would have been payable but for the claimant’s fault (s 10).  The part of the Act dealing with contributory negligence operates subject to the Civil Liability Act 2003 (s 4A) and was later amended with transitional rules (s 21).\n  - Gives spouses the same general right to sue one another in tort as if they were not married, but allows a court to stay a suit between spouses if continuing it would produce no substantial benefit (s 12).  It also preserves a spouse’s remedy for loss or impairment of consortium against the person who caused injury (s 13).\n  - Protects medical practitioners, nurses and other prescribed persons from liability for emergency, unpaid assistance given in good faith and without gross negligence (s 16).\n  - Sets the age of majority at 18 (s 17) and confirms that a married person has the same legal capacity as an unmarried person (s 18).\n  - Allows a court or court registrar to order attachment (garnishment) of the salary or wages of public service employees to satisfy court‑ordered debts, notwithstanding other laws (s 18A).\n  - Confers regulation‑making power (s 19) and provides that references to several earlier Law Reform Acts may be read as references to this Act (s 20).\n\n- Stated purpose and consolidation\n  - The Act is, in part, a consolidation: provisions from several earlier Law Reform Acts were moved into this Act without re‑enactment and the statute expressly declares that the relocation did not change meaning, revive lapsed rights, or affect courts’ powers (s 2(1)–(5)).  That means the text is intended to restate existing law in one place rather than to change legal rights or jurisdictions.\n\n- Who pays and who decides\n  - Employers (and the Crown where applicable) bear direct liability for wrongful acts of employees (s 3).  Employers may see higher liability costs and will often price that into wages, insurance and commercial decisions.\n  - Where several tortfeasors are liable, each can be required to contribute; a tortfeasor who pays can seek contribution from others (s 6(c) and s 7).  Courts allocate contribution as \"just and equitable\" (s 7).  Juries, when used, determine total damages and the reduction for contributory negligence (s 10(7)).\n  - Claimants whose own negligence contributed to loss receive reduced damages rather than a complete bar (s 10).\n  - Court registrars may act directly to attach public servants’ wages (s 18A(2)); the provision operates \"despite any other Act or rule of law\" (s 18A(3)).\n\n- Incentives, costs and compliance burdens (mechanics and likely effects)\n  - Employers: cannot contract out of liability for employee‑caused injury in common employment (s 3(2)).  That restricts contract freedom in employment agreements and increases incentive to carry liability insurance, tighten workplace safety, or adjust hiring/contracting arrangements.  The cost of liability shifts to employers (and their insurers) rather than to employees by contract.\n  - Tortfeasors: the contribution scheme (ss 6–7) incentivises parties who pay damages to pursue other potential wrongdoers for their share.  The court’s broad discretion to decide \"just and equitable\" contribution (s 7) introduces litigation risk and uncertainty about ultimate financial exposure.\n  - Claimants: contributory negligence rules (s 10) reduce recoverable damages proportionately, creating an incentive for claimants to emphasise defendant fault and for defendants to prove claimant fault.  Courts must find and record total damages as if no contributory negligence occurred (s 10(3)), which affects settlement dynamics.\n  - Medical volunteers: s 16 lowers the legal risk of giving unpaid emergency aid done in good faith (subject to gross negligence), which may increase willingness to render on‑scene assistance but preserves liability for grossly negligent acts.\n  - Public servants: s 18A permits courts (and registrars) to attach wages despite other laws, increasing exposure of public employees’ earnings to judgment enforcement; that shifts enforcement mechanics and can affect employee financial planning.\n  - Contract drafters and insurers face compliance costs updating standard terms and policies to reflect the statutory prohibitions and apportionment rules (s 3, ss 6–7, s 10).\n\n- Implementation risk and discretion\n  - Courts have wide fact‑driven discretion in apportioning contribution and in assessing what is \"just and equitable\" (s 7).  That discretion creates uncertainty for parties estimating future liabilities.\n  - The regulation‑making power (s 19) permits the executive to fill details by regulation, which may affect how parts of the Act operate in practice.\n  - The Act cross‑references and operates alongside other statutes (for example, Civil Liability Act 2003 at s 4A, WorkCover definitions addressed in s 21), so outcomes depend on statutory interaction and on how courts reconcile overlapping provisions.\n\n- Trade‑offs and substitution effects to note (mechanical, not evaluative)\n  - Eliminating the common employment defence (s 3) removes a particular defence for employers but increases reliance on other defences and on insurance, safety measures, or contractual arrangements that remain lawful.\n  - The contribution regime (ss 6–7) avoids double recovery by plaintiffs (s 6(b)) while enabling redistribution of loss between wrongdoers; it creates separate litigation incentives for contribution claims.\n  - The protection for unpaid emergency medical assistance (s 16) reduces liability for volunteers but retains liability for gross negligence, shifting the boundary of reasonable care in emergencies.\n\n- Temporal and transitional points\n  - Several provisions preserve temporal limits and exclusions: divisional rules do not apply to torts before certain historical dates (ss 9, 11, 14).  The Act declares that relocation of earlier provisions did not change their effect (s 2).\n  - Amendments to the contributory negligence provisions were given retrospective effect subject to specific exceptions (s 21); that changes which version of the law applies to certain past events and pending proceedings.\n\nOverall, the Act consolidates several law‑reform provisions into one statute and sets substantive rules on employer liability (removing common employment defence), contributory negligence and apportionment, inter‑tortfeasor contribution, spouse‑related tort rights, emergency volunteer protections, age of majority and legal capacity for married persons, and enforcement by attachment of public service wages.  Courts have central roles in apportionment and determining reductions for contributory negligence, and the executive has power to regulate details (ss 7, 10, 19)."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/law-reform-act-1995","history":"/api/acts/law-reform-act-1995/history","analysis":"/api/acts/law-reform-act-1995/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/law-reform-act-1995/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/law-reform-act-1995/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/law-reform-act-1995/documents"}}