{"id":"BILL-TAS-integrity-commission-amendment-mandatory-notifications-bill-2025","name":"Integrity Commission Amendment (Mandatory Notifications) Bill 2025","slug":"integrity-commission-amendment-mandatory-notifications-bill-2025","collection":"bill","jurisdiction":"tas","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":"2025-01-01","administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":446190,"registerId":"BILL-TAS-integrity-commission-amendment-mandatory-notifications-bill-2025:current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2025-01-01","status":"in_force","reasons":null,"registeredAt":"2026-05-08T16:48:25.866Z"},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"retrieval-0001","sectionType":"document_chunk","heading":"Document excerpt 1","content":"# Integrity Commission Amendment (Mandatory Notifications) Bill 2025\n\n[Bill 69]-V\nTASMANIA\n__________\nINTEGRITY COMMISSION AMENDMENT\n(MANDATORY NOTIFICATIONS) BILL 2025\n__________\nCONTENTS\n1. Short title\n2. Commencement\n3. Principal Act\n4. Section 4 amended (Interpretation)\n5. Part 4A inserted\nPART 4A – Mandatory Notification of Suspected Misconduct\nor Suspected Serious Misconduct\n32A. Interpretation of Part\n32B. Nomination of mandatory notifiers\n32C. Mandatory notifications\n32D. Integrity Commission’s role in relation to mandatory\nnotifications\n32E. Failure of mandatory notifiers to make mandatory\nnotifications\n32F. Guidelines for mandatory notifications\n6. Section 104 amended (Amendment of Schedule 1)\n7. Schedule 1 amended (Principal Officers)\n8. Repeal of Act\n\n2\n\n[Bill 69] 3\nINTEGRITY COMMISSION AMENDMENT\n(MANDATORY NOTIFICATIONS) BILL 2025\nThis Public Bill originated in the House of Assembly, and, having this day passed, is\nnow ready for presentation to the Legislative Council for its concurrence.\nLAURA ROSS, Clerk of the House\n6 May 2026\n(Brought in by the Minister for Justice, Corrections and\nRehabilitation, the Honourable Guy Barnett)\nA BILL FOR\nAn Act to amend the Integrity Commission Act 2009\nBe it enacted by Her Excellency the Governor of Tasmania, by\nand with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council and\nHouse of Assembly, in Parliament assembled, as follows:\n1. Short title\nThis Act may be cited as the Integrity\nCommission Amendment (Mandatory\nNotifications) Act 2025.\n2. Commencement\nThis Act commences on a day to be proclaimed.\n\nIntegrity Commission Amendment (Mandatory Notifications) Act\n2025\nAct No. of 2025\ns. 3\n4\n3. Principal Act\nIn this Act, the Integrity Commission Act 2009*\nis referred to as the Principal Act.\n4. Section 4 amended (Interpretation)\nSection 4(1) of the Principal Act is amended by\ninserting after the definition of misconduct the\nfollowing definition:\noffence of a serious nature, in relation to\nserious misconduct, means an offence\npunishable by imprisonment for a term of\n12 months or longer;\n5. Part 4A inserted\nAfter section 32 of the Principal Act, the\nfollowing Part is inserted:\nPART 4A – MANDATORY NOTIFICATION OF\nSUSPECTED MISCONDUCT OR SUSPECTED\nSERIOUS MISCONDUCT\n32A. Interpretation of Part\nIn this Part –\ncommencement day means the day on\nwhich this Part commences;\n_______________________________________________________________\n*No. 67 of 2009\n\nIntegrity Commission Amendment (Mandatory Notifications) Act\n2025\nAct No. of 2025\ns. 5\n5\nguidelines means guidelines issued by\nthe Integrity Commission under\nsection 32F;\nmandatory notification means a\nnotification made by a mandatory\nnotifier to the Integrity\nCommission in accordance with\nsection 32C;\nmandatory notifier, in relation to a\npublic authority, includes –\n(a) a principal officer of the\npublic authority; and\n(b) if the public authority is a\npublic authority referred\nto in section 5(1)(a) or\n(b), each Member of\nParliament; and\n(c) a person, or a holder of a\nposition, in the public\nauthority who is\nnominated under\nsection 32B(1) as a\nmandatory notifier for\nthat public authority.\n32B. Nomination of mandatory notifiers\n(1) If a public authority is not specified in\nSchedule 1, or the position of principal\nofficer specified in relation to a public\n\nIntegrity Commission Amendment (Mandatory Notifications) Act\n2025\nAct No. of 2025\ns. 5\n6\nauthority in Schedule 1 is vacant, the\npublic authority is to nominate a person,\nor the holder of a position, in that public\nauthority as a mandatory notifier for that\npublic authority.\n(2) A public authority may revoke a\nnomination made by the public authority\nunder subsection (1), and may make a\nnew nomination under that subsection, if\nthe public authority considers it\nnecessary and appropriate to do so.\n(3) As soon as practicable after making a\nnomination under subsection (1), the\npublic authority must notify the Integrity\nCommission, in writing, of the person, or\nthe holder of the position, in that public\nauthority who is nominated under that\nsubsection as a mandatory notifier for\nthat public authority.\n(4) As soon as practicable after revoking a\nnomination under subsection (2), the\npublic authority must notify the Integrity\nCommission, in writing, of the person, or\nthe holder of the position, in that public\nauthority whose nomination as a\nmandatory notifier for that public\nauthority has been revoked under that\nsubsection.\n\nIntegrity Commission Amendment (Mandatory Notifications) Act\n2025\nAct No. of 2025\ns. 5\n7\n32C. Mandatory notifications\n(1) Subject to this section and the guidelines,\na mandatory notifier for a public\nauthority must notify the Integrity\nCommission of any matter or information\nthat the mandatory notifier suspects, on\nreasonable grounds, involves or may\ninvolve –\n(a) misconduct or serious misconduct\nby a designated public officer\nwho holds any office,\nemployment, or position, in that\npublic authority; or\n(b) serious misconduct by a public\nofficer who holds any office,\nemployment, or position, in that\npublic authority –\nas soon as practicable after that\nmandatory notifier forms the suspicion\nand regardless of whether that suspicion\nwas formed before the commencement\nday.\n(2) A mandatory notifier for a public\nauthority is not required to make a\nmandatory notification under\nsubsection (1) in respect of misconduct\nor serious misconduct if the mandatory\nnotifier knows that legal, disciplinary,\nadministrative or investigatory\nproceedings or actions in relation to the\n\nIntegrity Commission Amendment (Mandatory Notifications) Act\n2025\nAct No. of 2025\ns. 5\n8\nmisconduct or serious misconduct were\nconcluded under any Act before the\ncommencement day.\n(3) A mandatory notifier for a public\nauthority is required to make a\nmandatory notification under\nsubsection (1) in respect of misconduct\nor serious misconduct by a person who\nwas –\n(a) a designated public officer for the\npublic authority at the time at\nwhich the misconduct, or serious\nmisconduct, to be notified in the\nmandatory notification occurred;\nor\n(b) a public officer for the public\nauthority at the time at which the\nserious misconduct to be notified\nin the mandatory notification\noccurred –\nwhether or not the person is a designated\npublic officer, or public officer, for that\npublic authority at the time at which the\nmandatory notifier makes the mandatory\nnotification.\n(4) A mandatory notifier for a public\nauthority must make a mandatory\nnotification under subsection (1) in\nrespect of misconduct or serious\nmisconduct regardless of whether the\n\nIntegrity Commission Amendment (Mandatory Notifications) Act\n2025\nAct No. of 2025\ns. 5\n9\nmisconduct or serious misconduct has\nbeen referred to a public officer,\nprincipal officer or public authority for\nthe purposes of any Act.\n(5) If a public authority has concluded its\nown investigation, or taken any other\naction, in relation to a matter or\ninformation to which a mandatory\nnotification relates, the public authority\nmust, as soon as is practicable, notify the\nIntegrity Commission of the outcome of\nthe investigation or action.\n(6) A mandatory notifier for a public\nauthority must have regard to the\nguidelines, if any, when making a\nmandatory notification under\nsubsection (1).\n(7) This section applies to a mandatory\nnotifier regardless of an obligation on the\nmandatory notifier –\n(a) under the provisions of any Act;\nor\n(b) to maintain confidentiality about\nthe alleged misconduct or alleged\nserious misconduct to which the\nmandatory notification relates.\n\nIntegrity Commission Amendment (Mandatory Notifications) Act\n2025\nAct No. of 2025\ns. 5\n10\n32D. Integrity Commission’s role in relation to\nmandatory notifications\n(1) In dealing with mandatory notifications,\nthe Integrity Commission, having regard\nto the principles stated in section 9,\nmay –\n(a) require a public authority to\nprovide a report to the Integrity\nCommission detailing the actions\nthe public authority is taking, or\nintends to take, in relation to a\nmandatory notification; and\n(b) provide advice to a public\nauthority in relation to the\nconduct of an investigation by the\npublic authority into any alleged\nmisconduct, or alleged serious\nmisconduct, to which a\nmandatory notification relates;\nand\n(c) exercise any of the functions and\npowers in relation to misconduct\nthat are conferred on the Integrity\nCommission under section 8.\n(2) If, in dealing with a mandatory\nnotification under subsection (1)(c), the\nIntegrity Commission assumes\nresponsibility for an investigation\ncommenced by a public authority into\nany alleged misconduct, or alleged\n\nIntegrity Commission Amendment (Mandatory Notifications) Act\n2025\nAct No. of 2025\ns. 5\n11\nserious misconduct, to which the\nmandatory notification relates, the public\nauthority must stop the public authority’s\ninvestigation, or any related actions, that\nmay impede the Integrity Commission’s\ninvestigation, if that public authority is\ndirected to do so by the Integrity\nCommission.\n32E. Failure of mandatory notifiers to make\nmandatory notifications\nIf the Integrity Commission believes that\na mandatory notifier has failed to comply\nwith the requirement to make a\nmandatory notification under\nsection 32C(1), the Integrity Commission\nmay do either or both of the following:\n(a) inquire into the alleged non-\ncompliance with the mandatory\nnotifier;\n(b) report the alleged non-\ncompliance to a person or body\nwho or which has the power to\ninquire into the alleged non-\ncompliance.\n32F. Guidelines for mandatory notifications\n(1) The Integrity Commission may, from\ntime to time, determine and issue\nguidelines with respect to any matter\n\nIntegrity Commission Amendment (Mandatory Notifications) Act\n2025\nAct No. of 2025\ns. 5\n12\nrelating to mandatory notifications,\nincluding but not limited to –\n(a) the form, content and method of\nmaking a mandatory notification;\nand\n(b) the provision of information and\nguidance on the types of matters\nand information that require\nmandatory notification; and\n(c) the provision of information and\nguidance on the obligations of\nmandatory notifiers.\n(2) The Integrity Commission may –\n(a) amend guidelines issued under\nsubsection (1); or\n(b) revoke guidelines issued under\nsubsection (1) and issue\nguidelines under that subsection\nin their place.\n(3) The Integrity Commission, as soon as\npracticable after issuing any guidelines,\nis to publish, and keep published while in\nforce, a copy of those guidelines on a\nwebsite of the Integrity Commission.\n\nIntegrity Commission Amendment (Mandatory Notifications) Act\n2025\nAct No. of 2025\ns. 6\n13\n6. Section 104 amended (Amendment of Schedule 1)\nSection 104 of the Principal Act is amended by\ninserting after subsection (3) the following\nsubsection:\n(4) The amendment by an Act of Column 1\nof Schedule 1, or Column 2 of\nSchedule 1, does not prevent those\nColumns of that Schedule, or that\nSchedule itself, from being amended, or\nomitted and substituted, by a subsequent\norder made under subsection (1), (2) or\n(3).\n7. Schedule 1 amended (Principal Officers)\nSchedule 1 to the Principal Act is amended by\ninserting after item 7 in Part 1 the following\nitem:\n8. University of Tasmania Vice-Chancellor of the University of\nTasmania\n8. Repeal of Act\nThis Act is repealed on the first anniversary of\nthe day on which it commenced.\nGovernment Printer, Tasmania","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":7,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"Yes. The amendment meaningfully expands the Integrity Commission’s practical remit compared with the Principal Act’s original framework by creating statutory, mandatory reporting duties on named officers and nominated positions (Part 4A), authorising the Commission to demand reports and to assume and direct investigations (s.32D), and by making confidentiality obligations secondary to the reporting duty (s.32C(7)). The bill also broadens the list of principal officers (adds the University of Tasmania Vice‑Chancellor) and changes the procedure for updating that list (s.104 amendment). The retroactive reporting obligation (s.32C(1)) and the Commission’s power to report alleged non‑compliance (s.32E) extend oversight into historical matters and enforcement pathways. The one‑year repeal clause limits the change to a temporary trial unless renewed, but while in force the amendments substantially extend the Commission’s oversight, reporting footprint, and operational control over investigations."},"complexity_factors":["Insertion of a new Part 4A containing 7 sections (32A–32F) introducing new duties and powers","Addition of a new defined term to s.4 (offence of a serious nature) with a bright‑line sentencing threshold (12 months)","Retroactive application: duty to notify applies to suspicions formed before commencement (s.32C(1))","Exception complexity: suspicions need not be reported only if prior proceedings were concluded before commencement (s.32C(2))","Multiple actor categories and nomination mechanism for mandatory notifiers (principal officers, MPs in some cases, and nominated position‑holders) (s.32A, 32B)","Interplay with existing confidentiality and other statutory obligations — the new duty applies despite confidentiality under other Acts (s.32C(7))","Commission powers to request reports, advise, assume investigations and direct public authorities to stop investigations (s.32D), creating inter‑agency operational dependencies","Guidelines regime with publication, amendment and revocation powers (s.32F) that will determine much practical detail","Amendment to Schedule 1 and to s.104 allowing Schedule 1 to be varied by order; plus a sunset (repeal) after one year, adding temporal complexity"],"plain_english_summary":"**What this law does, in plain language**\n\n- It adds a new mandatory reporting regime to the Integrity Commission Act 2009 (the Principal Act). The new Part 4A requires certain people connected with public authorities to tell the Integrity Commission when they reasonably suspect misconduct or serious misconduct. (See new sections 32A–32F.)\n\n- It defines “offence of a serious nature” for the purposes of serious misconduct as an offence punishable by 12 months’ imprisonment or more (amends section 4). (Section 4 amendment.)\n\n- It specifies who the mandatory reporters are (called “mandatory notifiers”): principal officers of public authorities, nominated holders of positions within a public authority, and — for some public authorities identified in the Act — each Member of Parliament. Public authorities that are not listed in Schedule 1, or where the listed principal officer position is vacant, must nominate a person or a position to be the mandatory notifier and must tell the Integrity Commission about that nomination (section 32B). (Section 32B.)\n\n- Mandatory notifiers must notify the Integrity Commission as soon as practicable if they suspect on reasonable grounds that a designated public officer has engaged in misconduct or serious misconduct, or that a public officer has engaged in serious misconduct. The duty to notify applies even if the suspicion was formed before the law commences (retroactive application), unless legal/disciplinary/administrative proceedings about the matter were concluded under any Act before commencement. The duty also applies whether or not the person accused is still in the job, and even if the matter was already referred to another public officer or authority. (Section 32C.)\n\n- If a public authority has already completed an internal investigation or taken action about a matter that must be notified, that authority must tell the Integrity Commission the outcome as soon as practicable. Mandatory notifiers must have regard to guidelines issued by the Integrity Commission. The obligation applies even if the notifier has confidentiality obligations under another law. (Section 32C(5)–(7).)\n\n- The Integrity Commission’s practical powers when it receives mandatory notifications include: asking a public authority for a report about actions taken (32D(1)(a)); advising a public authority about its investigations (32D(1)(b)); and using the Commission’s existing investigative powers in relation to misconduct (32D(1)(c)). If the Commission takes over an investigation, it can direct the public authority to stop its own investigation or related actions that would impede the Commission’s work. (Section 32D.)\n\n- If the Commission believes a mandatory notifier has not made a required notification, the Commission may inquire into the alleged failure or report it to another body that can investigate. (Section 32E.)\n\n- The Integrity Commission can issue and publish guidelines about how notifications should be made and what must be reported; it can amend or revoke those guidelines. (Section 32F.)\n\n- The bill adds the Vice‑Chancellor of the University of Tasmania to Schedule 1 (principal officers list) and makes a technical change so Schedule 1 can be altered by subsequent orders. The whole amendment Act is set to repeal automatically one year after it commences (sunset clause). (Schedule 1 amendment; section 104 amendment; repeal clause.)\n\n**Who is affected**\n\n- Mandatory notifiers: principal officers, nominated position‑holders within public authorities, and certain Members of Parliament (for public authorities listed in section 5(1)(a) or (b)). These people acquire a legal duty to report suspected misconduct/serious misconduct. (Sections 32A–32C.)\n\n- Public authorities: they must nominate notifiers when required, notify the Commission of investigation outcomes, and comply if the Commission directs them to halt their own investigations. They may face extra administrative work and oversight. (Sections 32B, 32C(5), 32D(2).)\n\n- Persons accused of misconduct: investigations may be transferred to the Integrity Commission, and matters may be reported even if the accused is no longer in office. (Sections 32C(3), 32D.)\n\n- The Integrity Commission: receives more reports, gains an express role to request reports, give advice, and assume investigations, and must publish guidance. (Sections 32D, 32F.)\n\n**Why it matters (claimed purpose and practical consequences)**\n\n- The explicit policy aim (as expressed by the instrument) is to centralise and standardise reporting of suspected wrongdoing so the Integrity Commission can oversee and, where necessary, step in to investigate. The law achieves that mechanically by creating duties on identified officers to report and by giving the Commission powers to demand information and take over investigations (Sections 32C, 32D, 32E, 32F).\n\n- Costs and compliance burden: the law increases reporting and administrative duties for public authorities and for individuals who become mandatory notifiers. Those duties include making notifications “as soon as practicable” and informing the Commission of outcomes of internal investigations (Sections 32B, 32C(1), 32C(5)). That will increase transaction costs for public authorities and require staff time and recordkeeping.\n\n- Scope and resource effects for the Commission: the Commission can expect more incoming reports (including historically formed suspicions because of retroactivity in section 32C(1)) and therefore needs capacity to triage, investigate, and manage sensitive material. The Commission also becomes a decision‑point that can halt internal inquiries (Section 32D(2)).\n\n- Legal and operational friction: the requirement applies despite other confidentiality obligations under law (Section 32C(7)). That creates a direct legal interaction with other statutes and workplace confidentiality or privacy rules and may produce disputes about precedence and lawful disclosure. The Commission’s power to direct a public authority to stop its investigation (Section 32D(2)) creates a coordination point but also a potential interruption of local investigatory processes.\n\n- Behavioural incentives and risks: mandatory reporting can increase detection and central review but may also produce over‑reporting (to avoid liability) or underreporting if notifiers fear reprisals or lack clarity about “reasonable grounds” or the timing requirement. The nomination mechanism (Section 32B) concentrates responsibility on identified positions, which makes compliance simple in design but could create gaps if nominations are delayed or revoked without notification.\n\n- Retroactivity and temporal scope: the duty applies to suspicions formed before commencement unless proceedings about the matter were already concluded before commencement (Section 32C(1)–(2)). That can generate reports about historical conduct and increase workload immediately after commencement.\n\n- Sunset clause: the amendment repeals itself after one year, meaning the regime is temporary unless re‑enacted. That affects long‑term planning and may indicate a trial period. (Repeal clause.)\n\n**Concrete trade‑offs and implementation issues to watch**\n\n- Who pays: administrative and investigation costs are borne by public authorities and the Integrity Commission. Individuals named in reports may face reputational and employment consequences.\n- Who decides: the Integrity Commission gains a stronger gatekeeping role to request information, advise, and take over investigations (Section 32D).\n- Unclear standards: terms such as “reasonable grounds” and “as soon as practicable” are left to case‑by‑case interpretation and to the Commission’s guidance (Sections 32C, 32F). How the Commission publishes and applies guidelines will shape practice.\n- Concentrated vs diffuse impacts: benefits (central oversight) are concentrated for those who want stronger central scrutiny; costs are diffuse across many public authorities and officers who must comply.\n\n**Key sections to refer to**: definition of serious offence (amendment to s.4), new Part 4A (ss.32A–32F), Schedule 1 addition (Vice‑Chancellor, University of Tasmania), amendment to s.104 about future changes to Schedule 1, and the repeal/sunset clause."},"summary":{"status_summary":"Introduced in the Tasmanian House of Assembly on 6 May 2026 and awaiting debate.","complexity_score":4,"likely_questions":["What specific conduct triggers the mandatory notification requirement?","Who exactly is a mandatory notifier for each public authority?","What happens if a mandatory notifier fails to report suspected misconduct?","Why does the Act repeal itself after one year?","How will the Integrity Commission handle an increase in mandatory notifications?"],"complexity_factors":["relatively short bill with a single new part and a few consequential amendments","definitions are straightforward but rely on existing terms in the principal Act","mandatory notification obligation is new but the conditions are clearly set out","sunset clause adds a temporal dimension that affects long-term planning"],"plain_english_summary":"This bill adds a mandatory reporting duty to the Integrity Commission Act requiring certain senior officers, specified MPs and nominated officials in Tasmanian public authorities (including the University of Tasmania vice‑chancellor) to notify the Integrity Commission when they form a reasonable suspicion of misconduct or serious misconduct. The Commission can issue guidance, investigate non‑compliance, and take over or pause agency investigations. The regime raises compliance, training and resourcing questions and sunsets one year after commencement. The bill is not yet passed."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/integrity-commission-amendment-mandatory-notifications-bill-2025","history":"/api/acts/integrity-commission-amendment-mandatory-notifications-bill-2025/history","analysis":"/api/acts/integrity-commission-amendment-mandatory-notifications-bill-2025/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/integrity-commission-amendment-mandatory-notifications-bill-2025/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/integrity-commission-amendment-mandatory-notifications-bill-2025/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/integrity-commission-amendment-mandatory-notifications-bill-2025/documents"}}