{"id":"nsw:sl-2017-0479","name":"Independent Commission Against Corruption Regulation 2017","slug":"independent-commission-against-corruption-regulation-2017","collection":"regulation","jurisdiction":"nsw","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":"479 of 2017","makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":176718,"registerId":"nsw-nsw:sl-2017-0479-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-05","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"Part 1","sectionType":"part","heading":"Preliminary","content":"# Part 1 Preliminary\n\nPart 1 Preliminary","sortOrder":0},{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"Name of Regulation","content":"#### 1 Name of Regulation\n\n1 Name of Regulation\n\n> This Regulation is the [Independent Commission Against Corruption Regulation 2017](/view/html/inforce/current/sl-2017-0479).","sortOrder":1},{"sectionNumber":"2","sectionType":"section","heading":"Commencement","content":"#### 2 Commencement\n\n2 Commencement\n\n> This Regulation commences on 1 September 2017 and is required to be published on the NSW legislation website.\n> \n> Note.\n> \n> This Regulation replaces the [Independent Commission Against Corruption Regulation 2010](/view/html/repealed/current/sl-2010-0211), which is repealed on 1 September 2017 by section 10 (2) of the [Subordinate Legislation Act 1989](/view/html/inforce/current/act-1989-146).","sortOrder":2},{"sectionNumber":"3","sectionType":"section","heading":"Definitions","content":"#### 3 Definitions\n\n3 Definitions\n\n> > (1) In this Regulation—\n> > \n> > affiliated health organisation has the same meaning as it has in the [Health Services Act 1997](/view/html/inforce/current/act-1997-154).\n> > \n> > approved means approved for the time being by the Chief Commissioner.\n> > \n> > associated person is defined in clause 4.\n> > \n> > dependent child of a person means anyone who is under the age of 18 years and is a child of the person or of the person’s spouse.\n> > \n> > financial interest, in relation to an officer of the Commission or an applicant for a position as an officer of the Commission, means—\n> > \n> > > (a) any pecuniary interest or other matter, referred to in section 110 (a) (i)–(xi) of the Act, that relates to the officer or applicant, or\n> > \n> > > (b) any such interest or other matter that relates to a person who is associated with the officer or applicant.\n> > \n> > spouse means—\n> > \n> > > (a) the person to whom a person is legally married (including the husband or wife of a person), or\n> > \n> > > (b) a de facto partner,\n> > \n> > but where more than one person would so qualify as a spouse, means only the last person so to qualify.\n> > \n> > Note.\n> > \n> > “De facto partner” is defined in section 21C of the [Interpretation Act 1987](/view/html/inforce/current/act-1987-015).\n> > \n> > statutory health corporation has the same meaning as it has in the [Health Services Act 1997](/view/html/inforce/current/act-1997-154).\n> > \n> > the Act means the [Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988](/view/html/inforce/current/act-1988-035).\n> > \n> > Note.\n> > \n> > The Act and the [Interpretation Act 1987](/view/html/inforce/current/act-1987-015) contain definitions and other provisions that affect the interpretation and application of this Regulation.\n> \n> > (2) For the purposes of section 110 (a) (xii) of the Act, the pecuniary interests or other matters referred to in paragraph (b) of the definition of financial interest in subclause (1) are specified.\n> \n> > (3) The Appendix to this Regulation forms part of this Regulation, but notes included in this Regulation do not form part of this Regulation.\n> \n> **cl 3:** Am 2018 No 28, Sch 1.15.","sortOrder":3},{"sectionNumber":"4","sectionType":"section","heading":"Associated persons","content":"#### 4 Associated persons\n\n4 Associated persons\n\n> > (1) In this Regulation, a reference to a person who is associated with an officer of the Commission, or an applicant for a position as an officer of the Commission, is a reference to—\n> > \n> > > (a) in the case of an officer or applicant who is an individual, any of the individual’s family or business associates, or\n> > \n> > > (b) in the case of an officer or applicant that is a company engaged under section 104B of the Act—\n> > > \n> > > > (i) any of the company’s key personnel, or\n> > > \n> > > > (ii) any of those key personnel’s family or business associates, or\n> > > \n> > > > (iii) any of the company’s related bodies corporate (within the meaning of the [Corporations Act 2001](http://www.legislation.gov.au/) of the Commonwealth).\n> \n> > (2) For the purposes of this clause—\n> > \n> > > (a) the following persons are an individual’s family associates—\n> > > \n> > > > (i) the individual’s spouse,\n> > > \n> > > > (ii) the individual’s dependent children,\n> > > \n> > > > (iii) such other members of the individual’s household or family as the Chief Commissioner may specify in respect of a particular individual or class of individuals, and\n> > \n> > > (b) the following persons are an individual’s business associates—\n> > > \n> > > > (i) the individual’s employer,\n> > > \n> > > > (ii) any such employer’s key personnel (in the case of an employer that is a company),\n> > > \n> > > > (iii) the individual’s partners in any partnership of which the individual is a member,\n> > > \n> > > > (iv) such employees of any such partnership, and such other persons having contractual relationships with the partnership, as the Chief Commissioner may specify in respect of a particular partnership or class of partnerships,\n> > > \n> > > > (v) the individual’s employees,\n> > > \n> > > > (vi) such other persons having contractual relationships with the individual as the Chief Commissioner may specify in respect of a particular individual or class of individuals, and\n> > \n> > > (c) the following persons are a company’s key personnel—\n> > > \n> > > > (i) the directors of the company,\n> > > \n> > > > (ii) the secretary of the company,\n> > > \n> > > > (iii) such officers or employees of the company, such shareholders in the company and such other persons having contractual relationships with the company as the Chief Commissioner may specify in respect of a particular company or class of companies.","sortOrder":4},{"sectionNumber":"Part 2","sectionType":"part","heading":"Codes of conduct","content":"# Part 2 Codes of conduct\n\nPart 2 Codes of conduct","sortOrder":5},{"sectionNumber":"5","sectionType":"section","heading":"NSW Ministerial Code of Conduct","content":"#### 5 NSW Ministerial Code of Conduct\n\n5 NSW Ministerial Code of Conduct\n\n> The NSW Ministerial Code of Conduct set out in the Appendix to this Regulation is prescribed as an applicable code of conduct for the purposes of section 9 of the Act.","sortOrder":6},{"sectionNumber":"Part 3","sectionType":"part","heading":"Security","content":"# Part 3 Security\n\nPart 3 Security","sortOrder":7},{"sectionNumber":"6","sectionType":"section","heading":"Disclosure of certain information","content":"#### 6 Disclosure of certain information\n\n6 Disclosure of certain information\n\n> > (1) The Chief Commissioner may at any time require an officer of the Commission, or an applicant for a position as an officer of the Commission, to furnish to the Chief Commissioner a statement of personal particulars, in the approved form, in relation to—\n> > \n> > > (a) the officer or applicant, or\n> > \n> > > (b) any other person who is associated with the officer or applicant.\n> \n> > (2) The statement must be accompanied by an authority for the release of information, and a consent to conduct inquiries, each in the approved form and each duly executed by the person to whom the statement relates.\n> \n> > (3) An officer or applicant who is required to furnish to the Chief Commissioner one or more statements under this clause must, when furnishing that statement or those statements, also furnish the Chief Commissioner with a statutory declaration, in the approved form, concerning the officer’s or applicant’s association (if any) with known or reputed criminals.","sortOrder":8},{"sectionNumber":"7","sectionType":"section","heading":"Production of certain documents","content":"#### 7 Production of certain documents\n\n7 Production of certain documents\n\n> > (1) The Chief Commissioner may require an officer of the Commission, or an applicant for a position as an officer of the Commission, to furnish to the Chief Commissioner such of the documents referred to in subclause (2) or (3) relating to—\n> > \n> > > (a) the officer or applicant, or\n> > \n> > > (b) any other person who is associated with the officer or applicant,\n> > \n> > as are in the possession of the officer or applicant or to which the officer or applicant has an immediate right of possession.\n> \n> > (2) The documents to be furnished in the case of an individual are as follows—\n> > \n> > > (a) a birth certificate or a duly certified extract of a birth certificate,\n> > \n> > > (b) a marriage certificate or a duly certified extract of a marriage certificate,\n> > \n> > > (c) a current passport,\n> > \n> > > (d) a current driver’s licence,\n> > \n> > > (e) a duly certified copy of any registered deed by which the individual has formally changed the individual’s name,\n> > \n> > > (f) a certificate of naturalisation,\n> > \n> > > (g) a certificate of discharge from the Defence Force,\n> > \n> > > (h) a certificate evidencing the individual’s educational, professional or trade qualifications,\n> > \n> > > (i) the most recent income tax return lodged by, and the most recent income tax assessment issued in relation to, the individual.\n> \n> > (3) The documents to be furnished in the case of a company or partnership engaged under section 104B of the Act are as follows—\n> > \n> > > (a) a copy of the constitution of the company or of the agreement establishing the partnership,\n> > \n> > > (b) the most recent annual report of the company or partnership,\n> > \n> > > (c) the most recent audited financial statement in relation to the company or partnership,\n> > \n> > > (d) the most recent income tax return lodged by, and the most recent income tax assessment issued in relation to, the company or the several partners in the partnership.","sortOrder":9},{"sectionNumber":"8","sectionType":"section","heading":"Fingerprints to be furnished","content":"#### 8 Fingerprints to be furnished\n\n8 Fingerprints to be furnished\n\n> > (1) The Chief Commissioner may require an officer of the Commission, or an applicant for a position as an officer of the Commission, to furnish to the Chief Commissioner an imprint of the officer’s or applicant’s fingerprints.\n> \n> > (2) If the officer or applicant is a company or partnership engaged or to be engaged under section 104B of the Act, the Chief Commissioner may require the officer or applicant to furnish to the Chief Commissioner an imprint of the fingerprints of—\n> > \n> > > (a) any specified associate of the company, or\n> > \n> > > (b) any specified associate of a partner in the partnership.\n> \n> > (3) Fingerprint imprints obtained by the Commission from an applicant, or an associate of an applicant, are to be destroyed within 6 months after the application is determined unless, within that time, the applicant becomes an officer of the Commission.\n> \n> > (4) Fingerprint imprints obtained by the Commission from an officer, or an associate of an officer, are to be destroyed within 6 months after the officer ceases to be an officer.\n> \n> > (5) In the case of an officer—\n> > \n> > > (a) who is under investigation by the Commission when the officer ceases to be an officer, or\n> > \n> > > (b) who becomes subject to such an investigation within 6 months after ceasing to be an officer,\n> > \n> > the Commission may retain the fingerprint imprints of the officer, or of any associate of the officer, for such further period as is necessary to complete the investigation and any legal proceedings arising from the investigation.","sortOrder":10},{"sectionNumber":"9","sectionType":"section","heading":"Changes in personal particulars to be notified","content":"#### 9 Changes in personal particulars to be notified\n\n9 Changes in personal particulars to be notified\n\n> An officer of the Commission who becomes aware of any significant change in the personal particulars in relation to—\n> \n> > (a) the officer, or\n> \n> > (b) any person who is associated with the officer and in respect of whom the officer has previously furnished a statement of personal particulars under this Part,\n> \n> must immediately furnish a statement of that change, in the approved form, to the Chief Commissioner.","sortOrder":11},{"sectionNumber":"10","sectionType":"section","heading":"Conflict of interests to be notified","content":"#### 10 Conflict of interests to be notified\n\n10 Conflict of interests to be notified\n\n> If an officer of the Commission becomes aware of any conflict of interest that has arisen, or that could be seen as having arisen, between the officer’s duties as an officer and the officer’s private interests, the officer must immediately notify the Chief Commissioner of that fact.","sortOrder":12},{"sectionNumber":"Part 4","sectionType":"part","heading":"Disclosure of financial interests","content":"# Part 4 Disclosure of financial interests\n\nPart 4 Disclosure of financial interests","sortOrder":13},{"sectionNumber":"11","sectionType":"section","heading":"Disclosure of certain financial information","content":"#### 11 Disclosure of certain financial information\n\n11 Disclosure of certain financial information\n\n> > (1) On becoming an officer of the Commission, the officer must furnish to the Chief Commissioner a statement of financial interests, in the approved form, in relation to the officer.\n> \n> > (2) Without limiting subclause (1), the Chief Commissioner may at any time require an officer of the Commission, or an applicant for a position as an officer of the Commission, to furnish to the Chief Commissioner a statement of financial interests, in the approved form, in relation to—\n> > \n> > > (a) the officer or applicant, or\n> > \n> > > (b) any other person who is associated with the officer or applicant.","sortOrder":14},{"sectionNumber":"12","sectionType":"section","heading":"Changes in financial interests to be notified","content":"#### 12 Changes in financial interests to be notified\n\n12 Changes in financial interests to be notified\n\n> An officer of the Commission who becomes aware of any significant change in the financial interests in relation to—\n> \n> > (a) the officer, or\n> \n> > (b) any person who is associated with the officer and in respect of whom the officer has previously furnished a statement of financial interests under this Part,\n> \n> must immediately furnish a statement of that change, in the approved form, to the Chief Commissioner.","sortOrder":15},{"sectionNumber":"13","sectionType":"section","heading":"Exemptions from this Part","content":"#### 13 Exemptions from this Part\n\n13 Exemptions from this Part\n\n> The Chief Commissioner—\n> \n> > (a) may at any time exempt any particular officer or class of officers from the requirements of this Part, and\n> \n> > (b) may at any time impose conditions on any such exemption, and\n> \n> > (c) may at any time revoke any such exemption or any condition to which any such exemption is subject.","sortOrder":16},{"sectionNumber":"Part 5","sectionType":"part","heading":"Miscellaneous","content":"# Part 5 Miscellaneous\n\nPart 5 Miscellaneous","sortOrder":17},{"sectionNumber":"14","sectionType":"section","heading":"Further information","content":"#### 14 Further information\n\n14 Further information\n\n> The Chief Commissioner may require an officer of the Commission, or an applicant for a position as an officer of the Commission, to furnish to the Chief Commissioner such further information as the Chief Commissioner may specify in respect of any matter disclosed to the Chief Commissioner by the officer or applicant for the purposes of this Regulation.","sortOrder":18},{"sectionNumber":"15","sectionType":"section","heading":"Statutory declarations","content":"#### 15 Statutory declarations\n\n15 Statutory declarations\n\n> A statutory declaration that, by or under this Regulation, is required to be made by a company or partnership engaged or to be engaged under section 104B of the Act must be made on behalf of the company or partnership by such of the directors or employees of the company, or by such of the partners in or employees of the partnership, as the Chief Commissioner may direct.","sortOrder":19},{"sectionNumber":"16","sectionType":"section","heading":"Compliance with Regulation a condition of employment","content":"#### 16 Compliance with Regulation a condition of employment\n\n16 Compliance with Regulation a condition of employment\n\n> > (1) It is a condition of an officer’s employment or engagement with the Commission that the officer complies with the requirements of this Regulation.\n> \n> > (2) Failure to comply with any such requirement is sufficient ground for terminating the officer’s employment or engagement.\n> \n> > (3) This clause has effect despite any other condition of the officer’s conditions of employment or engagement.\n> \n> > (4) A person does not fail to comply with the requirements of this Regulation merely because the person fails to disclose matters of which the person is not aware.","sortOrder":20},{"sectionNumber":"17","sectionType":"section","heading":"Seal of the Commission","content":"#### 17 Seal of the Commission\n\n17 Seal of the Commission\n\n> The seal of the Commission must be kept in the custody of a Commissioner and affixed to a document of the Commission in the presence of a Commissioner, or of an Assistant Commissioner, and of one other member of staff of the Commission.","sortOrder":21},{"sectionNumber":"18","sectionType":"section","heading":"Identity cards","content":"#### 18 Identity cards\n\n18 Identity cards\n\n> The Chief Commissioner may issue identity cards, in the approved form, to officers of the Commission.","sortOrder":22},{"sectionNumber":"19","sectionType":"section","heading":"Definition of “public authority”","content":"#### 19 Definition of “public authority”\n\n19 Definition of “public authority”\n\n> For the purposes of paragraph (g) of the definition of public authority in section 3 (1) of the Act the following are declared to be a body within that definition—\n> \n> > (a) each affiliated health organisation and statutory health corporation,\n> \n> > (b) each reserve trust established under the [Crown Lands Act 1989](/view/html/repealed/current/act-1989-006) in relation to a reserve or part of a reserve that is dedicated or reserved for the purposes of a public cemetery or crematorium or a related purpose.","sortOrder":23},{"sectionNumber":"20","sectionType":"section","heading":"Principal officers of public authorities","content":"#### 20 Principal officers of public authorities\n\n20 Principal officers of public authorities\n\n> > (1) For the purposes of section 11 (5) of the Act, the principal officers of the following public authorities are as follows—\n> > \n> > > (a) the council of a local government area—the general manager of the council,\n> > \n> > > (b) a local health district within the meaning of the [Health Services Act 1997](/view/html/inforce/current/act-1997-154)—the chief executive of the local health district,\n> > \n> > > (c) a statutory health corporation—the chief executive of the statutory health corporation,\n> > \n> > > (d) an affiliated health organisation—the person who is responsible to the governing body of the affiliated health organisation for the management of its recognised establishments and recognised services.\n> \n> > (2) For the purposes of section 11 (6) of the Act, the principal officers in relation to matters concerning the following separate offices of public authorities are as follows—\n> > \n> > > (a) Aboriginal Affairs, Department of Education—the Chief Executive of Aboriginal Affairs,\n> > \n> > > (b) Ageing, Disability and Home Care, Department of Family and Community Services—the Chief Executive of Ageing, Disability and Home Care,\n> > \n> > > (c) Ambulance Service of NSW, NSW Health Service—the chief executive of the Ambulance Service of NSW,\n> > \n> > > (d) Community Services, Department of Family and Community Services—the Chief Executive of Community Services,\n> > \n> > > (e) Corrective Services NSW, Department of Justice—the Commissioner of Corrective Services,\n> > \n> > > (f) Housing NSW, Department of Family and Community Services—the Chief Executive of Housing NSW,\n> > \n> > > (g) Juvenile Justice, Department of Justice—the Chief Executive of Juvenile Justice.\n> \n> **cl 20:** Am 2017 No 63, Sch 4.24.","sortOrder":24},{"sectionNumber":"21","sectionType":"section","heading":"Savings","content":"#### 21 Savings\n\n21 Savings\n\n> Any act, matter or thing that, immediately before the repeal of the [Independent Commission Against Corruption Regulation 2010](/view/html/repealed/current/sl-2010-0211), had effect under that Regulation continues to have effect under this Regulation.","sortOrder":25},{"sectionNumber":"app","sectionType":"schedule","heading":"NSW Ministerial Code of Conduct","content":"# app NSW Ministerial Code of Conduct\n\nAppendix NSW Ministerial Code of Conduct","sortOrder":26},{"sectionNumber":"app-inc-pt","sectionType":"part","heading":"Preamble","content":"# app-inc-pt Preamble\n\nPreamble\n\n> 1 It is essential to the maintenance of public confidence in the integrity of Government that Ministers exhibit and be seen to exhibit the highest standards of probity in the exercise of their offices and that they pursue and be seen to pursue the best interests of the people of New South Wales to the exclusion of any other interest.\n\n> 2 Ministers are individually and collectively responsible to the Parliament. Their ultimate responsibility is to the people of New South Wales, to whom they have pledged their loyalty under section 35CA of the [Constitution Act 1902](/view/html/inforce/current/act-1902-032).\n\n> 3 Ministers have a responsibility to maintain the public trust that has been placed in them by performing their duties with honesty and integrity, in compliance with the rule of law, and to advance the common good of the people of New South Wales.\n\n> 4 Ministers acknowledge that they are also bound by the conventions underpinning responsible Government, including the conventions of Cabinet solidarity and confidentiality.\n\n> 5 Ministers also have a responsibility to ensure that they do not act in a way that would place others, including public servants, in a position that would require them to breach the law or their own ethical obligations including those prescribed in the [Government Sector Employment Act 2013](/view/html/inforce/current/act-2013-040). That duty does not, however, limit Ministerial discretion to make decisions and direct departments in accordance with the principle of departmental responsibility to Ministers, including to disagree with advice and recommendations put to them by public servants.\n\n> 6 To further those principles, the NSW Ministerial Code of Conduct has been established, which prescribes standards of ethical behaviour and imposes internal governance practices directed toward ensuring that possible breaches of ethical standards are avoided.\n\n> 7 The NSW Ministerial Code of Conduct is adopted for the purposes of section 9 of the [Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988](/view/html/inforce/current/act-1988-035). The Code also applies to Parliamentary Secretaries.\n\n> 8 The Schedule to the NSW Ministerial Code of Conduct prescribes certain additional administrative and governance requirements that Ministers (and in some cases Parliamentary Secretaries) must comply with and that are directed to minimising the risk and opportunities for breaches of the Code.\n\n> 9 A substantial breach of the NSW Ministerial Code of Conduct (including a knowing breach of any provision of the Schedule) may constitute corrupt conduct for the purposes of the [Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988](/view/html/inforce/current/act-1988-035).\n\n> 10 The NSW Ministerial Code of Conduct is not intended to be a comprehensive statement of ethical conduct by Ministers. It is not possible to anticipate and make prescriptive rules for every contingency that might raise an ethical issue for a Minister. In all matters, however, Ministers are expected always to conform with the principles referred to above.\n\n> 11 In particular, Ministers have a responsibility to avoid or otherwise manage appropriately conflicts of interest to ensure the maintenance of both the actuality and appearance of Ministerial integrity.\n\n> 12 Further, and in addition to the rules set out in this Code, Ministers are subject to a range of civil and criminal laws in their capacity as holders of public office, as well as to standards of conduct applying to them in their capacity as Members of Parliament.","sortOrder":27},{"sectionNumber":"app-inc-pt-oc.2","sectionType":"part","heading":"NSW Ministerial Code of Conduct","content":"# app-inc-pt-oc.2 NSW Ministerial Code of Conduct\n\nNSW Ministerial Code of Conduct","sortOrder":28},{"sectionNumber":"app-inc-sch","sectionType":"schedule","heading":"Schedule to the NSW Ministerial Code of Conduct","content":"# app-inc-sch Schedule to the NSW Ministerial Code of Conduct\n\nSchedule to the NSW Ministerial Code of Conduct\n\n**Appendix:** Am 2020 No 30, Sch 1.25; 2022 No 26, Sch 2.14; 2023 No 35, Sch 4.18\\[1\\] \\[2\\].","sortOrder":41},{"sectionNumber":"Part 3A","sectionType":"part","heading":"Commissions from property developers","content":"# Part 3A Commissions from property developers\n\nPart 3A Commissions from property developers\n\nNote—\n\nThis Part also applies to Parliamentary Secretaries, and a reference to a Minister in this Part includes a reference to a Parliamentary Secretary.","sortOrder":61},{"sectionNumber":"16A","sectionType":"section","heading":"Commissions from property developers","content":"#### 16A Commissions from property developers\n\n16A Commissions from property developers\n\n> > (1) A Minister must not accept or seek payment of a commission from a property developer, either directly or through a third party.\n> \n> > (2) In this clause—\n> > \n> > property developer means a property developer within the meaning of Part 3, Division 7 of the [Electoral Funding Act 2018](/view/html/inforce/current/act-2018-020).","sortOrder":62},{"sectionNumber":"22","sectionType":"section","heading":"Gifts or hospitality that may be accepted","content":"#### 22 Gifts or hospitality that may be accepted\n\n22 Gifts or hospitality that may be accepted\n\n> > (1) Gifts of a token kind and reasonable acts of hospitality may be accepted by the Minister and need not be disclosed under this Part.\n> \n> > (2) In deciding whether to accept such gifts or hospitality, Ministers must satisfy themselves that doing so will not give rise to a conflict of interest.\n> \n> > (3) If the hospitality has a market value of more than $500, the Minister must promptly disclose in writing the receipt of the hospitality to the Secretary of the Cabinet Office.","sortOrder":69},{"sectionNumber":"23","sectionType":"section","heading":"Offers of employment received while in office","content":"#### 23 Offers of employment received while in office\n\n23 Offers of employment received while in office\n\n> A Minister who, while in office, wishes to consider accepting an offer of post-separation employment must, if it relates to any of their current portfolio responsibilities or any portfolio responsibilities held during the previous 2 years of Ministerial office, first obtain the advice of the Parliamentary Ethics Adviser.\n> \n> Note.\n> \n> The receipt of an offer of post-separation employment is also a private benefit to which provisions of the NSW Ministerial Code of Conduct might also apply.","sortOrder":71},{"sectionNumber":"24","sectionType":"section","heading":"Offers of employment received after leaving office","content":"#### 24 Offers of employment received after leaving office\n\n24 Offers of employment received after leaving office\n\n> > (1) A Minister who, within 18 months after ceasing to hold office, wishes to consider accepting an offer of post-separation employment must, if it relates to any of the portfolio responsibilities held during the last 2 years of Ministerial office, first obtain the advice of the Parliamentary Ethics Adviser.\n> \n> > (2) This clause does not apply to any offer of post-separation employment by the State of New South Wales or any agency representing the State.\n> \n> Note.\n> \n> The [Lobbying of Government Officials Act 2011](/view/html/inforce/current/act-2011-005) imposes additional restrictions on the ability of a former Minister to engage in lobbying activities within 18 months after leaving Ministerial office.","sortOrder":72},{"sectionNumber":"25","sectionType":"section","heading":"Advice of the Parliamentary Ethics Adviser","content":"#### 25 Advice of the Parliamentary Ethics Adviser\n\n25 Advice of the Parliamentary Ethics Adviser\n\n> > (1) The Parliamentary Ethics Adviser may advise against the acceptance of an offer of post-separation employment, either generally or unless certain conditions are met.\n> \n> > (2) A Minister must not, while in office, accept any offer of post-separation employment if the Parliamentary Ethics Adviser has advised against it.\n> \n> > (3) If a Minister accepts an offer of post-separation employment (whether or not against the advice of the Parliamentary Ethics Adviser), any advice obtained from the Parliamentary Ethics Adviser in respect of that offer is to be tabled in the House of Parliament to which the Minister belongs or belonged.","sortOrder":73},{"sectionNumber":"Part 6","sectionType":"part","heading":"Enforcement","content":"# Part 6 Enforcement\n\nPart 6 Enforcement\n\nNote.\n\nThis Part also applies to Parliamentary Secretaries, and a reference to a Minister in this Part includes a reference to a Parliamentary Secretary.","sortOrder":74},{"sectionNumber":"26","sectionType":"section","heading":"Premier to determine sanctions","content":"#### 26 Premier to determine sanctions\n\n26 Premier to determine sanctions\n\n> The enforcement of the requirements of this Schedule, including any sanctions for a breach, is a matter for the Premier.\n> \n> Note.\n> \n> While enforcement of the requirements of this Schedule, including any sanctions for a breach, is a matter for the Premier, the NSW Ministerial Code of Conduct has also been adopted for the purposes of the [Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988](/view/html/inforce/current/act-1988-035).","sortOrder":75},{"sectionNumber":"27","sectionType":"section","heading":"Rulings","content":"#### 27 Rulings\n\n27 Rulings\n\n> > (1) A Minister must, when applying for a ruling from the Premier, include with the application an accurate statement of all material information that is relevant to the decision whether to give the ruling. A ruling that is obtained on the basis of inaccurate or incomplete information is not effective and may not be relied upon by the Minister for the purposes of the NSW Ministerial Code of Conduct.\n> \n> > (2) A ruling is to be made in writing and dated, and placed on the Ministerial Register of Interests.\n> > \n> > Note.\n> > \n> > See clauses 1 (1) and (4), 2 (3), 3 (5) and 12 (2) of the Schedule, which provide for the Premier to issue rulings that a particular course of conduct is permitted.\n> \n> > (3) A ruling is effective on and from the date it is given and continues in effect until—\n> > \n> > > (a) it is revoked by the Premier, or\n> > \n> > > (b) any conditions specified in the ruling cease to be satisfied, or\n> > \n> > > (c) the information upon which the ruling was given changes materially.\n> > \n> > Note.\n> > \n> > If there is a material change of circumstances, the Minister may seek a new ruling from the Premier.\n> \n> > (4) The Premier may direct that a ruling that has been sought by a Minister has effect as a ruling pending a decision by the Premier on the matter.\n> \n> > (5) A ruling in respect of the Premier may be given if approved by the Cabinet.","sortOrder":76}],"analysis":{"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":6,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"The Regulation has grown significantly beyond simple administrative machinery for ICAC. While Parts 3-5 deal with ICAC staff vetting (the original operational purpose), the Appendix containing the NSW Ministerial Code of Conduct now dominates the document. This Code regulates Ministerial ethics in extraordinary detail—shareholdings, directorships, gifts, hospitality, post-employment conduct, and conflicts of interest. The Code was originally a separate document (commenced 2014) but is now embedded in this Regulation, making it legally enforceable as 'corrupt conduct' if substantially breached. This represents a major expansion from a staff-administration regulation to a comprehensive ethics framework for the executive government."},"complexity_factors":["Extensive cross-referencing to other Acts (ICAC Act 1988, Health Services Act 1997, Interpretation Act 1987, Corporations Act 2001, Constitution Act 1902, etc.)","Nested definitions: 'associated person' depends on 'family associates' and 'business associates', which themselves have multiple sub-categories with discretionary Chief Commissioner powers","Conditional logic throughout: exemptions available (clause 13), rulings from Premier required for various exceptions (clauses 1, 2, 3, 12)","Dual application structure: some parts apply to Ministers, others to Parliamentary Secretaries, others to former Ministers, with varying scopes","Temporal conditions: 6-month fingerprint retention, 18-month post-employment restrictions, 2-year lookback for portfolio responsibilities","Multiple registers referenced: Ministerial Register of Interests (confidential) vs Ministerial Register of Gifts vs Parliamentary disclosure returns","Exception to exception structure: general prohibitions with Premier-ruling exceptions, plus clause 13 allowing Chief Commissioner exemptions from financial disclosure","Appendix forms part of the Regulation but preamble/notes do not (clause 3(3)), creating interpretive complexity"],"plain_english_summary":"This Regulation sets out the rules for how the NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) operates, with a heavy focus on integrity requirements for both ICAC staff and NSW Government Ministers.\n\n**What it does:**\n\nThe Regulation has five main parts:\n\n1. **Definitions and preliminary matters** — Sets out who counts as an \"associated person\" for disclosure purposes (family members, business partners, employers, etc.) and defines key terms like \"financial interest\" and \"spouse\".\n\n2. **Codes of conduct** — Prescribes the NSW Ministerial Code of Conduct as the official code that applies to Ministers. This means breaches of the Code can be investigated as \"corrupt conduct\" by ICAC.\n\n3. **Security requirements for ICAC officers** — Imposes strict vetting requirements on people who work for ICAC (and applicants for jobs there), including:\n   - Furnishing personal details and identity documents (birth certificates, passports, tax returns)\n   - Providing fingerprints (destroyed 6 months after leaving unless under investigation)\n   - Declaring associations with known criminals\n   - Notifying changes in personal circumstances\n   - Disclosing conflicts of interest\n\n4. **Financial disclosure** — Requires ICAC officers to disclose their financial interests and those of their associates, with ongoing obligations to report changes. The Chief Commissioner can exempt officers from these requirements.\n\n5. **Miscellaneous** — Covers compliance as a condition of employment, use of the Commission's seal, identity cards, and expands the definition of \"public authority\" for ICAC purposes to include health organisations and cemetery trusts.\n\n**The Ministerial Code of Conduct (in the Appendix):**\n\nThis is the most substantial part of the Regulation. It governs how NSW Ministers must behave:\n\n- **Prohibited interests**: Ministers generally cannot hold company shares (except in diversified super funds or blind trusts), cannot be company directors, and cannot have secondary employment\n- **Disclosure obligations**: Ministers must disclose their interests to Parliament and maintain a confidential register of interests with the Premier\n- **Conflict of interest rules**: Ministers must disclose conflicts to the Premier, abstain from related decisions, and leave meetings if required\n- **Gifts and hospitality**: Ministers cannot accept gifts or hospitality that could be seen as inducements. Gifts over $500 must be surrendered to the State or paid for\n- **Post-employment restrictions**: Ministers must seek advice before accepting jobs related to their former portfolios within 18 months of leaving office\n- **Property developer ban**: Ministers cannot accept commissions from property developers\n\n**Who it affects:**\n- ICAC officers and job applicants (security vetting, financial disclosure)\n- NSW Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries (code of conduct)\n- Public authorities now covered by ICAC (health organisations, cemetery trusts)\n\n**Why it matters:**\nThis Regulation is the operational backbone of integrity enforcement in NSW. It ensures ICAC itself operates securely and without compromised staff, while the Ministerial Code creates enforceable ethical standards for the state's most powerful office-holders. A \"substantial breach\" of the Code can be investigated as corrupt conduct, giving ICAC jurisdiction over Ministerial misconduct."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":6,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"This Regulation replaced the Independent Commission Against Corruption Regulation 2010 and commenced on 1 September 2017 (cl 2). The instrument includes a savings clause preserving acts done under the old Regulation (cl 21). The text supplied does not provide a clause‑by‑clause comparison to the 2010 Regulation, so while the legal instrument replaced the prior regulation (a change of instrument), the material supplied does not identify which substantive obligations, thresholds or definitions were altered in scope relative to the 2010 version."},"complexity_factors":["Multiple actor groups covered (ICAC officers/applicants; Ministers; Parliamentary Secretaries; companies and partnerships engaged under s104B) increasing cross‑application complexity (cls 3–4, 5, 7(3), Schedule notes).","Extensive cross‑referencing to other statutes (Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988; Health Services Act 1997; Corporations Act 2001; Constitution Act 1902; and others) which affects interpretation and scope (cl 3 notes; Schedule cl 1–11 references).","Numerous mandatory and continuing disclosure duties with different triggers and form requirements (cls 6, 9–12; Schedule cl 6–11).","Significant discretionary powers held by two different decision‑makers (Chief Commissioner and Premier) creating variable implementation outcomes (cls 6, 13, 14; Schedule cl 27, cl 26).","Technical procedural requirements (fingerprint retention/destruction timelines, approved forms, statutory declaration procedures) that require administrative systems (cl 8, cl 15).","Confidentiality and limited public access to certain registers (Ministerial Register of Interests) while still enabling internal Cabinet use (Schedule cl 11 note).","Overlapping enforcement channels: employment consequences for officers (cl 16) and Premier‑determined sanctions for Ministers (Schedule cl 26) plus ICAC investigatory reach for substantial breaches (Appendix Preamble para 9)."],"plain_english_summary":"What this Regulation does, mechanically\n\n- This Regulation sets rules for two groups of people:\n  - officers of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) and applicants for ICAC officer roles (Parts 3–5); and\n  - Ministers (and in many places Parliamentary Secretaries) by prescribing the NSW Ministerial Code of Conduct and its Schedule as an \"applicable code of conduct\" under the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 (cl 5, Appendix and Schedule).\n\n- For ICAC officers and applicants the Regulation: requires personal and financial disclosure, production of identity and company documents, fingerprint imprints in specified cases, and statutory declarations about associations with known or reputed criminals (cls 3–4, 6–8, 11, 15). It makes compliance a condition of employment and allows termination for non‑compliance (cl 16). The Chief Commissioner may approve forms, require further information, impose or revoke exemptions, and specify who counts as an \"associated person\" for disclosure purposes (cls 3–4, 6, 13, 14).\n\n- For Ministers the Regulation (by prescribing the NSW Ministerial Code of Conduct and its Schedule) imposes rules on conflicts of interest, disclosure duties, prohibitions on shareholdings, directorships and secondary employment, handling of gifts and hospitality, restrictions on commissions from property developers, rules about post‑separation employment advice, and enforcement arrangements (Appendix Preamble; Code sections 1–12; Schedule Parts 1–6). Important mechanics include: divestment obligations (Schedule cl 1–4), requirements to place disclosures on a confidential Ministerial Register of Interests (Schedule cl 6–9, cl 11 note), and that enforcement and sanctions for breaches are a matter for the Premier (Schedule cl 26).\n\nOfficial purpose claims and the Regulation’s stated rationale\n\n- The preamble to the Code states the official aim: to maintain public confidence in the integrity of Government by prescribing standards of probity for Ministers and to reduce opportunities for breaches of ethical standards (Appendix Preamble paras 1–8). It also states that substantial breaches may constitute \"corrupt conduct\" and so be investigated by ICAC (Appendix Preamble para 9).\n\nCosts, incentives and trade‑offs (how the Regulation changes behaviour and who bears costs)\n\n- Who decides and exercises discretion\n  - The Chief Commissioner: decides approved forms, may require statements and documents, may grant or revoke exemptions, and may specify associated persons and other particulars for disclosure (cls 3(1)–(3), 4(2), 6(1)–(3), 7(1), 13, 14). The Chief Commissioner also controls retention and destruction periods for fingerprints (cl 8(3)–(5)).\n  - The Premier: makes binding rulings that can permit otherwise prohibited interests or actions by Ministers, and determines enforcement and sanctions for breaches of the Schedule (Schedule cl 27; Schedule cl 26).\n\n- Who pays / bears direct costs\n  - Officers and applicants: the Regulation requires officers/applicants to produce documents (birth certificate, passport, tax returns, company constitutions, annual reports, audited financial statements) and statutory declarations—time and cost fall on them or their organisations to assemble and provide these materials (cl 7(2)–(3), cl 15). Fingerprint imprints must be provided where required (cl 8). Failure to comply can lead to termination of employment (cl 16).\n  - Ministers: may need to divest or otherwise alter private interests to comply (Schedule cl 1–4). If a Minister retains a goodwill gift valued over $500 and decides to keep it, the Minister must pay the State the excess value (Schedule cl 18(2)–(4)).\n  - Companies and partnerships engaged under s104B of the Act: required company/partnership documents and statutory declarations must be supplied, and statutory declarations must be made by director(s)/partner(s) as directed by the Chief Commissioner (cl 7(3), cl 15).\n\n- Compliance burden and administrative processes\n  - Frequent and continuing disclosure duties: initial statements on appointment, immediate notification of significant changes in personal particulars or financial interests, and immediate notification of conflicts of interest (cls 9–12; Schedule cl 6–7, cl 10–12). Notices must often be in approved forms and, in the case of Ministers, placed on the Ministerial Register of Interests (Schedule cl 11).\n  - Recordkeeping and confidentiality: the Ministerial Register of Interests is confidential and available to the Premier and Cabinet for managing conflicts (Schedule cl 11 note). ICAC retains some investigatory discretion (Appendix Preamble para 9).\n\n- Incentives and effects on private choice, business and markets\n  - Ministers face restrictions on owning securities, holding directorships, and secondary employment (Schedule Part 1 and cl 3). That reduces scope for Ministers to continue in private business roles while in office and constrains post‑office activity through advice and tabling of Parliamentary Ethics Adviser opinions (Schedule Part 5 cl 23–25). These provisions change incentives for Ministers to retain or accept private commercial roles and protect perceived impartiality of public decision‑making.\n  - Divestment rules disallow simple transfers to family members or trusts from counting as divestment (Schedule cl 1(2), cl 4), closing an obvious technical workaround identified in the instrument itself.\n  - For businesses and advisors, the prohibition on Ministers accepting commissions from property developers (Schedule cl 16A) and the gift/hospitality disclosure rules (Schedule Part 4) constrain ways private actors may seek to influence Ministers.\n\n- Discretion, implementation risk and potential loopholes\n  - Broad discretionary powers: both the Chief Commissioner (re disclosure, exemptions, form, associated persons) and the Premier (rulings and sanctions) hold significant discretion. The Regulation explicitly contemplates Premier rulings that can permit otherwise prohibited holdings or activities (Schedule cl 27; Schedule cl 1(1)(b), cl 2(3), cl 3(5), cl 12(2)). That creates mechanisms to manage conflicts but also concentrates decision authority.\n  - Confidential registers and limited public access: the Ministerial Register of Interests is confidential and retained by the Cabinet Office (Schedule cl 11 note), which changes public visibility of disclosures while allowing Cabinet to manage conflicts internally.\n\nOther concrete operational points\n\n- The Regulation replaces the 2010 ICAC Regulation and took effect 1 September 2017; the savings clause preserves acts done under the previous Regulation (cl 2; cl 21).\n- Fingerprint retention is time‑limited (generally destroyed within 6 months after determination or after ceasing to be an officer) but may be retained longer where necessary to complete investigations (cl 8(3)–(5)).\n- Non‑disclosure because of lack of awareness is expressly not a breach (cl 16(4)).\n\nNet effect in plain terms\n\n- The instrument creates an administratively detailed disclosure and security regime for ICAC personnel and adopts a prescriptive Code of Conduct for Ministers that limits private commercial involvement while in office, sets gift and post‑office advice rules, and places primary enforcement responsibility with the Premier (cls 6–16; Appendix and Schedule). It imposes ongoing disclosure duties, gives the Chief Commissioner and the Premier powers to require information or issue rulings, and places costs of compliance mainly on officers, applicants, and Ministers (cl 7, cl 11, Schedule cl 1–4, 18)."},"summary":{"complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"Based on the available metadata, there is no indication the regulation has materially shifted from its original scope supporting ICAC's operational framework. The multiple amendments since 2017 suggest incremental updates rather than a fundamental change in purpose. A full scope assessment is not possible without the operative provisions."},"complexity_factors":["The actual substantive content of the regulation is not included in the provided text — only metadata and version history is visible, limiting analysis","Multiple historical versions (6 point-in-time versions since 2017) suggest ongoing amendments that could create complexity in tracking which rules apply when","Interaction with the parent Act (Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988) and the Subordinate Legislation Act 1989 requires cross-referencing multiple instruments","Upcoming automatic repeal and a pending amendment create a transitional period that could confuse compliance obligations","Score is kept low because regulations supporting bodies like ICAC are typically procedural/administrative rather than substantively complex"],"plain_english_summary":"## Independent Commission Against Corruption Regulation 2017 (NSW)\n\n**What is this?**\nThis is a supporting regulation (detailed rules made under a broader law) for the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) — the NSW body that investigates corruption by public officials and government agencies.\n\n**Important:** The document provided is essentially the *metadata and status information* for this regulation — the actual operative content (the specific rules) is not included in this text. What we can determine is:\n\n- This regulation has been in place since **1 September 2017** and has been updated several times\n- It is **due to be automatically repealed (cancelled) on 1 September 2026** under a NSW law that regularly sunsets (expires) older regulations to keep them fresh\n- An **amendment is coming on 1 September 2026** that is not yet in force\n- It sits under the main *Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988*\n\n**Who does this affect?**\nPrimarily NSW public sector employees, government agencies, and anyone who interacts with ICAC — including people making complaints, witnesses, or those under investigation. In practice, regulations like this typically cover things like procedural rules, fees, or operational details for how ICAC runs its investigations.\n\n**Why does it matter?**\nICAC is a powerful body — it can investigate politicians, public servants, and government contractors. The regulations set the practical ground rules for how it operates. Most ordinary people won't deal with it directly, but it underpins the integrity of NSW government."},"issue_detection":{"absurdities":[{"type":"impossible_compliance","section":"Status Information / Notes","severity":"high","reasoning":"An amending instrument that commences on the same day as the automatic repeal of its parent instrument cannot have any legal effect. If repeal and commencement occur simultaneously on 1 September 2026, the amendment either amends nothing (if repeal takes precedence) or creates a one-day absurdity. This renders the Amendment Regulation 2026 (114) legally purposeless as drafted.","confidence":0.85,"description":"The Amendment Regulation 2026 (114) is noted as 'not commenced' but is scheduled to commence on 1 September 2026 — the same date the parent Regulation is due to be automatically repealed. The amendment would commence into a legislative void, amending a regulation that no longer exists."},{"type":"other","section":"Status Information — Currency of version","severity":"low","reasoning":"Not a logical flaw in the regulation's provisions per se, but the metadata creates a structural absurdity: the instrument is presented as fully operative and current while being in a terminal phase, and the substantive provisions of the regulation are entirely absent from the provided text, making it impossible for any person to determine their obligations under it.","confidence":0.75,"description":"The status information states the legislation is 'current' and 'in force' as of 30 October 2023 to date, yet simultaneously discloses that the instrument is due to be automatically repealed on 1 September 2026 under the Subordinate Legislation Act 1989. The document was accessed on 5 April 2026, meaning users are reading a regulation with fewer than 5 months of remaining life with no substantive content visible to assess compliance obligations."}],"contradictions":[{"severity":"high","section_a":"Status Information — Notes: Amendment Regulation 2026 (114) to commence 1.9.2026","section_b":"Status Information — Staged repeal status: Regulation due to be automatically repealed on 1 September 2026","confidence":0.88,"description":"The parent Regulation is scheduled for automatic repeal on 1 September 2026 under the Subordinate Legislation Act 1989, and the Amendment Regulation 2026 (114) is also scheduled to commence on 1 September 2026. These two events are directly contradictory: an amendment cannot validly commence into a repealed instrument, meaning either the repeal date or the commencement date is operationally meaningless."}]},"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"Unauthenticated. Configure AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY or use a provider module. Learn more: https://ai-sdk.dev/unauthenticated-ai-gateway","source":"analysis-cron"}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/independent-commission-against-corruption-regulation-2017","history":"/api/acts/independent-commission-against-corruption-regulation-2017/history","analysis":"/api/acts/independent-commission-against-corruption-regulation-2017/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/independent-commission-against-corruption-regulation-2017/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/independent-commission-against-corruption-regulation-2017/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/independent-commission-against-corruption-regulation-2017/documents"}}