{"id":"nsw:act-1994-061","name":"Independent Commission Against Corruption (Commissioner) Act 1994","slug":"independent-commission-against-corruption-commissioner-act-1994","collection":"act","jurisdiction":"nsw","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":"61 of 1994","makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":105907,"registerId":"nsw-act-1994-061-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-03","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"Name of Act","content":"#### 1 Name of Act\n\n1 Name of Act\n\n> This Act may be cited as the [Independent Commission Against Corruption (Commissioner) Act 1994](/view/html/inforce/current/act-1994-061).","sortOrder":0},{"sectionNumber":"2","sectionType":"section","heading":"Commencement","content":"#### 2 Commencement\n\n2 Commencement\n\n> This Act commences on the date of assent.","sortOrder":1},{"sectionNumber":"3","sectionType":"section","heading":"Interpretation","content":"#### 3 Interpretation\n\n3 Interpretation\n\n> Words and expressions used in this Act have the same meanings as in the [Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988](/view/html/inforce/current/act-1988-035).","sortOrder":2},{"sectionNumber":"4","sectionType":"section","heading":"Appointment of Supreme Court or District Court Judge as Commissioner","content":"#### 4 Appointment of Supreme Court or District Court Judge as Commissioner\n\n4 Appointment of Supreme Court or District Court Judge as Commissioner\n\n> > (1) This section applies to a person—\n> > \n> > > (a) who was a Judge of the Supreme Court or the District Court before being appointed as a Commissioner (whether on a regular or an acting basis), and\n> > \n> > > (b) whose resignation as a Judge took effect immediately before the appointment as a Commissioner took effect, and\n> > \n> > > (c) whose instrument of appointment as a Commissioner declared that the person’s commission as a Judge is to revive by force of this Act, and\n> > \n> > > (d) who consented by letter to the Minister to the application of this Act.\n> \n> > (2) The person’s commission as a Judge revives by force of this Act when the person ceases to hold office as a Commissioner.\n> \n> > (2A) The person becomes, from the time the person ceases to hold office as a Commissioner—\n> > \n> > > (a) if the person was a Judge of the Supreme Court before being appointed as a Commissioner—a Judge of the Supreme Court again, or\n> > \n> > > (b) if the person was a Judge of the District Court before being appointed as a Commissioner—a Judge of the District Court again.\n> \n> > (2B) Subsections (2) and (2A) do not apply in relation to any other judicial office held by the person.\n> \n> > (3) For the purposes of the [Judges’ Pensions Act 1953](/view/html/inforce/current/act-1953-041)—\n> > \n> > > (a) service by the person as a Commissioner is taken to be service as a Judge, and\n> > \n> > > (b) references to a Judge or judicial office include references to the person in his or her capacity as a Commissioner and the office of a Commissioner, and\n> > \n> > > (c) references to notional judicial salary are, in relation to the person while a Commissioner, references to the salary payable to the holder of a judicial office having a status equivalent to that of the judicial office held by the person immediately before being appointed as a Commissioner.\n> \n> > (4) Subsections (2) and (2A) do not apply to the person if—\n> > \n> > > (a) the person so requests by letter to the Minister, or\n> > \n> > > (b) the person is removed from office as a Commissioner by the Governor on the address of both Houses of Parliament (under clause 7 of Schedule 1 to the [Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988](/view/html/inforce/current/act-1988-035)) on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity.\n> \n> > (5) For the purposes of this section, a re-appointment of the person as a Commissioner without a break is taken to be a continuation of the previous appointment as a Commissioner.\n> \n> **s 4:** Am 2016 No 65, Sch 2 \\[1\\]–\\[5\\]; 2022 No 28, Sch 2\\[1\\]–\\[5\\].","sortOrder":3},{"sectionNumber":"5","sectionType":"section","heading":"Savings provision relating to the Commissioner holding office immediately before commencement of Independent Commission Against Corruption Amendment Act 2016","content":"#### 5 Savings provision relating to the Commissioner holding office immediately before commencement of Independent Commission Against Corruption Amendment Act 2016\n\n5 Savings provision relating to the Commissioner holding office immediately before commencement of [Independent Commission Against Corruption Amendment Act 2016](/view/html/repealed/current/act-2016-065)\n\n> > (1) This section applies to the person who was the Commissioner for the Independent Commission Against Corruption immediately before the abolition of that office as the result of the substitution of Part 2 of the [Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988](/view/html/inforce/current/act-1988-035) by the [Independent Commission Against Corruption Amendment Act 2016](/view/html/repealed/current/act-2016-065).\n> \n> > (2) Section 4 applies to that person (subject to section 4 (4)).\n> \n> > (3) A reference in section 4 to a person who ceases to hold office as a Commissioner includes a reference to that person ceasing to hold office as the Commissioner following the abolition of that office, unless that person is appointed as a Commissioner with effect immediately after the abolition of that office.\n> \n> > (4) A reference in section 4 to a person’s appointment or service as a Commissioner, or to the office of a Commissioner, includes a reference to that person’s appointment or service as the Commissioner, or to the office of the Commissioner, before the abolition of that office.\n> \n> **s 5:** Ins 2016 No 65, Sch 2 \\[6\\].","sortOrder":4},{"sectionNumber":"6","sectionType":"section","heading":"Regulations","content":"#### 6 Regulations\n\n6 Regulations\n\n> > (1) The regulations may contain provisions of a savings or transitional nature consequent on the commencement of—\n> > \n> > > (a) a provision of this Act, or\n> > \n> > > (b) a provision amending this Act.\n> \n> > (2) A savings or transitional provision consequent on the commencement of a provision must not be made more than 2 years after the commencement.\n> \n> > (3) A savings or transitional provision made consequent on the commencement of a provision is repealed 2 years after the commencement.\n> \n> > (4) A savings or transitional provision made consequent on the commencement of a provision may take effect before the commencement but not before—\n> > \n> > > (a) for a provision of this Act—the date of assent to this Act, or\n> > \n> > > (b) for a provision amending this Act—the date of assent to the amending Act.\n> \n> > (5) A savings or transitional provision taking effect before its publication on the NSW legislation website does not—\n> > \n> > > (a) affect the rights of a person existing before the publication in a way prejudicial to the person, or\n> > \n> > > (b) impose liabilities on a person for anything done or omitted to be done before the publication.\n> \n> > (6) In this section—\n> > \n> > person does not include the State or an authority of the State.\n> \n> **s 6:** Ins 2022 No 28, Sch 2\\[6\\].","sortOrder":5},{"sectionNumber":"7","sectionType":"section","heading":"Commencement of amendments by ICAC and LECC Legislation Amendment Act 2022","content":"#### 7 Commencement of amendments by ICAC and LECC Legislation Amendment Act 2022\n\n7 Commencement of amendments by [ICAC and LECC Legislation Amendment Act 2022](/view/pdf/asmade/act-2022-28)\n\n> > (1) The amendments made by the amending Act apply on and from 30 June 2022, including if the amending Act commences after that date.\n> \n> > (2) In this section—\n> > \n> > amending Act means the [ICAC and LECC Legislation Amendment Act 2022](/view/pdf/asmade/act-2022-28).\n> \n> **s 7:** Ins 2022 No 28, Sch 2\\[6\\].","sortOrder":6}],"analysis":{"summary":{"complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"Based on available metadata, the Act appears to have remained focused on its original purpose of governing the ICAC Commissioner's position since 1994. The limited amendment history (amendments in 2017 and 2022) suggests refinements rather than significant scope expansion or contraction."},"complexity_factors":["The actual legislative text was not provided — only website metadata and navigation elements were included, making substantive analysis impossible","The Act appears narrow in scope, dealing with a single office-holder position rather than broad legal concepts","Short Act with limited amendment history (only two significant amendments since 1994)","Operates as a companion piece to the main ICAC Act rather than a standalone complex regime"],"plain_english_summary":"The Act governs the office of the Independent Commission Against Corruption’s Commissioner in NSW — setting out how the Commissioner is appointed, their terms and removal, and the role’s conditions. It specifically affects the Commissioner, the responsible ministers (Premier and Special Minister of State), and, indirectly, public officials and anyone interacting with ICAC.\n\nBecause the Commissioner’s independence shapes ICAC’s ability to investigate corruption, the Act matters for public-sector accountability."},"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"Unauthenticated. Configure AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY or use a provider module. Learn more: https://ai-sdk.dev/unauthenticated-ai-gateway","source":"analysis-cron"},"issue_detection":{"absurdities":[],"contradictions":[]},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":4,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The legislation remains tightly focused on its original purpose: facilitating judicial appointments to the ICAC Commissioner role by protecting judicial status and pensions. The 2016 and 2022 amendments added necessary transitional and machinery provisions to accommodate structural changes to the ICAC, but did not expand the Act's substantive scope beyond its core function of managing the interface between judicial office and anti-corruption leadership."},"complexity_factors":["Heavy reliance on external legislation — the entire interpretation section (s 3) defers to another Act, and multiple provisions reference the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 and Judges' Pensions Act 1953","Nested conditional logic in s 4(1) with four cumulative requirements (a)-(d) that must all be satisfied","Multiple cross-cutting exceptions: s 4(2B) carves out 'other judicial office', s 4(4) provides two alternative termination conditions, and s 5(3) creates a conditional inclusion for abolition scenarios","Temporal complexity with deeming provisions — s 4(5) treats re-appointments without a break as 'continuation', and s 7 applies amendments retrospectively to 30 June 2022 even if the amending Act commences later","Technical pension integration requiring equivalence calculations between Commissioner salary and 'notional judicial salary' of equivalent status"],"plain_english_summary":"This law deals with what happens to judges who leave the bench to become the head of New South Wales' anti-corruption watchdog (the ICAC Commissioner), and what happens when they finish that job.\n\n**The basic deal:**\n- If a Supreme Court or District Court judge resigns from the bench specifically to become ICAC Commissioner, they can get their judgeship back automatically when they finish as Commissioner.\n- This only works if they agreed to it upfront in writing and their appointment papers specifically say their judicial commission will \"revive\" (come back to life) later.\n\n**Key protections:**\n- **Pension continuity:** Time spent as Commissioner counts as judicial service for pension purposes, so they don't lose retirement benefits.\n- **Salary equivalence:** Their pension contributions are based on what they would have earned as a judge of equivalent seniority.\n- **No double-dipping:** This revival only applies to their main judicial office, not any other judicial positions they might hold.\n\n**When the deal is off:**\nThe judge doesn't get their job back if:\n- They write to the Minister saying they don't want it, **or**\n- They were sacked as Commissioner for \"proved misbehaviour or incapacity\" (serious misconduct or inability to do the job).\n\n**Why this matters:**\nWithout this law, judges would risk their entire career and pension to take on the Commissioner role. This removes that disincentive, making it easier to recruit senior judges to lead the state's corruption watchdog. The law also includes transitional rules for when the ICAC structure changed in 2016, ensuring the then-Commissioner wasn't left in limbo."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"The Act has been amended since original enactment: a 2016 insertion preserved the arrangements for the person holding the Commissioner office immediately before the 2016 reforms (s 5), and a 2022 amendment added express transitional/regulation powers with time limits and fixed the effective date of those amendments to 30 June 2022 (s 6; s 7). These amendments broadened the Act's transitional and temporal mechanisms without expanding the class of persons directly covered beyond judges who become Commissioner."},"complexity_factors":["Cross‑references to other statutes increase interpretive work (definitions drawn from Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988: s 3).","Conditional revival of judicial commission requires specific appointment instrument language and a letter of consent to the Minister (s 4(1)(c)–(d)), creating administrative steps and evidentiary requirements.","Pension treatment treats Commissioner service as judicial service and fixes 'notional judicial salary' for pension calculations, shifting long‑term fiscal effects to the State's pension scheme (s 4(3)(a)–(c)).","Exceptions allow the individual to opt out, and removal by the Governor on address of both Houses prevents automatic revival in cases of proved misbehaviour or incapacity (s 4(4)(a)–(b)); this ties revival to parliamentary removal processes in another Act.","Transitional savings for the Commissioner in office before the 2016 amendment add tailored legacy rules (s 5), increasing application complexity for that cohort.","Regulation‑making power for savings/transitional provisions is time‑limited (must be made and repeals after 2 years) and may take retrospective effect within narrow bounds, with non‑prejudicial and non‑liability safeguards (s 6(1)–(6)).","Commencement provision fixes a retroactive application date for the 2022 amending Act (s 7), which creates timing and retrospective‑effect considerations for affected rights and obligations."],"plain_english_summary":"This Act sets out how a Supreme or District Court judge who resigns to serve as the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) Commissioner can have their judicial commission revived when they stop being Commissioner, and treats time as Commissioner as judicial service for pension purposes. It also authorises short-term transitional regulations and preserves specific arrangements for the person who held the Commissioner office immediately before the 2016 reforms; 2022 amendments take effect from 30 June 2022."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/independent-commission-against-corruption-commissioner-act-1994","history":"/api/acts/independent-commission-against-corruption-commissioner-act-1994/history","analysis":"/api/acts/independent-commission-against-corruption-commissioner-act-1994/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/independent-commission-against-corruption-commissioner-act-1994/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/independent-commission-against-corruption-commissioner-act-1994/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/independent-commission-against-corruption-commissioner-act-1994/documents"}}