{"id":"C2004A05130","name":"Human Services (Centrelink) Act 1997","slug":"human-services-centrelink-act-1997","collection":"act","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":"31 of 1997","makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":39048,"registerId":"commonwealth-C2004A05130-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-01","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"Part 1","sectionType":"part","heading":"Preliminary","content":"## Part 1—Preliminary","sortOrder":0},{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"Short title","content":"#### 1 Short title\n\n  This Act may be cited as the Human Services (Centrelink) Act 1997.","sortOrder":1},{"sectionNumber":"2","sectionType":"section","heading":"Commencement","content":"#### 2 Commencement\n\n  This Act commences on 1 July 1997.","sortOrder":2},{"sectionNumber":"3","sectionType":"section","heading":"Definitions","content":"#### 3 Definitions\n\n  In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears:\n\n> Australia, when used in a geographical sense, includes Norfolk Island, the Territory of Cocos (Keeling) Islands and the Territory of Christmas Island.\n\n> benefit includes:\n\n    (a) a pension, allowance, concession or payment; and\n    (b) a card entitling its holder to a concession or a payment of any kind.\n\n> centrelink program has the meaning given by section 40.\n\n> Chief Executive Centrelink means the Chief Executive Centrelink referred to in section 7.\n\n> Chief Executive Medicare has the same meaning as in the Human Services (Medicare) Act 1973.\n\n> Departmental employee means an APS employee in Services Australia.\n\n> Note: APS employee is defined in the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.\n\n> enactment means:\n\n    (a) an Act; or\n    (b) an instrument (including rules, regulations and by‑laws) made under an Act.\n\n> function includes power.\n\n> medicare program has the same meaning as in the Human Services (Medicare) Act 1973.\n\n> perform includes exercise.\n\n> Secretary means the Chief Executive Officer of Services Australia.\n\n> service delivery functions, in relation to the Chief Executive Centrelink, has the meaning given by section 8A.","sortOrder":3},{"sectionNumber":"4","sectionType":"section","heading":"Act binds the Crown","content":"#### 4 Act binds the Crown\n\n  (1) This Act binds the Crown in each of its capacities.\n  (2) This Act does not make the Crown liable to be prosecuted for an offence.","sortOrder":4},{"sectionNumber":"5","sectionType":"section","heading":"External Territories","content":"#### 5 External Territories\n\n  This Act extends to Norfolk Island, to the Territory of Cocos (Keeling) Islands and to the Territory of Christmas Island.","sortOrder":5},{"sectionNumber":"Part 3","sectionType":"part","heading":"Chief Executive Centrelink","content":"## Part 3—Chief Executive Centrelink","sortOrder":6},{"sectionNumber":"7","sectionType":"section","heading":"Chief Executive Centrelink","content":"#### 7 Chief Executive Centrelink\n\n  (1) There is to be a Chief Executive Centrelink.\n  (2) The Chief Executive Centrelink is to be:\n    (a) the Chief Executive Officer of Services Australia; or\n    (b) if that position ceases to exist—a person appointed as the Chief Executive Centrelink by the Governor‑General by written instrument.\n\n> Note: If the Chief Executive Centrelink is appointed under paragraph (b), the Chief Executive Centrelink may be reappointed: see section 33AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.","sortOrder":7},{"sectionNumber":"7A","sectionType":"section","heading":"Acting Chief Executive Centrelink","content":"#### 7A Acting Chief Executive Centrelink\n\n  (1) The acting Chief Executive Officer of Services Australia is to act as the Chief Executive Centrelink:\n    (a) during a vacancy in the position of Chief Executive Centrelink (whether or not an appointment has previously been made to the position); or\n    (b) during any period, or during all periods, when the Chief Executive Centrelink:\n    (i) is absent from duty or from Australia; or\n    (ii) is, for any reason, unable to perform the duties of the position.\n\n> Note: For rules that apply to persons acting as the Chief Executive Centrelink, see section 33A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.\n\n  (2) However, if the position of Chief Executive Officer of Services Australia has ceased to exist, the Secretary of the Department may, in writing, appoint a person to act as the Chief Executive Centrelink for the purposes of subsection (1).","sortOrder":8},{"sectionNumber":"8","sectionType":"section","heading":"Functions of Chief Executive Centrelink","content":"#### 8 Functions of Chief Executive Centrelink\n\n  Functions—general\n  (1) The Chief Executive Centrelink has the following functions:\n    (a) the service delivery functions mentioned in section 8A;\n    (b) any functions conferred on the Chief Executive Centrelink under any other Act;\n    (ba) any functions that are prescribed by the regulations;\n    (d) doing anything incidental, conducive or related to the performance of any of his or her other functions.\n  Parallel function\n  (3) A function prescribed by regulations made for the purposes of paragraph (1)(ba) may be a specified function that another person (the primary person) has under a law of the Commonwealth.\n  (4) When the specified function is performed by the Chief Executive Centrelink, the function is, for the purposes of that or any other law of the Commonwealth, taken to have been performed by the primary person.\n  (5) The performance of the specified function by the Chief Executive Centrelink does not prevent the performance of the function under the law of the Commonwealth by the primary person.\n  (6) For the purposes of subsection (3), it is immaterial whether the specified function is a function that can be delegated.\n  (7) For the purposes of subsection (3), it is immaterial whether the specified function is a function under a law administered by the Minister.\n  (8) Subsection (3) does not limit paragraph (1)(ba).\n  (9) Subsections (6) and (7) are enacted for the avoidance of doubt.\n  Function of acting on behalf of another person\n  (10) A function prescribed by regulations made for the purposes of paragraph (1)(ba) may be a function of acting on behalf of another person (the primary person) in the performance of a function that the primary person may perform, whether under a law of the Commonwealth or otherwise.\n  (11) For the purposes of subsection (10), it is immaterial whether a function that the primary person may perform is a function that can be delegated.\n  (12) For the purposes of subsection (10), it is immaterial whether a function that the primary person may perform under a law of the Commonwealth is a function under a law administered by the Minister.\n  (13) For the purposes of subsection (10), it is immaterial whether a function that the primary person may perform otherwise than under a law of the Commonwealth is a function that is within the responsibilities of the Minister.\n  (14) Subsection (10) does not limit paragraph (1)(ba).\n  (15) Subsections (10) to (14) are enacted for the avoidance of doubt.","sortOrder":9},{"sectionNumber":"8A","sectionType":"section","heading":"Chief Executive Centrelink’s service delivery functions","content":"#### 8A Chief Executive Centrelink’s service delivery functions\n\n  The Chief Executive Centrelink’s service delivery functions are as follows:\n    (a) to provide services, benefits, programs or facilities that are provided for by the Commonwealth for a purpose for which the Parliament has the power to make laws;\n    (b) to provide services, benefits, programs or facilities that are provided for by a person other than the Commonwealth for a purpose for which the Parliament has the power to make laws.","sortOrder":10},{"sectionNumber":"8B","sectionType":"section","heading":"Agreements about performance of Chief Executive Centrelink’s functions","content":"#### 8B Agreements about performance of Chief Executive Centrelink’s functions\n\n  The Secretary may enter into a written agreement with the Secretary of another Department about the performance of any of the Chief Executive Centrelink’s functions.","sortOrder":11},{"sectionNumber":"12","sectionType":"section","heading":"Delegation","content":"#### 12 Delegation\n\n  (1) The Chief Executive Centrelink may, by writing, delegate to a Departmental employee all or any of the functions of the Chief Executive Centrelink under this Act or any other Act.\n  (1A) For the purposes of subsection (1), it is immaterial whether a function of the Chief Executive Centrelink is a function of the kind mentioned in subsection 8(3) or (10).\n  (2) However, the Chief Executive Centrelink must not delegate functions conferred on him or her under another Act if the delegation is inconsistent with the express provisions of that Act.\n  (3) The Chief Executive Centrelink may, by writing, delegate to a Departmental employee all or any of the functions delegated to the Chief Executive Centrelink under another Act.\n  (4) However, the Chief Executive Centrelink must not delegate functions delegated to him or her under another Act if the delegation by the Chief Executive Centrelink would be inconsistent with the express provisions of that Act or with the directions given by the person who delegated the function.\n  (5) In performing functions delegated to the Chief Executive Centrelink under another Act, the Chief Executive Centrelink, and any person to whom the function is subdelegated under subsection (3), must comply with any directions of the person who delegated the function.\n  (6) In performing functions delegated or subdelegated under this section, the delegate or subdelegate must comply with any directions of the Chief Executive Centrelink.\n  (7) Sections 34AA, 34AB and 34A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 apply in relation to a subdelegation in a corresponding way to the way in which they apply in relation to a delegation.","sortOrder":12},{"sectionNumber":"13","sectionType":"section","heading":"Commonwealth consent to conferral of powers etc. on Chief Executive Centrelink by State and Territory laws","content":"#### 13 Commonwealth consent to conferral of powers etc. on Chief Executive Centrelink by State and Territory laws\n\n  (1) A law of a State or Territory may confer powers or functions, or impose duties, on the Chief Executive Centrelink.\n\n> Note: Section 15 sets out when such a law imposes a duty on the Chief Executive Centrelink.\n\n  (2) Subsection (1) does not authorise the conferral of a power or function, or the imposition of a duty, by a law of a State or Territory to the extent to which:\n    (a) the conferral or imposition, or the authorisation, would contravene any constitutional doctrines restricting the duties that may be imposed on the Chief Executive Centrelink; or\n    (b) the authorisation would otherwise exceed the legislative power of the Commonwealth.\n  (3) The Chief Executive Centrelink cannot exercise a power, or perform a duty or function, under a law of a State or Territory without the written approval of the Minister.","sortOrder":13},{"sectionNumber":"14","sectionType":"section","heading":"How duty is imposed on Chief Executive Centrelink by State and Territory laws","content":"#### 14 How duty is imposed on Chief Executive Centrelink by State and Territory laws\n\n  Application\n  (1) This section applies if a law of a State or Territory purports to impose a duty on the Chief Executive Centrelink.\n\n> Note: Section 15 sets out when such a law imposes a duty on the Chief Executive Centrelink.\n\n  State or Territory legislative power sufficient to support duty\n  (2) The duty is taken not to be imposed by this Act (or any other law of the Commonwealth) to the extent to which:\n    (a) imposing the duty is within the legislative powers of the State or Territory concerned; and\n    (b) imposing the duty by the law of the State or Territory is consistent with the constitutional doctrines restricting the duties that may be imposed on the Chief Executive Centrelink.\n\n> Note: If this subsection applies, the duty will be taken to be imposed by force of the law of the State or Territory (the Commonwealth having consented under section 13 to the imposition of the duty by that law).\n\n  Commonwealth legislative power sufficient to support duty but State or Territory legislative powers are not\n  (3) If, to ensure the validity of the purported imposition of the duty, it is necessary that the duty be imposed by a law of the Commonwealth (rather than by the law of the State or Territory), the duty is taken to be imposed by this Act to the extent necessary to ensure that validity.\n  (4) If, because of subsection (3), this Act is taken to impose the duty, it is the intention of the Parliament to rely on all powers available to it under the Constitution to support the imposition of the duty by this Act.\n  (5) The duty is taken to be imposed by this Act in accordance with subsection (3) only to the extent to which imposing the duty:\n    (a) is within the legislative powers of the Commonwealth; and\n    (b) is consistent with the constitutional doctrines restricting the duties that may be imposed on the Chief Executive Centrelink.\n  (6) Subsections (1) to (5) do not limit section 13.","sortOrder":14},{"sectionNumber":"15","sectionType":"section","heading":"When State and Territory laws impose a duty on Chief Executive Centrelink","content":"#### 15 When State and Territory laws impose a duty on Chief Executive Centrelink\n\n  For the purposes of sections 13 and 14, a law of a State or Territory imposes a duty on the Chief Executive Centrelink if:\n    (a) the law confers a power or function on the Chief Executive Centrelink; and\n    (b) the circumstances in which the power or function is conferred give rise to an obligation on the Chief Executive Centrelink to exercise the power or to perform the function.","sortOrder":15},{"sectionNumber":"16","sectionType":"section","heading":"Chief Executive Centrelink may be assisted by Departmental employees","content":"#### 16 Chief Executive Centrelink may be assisted by Departmental employees\n\n  A Departmental employee may assist the Chief Executive Centrelink in the performance of any of the functions of the Chief Executive Centrelink.","sortOrder":16},{"sectionNumber":"Part 5","sectionType":"part","heading":"Miscellaneous","content":"## Part 5—Miscellaneous","sortOrder":17},{"sectionNumber":"38","sectionType":"section","heading":"Use of protected names and symbols","content":"#### 38 Use of protected names and symbols\n\n  (1) A person must not, without the Secretary’s written consent:\n    (a) use in relation to a business, trade, profession or occupation; or\n    (b) use as the name, or as part of the name, of any firm, body corporate, institution, premises, vehicle, ship, aircraft or other craft; or\n    (c) apply, as a trade mark or otherwise, to goods imported, manufactured, produced, sold, offered for sale or let for hire; or\n    (d) use in relation to:\n    (i) goods or services; or\n    (ii) the promotion, by any means, of the supply or use of goods or services:\n  either:\n    (e) a protected name, or a name so closely resembling a protected name as to be likely to be mistaken for it; or\n    (f) a protected symbol, or a symbol so closely resembling a protected symbol as to be likely to be mistaken for it.\n\nPenalty: 30 penalty units.\n\n  (1A) Subsection (1) is an offence of strict liability.\n  (2) Subsection (1), so far as it applies in relation to a particular protected name or a protected symbol, does not affect rights conferred by law on a person in relation to:\n    (a) a trade mark that is a registered trade mark for the purposes of the Trade Marks Act 1995; or\n    (b) a design registered under the Designs Act 2003;\n  that was so registered, or was registered under the Designs Act 1906, at the protection time in relation to the name or symbol.\n  (3) This section, so far as it applies in relation to a particular protected name or a protected symbol, does not affect the use, or rights conferred by law relating to the use, of a name or symbol (the relevant name or symbol) by a person in a particular manner if, at the protection time in relation to the protected name or protected symbol, the person:\n    (a) was using the relevant name or symbol in good faith in that manner; or\n    (b) would have been entitled to prevent another person from passing off, by means of the use of the relevant name or symbol or a similar name or symbol, goods or services as the goods or services of the first‑mentioned person.\n  (3A) Subsection (1) applies in relation to the use or application of the protected name “Services Australia” only if the use or application is, or is likely to be mistaken to be, in connection with the operations of Services Australia as an executive agency or the provision of services by the Commonwealth.\n  (3B) The prosecution bears the legal burden in relation to the matter in subsection (3A).\n  (4) In this section:\n\n> protected name means any of the following names:\n\n    (a) “Commonwealth Services Delivery Agency”;\n    (aa) “Services Australia”;\n    (b) such other names as are prescribed.\n\n> protected symbol means:\n\n    (a) a symbol:\n    (i) that is used, or for use, in connection with the performance of any or all of the functions of the Chief Executive Centrelink; and\n    (ii) the design of which is set out in the regulations; or\n    (b) a symbol:\n    (i) that is used, or for use, in connection with one or more services, benefits, programs or facilities, where Departmental employees are involved in the provision of those services, benefits, programs or facilities; and\n    (ii) the design of which is set out in the regulations.\n\n> protection time means:\n\n    (a) in relation to the name “Commonwealth Services Delivery Agency”—the time immediately before the commencement of this Act; or\n    (aa) in relation to the name “Services Australia”—the time immediately before the day the Services Australia Governance Amendment Act 2020 receives the Royal Assent; or\n    (b) in relation to any other name—the time immediately before the commencement of the regulation prescribing the name; or\n    (c) in relation to a protected symbol—the time immediately before the commencement of the regulation setting out the design of the symbol.\n  (5) To avoid doubt, a name may be prescribed by regulations made for the purposes of paragraph (b) of the definition of protected name in subsection (4) even if the name is not used, or for use, in connection with the performance of any or all of the functions of the Chief Executive Centrelink.\n  (6) To avoid doubt, the design of a symbol may be set out in regulations made for the purposes of subparagraph (b)(ii) of the definition of protected symbol in subsection (4) even if the symbol is not used, or for use, in connection with the performance of any or all of the functions of the Chief Executive Centrelink.\n  (7) For the purposes of subparagraph (b)(i) of the definition of protected symbol in subsection (4), a person is taken to be involved in the provision of services, benefits, programs or facilities if the person’s duties include:\n    (a) making payments in connection with the services, benefits, programs or facilities; or\n    (b) making decisions in connection with the services, benefits, programs or facilities; or\n    (c) collecting information in connection with the services, benefits, programs or facilities; or\n    (d) providing information about the services, benefits, programs or facilities.","sortOrder":18},{"sectionNumber":"39","sectionType":"section","heading":"Chief Executive Centrelink may charge for services","content":"#### 39 Chief Executive Centrelink may charge for services\n\n  The Chief Executive Centrelink may charge fees for services he or she provides in connection with the performance of his or her functions.","sortOrder":19},{"sectionNumber":"40","sectionType":"section","heading":"Centrelink programs","content":"#### 40 Centrelink programs\n\n  (1) For the purposes of a law of the Commonwealth, the following are centrelink programs:\n    (a) services, benefits, programs or facilities, where:\n    (i) the Chief Executive Centrelink is; or\n    (ii) Departmental employees are;\n    involved in the provision of the services, benefits, programs or facilities; or\n    (b) services, benefits, programs or facilities specified in a legislative instrument made by the Minister for the purposes of this paragraph.\n  (2) However, the following are not centrelink programs:\n    (a) medicare programs;\n    (b) services, benefits, programs or facilities that are provided for under:\n    (i) the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989; or\n    (ii) the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988; or\n    (c) services, benefits, programs or facilities that are specified in a legislative instrument made by the Minister for the purposes of this paragraph.\n  (3) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(a), a person is taken to be involved in the provision of services, benefits, programs or facilities if the person’s duties include:\n    (a) making payments in connection with the services, benefits, programs or facilities; or\n    (b) making decisions in connection with the services, benefits, programs or facilities; or\n    (c) collecting information in connection with the services, benefits, programs or facilities; or\n    (d) providing information about the services, benefits, programs or facilities.","sortOrder":20},{"sectionNumber":"40A","sectionType":"section","heading":"Multiple secrecy provisions","content":"#### 40A Multiple secrecy provisions\n\n  Scope\n  (1) This section applies to particular information if:\n    (a) the information is subject to a regulatory regime under a designated program Act (the first program Act); and\n    (b) the information is also subject to a regulatory regime under another designated program Act (the second program Act).\n  For the purposes of this subsection, in determining whether particular information is subject to a regulatory regime under a designated program Act, disregard whether the information is subject to a regulatory regime under any other designated program Act.\n  Disclosure or use of information etc.\n  (2) If:\n    (a) the Secretary, the Chief Executive Centrelink or a Departmental employee:\n    (i) discloses the information; or\n    (ii) uses the information; or\n    (iii) makes a record of the information; and\n    (b) the Secretary, the Chief Executive Centrelink or the Departmental employee, as the case may be, does so without contravening the first program Act;\n  the disclosure, use, or making of the record, as the case may be, does not contravene the second program Act.\n  Definitions\n  (3) In this section:\n\n> designated program Act means:\n\n    (a) the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999; or\n    (b) the Aged Care Act 2024; or\n    (ba) the Australian Immunisation Register Act 2015; or\n    (c) the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989; or\n    (d) the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988; or\n    (e) the Dental Benefits Act 2008; or\n    (f) the Disability Services and Inclusion Act 2023; or\n    (g) the Health Insurance Act 1973; or\n    (h) the Medical Indemnity Act 2002; or\n    (i) the Midwife Professional Indemnity (Commonwealth Contribution) Scheme Act 2010; or\n    (j) the National Health Act 1953; or\n    (k) the Paid Parental Leave Act 2010; or\n    (l) the Private Health Insurance Act 2007; or\n    (m) the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999; or\n    (n) the Student Assistance Act 1973; or\n    (o) an Act specified in a legislative instrument made by the Minister for the purposes of this paragraph.\n\n> disclose means disclose, divulge or communicate.","sortOrder":21},{"sectionNumber":"41","sectionType":"section","heading":"Regulations","content":"#### 41 Regulations\n\n  The Governor‑General may make regulations prescribing matters:\n    (a) required or permitted by this Act to be prescribed; or\n    (b) necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect to this Act.","sortOrder":22}],"analysis":{"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":6,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"The Act’s practical scope has been broadened over time by subordinate instruments and amendments that are reflected in the text provided. Mechanisms that enable scope expansion include: the ability to add functions by regulation (s8(1)(ba)); the Minister’s power to specify centrelink programs by legislative instrument (s40(1)(b)); and the listing of designated program Acts in s40A(3), which in the present text includes later Acts (for example the Aged Care Act 2024 and the Disability Services and Inclusion Act 2023). The protected‑name provisions also reference later changes (for example the insertion of “Services Australia” tied to a 2020 amendment) (s38(4)(aa), s38(3A)). These features show the Act now relies on subordinate instruments and later statutory amendments to extend the range of activities, names and information regimes covered, shifting substantive decisions away from the original Act text and into regulations, legislative instruments and subsequent amending Acts (s8(1)(ba), s40(1)(b), s41, s40A(3))."},"complexity_factors":["Extensive definitions and cross‑references defining scope (s3, s40) — multiple terms determine coverage of the Act.","Broad and open‑ended function conferral by regulation (s8(1)(ba)) and program specification by legislative instrument (s40(1)(b)), increasing subordinate instrument reliance.","Delegation and subdelegation rules with written‑direction constraints and interaction with functions delegated under other Acts (s12(1)–(6)).","Intergovernmental interaction and constitutional limits when States/Territories seek to impose duties on the Chief Executive (s13–s15).","Strict liability offence and protected‑name regime with exceptions and evidential allocations (s38(1), s38(1A), s38(2)–(3), s38(3A)–(3B)).","Multiple secrecy/conflict‑resolution provision covering many designated Acts, requiring nuanced application when information falls under several regimes (s40A(1)–(3)).","Reliance on regulations and ministerial legislative instruments to fill substantive detail (s41, s8(1)(ba), s40(1)(b), s40A(3)(o)).","Inclusion of external territories and Crown‑binding provisions with limited Crown criminal liability (s4–s5) affecting jurisdictional application."],"plain_english_summary":"What this law does, mechanically\n\n- Establishes a single office called the Chief Executive Centrelink and sets out how that office is filled and who can act in the role (s7, s7A).\n- Lists the Chief Executive’s functions: the service‑delivery functions in s8A, any functions conferred by other Acts, functions prescribed by regulation, and anything incidental or related to those functions (s8(1), s8A).\n- Allows the Chief Executive to delegate functions in writing to departmental employees, and to subdelegate functions that were themselves delegated to the Chief Executive under other Acts — subject to constraints and directions (s12(1)–(6)).\n- Permits the Secretary to make written agreements with other departments about performing Centrelink functions (s8B).\n- Provides for State and Territory laws to confer powers or duties on the Chief Executive, but only within constitutional limits and only if the Minister gives written approval before those State/Territory powers are exercised (s13–s15).\n- Creates a criminal offence (strict liability) for using protected names or symbols without the Secretary’s written consent, subject to limited exceptions for pre‑existing registered trade marks or good‑faith prior use (s38(1), s38(1A), s38(2)–(3)).  The protected names include specified terms such as “Commonwealth Services Delivery Agency” and “Services Australia” (s38(4)).  The offence carries a penalty of 30 penalty units (s38).\n- Allows the Chief Executive to charge fees for services provided in connection with Centrelink functions (s39).\n- Defines what counts as a “centrelink program” for Commonwealth law purposes, and excludes certain programs (for example, Medicare programs and specified child‑support Acts) from that definition (s40).\n- Provides a rule to resolve conflicts when the same information is subject to secrecy or regulatory regimes under more than one designated program Act: if a disclosure, use or record‑making does not breach the first program Act it will not breach the second (s40A(1)–(2)).  The list of designated Acts is set out in s40A(3).\n- Gives the Governor‑General power to make regulations needed to carry the Act into effect (s41).  Several provisions expressly allow functions, names, symbols and programs to be prescribed or specified by regulation or legislative instrument (s8(1)(ba), s38(4)(b), s40(1)(b), s41).\n\nWho is affected and who decides\n\n- The Chief Executive Centrelink and departmental employees perform and are delegated the functions of delivering services and programs (s7, s12, s16).\n- The Secretary controls use of protected names and symbols by giving or refusing written consent; the Secretary also negotiates inter‑departmental agreements (s38(1), s8B).\n- The Minister controls certain scope decisions by specifying centrelink programs in legislative instruments and by giving written approval before a State/Territory law is acted on by the Chief Executive (s13(3), s40(1)(b)).\n- Courts and prosecutors enforce the protected‑name offence; the offence is strict liability so the prosecution does not have to prove intent (s38(1A)).  For the particular limitation on the name “Services Australia,” the prosecution bears the legal burden on a specific fact (s38(3A)–(3B)).\n- The Governor‑General and the regulations it makes (on advice) can expand, specify or clarify many operational details authorised by the Act (s41).\n\nStated purpose and practical testing against costs, incentives and trade‑offs\n\n- The Act frames the Chief Executive’s core purpose as delivering services, benefits, programs or facilities provided by the Commonwealth or by others for purposes within Commonwealth legislative power (s8A).  That description is operational: it defines the sorts of activities Centrelink should provide rather than listing particular programs.\n\n- How that purpose can expand.  The Act expressly allows new functions or specified functions to be added by regulation (s8(1)(ba)).  The Act also permits the Minister to declare particular services or programs to be centrelink programs by legislative instrument (s40(1)(b)).  Mechanically, those two features mean the scope of what the Chief Executive can deliver can grow through subordinate instruments rather than only by amending the Act itself (s8(1)(ba), s40(1)(b), s41).  The trade‑off here is a lower parliamentary threshold for scope changes (regulations / instruments) in exchange for administrative flexibility.\n\n- Compliance and cost on private actors.  A business or person who wants to use a protected name or symbol must obtain the Secretary’s written consent or risk a strict liability offence and a 30‑penalty‑unit fine (s38(1), s38(1A)).  Exceptions protect pre‑existing registered trade marks and prior good‑faith use (s38(2)–(3)).  Mechanically, these rules impose a compliance burden (securing consent or demonstrating an existing right) and create enforcement risk for users of similar names (s38).  The Secretary’s consent power concentrates decision‑making in the executive (s38(1)).\n\n- Information handling and legal certainty.  Where the same information falls under multiple designated program Acts, s40A allows disclosure/use/record‑making that complies with one designated program Act not to be treated as breaching the other.  Mechanically this reduces the legal conflict barrier to reusing information across program regimes (s40A(1)–(2)).  The effect is to lower legal friction for departmental use of data when multiple Acts apply, but it also centralises legal interpretation of which program Act is treated as the “first” for a given disclosure (s40A(1)–(3)).\n\n- Intergovernmental and cross‑jurisdictional consequences.  State and Territory laws may confer powers or duties on the Chief Executive, but the Chief Executive cannot act under such laws without the Minister’s written approval (s13(1), s13(3)).  Where a purported State/Territory duty needs Commonwealth legislative backing to be valid, the Act treats that duty as imposed by this Act to the extent constitutionally appropriate (s14(3)–(5)).  Mechanically, that creates a two‑step process: States/Territories can legislate to involve the Chief Executive, but Commonwealth approval and constitutional limits shape whether and how those duties are ultimately performed (s13–s15).  This arrangement shifts control over cross‑jurisdictional performance to the Commonwealth executive and raises administrative coordination needs (s13(3), s14).\n\n- Delegation and administrative control.  Delegation must be in writing (s12(1)) and delegates/subdelegates must follow directions from the Chief Executive (s12(5)–(6)).  Where functions were delegated to the Chief Executive under other Acts, the Chief Executive’s ability to subdelegate is constrained by the original delegator’s directions (s12(3)–(5)).  Mechanically, the Act centralises practical control in written delegations and directions while allowing operational tasks to be carried out by departmental employees (s12).\n\n- Revenue and user charges.  The Chief Executive may charge fees for services connected to Centrelink functions (s39).  That gives the office a direct mechanism to recover costs from service users; the Act does not limit the types or rates of fees in the text provided, leaving detail to subordinate instruments or policy.\n\nOther practical notes and specific mechanics to watch\n\n- The Act applies in specified external territories (s5) and binds the Crown in each capacity but does not make the Crown criminally prosecutable (s4).\n- The definition of “centrelink program” shapes which services are treated under the Act and allows the Minister to add items by legislative instrument while excluding some categories like Medicare (s40(1)–(2)).\n- The list of Acts treated as designated program Acts for resolving multiple secrecy regimes is set in s40A(3) and can be expanded by ministerial instrument (s40A(3)(o)).  This list in the text includes later Acts (for example Aged Care Act 2024 and Disability Services and Inclusion Act 2023), which are concrete examples of how the Act’s practical scope has evolved by amendment.\n\nBottom line (mechanical statement)\n\nThe Act establishes the Chief Executive Centrelink as the organisational authority to deliver certain Commonwealth services, gives that office broad functions and the power to delegate, creates specific criminal and administrative controls over the use of certain names and symbols, allows fees to be charged for services, provides mechanisms for intergovernmental duties, and contains a conflict‑resolution rule for information subject to multiple program secrecy regimes. Key operational levers left to the executive and subordinate instruments are: the power to prescribe additional functions or programs (s8(1)(ba), s40(1)(b)), the Secretary’s consent over name/symbol use (s38(1)), the Minister’s approval for State/Territory conferrals (s13(3)), and the Governor‑General’s regulation‑making power (s41)."},"issue_detection":{"absurdities":[{"type":"circular_definition","section":"3 (definition of 'Chief Executive Centrelink') and 7","severity":"low","reasoning":"The definition in s3 points to s7 for meaning, but s7 merely declares the position exists without defining what 'Chief Executive Centrelink' means beyond the identity of the holder. The definition is tautological — it defines the term by reference to itself.","confidence":0.82,"description":"Circular definition: 'Chief Executive Centrelink' is defined as meaning 'the Chief Executive Centrelink referred to in section 7', while section 7 simply establishes that 'There is to be a Chief Executive Centrelink'. The definition adds no content and is entirely self-referential."},{"type":"other","section":"7(2) and 7A(1)","severity":"low","reasoning":"Because the Chief Executive Centrelink is (under s7(2)(a)) simply the CEO of Services Australia by virtue of holding that office, the 'acting' mechanism in s7A duplicates what would already flow from the acting CEO holding the substantive position. The section only has independent work in the s7(2)(b) scenario, making most of s7A redundant under normal operating conditions.","confidence":0.7,"description":"Structural paradox in acting arrangements: Section 7A(1) provides that the acting Chief Executive Officer of Services Australia acts as Chief Executive Centrelink during a vacancy or incapacity. However, under s7(2)(a), the Chief Executive Centrelink IS the Chief Executive Officer of Services Australia. This means that during a vacancy in the Chief Executive Centrelink role, the 'acting' CEO of Services Australia acts as the Chief Executive Centrelink — meaning the acting holder of the substantive role acts as themselves in the derived role, creating a logical redundancy."},{"type":"self_contradicting","section":"8(4) and 8(5)","severity":"medium","reasoning":"The deeming provision in s8(4) attributes the Chief Executive Centrelink's act to the primary person for all legal purposes. But s8(5) then allows the primary person to independently perform the same function. In contexts where a function may only lawfully be performed once (e.g., granting a single licence or making a binding determination), having two legal performances of the same act — one real, one deemed — could produce two legally valid but potentially conflicting outcomes with no priority rule.","confidence":0.78,"description":"The parallel function provisions create a legal fiction that is internally incoherent: s8(4) deems that when the Chief Executive Centrelink performs a function prescribed under s8(1)(ba), it is 'taken to have been performed by the primary person'. Yet s8(5) expressly preserves the primary person's ability to also perform that same function. This means the same act can simultaneously be legally attributed to two different persons, with no mechanism to resolve conflicts or double-counting of decisions."},{"type":"other","section":"8(6) and 8(11)","severity":"low","reasoning":"Excessive 'avoidance of doubt' provisions, especially when duplicated across two similar sub-regimes in the same section, suggest drafting uncertainty rather than genuine clarification. Courts may use the expressio unius principle to infer that matters not addressed by such clauses in analogous provisions are intended to be treated differently.","confidence":0.65,"description":"Repeated 'avoidance of doubt' clauses across parallel and acting-on-behalf provisions are structurally superfluous and potentially misleading. Sections 8(6) and 8(7) state it is 'immaterial' whether the function can be delegated or is under a law administered by the Minister — but these are declared to be 'for the avoidance of doubt' by s8(9). Sections 8(11), (12), (13) repeat the same structure. This legislative padding implies uncertainty where the Act purports to resolve it, and creates interpretive risk that omission of similar language elsewhere implies the opposite."},{"type":"self_contradicting","section":"38(3A) and 38(1A)","severity":"medium","reasoning":"In Australian criminal law, strict liability typically simplifies prosecution by removing fault elements. Imposing a full legal burden on the prosecution to prove a contextual element (s38(3B)) partially negates this advantage. The interaction is structurally contradictory: the offence is designed for ease of prosecution via strict liability, but then burdened with a prosecution-held legal burden for an element central to whether the offence is even engaged for the most commonly used protected name ('Services Australia').","confidence":0.8,"description":"Strict liability offence with a prosecution burden: s38(1A) makes the s38(1) offence one of strict liability (eliminating the mental element), but s38(3B) then imposes the legal burden of proof on the prosecution to establish the matter in s38(3A) — a contextual limitation on the offence. This is an unusual and potentially incoherent combination: strict liability removes the need to prove fault, but the prosecution must still affirmatively prove the contextual element in s38(3A), arguably making enforcement harder than a fault-based offence that uses an evidential burden."},{"type":"other","section":"38(4) (definition of 'protected name') and 38(3A)","severity":"low","reasoning":"Listing all names as equally 'protected' under a single defined term, while simultaneously subjecting one of them (the current operating name of the agency) to an additional threshold requirement, is internally inconsistent. It may also create perverse outcomes where a business can freely use the name 'Services Australia' in contexts not connected to the agency's operations, despite that being the agency's primary public-facing identity.","confidence":0.72,"description":"Section 38(3A) limits the prohibition on using 'Services Australia' to uses connected with Services Australia's operations, effectively carving it out from the strict general prohibition. Yet s38(4) lists 'Services Australia' as a 'protected name' on equal footing with other protected names. The carve-out in s38(3A) means 'Services Australia' is materially less protected than 'Commonwealth Services Delivery Agency' or other prescribed names, creating an asymmetry within the definition of a single defined term."},{"type":"self_contradicting","section":"40(1) and 40(2)","severity":"medium","reasoning":"Because Services Australia employees routinely handle inquiries across multiple program types in an integrated service delivery model, the functional definition of 'involved' (which includes merely providing information) combined with the explicit exclusions creates a definitional tension. The exclusions in s40(2) should logically take precedence, but the structure of the provision does not make this clear, and there is no express hierarchy stated between s40(1)(a) and s40(2) other than the word 'however'.","confidence":0.7,"description":"The definition of 'centrelink programs' in s40(1)(a) is potentially self-defeating: it includes any services where the Chief Executive Centrelink or Departmental employees are 'involved' in provision. Section 40(3) defines 'involved' very broadly to include merely 'providing information about' the services. This means that if a Departmental employee answers a phone query about a medicare program or child support service, that program could become a 'centrelink program' — yet s40(2) expressly excludes medicare programs and child support services from centrelink programs. The broad definition of 'involved' in s40(3) has the potential to swallow the exclusions in s40(2)."},{"type":"impossible_compliance","section":"12(3) and 12(4)","severity":"medium","reasoning":"Section 12(5) creates a compliance obligation on the Chief Executive Centrelink (and subdelegate) to the original delegator. Section 12(6) creates a separate compliance obligation on the subdelegate to the Chief Executive Centrelink. These chains of command can conflict. In the event of conflicting directions, the subdelegate cannot simultaneously comply with both s12(5) and s12(6). The Act provides no tiebreaker.","confidence":0.75,"description":"Subdelegation of delegated functions creates a potentially impossible compliance scenario: under s12(5), the Chief Executive Centrelink must comply with directions from the person who originally delegated a function. Under s12(6), the subdelegate must comply with directions from the Chief Executive Centrelink. If the original delegator's directions conflict with directions the Chief Executive Centrelink gives to the subdelegate, both the Chief Executive Centrelink and subdelegate face irreconcilable compliance obligations with no priority rule in the Act."}],"contradictions":[{"severity":"medium","section_a":"7(2)(a)","section_b":"3 (definition of 'Secretary')","confidence":0.88,"description":"The 'Chief Executive Centrelink' is defined (via s7(2)(a)) as the Chief Executive Officer of Services Australia, while 'Secretary' is also defined in s3 as the Chief Executive Officer of Services Australia. This means 'Chief Executive Centrelink' and 'Secretary' both refer to the same person under normal operating conditions, yet the Act treats them as distinct legal personas with different powers, functions and obligations throughout."},{"severity":"medium","section_a":"8B","section_b":"3 (definition of 'Secretary') and 7(2)(a)","confidence":0.8,"description":"Section 8B empowers 'the Secretary' to enter into agreements with 'the Secretary of another Department' about the performance of the Chief Executive Centrelink's functions. Since the Secretary IS the Chief Executive Centrelink under normal circumstances (both being the CEO of Services Australia), this provision enables the Chief Executive Centrelink to enter into agreements about the performance of his or her own functions — with himself or herself as the contracting party on both sides if no 'other Department' is involved. More fundamentally, the Secretary is agreeing about functions that are legally the Chief Executive Centrelink's, creating an ambiguity about who holds ultimate authority over those functions."},{"severity":"high","section_a":"13(3)","section_b":"14(1) and 15","confidence":0.85,"description":"Section 13(3) requires written ministerial approval before the Chief Executive Centrelink can exercise any power or perform any duty or function conferred by a State or Territory law. However, section 15 defines when a State/Territory law 'imposes a duty' as being when the circumstances of the conferral give rise to an obligation to exercise the power or perform the function. If a duty has arisen under s15 (i.e., there is an obligation to act), but the Minister has not given written approval under s13(3), the Chief Executive Centrelink is simultaneously obliged to act (under State/Territory law as engaged by s14-15) and prohibited from acting (under s13(3)) without approval. The Act provides no resolution for this conflict."},{"severity":"medium","section_a":"38(1) and 38(1A)","section_b":"38(2) and 38(3)","confidence":0.73,"description":"The strict liability offence in s38(1)/(1A) prohibits use of protected names/symbols without the Secretary's written consent. Sections 38(2) and 38(3) then provide defences/savings based on prior registered trade marks and prior good faith use. However, these savings are not framed as defences to the strict liability offence — they are framed as limitations on whether the section 'affects' pre-existing rights. This creates an ambiguity: a person relying on a prior trade mark registration or good faith use may have to litigate whether s38(2)/(3) operates as a complete bar to the offence being made out, or merely as a civil defence unavailable in criminal proceedings under s38(1A)."},{"severity":"low","section_a":"40(2)(a)","section_b":"40A(3) (definition of 'designated program Act')","confidence":0.65,"description":"Section 40(2)(a) expressly excludes 'medicare programs' from being centrelink programs. However, s40A applies to information subject to regulatory regimes under 'designated program Acts', which include the Health Insurance Act 1973 and National Health Act 1953 — core medicare program Acts. Section 40A(2) then applies its secrecy harmonisation regime to the Secretary, Chief Executive Centrelink and Departmental employees in relation to that information. This creates a structural tension: the substantive service delivery framework excludes medicare programs from the centrelink program definition, yet the secrecy/information regime in s40A integrates them without qualification, implying a broader operational overlap than the s40 exclusion suggests."}]},"kimi_summary":{"_metrics":{"source":"grok-batch-everything"},"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":7,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"The legislation has expanded well beyond its original 1997 focus on the 'Commonwealth Services Delivery Agency' delivering social security. It now expressly encompasses Services Australia, allows regulations to prescribe entirely new functions (including parallel performance of other persons' powers), covers a wide list of designated program Acts for secrecy purposes, and includes updated protected-name rules that apply to the agency's modern executive-agency status."},"complexity_factors":["Extensive cross-references to the Acts Interpretation Act 1901, the Human Services (Medicare) Act 1973, and 15+ designated program Acts in s.40A","Multi-layered rules on delegation, subdelegation and compliance with directions in s.12","Detailed constitutional safeguards and fallback provisions for when State or Territory laws impose duties (ss.13-15)","Nested definitions of 'function', 'benefit', 'centrelink program', 'protected name' and 'protected symbol' in s.3 and ss.38, 40","Parallel function and 'acting on behalf of' mechanisms in s.8 with multiple 'for the avoidance of doubt' clauses","Conditional exceptions and burdens of proof in the protected names offence (s.38(2)-(3B))"],"plain_english_summary":"# Human Services (Centrelink) Act 1997\n\nThis Act creates and defines the role of the **Chief Executive Centrelink** (the head of Services Australia, the main government agency delivering welfare). It gives this role broad powers to deliver **benefits** (pensions, allowances, concession cards, and payments) and services that the Australian Parliament can legally fund.\n\nThe law covers:\n- The Chief Executive's core 'service delivery functions' (providing government or non-government services, benefits, programs or facilities that Parliament could fund)\n- How the Chief Executive can delegate work to public servants, act on behalf of other officials, or take on extra tasks through regulations\n- Rules allowing the Chief Executive to help deliver state or territory programs (with safeguards to respect constitutional limits)\n- Protection of official names like 'Services Australia' and symbols so businesses cannot misuse them\n- Ways to charge fees for some services and rules for sharing information between different government programs without breaching secrecy laws\n\nIt affects everyone who receives Centrelink payments or uses its services, public servants who work there, businesses that might want to use protected branding, and other government departments that coordinate with it. The Act matters because it provides the legal framework that lets one agency efficiently deliver billions of dollars in social security and related support across Australia while preventing misuse of its identity and managing overlaps with other laws."},"summary":{"complexity_score":6,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"The Act has materially evolved from its original 1997 scope. Originally focused narrowly on the Commonwealth Services Delivery Agency, it has been amended to reflect the agency's rebrand to 'Services Australia' (via the Services Australia Governance Amendment Act 2020), the addition of new designated program Acts in the secrecy provisions (including the Aged Care Act 2024, Disability Services and Inclusion Act 2023, and Australian Immunisation Register Act 2015), and the expansion of Centrelink program definitions. The core governance framework is similar to its original intent, but the range of programs and legislative interactions has grown substantially."},"complexity_factors":["Constitutional law concepts embedded throughout — particularly sections dealing with Commonwealth vs State/Territory legislative powers and constitutional doctrines restricting duties on the Chief Executive","Multi-layered delegation and sub-delegation framework with specific carve-outs and conditions that must be tracked across multiple subsections","The 'parallel function' and 'acting on behalf' provisions (s.8(3)-(15)) create complex legal fictions where Centrelink's actions are deemed to be another person's actions","Interaction with a large number of other Commonwealth Acts (17+ listed in s.40A alone) requiring cross-referencing to understand full effect","Strict liability offence with nuanced carve-outs for pre-existing trade marks and good faith use, plus a specific reverse burden provision (s.38(3B))","Broad regulation-making powers mean the full scope of the law cannot be understood from the Act alone — regulations must also be consulted","The secrecy/information-sharing provision (s.40A) is technically sophisticated, requiring analysis of multiple regulatory regimes simultaneously","Frequent use of 'avoidance of doubt' subsections signals areas of genuine legal ambiguity"],"plain_english_summary":"## What is this law?\n\nThe **Human Services (Centrelink) Act 1997** is the foundational law that created and governs **Centrelink** — the government body most Australians deal with when accessing welfare payments, concessions cards, and other government assistance.\n\n## Who does it affect?\n\nThis law affects virtually **every Australian** who has ever interacted with Centrelink — whether claiming unemployment benefits, the aged pension, family payments, parenting allowances, student assistance, or any other government benefit. It also affects **businesses and organisations** that try to use the Centrelink or Services Australia name/logo without permission.\n\n## What does it actually do?\n\n### 1. Creates the \"Chief Executive Centrelink\" role\nThe law establishes a senior position (currently held by whoever is the CEO of Services Australia) responsible for delivering government services. This person can delegate their powers to Centrelink staff.\n\n### 2. Defines what Centrelink does\nCentrelink's job is to **deliver services, benefits, programs and facilities** on behalf of the Commonwealth — basically, to be the front counter for a huge range of government programs. Its functions can also be expanded by regulations (rules made by the Government without needing a new Act of Parliament).\n\n### 3. Protects Centrelink/Services Australia names and logos\nBusinesses **cannot** use names like \"Services Australia\" or \"Commonwealth Services Delivery Agency,\" or logos associated with Centrelink, without written permission from the Secretary. Doing so is a strict liability offence (meaning you can be penalised even if you didn't intend to break the law) carrying a fine of up to **30 penalty units** (currently around $9,900).\n\n### 4. Allows state and territory laws to give Centrelink extra responsibilities\nState and territory governments can give the Chief Executive Centrelink powers or duties under their own laws — but only with the written approval of the federal Minister. This allows Centrelink to act as a \"one-stop shop\" across different levels of government.\n\n### 5. Handles privacy/secrecy across multiple programs\nIf Centrelink staff lawfully share or use your information under one program (say, the Social Security Act) without breaching that law's secrecy rules, they won't automatically be breaking the secrecy rules of another related law (say, the Family Assistance Act). This prevents legal \"double jeopardy\" for staff handling information across multiple programs.\n\n### 6. Allows fee-charging for services\nCentrelink can charge fees for services it provides, though in practice this is rare for individual Australians.\n\n## Why does it matter?\n\nThis is the **machinery law** behind one of Australia's most important government agencies. It determines who runs Centrelink, what it can do, and how far its reach extends — including into state and territory service delivery. Without this law, there would be no legal basis for Centrelink to exist and act as it does."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/human-services-centrelink-act-1997","history":"/api/acts/human-services-centrelink-act-1997/history","analysis":"/api/acts/human-services-centrelink-act-1997/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/human-services-centrelink-act-1997/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/human-services-centrelink-act-1997/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/human-services-centrelink-act-1997/documents"}}