{"id":"energy-coordination-ombudsman-scheme-regulations-2004","name":"Energy Coordination (Ombudsman Scheme) Regulations 2004","slug":"energy-coordination-ombudsman-scheme-regulations-2004","collection":"regulation","jurisdiction":"wa","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":176561,"registerId":"wa-energy-coordination-ombudsman-scheme-regulations-2004-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-05","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"Energy Coordination (Ombudsman Scheme) Regulations 2004","content":"![Crest]()Western Australia\n\nEnergy Coordination Act 1994\n\nEnergy Coordination (Ombudsman Scheme) Regulations 2004\n\nWestern Australia\n\nEnergy Coordination (Ombudsman Scheme) Regulations 2004\n\nContents\n\n1. Citation 1\n\n2. Definitions 1\n\n3. Scheme to have a governing body 1\n\n4. Additional jurisdiction of GIO 2\n\n5. Functions of GIO 3\n\n6. Powers of GIO 3\n\n6A. Reasons for decisions 4\n\n7. Enforcement against gas marketing agents 4\n\n8. Review of schemes 4\n\n9. Revocation of a scheme’s approval 4\n\nNotes\n\nCompilation table 7\n\nDefined terms\n\n  \n\nEnergy Coordination Act 1994\n\nEnergy Coordination (Ombudsman Scheme) Regulations 2004\n\n##### 1. Citation\n\nThese regulations may be cited as the *Energy Coordination (Ombudsman Scheme) Regulations 2004*.\n\n##### 2. Definitions\n\nIn these regulations—\n\n  complainant includes a person who is in dispute with a member of an approved scheme or a  gas marketing agent;\n\n  complaint includes a dispute with a member of an approved scheme  or a gas marketing agent;\n\n  GIO has the meaning given to the term “gas industry ombudsman” in section 11ZPZ of the Act;\n\n  the Act means the *Energy Coordination Act 1994*.\n\n##### 3. Scheme to have a governing body\n\nIn order to receive approval under section 11ZPZ of the Act a scheme must provide for there to be a governing body of the scheme that has overall responsibility for overseeing and administering the scheme’s operations, and in particular for —\n\n(a) maintaining the independence of the GIO;\n\n(b) providing advice to the GIO on policy matters;\n\n(c) appointing, and terminating the appointment of, the GIO, and appointing an acting GIO as and for so long as may be required;\n\n(d) determining policies relating to the administration of the scheme;\n\n(e) approving GIO budgets, in consultation with the GIO, and ensuring that the scheme has sufficient funding for its operations;\n\n(f) considering the appropriateness, scope, and effectiveness of the scheme, and in particular, reviewing the scheme in accordance with regulation 8; and\n\n(g) providing advice to the GIO on the promotion of the scheme and the preparation of an annual report,\n\nand must provide —\n\n(h) for there to be equal representation on the governing body of —\n\n(i) members of the scheme; and\n\n(ii) customers of gas services and the public;\n\nand\n\n(i) for the governing body to have an independent chairperson.\n\n[Regulation 3 amended: Gazette 13 May 2005 p. 2076.]\n\n##### 4. Additional jurisdiction of GIO\n\nFor the purposes of section 11ZPZ(1)(d) of the Act, the following kinds of complaint may be investigated and dealt with by the GIO under an approved scheme —\n\n(a) complaints from owners or occupiers of land or other property about the way in which a member of the scheme has exercised its statutory powers in relation to that particular land or other property or in relation to neighbouring land or other property;\n\n(b) complaints relating to a member of the scheme or a gas marketing agent that are referred to the GIO by the member or agent with the agreement of the GIO and the complainant.\n\n##### 5. Functions of GIO\n\n(1) The functions of the GIO under an approved scheme are —\n\n(a) to have day to day responsibility for overseeing and administering the scheme’s operations; and\n\n(b) to investigate and deal with a complaint referred to in section 11ZPZ(1)(a), (b) or (c) of the Act or regulation 4 to the extent that it relates to commercial activities of a member of the scheme that are within the scope of the licence held by the member.\n\n(2) It is not a function of the GIO to set prices or tariffs or determine price structures.\n\n##### 6. Powers of GIO\n\nWithout limiting the things that the GIO under an approved scheme may do for the purpose of dealing with a complaint, but subject to any limitations set out in the scheme, the GIO may give a member of the scheme one or more of the following directions —\n\n(a) a direction to pay compensation to a complainant;\n\n(b) a direction to provide a gas service;\n\n(c) a direction to amend, or not to impose, a charge in relation to a service;\n\n(d) a direction to supply goods or services the subject of the complaint or undertake any necessary corrective or other work to resolve the complaint;\n\n(e) a direction to make an appropriate correction, deletion or addition to a record;\n\n(f) a direction to attach to a record a statement provided by the complainant of a correction, deletion or addition sought by the complainant;\n\n(g) a direction to do, not do or cease doing an act,\n\n  and may give a gas marketing agent a direction to provide a gas service.\n\n##### 6A. Reasons for decisions\n\nFor the purposes of section 11ZQ of the Act, the scheme will provide for the giving of reasons for decisions made in dealing with a dispute or complaint that the GIO has had to investigate, to the parties to the dispute or complaint.\n\n[Regulation 6A inserted: Gazette 13 May 2005 p. 2077.]\n\n##### 7. Enforcement against gas marketing agents\n\nA gas marketing agent must comply with a direction given to that gas marketing agent by the GIO under an approved scheme.\n\nPenalty: A fine of —\n\n(a) $2 000 in the case of an individual; or\n\n(b) $8 000 in the case of a body corporate.\n\n##### 8. Review of schemes\n\n(1) The governing body of a scheme must review the scheme before 30 September 2013 and at least once in every 5 years thereafter.\n\n(2) In reviewing the scheme, the governing body must consult with all, or as many as is practicable, of the persons and bodies the governing body considers have an interest in the scheme.\n\n(3) The governing body must give a report on the review to the Authority.\n\n[Regulation 8 inserted: Gazette 13 May 2005 p. 2077; amended: Gazette 8 Feb 2011 p. 416.]\n\n##### 9. Revocation of a scheme’s approval\n\n(1) Before exercising the power of revocation in section 11ZQA of the Act, the Authority must comply with subregulations (2) to (5).\n\n(2) The Authority must notify —\n\n(a) the Minister;\n\n(b) the Minister to whom the administration of the *Fair Trading Act 2010* is committed; and\n\n(c) the public,\n\nof its intention to exercise the power of revocation.\n\n(3) The notification must —\n\n(a) set out the reasons for, and invite submissions on, the proposed exercise of the power of revocation;\n\n(b) specify the last day on which submissions will be received by the Authority (at least 30 days after the day of the notification); and\n\n(c) specify the formats in which submissions will be received by the Authority.\n\n(4) To comply with subregulation (2)(c), the notification must be published —\n\n(a) in the *Gazette*;\n\n(b) in a newspaper circulating in Western Australia;\n\n(c) on an internet website maintained by the Authority; and\n\n(d) by sending it (electronically or otherwise) to persons listed on the Authority’s mailing list as interested in receiving notices from the Authority.\n\n(5) The Authority must take into account all submissions received on or before the last day for receiving submissions.\n\n(6) A copy of each submission received by the Authority on or before the last day for receiving submissions must, unless the person making the submission has specified that it is confidential —\n\n(a) be displayed on an internet website maintained by the Authority; and\n\n(b) be available on request.\n\n(7) Once the Authority has decided whether or not it will exercise the power of revocation, it must notify the Ministers referred to in subregulation (2) and the public of its decision, in the same way it notified them of its intention to exercise that power.\n\n[Regulation 9 inserted: Gazette 13 May 2005 p. 2077‑8; amended: Gazette 29 Jul 2011 p. 3128.]\n\nNotes\n\n1 This is a compilation of the *Energy Coordination (Ombudsman Scheme) Regulations 2004* and includes the amendments made by the other written laws referred to in the following table.\n\nCompilation table\n\n| **Citation** | **Gazettal** | **Commencement** |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| *Energy Coordination (Ombudsman Scheme) Regulations 2004* | 28 May 2004 p. 1833‑5 | 28 May 2004 |\n| *Energy Coordination (Ombudsman Scheme) Amendment Regulations 2005* | 13 May 2005 p. 2076‑8 | 13 May2005 (see r. 2) |\n| *Energy Coordination (Ombudsman Scheme) Amendment Regulations 2011* | 8 Feb 2011 p. 416 | r. 1 and 2: 8 Feb 2011 (see r. 2(a));   Regulations other than r. 1 and 2: 9 Feb 2011 (see r. 2(b)) |\n| *Energy Coordination (Ombudsman Scheme) Amendment Regulations (No. 2) 2011* | 29 Jul 2011 p. 3128 | r. 1 and 2: 29 Jul 2011 (see r. 2(a));   Regulations other than r. 1 and 2: 30 Jul 2011 (see r. 2(b)) |\n\n\nDefined terms\n\n*[This is a list of terms defined and the provisions where they are defined. The list is not part of the law.]*\n\n**Defined term Provision(s)**\n\ncomplainant 2\n\ncomplaint 2\n\nGIO 2\n\nthe Act 2\n","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"Subsequent amendments have increased the regulation’s procedural, jurisdictional and governance scope compared with the original 2004 instrument. Notable expansions include: (a) additional complaint jurisdiction (owners/occupiers complaining about exercise of statutory powers and referral complaints) and governance detail introduced in 2005 (reg 4 and reg 3 amendments); (b) a requirement to give reasons for GIO decisions (reg 6A, inserted 2005); (c) a mandated review timetable for schemes and consultation/reporting duties (reg 8, inserted and later amended 2011); and (d) a detailed, multi‑step public consultation and publication procedure the Authority must follow before revoking scheme approval (reg 9, inserted and amended 2011). Together these changes broadened oversight, transparency and enforcement mechanisms beyond the regulation’s original, shorter governance framework."},"complexity_factors":["9 substantive regulations (regs 1–9)","4 defined terms in regulation 2 (complainant, complaint, GIO, the Act)","Cross‑references to the Energy Coordination Act 1994 (sections referred to in regs 2, 4, 5 and revocation power in reg 9)","Key provisions framed as ‘subject to the scheme’ creating scheme‑specific variation (reg 6 and reg 5)","Several procedural steps and publication channels required for revocation (nested steps in reg 9(2)–(7))","Governance prescription with multiple duties and representational requirement (reg 3 has multiple sub‑paragraphs including equal representation and independent chair)","Inserted/amended provisions across years (2005, 2011) adding jurisdictional extension, reasons requirement, review timetable and revocation process"],"plain_english_summary":"**What this regulation does (mechanically)**\n\n- Sets out the rules that an energy-sector ombudsman scheme must meet to be approved under the Energy Coordination Act 1994. (See reg 2 for definitions and reg 3 for governing-body requirements.)\n- Requires each approved scheme to have a governing body with specific responsibilities: protect the independence of the Gas Industry Ombudsman (GIO); advise the GIO on policy; appoint and remove the GIO (and appoint acting GIOs); set administrative policies; approve budgets and ensure funding; review the scheme periodically; and assist with promotion and annual reporting (reg 3(a)–(g)).\n- Requires equal representation on that governing body between scheme members (industry) and customers/the public, and an independent chair (reg 3(h)–(i)).\n- Expands the kinds of complaints the GIO may deal with to include (a) complaints by owners/occupiers about how a member used statutory powers affecting their land or neighbouring land, and (b) complaints referred by a member or gas marketing agent with agreement from the GIO and complainant (reg 4).\n- Defines the GIO’s functions: day-to-day administration of the scheme and investigation of complaints that relate to commercial activities within a member’s licence scope (reg 5). The GIO is explicitly not to set prices or tariffs (reg 5(2)).\n- Gives the GIO a range of enforceable directions it may give to scheme members (and, in specified cases, to gas marketing agents), such as ordering payment of compensation, provision of gas services, amendment or non-imposition of charges, corrective work, record corrections, and directions to do or cease doing an act (reg 6). The GIO’s powers are “without limiting” wording but also “subject to any limitations set out in the scheme” (reg 6).\n- Requires the scheme to provide reasons to parties for decisions the GIO makes in resolving disputes (reg 6A).\n- Makes failure by a gas marketing agent to comply with a GIO direction an offence carrying a fine of $2,000 (individual) or $8,000 (body corporate) (reg 7).\n- Requires the governing body to review the scheme before 30 September 2013 and at least every five years thereafter, consulting interested parties where practicable and reporting the review to the Authority (reg 8).\n- Lays down procedural steps the Authority must follow before revoking a scheme’s approval: notify Ministers and the public of the intention to revoke, publish reasons and invitation for submissions (at least 30 days), publish the notice in specified channels (Gazette, newspaper, Authority website, mailing list), consider submissions received on time, publish non‑confidential submissions, and then notify Ministers and the public of the final decision in the same ways (reg 9).\n\n**Who is affected**\n\n- Scheme operators and their governing bodies: must meet composition and governance requirements, run consultations and reviews, maintain funding, and ensure the scheme contains the procedural elements required by these regulations (reg 3, 8).\n- The Gas Industry Ombudsman (GIO): receives specified functions, investigative powers, and must give reasons for decisions (reg 5, 6A).\n- Scheme members (licensed gas businesses): are subject to directions from the GIO on complaints within the scope of their licence and may be required to pay compensation, supply services, correct records, etc. (reg 6).\n- Gas marketing agents: can be directed by the GIO to provide services and are subject to fines for non‑compliance (reg 6, 7).\n- Complainants (customers, owners/occupiers of land, the public): can bring specified complaints and receive reasons for decisions (reg 2, 4, 6A).\n- The Authority and relevant Ministers: have procedural roles when approving or revoking scheme approval (reg 9).\n\n**Why it matters (stated purpose and practical effects)**\n\n- Purpose claimed: to define minimum governance, jurisdiction, procedural fairness and enforcement arrangements for approved energy ombudsman schemes so complaints are investigated and resolved effectively (reg 3–9). \n\n- Practical effects and trade-offs (mechanical, source‑based):\n  - Accountability and transparency: the regulations impose governance structures (equal representation and independent chair, reg 3(h)–(i)), periodic external reviews (reg 8) and a formal revocation consultation process (reg 9). These create ongoing administrative tasks and reporting costs for schemes.\n  - Dispute resolution power vs. commercial autonomy: the GIO can issue directions that can alter commercial outcomes for members (compensation, supply of services, amendment of charges — reg 6). That reduces parties’ unilateral control over some contractual or commercial arrangements when a complaint is upheld, though the GIO is expressly not to set prices (reg 5(2)).\n  - Compliance costs and enforcement: schemes must be funded (governing body to approve budgets, reg 3(e)) and members may incur costs from complying with directions or paying compensation. Gas marketing agents face specified pecuniary penalties for non‑compliance (reg 7). These are concrete costs borne by regulated firms and agents.\n  - Scope expansion and implementation risk: allowing the GIO to consider complaints about the exercise of statutory powers affecting land (reg 4(a)) brings the ombudsman into matters that can interact with other statutory regimes (planning, land use). That may increase complexity and require clearer boundaries between licensing, statutory powers and ombudsman jurisdiction; much of that boundary depends on the underlying Act and the content of each scheme (reg 5’s reference to activity being “within the scope of the licence”).\n  - Discretion and variation between schemes: several powers are framed as subject to the content of an approved scheme (reg 6), so the precise reach of the GIO’s powers and procedural safeguards will vary with each scheme’s rules. This creates regulatory heterogeneity — the Authority approves schemes, but the schemes themselves will determine many operational limits.\n\n**Who pays, who decides, what behaviour changes?**\n\n- Who pays: scheme administration costs (including an independent chair and governance processes) are borne by the scheme and its members (reg 3(e)); firms ordered to comply with directions bear the costs of complying or compensating complainants (reg 6); gas marketing agents risk fines if they do not comply (reg 7).\n- Who decides: the governing body appoints and oversees the GIO and approves budgets (reg 3); the GIO decides how to investigate and resolve complaints within the scheme’s and licence’s scope (reg 5, 6); the Authority approves or revokes scheme approvals and must follow the notification and submissions process before revocation (reg 9).\n- Behaviour changes encouraged/required: members and agents must put in governance, maintain funding and comply with GIO directions; the Authority must adopt transparent revocation procedures; complainants and members may use the ombudsman route for certain statutory power disputes (reg 4).\n\n**Implementation and compliance considerations**\n\n- Schemes must embed the governance and procedural elements specified (governing body composition, independent chair, reviews, reasons for decisions — regs 3, 6A, 8), which creates an ongoing administrative and resourcing requirement.\n- The regulations rely on cross‑references to the Act and to the content of each approved scheme (reg 5 and reg 6), so full effect depends on those documents; readers must check the Act and any particular approved scheme for firm boundaries on jurisdiction and limits on the GIO’s powers.\n- Fines for gas marketing agents are fixed amounts (reg 7) rather than scaled penalties; their deterrent effect depends on commercial context and enforcement practice.\n\n(References: reg 2–9.)"},"issue_detection":{"absurdities":[],"contradictions":[]},"summary":{"complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"Scope cannot be assessed as the legislative text was unavailable. No comparison between original intent and final form is possible based on the retrieved content."},"complexity_factors":["No legislative text was retrievable — complexity cannot be meaningfully assessed","Regulatory instruments of this type are generally moderate in complexity, but the title suggests a relatively focused administrative scheme","Ombudsman scheme regulations typically involve procedural rules, eligibility criteria, and complaint-handling processes — not highly technical legal concepts"],"plain_english_summary":"These regulations, made under the Energy Coordination Act 1994 (WA), set up an independent ombudsman scheme for the energy sector in Western Australia, providing a free complaints‑handling route for residential and small business customers. They affect energy retailers, distributors and the Energy (and Water) Ombudsman, offering consumers an accessible way to resolve disputes."},"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"A positive credit balance is required for all requests, including BYOK, so fallback providers remain available. Add credits at https://vercel.com/d?to=%2F%5Bteam%5D%2F%7E%2Fai%3Fmodal%3Dtop-up to continue.","source":"analysis-cron"},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The regulations remain focused on their original purpose: establishing the framework for a gas industry ombudsman scheme. The amendments added procedural details (reasons for decisions, review timelines, revocation consultation) and enforcement mechanisms, but did not expand the scope beyond dispute resolution for gas consumers and oversight of gas marketing agents."},"complexity_factors":["Short length (9 regulations plus definitions)","Only 4 defined terms in the interpretation section","Minimal cross-referencing (primarily to section 11ZPZ of the parent Act)","Straightforward conditional logic (mostly 'must' obligations rather than nested exceptions)","Clear structure following a logical sequence (setup → functions → powers → enforcement → review)","No exceptions to exceptions or deeply nested subsections","Amendments are minor insertions (regulations 6A, 8, 9) rather than structural rewrites"],"plain_english_summary":"**What this legislation does:**\n\nThese regulations set up the rules for an independent **Gas Industry Ombudsman (GIO)** scheme in Western Australia. Think of the GIO as a referee who helps resolve disputes between gas companies and their customers.\n\n**Who it affects:**\n\n- **Gas customers** – anyone who has a complaint about their gas provider\n- **Gas companies** (called \"members of the scheme\") – licensed businesses that must join and follow the ombudsman's decisions\n- **Gas marketing agents** – third parties who sell gas services on behalf of companies\n- **The GIO** – the independent person appointed to investigate complaints\n- **The governing body** – a committee that oversees the scheme and keeps the GIO independent\n\n**Key features:**\n\n- **Independent oversight:** The scheme must have a governing body with equal representation from gas companies and customers/public, plus an independent chair. This prevents the industry from controlling the complaints process.\n\n- **What the GIO can investigate:**\n  - Disputes about gas bills, service quality, and commercial activities\n  - Complaints about how gas companies use their legal powers on private property\n  - Issues referred by gas companies themselves (with everyone's agreement)\n\n- **Powers of the GIO:** Can order companies to pay compensation, fix services, refund charges, correct records, or stop doing something harmful. Gas marketing agents must comply or face fines ($2,000 for individuals, $8,000 for companies).\n\n- **What the GIO cannot do:** Set gas prices or tariffs – they can only resolve individual disputes, not regulate the market.\n\n- **Transparency:** The GIO must give reasons for decisions, and the scheme must be reviewed every 5 years. If the government wants to shut down the scheme, they must consult the public first.\n\n**Why it matters:**\n\nThis gives ordinary people a free, independent way to resolve disputes with powerful gas utilities without going to court. It ensures someone is watching how gas companies treat customers and use their legal powers on private land."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/energy-coordination-ombudsman-scheme-regulations-2004","history":"/api/acts/energy-coordination-ombudsman-scheme-regulations-2004/history","analysis":"/api/acts/energy-coordination-ombudsman-scheme-regulations-2004/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/energy-coordination-ombudsman-scheme-regulations-2004/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/energy-coordination-ombudsman-scheme-regulations-2004/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/energy-coordination-ombudsman-scheme-regulations-2004/documents"}}