{"id":"tas:sr-2018-002","name":"Electricity Supply Industry (Network Planning Requirements) Regulations 2018","slug":"electricity-supply-industry-network-planning-requirements-regulations-2018","collection":"regulation","jurisdiction":"tas","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":"2 of 2018","makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":184854,"registerId":"tas-tas:sr-2018-002-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-05","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"Short title","content":"### 1 Short title\n\n> These regulations may be cited as the [Electricity Supply Industry (Network Planning Requirements) Regulations 2018](/view/html/inforce/2026-04-12/sr-2018-002) .","sortOrder":0},{"sectionNumber":"2","sectionType":"section","heading":"Commencement","content":"### 2 Commencement\n\n> These regulations take effect on the day on which their making is notified in the *Gazette*.","sortOrder":1},{"sectionNumber":"3","sectionType":"section","heading":"Interpretation","content":"### 3 Interpretation\n\n> > (1)  In these regulations –\n> > \n> > > ***affected customer***, in relation to –\n> > > \n> > > > > (a) a proposed augmentation of a part of a Provider's relevant transmission system; or\n> > > > \n> > > > > (b) an exempted augmentation –\n> > > \n> > > means a customer, of the Provider, who receives from the Provider a prescribed transmission service that would not be likely to meet the service standards set out in [regulation 5](#GS5@EN) if the proposed augmentation were not to proceed or if the exempted augmentation ceased to be an exempted augmentation;\n> > \n> > > ***APR*** means a Transmission Annual Planning Report of a Provider that is published by the Provider;\n> > \n> > > ***Australian CPI number***, for a particular quarter in a financial year, means the Consumer Price Index, weighted average of eight capital cities for that quarter, published by the Australian Statistician under the authority of the *Census and Statistics Act 1905* of the Commonwealth;\n> > \n> > > ***CPI increase since 2013***, for a particular financial year, means the ratio of the average of the Australian CPI number, for each of the 4 quarters of that financial year, to the average of the Australian CPI number for each of the 4 quarters of the 2012-2013 financial year;\n> > \n> > > ***exempted augmentation*** means an augmentation to which [regulation 8(4)](#GS8@Gs4@EN) applies;\n> > \n> > > ***power system planning*** means carrying out studies involved in the development of a technically and economically sound system of electricity supply;\n> > \n> > > ***Provider*** means a Transmission Network Service Provider;\n> > \n> > > ***publication date***, in respect of an APR, means the day on which the APR is published by a Provider;\n> > \n> > > ***published*** means published as required by the National Electricity Rules;\n> > \n> > > ***relevant transmission system*** means the parts, of a transmission system, used to provide prescribed transmission services.\n> \n> > (2)  Unless the contrary intention appears, an expression used in these regulations that is defined in the National Electricity Rules has the same meaning in these regulations as in those rules.","sortOrder":2},{"sectionNumber":"4","sectionType":"section","heading":"Objects of regulations","content":"### 4 Objects of regulations\n\n> The objects of these regulations are to specify, for the purposes of the National Electricity Rules –\n> \n> > > (a) the network performance requirements to be taken into account in power system planning in respect of a relevant transmission system; and\n> > \n> > > (b) the service standards that a Provider must take into account, for the purposes of the regulatory investment test for transmission, in carrying out power system planning in respect of a relevant transmission system –\n> \n> and to allow, in respect of certain augmentations, for exemptions from such requirements and standards.\n> \n> > > Note 1\n> > \n> > *Network performance requirements* may, under the National Electricity Rules, be set out in a statutory instrument of a participating jurisdiction.\n> \n> > > Note 2\n> > \n> > *Service standards* for the purposes of the regulatory investment test for transmission may, under the National Electricity Rules, be set out in an applicable regulatory instrument of a participating jurisdiction.\n> \n> > > Note 3\n> > \n> > *Transmission Network Service Provider* and *regulatory investment test for transmission* are defined in the National Electricity Rules.","sortOrder":3},{"sectionNumber":"5","sectionType":"section","heading":"Minimum network performance requirements","content":"### 5 Minimum network performance requirements\n\n> > (1)  Power system planning in respect of a relevant transmission system must be such that the system is likely to meet the following network performance requirements:\n> > \n> > > > (a) in respect of an intact transmission system –\n> > > > \n> > > > > > (i) no more than 25 MW of load is to be capable of being interrupted by a credible contingency event; and\n> > > > > \n> > > > > > (ii) no more than 850 MW of load is to be capable of being interrupted by a single asset failure; and\n> > > > > \n> > > > > > (iii) load that is interrupted by a single asset failure is not to be capable of resulting in a black system; and\n> > > > > \n> > > > > > (iv) the unserved energy to load that is interrupted consequent on damage to a network element resulting from a credible contingency event is not to be capable of exceeding 300 MW.h at any time; and\n> > > > > \n> > > > > > (v) the unserved energy to load that is interrupted by a single asset failure is not to be capable of exceeding 3 000 MW.h at any time;\n> > > \n> > > > (b) in respect of a transmission system that is not an intact transmission system, the active energy exposed to interruption by a credible contingency event is not to be capable of exceeding 18 000 MW.h at any time.\n> \n> > (2)  The network performance requirements under [subregulation (1)](#GS5@Gs1@EN) constitute the service standards that a Provider must take into account, for the purposes of the regulatory investment test for transmission, in carrying out power system planning in respect of a relevant transmission system.\n> \n> > (3)  For the purpose of meeting the requirements under [subregulation (1)](#GS5@Gs1@EN) , a Provider may use load shedding –\n> > \n> > > > (a) to control network load after a non-credible contingency event; or\n> > > \n> > > > (b) as specified in a contract, agreement or arrangement entered into by the Provider and a Transmission Customer.\n> \n> > (4)  For the purpose of calculating unserved energy under [subregulation (1)](#GS5@Gs1@EN) , any replacements or repairs undertaken must be taken to not exceed –\n> > \n> > > > (a) 48 hours to repair a transmission line; or\n> > > \n> > > > (b) 8 days to replace a transformer; or\n> > > \n> > > > (c) 18 days to replace an autotransformer.\n> \n> > (5)  In this regulation –\n> > \n> > > ***intact transmission system*** means a transmission system from which no network element has been removed for maintenance, replacement or repair;\n> > \n> > > ***single asset*** means –\n> > > \n> > > > > (a) one double transmission line circuit that contains 2 three-phase circuits; or\n> > > > \n> > > > > (b) one circuit breaker as defined in Australian Standard AS 1852-441 entitled \"International Electrotechnical Vocabulary, Chapter 441 – Switchgear, Controlgear and Fuses\" published by Standards Australia on 7 June 1985, as amended or substituted from time to time; or\n> > > > \n> > > > > (c) one substation busbar;\n> > \n> > > ***single asset failure*** means one single incident (other than a credible contingency event) that results in the failure of one single asset to perform its intended function;\n> > \n> > > ***unserved energy*** means unserved energy as defined in the Australian Standard AS 1852-604 entitled \"International Electrotechnical Vocabulary, Chapter 604 – Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electricity – Operation\" published by Standards Australia on 17 June 1988, as amended or substituted from time to time.\n> > \n> > > > Note\n> > > \n> > > *Black system*, *busbar*, *credible contingency event*, *load shedding*, *network element*, *non-credible contingency event*, *regulatory investment test for transmission*, *transformer*, *Transmission Customer*, *transmission line and transmission system* are defined in the National Electricity Rules.","sortOrder":4},{"sectionNumber":"6","sectionType":"section","heading":"Approval of certain transmission system augmentations","content":"### 6 Approval of certain transmission system augmentations\n\n> > (1)  This regulation applies if –\n> > \n> > > > (a) an augmentation of a part of the Provider's relevant transmission system would be required in order for the system to be likely to meet a network performance requirement contained in a provision of [regulation 5](#GS5@EN) that applies in relation to the system; and\n> > > \n> > > > (b) the augmentation is proposed in power system planning of the Provider; and\n> > > \n> > > > (c) the present value of the cost of constructing, operating and maintaining the proposed augmentation is estimated to exceed the relevant amount in relation to the augmentation.\n> \n> > (2)  For the purposes of [subregulation (1)(c)](#GS6@Gs1@Hpc@EN) , the relevant amount in relation to an augmentation is –\n> > \n> > > > (a) if the augmentation is proposed in the financial year in which this subregulation commences – $35 million; and\n> > > \n> > > > (b) if the augmentation is proposed in any following financial year – the amount obtained by multiplying $35 million by the CPI increase since 2013 for that following year.\n> \n> > (3)  The relevant Provider must apply to the Minister for approval of the proposed augmentation.\n> \n> > (4)  If this regulation applies in relation to a proposed augmentation, of a part of a relevant transmission system, that would be required in order for the system to be likely to meet a network performance requirement contained in a provision of [regulation 5](#GS5@EN) that applies in relation to the system, the provision of that regulation –\n> > \n> > > > (a) is not, despite [regulation 5](#GS5@EN) , to be taken to be a network performance requirement in relation to that part of the system; and\n> > > \n> > > > (b) does not constitute a service standard under [regulation 5(2)](#GS5@Gs2@EN) in relation to that part of the system –\n> > \n> > unless the Minister has approved the augmentation under this regulation.\n> \n> > (5)  The application –\n> > \n> > > > (a) is to be in a form provided or approved by the Minister; and\n> > > \n> > > > (b) must be supported by such evidence or information as the Minister requires.\n> \n> > (6)  After considering the application, the Minister may –\n> > \n> > > > (a) approve the proposed augmentation if satisfied that its direct and indirect economic, social and environmental benefits outweigh its direct and indirect economic, social and environmental costs; or\n> > > \n> > > > (b) refuse to approve the proposed augmentation if not so satisfied.\n> \n> > (7)  The Minister is to notify the applicant in writing of his or her decision under [subregulation (6)](#GS6@Gs6@EN) and, in the case of a refusal, the reasons for the refusal.\n> > \n> > > > Note 1\n> > > \n> > > *Minimum network performance requirements* means minimum network performance requirements within the meaning of the National Electricity Rules.\n> > \n> > > > Note 2\n> > > \n> > > *Augmentation, Transmission Network Service Provider* and *transmission system* are defined in the National Electricity Rules.","sortOrder":5},{"sectionNumber":"7","sectionType":"section","heading":"Notices as to proposed augmentations","content":"### 7 Notices as to proposed augmentations\n\n> > (1)  If –\n> > \n> > > > (a) an augmentation of a part of a Provider's relevant transmission system would be required in order for the system to be likely to meet a network performance requirement set out in [regulation 5](#GS5@EN) that applies in relation to the system; and\n> > > \n> > > > (b) the augmentation is proposed in an APR of the Provider –\n> > \n> > an affected customer may, within 3 months of the publication date of the APR, give to the Provider a notice in relation to the proposed augmentation.\n> \n> > (2)  A notice under [subregulation (1)](#GS7@Gs1@EN) by an affected customer in relation to an augmentation proposed in an APR is to specify that the customer is of the opinion that there is insufficient customer benefit to justify requiring the proposed augmentation to be provided in the 5-year period from the publication date of the APR.\n> \n> > (3)  A Provider that receives from an affected customer a notice under [subregulation (1)](#GS7@Gs1@EN) in relation to a proposed augmentation must, within 30 days, give to all other affected customers in respect of the augmentation a notice, in accordance with [subregulation (5)](#GS7@Gs5@EN) , in relation to the proposed augmentation.\n> \n> > (4)  A Provider must give to all affected customers in relation to a proposed augmentation of a Provider's relevant transmission system a notice, in accordance with [subregulation (5)](#GS7@Gs5@EN) , in relation to the augmentation, if –\n> > \n> > > > (a) the augmentation would be required in order for the system to be likely to meet a network performance requirement set out in [regulation 5](#GS5@EN) that applies in relation to the system; and\n> > > \n> > > > (b) the Provider is of the opinion that there may be insufficient customer benefit to justify requiring the augmentation to be provided in the 5-year period from the publication date of the APR that was most recently published by the Provider before the notice is given by the Provider.\n> \n> > (5)  A notice under [subregulation (3)](#GS7@Gs3@EN) or [(4)](#GS7@Gs4@EN) given by a Provider to an affected customer in relation to a proposed augmentation is to –\n> > \n> > > > (a) specify the proposed augmentation to which the notice relates; and\n> > > \n> > > > (b) specify the network performance requirement, set out in [regulation 5](#GS5@EN) , to which the proposed augmentation relates; and\n> > > \n> > > > (c) specify –\n> > > > \n> > > > > > (i) if the notice is given under [subregulation (3)](#GS7@Gs3@EN) , that an affected customer is of the opinion that there is insufficient customer benefit; or\n> > > > > \n> > > > > > (ii) if the notice is given under [subregulation (4)](#GS7@Gs4@EN) , that the Provider is of the opinion that there may be insufficient customer benefit –\n> > > > \n> > > > to justify requiring the augmentation to be provided in the 5-year period from the publication date of the APR that was most recently published by the Provider before the notice was given by the Provider; and\n> > > \n> > > > (d) inform the affected customer that the customer may give to the Provider, within 3 months after receiving the notice, a notice under [regulation 8(1)](#GS8@Gs1@EN) in relation to the proposed augmentation.\n> \n> > (6)  A notice in relation to a proposed augmentation is to be given under [subregulation (3)](#GS7@Gs3@EN) or [(4)](#GS7@Gs4@EN) to an affected customer –\n> > \n> > > > (a) by letter directed to the affected customer; or\n> > > \n> > > > (b) by means of electronic communication, within the meaning of the [Electronic Transactions Act 2000](/view/html/inforce/2026-04-12/act-2000-075) .","sortOrder":6},{"sectionNumber":"8","sectionType":"section","heading":"Exemption from network planning requirements","content":"### 8 Exemption from network planning requirements\n\n> > (1)  An affected customer in relation to a proposed augmentation of a part of a Provider's relevant transmission service may, within 3 months after receiving a notice under [regulation 7(3)](#GS7@Gs3@EN) or [(4)](#GS7@Gs4@EN) in relation to the augmentation, give to the Provider notice in writing in relation to the augmentation.\n> \n> > (2)  A notice under [subregulation (1)](#GS8@Gs1@EN) , by an affected customer, in relation to an augmentation to which a notice under [regulation 7(3)](#GS7@Gs3@EN) or [(4)](#GS7@Gs4@EN) relates is to specify that the affected customer is of the opinion that there is insufficient customer benefit to justify requiring the augmentation to be provided in the 5-year period from the publication date of the APR that was most recently published by the Provider before the notice under [regulation 7(3)](#GS7@Gs3@EN) or [(4)](#GS7@Gs4@EN) was given.\n> \n> > (3)  If all affected customers have given a Provider a notice either –\n> > \n> > > > (a) under [subregulation (1)](#GS8@Gs1@EN) in relation to an augmentation to which a notice given under [regulation 7(3)](#GS7@Gs3@EN) or [(4)](#GS7@Gs4@EN) by the Provider relates; or\n> > > \n> > > > (b) under [regulation 7(1)](#GS7@Gs1@EN) in relation to an augmentation proposed in an APR published by the Provider –\n> > \n> > (whether or not all the notices have been given under the same provision), [subregulation (4)](#GS8@Gs4@EN) applies in relation to the augmentation and the provision of [regulation 5](#GS5@EN) to which the augmentation relates.\n> \n> > (4)  If this subregulation applies in relation to an augmentation and the provision of [regulation 5](#GS5@EN) to which the augmentation relates, that provision –\n> > \n> > > > (a) despite [regulation 5](#GS5@EN) , is not to be taken to be a network performance requirement in relation to the relevant part of the system; and\n> > > \n> > > > (b) does not constitute a service standard under [regulation 5(2)](#GS5@Gs2@EN) in relation to that part of the system –\n> > \n> > for the 5-year period from the publication date of the APR that was most recently published by the Provider before a notice under [regulation 7(3)](#GS7@Gs3@EN) or [(4)](#GS7@Gs4@EN) was given in relation to the augmentation.\n> \n> > (5)  If [subregulation (4)](#GS8@Gs4@EN) applies in relation to an augmentation in respect of a part of a relevant transmission system and a provision of [regulation 5](#GS5@EN) to which the augmentation relates for a 5-year period from the publication date of an APR –\n> > \n> > > > (a) the Provider must not propose, in an APR that is published by the Provider during that 5-year period –\n> > > > \n> > > > > > (i) the augmentation; or\n> > > > > \n> > > > > > (ii) another augmentation, in relation to the part of the system, that would be necessary in order for the system to be likely to meet the requirements of that provision if it were a network performance requirement in relation to the part of the system; and\n> > > \n> > > > (b) the Provider must include the relevant information, in relation to the augmentation and the provision, in each APR that is published by the Provider during that 5-year period.\n> \n> > (6)  For the purposes of [subregulation (5)(b)](#GS8@Gs5@Hpb@EN) , the following is the relevant information in relation to an augmentation and a provision of [regulation 5](#GS5@EN) to which the augmentation relates:\n> > \n> > > > (a) the part of the relevant transmission system, and the augmentation, to which [subregulation (4)](#GS8@Gs4@EN) applies;\n> > > \n> > > > (b) a statement that the affected customers in relation to the augmentation are of the opinion that there is insufficient customer benefit to justify requiring the augmentation to be provided in the 5-year period for which [subregulation (4)](#GS8@Gs4@EN) applies in relation to the augmentation;\n> > > \n> > > > (c) a statement that, because of the application of [subregulation (4)](#GS8@Gs4@EN) to that provision of [regulation 5](#GS5@EN) , that provision is not a network performance requirement, and does not constitute a service standard, in relation to the part of the system.","sortOrder":7},{"sectionNumber":"9","sectionType":"section","heading":"Exemption from network planning requirement may cease to apply","content":"### 9 Exemption from network planning requirement may cease to apply\n\n> > (1)  [Subregulation (4)](#GS9@Gs4@EN) applies in relation to an augmentation (the ***exempted augmentation***), and to a provision of [regulation 5](#GS5@EN) (the ***exempted provision***), to which [regulation 8(4)](#GS8@Gs4@EN) applies, if –\n> > \n> > > > (a) the Provider in respect of the relevant transmission system to which the augmentation relates is of the opinion that there has been a material change in circumstances in relation to the part of the relevant transmission system to which the exempted augmentation relates; and\n> > > \n> > > > (b) the Provider is of the opinion that –\n> > > > \n> > > > > > (i) [regulation 8(4)](#GS8@Gs4@EN) ought to cease to apply in relation to the exempted augmentation and the exempted provision; and\n> > > > > \n> > > > > > (ii) the exempted augmentation, or another augmentation, is or may be necessary in relation to the part of the system in order for the system to be likely in the future to meet the requirements of that provision of [regulation 5](#GS5@EN) if it ceases to be an exempted provision.\n> \n> > (2)  An affected customer in relation to an augmentation to which [regulation 8(4)](#GS8@Gs4@EN) applies may give a notice in writing, to the Provider in respect of the relevant transmission system to which the augmentation relates, stating that the customer is of the opinion that [regulation 8(4)](#GS8@Gs4@EN) should cease to apply in relation to the augmentation.\n> \n> > (3)  [Subregulation (4)](#GS9@Gs4@EN) applies in relation to an augmentation (the ***exempted augmentation***), and to a provision of [regulation 5](#GS5@EN) (the ***exempted provision***), to which [regulation 8(4)](#GS8@Gs4@EN) applies, if a Provider receives a notice under [subregulation (2)](#GS9@Gs2@EN) in relation to the augmentation.\n> \n> > (4)  If this subregulation applies in relation to an exempted augmentation and an exempted provision –\n> > \n> > > > (a) [regulation 8(5)](#GS8@Gs5@EN) ceases to apply in relation to the exempted augmentation and the exempted provision; and\n> > > \n> > > > (b) [regulation 8(4)](#GS8@Gs4@EN) does not, on and from the relevant date in relation to the exempted provision, apply in relation to the augmentation that was an exempted augmentation and the provision that was an exempted provision; and\n> > > \n> > > > (c) [regulation 7](#GS7@EN) applies in relation to the augmentation specified in the relevant information in accordance with [subregulation (6)(c)](#GS9@Gs6@Hpc@EN) .\n> \n> > (5)  For the purposes of [subregulation (4)(b)](#GS9@Gs4@Hpb@EN) , the relevant date in relation to the exempted provision is the publication date of the APR next published, after [regulation 8(5)](#GS8@Gs5@EN) ceases, in accordance with [subregulation (4)(a)](#GS9@Gs4@Hpa@EN) , to apply to the exempted provision, by the Provider in respect of the relevant transmission system to which the augmentation relates.\n> \n> > (6)  If [subregulation (4)](#GS9@Gs4@EN) applies in relation to an exempted augmentation and an exempted provision, the Provider in respect of the relevant transmission system to which the augmentation relates must, in the APR next published by the Provider after that subregulation applies to the exempted provision, include a statement as to –\n> > \n> > > > (a) the relevant opinion in relation to the exempted augmentation; and\n> > > \n> > > > (b) the application of the regulations to the exempted augmentation and the exempted provision; and\n> > > \n> > > > (c) the necessary augmentations.\n> \n> > (7)  A statement as to the relevant opinion in relation to an exempted augmentation is –\n> > \n> > > > (a) if [subregulation (1)](#GS9@Gs1@EN) applies to the exempted augmentation and the exempted provision, a statement that the Provider is of the opinion that [regulation 8(4)](#GS8@Gs4@EN) ought to cease to apply in relation to the exempted augmentation and the exempted provision; or\n> > > \n> > > > (b) if [subregulation (3)](#GS9@Gs3@EN) applies to the exempted augmentation and the exempted provision, a statement that an affected customer in relation to the augmentation has notified the Provider that the customer is of the opinion that [regulation 8(4)](#GS8@Gs4@EN) should cease to apply in relation to the exempted augmentation and the exempted provision.\n> \n> > (8)  A statement as to the application of the regulations to the exempted augmentation and the exempted provision is a statement –\n> > \n> > > > (a) that [regulation 8(4)](#GS8@Gs4@EN) has, on the publication of the statement in the APR, ceased to apply to the exempted augmentation and the exempted provision; and\n> > > \n> > > > (b) that, accordingly, the exempted provision applies, on and from the publication date of the APR, in relation to the part of the relevant transmission system to which the exempted augmentation relates.\n> \n> > (9)  A statement as to the necessary augmentations is a statement setting out the augmentation (which may be the same augmentation as, or a different augmentation to, the exempted augmentation), if any, that the Provider is of the opinion is necessary in order for the system to be likely to meet the requirements of the provision that was, before the publication of the statement, an exempted provision.\n\nDisplayed and numbered in accordance with the *[Rules Publication Act 1953](/view/html/inforce/current/act-1953-050)*.\n\nNotified in the *Gazette* on 31 January 2018","sortOrder":8}],"analysis":{"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"A positive credit balance is required for all requests, including BYOK, so fallback providers remain available. Add credits at https://vercel.com/d?to=%2F%5Bteam%5D%2F%7E%2Fai%3Fmodal%3Dtop-up to continue.","source":"analysis-cron"},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":7,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"These regulations implement and specify network performance requirements and related procedural mechanisms that the National Electricity Rules allow a participating jurisdiction to set (see regulation 4 and related notes). The instrument confines itself to setting numerical reliability standards, processes for customer objection, ministerial approval for large-cost augmentations, and APR disclosure duties. That subject-matter matches the regulations' stated purpose and does not materially expand beyond the original intent of specifying planning requirements and the available exemptions and processes under the National Electricity Rules."},"complexity_factors":["Approximately 14–15 explicitly defined terms in regulation 3 and further definitions added in regulation 5 (e.g. 'affected customer', 'single asset', 'unserved energy', 'intact transmission system').","Numeric performance standards with multiple distinct thresholds and units (MW and MW.h) in regulation 5, creating multiple compliance metrics.","Indexed monetary threshold for ministerial approval (initial $35 million, then CPI-indexed), requiring CPI calculations and time-based indexing (reg 6(2)).","Nested conditional logic linking whether a requirement is 'taken to be' a network performance requirement to (a) whether an augmentation is proposed, (b) cost exceeding threshold, and (c) ministerial approval (reg 6(1)–(4)).","Multi-step notice and consent process involving time limits (3 months, 30 days) and cross-notification between Providers and affected customers (regs 7–8).","Five-year exemption regime with continuing APR disclosure duties and prohibitions on re-proposing augmentations during the exemption (reg 8(4)–(6)).","Reinstatement mechanism dependent on subjective judgments of 'material change in circumstances' and opinions from either the Provider or affected customers (reg 9), increasing interpretive complexity.","Multiple cross-references to the National Electricity Rules and external Australian Standards, requiring cross-document reading to resolve key terms and duties (reg 3 and notes).","Administrative discretion vested in the Minister (reg 6(6)) and procedural obligations to provide reasons for refusal (reg 6(7)), adding legal and political layers to decision-making."],"plain_english_summary":"**What this regulation does (mechanics first)**\n\n- Sets mandatory minimum performance targets that transmission network planners (Transmission Network Service Providers, called \"Providers\") must aim to meet when planning transmission systems. The key numerical standards are in regulation 5: for an \"intact\" transmission system no more than 25 MW of load may be at risk from a credible contingency, no more than 850 MW from a single asset failure, a single asset failure must not be able to cause a black system (total system collapse), and limits on unserved energy of 300 MWh (credible contingency) and 3,000 MWh (single asset failure). For non-intact systems the maximum exposed unserved energy from a credible contingency is 18,000 MWh (reg 5).\n\n- Allows Providers to use planned load shedding to help meet those targets in specific non-credible events or under contract with customers (reg 5(3)). It also fixes assumed repair/replacement times when calculating unserved energy (reg 5(4)).\n\n- Requires Provider action and ministerial approval for large, expensive augmentations. If a proposed augmentation is necessary to meet a reg 5 requirement and its present value cost exceeds a monetary threshold ($35 million in the first year, then indexed by CPI), the Provider must apply to the Minister. Until the Minister approves, that particular reg 5 requirement is not treated as a binding network performance requirement for that part of the system (reg 6).\n\n- Creates a process that lets affected customers object to planned augmentations. If an augmentation that would otherwise be required to meet a reg 5 requirement appears in the Provider's Transmission Annual Planning Report (APR), an \"affected customer\" (a customer who receives the prescribed transmission service that would be at risk if the augmentation did not proceed) has 3 months from APR publication to tell the Provider they believe there is \"insufficient customer benefit\" to justify the augmentation within the next 5 years (regs 7–8). If all affected customers supply that notice, the relevant reg 5 requirement is not treated as a network performance requirement for that part of the system for a 5‑year period from the APR publication date; during that period the Provider must not propose that augmentation in its APR and must state the customers' position in each APR (reg 8).\n\n- Provides a mechanism to reverse such an exemption sooner if circumstances materially change. Either the Provider (if it forms the required opinion) or an affected customer may trigger a process that ends the exemption; the Provider must then include statements and any necessary augmentations in the next APR (reg 9).\n\n- Contains definitions and cross-references to the National Electricity Rules (reg 3) and sets the commencement rule (reg 2).\n\n**Who this affects**\n\n- Transmission Network Service Providers (\"Providers\"): must plan to meet reg 5 performance levels, run the notice and APR processes (regs 5–9), prepare ministerial applications for large projects (reg 6), and record statements in APRs when exemptions apply (regs 8–9).\n\n- \"Affected customers\": customers who would face reduced service if a proposed augmentation did not proceed. They get formal rights to be notified, to object to augmentations, and — if all affected customers agree — to have a 5‑year deferral/exemption of the relevant planning requirement (regs 7–8).\n\n- The Minister: has discretionary approval power for large augmentations (reg 6(6)). The Minister decides whether a proposed expensive augmentation's benefits outweigh its costs and must give reasons where approval is refused (reg 6(6)–(7)).\n\n- Wider electricity consumers and market participants: may be indirectly affected if augmentations are delayed or not built (through changes to reliability, network constraints, or investment signals).\n\n**Why it matters (official purpose and practical tests)**\n\n- Officially the regulations specify the network performance requirements that Providers must consider in power system planning and set service standards for the regulatory investment test for transmission (reg 4).\n\n- Practical trade-offs and incentives created by the rules:\n  - Who pays: augmentations are capital projects recovered through regulated revenue; delaying or avoiding an augmentation shifts short-term cost avoidance to affected customers but may leave future reliability risks for the wider system (regs 6–8). The Minister reviews large cost items (> indexed $35M) before a Provider can be treated as excused from meeting a reg 5 requirement (reg 6).\n  - Concentrated vs diffuse interests: a small, clearly identifiable set of \"affected customers\" can prevent a proposed augmentation (by unanimous notice) even if the broader consumer base would benefit — the mechanism allocates blocking power to concentrated beneficiaries (reg 8(3)–(5)).\n  - Bureaucratic discretion and delay: the Minister has a substantive cost/benefit test when a project is above the threshold; that inserts political/bureaucratic judgment and potential delay into large projects (reg 6(6)).\n  - Measurement and subjectivity: terms like \"insufficient customer benefit\" and the definition of an \"affected customer\" require judgment in practice and create implementation risk and potential dispute (regs 3, 7–8).\n  - Contract and operational flexibility: Providers are explicitly allowed to use contractual load shedding and specified load control arrangements as part of meeting planning targets, preserving some space for commercial solutions (reg 5(3)).\n  - Compliance burden on Providers: notification duties to affected customers, handling customer notices, maintaining APR disclosures for 5 years, and preparing ministerial applications for large projects introduce process and reporting costs (regs 6–9).\n  - Effects on private choice and competition: by limiting or delaying augmentations, the rules can change the network capacity available to new entrants (generators, large industrial customers) and thus influence market entry, dispatch patterns and prices; the allowed use of contracts for load prioritisation preserves some scope for negotiated private arrangements (regs 5(3), 7–9).\n\n**Concrete behavioural effects**\n\n- Providers must budget and plan differently for large augmentation projects because projects above the monetary threshold require ministerial approval to be treated as mandatory performance remedies (reg 6).\n- Affected customers gain an explicit lever to delay or defer network investment for 5 years if they unanimously claim insufficient benefit (reg 8).\n- Where exemptions are in force, Providers must continue to disclose information in APRs and cannot re-propose equivalent augmentations for the exempted part during the 5‑year period (reg 8(5)).\n- Exemptions can be lifted earlier if material circumstances change, bringing the planning requirement back into force and requiring the Provider to report and propose necessary augmentations in the next APR (reg 9).\n\n**Key statutory citations (examples)**\n- Minimum network performance and definitions: regulation 5 (and reg 3 for defined terms).\n- Ministerial approval and cost threshold: regulation 6.\n- Notices, affected-customer objection, 5‑year exemption and APR disclosure obligations: regulations 7–8.\n- Reinstatement of exemptions and APR reporting: regulation 9.\n\n(For precise legal application, read the cited provisions themselves; this summary describes mechanics and likely operational effects rather than legal advice.)"},"summary":{"complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"Insufficient content was provided to assess whether the regulation's scope changed from its original intent. Only status information and administrative metadata were included in the excerpt — the substantive provisions are absent."},"complexity_factors":["Only administrative metadata was provided — no substantive regulatory content to analyse","The title suggests technical subject matter (network planning) which would typically carry higher complexity, but cannot be assessed without the actual text","Score reflects the limited material available, not the likely complexity of the full regulation"],"plain_english_summary":"This Tasmanian regulation sets planning requirements for electricity network infrastructure—covering how the grid is planned, maintained and expanded. In force since 31 January 2018 (last updated 27 February 2019), it likely affects TasNetworks, energy regulators, government planners and parties seeking network connections. It matters because such rules shape reliable power delivery. Note: the substantive regulatory text was not provided, so details are unavailable."},"issue_detection":{"absurdities":[],"contradictions":[]},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":6,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The legislation appears to maintain its original scope as specified in regulation 4. The objects clause clearly states the dual purpose of setting network performance requirements/service standards and allowing exemptions. The subsequent regulations (5-9) implement these objects without significant expansion beyond the stated purposes. The exemption mechanism in regulations 7-9, while detailed, is explicitly contemplated by regulation 4(b) ('allow... for exemptions from such requirements and standards')."},"complexity_factors":["Heavy cross-referencing to the National Electricity Rules (external statutory instrument) for core definitions like 'credible contingency event', 'black system', and 'Transmission Network Service Provider'","Nested conditional logic in regulations 7-9: exemptions depend on customer notices, which depend on prior notices, which depend on APR publication dates, creating multi-layered temporal dependencies","Dual-purpose definitions where terms like 'service standards' and 'network performance requirements' are defined by reference to each other (regulation 5(2))","CPI indexation formula requiring calculation across financial years and quarters (regulation 3 and 6(2))","Multiple overlapping pathways for exemption: customer-initiated (reg 7(1)), Provider-initiated (reg 7(4)), and subsequent reversal (reg 9)","Precise technical thresholds with mixed units: MW (power), MW.h (energy), hours/days for repair times, and 5-year periods","11 defined terms in the interpretation section, plus incorporation-by-reference of an undefined number of terms from the National Electricity Rules"],"plain_english_summary":"This legislation sets the rules for how electricity transmission companies in Australia must plan their network upgrades to keep the lights on.\n\n**What it does:**\n- **Sets minimum reliability standards** for the high-voltage electricity grid (the \"transmission system\"). These are technical limits on how much power can be lost during equipment failures or emergencies. For example:\n  - No more than 25 megawatts of customer load should be cut off by a single credible emergency\n  - No more than 850 megawatts should be lost from one equipment failure\n  - Total energy not supplied after a failure can't exceed certain limits (300 megawatt-hours for some events, 3,000 for others)\n\n- **Requires ministerial approval for expensive projects:** If a network upgrade would cost more than $35 million (adjusted for inflation), the company must get approval from the relevant Minister. The Minister can only approve if the benefits outweigh the costs.\n\n- **Lets customers delay upgrades:** If affected customers think an upgrade isn't worth the cost, they can object. If ALL affected customers agree, the company can skip that upgrade for 5 years—even if it means the network won't meet the usual reliability standards. This is called an \"exemption.\"\n\n- **Allows exemptions to be reversed:** If circumstances change, either the company or any affected customer can end the exemption early, bringing the reliability standards back into force.\n\n**Who it affects:**\n- **Transmission Network Service Providers** (the companies that own the big power lines and substations)\n- **Large electricity customers** who are directly connected to the transmission network and would be affected by outages\n- **State/Territory Ministers** who must approve expensive projects\n\n**Why it matters:**\nThis creates a balance between reliability and cost. It stops transmission companies from automatically building expensive infrastructure that customers pay for through their bills. Instead, customers get a say—if they'd rather risk occasional outages than pay for expensive upgrades, they can vote with their wallets. It's a consumer protection mechanism built into the technical planning of the electricity grid."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/electricity-supply-industry-network-planning-requirements-regulations-2018","history":"/api/acts/electricity-supply-industry-network-planning-requirements-regulations-2018/history","analysis":"/api/acts/electricity-supply-industry-network-planning-requirements-regulations-2018/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/electricity-supply-industry-network-planning-requirements-regulations-2018/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/electricity-supply-industry-network-planning-requirements-regulations-2018/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/electricity-supply-industry-network-planning-requirements-regulations-2018/documents"}}