{"id":"criminal-law-consolidation-act-1935","name":"Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935","slug":"criminal-law-consolidation-act-1935","collection":"act","jurisdiction":"sa","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":16505,"registerId":"sa-criminal-law-consolidation-act-1935-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-03-31","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"Div 1","sectionType":"division","heading":"Preliminary","content":"Division 1—Preliminary\n83GH\tInterpretation\n","sortOrder":0},{"sectionNumber":"Div 2","sectionType":"division","heading":"Declared street gangs","content":"Division 2—Declared street gangs\n83GI\tCommissioner may apply for declaration\n83GJ\tPublication of notice of application\n83GK\tCourt may make declaration\n83GL\tNotice of declaration\n83GM\tDuration of declaration\n83GN\tRevocation of declaration\n83GO\tProcedure at hearings\n83GP\tMaking of subsequent declaration\n83GQ\tPractice and procedure\n83GR\tAppeal\n83GS\tEvidentiary\n","sortOrder":1},{"sectionNumber":"Div 3","sectionType":"division","heading":"Street gang control orders","content":"Division 3—Street gang control orders\n83GT\tCourt may make street gang control order\n83GU\tInterim street gang control orders\n83GV\tDuration of street gang control order or interim street gang control order\n83GW\tVariation or revocation\n83GX\tRight to object if interim order made ex parte\n83GY\tConsequential and ancillary orders\n83GZ\tAutomatic revocation of order\n83GZA\tApplication of Division to children\n","sortOrder":2},{"sectionNumber":"Div 4","sectionType":"division","heading":"Offences","content":"Division 4—Offences\n83GZB\tOffence to contravene or fail to comply with street gang control order\n83GZC\tOffence to recruit persons to become participants in street gang\n83GZD\tParticipants in street gang entering prescribed places and attending prescribed events\n83GZE\tCriminal associations\n","sortOrder":3},{"sectionNumber":"Div 5","sectionType":"division","heading":"Miscellaneous","content":"Division 5—Miscellaneous\n83GZF\tAppeal\n83GZG\tEvidentiary\n83GZH\tStandard of proof\n83GZI\tEvidence in other proceedings\n83GZJ\tService\n83GZK\tRepresentation of unincorporated group\n83GZL\tCosts\n83GZM\tPresumption as to participation\n83GZN\tCriminal intelligence\n83GZO\tUse of evidence or information for purposes of Act\n83GZP\tDelegation\nPart 3C—Protection for working animals\n83H\tInterpretation\n83I\tCausing death or serious harm etc to working animals\n83J\tCourt may order compensation and other costs\n83K\tEnforcement of order for compensation etc\n83L\tEvidentiary\nPart 3D—Explosives offences\n83M\tInterpretation\n83N\tExplosive devices\n83O\tExplosive substances, prescribed equipment or instructions\n83P\tBomb hoaxes\nPart 4—Offences with respect to property\n84\tPreliminary\n85\tArson and other property damage\n85A\tRecklessly endangering property\n85B\tSpecial provision for causing bushfire\n86\tPossession of object with intent to damage property\n86A\tUsing motor vehicle without consent\nPart 4A—Computer offences\n86B\tInterpretation\n86C\tMeaning of unauthorised access to or modification of computer data\n86D\tMeaning of unauthorised impairment of electronic communication\n86E\tUse of computer with intention to commit, or facilitate the commission of, an offence\n86F\tUse of computer to commit, or facilitate the commission of, an offence outside the State\n86G\tUnauthorised modification of computer data\n86H\tUnauthorised impairment of electronic communication\n86I\tPossession of computer viruses etc with intent to commit serious computer offence\nPart 5—Offences of dishonesty\n130\tInterpretation\n131\tDishonesty\n132\tConsent of owner\n133\tOperation of this Part\nDivision 2—Theft\n134\tTheft (and receiving)\n135\tSpecial provision with regard to land and fixtures\n136\tGeneral deficiency\nDivision 3—Robbery\n137\tRobbery\nDivision 4—Money laundering and dealing in instruments of crime\n138\tMoney laundering\n138A\tDealing in instruments of crime\nDivision 5—Deception\n139\tDeception\nDivision 5A—Dishonest communication with children\n139A\tDishonest communication with children\nDivision 6—Dishonest dealings with documents\n140\tDishonest dealings with documents\nDivision 7—Dishonest manipulation of machines\n141\tDishonest manipulation of machines\nDivision 8—Dishonest exploitation of advantage\n142\tDishonest exploitation of position of advantage\nDivision 9—Miscellaneous offences of dishonesty\n143\tDishonest interference with merchandise\n144\tMaking off without payment\nPart 5A—Identity theft\n144A\tInterpretation\n144B\tFalse identity etc\n144C\tMisuse of personal identification information\n144D\tProhibited material\n144DA\tPossession of personal identification information\n144E\tAttempt offence excluded\n144F\tApplication of Part\nPart 5B—Cheating at gambling\n144G\tInterpretation\n144H\tEngaging in conduct that corrupts betting outcome of event\n144I\tFacilitating conduct that corrupts betting outcome of event\n144J\tConcealing conduct or agreement\n144K\tUse of corrupt conduct information or inside information for betting purposes\nPart 6—Secret commissions\n145\tInterpretation\nDivision 2—Unlawful bias in commercial relationships\n146\tFiduciaries\n147\tExercise of fiduciary functions\n148\tUnlawful bias\n149\tOffence for fiduciary to exercise unlawful bias\n150\tBribery\nDivision 3—Exclusion of defence\n151\tExclusion of defence\nPart 6A—Serious criminal trespass\n167\tSacrilege\n168\tSerious criminal trespass\n169\tSerious criminal trespass—non-residential buildings\n170\tSerious criminal trespass—places of residence\n170A\tCriminal trespass—places of residence\nPart 6B—Blackmail\n171\tInterpretation\n172\tBlackmail\nPart 6C—Piracy\n173\tInterpretation\n174\tPiracy\nPart 6D—Offences relating to human remains\n175\tInterpretation\n176\tApplication of Part\n177\tOffence to destroy etc human remains to pervert course of justice\n178\tOffence to defile etc human remains\n179\tOffence to fail to report find of or conceal human remains\n180\tAlternative verdicts\nPart 7—Offences of a public nature\n237\tDefinitions\n238\tActing improperly\n239\tGeneral attempt offence excluded\n240\tParliamentary privilege not affected\nDivision 2—Impeding investigation of offences or assisting offenders\n241\tImpeding investigation of offences or assisting offenders\nDivision 2A—Offences relating to providing false or misleading information to a court\n241A\tFalse or misleading information entered into electronic court management system\nDivision 3—Offences relating to judicial proceedings\n242\tPerjury and subornation\n243\tFabricating, altering or concealing evidence\n244\tOffences relating to witnesses\n245\tOffences relating to jurors\n246\tConfidentiality of jury deliberations and identities\n247\tHarassment to obtain information about jury's deliberations\n248\tThreats or reprisals relating to persons involved in criminal investigations or judicial proceedings\nDivision 4—Offences relating to public officers\n249\tBribery or corruption of public officers\n250\tThreats or reprisals against public officers\n251\tAbuse of public office\n252\tDemanding or requiring benefit on basis of public office\n253\tOffences relating to appointment to public office\nDivision 5—Escape, rescue and harbouring of persons subject to detention\n254\tEscape or removal from lawful custody\n255\tHarbouring or employing escapee etc\nDivision 6—Attempt to obstruct or pervert course of justice or due administration of law\n256\tAttempt to obstruct or pervert course of justice or due administration of law\nDivision 7—Criminal defamation\n257\tCriminal defamation\nDivision 8—Offences limited in relation to industrial disputes and restraint of trade\n258\tOffences limited in relation to industrial disputes and restraint of trade\nPart 7A—Goods contamination and comparable offences\n259\tInterpretation\n260\tUnlawful acts of goods contamination or other acts prejudicing the health or safety of the public\n261\tGoods contamination unrelated to issues of public health and safety\nPart 7B—Accessories\n267\tAiding and abetting\nPart 7C—Derivative liability for certain offences\n267AA\tOffence where unlawfully supplied firearm used in subsequent offence\nPart 7D—Recruiting etc children to engage in certain criminal activities\n267AB\tRecruiting etc child for criminal activity\nPart 8—Intoxication\n267A\tDefinitions\n268\tMental element of offence to be presumed in certain cases\n269\tQuestion of intoxication must be specifically raised\nPart 8A—Mental impairment\n269A\tInterpretation\n269AB\tReference to finding of not guilty to include finding of mental incompetence\n269B\tDistribution of judicial functions between judge and jury\n269BA\tCharges on which alternative verdicts are possible\nDivision 2—Mental competence to commit offences\n269C\tMental competence\n269D\tPresumption of mental competence\n269E\tReservation of question of mental competence\n269F\tWhat happens if trial judge decides to proceed first with trial of defendant's mental competence to commit offence\n269G\tWhat happens if trial judge decides to proceed first with trial of objective elements of offence\nDivision 3—Mental unfitness to stand trial\n269H\tMental unfitness to stand trial\n269I\tPresumption of mental fitness to stand trial\n269J\tOrder for investigation of mental fitness to stand trial\n269K\tPreliminary prognosis of defendant's condition\n269L\tTrial judge's discretion about course of trial\n269M\tWhat happens if trial judge decides to proceed first with trial of defendant's mental fitness to stand trial\n269N\tWhat happens if trial judge decides to proceed first with trial of objective elements of offence\nDivision 3A—Disposition of persons with mental impairment charged with summary and minor indictable offences\nSubdivision 1—Principle on which court is to act\n269NA\tPrinciple on which court is to act\nSubdivision 2—Making, variation and revocation of Division 3A orders\n269NB\tDivision 3A orders\n269NC\tCourt may direct defendant to surrender firearm etc\n269ND\tVariation or revocation of condition of Division 3A order\n269NDA\tRevision of Division 3A orders\n","sortOrder":4},{"sectionNumber":"Subdiv 3","sectionType":"subdivision","heading":"Administrative detention for defendant released on licence under this Division","content":"Subdivision 3—Administrative detention for defendant released on licence under this Division\n269NE\tAdministrative detention for defendant released on licence under this Division\n269NF\tPowers of police officers relating to persons in respect of whom an administrative detention order has been issued\nSubdivision 4—Custody, supervision and care\n269NG\tCustody, supervision and care\nSubdivision 5—Effect of supervening imprisonment on Division 3A order\n269NH\tEffect of supervening imprisonment on Division 3A order\nDivision 4—Disposition of persons declared to be liable to supervision under this Division\nSubdivision 1—Principle on which court is to act\n269NI\tPrinciple on which court is to act\nSubdivision 2—Making, variation and revocation of supervision orders\n269O\tSupervision orders\n269OA\tCourt may direct defendant to surrender firearm etc\n269P\tVariation or revocation of supervision order\n269Q\tReport on mental condition of defendant\n269R\tReports and statements to be provided to court\n269T\tMatters to which court is to have regard\n269U\tRevision of supervision orders\nSubdivision 3—Continuing supervision orders\n269UA\tApplication for continuing supervision\n269UB\tContinuing supervision orders\n269UC\tVariation or revocation of continuing supervision order\n269UD\tAppeal\n","sortOrder":5},{"sectionNumber":"Subdiv 4","sectionType":"subdivision","heading":"Administrative detention for defendant released on licence under this Division","content":"Subdivision 4—Administrative detention for defendant released on licence under this Division\n269UE\tAdministrative detention for defendant released on licence under this Division\n269UF\tPowers of police officers relating to persons in respect of whom an administrative detention order has been issued\nSubdivision 5—Custody, supervision and care\n269V\tCustody, supervision and care\nSubdivision 6—Effect of supervening imprisonment on an order under Division 4\n269VA\tEffect of supervening imprisonment\nDivision 4A—Interstate transfer of persons subject to supervision order\n269VB\tInterpretation\n269VC\tInformed consent\n269VD\tTransfer of persons from South Australia to another participating jurisdiction\n269VE\tTransfer of persons from participating jurisdiction to South Australia\nDivision 5—Miscellaneous\n269W\tCounsel to have independent discretion\n269WA\tPower to order examination etc in pre-trial proceedings\n269X\tPower of court to deal with defendant before proceedings completed\n269Y\tAppeals\n269Z\tCounselling of next of kin and victims\n269ZA\tExclusion of evidence\n269ZB\tArrest of person who escapes from detention etc\nPart 9—Miscellaneous and procedure\nDivision 1—Punishment for certain common law offences\n270\tPunishment for certain offences\nDivision 2—Attempts\n270A\tAttempts\n270AB\tAttempted manslaughter\nDivision 3—Assaults with intent\n270B\tAssaults with intent\nDivision 4—Preparatory conduct\n270C\tGoing equipped for commission of offence of dishonesty or offence against property\n270D\tGoing equipped for commission of offence against the person\nDivision 5—Apprehension of offenders\n271\tGeneral power of arrest\n273\tJudge's warrant for arrest of person charged\nDivision 14—Provision as to persons convicted of offence\n329\tProvision as to persons convicted of an offence\nPart 12—Regulations\n370\tRegulations\nSchedule 11—Abolition of certain offences\n1\tCertain common law offences abolished\n2\tCertain offences under Imperial law abolished\n3\tSpecial provisions relating to maintenance and champerty\nLegislative history\n\nThe Parliament of South Australia enacts as follows:\n","sortOrder":6},{"sectionNumber":"Part 1","sectionType":"part","heading":"Preliminary","content":"Part 1—Preliminary\n1—Short title\nThis Act may be cited as the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935.\n5—Interpretation\n\t(1)\tIn this Act, unless the contrary intention appears—\naggravated offence—where a provision differentiates between the penalty for an aggravated offence and the penalty for a basic offence, the reference to an aggravated offence is a reference to the offence in its aggravated form (see section 5AA);\napproved carer, of a child, means an approved carer (within the meaning of the Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017) in whose care the child has been placed under that Act;\nbasic offence—where a provision differentiates between the penalty for an aggravated offence and the penalty for a basic offence, the reference to a basic offence is a reference to the offence in its non-aggravated form (see section 5AA);\nbestiality means sexual activity between a person and an animal;\ncommon prostitute includes any male person who prostitutes his body for fee or reward;\ncourt means, except where a contrary intention is indicated or appears from the context, the Supreme Court, the District Court or a court of summary jurisdiction;\ncriminal organisation has the same meaning as in Part 3B Division 1;\ndomestic partner means a person who is a domestic partner within the meaning of the Family Relationships Act 1975, whether declared as such under that Act or not;\ndrive includes ride;\ndriver's licence includes a learner's permit;\ndwelling house does not include a building, although within the curtilage of a dwelling house and occupied with the dwelling house, unless there is a communication between the building and dwelling house, either immediate or by means of a covered and enclosed passage leading from the one to the other;\nfirearm has the same meaning as in the Firearms Act 2015;\nfoster parent, of a child, includes—\n\t(a)\tan approved carer of the child; and\n\t(b)\ta person in whose care the child is placed under section 77 of the Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017;\nliable to be imprisoned for life means liable to be imprisoned for life or any lesser term;\nlocal government body means a council or other body constituted under the Local Government Act 1999;\nmotor vehicle means a vehicle that is propelled by a motor;\nmotor vessel means a vessel that is propelled by a motor;\nnight means the interval between nine o'clock in the evening and six o'clock in the morning of the next day;\noffensive weapon means—\n\t(a)\tan article or substance made or adapted for use for causing, or threatening to cause, personal injury or incapacity including—\n\t(i)\ta firearm or imitation firearm (ie an article intended to be taken for a firearm); or\n\t(ii)\tan explosive or an imitation explosive (ie an article or substance intended to be taken for an explosive); or\n\t(b)\tan article or substance that a person has—\n\t(i)\tfor the purpose of causing personal injury or incapacity; or\n\t(ii)\tin circumstances in which another is likely to feel reasonable apprehension that the person has it for the purpose of causing personal injury or incapacity;\nthe Parole Board means the Parole Board of South Australia;\nplace of divine worship means any church, chapel, meeting house or other place of divine worship;\nplanning assessment panel means an assessment panel appointed or constituted under Part 6 Division 2 of the Planning, Development and Infrastructure Act 2016;\nproperty means real or personal property whether tangible or intangible and includes a wild animal that is in captivity or ordinarily kept in captivity;\nserious and organised crime offence means—\n\t(a)\tan offence against Part 3B; or\n\t(b)\tan offence that—\n\t(i)\tis punishable by life imprisonment; or\n\t(ii)\tis an aggravated offence against a provision of this, or any other, Act,\nif it is alleged that the offence was committed in the circumstances where—\n\t(iii)\tthe offender committed the offence for the benefit of a criminal organisation, or 2 or more members of a criminal organisation, or at the direction of, or in association with, a criminal organisation; or\n\t(iv)\tin the course of, or in connection with, the offence the offender identified himself or herself in some way as belonging to, or otherwise being associated with, a criminal organisation (whether or not the offender did in fact belong to, or was in fact associated with, the organisation);\nsexual intercourse includes any activity (whether of a heterosexual or homosexual nature) consisting of or involving—\n\t(a)\tpenetration of a person's vagina, labia majora or anus by any part of the body of another person or by any object; or\n\t(b)\tfellatio; or\n\t(c)\tcunnilingus,\nand includes a continuation of such activity;\nspouse—a person is the spouse of another if they are legally married;\nvehicle includes an animal;\nvessel has the same meaning as in the Harbors and Navigation Act 1993.\n\t(2)\tA note to a section or subsection of this Act forms part of the text of the Act unless the note clearly has no substantive effect.\n\t(3)\tFor the purposes of this Act, a reference to a breast, vagina, labia majora, penis or other sexual organ includes a reference to a surgically constructed or altered breast, vagina, labia majora, penis or sexual organ (as the case may be).\n5AA—Aggravated offences\n\t(1)\tSubject to this section, an aggravated offence is an offence committed in 1 or more of the following circumstances:\n\t(a)\tthe offender committed the offence in the course of deliberately and systematically inflicting severe pain on the victim;\n\t(b)\tthe offender used, or threatened to use, an offensive weapon to commit, or when committing, the offence;\n\t(c)\tthe offender committed the offence against a police officer, prison officer, employee in a training centre (within the meaning of the Youth Justice Administration Act 2016) or other law enforcement officer—\n\t(i)\tknowing the victim to be acting in the course of his or her official duty; or\n\t(ii)\tin retribution for something the offender knows or believes to have been done by the victim in the course of his or her official duty;\n\t(ca)\tthe offender committed the offence against a community corrections officer (within the meaning of the Correctional Services Act 1982) or community youth justice officer (within the meaning of the Youth Justice Administration Act 2016) knowing the victim to be acting in the course of their official duties;\n\t(d)\tthe offender committed the offence—\n\t(i)\tintending to prevent or dissuade the victim from taking legal proceedings or from pursuing a particular course in legal proceedings; or\n\t(ii)\tin connection with the victim's conduct or future conduct (as party, witness or in any other capacity) in legal proceedings; or\n\t(iii)\tin retribution against the victim for taking legal proceedings or for the victim's conduct (as party, witness or in any other capacity) in legal proceedings;\n\t(e)\tthe offender committed the offence—\n\t(i)\tin the case of an offence against section 63B(3)—believing that the victim of the offence was, at the time of the offence, under the age of 14 years; or\n\t(ii)\tin the case of an offence against Part 3 Division 8A or section 63B(1)—knowing that the victim of the offence was, at the time of the offence, under the age of 14 years; or\n\t(iii)\tin any other case—knowing that the victim of the offence was, at the time of the offence, under the age of 12 years;\n\t(f)\tthe offender committed the offence knowing that the victim of the offence was, at the time of the offence, over the age of 60 years;\n\t(g)\tthe offender committed the offence knowing that the victim of the offence was a person with whom the offender was, or was formerly, in a relationship;\n\t(ga)\t—\n\t(i)\tthe offender committed the offence for the benefit of a criminal organisation, or 2 or more members of a criminal organisation, or at the direction of, or in association with, a criminal organisation; or\n\t(ii)\tin the course of, or in connection with, the offence the offender identified himself or herself in some way as belonging to, or otherwise being associated with, a criminal organisation (whether or not the offender did in fact belong to, or was in fact associated with, the organisation);\n\t(h)\texcept in the case of an offence against Part 3A, the offender committed the offence in company with 1 or more other persons (including persons who are children);\n\t(ha)\tin the case of an offence against Division 2 or 3 of Part 5, or Part 6A—the offender committed the offence in a place in relation to which, at the time of the offence—\n\t(i)\tthere was in force a declaration under Part 4 of the Emergency Management Act 2004; or\n\t(ii)\t—\n\t(A)\tresidents and others in the place, or in the vicinity of the place, had been advised (by radio broadcast) by the CFS that, as a result of a severe, extreme or catastrophic fire danger rating in respect of the place, they should activate their bushfire survival plan; and\n\t(B)\tthat advice had not been withdrawn or ceased to apply; or\n\t(iii)\tresidents and others had not been able to return to the place after leaving in response to a declaration referred to in subparagraph (i) or the provision of advice referred to in subparagraph (ii),\nand the offender knew, ought reasonably to have known, or was reckless with respect to, that fact;\n\t(i)\tthe offender abused a position of authority, or a position of trust, in committing the offence;\n\t(ia)\tin the case of an offence constituted under Part 7B where the principal offence is an aggravated offence—the principal offender was, to the knowledge of the offender under that Part, a child;\n\t(j)\tthe offender committed the offence knowing that the victim was, at the time of the offence, in a position of particular vulnerability because of physical disability or cognitive impairment;\n\t(k)\tin the case of an offence against the person—\n\t(i)\tthe victim was, to the knowledge of the offender, in a position of particular vulnerability at the time of the offence because of the nature of his or her occupation or employment;\n\t(ka)\tin the case of an offence against the person—the victim was, at the time of the offence, engaged in a prescribed occupation or employment (whether on a paid or volunteer basis) and the offender committed the offence knowing the victim to be acting in the course of the victim's official duties;\n\t(l)\tthe offender was, at the time of the offence, acting in contravention of an injunction or other order of a court (made in the exercise of either state or federal jurisdiction) and the offence lay within the range of conduct that the injunction or order was designed to prevent.\n\t(1a)\tFor the purposes of section 19A, an aggravated offence is an offence committed in 1 or more of the following circumstances:\n\t(a)\tthe offender committed the offence in the course of attempting to escape pursuit by a police officer;\n\t(ab)\tthe offender was, at the time of the offence, driving a motor vehicle in a street race;\n\t(b)\tthe offender was, at the time of the offence, driving a vehicle knowing that he or she was disqualified, under the law of this State or another State or Territory of the Commonwealth, from holding or obtaining a driver's licence or that his or her licence was suspended by notice given under the Road Traffic Act 1961;\n\t(c)\tthe offender committed the offence as part of a prolonged, persistent and deliberate course of very bad driving or vessel operation;\n\t(d)\tthe offender committed the offence while there was present in his or her blood a concentration of .08 grams or more of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood;\n\t(e)\tthe offender was, at the time of the offence, driving a vehicle in contravention of section 45A, 47 or 47BA of the Road Traffic Act 1961 or operating a vessel in contravention of section 70(1) of the Harbors and Navigation Act 1993.\n\t(1ab)\tFor the purposes of section 19ABA(1) or (2), an aggravated offence is an offence committed in 1 or more of the following circumstances:\n\t(a)\tthe offender was, at the time of the offence, driving a motor vehicle knowing that they were disqualified, under the law of this State or another State or Territory of the Commonwealth, from holding or obtaining a driver's licence or that their licence was suspended by notice given under the Road Traffic Act 1961;\n\t(b)\tthe offender committed the offence while there was present in the offender's blood a concentration of .08 grams or more of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood;\n\t(c)\tthe offender was, at the time of the offence, driving a motor vehicle in contravention of section 44C, 47 or 47BA of the Road Traffic Act 1961;\n\t(d)\tthe offender was, at the time of the offence, driving or using a motor vehicle knowing that it had a material defect and that material defect contributed to the commission of the offence.\n\t(1b)\tFor the purposes of section 19AC, an aggravated offence is an offence committed in 1 or more of the following circumstances:\n\t(a)\tthe offender was, at the time of the offence, driving or using a motor vehicle that—\n\t(i)\twas stolen; or\n\t(ii)\twas being driven or used without the consent of the owner of the vehicle,\nand the offender knew, or was reckless with respect to, that fact;\n\t(b)\tthe offender was, at the time of the offence, driving a motor vehicle knowing that he or she was disqualified, under the law of this State or another State or Territory of the Commonwealth, from holding or obtaining a driver's licence or that his or her licence was suspended by notice given under the Road Traffic Act 1961;\n\t(c)\tthe offender committed the offence while there was present in his or her blood a concentration of .08 grams or more of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood;\n\t(d)\tthe offender was, at the time of the offence, driving a motor vehicle in contravention of section 47 or 47BA of the Road Traffic Act 1961.\n\t(1c)\tFor the purposes of section 19AD, an aggravated offence is an offence committed by the driver of a motor vehicle in 1 or more of the following circumstances:\n\t(a)\tthe offender knew that, at the time of the offence, he or she was driving the motor vehicle in circumstances of heightened risk;\n\t(b)\tthe offender committed the offence knowing that there were 1 or more passengers in or on the motor vehicle;\n\t(c)\tthe offender knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that, at the time of the offence, he or she was driving a motor vehicle that had a major defect.\n\t(1d)\tFor the purposes of section 19ADA, an aggravated offence is—\n\t(a)\tan offence that caused harm to a person; or\n\t(b)\tan offence committed by the driver of a motor vehicle in 1 or more of the following circumstances:\n\t(i)\tthe offender was, at the time of the offence, driving or using a motor vehicle that—\n\t(A)\twas stolen; or\n\t(B)\twas being driven or used without the consent of the owner of the vehicle,\nand the offender knew, or was reckless with respect to, that fact;\n\t(ii)\tthe offender committed the offence in the course of attempting to escape pursuit by a police officer;\n\t(iii)\tthe offender committed the offence knowing that there were 1 or more passengers in or on the motor vehicle;\n\t(iv)\tthe offender committed the offence while the offender was the holder of—\n\t(A)\ta provisional licence; or\n\t(B)\ta probationary licence; or\n\t(C)\ta learner's permit; or\n\t(D)\tan interstate provisional licence; or\n\t(E)\tan interstate learner's permit,\n(as defined in the Motor Vehicles Act 1959) authorising the holder to drive a motor vehicle of the class driven by the offender at the time of the offence;\n\t(v)\tthe offender was not, at the time of the offence, the holder of—\n\t(A)\ta driver's licence; or\n\t(B)\ta learner's permit; or\n\t(C)\tan interstate licence; or\n\t(D)\tan interstate learner's permit; or\n\t(E)\ta foreign licence,\n(as defined in the Motor Vehicles Act 1959) authorising the holder to drive a motor vehicle of the class driven by the offender at the time of the offence;\n\t(vi)\tthe offender was, at the time of the offence, driving a motor vehicle knowing that they were disqualified, under the law of this State or another State or Territory of the Commonwealth, from holding or obtaining a driver's licence or that their licence was suspended by notice given under the Road Traffic Act 1961;\n\t(vii)\tthe offender committed the offence while there was present in the offender's blood a concentration of .08 grams or more of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood;\n\t(viii)\tthe offender was, at the time of the offence, driving a motor vehicle in contravention of section 47 or 47BA of the Road Traffic Act 1961.\n\t(2)\tA person is taken to know a particular fact if the person, knowing of the possibility that it is true, is reckless as to whether it is true or not.\n\t(2a)\tFor the purposes of subsection (1)(ga)(ii), a person will be taken to have identified himself or herself as belonging to, or as being associated with, a criminal organisation if the person displayed (whether on an article of clothing, as a tattoo or otherwise) the insignia of the criminal organisation unless the person proves that he or she did not display the insignia knowingly or recklessly.\n\t(2b)\tSubsection (2a) does not limit the ways in which a person may identify himself or herself as belonging to, or being associated with, a criminal organisation.\n\t(3)\tIf a person is charged with an aggravated offence, the circumstances alleged to aggravate the offence must be stated in the instrument of charge.\n\t(4)\tIf a jury finds a person guilty of an aggravated offence, and 2 or more aggravating factors are alleged in the instrument of charge, the jury must state which of the aggravating factors it finds to have been established (but a failure to comply with this subsection does not affect the validity of the jury's verdict).\n\t(4a)\tTwo people will be taken to be in a relationship for the purposes of subsection (1)(g) if—\n\t(a)\tthey are married to each other; or\n\t(b)\tthey are domestic partners; or\n\t(c)\tthey are in some other form of intimate personal relationship in which their lives are interrelated and the actions of 1 affects the other; or\n\t(d)\t1 is the child, stepchild or grandchild, or is under the guardianship, of the other (regardless of age); or\n\t(e)\t1 is a child, stepchild or grandchild, or is under the guardianship, of a person who is or was formerly in a relationship with the other under paragraph (a), (b) or (c) (regardless of age); or\n\t(f)\t1 is a child and the other is a person who acts in loco parentis in relation to the child; or\n\t(g)\t1 is a child who normally or regularly resides or stays with the other; or\n\t(h)\tthey are brothers or sisters or brother and sister; or\n\t(i)\tthey are otherwise related to each other by or through blood, marriage, a domestic partnership or adoption; or\n\t(j)\tthey are related according to Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander kinship rules or are both members of some other culturally recognised family group; or\n\t(k)\t1 is the carer (within the meaning of the Carers Recognition Act 2005) of the other.\nCFS means the South Australian Country Fire Service;\nchild means a person under 18 years of age; \ncircumstances of heightened risk, in relation to the driving of a motor vehicle, means—\n\t(a)\tdriving the motor vehicle between sunset on one day and sunrise on the next day; or\n\t(b)\tdriving the motor vehicle in circumstances where traction between the vehicle and the surface being driven on is adversely affected; or\n\t(c)\tdriving the motor vehicle in circumstances where visibility is adversely affected;\ncognitive impairment includes—\n\t(a)\ta developmental disability (including, for example, an intellectual disability, Down syndrome, cerebral palsy or an autistic spectrum disorder);\n\t(b)\tan acquired disability as a result of illness or injury (including, for example, dementia, a traumatic brain injury or a neurological disorder);\n\t(c)\ta mental illness;\nharm has the same meaning as in section 21;\nmajor defect—a motor vehicle has a major defect if use of the motor vehicle constitutes a serious risk to the safety of any person;\nmaterial defect—a motor vehicle has a material defect if it has a defect that could affect the safe operation of the vehicle;\nstreet race has the meaning given in section 19AD.\n\t(6)\tThis section does not prevent a court from taking into account, in the usual way, the circumstances of and surrounding the commission of an offence for the purpose of determining sentence.\n1\tA person is charged with a basic offence and the court finds that the offence was committed in circumstances that would have justified a charge of the offence in its aggravated form. In this case, the court may, in sentencing, take into account the circumstances of aggravation for the purpose of determining penalty but must (of course) fix a penalty within the limits appropriate to the basic offence.\n2\tA person is charged with an aggravated offence and the court finds a number (but not all) of the circumstances alleged in the instrument of charge to aggravate the offence have been established. In this case, the court may, in sentencing, take into account the established circumstances of and surrounding the aggravated offence (whether alleged in the instrument of charge or not) but must not (of course) take account of circumstances alleged in the instrument of charge that were not established.\n5AB—Mandatory penalty for certain child sex offences committed by serious child sex offenders\n\t(1)\tDespite section 53 of the Legislation Interpretation Act 2021, the mandatory penalty for a triggering child sex offence committed by a serious child sex offender is a sentence of indeterminate duration.\n\t(2)\tHowever, subsection (1) does not apply if the court sentencing a serious child sex offender for a triggering child sex offence—\n\t(a)\tdetermines under section 48I(1)(a) of the Sentencing Act 2017 that a sentence of imprisonment to be served in a correctional facility is not to be imposed in relation to the offence; or\n\t(b)\tmakes a declaration under section 48J of the Sentencing Act 2017,\n(in which case the maximum penalty for the triggering child sex offence is the maximum penalty for the relevant offence had it not been committed by a serious child sex offender).\n\t(3)\tFor the purposes of this section, a reference to a sentence of indeterminate duration will be taken to be a reference to the detention of a person in custody until the sentence of imprisonment is extinguished by order of the Supreme Court under section 48M of the Sentencing Act 2017.\nserious child sex offender has the same meaning as in the Sentencing Act 2017;\ntriggering child sex offence has the same meaning as in the Sentencing Act 2017.\n5A—Abolition of capital punishment\n\t(1)\tNotwithstanding any provision of any Act or law, no sentence of death shall be—\n\t(a)\timposed on, or recorded against, any person; or\n\t(b)\tcarried into execution on any person.\n\t(2)\tWhere any person is liable to sentence of death under any Act or law, the court before which that person is convicted shall, instead of sentencing him to death, sentence him to be imprisoned for life.\n\t(3)\tAny sentence of death that was imposed or recorded before the commencement of the Statutes Amendment (Capital Punishment Abolition) Act 1976 shall (whether or not that sentence has been commuted to a sentence of imprisonment for life) be deemed to be a sentence of imprisonment for life imposed by a court of competent jurisdiction.\n\t(4)\tAny direction or order made by the Governor on, or in relation to, the commutation of a sentence of death to a sentence of imprisonment for life shall be deemed to be a direction or order given or made by a court of competent jurisdiction.\n5B—Proof of lawful authority or lawful or reasonable excuse\nIn proceedings for an offence against this Act in which it is material to establish whether an act was done with or without lawful authority, lawful excuse or reasonable excuse the onus of proving the authority or excuse lies on the defendant and in the absence of such proof it will be presumed that no such authority or excuse exists.\n5D—Abolition of historical classifications\n\t(1)\tThe classification of offences as felonies is abolished.\n\t(2)\tThe classification of offences as misdemeanours is abolished.\n","sortOrder":7},{"sectionNumber":"Part 1A","sectionType":"part","heading":"Territorial application of the criminal law","content":"Part 1A—Territorial application of the criminal law\n5E—Interpretation\nnecessary territorial nexus—see section 5G(2);\nState includes the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory;\nrelevant act in relation to an offence means—\n\t(a)\tan act or omission that is, or causes or contributes to, an element of the offence; or\n\t(b)\tan act or omission that is, or causes or contributes to, something that would, assuming the necessary territorial nexus existed, be an element of the offence; or\n\t(c)\ta state of affairs that is an element of the offence, or would, assuming the necessary territorial nexus existed, be an element of the offence.\n\t(2)\tThe question whether the necessary territorial nexus exists in relation to an alleged offence is a question of fact to be determined, where a court sits with a jury, by the jury.\n5F—Application\n\t(1)\tThe law of this State operates extra-territorially to the extent contemplated by this Part.\n\t(2)\tHowever—\n\t(a)\tthis Part does not operate to extend the operation of a law that is expressly or by necessary implication limited in its application to this State or a particular part of this State; and\n\t(b)\tthis Part operates subject to any other specific provision as to the territorial application of the law of the State; and\n\t(c)\tthis Part is in addition to, and does not derogate from, any other law providing for the extra-territorial operation of the criminal law.1\n","sortOrder":8},{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"For example, the Crimes at Sea Act 1998.","content":"1\tFor example, the Crimes at Sea Act 1998.\n5G—Territorial requirements for commission of offence against a law of this State\n\t(1)\tAn offence against a law of this State is committed if—\n\t(a)\tall elements necessary to constitute the offence (disregarding territorial considerations) exist; and\n\t(b)\tthe necessary territorial nexus exists.\n\t(2)\tThe necessary territorial nexus exists if—\n\t(a)\ta relevant act occurred wholly or partly in this State; or\n\t(b)\tit is not possible to establish whether any of the relevant acts giving rise to the alleged offence occurred within or outside this State but the alleged offence caused harm or a threat of harm in this State; or\n\t(c)\talthough no relevant act occurred in this State—\n\t(i)\tthe alleged offence caused harm or a threat of harm in this State and the relevant acts that gave rise to the alleged offence also gave rise to an offence against the law of a jurisdiction in which the relevant acts, or at least one of them, occurred; or\n\t(ii)\tthe alleged offence caused harm or a threat of harm in this State and the harm, or the threat, is sufficiently serious to justify the imposition of a criminal penalty under the law of this State; or\n\t(iii)\tthe relevant acts that gave rise to the alleged offence also gave rise to an offence against the law of a jurisdiction in which the relevant acts, or at least one of them, occurred and the alleged offender was in this State when the relevant acts, or at least one of them, occurred; or\n\t(d)\tthe alleged offence is a conspiracy to commit, an attempt to commit, or in some other way preparatory to the commission of another offence for which the necessary territorial nexus would exist under one or more of the above paragraphs if it (the other offence) were committed as contemplated.\n5H—Procedural provisions\n\t(1)\tIn proceedings for an offence against a law of the State, the existence of the necessary territorial nexus will be presumed and the presumption is conclusive unless rebutted under subsection (2).\n\t(2)\tIf a person charged with an offence disputes the existence of the necessary territorial nexus, the court will proceed with the trial of the offence in the usual way and if at the conclusion of the trial, the court is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the necessary territorial nexus does not exist, it must, subject to subsection (3), make a finding to that effect and the charge will be dismissed.\n\t(3)\tIf the court would, disregarding territorial considerations—\n\t(a)\tfind the person not guilty of the offence—the court must record a finding of not guilty; or\n\t(b)\tfind that the conduct has been proved but the person is not criminally responsible due to mental incompetence—the court must record a finding of conduct proved but not criminally responsible due to mental incompetence.\n\t(4)\tThe issue of whether the necessary territorial nexus exists must, if raised before the trial, be reserved for consideration at the trial.\n\t(5)\tA power or authority exercisable on reasonable suspicion that an offence has been committed may be exercised in the State if the person in whom the power or authority is vested suspects on reasonable grounds that the elements necessary to constitute the offence exist (whether or not that person suspects or has any ground to suspect that the necessary territorial nexus exists).\n5I—Double criminality\n\t(1)\tIf—\n\t(a)\tan offence against the law of another State (the external offence) is committed wholly or partly in this State; and\n\t(b)\ta corresponding offence (the local offence) exists under the law of this State,\nan offence (an auxiliary offence) arises under the law of this State.\n\t(2)\tThe maximum penalty for an auxiliary offence is the maximum penalty for the external offence or the maximum penalty for the local offence (whichever is the lesser).\n\t(3)\tIf a person is charged with an offence (but not specifically an auxiliary offence) and the court finds that the defendant has not committed the offence as charged but has committed the relevant auxiliary offence, the court may make or return a finding that the defendant is guilty of the auxiliary offence.\n","sortOrder":9},{"sectionNumber":"Part 2","sectionType":"part","heading":"Treason","content":"Part 2—Treason\n6—Repeal\nThe Acts 36 George III C. 7 and 57 George III C. 6 of the Imperial Parliament, except those provisions which relate to the compassing, imagining, inventing, devising or intending of the death or destruction, or any bodily harm tending to the death or destruction, maiming or wounding, imprisonment or restraint, of the person of Her Majesty, and the expressing, uttering or declaring of such compassings, imaginations, inventions, devices or intentions, are repealed.\n7—Treason\nAny person who compasses, imagines, invents, devises or intends—\n\t(a)\tto deprive or depose Her Majesty from the style, honour or Royal name of the Imperial Crown of the United Kingdom or of any other of Her Majesty's dominions and countries; or\n\t(b)\tto levy war against Her Majesty within any part of the United Kingdom or any other of Her Majesty's dominions in order—\n\t(i)\tby force or constraint, to compel Her to change Her measures or counsels; or\n\t(ii)\tto put any force or constraint on, or to intimidate or overawe, both Houses or either House of the Parliament of the United Kingdom or the Parliament of this State; or\n\t(c)\tto move or stir any foreigner or stranger with force to invade the United Kingdom or any other of Her Majesty's dominions or countries under the obeisance of Her Majesty,\nand expresses, utters or declares such compassings, imaginations, inventions, devices or intentions by publishing any printing or writing, or by open and advised speaking, or by any overt act or deed, shall be guilty of an offence and liable to be imprisoned for life or for a term of not less than six months.\n8—Time within which prosecution shall be commenced and warrant issued\n\t(1)\tNo person shall be prosecuted under section 7 in respect of any compassings, imaginations, inventions, devices or intentions which are expressed, uttered or declared by open and advised speaking only, unless—\n\t(a)\tinformation of the compassings, imaginations, inventions, devices or intentions and of the words by which they were expressed, uttered or declared is given on oath to a justice within six days after the words were spoken; and\n\t(b)\ta warrant for the apprehension of the person by whom the words were spoken is issued within ten days after that information was given.\n\t(2)\tNo person shall be convicted of any such compassings, imaginations, inventions, devices or intentions which are expressed, uttered or declared by open or advised speaking except on his own confession in open court or unless the words so spoken are proved by two credible witnesses.\n9—In informations more than one overt act may be charged\n\t(1)\tIt shall be lawful in any information under section 7 to charge against the offender any number of the matters, acts or deeds by which the compassings, imaginations, inventions, devices or intentions were expressed, uttered or declared.\n\t(2)\tIf the facts or matters alleged in an information under section 7 amount in law to treason, the information shall not for that reason be deemed void, erroneous or defective and, if the facts or matters proved on the trial of any person so informed against amount in law to treason, the accused person shall not for that reason be entitled to be acquitted of the offence charged, but no person tried for that offence shall be afterwards prosecuted for treason on the same facts.\n10—Nothing herein to affect 25 Edward III Stat. 5, c. 2\nThe provisions of this Part shall not lessen the force of, or in any manner affect, anything enacted by the Statute passed in the twenty-fifth year of King Edward the Third: \"A Declaration which Offences shall be adjudged Treason\".\n10A—Penalty for treason\nAny person who is convicted of treason shall be imprisoned for life.\n","sortOrder":10},{"sectionNumber":"Part 3","sectionType":"part","heading":"Offences against the person etc","content":"Part 3—Offences against the person etc\nDivision 1—Homicide\n11—Murder\nAny person who commits murder shall be guilty of an offence and shall be imprisoned for life.\n12—Conspiring or soliciting to commit murder\nAny person who—\n\t(a)\tconspires, confederates and agrees with any other person to murder any person, whether he is a subject of Her Majesty or not and whether he is within the Queen's dominions or not;\n\t(b)\tsolicits, encourages, persuades or endeavours to persuade, or proposes to, any person to murder any other person, whether he is a subject of Her Majesty or not and whether he is within the Queen's dominions or not,\nshall be guilty of an offence and liable to be imprisoned for life.\n12A—Causing death by an intentional act of violence\nA person who commits an intentional act of violence while acting in the course or furtherance of a major indictable offence punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more, and thus causes the death of another, is guilty of murder.\n13—Manslaughter\n\t(1)\tAny person who is convicted of manslaughter shall be liable to be imprisoned for life or to pay such fine as the court awards or to both such imprisonment and fine.\n\t(2)\tIf a court convicting a person of manslaughter is satisfied that the victim's death was caused by the convicted person's use of a motor vehicle, the court must order that the person be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for 10 years or such longer period as the court orders.\n\t(3)\tWhere a convicted person is disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence—\n\t(a)\tthe disqualification operates to cancel any driver's licence held by the convicted person as at the commencement of the period of disqualification; and\n13A—Criminal liability in relation to suicide\n\t(1)\tIt is not an offence to commit or attempt to commit suicide.\n\t(2)\tNotwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1), a person who finds another committing or about to commit an act which he believes on reasonable grounds would, if committed or completed, result in suicide is justified in using reasonable force to prevent the commission or completion of the act.\n\t(3)\tIf on the trial of a person for the murder of another the jury is satisfied that the accused killed the other, or was a party to the other being killed by a third person, but is further satisfied that the acts or omissions alleged against the accused were done or made in pursuance of a suicide pact with the person killed, then, subject to subsection (11), the jury shall not find the accused guilty of murder but may bring in a verdict of manslaughter.\n\t(4)\tThe killing of another or an attempt to kill another in pursuance of a suicide pact shall, for the purposes of determining the criminal liability of a person who was a party to the killing or attempt but not a party to the suicide pact, be regarded as murder or attempted murder, as the case may require.\n\t(5)\tA person who aids, abets or counsels the suicide of another, or an attempt by another to commit suicide, shall be guilty of an indictable offence.\n\t(6)\tThe penalty for an offence against subsection (5) shall be—\n\t(a)\tsubject to paragraph (b)—\n\t(i)\twhere suicide was committed—imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years;\n\t(ii)\twhere suicide was attempted—imprisonment for a term not exceeding eight years;\n\t(b)\twhere the convicted person committed the offence in pursuance of a suicide pact and—\n\t(i)\tsuicide was committed—imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years;\n\t(ii)\tsuicide was attempted—imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.\n\t(7)\tA person who, by fraud, duress or undue influence, procures the suicide of another or an attempt by another to commit suicide shall (whether or not he was a party to a suicide pact with the other person) be guilty of murder or attempted murder, as the case may require.\n\t(8)\tIf on the trial of a person for murder or attempted murder the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged but is satisfied that he is guilty of an offence against subsection (5), the jury may bring in a verdict that he is guilty of an offence against that subsection.\n\t(9)\tIn any criminal proceedings in which it is material to establish the existence of a suicide pact and whether an act was done, or an omission made, in pursuance of the pact, the onus of proving the existence of the pact and that the act was done, or the omission made, in pursuance of the pact shall lie on the accused.\n\t(10)\tFor the purposes of this section—\n\t(a)\tsuicide pact means an agreement between two or more persons having for its object the death of all of them whether or not each is to take his own life; and\n\t(b)\tnothing done or omitted to be done by a person who enters into a suicide pact shall be treated as done or omitted to be done in pursuance of the pact unless it is done or omitted to be done while he has the settled intention of dying in pursuance of the pact.\n\t(11)\tWhere a person induced another to enter into a suicide pact by means of fraud, duress or undue influence, the person is not entitled in relation to an offence against the other to any mitigation of criminal liability or penalty under this section based on the existence of the pact.\n\t(12)\tTo avoid doubt, the death of a person by the administration of a voluntary assisted dying substance in accordance with the Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2021 does not constitute suicide.\nSee section 6 of the Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2021.\n","sortOrder":11},{"sectionNumber":"Div 1A","sectionType":"division","heading":"Criminal neglect etc","content":"Division 1A—Criminal neglect etc\n13B—Interpretation\nact includes—\n\t(a)\tan omission; and\n\t(b)\ta course of conduct;\nchild means a person under 16 years of age;\ncognitive impairment includes—\n\t(a)\ta developmental disability (including, for example, an intellectual disability, Down syndrome, cerebral palsy or an autistic spectrum disorder);\n\t(b)\tan acquired disability as a result of illness or injury (including, for example, dementia, a traumatic brain injury or a neurological disorder);\n\t(c)\ta mental illness;\nvulnerable adult means a person aged 16 years or above who is significantly impaired through physical disability, cognitive impairment, illness or infirmity.\n\t(2)\tSubject to subsection (3), in this Division the following terms and phrases have the same meaning as in Division 7A:\n\t(a)\tcause;\n\t(b)\tharm.\n\t(3)\tFor the purposes of this Division, a reference to harm will be taken to include detriment caused to the physical, mental or emotional wellbeing or development of a child or vulnerable adult (whether temporary or permanent).\n\t(4)\tFor the purposes of this Division, a defendant has a duty of care to a victim if the defendant is a parent or guardian of the victim or has assumed responsibility for the victim's care.\n14—Criminal neglect\n\t(1)\tA person (the defendant) is guilty of the offence of criminal neglect if—\n\t(a)\ta child or a vulnerable adult (the victim) dies or suffers harm as a result of an act; and\n\t(b)\tthe defendant had, at the time of the act, a duty of care to the victim; and\n\t(c)\tthe defendant was, or ought to have been, aware that there was an appreciable risk that harm would be caused to the victim by the act; and\n\t(d)\tthe defendant failed to take steps that he or she could reasonably be expected to have taken in the circumstances to protect the victim from harm and the defendant's failure to do so was, in the circumstances, so serious that a criminal penalty is warranted.\n\t(a)\twhere the victim dies—imprisonment for life; or\n\t(b)\tin any other case—imprisonment for 15 years.\n\t(2)\tIf a jury considering a charge of criminal neglect against a defendant finds that—\n\t(a)\tthere is reasonable doubt as to the identity of the person who committed the act that caused the victim's death or harm; but\n\t(b)\tthe act can only have been the act of the defendant or some other person who, on the evidence, may have committed the act,\nthe jury may find the defendant guilty of the charge of criminal neglect even though of the opinion that the act may have been the act of the defendant.\n\t(3)\tIf a defendant is charged with an offence against this section in respect of a course of conduct—\n\t(a)\tit is not necessary to prove that the defendant was, or ought to have been, aware that there was an appreciable risk that harm would be caused to the victim by each act making up the course of conduct; and\n\t(b)\tthe information need not—\n\t(i)\tallege particulars of each act with the degree of particularity that would be required if the act were charged as an offence under a different section of this or any other Act; or\n\t(ii)\tidentify particular acts or the occasions on which, places at which or order in which acts occurred; or\n\t(iii)\tidentify particular acts as causing, wholly or partly, particular harm to the victim.\n\t(4)\tA defendant may be charged with an offence against this section in respect of a course of conduct even if some of the acts making up the course of conduct occurred before the commencement of this section.\n14A—Failing to provide food etc in certain circumstances\nIf—\n\t(a)\ta person is liable to provide necessary food, clothing or accommodation to a child or vulnerable adult; and\n\t(b)\tthe person, without lawful excuse, fails to provide that food, clothing or accommodation,\nDivision 2—Defences\n14B—Abolition of certain common law defences\n\t(1)\tThe following common law defences are abolished:\n\t(a)\tprovocation;\n\t(b)\tnecessity;\n\t(c)\tduress;\n\t(d)\tmarital coercion.\n\t(2)\tTo avoid doubt, the common law defences abolished by subsection (1) remain available in respect of offences allegedly committed before the commencement of that subsection.\n15—Self defence\n\t(1)\tIt is a defence to a charge of an offence if—\n\t(a)\tthe defendant genuinely believed the conduct to which the charge relates to be necessary and reasonable for a defensive purpose; and\n\t(b)\tthe conduct was, in the circumstances as the defendant genuinely believed them to be, reasonably proportionate to the threat that the defendant genuinely believed to exist1.\n\t(2)\tSubject to subsection (2a), it is a partial defence to a charge of murder (reducing the offence to manslaughter) if—\n\t(a)\tthe defendant genuinely believed the conduct to which the charge relates to be necessary and reasonable for a defensive purpose; but\n\t(b)\tthe conduct was not, in the circumstances as the defendant genuinely believed them to be, reasonably proportionate to the threat that the defendant genuinely believed to exist.2\n\t(2a)\tA defendant is not entitled to rely on a defence under subsection (2) in relation to a charge of murder if the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that the genuine belief of the defendant, that the conduct to which the charge relates was necessary and reasonable for a defensive purpose, was substantially affected by the voluntary and non‑therapeutic consumption of a drug.\nIt may be that the genuine belief of a defendant is not substantially affected by the consumption of a drug where there is evidence of other matters substantially informing or affecting the belief (for example, if the offence occurred in circumstances of family violence—see section 15B(2)).\n\t(3)\tFor the purposes of this section, a person acts for a defensive purpose if the person acts—\n\t(a)\tin self defence or in defence of another; or\n\t(b)\tto prevent or terminate the unlawful imprisonment of himself, herself or another.\n\t(4)\tHowever, if a person—\n\t(a)\tresists another who is purporting to exercise a power of arrest or some other power of law enforcement; or\n\t(b)\tresists another who is acting in response to an unlawful act against person or property committed by the person or to which the person is a party,\nthe person will not be taken to be acting for a defensive purpose unless the person genuinely believes, on reasonable grounds, that the other person is acting unlawfully.\n\t(5)\tIf a defendant raises a defence under this section, the defence is taken to have been established unless the prosecution disproves the defence beyond reasonable doubt.\ndrug means alcohol or any other substance that is capable (either alone or in combination with other substances) of influencing mental functioning;\nnon-therapeutic—consumption of a drug is to be considered non‑therapeutic unless—\nNotes—\n1\tSee, however, section 15C. If the defendant establishes that he or she is entitled to the benefit of that section, this paragraph will be inapplicable.\n2\tSee, however, section 15C. If the defendant establishes that he or she is entitled to the benefit of that section, the defendant will be entitled to a complete defence.\n15A—Defence of property etc\n\t(1)\tIt is a defence to a charge of an offence if—\n\t(a)\tthe defendant genuinely believed the conduct to which the charge relates to be necessary and reasonable—\n\t(i)\tto protect property from unlawful appropriation, destruction, damage or interference; or\n\t(ii)\tto prevent criminal trespass to land or premises, or to remove from land or premises a person who is committing a criminal trespass; or\n\t(iii)\tto make or assist in the lawful arrest of an offender or alleged offender or a person who is unlawfully at large; and\n\t(b)\tif the conduct resulted in death—the defendant did not intend to cause death nor did the defendant act recklessly realising that the conduct could result in death; and\n\t(c)\tthe conduct was, in the circumstances as the defendant genuinely believed them to be, reasonably proportionate to the threat that the defendant genuinely believed to exist1.\n\t(2)\tSubject to subsection (2a), it is a partial defence to a charge of murder (reducing the offence to manslaughter) if—\n\t(a)\tthe defendant genuinely believed the conduct to which the charge relates to be necessary and reasonable—\n\t(i)\tto protect property from unlawful appropriation, destruction, damage or interference; or\n\t(ii)\tto prevent criminal trespass to land or premises, or to remove from land or premises a person who is committing a criminal trespass; or\n\t(iii)\tto make or assist in the lawful arrest of an offender or alleged offender or a person who is unlawfully at large; and\n\t(b)\tthe defendant did not intend to cause death; but\n\t(c)\tthe conduct was not, in the circumstances as the defendant genuinely believed them to be, reasonably proportionate to the threat that the defendant genuinely believed to exist.2\n\t(2a)\tA defendant is not entitled to rely on a defence under subsection (2) in relation to a charge of murder if the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that the genuine belief of the defendant, that the conduct to which the charge relates was necessary and reasonable for a purpose referred to in subsection (2)(a), was substantially affected by the voluntary and non‑therapeutic consumption of a drug.\nIt may be that the genuine belief of a defendant is not substantially affected by the consumption of a drug where there is evidence of other matters substantially informing or affecting the belief (for example, if the offence occurred in circumstances of family violence—see section 15B(2)).\n\t(3)\tFor the purposes of this section, a person commits a criminal trespass if the person trespasses on land or premises—\n\t(a)\twith the intention of committing an offence against a person or property (or both); or\n\t(b)\tin circumstances where the trespass itself constitutes an offence or is an element of the offence.\n\t(4)\tIf a defendant raises a defence under this section, the defence is taken to have been established unless the prosecution disproves the defence beyond reasonable doubt.\ndrug means alcohol or any other substance that is capable (either alone or in combination with other substances) of influencing mental functioning;\nnon-therapeutic—consumption of a drug is to be considered non‑therapeutic unless—\nNotes—\n1\tSee, however, section 15C. If the defendant establishes that he or she is entitled to the benefit of that section, this paragraph will be inapplicable.\n2\tSee, however, section 15C. If the defendant establishes that he or she is entitled to the benefit of that section, the defendant will be entitled to a complete defence.\n15B—Reasonableness etc where offence committed in circumstances of family violence\n\t(1)\tA requirement under this Division that the defendant's conduct be (objectively) reasonably proportionate to the threat that the defendant genuinely believed to exist does not imply that the force used by the defendant cannot exceed the force used against him or her.\n\t(2)\tIn a trial for an offence in which the defendant raises a defence under this Division, the question of whether—\n\t(a)\tthe defendant genuinely believed that particular conduct was necessary and reasonable (either for a defensive purpose or for the purposes referred to in section 15A(1)(a)); or\n\t(b)\tparticular conduct was reasonably proportionate to a particular threat; or\n\t(c)\tthe defendant reasonably believed that a particular threat would be carried out; or\n\t(d)\tthe defendant reasonably believed that particular conduct was the only reasonable way a particular threat could be avoided; or\n\t(e)\tparticular conduct was a reasonable response to a particular threat,\nis, if the defendant asserts that the offence occurred in circumstances of family violence, to be determined having regard to any evidence of family violence admitted in the course of the trial.\ncircumstances of family violence has the same meaning as in section 34V of the Evidence Act 1929;\nevidence of family violence has the same meaning as in section 34W of the Evidence Act 1929.\n15C—Requirement of reasonable proportionality not to apply in case of an innocent defence against home invasion\n\t(1)\tThis section applies where—\n\t(a)\ta relevant defence would have been available to the defendant if the defendant's conduct had been (objectively) reasonably proportionate to the threat that the defendant genuinely believed to exist (the perceived threat); and\n\t(b)\tthe victim was not a police officer acting in the course of his or her duties.\n\t(2)\tIn a case to which this section applies, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of the relevant defence even though the defendant's conduct was not (objectively) reasonably proportionate to the perceived threat if the defendant establishes, on the balance of probabilities, that—\n\t(a)\tthe defendant genuinely believed the victim to be committing, or to have just committed, home invasion; and\n\t(b)\tthe defendant was not (at or before the time of the alleged offence) engaged in any criminal misconduct that might have given rise to the threat or perceived threat; and\n\t(c)\tthe defendant's mental faculties were not, at the time of the alleged offence, substantially affected by the voluntary and non-therapeutic consumption of a drug.\ncriminal misconduct means conduct constituting an offence for which a penalty of imprisonment is prescribed;\ndrug means alcohol or any other substance that is capable (either alone or in combination with other substances) of influencing mental functioning;\nhome invasion means a serious criminal trespass committed in a place of residence;\nnon-therapeutic—consumption of a drug is to be considered non-therapeutic unless—\n\t(b)\tthe drug is of a kind available, without prescription, from registered pharmacists, and is consumed for a purpose recommended by the manufacturer and in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions;\nrelevant defence means a defence under section 15(1) or section 15A(1).\n15D—Duress\n\t(1)\tIt is a defence to a charge of an offence (other than a prescribed offence) if—\n\t(a)\tat the time of carrying out the conduct constituting the offence, the defendant reasonably believed that—\n\t(i)\ta threat had been made that would be carried out unless the person engaged in the conduct; and\n\t(ii)\tcarrying out the conduct was the only reasonable way that the threat could be avoided; and\n\t(b)\tthe conduct was a reasonable response to the threat.\n\t(2)\tHowever, this section does not apply if the threat referred to in subsection (1)(a) was made by or on behalf of a person with whom the defendant was voluntarily associating for the purpose of carrying out conduct of the kind actually carried out.\n\t(3)\tIf a defendant raises a defence under this section, the defence is taken to have been established unless the prosecution disproves the defence beyond reasonable doubt.\nprescribed offence means—\n\t(a)\tmurder; or\n\t(b)\tattempted murder; or\n\t(c)\tconspiring or soliciting to commit murder; or\n\t(d)\taiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of murder; or\n\t(e)\tany other offence prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this definition.\n15E—Sudden or extraordinary emergency\n\t(1)\tIt is a defence to a charge of an offence (other than a prescribed offence) if—\n\t(a)\tthe defendant carried out the conduct constituting the offence in response to circumstances of sudden or extraordinary emergency; and\n\t(b)\tat the time of carrying out the conduct, the defendant reasonably believed that—\n\t(i)\tcircumstances of sudden or extraordinary emergency existed; and\n\t(ii)\tcarrying out the conduct constituting the offence charged was the only reasonable way to deal with the emergency; and\n\t(c)\tthe conduct was a reasonable response to the emergency.\n\t(2)\tTo avoid doubt, an emergency need not involve a risk of death or serious harm.\n\t(3)\tIf a defendant raises a defence under this section, the defence is taken to have been established unless the prosecution disproves the defence beyond reasonable doubt.\nprescribed offence means—\n\t(a)\tmurder; or\n\t(b)\tattempted murder; or\n\t(c)\tconspiring or soliciting to commit murder; or\n\t(d)\taiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of murder; or\n\t(e)\tany other offence prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this definition.\n15F—Review of Division\n\t(1)\tThe Minister must cause a review of the operation of this Division (as amended by the Statutes Amendment (Abolition of Defence of Provocation and Related Matters) Act 2020) to be conducted and a report on the review to be prepared and submitted to the Minister.\n\t(2)\tThe review and report must include—\n\t(a)\tconsideration of the effect (if any) of the abolition of the common law defences specified in section 14B; and\n\t(b)\tconsideration of the effect (if any) that section 15B(2) has had generally on the operation of sections 15 and 15A; and\n\t(c)\tconsideration of the operation of the defences set out in sections 15D and 15E; and\n\t(d)\ta recommendation as to whether further modification to the Act is necessary or desirable for the purpose of recognising and addressing the role family violence plays in relation to certain offending,\nand may include any other matter the Minister thinks fit.\n\t(3)\tThe review and the report must be completed after the fifth, but before the sixth, anniversary of the commencement of this section.\n\t(4)\tA report under this section may be combined with a report under section 34Z of the Evidence Act 1929.\n\t(5)\tThe Minister must cause a copy of the report submitted under subsection (1) to be laid before both Houses of Parliament within 6 sitting days after receiving the report.\nDivision 3—Miscellaneous\n16—Petit treason\nEvery offence which, before the commencement of the Act 9 George IV C. 31 of the Imperial Parliament, would have amounted to petit treason shall be deemed to be murder only, and no greater offence, and shall be punishable accordingly.\n18—Abolition of year-and-a-day rule\nAn act or omission that in fact causes death will be regarded in law as the cause of death even though the death occurs more than a year and a day after the act or omission.\nDivision 4—Unlawful threats\n19—Unlawful threats\n\t(a)\tthreatens, without lawful excuse, to kill or endanger the life of another; and\n\t(b)\tintends to arouse a fear that the threat will be, or is likely to be, carried out, or is recklessly indifferent as to whether such a fear is aroused,\n\t(b)\tfor an aggravated offence—imprisonment for 12 years.\n\t(a)\tthreatens, without lawful excuse, to cause harm to another; and\n\t(b)\tintends to arouse a fear that the threat will be, or is likely to be, carried out, or is recklessly indifferent as to whether such a fear is aroused,\n\t(c)\tfor an offence aggravated by the circumstances referred to in section 5AA(1)(c), (ca) or (ka)—imprisonment for 8 years.\n\t(3)\tThis section applies to a threat directly or indirectly communicated by words (written or spoken) or by conduct, or partially by words and partially by conduct.\nharm, in relation to a person, has the same meaning as in section 21.\nDivision 5—Stalking and harassment\n19AA—Stalking and harassment\n\t(1)\tA person is guilty of stalking and harassment of another person if—\n\t(a)\ton at least two separate occasions, the person—\n\t(i)\tfollows the other person; or\n\t(ii)\tloiters outside the place of residence of the other person or some other place frequented by the other person; or\n\t(iii)\tenters or interferes with property in the possession of the other person; or\n\t(iv)\tgives or sends offensive material to the other person, or leaves offensive material where it will be found by, given to or brought to the attention of the other person; or\n\t(iva)\tpublishes or transmits offensive material in such a way that the offensive material will be found by, or brought to the attention of, the other person; or\n\t(ivaa)\tpublishes or transmits material that appears to have been prepared, published, transmitted or authorised by the other person in a manner that could reasonably be expected to arouse apprehension or fear in the other person; or\n\t(ivb)\tcommunicates with the other person, or to others about the other person, in a manner that could reasonably be expected to arouse apprehension or fear in the other person; or\n\t(v)\tmonitors, tracks or surveils the other person, or the person's movements, activities or associations; or\nA person may monitor, track or surveil another person by—\n\t•\tusing a tracking device or drone to track the other person's movements\n\t•\taccessing the other person's call history, internet browser history, messages or other history or communications\n\t•\taccessing or monitoring the other person's social media account, email account or other online account.\n\t(vi)\tacts in any other way that could reasonably be expected to arouse the other person's apprehension or fear; and\n\t(b)\tthe person—\n\t(i)\tintends to cause physical or mental harm to the other person or a third person; or\n\t(ii)\tintends to cause serious apprehension or fear; or\n\t(iii)\tought reasonably to have known that—\n\t(A)\tphysical or mental harm would be caused to the other person or a third person; or\n\t(B)\tserious apprehension or fear would be caused.\n\t(2)\tFor the purposes of subsection (1), a reference to conduct set out in paragraph (a)(iv) to (vi) (inclusive) will be taken to include, without limitation, conduct that is engaged in or undertaken—\n\t(a)\tby way of the internet or any other form of electronic communication or technology; or\n\t(b)\tby way of a social media platform or any other online platform or network; or\n\t(c)\tby way of telephone, email, fax or any other associated technology; or\n\t(d)\tby way of mail or any other analogue manner of communication; or\n\t(e)\tin person.\n\t(2a)\tIt is a defence to a charge of an offence against subsection (1) if the defendant proves that the conduct allegedly constituting the offence was engaged in with lawful authority.\n\t(3)\tA person who is charged with stalking and harassment is (subject to any exclusion in the instrument of charge) to be taken to have been charged in the alternative with offensive behaviour1 so that if the court is not satisfied that the charge of stalking and harassment has been established but is satisfied that the charge of offensive behaviour has been established, the court may convict the person of offensive behaviour.\n\t(4)\tA person who has been acquitted or convicted on a charge of stalking and harassment may not be convicted of another offence arising out of the same set of circumstances and involving a physical element that is common to that charge.\n\t(5)\tA person who has been acquitted or convicted on a charge of an offence other than stalking and harassment may not be convicted of stalking and harassment if the charge of stalking and harassment arises out of the same set of circumstances and involves a physical element that is common to the charge of that other offence.\n\t(6)\tFor the purposes of this section, the circumstances of a dealing with material may be taken into account in determining whether the material was offensive material but, if material was inherently offensive material, the circumstances of a dealing with the material cannot be taken to have deprived it of that character.\n1\tSee section 7 of the Summary Offences Act 1953.\n","sortOrder":12},{"sectionNumber":"Div 6","sectionType":"division","heading":"Serious vehicle and vessel offences","content":"Division 6—Serious vehicle and vessel offences\n19AAB—Interpretation\nconsumption in relation to a drug includes injection and any other form of administration;\nharm, physical harm and serious harm have the same meanings as in section 21;\nRegistrar of Motor Vehicles has the same meaning as in the Road Traffic Act 1961.\n19A—Causing death or harm by dangerous use of vehicle or vessel\n\t(a)\tdrives a vehicle or operates a vessel in a culpably negligent manner, recklessly, or at a speed or in a manner dangerous to any person; and\n\t(b)\tby that culpable negligence, recklessness or other conduct, causes the death of another,\n\t(i)\tfor a first offence that is a basic offence—imprisonment for 15 years and, in the case of an offence involving the use of a motor vehicle, disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for 10 years or such longer period as the court orders;\n\t(ii)\tfor a first offence that is an aggravated offence or for any subsequent offence—imprisonment for life and, in the case of an offence involving the use of a motor vehicle, disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for 10 years or such longer period as the court orders;\n\t(b)\twhere neither a motor vehicle nor motor vessel was used in the commission of the offence—imprisonment for 7 years.\n\t(3)\tA person who—\n\t(a)\tdrives a vehicle or operates a vessel in a culpably negligent manner, recklessly, or at a speed or in a manner dangerous to any person; and\n\t(b)\tby that culpable negligence, recklessness or other conduct, causes harm to another,\n\t(a)\twhere a motor vehicle or motor vessel was used in the commission of the offence and serious harm was caused to a person—\n\t(i)\tfor a first offence that is a basic offence—imprisonment for 15 years and, in the case of an offence involving the use of a motor vehicle, disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for 10 years or such longer period as the court orders;\n\t(ii)\tfor a first offence that is an aggravated offence or for any subsequent offence—imprisonment for life and, in the case of an offence involving the use of a motor vehicle, disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for 10 years or such longer period as the court orders;\n\t(b)\twhere a motor vehicle or motor vessel was used in the commission of the offence but serious harm was not caused to any person—\n\t(i)\tfor a first offence that is a basic offence—imprisonment for 5 years and, in the case of an offence involving the use of a motor vehicle, disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for 1 year or such longer period as the court orders;\n\t(ii)\tfor a first offence that is an aggravated offence or for any subsequent offence—imprisonment for 7 years and, in the case of an offence involving the use of a motor vehicle, disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for 3 years or such longer period as the court orders;\n\t(c)\twhere neither a motor vehicle nor motor vessel was used in the commission of the offence—imprisonment for 5 years.\n\t(5)\tIn determining whether an offence is a first or subsequent offence for the purposes of this section a previous offence against—\n\t(a)\tthis section; or\n\t(b)\tsection 19AC; or\n\t(c)\tsection 46 of the Road Traffic Act 1961; or\n\t(d)\tsection 69A of the Harbors and Navigation Act 1993,\nfor which the defendant has been convicted will be taken into account.\n\t(6)\tWhere a convicted person is disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence—\n\t(a)\tthe disqualification operates to cancel any driver's licence held by the convicted person as at the commencement of the period of disqualification; and\n\t(7)\tA person is liable to be charged with and convicted of an offence against subsection (1) in respect of each person killed, and of an offence against subsection (3) in respect of each person who suffers harm, in consequence of the same act or omission (but in determining whether an offence arising out of a particular act or omission is a first or subsequent offence for the purposes of this section, a conviction for an offence arising out of the same act or omission cannot be taken into account).\n\t(8)\tWhere at the trial of a person for an offence against this section it appears that the defendant was, or may have been, in a state of self-induced intoxication at the time of the alleged offence but the evidence adduced at the trial would, assuming that the defendant had been sober, be sufficient to establish the mental elements of the alleged offence, the mental elements of the alleged offence shall be deemed to have been established against the defendant.\n\t(9)\tFor the purposes of subsection (8), intoxication shall be taken to be self-induced if it results from the voluntary consumption of alcohol or a drug (not being a drug supplied on the prescription of, and consumed in accordance with the directions of, a legally qualified medical practitioner).\n\t(10)\tIt is a defence to a charge of an offence against this section for the defendant to prove that he or she was, at the time of the offence—\n\t(a)\tcarrying out duties as an emergency worker; and\n\t(b)\tacting in accordance with the directions of his or her employing authority; and\n\t(c)\tacting reasonably in the circumstances as he or she believed them to be.\n\t(11)\tIn this section—\nemergency worker means a police officer or a person who is an emergency worker as defined by the regulations for the purposes of this section;\nemploying authority means—\n\t(a)\tin relation to a police officer—the Commissioner of Police; or\n\t(b)\tin relation to a person who is an emergency worker as defined by the regulations for the purposes of this section—the person defined by the regulations as the employing authority for that person.\n19AB—Leaving accident scene etc after causing death or harm by careless use of vehicle or vessel\n\t(a)\tdrives a vehicle or operates a vessel without due care or attention or without reasonable consideration for any person; and\n\t(b)\tby that conduct, causes the death of another; and\n\t(c)\tfails to satisfy the statutory obligations of a driver of a vehicle or an operator of a vessel (as the case may be) in relation to the incident,\n\t(i)\tfor a first offence—imprisonment for 15 years and, in the case of an offence involving the use of a motor vehicle, disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for 10 years or such longer period as the court orders;\n\t(ii)\tfor a subsequent offence—imprisonment for life and, in the case of an offence involving the use of a motor vehicle, disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for 10 years or such longer period as the court orders;\n\t(b)\twhere neither a motor vehicle nor motor vessel was used in the commission of the offence—imprisonment for 7 years.\n\t(a)\tdrives a vehicle or operates a vessel without due care or attention or without reasonable consideration for any person; and\n\t(b)\tby that conduct, causes physical harm to another; and\n\t(c)\tfails to satisfy the statutory obligations of a driver of a vehicle or an operator of a vessel (as the case may be) in relation to the incident,\n\t(a)\twhere a motor vehicle or motor vessel was used in the commission of the offence and the physical harm caused to a person amounts to serious harm—\n\t(i)\tfor a first offence—imprisonment for 15 years and, in the case of an offence involving the use of a motor vehicle, disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for 10 years or such longer period as the court orders;\n\t(ii)\tfor a subsequent offence—imprisonment for life and, in the case of an offence involving the use of a motor vehicle, disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for 10 years or such longer period as the court orders;\n\t(b)\twhere a motor vehicle or motor vessel was used in the commission of the offence but the physical harm caused to any person does not amount to serious harm—\n\t(i)\tfor a first offence—imprisonment for 5 years and, in the case of an offence involving the use of a motor vehicle, disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for 1 year or such longer period as the court orders;\n\t(ii)\tfor a subsequent offence—imprisonment for 7 years and, in the case of an offence involving the use of a motor vehicle, disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for 3 years or such longer period as the court orders;\n\t(c)\twhere neither a motor vehicle nor motor vessel was used in the commission of the offence—imprisonment for 5 years.\n\t(3)\tFor the purposes of subsection (1) and (2)—\n\t(a)\ta person fails to satisfy the statutory obligations of a driver of a vehicle in relation to an incident if the person commits an offence against section 43 of the Road Traffic Act 1961 in relation to the incident; and\n\t(b)\ta person fails to satisfy the statutory obligations of an operator of a vessel in relation to an incident if the person commits an offence against section 75 or 76 of the Harbors and Navigation Act 1993 in relation to the incident.\n\t(4)\tIn determining whether an offence is a first or subsequent offence for the purposes of this section, all previous offences against this section or section 19A that involved the driving of a motor vehicle or operation of a motor vessel must be taken into account except that such an offence will not be taken to be a previous offence for the purposes of subsection (1), or an offence against subsection (2) in which serious harm was caused to a person, unless it resulted in the death of, or grievous bodily or serious harm to, the victim.\n\t(5)\tWhere a convicted person is disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence—\n\t(a)\tthe disqualification operates to cancel any driver's licence held by the convicted person as at the commencement of the period of disqualification; and\n\t(6)\tA person is liable to be charged with and convicted of an offence against subsection (1) in respect of each person killed, and of an offence against subsection (2) in respect of each person who suffers physical harm, in consequence of the same act or omission (but in determining whether an offence arising out of a particular act or omission is a first or subsequent offence for the purposes of this section, a conviction for an offence arising out of the same act or omission cannot be taken into account).\n19ABA—Causing death or serious harm by careless use of vehicle or vessel\n\t(a)\tdrives a vehicle or operates a vessel without due care or attention or without reasonable consideration for any person; and\n\t(b)\tby that conduct, causes the death of another,\n\t(i)\tfor a basic offence—imprisonment for 5 years and, in the case of an offence involving the use of a motor vehicle, disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for 1 year or such longer period as the court orders;\n\t(ii)\tfor an aggravated offence—imprisonment for 7 years and, in the case of an offence involving the use of a motor vehicle, disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for 3 years or such longer period as the court orders;\n\t(b)\twhere neither a motor vehicle nor motor vessel was used in the commission of the offence—imprisonment for 3 years.\n\t(a)\tdrives a vehicle or operates a vessel without due care or attention or without reasonable consideration for any person; and\n\t(b)\tby that conduct, causes serious harm to another,\n\t(i)\tfor a basic offence—imprisonment for 5 years and, in the case of an offence involving the use of a motor vehicle, disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for 1 year or such longer period as the court orders;\n\t(ii)\tfor an aggravated offence—imprisonment for 7 years and, in the case of an offence involving the use of a motor vehicle, disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for 3 years or such longer period as the court orders;\n\t(b)\twhere neither a motor vehicle nor motor vessel was used in the commission of the offence—imprisonment for 2 years.\n\t(3)\tWhere a convicted person is disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence—\n\t(a)\tthe disqualification operates to cancel any driver's licence held by the convicted person as at the commencement of the period of disqualification; and\n\t(4)\tA person is liable to be charged with and convicted of an offence against subsection (1) in respect of each person killed, and of an offence against subsection (2) in respect of each person who suffers serious harm, in consequence of the same act or omission.\n\t(5)\tIt is a defence to a charge of an offence against this section for the defendant to prove that they were, at the time of the offence—\n\t(a)\tcarrying out duties as an emergency worker; and\n\t(b)\tacting in accordance with the directions of their employing authority; and\n\t(c)\tacting reasonably in the circumstances as they believed them to be.\n\t(6)\tSections 22, 53B(5), 79B(10) and 175 of the Road Traffic Act 1961 apply in relation to an offence against this section as if a reference in any of those sections to an offence against that Act was a reference to the offence against this section.\nemergency worker has the same meaning as in section 19A;\nemploying authority has the same meaning as in section 19A.\n19AC—Dangerous driving to escape police pursuit etc\n\t(1)\tA person who, intending to—\n\t(a)\tescape pursuit by a police officer; or\n\t(b)\tcause a police officer to engage in a pursuit,\ndrives a motor vehicle in a culpably negligent manner, recklessly, or at a speed or in a manner dangerous to any person is guilty of an offence.\n\t(b)\tfor an aggravated offence—imprisonment for 5 years.\n\t(2)\tWhere a court convicts a person of an offence against subsection (1) the following provisions apply:\n\t(a)\tthe court must order that the person be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for such period, being not less than 2 years, as the court thinks fit;\n\t(b)\tthe disqualification prescribed by paragraph (a) may not be reduced or mitigated in any way or be substituted by any other penalty or sentence;\n\t(c)\tthe disqualification operates to cancel any driver's licence held by the convicted person as at the commencement of the period of disqualification.\n\t(3)\tIf a person is tried on a charge of an offence against section 29—\n\t(a)\tthe person may not be convicted of both the offence against section 29 and an offence against subsection (1) if the charge under subsection (1) arises out of the same set of circumstances that gave rise to the charge under section 29; and\n\t(b)\tan offence against subsection (1) is not available as an alternative verdict to the charge under section 29 unless the offence against subsection (1) was specified in the instrument of charge as an alternative offence.\n19AD—Street racing\n\t(1)\tA person who participates in a street race, or in preparations for a proposed street race, is guilty of an offence.\n\t(a)\tfor a first offence that is a basic offence—imprisonment for 3 years and disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for 1 year or such longer period as the court orders;\n\t(b)\tfor a first offence that is an aggravated offence or for any subsequent offence—imprisonment for 5 years and disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for 3 years or such longer period as the court orders.\n\t(2)\tFor the purposes of this section, a person participates in a street race, or in preparations for a proposed street race, if the person—\n\t(a)\tdrives a motor vehicle in the street race; or\n\t(b)\tpromotes, or assists in the promotion of, the street race or proposed street race in any way; or\n\t(c)\tengages in any other conduct that assists, or is intended to assist, in the street race or proposed street race taking place.\n\t(3)\tHowever, subsection (1) does not apply to a street race that occurs in a place with the consent of the owner or occupier of the place or the person who has the care, control and management of the place.\n\t(4)\tWhere a person is, on conviction of an offence against this section, disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence—\n\t(a)\tthe disqualification operates to cancel any driver's licence held by the convicted person as at the commencement of the period of disqualification; and\n\t(5)\tFor the avoidance of doubt, a person may be found guilty of an offence against this section relating to a proposed street race whether or not the street race in fact took place.\n\t(6)\tIn determining whether an offence is a first or subsequent offence for the purposes of this section—\n\t(a)\ta previous offence against section 45A, 46, 47 or 47B (other than a category 1 offence against that section) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 for which the defendant has been convicted and that was committed within the period of 5 years immediately preceding the commission of the offence under consideration will be taken into account; and\n\t(b)\ta previous offence (whenever occurring) against this section or another provision of this Division, or a corresponding previous enactment, for which the defendant has been convicted will be taken into account.\npromote, in relation to a street race or proposed street race, includes—\n\t(a)\torganise or conduct the street race; or\n\t(b)\toffer an inducement to another person to participate in the street race;\nroad and road‑related area have the same meaning as in the Road Traffic Act 1961;\nstreet race means any or all of the following when conducted on a road or a road‑related area:\n\t(a)\ta race between 2 or more motor vehicles (whether the race is a drag race or otherwise, and whether the race is over a predetermined or indeterminate course);\n\t(b)\ta trial to determine how quickly a motor vehicle can cover the distance between 2 points;\n\t(c)\ta competition between, or display involving, 2 or more motor vehicles consisting of or including the production of sustained wheel spin;\n\t(d)\ta trial of a motor vehicle's speed or performance, or of a driver's skill,\nbut does not include conduct declared by the regulations not to be included within the ambit of this definition.\n\t(8)\tA regulation made for the purposes of the definition of street race may confer a discretionary power on the Attorney‑General, the Commissioner of Police or any other specified person or body.\n19ADA—Extreme speed\n\t(1)\tA person who drives a motor vehicle at an extreme speed is guilty of an offence.\n\t(2)\tFor the purposes of subsection (1), a person drives a motor vehicle at an extreme speed if—\n\t(a)\tthe relevant speed limit is 60 kilometres an hour or less and the person drives the vehicle at a speed exceeding the relevant speed limit by 55 kilometres an hour or more; or\n\t(b)\tthe relevant speed limit is more than 60 kilometres an hour and the person drives the vehicle at a speed exceeding the relevant speed limit by 80 kilometres an hour or more.\n\t(3)\tSubsection (1) does not apply to the driver of an emergency vehicle if—\n\t(a)\tin the circumstances—\n\t(i)\tthe driver is taking reasonable care; and\n\t(ii)\tit is reasonable that the provision should not apply; and\n\t(b)\tif the vehicle is a motor vehicle that is moving—the vehicle is displaying a blue or red flashing light or sounding an alarm.\n\t(4)\tSubsection (3)(b) does not apply to a vehicle used by a police officer if, in the circumstances, it is reasonable—\n\t(a)\tnot to display the light or sound the alarm; or\n\t(b)\tfor the vehicle not to be fitted or equipped with a blue or red flashing light or an alarm.\n\t(5)\tIf a court convicts a person of an offence against subsection (1), the following provisions apply:\n\t(a)\tthe court must order that the person is disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for the following period:\n\t(i)\tfor a first offence—\n\t(A)\tif the offence is a basic offence—such period, being not less than 2 years, as the court thinks fit; or\n\t(B)\tif the offence is an aggravated offence—such period, being not less than 5 years, as the court thinks fit;\n\t(ii)\tfor a subsequent offence—such period, being not less than 5 years, as the court thinks fit;\n\t(b)\tthe disqualification prescribed by paragraph (a) cannot be reduced or mitigated in any way or be substituted by any other penalty or sentence;\n\t(c)\tif the person is the holder of a driver's licence—the disqualification operates to cancel the licence as from the commencement of the period of disqualification.\n\t(6)\tIf a person is tried on a charge of an offence against section 29—\n\t(a)\tthe person may not be convicted of both the offence against section 29 and an offence against subsection (1) if the charge under subsection (1) arises out of the same set of circumstances that gave rise to the charge under section 29; and\n\t(b)\tan offence against subsection (1) is not available as an alternative verdict to the charge under section 29 unless the offence against subsection (1) was specified in the instrument of charge as an alternative offence.\n\t(7)\tIn determining whether an offence is a first or subsequent offence for the purposes of this section—\n\t(a)\ta previous offence against section 45A or 46 of the Road Traffic Act 1961 for which the defendant has been convicted and that was committed within the period of 5 years immediately preceding the commission of the offence under consideration will be taken into account; and\n\t(b)\ta previous offence (whenever occurring) against this section or another provision of this Division, or a corresponding previous enactment, for which the defendant has been convicted will be taken into account.\n\t(8)\tThis section is in addition to, and does not derogate from, any other provision relating to speed limits contained in the Road Traffic Act 1961 or the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 or any other Act or in any regulation, rule or by‑law made under the Road Traffic Act 1961 or the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 or any other Act.\n\t(9)\tSections 22, 53B(5), 79B(10) and 175 of the Road Traffic Act 1961 apply in relation to an offence against subsection (1) as if a reference in any of those sections to an offence against that Act was a reference to an offence against subsection (1).\n\t(10)\tIn this section—\nemergency vehicle means a motor vehicle used by a police officer or a person who is an emergency worker as defined by the regulations for the purposes of this section;\nrelevant speed limit, for a person who drives a motor vehicle, means a speed limit that applies to the driver under—\n\t(a)\tthe Road Traffic Act 1961 (other than section 82 or 83); or\n\t(b)\tthe Motor Vehicles Act 1959.\n19AE—Commissioner of Police to impose immediate licence disqualification or suspension following certain charges\n\t(1)\tIf a person is, after the commencement of this section, charged with an offence against section 19A, section 19AB or section 19ABA (in any case being an offence where a motor vehicle was used in the commission of the offence and where the offence caused the death of, or serious harm to, a person), the Commissioner of Police must, as soon as is reasonably practicable after the person is so charged and in accordance with any requirements set out in the regulations, give the person a notice of immediate licence disqualification or suspension.\n\t(1a)\tA notice of immediate licence disqualification or suspension under this section must—\n\t(a)\tcontain the prescribed particulars; and\n\t(b)\tcomply with any requirements specified by the regulations.\n\t(2)\tIf a person is given a notice of immediate licence disqualification or suspension under this section—\n\t(a)\tin the case of a person who does not hold a driver's licence—the person is disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for the prescribed period; or\n\t(b)\tin the case of a person who holds a driver's licence—the person's driver's licence is suspended for the prescribed period.\n\t(3)\tThe Commissioner of Police must ensure that the prescribed particulars of a notice of immediate licence disqualification or suspension given to a person under this section are forwarded to the Registrar of Motor Vehicles.\n\t(4)\tThe Registrar of Motor Vehicles must, on receiving particulars of a notice of immediate licence disqualification or suspension from the Commissioner of Police, send, by post, a notice to the person of the name and address specified by the Commissioner containing the prescribed particulars of the notice of immediate licence disqualification or suspension.\n\t(5)\tThe operation of a notice of immediate licence disqualification or suspension is not affected by any failure to comply with subsection (4).\n\t(6)\tA court may, on the application of a person to whom a notice of immediate licence disqualification or suspension is given under this section, if the court is satisfied on the basis of evidence given on oath by or on behalf of the person that—\n\t(a)\texceptional circumstances exist in relation to the person or the alleged offence such that it is, in all the circumstances, appropriate that an order be made under this subsection; and\n\t(b)\tthe person does not pose a substantial risk to other members of the public if an order is made under this subsection,\norder that the disqualification of the person from holding or obtaining a driver's licence be removed, or the suspension of the person's driver's licence end, (as the case requires) on the date specified in the order.\n\t(7)\tThe Crown is entitled to be heard on an application under subsection (6).\n\t(8)\tWithout limiting the evidence that may be adduced by the Crown on the question of whether a person poses a substantial risk to members of the public, the Crown may, in relation to an application under subsection (6)—\n\t(a)\tevidence of previous offences relating to the applicant's use of a motor vehicle for which the applicant has been found guilty or that the applicant has expiated; or\n\t(b)\tadduce evidence of the alleged offence to which the notice of immediate licence disqualification or suspension under this section relates.\n\t(9)\tA court must, as soon as is reasonably practicable after an order is made under subsection (6) and in a manner and form determined by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles, notify the Registrar of Motor Vehicles of the terms of the order.\n\t(10)\tIf—\n\t(a)\ta period of licence disqualification or suspension has applied to a person as a result of the person having been given a notice of immediate licence disqualification or suspension under this section; and\n\t(b)\ta court convicts the person of the offence to which the notice relates or another offence arising out of the same course of conduct; and\n\t(c)\ta mandatory minimum period of disqualification would (apart from this subsection) be required to be imposed for the offence,\nthen—\n\t(d)\tthe court must order that the person be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for a period determined by the court (and if the person is the holder of a driver's licence, the disqualification operates to cancel the licence from the commencement of that period); and\n\t(e)\tdespite any other provision of this or any other Act, the court must, in determining the period, take into account the period of licence disqualification or suspension that has applied to the person as a result of the notice and may for that purpose order that the period imposed be taken to have commenced on the day on which the licence disqualification or suspension commenced (provided that the period imposed is not less than the mandatory minimum period of disqualification), and if the person is the holder of a driver's licence, the licence will be taken to have been cancelled from the day on which the order of the court is made.\n\t(10a)\tIf the Commissioner of Police is satisfied that a notice of licence disqualification or suspension under this section should not have been given because—\n\t(a)\tthe notice has been given to a particular person in error; or\n\t(b)\tthe notice is defective; or\n\t(c)\tthere is other proper cause for which the notice should not have been given,\nthe Commissioner may withdraw the notice.\n\t(10b)\tA withdrawal referred to in subsection (10a) is effected by giving notice of the withdrawal, in a manner and form determined by the Commissioner of Police, to the person to whom the notice of licence disqualification or suspension was given.\n\t(10c)\tThe notice of withdrawal must specify the reason for withdrawal.\n\t(10d)\tIf a notice of licence disqualification or suspension under this section is withdrawn, the Commissioner of Police may, if satisfied that there are proper grounds to give a fresh notice of licence disqualification or suspension to any person, give such a notice.\n\t(11)\tNo compensation is payable by the Crown or the Commissioner of Police in respect of the exercise, or purported exercise, of powers under this section (however, nothing in this subsection protects the Commissioner of Police from liability in respect of the exercise, or purported exercise, of powers otherwise than in good faith).\n\t(12)\tThis section is in addition to, and does not derogate from, the Road Traffic Act 1961 or any other Act or law.\n\t(13)\tFor the purposes of this section, a reference to the charging of a person with an offence against section 19A, section 19AB or section 19ABA will be taken to include a reference to the laying of an information charging a person with such an offence (and the person will be taken to have been charged at the time the information is laid in court in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Act 1921).\n\t(14)\tIn this section—\nprescribed period means the period—\n\t(a)\tcommencing at the time that the person is given a notice of immediate licence disqualification or suspension under this section; and\n\t(b)\tfinishing—\n\t(i)\tif a court makes an order under subsection (6)—on the date specified in that order; or\n\t(ii)\tif the person is found guilty of the offence to which the disqualification or suspension relates—at the time that the person is sentenced in relation to the offence; or\n\t(iii)\tif the person is acquitted of the offence, or the charge of the offence is withdrawn—at the time that person is so acquitted or the charge withdrawn (as the case requires).\n19AF—Power of police to impose immediate licence disqualification or suspension for certain offences\n\t(1)\tIf a police officer reasonably believes that a person has, after the commencement of this section, committed—\n\t(a)\tan offence against section 19A (being an offence where a motor vehicle was used in the commission of the offence); or\n\t(ab)\tan offence against section 19AB (being an offence where a motor vehicle was used in the commission of the offence); or\n\t(ac)\tan offence against section 19ABA (being an offence where a motor vehicle was used in the commission of the offence); or\n\t(b)\tan offence against section 19ADA(1),\nthe police officer may give the person a notice of immediate licence disqualification or suspension.\n\t(1a)\tA notice of immediate licence disqualification or suspension under this section must—\n\t(a)\tcontain the prescribed particulars; and\n\t(b)\tcomply with any requirements specified by the regulations.\n\t(2)\tIf a person is given a notice of immediate licence disqualification or suspension under this section—\n\t(a)\tin the case of a person who does not hold a driver's licence—the person is disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for the prescribed period; or\n\t(b)\tin the case of a person who holds a driver's licence—the person's driver's licence is suspended for the prescribed period.\n\t(3)\tThe Commissioner of Police must ensure that the prescribed particulars of a notice of immediate licence disqualification or suspension given to a person under this section are forwarded to the Registrar of Motor Vehicles.\n\t(4)\tThe Registrar of Motor Vehicles must, on receiving particulars of a notice of immediate licence disqualification or suspension from the Commissioner of Police, send, by post, a notice to the person of the name and address specified by the Commissioner containing the prescribed particulars of the notice of immediate licence disqualification or suspension.\n\t(5)\tThe operation of a notice of immediate licence disqualification or suspension is not affected by any failure to comply with subsection (4).\n\t(6)\tA court may, on the application of a person to whom a notice of immediate licence disqualification or suspension is given under this section, if the court is satisfied on the basis of evidence given on oath by or on behalf of the person that—\n\t(a)\texceptional circumstances exist in relation to the person or the alleged offence such that it is, in all the circumstances, appropriate that an order be made under this subsection; and\n\t(b)\tthe person does not pose a substantial risk to other members of the public if an order is made under this subsection,\norder that the disqualification of the person from holding or obtaining a driver's licence be removed, or the suspension of the person's driver's licence end, (as the case requires) on the date specified in the order.\n\t(7)\tThe Crown is entitled to be heard on an application under subsection (6).\n\t(8)\tWithout limiting the evidence that may be adduced by the Crown on the question of whether a person poses a substantial risk to members of the public, the Crown may, in relation to an application under subsection (6)—\n\t(a)\tadduce evidence of previous offences relating to the applicant's use of a motor vehicle for which the applicant has been found guilty or that the applicant has expiated; or\n\t(b)\tadduce evidence of the alleged offence to which the notice of immediate licence disqualification or suspension under this section relates.\n\t(9)\tThe court must ensure that the prescribed particulars of an order under subsection (6) are forwarded to the Registrar of Motor Vehicles.\n\t(10)\tIf a person is given a notice of immediate licence disqualification or suspension under this section and a determination is later made that the person should not be charged with an offence against section 19A, section 19AB, section 19ABA or section 19ADA(1), the Commissioner of Police must ensure that the person is given, or sent by post, written notice of that determination containing the information required by the regulations.\n\t(11)\tThe Commissioner of Police must ensure that the prescribed particulars of a determination referred to in subsection (10) are forwarded to the Registrar of Motor Vehicles.\n\t(12)\tThe laying of charges against a person is not prevented by a failure to comply with subsection (10) in relation to the person or by the making of a determination referred to in that subsection or the notification of such a determination.\n\t(13)\tIf—\n\t(a)\ta period of licence disqualification or suspension has applied to a person as a result of the person having been given a notice of immediate licence disqualification or suspension under this section; and\n\t(b)\ta court convicts the person of the offence to which the notice relates or another offence arising out of the same course of conduct; and\n\t(c)\ta mandatory minimum period of disqualification would (apart from this subsection) be required to be imposed for the offence,\nthen—\n\t(d)\tthe court must order that the person be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for a period determined by the court (and if the person is the holder of a driver's licence, the disqualification operates to cancel the licence from the commencement of that period); and\n\t(e)\tdespite any other provision of this or any other Act, the court must, in determining the period, take into account the period of licence disqualification or suspension that has applied to the person as a result of the notice and may for that purpose order that the period imposed be taken to have commenced on the day on which the licence disqualification or suspension commenced (provided that the period imposed is not less than the mandatory minimum period of disqualification), and if the person is the holder of a driver's licence, the licence will be taken to have been cancelled from the day on which the order of the court is made.\n\t(13a)\tIf the Commissioner of Police is satisfied that a notice of licence disqualification or suspension under this section should not have been given because—\n\t(a)\tthe notice has been given to a particular person in error; or\n\t(b)\tthe notice is defective; or\n\t(c)\tthere is other proper cause for which the notice should not have been given,\nthe Commissioner may authorise the withdrawal of the notice.\n\t(13b)\tA withdrawal referred to in subsection (13a) is effected by giving notice of the withdrawal, in a manner and form determined by the Commissioner of Police, to the person to whom the notice of licence disqualification or suspension was given.\n\t(13c)\tThe notice of withdrawal must specify the reason for withdrawal.\n\t(13d)\tIf a notice of licence disqualification or suspension under this section is withdrawn, the Commissioner of Police may, if satisfied that there are proper grounds to give a fresh notice of licence disqualification or suspension to any person, authorise the giving of such a notice (provided that in the case of a notice relating to an offence against section 19ADA(1), the relevant period for the fresh notice must, if it is given to the same person as was given the withdrawn notice, be reduced by the period for which the withdrawn notice was (or purported to be) in operation).\n\t(14)\tNo compensation is payable by the Crown or a police officer in respect of the exercise, or purported exercise, of powers under this section (however, nothing in this subsection protects a police officer from liability in respect of the exercise, or purported exercise, of powers otherwise than in good faith).\n\t(15)\tThis section is in addition to, and does not derogate from, the Road Traffic Act 1961 or any other Act or law.\n\t(16)\tFor the purposes of this section, a reference to the charging of a person with an offence will be taken to include a reference to the laying of an information charging a person with such an offence (and the person will be taken to have been charged at the time the information is laid in court in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Act 1921).\n\t(17)\tFor the purposes of this section, the prescribed period is a period that—\n\t(a)\tcommences at the time the person is given a notice of immediate licence disqualification or suspension under this section; and\n\t(b)\tends—\n\t(i)\tif the notice of immediate licence disqualification or suspension relates to an offence against section 19A, section 19AB or section 19ABA (in any case being an offence where a motor vehicle was used in the commission of the offence and where the offence caused the death of, or serious harm to, a person)—\n\t(A)\tif a court makes an order under subsection (6)—on the date specified in that order; or\n\t(B)\tif the person is charged with such an offence—at the time the person is issued a notice of immediate licence disqualification or suspension under section 19AE in relation to the charge; or\n\t(C)\tif a determination is made that the person should not be charged with such an offence—at the time the determination is made; or\n\t(ii)\tif the notice of immediate licence disqualification or suspension relates to any other offence against section 19A or section 19AB or an offence against section 19ADA(1)—\n\t(A)\tif a court makes an order under subsection (6)—on the date specified in that order; or\n\t(B)\tif a determination is made that the person should not be charged with an offence against section 19A, section 19AB or section 19ADA(1)—at the time the determination is made; or\n\t(C)\tif proceedings for the offence to which the notice relates are determined by a court or are withdrawn or otherwise discontinued; or\n\t(D)\tin any event—at the end of 12 months from the commencement of the prescribed period.\n19B—Alternative verdicts\n\t(1)\tIf at the trial of a person for murder or manslaughter the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged but is satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence constituted by section 19A(1) or (3) or section 19ABA(1) or (2), the jury may bring in a verdict that the accused is guilty of that offence.\n\t(2)\tThe following offences (which are listed in order of seriousness) are offences to which subsection (3) applies:\n\t(a)\tthe offence constituted by section 19A(1);\n\t(b)\tthe offence constituted by section 19A(3);\n\t(baa)\tthe offence constituted by section 19ABA(1);\n\t(bab)\tthe offence constituted by section 19ABA(2);\n\t(ba)\tthe offence constituted by section 19ADA(1);\n\t(c)\tthe offence constituted by section 46 of the Road Traffic Act 1961 or section 69A of the Harbors and Navigation Act 1993;\n\t(d)\tthe offence constituted by section 45 of the Road Traffic Act 1961 or section 69 of the Harbors and Navigation Act 1993.\n\t(3)\tIf at the trial of a person for an offence to which this subsection applies (being an offence mentioned in subsection (2)(a), (b), (baa), (bab) or (ba)) the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged but is satisfied that the accused is guilty of a less serious offence to which this subsection applies, the jury may bring in a verdict that the accused is guilty of that less serious offence.\n\t(4)\tIf at the trial of a person for an offence against section 19A(1) or (3) that is alleged to be an aggravated offence committed in the course of attempting to escape pursuit by a police officer, the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the aggravated offence charged but is satisfied that the accused is guilty of an offence against section 19AC(1), the jury may bring in a verdict that the accused is guilty of an offence against section 19AC(1).\n\t(4a)\tIf at the trial of a person for an offence against section 19A(1) or (3) that is alleged to be an aggravated offence committed whilst the person was driving a motor vehicle in a street race, the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the aggravated offence charged but is satisfied that the accused is guilty of an offence against section 19AD, the jury may bring in a verdict that the accused is guilty of an offence against section 19AD.\n\t(5)\tIf at the trial of a person for an offence against section 19AC(1), the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged but is satisfied that the accused is guilty of—\n\t(a)\tan offence against section 46 of the Road Traffic Act 1961; or\n\t(b)\tan offence against section 45 of the Road Traffic Act 1961,\nthe jury may bring in a verdict that the accused is guilty of the relevant offence against the Road Traffic Act 1961.\n","sortOrder":13},{"sectionNumber":"Div 7","sectionType":"division","heading":"Assault","content":"Division 7—Assault\n20—Assault\n\t(1)\tA person commits an assault if the person, without the consent of another person (the victim)—\n\t(a)\tintentionally applies force (directly or indirectly) to the victim; or\n\t(b)\tintentionally makes physical contact (directly or indirectly) with the victim, knowing that the victim might reasonably object to the contact in the circumstances (whether or not the victim was at the time aware of the contact); or\n\t(c)\tthreatens (by words or conduct) to apply force (directly or indirectly) to the victim and there are reasonable grounds for the victim to believe that—\n\t(i)\tthe person who makes the threat is in a position to carry out the threat and intends to do so; or\n\t(ii)\tthere is a real possibility that the person will carry out the threat; or\n\t(d)\tdoes an act of which the intended purpose is to apply force (directly or indirectly) to the victim; or\n\t(e)\taccosts or impedes another in a threatening manner.\n\t(2)\tHowever—\n\t(a)\tconduct that lies within limits of what would be generally accepted in the community as normal incidents of social interaction or community life cannot amount to an assault; and\n\t(b)\tconduct that is justified or excused by law cannot amount to an assault.\n\t(3)\tA person who commits an assault is guilty of an offence.\n\t(a)\tfor a basic offence—imprisonment for 2 years;\n\t(b)\tfor an aggravated offence (except one to which paragraph (c) or (d) applies)—imprisonment for 3 years;\n\t(c)\tfor an offence aggravated by the use of, or a threat to use, an offensive weapon—imprisonment for 4 years;\n\t(d)\tfor an offence aggravated by the circumstances referred to in section 5AA(1)(c), (ca) or (ka)—imprisonment for 5 years.\n\t(4)\tA person who commits an assault that causes harm to another is guilty of an offence.\n\t(b)\tfor an aggravated offence (except one to which paragraph (c) or (d) applies)—imprisonment for 4 years;\n\t(c)\tfor an offence aggravated by the use of, or a threat to use, an offensive weapon—imprisonment for 5 years;\n\t(d)\tfor an offence aggravated by the circumstances referred to in section 5AA(1)(c), (ca) or (ka)—imprisonment for 7 years.\nThis offence replaces section 40 (assault occasioning actual bodily harm) as in force prior to the commencement of this subsection and, consequently, see Coulter v The Queen (1988) 164 CLR 350. \n20AA—Causing harm to, or assaulting, certain emergency workers etc\n\t(1)\tA person who causes harm to a prescribed emergency worker acting in the course of official duties, intending to cause harm, is guilty of an offence.\n\t(2)\tA person who causes harm to a prescribed emergency worker acting in the course of official duties, and is reckless in doing so, is guilty of an offence.\n\t(3)\tA person who assaults a prescribed emergency worker acting in the course of official duties is guilty of an offence.\n\t(4)\tA person who hinders or resists a police officer acting in the course of official duties, and, in so doing, causes harm to the officer, is guilty of an offence.\n\t(5)\tIn proceedings for an offence against this section, it is a defence for the defendant to prove that the defendant did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know, that the victim was a prescribed emergency worker, or police officer, (as the case requires) acting in the course of official duties.\n\t(6)\tWithout limiting the ways in which a person can cause harm to a prescribed emergency worker, harm can be caused (but will not be taken to be caused) by causing human biological material to come into contact with a prescribed emergency worker.\n\t(7)\tFor the purposes of this section, a person causes human biological material to come into contact with a victim if the person performs any act (including, without limiting the generality of this subsection, by spitting or throwing human biological material at the victim, or deliberately applying human biological material to their person knowing that the victim is likely to come into physical contact with the person in the course of their duties) intended or likely to cause human biological material to come into contact with the victim.\n\t(8)\tThis section does not apply to conduct occurring before the commencement of this section.\n\t(9)\tIn this section—\nassault means an assault within the meaning of section 20(1) and includes, to avoid doubt, an act consisting of intentionally causing human biological material to come into contact with a victim, or threatening to do so;\nharm has the same meaning as in Division 7A;\nhuman biological material means—\n\t(a)\tblood, saliva, semen, faeces, urine or vomit; or\n\t(b)\tany other material prescribed by the regulations;\npharmacy has the same meaning as in Part 4 of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (South Australia) Act 2010;\npharmacy services has the same meaning as in Part 4 of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (South Australia) Act 2010;\nprescribed emergency worker means—\n\t(a)\ta police officer; or\n\t(b)\ta prison officer; or\n\t(c)\ta community corrections officer or community youth justice officer; or\n\t(d)\tan employee in a training centre (within the meaning of the Youth Justice Administration Act 2016); or\n\t(e)\ta person (whether a health practitioner, nurse, nurse practitioner, midwife, security officer or otherwise) performing duties in a hospital, or at any other place where medical treatment is provided or medical testing undertaken (however described, but including, without limiting this paragraph, a general practice, medical centre or other place at which people are vaccinated or screened for diseases); or\n\t(f)\ta person (whether a medical practitioner, nurse, pilot or otherwise) performing duties in the course of retrieval medicine; or\n\t(g)\ta medical practitioner or other health practitioner (both within the meaning of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (South Australia)) attending an out of hours or unscheduled callout, or assessing, stabilising or treating a person at the scene of an accident or other emergency, in a rural area; or\n\t(ga)\ta person (whether a pharmacist, pharmacy assistant or otherwise) performing duties in a pharmacy; or\n\t(gb)\ta person providing pharmacy services at a place other than a pharmacy, or a person assisting in the provision of such services; or\n\t(h)\ta member of the SA Ambulance Service Inc; or\n\t(i)\ta member of SAMFS, SACFS or SASES; or\n\t(j)\ta law enforcement officer; or\n\t(k)\tan inspector within the meaning of the Animal Welfare Act 1985; or\n\t(ka)\tan authorised person within the meaning of the Dog and Cat Management Act 1995, or a person assisting an authorised person in the exercise of powers under that Act; or\n\t(l)\tany other person engaged in an occupation or employment prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of section 5AA(1)(ka); or\n\t(m)\tany other person prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this paragraph,\nwhether acting in a paid or voluntary capacity, but does not include a person, or person of a class, declared by the regulations to be excluded from the ambit of this definition;\nrecklessly—a person is reckless in causing harm to another if the person—\n\t(a)\tis aware of a substantial risk that his or her conduct could result in harm or serious harm (as the case requires); and\n\t(b)\tengages in the conduct despite the risk and without adequate justification;\nretrieval medicine means the assessment, stabilisation and transportation to hospital of patients with severe injury or critical illness (other than by a member of SA Ambulance Service Inc);\nrural area means an area outside of Metropolitan Adelaide as defined by GRO Plan 639/93.\n20AB—Further offence involving use of human biological material\n\t(1)\tA person who commits a prohibited act involving human biological material against another person is guilty of an offence.\n\t(a)\tif harm is caused to the victim—imprisonment for 3 years;\n\t(b)\tin any other case—imprisonment for 2 years.\n\t(2)\tFor the purposes of subsection (1), a person commits a prohibited act involving human biological material against another person (the victim) if—\n\t(a)\tthe person intentionally causes human biological material to come into contact with the victim; or\n\t(b)\tthe person threatens (by words or conduct) to cause human biological material to come into contact with the victim.\n\t(3)\tFor the purposes of this section, a person causes human biological material to come into contact with a victim if the person performs any act (including, without limiting the generality of this subsection, by spitting or throwing human biological material at the victim) intended or likely to cause human biological material to come into contact with the victim.\nharm has the same meaning as in Division 7A;\nhuman biological material means—\n\t(a)\tblood, saliva, semen, faeces, urine or vomit; or\n\t(b)\tany other material prescribed by the regulations.\n20AC—Alternative verdicts\nIf—\n\t(a)\ta jury is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a charge of an offence against section 20AA or 20AB has been established; but\n\t(b)\tthe Judge has instructed the jury that it is open to the jury on the evidence to find the defendant guilty of a specified offence against this Act; and\n\t(c)\tthe jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the specified offence against this Act has been established,\nthe jury may return a verdict that the defendant is not guilty of the offence charged but is guilty of the specified offence against this Act.\nDivision 7AA—Choking etc in a domestic setting\n20A—Choking, suffocation or strangulation in a domestic setting\n\t(a1)\tA person who—\n\t(a)\tis, or has been, in a relationship with another person; and\n\t(b)\tchokes, suffocates or strangles that other person, without that other person's consent; and\n\t(c)\tcauses harm to that other person such that the other person is rendered unconscious,\n\t(a)\tis, or has been, in a relationship with another person; and\n\t(b)\tchokes, suffocates or strangles that other person, without that other person's consent,\nMaximum penalty: Imprisonment for 7 years.\n\t(2)\tHowever, conduct that is justified or excused by law cannot amount to an offence against this section.\n\t(3)\tTwo people will be taken to be in a relationship for the purposes of this section if—\n\t(a)\tthey are married to each other; or\n\t(b)\tthey are domestic partners; or\n\t(c)\tthey are in some other form of intimate personal relationship in which their lives are interrelated and the actions of 1 affects the other; or\n\t(d)\t1 is the child, stepchild or grandchild, or is under the guardianship, of the other (regardless of age); or\n\t(e)\t1 is a child, stepchild or grandchild, or is under the guardianship, of a person who is or was formerly in a relationship with the other under paragraph (a), (b) or (c) (regardless of age); or\n\t(f)\t1 is a child and the other is a person who acts in loco parentis in relation to the child; or\n\t(g)\t1 is a child who normally or regularly resides or stays with the other; or\n\t(h)\tthey are brothers or sisters or brother and sister; or\n\t(i)\tthey are otherwise related to each other by or through blood, marriage, a domestic partnership or adoption; or\n\t(j)\tthey are related according to Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander kinship rules or are both members of some other culturally recognised family group; or\n\t(k)\t1 is the carer (within the meaning of the Carers Recognition Act 2005) of the other.\n\t(4)\tA reference in this section to—\n\t(a)\tchoking or strangling a person means the applying of pressure to the person's neck to an extent that is capable of affecting the breath or the flow of blood to the head of the person; and\n\t(b)\tsuffocating a person includes a reference to—\n\t(i)\tobstructing, to any extent, any part of the person's respiratory system; or\n\t(ii)\tinterfering, to any extent, with the operation of the person's respiratory system; or\n\t(iii)\timpeding, to any extent, the person's respiration.\n\t(a)\ta jury is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a charge of an offence against subsection (a1) has been established; but\n\t(b)\tthe court in which the defendant is being tried for an offence against subsection (a1) has instructed the jury that it is open to the jury on the evidence to find the defendant guilty of an offence against subsection (1); and\n\t(c)\tthe jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that an offence against subsection (1) has been established,\nthe jury may return a verdict that the defendant is not guilty of the offence charged but is guilty of an offence against subsection (1).\n\t(6)\tIf—\n\t(a)\ta jury is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a charge of an offence against subsection (a1) or (1) has been established; but\n\t(b)\tthe court in which the defendant is being tried for an offence against subsection (a1) or (1) has instructed the jury that it is open to the jury on the evidence to find the defendant guilty of an offence of assault; and\n\t(c)\tthe jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offence of assault has been established,\nthe jury may return a verdict that the defendant is not guilty of the offence charged but is guilty of assault.\n","sortOrder":14},{"sectionNumber":"Div 7A","sectionType":"division","heading":"Causing physical or mental harm","content":"Division 7A—Causing physical or mental harm\n21—Interpretation\ncause—a person causes harm if the person's conduct is the sole cause of the harm or substantially contributes to the harm;\nIf a victim suffers serious harm as a result of multiple acts of harm and those acts occur in the course of the same incident, or together constitute a single course of conduct, a person who commits any of the acts causing harm is taken to cause serious harm even though the harm caused by the act might not, if considered in isolation, amount to serious harm.\nharm means physical or mental harm (whether temporary or permanent);\nlesser offence, in relation to an offence against this Division, means—\n\t(a)\tin relation to an aggravated offence—the basic offence or another offence against this Division, Division 7AB or section 32A, for which a lesser maximum penalty is prescribed;\n\t(b)\tin any other case—another offence against this Division, Division 7AB or section 32A for which a lesser maximum penalty is prescribed;\nmental harm means psychological harm and does not include emotional reactions such as distress, grief, fear or anger unless they result in psychological harm;\nphysical harm includes—\n\t(a)\tunconsciousness;\n\t(b)\tpain;\n\t(c)\tdisfigurement;\n\t(d)\tinfection with a disease;\nrecklessly—a person is reckless in causing harm or serious harm to another if the person—\n\t(a)\tis aware of a substantial risk that his or her conduct could result in harm or serious harm (as the case requires); and\n\t(b)\tengages in the conduct despite the risk and without adequate justification;\nserious harm means—\n\t(a)\tharm that endangers a person's life; or\n\t(b)\tharm that consists of, or results in, serious and protracted impairment of a physical or mental function; or\n\t(c)\tharm that consists of, or results in, serious disfigurement.\n22—Conduct falling outside the ambit of this Division \n\t(1)\tThis Division does not apply to the conduct of a person who causes harm to another if the victim lawfully consented to the act causing the harm.\n\t(2)\tA lawful consent given on behalf of a person who is not of full age and capacity by a parent or guardian will be taken to be the consent of the person for whom the consent was given.\n\t(3)\tA person may consent to harm (including serious harm) if the nature of the harm and the purpose for which it is inflicted fall within limits that are generally accepted in the community.\n1\tA person may (within the limits referred to above) consent to harm that has a religious purpose (eg male circumcision but not female genital mutilation).\n2\tA person may (within the limits referred to above) consent to harm that has a genuine therapeutic purpose (eg a person with 2 healthy kidneys may consent to donate 1 for the purpose of transplantation to someone with kidney disease).\n3\tA person may (within the limits referred to above) consent to harm for the purpose of controlling fertility (eg a vasectomy or tubal ligation). \n4\tA participant in a sporting or recreational activity may (within the limits referred to above) consent to harm arising from a risk inherent in the nature of the activity (eg a boxer may accept the risk of being knocked unconscious in the course of a boxing match and, hence, consent to that harm if it in fact ensues).\n\t(4)\tIf a defendant's conduct lies within the limits of what would be generally accepted in the community as normal incidents of social interaction or community life, this Division does not apply to the conduct unless it is established that the defendant intended to cause harm.\n\t(5)\tIf the defendant's conduct caused only mental harm, this Division does not apply to the defendant's conduct unless—\n\t(a)\tthe defendant's conduct gave rise to a situation in which the victim's life or physical safety was endangered and the mental harm arose out of that situation; or\n\t(b)\tthe defendant's primary purpose was to cause such harm.\n1\tAn examiner fails a student in an examination knowing that the student has been diagnosed with schizophrenia and that failure to pass is likely to precipitate a schizophrenic episode. The student in fact suffers such an episode.\n2\tAn employer legally terminates an employee's employment knowing that the employee suffers from a mental illness and that the termination is likely to exacerbate the mental illness. The employee in fact suffers an exacerbation of the mental illness.\nIn both the above examples, it is not sufficient for the prosecution to prove that the defendant acted intentionally knowing that harm would inevitably, probably or possibly result from his or her act. It would be necessary for the prosecution to establish that the defendant wanted to cause harm and that desire was the sole or a significant motivation for the defendant's conduct.\n23—Causing serious harm\n\t(1)\tA person who causes serious harm to another, intending to cause serious harm, is guilty of an offence.\n\t(a)\tfor a basic offence—imprisonment for 20 years;\n\t(b)\tfor an aggravated offence—imprisonment for 25 years.\n\t(2)\tIf, however, the victim in a particular case suffers such serious harm that a penalty exceeding the maximum prescribed in subsection (1) is warranted, the court may, on application by the Director of Public Prosecutions, impose a penalty exceeding the prescribed maximum.\n\t(3)\tA person who causes serious harm to another, and is reckless in doing so, is guilty of an offence.\n24—Causing harm\n\t(1)\tA person who causes harm to another, intending to cause harm, is guilty of an offence.\n\t(b)\tfor an aggravated offence—imprisonment for 13 years.\n\t(2)\tA person who causes harm to another, and is reckless in doing so, is guilty of an offence.\n\t(c)\tfor an offence aggravated by the circumstances referred to in section 5AA(1)(c), (ca) or (ka)—imprisonment for 8 years.\n25—Alternative verdicts\nIf —\n\t(a)\ta jury is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a charge of an offence against this Division has been established; but\n\t(b)\tthe Judge has instructed the jury that it is open to the jury on the evidence to find the defendant guilty of a specified lesser offence or any 1 of a number of specified lesser offences; and\n\t(c)\tthe jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the specified lesser offence, or a particular 1 of the specified lesser offences, has been established,\nthe jury may return a verdict that the defendant is not guilty of the offence charged but is guilty of the lesser offence.\n29—Acts endangering life or creating risk of serious harm\n\t(1)\tWhere a person, without lawful excuse, does an act or makes an omission—\n\t(a)\tknowing that the act or omission is likely to endanger the life of another; and\n\t(b)\tintending to endanger the life of another or being recklessly indifferent as to whether the life of another is endangered,\n\t(b)\tfor an aggravated offence—imprisonment for 18 years.\n\t(2)\tWhere a person, without lawful excuse, does an act or makes an omission—\n\t(a)\tknowing that the act or omission is likely to cause serious harm to another; and\n\t(b)\tintending to cause such harm or being recklessly indifferent as to whether such harm is caused,\n\t(b)\tfor an aggravated offence—imprisonment for 12 years.\n\t(3)\tWhere a person, without lawful excuse, does an act or makes an omission—\n\t(a)\tknowing that the act or omission is likely to cause harm to another; and\n\t(b)\tintending to cause such harm or being recklessly indifferent as to whether such harm is caused,\n\t(c)\tfor an offence aggravated by the circumstances referred to in section 5AA(1)(c), (ca) or (ka)—imprisonment for 8 years.\n\t(4)\tIf a court convicting a person of an offence against this section is satisfied that the act or omission constituting the offence was done or made by the convicted person in the course of the convicted person's use of a motor vehicle, the court must order that the person be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for 5 years or such longer period as the court orders.\n\t(5)\tWhere a convicted person is disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence—\n\t(a)\tthe disqualification operates to cancel any driver's licence held by the convicted person as at the commencement of the period of disqualification; and\n29A—Shooting at police officers\n\t(a)\tdischarges a firearm—\n\t(i)\tintending to hit a police officer with shot, or a bullet or other projectile, fired from the firearm; or\n\t(ii)\tbeing reckless as to whether a police officer is hit with shot, or a bullet or other projectile, fired from the firearm; and\n\t(b)\tby that conduct, causes serious harm to the police officer,\nMaximum penalty: Imprisonment for 25 years.\n\t(2)\tIf, however, the victim in a particular case suffers such serious harm that a penalty exceeding the maximum prescribed in subsection (1) is warranted, the court may, on application by the Director of Public Prosecutions, impose a penalty exceeding the prescribed maximum.\n\t(3)\tIn proceedings for an offence against subsection (1), it is not necessary for the prosecution to establish that the defendant intended to cause serious harm to a police officer.\n\t(4)\tA person who discharges a firearm—\n\t(a)\tintending to hit a police officer with shot, or a bullet or other projectile, fired from the firearm; or\n\t(b)\tbeing reckless as to whether a police officer is hit with shot, or a bullet or other projectile, fired from the firearm,\n\t(a)\ta jury is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a charge of an offence against this section has been established; but\n\t(b)\tthe Judge has instructed the jury that it is open to the jury on the evidence to find the defendant guilty of a specified lesser offence or any 1 of a number of specified lesser offences; and\n\t(c)\tthe jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the specified lesser offence, or a particular 1 of the specified lesser offences, has been established,\nthe jury may return a verdict that the defendant is not guilty of the offence charged but is guilty of the lesser offence.\nreckless—a person is reckless as to whether a police officer is hit with shot, or a bullet or other projectile, fired from a firearm discharged by the person if the person—\n\t(a)\tis aware of a substantial risk that a police officer could be hit with shot, or a bullet or other projectile, fired from the firearm; and\n\t(b)\tdischarges the firearm despite the risk and without adequate justification.\n31—Possession of object with intent to kill or cause harm\n\t(1)\tA person who, without lawful excuse, has the custody or control of an object that the person intends to use, or to cause or permit another to use—\n\t(a)\tto kill, or to endanger the life of, another; or\n\t(b)\tto cause serious harm to another,\nshall be guilty of an indictable offence and liable to be imprisoned for a term not exceeding 20 years.\n\t(2)\tA person who, without lawful excuse, has the custody or control of an object that the person intends to use, or to cause or permit another to use, to cause harm to another, shall be guilty of an indictable offence and liable to be imprisoned for a term not exceeding 10 years.\nDivision 7AB—Special firearm offences\n32—Possession of a firearm with intent to commit an offence\nA person who has the custody or control of a firearm or imitation firearm for the purpose of—\n\t(a)\tusing, or causing or permitting another person to use, the firearm in the course of committing an offence punishable by a term of imprisonment of 2 years or more; or\n\t(b)\tcarrying, or causing or permitting another person to carry, the firearm when committing an offence punishable by a term of imprisonment of 2 years or more,\n32AA—Discharge of firearms to injure etc\n\t(1)\tA person who, without lawful excuse, discharges a firearm intending to injure, annoy or frighten any person is guilty of an offence.\nMaximum penalty: Imprisonment for 8 years.\n\t(2)\tA person who, without lawful excuse, discharges a firearm intending to damage any property is guilty of an offence.\n\t(3)\tA person who, without lawful excuse, discharges a firearm and who is reckless as to whether that act injures, annoys or frightens, or may injure, annoy or frighten, any person is guilty of an offence.\n\t(4)\tA person who, without lawful excuse, discharges a firearm and who is reckless as to whether that act damages, or may damage, any property is guilty of an offence.\n\t(5)\tIn proceedings for an offence against this section, it is not necessary for the prosecution to establish that a person was, in fact, injured, annoyed or frightened or that property was, in fact, damaged (as the case requires) by the defendant's act.\nreckless—a person is reckless as to whether an act injures, annoys or frightens, or may injure, annoy or frighten any person, or damages, or may damage, any property, if the person—\n\t(a)\tis aware of a substantial risk that the act could injure, annoy or frighten any person or damage any property; and\n\t(b)\tdoes the act despite the risk and without adequate justification.\n","sortOrder":15},{"sectionNumber":"Div 7B","sectionType":"division","heading":"Throwing objects at vehicles","content":"Division 7B—Throwing objects at vehicles\n32A—Throwing objects at vehicles\n\t(1)\tA person must not throw a prescribed object at, or drop a prescribed object on, a vehicle that is being driven on a road or road-related area or being run on a busway, railway or tramway (whether, at the time the object is thrown or dropped, the vehicle is moving or stationary).\nprescribed object means an object of a class prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this section;\nroad and road-related area have the same meanings as in the Road Traffic Act 1961;\nvehicle means—\n\t(a)\ta vehicle that is propelled by a motor; or\n\t(b)\ta vehicle that is run on a busway, railway or tramway; or\n\t(c)\ta bicycle, tricycle or other similar vehicle for which the rider provides the motive force; or\n\t(d)\ta vehicle that is drawn by an animal; or\n\t(e)\tan animal that is being ridden by a person.\n32B—Alternative verdicts\nIf at the trial of a person for murder or manslaughter the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged but is satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence constituted by section 32A, the jury may bring in a verdict that the accused is guilty of that offence.\n","sortOrder":16},{"sectionNumber":"Div 7C","sectionType":"division","heading":"Food and beverage spiking","content":"Division 7C—Food and beverage spiking\n32C—Spiking of food or beverages\n\t(1)\tA person is guilty of an offence if the person adds a substance, or causes a substance to be added, to any food or beverage intending to cause, or being recklessly indifferent as to causing, impairment of the consciousness or bodily function of another who will or might consume the food or beverage without knowledge of the presence of the substance (whether at all or in the quantity added).\n\t(2)\tA person is guilty of an offence if, between the hours of 9 pm on any day and 5 am on the following day, the person enters or remains in licensed premises while in possession of a prescription drug or controlled drug that—\n\t(a)\tis such as to be capable of producing a state of intoxication in a person who consumes the drug; and\n\t(b)\tis not contained in packaging on which is affixed a prescribed label indicating that the drug was lawfully prescribed for or supplied to the person.\nMaximum penalty: Imprisonment for 30 months.\n\t(3)\tIt is a defence to a charge of an offence against subsection (2) to prove that the prescription drug or controlled drug was lawfully prescribed for or supplied to the person or that the person had some other lawful reason for being in possession of the prescription drug or controlled drug.\ncontrolled drug has the same meaning as in the Controlled Substances Act 1984;\nfood or beverage includes any solid or liquid substance prepared or intended for human consumption;\nlicensed premises means—\n\t(a)\tlicensed premises within the meaning of the Liquor Licensing Act 1997, other than premises in respect of which only a restaurant and catering licence or residential licence is in force; and\n\t(b)\tthe premises defined in the casino licence, within the meaning of the Casino Act 1997, as the premises to which the licence relates; \nprescribed label means a label required by law to be affixed to a prescription drug or controlled drug and specifying—\n\t(a)\tthe name (or business name) of the person by whom the drug is sold or supplied; and\n\t(b)\tthe name of the person for whose use the drug is sold or supplied; and\n\t(c)\tthe trade name or the approved name of the drug or, if it does not have either a trade or approved name, its ingredients;\nprescription drug has the same meaning as in the Controlled Substances Act 1984.\n","sortOrder":17},{"sectionNumber":"Div 8","sectionType":"division","heading":"Female genital mutilation","content":"Division 8—Female genital mutilation\n33—Definitions\nchild means a person under 18;\nfemale genital mutilation means—\n\t(a)\tclitoridectomy; or\n\t(b)\texcision of any other part of the female genital organs; or\n\t(c)\ta procedure to narrow or close the vaginal opening; or\n\t(d)\tany other mutilation of the female genital organs,\nbut does not include a sexual reassignment procedure or a medical procedure that has a genuine therapeutic purpose;\nsexual reassignment procedure means a surgical procedure to give a female, or a person whose sex is ambivalent, genital characteristics, or ostensible genital characteristics, of a male.\n\t(2)\tA medical procedure has a genuine therapeutic purpose only if directed at curing or alleviating a physiological disability or physical abnormality.\n33A—Prohibition of female genital mutilation\n\t(1)\tA person who performs female genital mutilation is guilty of an offence.\n\t(2)\tThis section applies irrespective of whether the victim, or a parent or guardian of the victim, consents to the mutilation.\n33B—Removal of child from State for genital mutilation\n\t(1)\tA person must not take a child from the State, or arrange for a child to be taken from the State, with the intention of having the child subjected to female genital mutilation.\n\t(a)\tthe defendant took a child, or arranged for a child to be taken from the State; and\n\t(b)\tthe child was subjected, while outside the State, to female genital mutilation,\nit will be presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the defendant took the child, or arranged for the child to be taken, from the State (as the case may be) with the intention of having the child subjected to female genital mutilation.\n","sortOrder":18},{"sectionNumber":"Div 8A","sectionType":"division","heading":"Child marriage","content":"Division 8A—Child marriage\n34—Interpretation and application of Division\nchild means a person under the age of 18 years.\n\t(2)\tNothing in this Division is intended to limit the operation of the Marriage Act 1961 of the Commonwealth.\n34A—Bringing child into State for marriage\n\t(1)\tA person must not bring a child into the State, or arrange for a child to be brought into the State, with the intention of causing the child to be married.\n\t(a)\tthe defendant brought a child, or arranged for a child to be brought, into the State; and\n\t(b)\tthe child, while in the State, went through the form or ceremony of marriage,\nit will be presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the defendant brought the child, or arranged for the child to be brought, into the State (as the case may be) with the intention of causing the child to be married.\n34B—Removing child from State for marriage\n\t(1)\tA person must not take a child from the State, or arrange for a child to be taken from the State, with the intention of causing the child to be married.\n\t(a)\tthe defendant took a child, or arranged for a child to be taken, from the State; and\n\t(b)\tthe child, while outside the State, went through the form or ceremony of marriage,\nit will be presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the defendant took the child, or arranged for the child to be taken, from the State (as the case may be) with the intention of causing the child to be married.\n34C—Consent no defence\nThis Division applies irrespective of whether the child concerned, or a parent or guardian of the child, consents to the marriage.\n","sortOrder":19},{"sectionNumber":"Div 9","sectionType":"division","heading":"Kidnapping and unlawful child removal","content":"Division 9—Kidnapping and unlawful child removal\n38—Interpretation\nchild means a person under the age of 18 years;\ndetain—detention is not limited to forcible restraint but extends to any means by which a person gets another to remain in a particular place or with a particular person or persons;\ntake—a person takes another if the person compels, entices or persuades the other to accompany him or her or a third person.\n39—Kidnapping\n\t(1)\tA person who takes or detains another person, without the other person's consent—\n\t(a)\twith the intention of holding the other person to ransom or as a hostage; or\n\t(b)\twith the intention of committing an indictable offence against the other person or a third person,\n\t(a)\tfor a basic offence—imprisonment for 20 years;\n\t(b)\tfor an aggravated offence—imprisonment for 25 years.\n\t(2)\tA consent to the taking or detention is to be ignored in the following cases:\n\t(a)\tif the person apparently giving the consent is a child or mentally incapable of understanding the significance of the consent;\n\t(b)\tif the consent was obtained by duress or deception.\n40—Unlawful removal of child from jurisdiction\n\t(1)\tA person who wrongfully takes or sends a child out of the jurisdiction is guilty of an offence.\n\t(2)\tFor the purposes of subsection (1), a person acts wrongfully if—\n\t(a)\tthe person acts in the knowledge that a person who has the lawful custody of the child (either alone or jointly with someone else) does not consent to the child being taken or sent out of the jurisdiction; and\nAs a general rule, the parents of a child have joint custody of the child (see Guardianship of Infants Act 1940, section 4).\n\t(b)\tthere is no judicial or statutory authority for the person's act.\n","sortOrder":20},{"sectionNumber":"Div 11","sectionType":"division","heading":"Rape and other sexual offences","content":"Division 11—Rape and other sexual offences\n46—Consent to sexual activity\n\t(1)\tIn this section—\nsexual activity includes sexual intercourse.\n\t(2)\tFor the purposes of this Division, a person consents to sexual activity if the person freely and voluntarily agrees to the sexual activity.\n\t(3)\tWithout limiting subsection (2), a person is taken not to freely and voluntarily agree to sexual activity if—\n\t(a)\tthe person agrees because of—\n\t(i)\tthe application of force or an express or implied threat of the application of force or a fear of the application of force to the person or to some other person; or\n\t(ii)\tan express or implied threat to degrade, humiliate, disgrace or harass the person or some other person; or\n\t(b)\tthe person is unlawfully detained at the time of the activity; or\n\t(c)\tthe activity occurs while the person is asleep or unconscious; or\n\t(d)\tthe activity occurs while the person is intoxicated (whether by alcohol or any other substance or combination of substances) to the point of being incapable of freely and voluntarily agreeing to the activity; or\n\t(e)\tthe activity occurs while the person is affected by a physical, mental or intellectual condition or impairment such that the person is incapable of freely and voluntarily agreeing; or\n\t(f)\tthe person is unable to understand the nature of the activity; or\n\t(g)\tthe person agrees to engage in the activity with a person under a mistaken belief as to the identity of that person; or\n\t(ga)\tthe person agrees to engage in the activity because of a misrepresentation (whether express or implied) as to the use of a condom during the activity; or\n\t(h)\tthe person is mistaken about the nature of the activity.\nA person is taken not to freely and voluntarily agree to sexual activity if the person agrees to engage in the activity under the mistaken belief that the activity is necessary for the purpose of medical diagnosis, investigation or treatment, or for the purpose of hygiene.\n47—Reckless indifference\nFor the purposes of this Division, a person is recklessly indifferent to the fact that another person does not consent to an act, or has withdrawn consent to an act, if he or she—\n\t(a)\tis aware of the possibility that the other person might not be consenting to the act, or has withdrawn consent to the act, but decides to proceed regardless of that possibility; or\n\t(b)\tis aware of the possibility that the other person might not be consenting to the act, or has withdrawn consent to the act, but fails to take reasonable steps to ascertain whether the other person does in fact consent, or has in fact withdrawn consent, to the act before deciding to proceed; or\n\t(c)\tdoes not give any thought as to whether or not the other person is consenting to the act, or has withdrawn consent to the act before deciding to proceed.\n48—Rape\n\t(1)\tA person (the offender) is guilty of the offence of rape if he or she engages, or continues to engage, in sexual intercourse with another person who—\n\t(a)\tdoes not consent to engaging in the sexual intercourse; or\n\t(b)\thas withdrawn consent to the sexual intercourse,\nand the offender knows, or is recklessly indifferent to, the fact that the other person does not so consent or has so withdrawn consent (as the case may be).\n\t(2)\tA person (the offender) is guilty of the offence of rape if he or she compels a person to engage, or to continue to engage, in—\n\t(a)\tsexual intercourse with a person other than the offender; or\n\t(b)\tan act of sexual self‑penetration; or\n\t(c)\tan act of bestiality,\nwhen the person so compelled does not consent to engaging in the sexual intercourse or act, or has withdrawn consent to the sexual intercourse or act, and the offender knows, or is recklessly indifferent to, the fact that the person does not so consent or has so withdrawn consent (as the case may be).\ncompels—a person compels another person if he or she controls or influences the other person's conduct by means that effectively prevent the other person from exercising freedom of choice;\nsexual self‑penetration means the penetration by a person of the person's vagina, labia majora or anus by any part of the body of the person or by any object.\n48A—Compelled sexual manipulation\n\t(1)\tA person (the offender) is guilty of an offence if he or she, for a prurient purpose, compels a person to engage, or to continue to engage, in—\n\t(a)\tan act of sexual manipulation of the offender; or\n\t(b)\tan act of sexual manipulation of a person other than the offender; or\n\t(c)\tan act of sexual self‑manipulation,\nwhen the person so compelled does not consent to engaging in the act, or has withdrawn consent to the act, and the offender knows, or is recklessly indifferent to, the fact that the person does not so consent or has so withdrawn consent (as the case may be).\ncompels—a person compels another person if he or she controls or influences the other person's conduct by means that effectively prevent the other person from exercising freedom of choice;\nprurient purpose—a person acts for a prurient purpose if the person acts with the intention of satisfying his or her own desire for sexual arousal or gratification or of providing sexual arousal or gratification for someone else;\nsexual manipulation means the manipulation by a person of another person's genitals or anus (whether or not including sexual intercourse);\nsexual self‑manipulation means the manipulation by a person of his or her genitals or anus (whether or not including sexual self‑penetration, within the meaning of section 48).\n49—Unlawful sexual intercourse\n\t(1)\tA person who has sexual intercourse with any person under the age of 14 years shall be guilty of an offence and liable to be imprisoned for life.\n\t(3)\tA person who has sexual intercourse with a person under the age of seventeen years is guilty of an offence.\n\t(4)\tIt shall be a defence to a charge under subsection (3) to prove that—\n\t(a)\tthe person with whom the accused is alleged to have had sexual intercourse was, on the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed, of or above the age of sixteen years; and\n\t(i)\twas, on the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed, under the age of seventeen years; or\n\t(ii)\tbelieved on reasonable grounds that the person with whom he is alleged to have had sexual intercourse was of or above the age of seventeen years.\n\t(5)\tA person who, being in a position of authority in relation to a person under the age of 18 years, has sexual intercourse with that person is guilty of an offence.\n\t(5a)\tIt is a defence to a charge under subsection (5) if the accused was a person of a class described in subsection (9)(c) and proves that—\n\t(a)\tthe person with whom the accused is alleged to have had sexual intercourse was, on the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed, of or above the age of 17 years; and\n\t(i)\twas, on the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed, under the age of 18 years; or\n\t(ii)\tbelieved on reasonable grounds that the person with whom the accused is alleged to have had sexual intercourse was of or above the age of 18 years.\n\t(6)\tA person who, knowing that another is by reason of intellectual disability unable to understand the nature or consequences of sexual intercourse, has sexual intercourse with that other person is guilty of an offence.\n\t(7)\tConsent to sexual intercourse is not a defence to a charge of an offence under this section.\n\t(8)\tThis section does not apply to sexual intercourse between persons who are married to each other.\n\t(9)\tFor the purposes of this section, a person is in a position of authority in relation to a person under the age of 18 years (the child) if—\n\t(b)\tthe person is a parent, step-parent, guardian or foster parent of the child or the de facto partner or domestic partner of a parent, step-parent, guardian or foster parent of the child; or\n\t(d)\tthe person is a religious official or spiritual leader (however described and including lay members and whether paid or unpaid) in a religious or spiritual group attended by the child; or\n\t(g)\tthe person is employed or providing services in a correctional institution (within the meaning of the Correctional Services Act 1982) or a training centre (within the meaning of the Young Offenders Act 1993), or is a person engaged in the administration of those Acts, acting in the course of the person's duties in relation to the child; or\n\t(ga)\tthe person is employed or providing services in a licensed children's residential facility (within the meaning of the Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017), or a residential care facility or other facility established under section 36 of the Family and Community Services Act 1972, or is a person engaged in the administration of those Acts, acting in the course of the person's duties in relation to the child; or\n\t(h)\tthe person is an employer of the child or other person who has the authority to determine significant aspects of the child's terms and conditions of employment or to terminate the child's employment (whether the child is being paid in respect of that employment or is working in a voluntary capacity).\n50—Sexual abuse of a child\n\t(1)\tAn adult who maintains an unlawful sexual relationship with a child is guilty of an offence.\n\t(2)\tAn unlawful sexual relationship is a relationship in which an adult engages in 2 or more unlawful sexual acts with or towards a child over any period.\n\t(3)\tFor an adult to be convicted of an unlawful sexual relationship offence, the trier of fact must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the evidence establishes that an unlawful sexual relationship existed. \n\t(4)\tHowever—\n\t(a)\tthe prosecution is not required to allege the particulars of any unlawful sexual act that would be necessary if the act were charged as a separate offence; and\n\t(b)\tthe trier of fact is not required to be satisfied of the particulars of any unlawful sexual act that it would have to be satisfied of if the act were charged as a separate offence, but must be satisfied as to the general nature or character of those acts; and\n\t(c)\tif the trier of fact is a jury, the members of the jury are not required to agree on which unlawful sexual acts constitute the unlawful sexual relationship.\n\t(5)\tThe prosecution is required to allege the particulars of the period of time over which the unlawful sexual relationship existed. \n\t(6)\tThis section extends to a relationship that existed wholly or partly before the commencement of this section and to unlawful sexual acts that occurred before the commencement of this section.\n\t(7)\tA person may be charged on a single indictment with, and convicted of and punished for, both—\n\t(a)\tan offence of maintaining an unlawful sexual relationship with a child; and\n\t(b)\t1 or more sexual offences committed by the person against the same child during the alleged period of the unlawful sexual relationship.\n\t(8)\tExcept as provided by subsection (7)—\n\t(a)\ta person who has been convicted or acquitted of an unlawful sexual relationship offence in relation to a child cannot be convicted of a sexual offence in relation to the same child if the occasion on which the sexual offence is alleged to have occurred is during the period over which the person was alleged to have committed the unlawful sexual relationship offence; and\n\t(b)\ta person who has been convicted or acquitted of a sexual offence in relation to a child cannot be convicted of an unlawful sexual relationship offence in relation to the same child if the sexual offence of which the person has been convicted or acquitted is one of the unlawful sexual acts that are alleged to constitute the unlawful sexual relationship.\n\t(9)\tA person who has been convicted or acquitted of a predecessor offence in relation to a child cannot be convicted of an unlawful sexual relationship offence in relation to the same child if the period of the alleged unlawful sexual relationship includes any part of the period during which the person was alleged to have committed the predecessor offence.\n\t(10)\tFor the purposes of this section, a person ceases to be regarded as having been convicted for an offence if the conviction is quashed or set aside.\n\t(11)\tA court sentencing a person for an offence against this section is to sentence the person consistently with the verdict of the trier of fact but having regard to the general nature or character of the unlawful sexual acts determined by the sentencing court to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt (and, for the avoidance of doubt, the sentencing court need not ask any question of the trier of fact directed to ascertaining the general nature or character of the unlawful sexual acts determined by the trier of fact found to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt).\n\t(12)\tIn this section—\nadult means a person of or over the age of 18 years;\nchild means—\n\t(a)\ta person who is under 17 years of age; or\n\t(b)\ta person who is under 18 years of age if, during the period of the relationship that is the subject of the alleged unlawful sexual relationship offence, the adult in the relationship is in a position of authority in relation to the person who is under 18 years of age;\npredecessor offence means an offence of persistent sexual exploitation of a child, or of persistent sexual abuse of a child, as in force under a previous enactment;\nsexual offence means—\n\t(a)\tan offence against Division 11 (other than sections 59 and 61) or sections 63B, 66, 69 or 72; or\n\t(b)\tan attempt to commit, or assault with intent to commit, any of those offences; or\n\t(c)\ta substantially similar offence against a previous enactment;\nunlawful sexual act means any act that constitutes, or would constitute (if particulars of the time and place at which the act took place were sufficiently particularised), a sexual offence;\nunlawful sexual relationship offence means an offence against subsection (1).\n\t(13)\tFor the purposes of this section, a person is in a position of authority in relation to a child if—\n\t(b)\tthe person is a parent, step-parent, guardian or foster parent of the child or the de facto partner or domestic partner of a parent, step-parent, guardian or foster parent of the child; or\n\t(d)\tthe person is a religious official or spiritual leader (however described and including lay members and whether paid or unpaid) in a religious or spiritual group attended by the child; or\n\t(g)\tthe person is employed or providing services in a correctional institution (within the meaning of the Correctional Services Act 1982) or a training centre (within the meaning of the Young Offenders Act 1993), or is a person engaged in the administration of those Acts, acting in the course of the person's duties in relation to the child; or\n\t(ga)\tthe person is employed or providing services in a licensed children's residential facility (within the meaning of the Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017), or a residential care facility or other facility established under section 36 of the Family and Community Services Act 1972, or is a person engaged in the administration of those Acts, acting in the course of the person's duties in relation to the child; or\n\t(h)\tthe person is an employer of the child or other person who has the authority to determine significant aspects of the child's terms and conditions of employment or to terminate the child's employment (whether the child is being paid in respect of that employment or is working in a voluntary capacity).\n\t(14)\tThe heading of this section—\n\t(a)\tis not part of this section (despite section 19 of the Legislation Interpretation Act 2021); and\n\t(b)\tis not intended to affect the interpretation or operation of this section.\nParliament, in amending the heading of this section by the Criminal Law Consolidation (Child Sexual Abuse) Amendment Act 2023, did not intend to change the nature or scope of this offence or the requirements for establishing an offence against this section.\n51—Sexual exploitation of person with a cognitive impairment\n\t(1)\tA person who provides a service (whether for remuneration or not) to a person with a cognitive impairment is guilty of an offence if he or she obtains or procures, by undue influence, sexual intercourse or indecent contact with that person.\n\t(2)\tA person who provides a service (whether for remuneration or not) to a person with a cognitive impairment is guilty of an offence if he or she behaves in an indecent manner in the presence of that person—\n\t(a)\twithout the person's consent; or\n\t(b)\twith the person's consent where that consent was obtained by undue influence.\n\t(a)\tin the case of a first offence—imprisonment for 3 years;\n\t(b)\tin the case of a subsequent offence—imprisonment for 5 years.\n\t(3)\tThis section does not apply in relation to a person who is legally married to the person with a cognitive impairment or is the domestic partner of that person.\n\t(4)\tA defendant who was, at the time of an alleged offence against this section, in a position of power, trust or authority in relation to the victim of the offence, is presumed to have obtained the consent of the victim by undue influence unless the defendant proves the contrary on the balance of probabilities.\nclose personal relationship means the relationship between 2 adult persons (whether or not related by family and irrespective of their gender) who live together as a couple on a genuine domestic basis, but does not include a relationship where 1 of the persons provides the other with domestic support or personal care (or both) for fee or reward, or on behalf of some other person or an organisation of whatever kind;\ncognitive impairment includes the following:\n\t(a)\tan intellectual disability;\n\t(b)\ta developmental disorder (including an autistic spectrum disorder);\n\t(c)\ta neurological disorder;\n\t(d)\tdementia;\n\t(e)\tmental impairment;\n\t(f)\ta brain injury;\ndomestic partner—a person is the domestic partner of another if he or she lives with the other in a close personal relationship;\nundue influence includes the abuse of a position of trust, power or authority.\n56—Indecent assault\n\t(1)\tA person who indecently assaults another is guilty of an offence.\n\t(a)\tfor a basic offence—imprisonment for 8 years;\n\t(b)\tfor an aggravated offence (other than an offence of a kind described in paragraph (c) or (d))—imprisonment for 10 years;\n\t(c)\tif the victim of the offence was at the time of the offence under the age of 17 years—imprisonment for 10 years;\n\t(d)\tif the victim of the offence was at the time of the offence under the age of 14 years—imprisonment for 15 years.\n57—Consent no defence in certain cases\n\t(1)\tSubject to subsection (1a), a person under the age of 18 years will be taken not to be capable of consenting to an indecent assault committed by a person who is in a position of authority in relation to the person.\n\t(1a)\tDespite subsection (1), the alleged victim's consent will be a defence to a charge of indecent assault if the accused was a person of a class described in subsection (4)(c) in relation to the alleged victim and proves that—\n\t(a)\tthe alleged victim was, on the day on which the offence is alleged to have occurred, of or above the age of 17 years; and\n\t(i)\twas, on that day, under the age of 18 years; or\n\t(ii)\tbelieved on reasonable grounds that the alleged victim was, on that day, of or above the age of 18 years.\n\t(2)\tSubject to subsection (3), no person under the age of seventeen years shall be deemed capable of consenting to any indecent assault.\n\t(3)\tWhere the person is between the age of sixteen and seventeen years, his or her consent shall be a defence to a charge of indecent assault if the accused proves that at the time of the indecent assault—\n\t(a)\the or she was under the age of seventeen years; or\n\t(b)\the or she believed on reasonable grounds that the person was of or above the age of seventeen years.\n\t(4)\tFor the purposes of subsection (1), a person is in a position of authority in relation to a person under the age of 18 years (the child) if—\n\t(b)\tthe person is a parent, step-parent, guardian or foster parent of the child or the de facto partner or domestic partner of a parent, step-parent, guardian or foster parent of the child; or\n\t(d)\tthe person is a religious official or spiritual leader (however described and including lay members and whether paid or unpaid) in a religious or spiritual group attended by the child; or\n\t(g)\tthe person is employed or providing services in a correctional institution (within the meaning of the Correctional Services Act 1982) or a training centre (within the meaning of the Young Offenders Act 1993), or is a person engaged in the administration of those Acts, acting in the course of the person's duties in relation to the child; or\n\t(ga)\tthe person is employed or providing services in a licensed children's residential facility (within the meaning of the Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017), or a residential care facility or other facility established under section 36 of the Family and Community Services Act 1972, or is a person engaged in the administration of those Acts, acting in the course of the person's duties in relation to the child; or\n\t(h)\tthe person is an employer of the child or other person who has the authority to determine significant aspects of the child's terms and conditions of employment or to terminate the child's employment (whether the child is being paid in respect of that employment or is working in a voluntary capacity).\n57A—Power to take plea without evidence\n\t(1)\tWhen a person is charged with sexual intercourse with, or an indecent assault upon, a person under the age of seventeen years, the justice sitting to conduct the preliminary examination of the witnesses may, without taking any evidence, accept a plea of guilty and commit the defendant to gaol, or admit him to bail, to appear for sentence.\n\t(2)\tThe justice shall take written notes of any facts stated by the prosecutor as the basis of the charge and of any statement made by the defendant in contradiction or explanation of the facts stated by the prosecutor and shall forward those notes to the Director of Public Prosecutions together with any proofs of witnesses tendered by the prosecutor to the justice.\n\t(3)\tThe Director of Public Prosecutions shall cause the notes and proofs of witnesses to be delivered to the proper officer of the court at which the defendant is to appear for sentence before or at the opening of the court on the first sitting thereof or at such other time as the judge who is to preside in the court may order.\n\t(4)\tThis section does not restrict or take away any right of the defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty and substitute a plea of not guilty.\n58—Acts of gross indecency\n\t(1)\tAny person who, in public or in private—\n\t(a)\tcommits any act of gross indecency with, or in the presence of, any person under the age of sixteen years;\n\t(b)\tincites or procures the commission by any such person of any act of gross indecency with the accused, or in the presence of the accused, or with any other person in the presence of the accused;\n\t(c)\tis otherwise a party to the commission of any act of gross indecency by or with, or in the presence of, any such person, or by or with any other person in the presence of any such person, or by any such person with any other person in the presence of the accused,\nshall be guilty of an offence.\n\t(2)\tIt is no defence to a charge under this section that the act of indecency was committed with the consent of the person concerned.\n59—Abduction of male or female person\nA person who takes away by force, or detains against his will, any other person—\n\t(a)\twith intent to marry, or to have sexual intercourse with, that other person; or\n\t(b)\twith intent to cause that other person to be married to, or to have sexual intercourse with, a third person,\n\t(a)\tfor a basic offence—imprisonment for 14 years;\n\t(b)\tfor an aggravated offence—imprisonment for 18 years.\n60—Procuring sexual intercourse\nAny person who—\n\t(a)\tby threats or intimidation, procures any person to have sexual intercourse;\n\t(b)\tby false pretences, false representations or other fraudulent means, procures any person to have sexual intercourse,\n\t(a)\tfor a basic offence—imprisonment for 7 years;\n\t(b)\tfor an aggravated offence—imprisonment for 10 years.\n61—Householder etc not to permit unlawful sexual intercourse on premises\nAny person who, being the owner or occupier of any premises or having, or acting or assisting in, the management or control thereof, induces or knowingly suffers any person under the age of seventeen years to resort to, or be in, those premises for the purpose of having sexual intercourse shall be guilty of an offence and liable to be imprisoned for a term not exceeding seven years.\n","sortOrder":21},{"sectionNumber":"Div 11A","sectionType":"division","heading":"Child exploitation material and related offences","content":"Division 11A—Child exploitation material and related offences\n62—Interpretation\nadministering a website includes—\n\t(a)\tbuilding, developing or maintaining the website; and\n\t(b)\tmoderating contributions to, or content on, the website; and\n\t(c)\tmanaging or regulating membership of, or access to, the website; and\n\t(d)\tmonitoring traffic through the website; and\n\t(e)\tan activity or function of a prescribed kind,\nbut does not include an activity or function of a kind excluded by the regulations from the ambit of this definition;\nchild exploitation material means material—\n\t(a)\t—\n\t(i)\tthat—\n\t(A)\tdescribes or depicts a child under, or apparently under, the age of 17 years engaging in sexual activity; or\n\t(B)\tconsists of, or contains, the image or representation of (or what appears to be the image or representation of) a child under, or apparently under, the age of 17 years, or the bodily parts of such a child, or in the production of which such a child has been or appears to have been involved; or\n\t(C)\t(without limiting subsubparagraph (B)) consists of, or contains, the image or representation of (or what appears to be the image or representation of) a child‑like sex doll, or part of a child‑like sex doll; and\n\t(ii)\tthat is of a pornographic nature; or\n\t(b)\tthat is a child‑like sex doll;\nchild‑like sex doll means an actual doll or other object that—\n\t(a)\tresembles—\n\t(i)\ta person who is, or appears to be, under 17 years of age; or\n\t(ii)\ta part of the body of such a person; and\n\t(b)\ta reasonable person would consider it likely that the doll or other object is intended to be used by a person to simulate sexual intercourse;\ndeal with child exploitation material includes—\n\t(a)\tview, upload, download or stream child exploitation material; and\n\t(b)\tmake child exploitation material available for viewing, uploading, downloading or streaming; and\n\t(c)\tfacilitate the viewing, uploading, downloading or streaming of child exploitation material;\ndisseminate—a person disseminates child exploitation material if the person—\n\t(a)\tsends, supplies, sells, exhibits, distributes, transmits or communicates it to another, or enters into an agreement or arrangement to do so; or\n\t(b)\tmakes it available for access by another (including access by means of a computer) or enters into an agreement or arrangement to do so;\nencourage includes suggest, request, urge, induce and demand;\nhosting a website means—\n\t(a)\tproviding storage space or other resources on a server for the website; or\n\t(b)\tan activity or function of a prescribed kind,\nbut does not include an activity or function of a kind excluded by the regulations from the ambit of this definition;\nmaterial includes—\n\t(a)\tany written or printed material; or\n\t(b)\tany picture, painting or drawing; or\n\t(c)\tany carving, sculpture, doll, statue or figure; or\n\t(d)\tany photographic, electronic or other information or data from which an image or representation may be produced or reproduced; or\n\t(e)\tany film, tape, disc, or other object or system containing any such information or data;\npornographic nature—material is of a pornographic nature for the purposes of this Division if the material is intended or apparently intended—\n\t(a)\tto excite or gratify sexual interest; or\n\t(b)\tto excite or gratify a sadistic or other perverted interest in violence or cruelty;\nSee also section 63C(1).\nprivate act means—\n\t(a)\ta sexual act; or\n\t(b)\tan act involving an intimate bodily function such as using a toilet; or\n\t(c)\tan act or activity involving undressing to a point where the body is clothed only in undergarments; or\n\t(d)\tan activity involving nudity or exposure or partial exposure of sexual organs, pubic area, buttocks or female breasts;\nprurient purpose—a person acts for a prurient purpose if the person acts with the intention of satisfying his or her own desire for sexual arousal or gratification or of providing sexual arousal or gratification for someone else;\nrelevant industry regulatory authority means a person or body prescribed as a relevant industry regulatory authority for the purposes of section 63AB(3)(d);\nwebsite includes an online forum, group or social media platform.\n63—Production or dissemination of child exploitation material\n\t(a)\tproduces, or takes any step in the production of, child exploitation material, other than a child‑like sex doll, knowing of its pornographic nature; or\n\t(b)\tdisseminates, or takes any step in the dissemination of, child exploitation material, other than a child‑like sex doll, knowing of its pornographic nature,\n63AA—Production or dissemination of child‑like sex dolls\n\t(a)\tproduces, or takes any step in the production of, a child‑like sex doll; or\n\t(b)\tdisseminates, or takes any step in the dissemination of, a child‑like sex doll,\n63A—Possession of child exploitation material\n\t(a)\tis in possession of child exploitation material, other than a child‑like sex doll, knowing of its pornographic nature; or\n\t(b)\tintending to obtain access to child exploitation material, other than a child‑like sex doll, obtains access, or takes a step towards obtaining access, to child exploitation material (other than a child‑like sex doll),\nMaximum penalty: Imprisonment for 12 years.\n\t(2)\tIt is a defence to a charge of an offence against subsection (1) to prove that the material to which the charge relates came into the defendant's possession unsolicited and that the defendant, as soon as he or she became aware of the material and its pornographic nature, took reasonable steps to get rid of it.\n63AAB—Possession of child‑like sex dolls\nA person who is in possession of a child‑like sex doll is guilty of an offence.\n63AB—Offences relating to websites\n\t(1)\tA person commits an offence if—\n\t(a)\tthe person hosts or administers, or assists in the hosting or administration of, a website; and\n\t(b)\tthe website is used by another person to deal with child exploitation material; and\n\t(c)\tthe person—\n\t(i)\tintends that the website be used by another person to deal with child exploitation material; or\n\t(ii)\tis aware that the website is being used by another person to deal with child exploitation material.\n\t(2)\tIt is a defence to a charge of an offence against subsection (1) to prove that the person, on becoming aware that the website was being used, or had been used, by another person to deal with child exploitation material, took all reasonable steps, in the circumstances, to prevent any person from being able to use the website to deal with child exploitation material.\n\t(3)\tIn determining whether a person has taken all reasonable steps, in the circumstances, for the purposes of subsection (2), regard must be had as to whether the person, as soon as it was reasonably practicable, did any of the following:\n\t(a)\tshut the website down;\n\t(b)\tmodified the operation of the website so that it could not be used to deal with child exploitation material;\n\t(c)\tnotified a police officer that the website was being, or had been, used to deal with child exploitation material, and complied with any reasonable directions given by a police officer as to action to be taken by the person in relation to that use of the website;\n\t(d)\tnotified a relevant industry regulatory authority that the website was being, or had been, used to deal with child exploitation material, and complied with any reasonable directions given by the authority as to action to be taken by the person in relation to that use of the website.\n\t(4)\tIn proceedings for an offence against subsection (1), it is not necessary to prove the identity of the person that was using the website to deal with child exploitation material.\n\t(5)\tA person commits an offence if—\n\t(a)\tthe person encourages another person to use a website; and\n\t(b)\tthe person intends that the other person use the website to deal with child exploitation material.\n\t(6)\tIn proceedings for an offence against subsection (5), it is not necessary to prove—\n\t(a)\tthe identity of the person encouraged to use the website to deal with child exploitation material; or\n\t(b)\tthat another person in fact used the website to deal with child exploitation material; or\n\t(c)\tif another person did in fact use the website, that it was the person's encouragement that caused the other person to do so.\n\t(7)\tA person commits an offence if—\n\t(a)\tthe person provides information to another person; and\n\t(b)\tthe person intends the other person to use the information for the purpose of avoiding or reducing the likelihood of apprehension for an offence committed by that other person against this Division.\n\t(8)\tIn proceedings for an offence against subsection (7), it is not necessary to prove—\n\t(a)\tthe identity of the person to whom the information was provided; or\n\t(b)\tthat the information was actually used by the other person.\n63B—Procuring child to commit indecent act etc\n\t(a)\tincites or procures the commission of an indecent act by a child under the prescribed age in relation to that person; or\n\t(b)\tacting for a prurient purpose—\n\t(i)\tcauses or induces a child under the prescribed age in relation to that person to expose any part of his or her body; or\n\t(ii)\tmakes a photographic, electronic or other record from which the image, or images, of a child under the age of 17 years engaged in a private act may be reproduced,\n\t(a)\tfor a basic offence—imprisonment for 12 years;\n\t(2)\tSubsection (1) applies whether the acts alleged to constitute the offence—\n\t(a)\toccur in private or in public; or\n\t(b)\toccur with or without the consent of the child, or the child's parent or guardian.\n\t(3)\tA person who—\n\t(a)\tprocures a child under the prescribed age in relation to that person or makes a communication with the intention of procuring a child under the prescribed age in relation to that person to engage in, or submit to, a sexual activity; or\n\t(b)\tmakes a communication for a prurient purpose and with the intention of making a child under the prescribed age in relation to that person amenable to a sexual activity,\n\t(a)\tfor a basic offence—imprisonment for 12 years;\n\t(3a)\tFor the purposes of subsection (3), it does not matter if the victim is a fictitious person represented to the defendant as a real person.\n\t(4)\tIt is a defence to a charge under subsection (1)(a), (1)(b)(i) or (3) (other than where the defendant was in a position of authority in relation to the child) if the defendant proves that—\n\t(a)\tthe child was, on the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed, of or above the age of 16 years; and\n\t(i)\twas, on the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed, under the age of 17 years; or\n\t(ii)\tbelieved on reasonable grounds that the child was of or above the age of 17 years.\n\t(4a)\tIt is a defence to a charge under subsection (1)(a), (1)(b)(i) or (3) if the defendant was a person of a class described in subsection (6)(c) in relation to the child and proves that—\n\t(a)\tthe child was, on the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed, of or above the age of 17 years; and\n\t(b)\tthe defendant—\n\t(i)\twas, on the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed, under the age of 18 years; or\n\t(ii)\tbelieved on reasonable grounds that the child was of or above the age of 18 years.\n\t(5)\tThis section does not apply if the person and the child are legally married to each other.\n\t(6)\tFor the purposes of this section, a person is in a position of authority in relation to a child if—\n\t(b)\tthe person is a parent, step-parent, guardian or foster parent of the child or the de facto partner or domestic partner of a parent, step-parent, guardian or foster parent of the child; or\n\t(d)\tthe person is a religious official or spiritual leader (however described and including lay members and whether paid or unpaid) in a religious or spiritual group attended by the child; or\n\t(g)\tthe person is employed or providing services in a correctional institution (within the meaning of the Correctional Services Act 1982) or a training centre (within the meaning of the Young Offenders Act 1993), or is a person engaged in the administration of those Acts, acting in the course of the person's duties in relation to the child; or\n\t(ga)\tthe person is employed or providing services in a licensed children's residential facility (within the meaning of the Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017), or a residential care facility or other facility established under section 36 of the Family and Community Services Act 1972, or is a person engaged in the administration of those Acts, acting in the course of the person's duties in relation to the child; or\n\t(h)\tthe person is an employer of the child or other person who has the authority to determine significant aspects of the child's terms and conditions of employment or to terminate the child's employment (whether the child is being paid in respect of that employment or is working in a voluntary capacity).\n\t(7)\tFor the purposes of this section, the prescribed age of a child in relation to a person is—\n\t(a)\tif the person is in a position of authority in relation to the child—18 years; or\n\t(b)\tin any other case—17 years.\n63C—Material to which Division relates\n\t(1)\tIn determining whether material to which a charge of an offence relates is of a pornographic nature, the circumstances of its production and its use or intended use may be taken into account but no such circumstance can deprive material that is inherently pornographic of that character.\n\t(2)\tNo offence is committed against this Division (other than an offence against section 63AB(7)) by reason of the production, dissemination or possession of, or dealing with, material in good faith and for the advancement or dissemination of legal, medical or scientific knowledge.\n\t(2a)\tNo offence is committed against this Division (other than an offence against section 63AB(7)) by reason of the production, dissemination or possession of, or dealing with, material in good faith by—\n\t(a)\ta police officer or other law enforcement officer acting in the course of his or her duties; or\n\t(b)\tany other person acting in the course of his or her duties in the administration of the criminal justice system.\n\t(2b)\tNo offence is committed against this Division (other than an offence against section 63AB(7)) by reason of the production, dissemination or possession of, or dealing with, material in good faith by a person acting reasonably for the purpose of providing genuine child protection or legal advice.\n\t(3)\tNo offence is committed against this Division (other than an offence against section 63AB(7)) by reason of the production, dissemination or possession of, or dealing with, material that constitutes, or forms part of, a work of artistic merit if, having regard to the artistic nature and purposes of the work as a whole, there is no undue emphasis on aspects of the work that might otherwise be considered to be of a pornographic nature.\n\t(4)\tNo offence is committed against this Division (other than an offence against section 63AB(7)) by reason of—\n\t(a)\tthe possession or dissemination of, or dealing with, a publication, film or computer game that has been classified under the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 (unless it is classified as a publication for which classification is refused (RC)); or\n\t(b)\tthe possession of a publication, film or computer game for the purposes of obtaining a classification under that Act.\n63D—Forfeiture\n\t(1)\tIf a court finds a person guilty of an offence against this Division, the court may order forfeiture of any material, equipment, device or other item that was used for, or in connection with, the commission of the offence.\n\t(2)\tA court making an order for forfeiture of any equipment, device or other item under subsection (1) may, if it thinks fit, allow the offender or any other person an opportunity to retrieve (in accordance with any directions of the court) specified records, or other material not involved in the commission of the offence from the equipment, device or item before it is so forfeited.\n","sortOrder":22},{"sectionNumber":"Div 11B","sectionType":"division","heading":"Institutional and out of home care child sexual abuse","content":"Division 11B—Institutional and out of home care child sexual abuse\n64—Interpretation\nadult means a person who is not a child;\nchild means a person under 18 years of age;\ninstitution means—\n\t(a)\tan entity (whether private or public) that operates facilities or provides services to children who are in the care, or under the supervision or control, of the institution and includes (without limitation) medical and religious institutions and any services or functions provided by persons as part of the duties of a medical practitioner or of a religious or spiritual vocation; or\n\t(b)\tan entity of a class prescribed by the regulations;\nout of home care means—\n\t(a)\tcare provided to a child where—\n\t(i)\tthe child is under the guardianship or custody of the Chief Executive under the Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017; and\n\t(ii)\tthe care is provided by a person with whom the child is placed pursuant to section 84 of that Act; and\n\t(iii)\tthe care is provided on a residential basis in premises other than the child's home; and\n\t(iv)\tthe provider of the care receives, or may receive, payment, or financial or other assistance, in relation to the care provided; or\n\t(b)\tany other care of a kind declared by the regulations to be included in the ambit of this definition;\nprescribed person means an adult who—\n\t(a)\tis an employee of an institution, including a person who—\n\t(i)\tis a self‑employed person who constitutes, or who carries out work for, an institution; or\n\t(ii)\tcarries out work for an institution under a contract for services; or\n\t(iii)\tcarries out work as a minister of religion or as part of the duties of a religious or spiritual vocation; or\n\t(iv)\tundertakes practical training with an institution as part of an educational or vocational course; or\n\t(v)\tcarries out work as a volunteer for an institution; or\n\t(vi)\tis of a class prescribed by the regulations; or\n\t(b)\tprovides out of home care;\nsexual abuse of a child includes any unlawful conduct of a sexual nature committed to, or in relation to, a child.\n64A—Failure to report suspected child sexual abuse\n\t(1)\tA prescribed person is guilty of an offence if the person knows, suspects or should have suspected that another person (the abuser)—\n\t(a)\thas previously engaged in the sexual abuse of a child while an employee of the institution or, if the prescribed person provides out of home care, while also providing out of home care, and—\n\t(i)\tthe child is still under the age of 18 years; or\n\t(ii)\tthe abuser is still an employee of the institution or another institution or still provides out of home care; or\n\t(iii)\tthe sexual abuse occurred during the preceding 10 year period; or\n\t(b)\tis an employee of the institution or, if the prescribed person provides out of home care, is providing out of home care, and is engaging, or is likely to engage, in the sexual abuse of a child,\nand the prescribed person refuses or fails to report that to the police.\n\t(2)\tFor the purposes of subsection (1), a defendant should have suspected that another person has engaged, is engaging or is likely to engage in sexual abuse of a child if a reasonable person in the defendant's circumstances would have held the relevant suspicion and the defendant's failure to hold that suspicion, if judged by the standard appropriate to a reasonable person in the defendant's position, amounts to criminal negligence.\n\t(3)\tA prescribed person may be guilty of an offence under this section in respect of any knowledge, suspicion, or circumstances in which they should have held a suspicion, occurring before the commencement of this section, but in such a case the person will not be guilty of the offence unless—\n\t(a)\tthe relevant child is still under the age of 18 years and is still in the care, or under the supervision or control, of the institution or is still in out of home care; or\n\t(b)\tthe abuser is still an employee of the institution or another institution or still provides out of home care.\n\t(4)\tIt is a defence to a charge of an offence under this section if the defendant had a reasonable excuse for the refusal or failure to report.\n\t(5)\tWithout limiting the circumstances in which a person might be found to have had a reasonable excuse for a refusal or failure to report, a person will be taken to have had a reasonable excuse if the person refused or failed to report the matter to the police because the person believed on reasonable grounds that the matter had already been reported to the police or had been reported under Chapter 5 Part 1 of the Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017.\n\t(6)\tIf a prescribed person reports a matter to the police, in good faith, believing that the report was required under this section—\n\t(a)\tno civil or criminal liability lies against the person for making the report; and\n\t(b)\tthe person cannot be held to have breached any code of professional etiquette or ethics, or to have departed from any acceptable form of professional conduct, for making the report.\n\t(7)\tSections 163 (other than section 163(1)(ab)) and 165 of the Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017 apply in relation to a prescribed person who reports a matter to the police under this section as if they had provided the information under Chapter 5 Part 1 of that Act.\n65—Failure to protect child from sexual abuse\n\t(1)\tA prescribed person is guilty of an offence if—\n\t(a)\tthe prescribed person knows that there is a substantial risk that another person (the abuser) who is also an employee of the institution or, if the prescribed person provides out of home care, who is also a provider of out of home care, will engage in the sexual abuse of a child—\n\t(i)\twho is under 17 years of age; or\n\t(ii)\tin relation to whom the abuser is in a position of authority; and\n\t(b)\tthe prescribed person has the power or responsibility to reduce or remove that risk but negligently fails to do so.\n\t(2)\tFor the avoidance of doubt, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that sexual abuse of a child occurred to make out an offence against this section.\n\t(3)\tFor the purposes of this section, a person is in a position of authority in relation to a person under the age of 18 years (the child) if—\n\t(b)\tthe person is a parent, step‑parent, guardian or foster parent of the child or the de facto partner or domestic partner of a parent, step‑parent, guardian or foster parent of the child; or\n\t(d)\tthe person is a religious official or spiritual leader (however described and including lay members and whether paid or unpaid) in a religious or spiritual group attended by the child; or\n\t(g)\tthe person is employed or providing services in a correctional institution (within the meaning of the Correctional Services Act 1982) or a training centre (within the meaning of the Young Offenders Act 1993), or is a person engaged in the administration of those Acts, acting in the course of the person's duties in relation to the child; or\n\t(h)\tthe person is employed or providing services in a licensed children's residential facility (within the meaning of the Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017), or a residential care facility or other facility established under section 36 of the Family and Community Services Act 1972, or is a person engaged in the administration of those Acts, acting in the course of the person's duties in relation to the child; or\n\t(i)\tthe person is an employer of the child or other person who has the authority to determine significant aspects of the child's terms and conditions of employment or to terminate the child's employment (whether the child is being paid in respect of that employment or is working in a voluntary capacity).\n","sortOrder":23},{"sectionNumber":"Div 12","sectionType":"division","heading":"Sexual servitude and related offences","content":"Division 12—Sexual servitude and related offences\n65A—Definitions\n\t(1)\tFor the purposes of this Division—\nask connotes a request made with serious intendment (as distinct from one made without an actual intention of obtaining the ostensible object of the request);\nchild means a person under the age of 18 years;\ncommercial sexual acts means acts performed by a person for payment (whether made to the person or to another) involving the use or display of the body of that person for the sexual gratification of another or others;\ncompulsion—a person compels another (the victim) if the person controls or influences the victim's conduct by means that effectively prevent the victim from exercising freedom of choice;\npayment includes any form of commercial consideration;\nsexual servitude means the condition of a person who performs commercial sexual acts under compulsion;\nundue influence—a person exerts undue influence on another (the victim) if the person uses unfair or improper means to influence the victim's conduct.\n\t(2)\tFor the purposes of this Division, a person whose conduct causes a particular result is taken to have intended that result if the person is reckless about whether that result ensues.\n66—Sexual servitude and related offences\n\t(1)\tA person who compels another to perform or to continue to perform commercial sexual acts is guilty of the offence of inflicting sexual servitude.\n\t(a)\tif the victim is a child under the age of 14 years—imprisonment for life;\n\t(b)\tif the victim is a child under the age of 18 years—imprisonment for 19 years;\n\t(c)\tin any other case—imprisonment for 15 years.\n\t(2)\tA person who, by undue influence, gets another to perform, or to continue to perform, commercial sexual acts is guilty of an offence.\n\t(a)\tif the victim is a child under the age of 14 years—imprisonment for life;\n\t(b)\tif the victim is a child under the age of 18 years—imprisonment for 12 years;\n\t(c)\tin any other case—imprisonment for 7 years.\n\t(3)\tA person charged with an offence against subsection (1) (the aggravated offence) may be convicted, on that charge, of an offence against subsection (2) (the lesser offence) if the court is not satisfied that the aggravated offence has been established beyond reasonable doubt but is satisfied that the lesser offence has been so established.\n\t(4)\tThe question whether, in a particular case, a defendant's conduct amounts to compulsion or undue influence (or neither) is one of fact to be determined according to the circumstances of the particular case.\n\t(5)\tEvidence of the following or any combination of the following may be relevant to that question—\n\t(a)\tfraud, misrepresentation or suppression of information;\n\t(b)\tforce or a threat of force;\n\t(c)\tany other threat (including a threat to take action that may result in the victim's deportation or a threat to take other lawful action);\n\t(d)\trestrictions on freedom of movement;\n\t(e)\tsupply, or withdrawal of supply, of an illicit drug;\n\t(f)\tabuse of a position of guardianship or trust;\n\t(g)\tany other form of unreasonable or unfair pressure.\n67—Deceptive recruiting for commercial sexual acts\n\t(a)\toffers another (the victim) employment or some other form of engagement to provide personal services; and\n\t(b)\tknows at the time of making the offer—\n\t(i)\tthat the victim will, in the course of or in connection with the employment or engagement, be asked or expected to perform commercial sexual acts; and\n\t(ii)\tthat the continuation of the employment or engagement, or the victim's advancement in the employment or engagement, will be dependent on the victim's preparedness to perform commercial sexual acts; and\n\t(c)\tfails to disclose that information to the victim at the time of offering the employment or engagement,\n\t(a)\tif the victim is a child—imprisonment for 12 years;\n\t(b)\tin any other case—imprisonment for 7 years.\n68—Use of children in commercial sexual acts\n\t(1)\tA person must not employ, engage, cause or permit a child to perform, or to continue to perform, commercial sexual acts.\n\t(a)\tif the child is under the age of 14 years—imprisonment for life;\n\t(b)\tin any other case—imprisonment for 15 years.\n\t(2)\tA person must not ask a child to perform commercial sexual acts.\n\t(a)\tif the child is under the age of 14 years—imprisonment for 15 years;\n\t(b)\tin any other case—imprisonment for 12 years.\n\t(3)\tA person must not—\n\t(a)\thave an arrangement with a child who performs commercial sexual acts under which the person receives, on a regular or systematic basis, the proceeds, or a share in the proceeds, of commercial sexual acts performed by the child; or\n\t(b)\texploit a child by obtaining money knowing it to be the proceeds of commercial sexual acts performed by the child.\n\t(a)\tif the child is under the age of 14 years—imprisonment for 10 years;\n\t(b)\tin any other case—imprisonment for 4 years.\n\t(4)\tIn proceedings for an offence against this section, it is not necessary for the prosecution to establish that the defendant knew the victim of the alleged offence to be a child.\n\t(5)\tHowever, it is a defence to a charge of an offence against this section if it is proved that the defendant believed on reasonable grounds that the victim had attained 18 years of age.\n","sortOrder":24},{"sectionNumber":"Div 13","sectionType":"division","heading":"Miscellaneous sexual offences","content":"Division 13—Miscellaneous sexual offences\n68A—Abolition of crime of sodomy\nThe law relating to unnatural offences shall be as prescribed by this Act and any such offence created under any other enactment or at common law is abolished.\n69—Bestiality\nA person who commits bestiality is guilty of an offence. \nBestiality is defined in section 5. \n72—Incest\n\t(1)\tA person who has sexual intercourse with a close family member is guilty of an offence.\n\t(2)\tIt is a defence to a charge of an offence against this section for the accused to prove that he or she did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know, that the person was a close family member.\nclose family member, in relation to a person, means—\n\t(a)\ta parent; or\n\t(b)\ta child; or\n\t(c)\ta sibling (including a half‑brother or half‑sister); or\n\t(d)\ta grandparent; or\n\t(e)\ta grandchild,\nof the person, but does not include such a family member related to the person by marriage or adoption alone.\n","sortOrder":25},{"sectionNumber":"Div 14","sectionType":"division","heading":"Procedure in sexual offences","content":"Division 14—Procedure in sexual offences\n72A—Former time limit abolished\nAny immunity from prosecution arising because of the time limit imposed by the former section 76A1 is abolished.\n1\tRepealed by section 5 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1985.\n73—Proof of certain matters\n\t(1)\tFor the purposes of this Act, sexual intercourse is sufficiently proved by proof of penetration.\n\t(2)\tNo person shall, by reason of his age, be presumed incapable of sexual intercourse.\n\t(2a)\tSubsection (2) applies to proceedings for an offence regardless of whether the offence was allegedly committed before or after the commencement of that subsection.\n\t(3)\tNo person shall, by reason only of the fact that he is married to some other person, be presumed to have consented to sexual intercourse with that other person.\n\t(4)\tNo person shall, by reason only of the fact that he is married to some other person, be presumed to have consented to an indecent assault by that other person.\n75—Alternative verdict on charge of rape etc\nIf on a trial for rape, compelled sexual manipulation or unlawful sexual intercourse, or an attempt to commit rape, compelled sexual manipulation or unlawful sexual intercourse, the jury—\n\t(a)\tis not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged; but\n\t(b)\tis satisfied that the accused is guilty of an indecent assault or a common assault, or an attempt to commit indecent assault or a common assault (the lesser offence),\nthe jury must find the accused not guilty of the offence charged, but may find the accused guilty of the lesser offence.\n76—Corroborative evidence in certain cases\nNo person shall be convicted of an offence under section 67 or 68 on the evidence of one witness only unless the evidence of the witness is corroborated in some material particular by evidence implicating the accused.\n","sortOrder":26},{"sectionNumber":"Div 15","sectionType":"division","heading":"Bigamy","content":"Division 15—Bigamy\n78—Bigamy\nAny person who, being married, goes through the form or ceremony of marriage with any other person during the life of the person's spouse is guilty of an offence and liable to be imprisoned for a first offence for a term not exceeding four years and for any subsequent offence for a term not exceeding ten years.\n79—Defences in cases of bigamy\nThe provisions of section 78 do not extend to any person going through the form or ceremony of marriage as mentioned in that section—\n\t(a)\twhose spouse has then been continuously absent from that person for the last seven years and has not been known by that person to be living within that time; or\n\t(b)\twhose marriage has been dissolved or declared void by any court of competent jurisdiction.\n","sortOrder":27},{"sectionNumber":"Div 16","sectionType":"division","heading":"Abduction of children","content":"Division 16—Abduction of children\n80—Abduction of child under 16 years\n\t(1)\tAny person who—\n\t(a)\tunlawfully, either by force or fraud, leads, takes, decoys or entices away, or detains, any child under the age of sixteen years;\n\t(b)\tharbours or receives any such child, knowing him or her to have been, by force or fraud, led, taken, decoyed or enticed away, or detained,\nwith intent—\n\t(c)\tto deprive any parent, guardian or other person, having the lawful care of the child, of the possession of the child; or\n\t(d)\tto steal any article on or about the person of the child,\nshall be guilty of an offence and liable to be imprisoned for a term not exceeding seven years.\n\t(1a)\tAny person who unlawfully takes, or causes to be taken, a child under the age of sixteen years out of the possession and against the will of the parent, guardian or other person having the lawful care of the child shall be guilty of an offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.\n\t(2)\tThis section does not render liable to prosecution any person who, in the exercise of any bona fide claim to the right to possession of a child, whether as the mother or father of the child or otherwise, obtains possession of the child or takes the child out of the possession of any person having the lawful charge of the child.\n","sortOrder":28},{"sectionNumber":"Div 18","sectionType":"division","heading":"Concealment of birth","content":"Division 18—Concealment of birth\n83—Concealment of birth\n\t(1)\tAny person who, by any secret disposition of the dead body of a child, whether the child died before, at or after its birth, endeavours to conceal the birth of the child shall be guilty of an offence and liable to be imprisoned for a term not exceeding three years.\n\t(2)\tIf on the trial of any person for the murder of a child recently born the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of murder or manslaughter but is satisfied that such accused is guilty of an offence against subsection (1), it shall be lawful for the jury to return a verdict of guilty of concealment of birth and thereupon the accused shall be liable to be punished in the same manner as if convicted on an information under subsection (1).\n","sortOrder":29},{"sectionNumber":"Part 3A","sectionType":"part","heading":"Offences relating to public order","content":"Part 3A—Offences relating to public order\n83A—Interpretation\nviolence means any violent conduct, so that—\n\t(a)\texcept for the purposes of section 83C, it includes violent conduct towards property as well as violent conduct towards persons; and\n\t(b)\tit is not restricted to conduct causing or intended to cause injury or damage but includes any other violent conduct.\nThrowing at, or towards, a person a missile of a kind capable of causing injury which does not hit, or falls short of, the person.\n83B—Riot\n\t(1)\tWhere 12 or more persons who are present together use or threaten unlawful violence for a common purpose and the conduct of them (taken together) is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his or her personal safety, each of the persons using unlawful violence for the common purpose is guilty of riot.\n\t(2)\tIt is immaterial whether or not the 12 or more persons use or threaten unlawful violence simultaneously.\n\t(3)\tThe common purpose may be inferred from conduct.\n\t(4)\tNo person of reasonable firmness need actually be, or be likely to be, present at the scene.\n\t(5)\tRiot may be committed in private as well as in public places.\n\t(6)\tA person is guilty of riot only if the person intends to use violence or is aware that his or her conduct may be violent.\n\t(7)\tSubsection (6) does not affect the determination for the purposes of subsection (1) of the number of persons who use or threaten violence.\n\t(8)\tIf at a trial of a person for riot the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged but is satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence constituted by section 6A of the Summary Offences Act 1953 (violent disorder), the jury may bring in a verdict that the accused is guilty of that offence.\n83C—Affray\n\t(1)\tA person who uses or threatens unlawful violence towards another and whose conduct is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his or her personal safety is guilty of affray.\n\t(2)\tIf 2 or more persons use or threaten the unlawful violence, it is the conduct of them taken together that must be considered for the purposes of subsection (1).\n\t(3)\tFor the purposes of this section, a threat cannot be made by the use of words alone.\n\t(4)\tNo person of reasonable firmness need actually be, or be likely to be, present at the scene.\n\t(5)\tAffray may be committed in private as well as in public places.\n\t(6)\tA person is guilty of affray only if the person intends to use or threaten violence or is aware that his or her conduct may be violent or threaten violence.\n\t(7)\tAn offence of affray may be charged on complaint and be prosecuted and dealt with by the Magistrates Court as a summary offence but, if the Court determines that a person found guilty of such an offence should be sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding 2 years, the Court must commit the person to the District Court for sentence.\n\t(8)\tFor the avoidance of doubt, a person who is convicted of the offence of affray that has been prosecuted and dealt with as a summary offence in accordance with subsection (7) is, despite that fact, taken to have been convicted of an indictable offence for the purposes of any Act or law.\n83CA—Information for terrorist acts\n\t(1)\tA person who, without reasonable excuse—\n\t(a)\tcollects or makes a record of information of a kind likely to be of practical use to a person committing or preparing a terrorist act; or\n\t(b)\thas possession of a document or record containing information of that kind,\n\t(2)\tIf a court finds a person guilty of an offence against this section, the court may order the forfeiture of anything that has been seized and consists of, or contains, material to which the offence relates or consists of equipment used for the commission of the offence.\n\t(3)\tA court making an order for forfeiture of any equipment or item under subsection (2) may, if it thinks fit, allow the offender or any other person an opportunity to retrieve (in accordance with any directions of the court) specified records, or other material, not involved in the commission of the offence from the equipment or item before it is so forfeited.\nCommonwealth Criminal Code means the Criminal Code set out in the Schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 of the Commonwealth, or a law of the Commonwealth that replaces that Code;\nterrorist act has the same meaning as in Part 5.3 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code.\n","sortOrder":30},{"sectionNumber":"Part 3B","sectionType":"part","heading":"Offences relating to criminal organisations","content":"Part 3B—Offences relating to criminal organisations\nDivision 1—Participation in criminal organisation\n83D—Interpretation\ncriminal group—a group consisting of 2 or more persons is a criminal group if—\n\t(a)\tan aim or activity of the group includes engaging in conduct, or facilitating engagement in conduct, constituting a serious offence of violence (or conduct that would, if engaged in within this State, constitute such an offence); or\n\t(b)\tan aim or activity of the group includes engaging in conduct, or facilitating engagement in conduct, constituting a serious offence (or conduct that would, if engaged in within this State, constitute such an offence) that is intended to benefit the group, persons who participate in the group or their associates;\ncriminal organisation means—\n\t(a)\ta criminal group; or\n\t(b)\ta declared organisation;\ndeclared organisation has the same meaning as in the Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008;\nharm has the same meaning as in Part 3 Division 7A;\nparticipating in a criminal organisation includes (without limitation)—\n\t(a)\trecruiting others to participate in the organisation; and\n\t(b)\tsupporting the organisation; and\n\t(c)\tcommitting an offence for the benefit of, or at the direction of, the organisation; and\n\t(d)\toccupying a leadership or management position in the organisation or otherwise directing any acts of the organisation;\nperverting the course of justice means obstructing, preventing, perverting or defeating the course of justice or the administration of the law;\npublic officer means—\n\t(a)\ta person appointed to public office by the Governor; or\n\t(b)\ta judicial officer; or\n\t(c)\ta member of Parliament; or\n\t(d)\ta person employed in the Public Service of the State; or\n\t(e)\ta police officer; or\n\t(f)\tany other officer or employee of the Crown; or\n\t(g)\ta member of a State instrumentality or of the governing body of a State instrumentality or an officer or employee of a State instrumentality; or\n\t(h)\ta member of a local government body or an officer or employee of a local government body; or\n\t(i)\ta juror in any proceedings; or\n\t(j)\ta person who personally performs work for the Crown, a State instrumentality or a local government body as a contractor or as an employee of a contractor or otherwise directly or indirectly on behalf of a contractor;\nserious harm has the same meaning as in Part 3 Division 7A;\nserious offence means an indictable offence that is punishable by imprisonment for life or for a term of 5 years or more;\nserious offence of violence means a serious offence where the conduct constituting the offence involves—\n\t(a)\tthe death of, or serious harm to, a person or a risk of the death of, or serious harm to, a person; or\n\t(b)\tserious damage to property in circumstances involving a risk of the death of, or harm to, a person; or\n\t(c)\tperverting the course of justice in relation to any conduct that, if proved, would constitute a serious offence of violence as referred to in paragraph (a) or (b).\n\t(2)\tA group of people is capable of being a criminal group for the purposes of this Division whether or not—\n\t(a)\tany of them are subordinates or employees of others; or\n\t(b)\tonly some of the people involved in the group are involved in planning, organising or carrying out any particular activity; or\n\t(c)\tmembership of the group changes from time to time.\n83E—Participation in criminal organisation\n\t(1)\tA person who participates in a criminal organisation—\n\t(a)\tknowing that, or being reckless as to whether, it is a criminal organisation; and\n\t(b)\tknowing that, or being reckless as to whether, his or her participation in that organisation contributes to the occurrence of any criminal activity,\n\t(2)\tA person who assaults another person, knowing that, or being reckless as to whether, he or she is, by that act, participating in a criminal activity of a criminal organisation, is guilty of an offence.\nMaximum penalty: Imprisonment for 20 years.\n\t(3)\tA person who destroys or damages property belonging to another person, or threatens to destroy or damage property belonging to another person, knowing that, or being reckless as to whether, he or she is, by that act, participating in a criminal activity of a criminal organisation, is guilty of an offence.\nMaximum penalty: Imprisonment for 20 years.\n\t(4)\tA person who assaults a public officer while in the execution of the officer's duty, knowing that, or being reckless as to whether, he or she is, by that act, participating in a criminal activity of a criminal organisation, is guilty of an offence.\nMaximum penalty: Imprisonment for 25 years.\n\t(5)\tA term of imprisonment to which a person is sentenced for an offence against this section is cumulative on any other term of imprisonment or detention in a training centre that the person is liable to serve in respect of another offence (not being another offence against this section).\n\t(6)\tFor the purposes of this section, an action is taken to be carried out in relation to a public officer while in the execution of the officer's duty, even though the public officer is not on duty at the time, if it is carried out—\n\t(a)\tas a consequence of, in retaliation for or otherwise in connection with actions undertaken by that public officer in the execution of the officer's duty; or\n\t(b)\tbecause the officer is a public officer.\n\t(7)\tFor the purposes of this section, a person is presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to be knowingly participating in an organisation at a particular time if the person is, at that time, displaying (whether on an article of clothing, as a tattoo or otherwise) the insignia of that organisation.\n\t(8)\tFor the purposes of this section, a legal practitioner acting in the course of legal practice will be taken not to be participating in a criminal organisation or in an activity of a criminal organisation.\n83F—Alternative verdicts\nIf, on the trial of a person for an offence under section 83E(2), (3) or (4), the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged but is satisfied that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 83E(1), it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of an offence under section 83E(1), and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly.\n83G—Evidentiary\n\t(1)\tIf, in any criminal proceedings, the court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a particular group was, at a particular time, a criminal group within the meaning of this Division, the court may, on the application of the Director of Public Prosecutions, make a declaration to that effect.\n\t(2)\tIf a declaration is made in relation to a group under this section, that group will, for the purposes of any subsequent criminal proceedings, be taken to be a criminal group in the absence of proof to the contrary.\nDivision 2—Public places, prescribed places and prescribed events\n83GA—Preliminary\n\t(1)\tIn this Division, unless the contrary intention appears—\nCommittee means the Crime and Public Integrity Policy Committee of the Parliament;\nconviction means a finding of guilt by a court, or the acceptance of a plea of guilty by a court, whether or not a conviction is recorded;\ncriminal organisation means—\n\t(a)\tan organisation of 3 or more persons—\n\t(i)\twho have as their purpose, or 1 of their purposes, engaging in, organising, planning, facilitating, supporting, or otherwise conspiring to engage in, serious criminal activity; and\n\t(ii)\twho, by their association, represent an unacceptable risk to the safety, welfare or order of the community; or\n\t(b)\ta declared organisation within the meaning of the Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008; or\n\t(c)\tan entity declared by regulation to be a criminal organisation;\nmember, of an organisation, includes an associate member, or prospective member, however described;\nparticipant, in a criminal organisation, means—\n\t(a)\tif the organisation is a body corporate—a director or officer of the body corporate; or\n\t(b)\ta person who (whether by words or conduct, or in any other way) asserts, declares or advertises his or her membership of, or association with, the organisation; or\n\t(c)\ta person who (whether by words or conduct, or in any other way) seeks to be a member of, or to be associated with, the organisation; or\n\t(d)\ta person who attends more than 1 meeting or gathering of persons who participate in the affairs of the organisation in any way; or\n\t(e)\ta person who takes part in the affairs of the organisation in any other way,\nbut does not include a lawyer acting in a professional capacity;\nprescribed event means an event declared by regulation to be a prescribed event;\nprescribed place means a place declared by regulation to be a prescribed place;\npublic place means—\n\t(a)\ta place, or part of a place, that the public is entitled to use, is open to members of the public or is used by the public, whether or not on payment of money; or\n\t(b)\ta place, or part of a place, the occupier of which allows, whether or not on payment of money, members of the public to enter;\nrecruit, a person, to become a participant in a criminal organisation, includes counsel, procure, solicit, incite and induce the person, including by promoting the organisation, to become a participant in the organisation;\nserious criminal activity has the same meaning as in the Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008. \n\t(2)\tEach regulation made under subsection (1) for the purposes of the definitions of criminal organisation, prescribed event or prescribed place and required to be laid before each House of Parliament in accordance with the Legislative Instruments Act 1978 may only relate to 1 entity, 1 event or 1 place (as the case may require).\n\t(3)\tThe Governor may only make a regulation declaring an entity to be a criminal organisation for the purposes of paragraph (c) of the definition of criminal organisation in subsection (1) on the recommendation of the Minister.\n\t(4)\tA recommendation of the Minister in relation to an entity for the purposes of subsection (3) may only be made—\n\t(a)\tafter the receipt of a report of the Committee in relation to the entity under section 83GB (and, in such a case, the recommendation must include a statement as to the opinion of the Committee on whether or not the entity should be declared a criminal organisation for the purposes of this Division); or\n\t(b)\tafter the passage of 10 days after a referral in relation to the entity was made to the Committee by the Minister under section 83GB(1).\n\t(5)\tThe Minister may, in deciding whether to make a recommendation for the purposes of subsection (3), have regard to the following matters:\n\t(a)\tif the Minister has received a report of the Committee in relation to the entity—the report of the Committee;\n\t(b)\tany information suggesting a link exists between the entity and serious criminal activity;\n\t(c)\tany convictions recorded in relation to—\n\t(i)\tcurrent or former participants in the entity; or\n\t(ii)\tpersons who associate, or have associated, with participants in the entity;\n\t(d)\tany information suggesting current or former participants in the entity have been, or are, involved in serious criminal activity (whether directly or indirectly and whether or not the involvement has resulted in any convictions);\n\t(e)\tany information suggesting participants in an interstate or overseas chapter or branch (however described) of the entity have as their purpose, or 1 of their purposes, organising, planning, facilitating, supporting or engaging in serious criminal activity;\n\t(f)\tany other matter the Minister considers relevant.\n\t(5a)\tNo obligation to provide procedural fairness exists in relation to the making of a declaration by regulation that—\n\t(a)\tan entity is a criminal organisation for the purposes of paragraph (c) of the definition of criminal organisation in subsection (1); or\n\t(b)\tan event is a prescribed event for the purposes of the definition of prescribed event in subsection (1); or\n\t(c)\ta place is a prescribed place for the purposes of the definition of prescribed place in subsection (1).\n\t(6)\tSection 10A of the Legislative Instruments Act 1978 does not apply in relation to a regulation made under paragraph (c) of the definition of criminal organisation in subsection (1).\n\t(7)\tFor the avoidance of doubt, nothing prevents the regulations declaring as a criminal organisation an entity that is, at the time of the declaration, based interstate or overseas and not operating in this State.\n\t(8)\tA change in the name or membership of a criminal organisation does not affect its status as a criminal organisation.\n\t(9)\tIf the members of a criminal organisation (the original organisation) substantially re‑form themselves into another organisation, that organisation is taken to form a part of the original organisation (whether or not the original organisation is dissolved).\n83GB—Report of Crime and Public Integrity Policy Committee\n\t(1)\tThe Minister may, by notice in writing, refer a proposal to declare an entity to be a criminal organisation by regulation under paragraph (c) of the definition of criminal organisation to the Committee.\n\t(2)\tOn receipt of a referral under subsection (1), the Committee must request the Commissioner of Police (the Commissioner) to provide to the Committee any information that the Commissioner thinks fit that may support the referral.\n\t(3)\tThe Committee must inquire into and consider a referral under subsection (1) along with any supporting information provided by the Commissioner under subsection (2) and must report to the Minister on whether or not the Committee is of the opinion that the entity should be declared a criminal organisation for the purposes of this Division.\n\t(4)\tThe Committee may include grounds for its opinion in a report under subsection (3).\n83GC—Participants in criminal organisation being knowingly present in public places\n\t(1)\tAny person who is a participant in a criminal organisation and is knowingly present in a public place with 2 or more other persons who are participants in a criminal organisation commits an offence.\n83GD—Participants in criminal organisation entering prescribed places and attending prescribed events\n\t(1)\tAny person who is a participant in a criminal organisation and enters, or attempts to enter, a prescribed place commits an offence.\n\t(2)\tAny person who is a participant in a criminal organisation and attends, or attempts to attend, a prescribed event commits an offence.\n83GE—Participants in criminal organisation recruiting persons to become participants in the organisation\n\t(1)\tAny person who is a participant in a criminal organisation and recruits, or attempts to recruit, anyone to become a participant in a criminal organisation commits an offence.\n\t(3)\tThis section does not apply in relation to a declared organisation within the meaning of the Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008.\n83GF—Sentencing\n\t(1)\tSubject to subsection (2), but despite any other Act or law, the following provisions apply to the sentencing of a person for an offence under this Division:\n\t(a)\ta sentence of imprisonment must be imposed on the person;\n\t(b)\tthe sentence of imprisonment cannot be suspended;\n\t(c)\tsection 25 of the Sentencing Act 2017 does not apply;\n\t(d)\tsection 26 of the Sentencing Act 2017 does not apply (but nothing in this subsection affects the operation of that section in respect of other offences for which the person is being sentenced).\n\t(2)\tA court sentencing a person for an offence under this Division may declare that subsection (1), in whole or part, does not apply to the person if he or she satisfies the court, by evidence given on oath, that exceptional circumstances exist in the particular case.\n\t(3)\tIf a court finds that exceptional circumstances exist for the purposes of subsection (2), the court must give written reasons for so finding.\n\t(4)\tIf a court is required to fix a non‑parole period in relation to the sentencing of a person for an offence under this Division—\n\t(a)\tthe standard non‑parole period must be taken into account by the court in determining the appropriate sentence (without limiting the matters that are otherwise required or permitted to be taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence); and\n\t(b)\tif the court fixes a non‑parole period that is longer or shorter than the standard non‑parole period, the court must make a record of its reasons for so doing and must identify in the record of its reasons each factor that it took into account.\n\t(5)\tA requirement under subsection (4)(b) for a court to make a record of reasons for fixing a non‑parole period that is longer or shorter than a standard non‑parole period does not require the court to identify the extent to which the seriousness of the offence for which the non‑parole period is set differs from that of an offence to which the standard non‑parole period is referable.\n\t(6)\tA failure of a court to comply with subsection (4) does not invalidate a sentence.\n\t(7)\tIn this section, standard non‑parole period—\n\t(a)\tis 9 months; and\n\t(b)\trepresents the non‑parole period for an offence, being a first offence, in the middle of the range of objective seriousness for offences in this Division.\n83GG—Evidentiary\n\t(1)\tIf, in any criminal proceedings, the court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a particular organisation was, at a particular time, a criminal organisation within the meaning of paragraph (a) of the definition of criminal organisation in section 83GA(1), the court may, on the application of the Director of Public Prosecutions, make a declaration to that effect.\n\t(2)\tIf a declaration is made in relation to an organisation under subsection (1), then that organisation will, for the purposes of any subsequent criminal proceedings, be taken to be a criminal organisation (within the meaning of paragraph (a) of the definition of criminal organisation in section 83GA(1)) in the absence of proof to the contrary.\nPart 3BA—Street gangs\nDivision 1—Preliminary\n83GH—Interpretation\nchild means a person under 18 years of age;\nclose personal relationship has the same meaning as in Part 3 of the Family Relationships Act 1975;\nCommissioner means the Commissioner of Police;\nconviction means a finding of guilt by a court, or the acceptance of a plea of guilty by a court, whether or not a conviction is recorded;\nCourt means—\n\t(a)\tthe Supreme Court; or\n\t(b)\tin proceedings under Division 3, the Youth Court if—\n\t(i)\tthe respondent is a child at the time the application initiating the proceedings is made; or\n\t(ii)\tthe proceedings relate to the variation or revocation of a street gang control order made by the Youth Court;\ncriminal intelligence means information relating to actual or suspected criminal activity (whether in this State or elsewhere) the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to prejudice criminal investigations, to enable the discovery of the existence or identity of a confidential source of information relevant to law enforcement or to endanger a person's life or physical safety;\ndeclared street gang means a group subject to a declaration under Division 2;\ninterim street gang control order means an order under section 83GU;\nparticipant, in a street gang or other group, means a person who—\n\t(a)\tasserts, declares or advertises their membership of, or association with, the group (whether by words or conduct, or in any other way); or\n\t(b)\tseeks to be a member of, or to be associated with, the group (whether by words or conduct, or in any other way); or\n\t(c)\twith the intention of engaging in, organising, planning, facilitating, supporting, or otherwise conspiring to engage in, criminal activity—\n\t(i)\tattends more than 1 meeting or gathering of persons who participate in the affairs of the group in any way; or\n\t(ii)\ttakes part in the affairs of the group in any other way,\nbut does not include a lawyer acting in a professional capacity;\nrecruit a person, to become a participant in a street gang, includes counsel, procure, solicit, incite and induce the person, including by promoting the street gang, to become a participant in the street gang;\nrespondent means, according to the context—\n\t(a)\ta person in relation to whom an application for a street gang control order has been made (see section 83GT); or\n\t(b)\ta person who is subject to a street gang control order;\nserious criminal activity means the commission of serious offences;\nserious offence means an indictable offence that is punishable by imprisonment for life or for a term of 5 years or more;\nspouse—a person is the spouse of another if they are legally married;\nstreet gang means—\n\t(a)\ta group consisting of 3 or more persons—\n\t(i)\twho have as their purpose, or 1 of their purposes, engaging in, organising, planning, facilitating, supporting, or otherwise conspiring to engage in, serious criminal activity; and\n\t(ii)\twho, by their association, represent an unacceptable risk to the safety, welfare or order of the community; or\n\t(b)\ta declared street gang;\nstreet gang control order means an order under section 83GT.\n\t(2)\tA change in the name of, or the persons who are participants in, a street gang does not affect its status as a street gang under this Part.\n\t(3)\tIf the participants in a street gang (the original group) substantially re‑form themselves into another group, that organisation is taken to form a part of the original group (whether or not the original group is dissolved).\n\t(4)\tFor the purposes of this Part—\n\t(a)\ta person may associate with another person by any means including communicating with that person by letter, telephone or facsimile or by email or other electronic means; and\n\t(b)\ta person is a close family member of another person if—\n\t(i)\t1 is a spouse or former spouse of the other or is, or has been, in a close personal relationship with the other; or\n\t(ii)\t1 is a parent or grandparent of the other (whether by blood or by marriage); or\n\t(iii)\t1 is a brother or sister of the other (whether by blood or by marriage); or\n\t(iv)\t1 is a guardian or carer of the other.\nDivision 2—Declared street gangs\n83GI—Commissioner may apply for declaration\n\t(1)\tThe Commissioner may apply to the Court for a declaration under this Division in relation to a group.\n\t(2)\tThe application must—\n\t(a)\tbe in writing; and\n\t(b)\tidentify the particular group in respect of which the declaration is sought; and\n\t(c)\tdescribe the nature of the group and any of its distinguishing characteristics; and\n\t(d)\tset out the grounds on which the declaration is sought; and\n\t(e)\tset out the information supporting the grounds on which the declaration is sought; and\n\t(f)\tset out details of any previous application for a declaration in respect of the group and the outcome of that application; and\n\t(g)\tbe supported by at least 1 affidavit from a police officer, verifying the contents of the application.\n\t(3)\tThe application may identify the group by specifying the name of the group or the name by which the group is commonly known or by providing other particulars identifying the group.\n\t(4)\tSubject to subsection (5), the Commissioner must make a copy of an application under this section, and any affidavit supporting the application, available for inspection by—\n\t(a)\tany person who satisfies the Commissioner that they are representative of the group; and\n\t(b)\tany person who is alleged in an affidavit supporting the application to be a participant or former participant in the group; and\n\t(c)\tany person who satisfies the Commissioner that they are a participant or former participant in the group or other person who may be directly affected (whether or not adversely) by the outcome of the application; and\n\t(d)\tany other person whom the Court considers should be provided with an opportunity to inspect the application and supporting affidavits.\n\t(5)\tNothing in subsection (4) authorises or requires the disclosure of information properly classified by the Commissioner as criminal intelligence.\n83GJ—Publication of notice of application\n\t(1)\tIf the Commissioner makes an application under section 83GI in relation to a group, the Commissioner must as soon as practicable publish a notice in the Gazette and a newspaper circulating generally throughout the State—\n\t(a)\tspecifying that an application has been made for a declaration under this Division in respect of the group; and\n\t(b)\tspecifying that there may be serious consequences for participants in the group and other persons if the declaration is made; and\n\t(c)\tadvising interested parties of their rights in relation to making or providing submissions to the Court at the hearing of the application; and\n\t(d)\tspecifying the manner in which interested parties may inspect or apply to inspect a copy of the application; and\n\t(e)\tspecifying the date, time and place of the hearing.\ninterested party, in relation to an application, means an organisation, group or person who would, under section 83GO, be entitled to make an oral submission or provide a written submission to the Court at the hearing of the application.\n83GK—Court may make declaration\n\t(1)\tThe Court may make a declaration on an application made under this Division in relation to a group if satisfied that—\n\t(a)\tparticipants in the group associate for the purpose of organising, planning, facilitating, supporting or engaging in serious criminal activity; and\n\t(b)\tparticipants in the group, by their association, represent an unacceptable risk to the safety, welfare or order of the community.\n\t(2)\tIn considering whether or not to make a declaration, the Court may have regard to the following:\n\t(a)\tinformation suggesting that a link exists between the group and serious criminal activity;\n\t(b)\tany convictions recorded against—\n\t(i)\tcurrent or former participants in the group; or\n\t(ii)\tpersons who associate, or have associated, with participants in the group;\n\t(c)\tinformation suggesting that—\n\t(i)\tcurrent or former participants in the group; or\n\t(ii)\tpersons who associate, or have associated, with participants in the group,\nhave been, or are, involved in serious criminal activity, whether directly or indirectly and whether or not the involvement resulted in convictions;\n\t(d)\tinformation suggesting that participants in an interstate or overseas chapter or branch of the group (however described) associate for the purpose of organising, planning, facilitating, supporting or engaging in serious criminal activity;\n\t(e)\tanything else the Court considers relevant.\n\t(3)\tA declaration may be made whether or not any of the persons who are entitled to make or provide submissions in relation to the application take advantage of that opportunity.\n\t(4)\tParticipants in a group may associate for the purposes of this section in any manner including merely by being participants in the group.\n\t(5)\tThe Court may, for the purposes of making the declaration, be satisfied that participants in the group associate for the purpose of organising, planning, facilitating, supporting or engaging in serious criminal activity—\n\t(a)\twhether all the participants associate for that purpose or only some of the participants; and\n\t(b)\twhether participants associate for that purpose in relation to the same serious criminal activity or different serious criminal activity; and\n\t(c)\twhether or not the participants also associate for other purposes.\n83GL—Notice of declaration\n\t(1)\tAs soon as practicable after the making of a declaration under this Division, the Commissioner must publish notice of the declaration—\n\t(a)\tin the Gazette; and\n\t(b)\tin a newspaper circulating generally throughout the State; and\n\t(c)\ton a website maintained by the Commissioner.\n\t(2)\tUnless the Court otherwise directs, the declaration is of no effect until notice of it is published under subsection (1)(a) and (b).\n83GM—Duration of declaration\nA declaration made under this Division remains in force unless and until it is revoked in accordance with this Division.\n83GN—Revocation of declaration\n\t(1)\tThe Court may, at any time, revoke a declaration made under this Division in relation to a group on application—\n\t(a)\tby the Commissioner; or\n\t(b)\tby—\n\t(i)\tthe group; or\n\t(ii)\ta person who made or provided submissions in relation to the application for the declaration; or\n\t(iii)\twith the permission of the Court—\n\t(A)\tany other participant or former participant in the group or person directly affected (whether or not adversely) by the declaration; or\n\t(B)\tany other person whom the Court considers should, in the interests of justice, be entitled to make the application.\n\t(2)\tAn application may not be made under subsection (1)(b) except with the permission of the Court if—\n\t(a)\tan application has been made in relation to the group under that paragraph (whether by the same or a different applicant) within the preceding period of 12 months; or\n\t(b)\tan application has been made in relation to the group under that paragraph (whether by the same or a different applicant) and that application has not been finally determined.\n\t(3)\tAn application under subsection (1) must—\n\t(a)\tbe in writing; and\n\t(b)\tset out the grounds on which revocation is sought; and\n\t(c)\tset out the information supporting the grounds on which revocation is sought; and\n\t(d)\tbe supported by at least 1 affidavit from the applicant verifying the contents of the application.\n\t(4)\tIf an application is made under subsection (1)(b), the applicant must, as soon as practicable, serve on the Commissioner a copy of the application and any supporting affidavit.\n\t(5)\tIf an application is made under subsection (1), the Commissioner must, as soon as practicable, publish a notice in the Gazette and a newspaper circulating generally throughout the State—\n\t(a)\tspecifying that an application has been made for revocation of a declaration under this Division in respect of the group; and\n\t(b)\tadvising interested parties of their rights in relation to making or providing submissions to the Court at the hearing of the application; and\n\t(c)\tspecifying the manner in which interested parties may inspect or apply to inspect a copy of the application; and\n\t(d)\tspecifying the date, time and place of the hearing.\n\t(6)\tA declaration may be revoked on an application under subsection (1) if the Court is satisfied that, as at the time at which the application for revocation is made and heard, there would not be grounds for the making of a declaration in relation to the group.\n\t(7)\tThe Commissioner must, as soon as practicable after a declaration is revoked—\n\t(a)\tmake reasonable efforts to give notice of the revocation to any person who made or provided a submission in relation to the making of the declaration; and\n\t(b)\tpublish notice of the revocation in the Gazette and in a newspaper circulating generally throughout the State.\n\t(8)\tIn this section—\ninterested party, in relation to an application, means an organisation or person who would, under section 83GO, be entitled to make an oral submission or provide a written submission to the Court at the hearing of the application.\n83GO—Procedure at hearings\n\t(1)\tAt the hearing of an application under this Division, the following are entitled to make oral submissions, personally or through a legal representative, to the Court and, with the permission of the Court, to provide, in accordance with any requirements of the Court, written submissions:\n\t(a)\tthe Commissioner;\n\t(b)\tthe group to which the application relates;\n\t(c)\tany person who is alleged in an affidavit supporting the application to be a participant or former participant in the group;\n\t(d)\tany person who is a participant or former participant in the group or other person who may be directly affected (whether or not adversely) by the outcome of the application;\n\t(e)\tany other person whom the Court considers should, in the interests of justice, be entitled to make submissions.\n\t(2)\tA person referred to in subsection (1) who is not the applicant (an interested party) may, in accordance with any requirements of the Court, file with the Court 1 or more affidavits in response to the application.\n\t(3)\tThe applicant may, with the permission of the Court, file with the Court 1 or more affidavits in response to any affidavit filed by an interested party.\n\t(4)\tAt the hearing of an application under this Division, the applicant or an interested party may adduce oral evidence, or cross‑examine a person who has given oral evidence or provided an affidavit, if the Court considers, on application, or on its own initiative, that it is in the interests of justice to permit the evidence or the cross‑examination.\n\t(5)\tIf the applicant or an interested party applies to adduce oral evidence or cross‑examine a person who has given oral evidence or provided an affidavit, the Court may, before deciding whether to allow the evidence or to allow the cross‑examination, require the applicant or interested party to file a notice of contention specifying fully and in detail the grounds on which the application is made.\n83GP—Making of subsequent declaration\nFor the avoidance of doubt, nothing prevents the making of a declaration in relation to a group that has been the subject of a previous declaration which has been revoked.\n83GQ—Practice and procedure\nIn proceedings under this Division, the Court—\n\t(a)\tis not bound by the rules of evidence but may inform itself on any matter as it thinks fit; and\n\t(b)\tmust act according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case without regard to technicalities and legal forms.\n83GR—Appeal\nThe commencement of an appeal under the Supreme Court Act 1935 against a declaration made under this Division does not, of itself, affect the operation of the declaration to which the appeal relates.\n83GS—Evidentiary\nIn any proceedings before a court, an apparently genuine document purporting to be signed by the Commissioner and to certify that a specified group was, on a specified date, a declared street gang constitutes, in the absence of proof to the contrary, proof of the matter so certified.\nDivision 3—Street gang control orders\n83GT—Court may make street gang control order\n\t(1)\tThe Commissioner may apply to the Court for the making of a street gang control order relating to a person (the respondent).\n\t(2)\tThe Court may, on application by the Commissioner, make a street gang control order relating to the respondent if the Court is satisfied that—\n\t(a)\tthe respondent is a participant in a street gang; or\n\t(b)\tthe respondent—\n\t(i)\thas been a participant in a group that is, at the time of the application, a declared street gang; and\n\t(ii)\tassociates with 1 or more participants in a street gang; or\n\t(c)\tthe respondent has engaged in serious criminal activity with 1 or more participants in a street gang,\nand that the making of the order is appropriate in the circumstances.\n\t(3)\tIn proceedings under this section—\n\t(a)\tthe Commissioner and the respondent are parties to the proceedings; but\n\t(b)\tthe Court may, if satisfied that the application has been served on the respondent, hear and determine the proceedings whether or not the respondent chooses to participate in the hearing.\n\t(4)\tIf the Commissioner requests the making of an interim street gang control order without notice to the respondent under section 83GU, the Court may order that service of the application (and any material to be served with the application) on the respondent under this section be delayed until the Court has determined that request.\n\t(5)\tA street gang control order may prohibit the respondent from any 1 or more of the following:\n\t(a)\tsubject to subsection (7), associating with a specified person or persons of a specified class;\n\t(b)\tholding an authorisation to carry on a prescribed activity while the street gang control order remains in force;\n\t(c)\tsubject to subsection (7), being present at, or being within a specified distance of, a specified place or premises or a place or premises of a specified class;\n\t(d)\tpossessing a specified article or weapon, or articles or weapons of a specified class;\n\t(e)\tcarrying on their person more than a specified amount of cash;\n\t(f)\tusing for communication purposes, or being in possession of, a telephone, mobile phone, computer or other communication device except as may be specified;\n\t(g)\tengaging in other conduct of a specified kind that the Court considers could be relevant to the commission of serious offences.\n\t(6)\tIn determining an application for a street gang control order, the Court may have regard to the following:\n\t(a)\tthe likelihood that the respondent will engage in serious criminal activity if they are not subject to an order;\n\t(b)\tif the application relates to a declared street gang, any evidence before the Court as to the reasons given by the court for the making of the declaration under section 83GK;\n\t(c)\tthe extent to which the order might assist in preventing the respondent from participating or further participating in a street gang;\n\t(d)\tthe prior criminal record (if any) of the respondent and any person specified in the application as a person with whom the respondent associates or has associated;\n\t(e)\tany legitimate reason the respondent may have for associating with any person specified in the application;\n\t(f)\tany other matter that, in the circumstances of the case, the Court considers relevant.\n\t(7)\tIn determining whether to make a street gang control order prohibiting conduct of a kind referred to in subsection (5)(a) or (c), the Court—\n\t(a)\tmust have regard to the extent to which such an order may affect the respondent's connection with their family and culture; and\n\t(b)\tmust not prohibit the respondent from associating with a close family member unless the Court considers it necessary to prevent the respondent from engaging in serious criminal activity.\n\t(8)\tIf the Court prohibits a respondent from holding an authorisation to carry on a prescribed activity—\n\t(a)\tany such authorisation held by the respondent is revoked from the date on which the street gang control order takes effect or a later date specified by the Court; and\n\t(b)\tif the revocation is to take effect on a later date—the Court may impose any further prohibition it thinks fit on the respondent in relation to the conduct of the activity to which the authorisation relates until the revocation takes effect; and\n\t(c)\tthe revocation is effected despite any other Act or any law, award or industrial or other agreement affecting the employment of the respondent, and neither the Crown nor the authority that issues an authorisation incurs any liability because of the revocation.\n\t(9)\tIn this section—\nauthorisation includes the licensing, registration, approval, certification or any other form of authorisation required by or under legislation for the carrying on of an occupation or activity;\noccupation means an occupation, trade, profession or calling of any kind that may only be carried on by a person holding an authorisation;\nprescribed activity means an occupation or activity of a kind prescribed by regulation for the purposes of this definition.\n83GU—Interim street gang control orders\n\t(1)\tThe Court may, on an application under section 83GT, make an interim street gang control order if the Court is satisfied that it is appropriate to do so in all of the circumstances.\n\t(2)\tAn interim street gang control order—\n\t(a)\tmay be made without notice to the respondent; and\n\t(b)\tmay include any prohibition that may be included in a street gang control order.\n\t(3)\tSection 83GT(8) applies in relation to an interim street gang control order as if it were a street gang control order.\n83GV—Duration of street gang control order or interim street gang control order\n\t(1)\tA street gang control order or interim street gang control order takes effect—\n\t(a)\tif the respondent or a legal representative of the respondent is present when the order is made—on the making of the order; or\n\t(b)\totherwise—when the Commissioner serves the order on the respondent.\n\t(2)\tService under subsection (1)(b) must be by personal service.\n\t(3)\tSubject to section 83GZ, a street gang control order remains in force—\n\t(a)\tfor a period of 2 years or for such lesser period as may be specified in the order; or\n\t(b)\tuntil the order is revoked in accordance with section 83GW,\n(whichever occurs first).\n\t(4)\tSubject to sections 83GX and 83GZ, an interim street gang control order remains in force for a period of 6 months or for such lesser period as may be specified in the order.\n\t(5)\tNothing prevents the Commissioner from applying for a further street gang control order or interim street gang control order in respect of a respondent.\n83GW—Variation or revocation\n\t(1)\tThe Court may make an order varying a street gang control order (a variation order) or revoking a street gang control order (a revocation order) on application—\n\t(a)\tby the Commissioner; or\n\t(b)\tby the respondent.\n\t(2)\tAn application may only be made under subsection (1)(b) with the permission of the Court.\n\t(3)\tSubject to this section, in proceedings for the variation or revocation of a street gang control order—\n\t(a)\tthe Commissioner and the respondent are parties to the proceedings; but\n\t(b)\tin the case of an application under subsection (1)(a), the Court may, if satisfied that the application has been served on the respondent, hear and determine the proceedings whether or not the respondent chooses to participate in the hearing.\n\t(4)\tThe Court may make an interim variation order if the Court is satisfied that it is appropriate to do so in all of the circumstances.\n\t(5)\tAn interim variation order—\n\t(a)\tmay be made without notice to the respondent; and\n\t(b)\tremains in force until further order of the Court.\n\t(6)\tIn determining an application under this section the Court—\n\t(a)\tmay have regard to the same matters that the Court may have regard to in determining an application for a street gang control order; and\n\t(b)\tmust, before prohibiting conduct of a kind referred to in section 83GT(5)(a) or (c), comply with section 83GT(7) in the same way as the Court must in determining an application for a street gang control order.\n\t(7)\tIf a revocation order is made, or a variation order is made on application under subsection (1)(b), the revocation or variation order has effect immediately on the making of the order or at such later time as may be specified by the Court in making the order.\n\t(8)\tIf a variation order or interim variation order is made on application under subsection (1)(a), the order has effect—\n\t(a)\tif the respondent or a legal representative of the respondent is present when the variation order or interim variation order is made—on the making of the order; or\n\t(b)\totherwise—when the Commissioner serves the order on the respondent.\n\t(9)\tService under subsection (8)(b) must be by personal service.\n83GX—Right to object if interim order made ex parte\n\t(1)\tThis section only applies if an interim street gang control order or interim variation order has been made without notice to the respondent.\n\t(2)\tThe respondent may, within 14 days of service of the interim street gang control order or interim variation order or such longer period as the Court may allow, lodge a notice of objection with the Court.\n\t(3)\tA copy of the notice of objection must be served by the respondent on the Commissioner by registered post.\n\t(4)\tThe Court may, on hearing a notice of objection, confirm, vary or revoke the interim street gang control order or interim variation order.\n83GY—Consequential and ancillary orders\n\t(1)\tThe Court may, on making a street gang control order or variation order or an interim street gang control order or variation order, make any consequential or ancillary orders it thinks fit, including, in a case where the order prohibits the possession of an article or weapon or an article or weapon of a specified class, orders—\n\t(a)\tproviding for the surrender or confiscation of the article or weapon or such an article or weapon; and\n\t(b)\tif the circumstances of the case so require, authorising a police officer—\n\t(i)\tto enter and search and, if necessary, use reasonable force to break into or open—\n\t(A)\tpremises or a vehicle in which the article or weapon, or such an article or weapon, is suspected to be; or\n\t(B)\tpart of, or anything in or on, premises or a vehicle in which the article or weapon, or such an article or weapon, is suspected to be; and\n\t(ii)\tto take possession of the article or weapon, or such an article or weapon.\n\t(2)\tAn article or weapon surrendered or confiscated under subsection (1) is forfeited to the Crown and may be sold or disposed of as the Minister thinks fit unless the Court orders that the article or weapon is to be returned to the respondent when the street gang control order or interim street gang control order lapses or is revoked.\n83GZ—Automatic revocation of order\nWithout derogating from any power of the Court under this Part, if a street gang control order or interim street gang control order is made in relation to a person in reliance on the person's participation in a particular declared street gang or the person's association with a participant in a particular declared street gang, the order is revoked if the declaration that declares the street gang ceases to be in force.\n83GZA—Application of Division to children\n\t(1)\tSubject to this section, this Division applies in relation to a child in the same way as it applies to an adult.\n\t(2)\tA street gang control order may not be made in relation to a child who is under 14 years of age.\n\t(3)\tIf a street gang control order relating to a child is made, varied or revoked, the Commissioner must, as soon as reasonably practicable, give written notice of the making of the order or of the variation or revocation (as the case may be) to—\n\t(a)\ta parent or guardian of the child, if the Commissioner is able to find a parent or guardian of the child after making reasonable attempts; and\n\t(b)\tany other prescribed person or person of a prescribed class.\n\t(4)\tThe following provisions apply in relation to proceedings under this Division for the making, variation or revocation of a street gang control order relating to a child:\n\t(a)\tsection 13 of the Young Offenders Act 1993 applies to the proceedings as if they were an action or proceedings taken against a youth by a police officer or a family conference under Part 2 of that Act;\n\t(b)\tthe Court must satisfy itself that the child understands the nature of the proceedings;\n\t(c)\tif the child is not represented by counsel or solicitor, the Court—\n\t(i)\tmust explain to the child in simple language any allegations being made against the child in the proceedings, the nature of the proceedings and the legal implications of the order being sought in the proceedings; and\n\t(ii)\tmust provide the child with a written statement in a form approved by the Attorney-General of the child's rights in respect of legal representation and of the way to proceed in order to obtain legal advice, representation or assistance.\nDivision 4—Offences\n83GZB—Offence to contravene or fail to comply with street gang control order\n\t(1)\tA person who contravenes or fails to comply with a street gang control order or interim street gang control order is guilty of an offence.\nMaximum penalty: imprisonment for 5 years.\n\t(2)\tA person does not commit an offence against this section in respect of an act or omission unless the person knew that the act or omission constituted a contravention of, or failure to comply with, the order or was reckless as to that fact.\n83GZC—Offence to recruit persons to become participants in street gang\nA person who is aged 18 years or more who—\n\t(a)\tis a participant in a street gang; and\n\t(b)\trecruits, or attempts to recruit, another person to become a participant in a street gang,\n\t(a)\tif the person recruited, or attempted to have been recruited, was under the age of 18 years at the time of the offence—imprisonment for 5 years;\n\t(b)\tin any other case—imprisonment for 3 years.\n83GZD—Participants in street gang entering prescribed places and attending prescribed events\n\t(a)\tis a participant in a street gang or is subject to a street gang control order; and\n\t(b)\tenters, or attempts to enter, a prescribed place,\ncommits an offence.\nMaximum penalty: imprisonment for 3 years.\n\t(a)\tis a participant in a street gang or is subject to a street gang control order; and\n\t(b)\tattends, or attempts to attend, a prescribed event,\ncommits an offence.\nMaximum penalty: imprisonment for 3 years.\nprescribed event means an event that is a prescribed event under Part 3B Division 2;\nprescribed place means a place that is a prescribed place under Part 3B Division 2.\n83GZE—Criminal associations\n\t(1)\tA person to whom this section applies who associates, on not less than 6 occasions during a period of 12 months, with another person to whom this section applies is guilty of an offence.\nMaximum penalty: imprisonment for 2 years.\n\t(2)\tThis section applies in relation to the following persons:\n\t(a)\ta person who is a participant in a street gang;\n\t(b)\ta person subject to a street gang control order;\n\t(c)\ta person who is a participant (within the meaning of Part 3B Division 2) in a criminal organisation;\n\t(d)\ta member (within the meaning of the Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008) of a declared organisation;\n\t(e)\ta person subject to a control order under the Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008.\n\t(3)\tA person does not commit an offence against subsection (1) unless, on each occasion on which it is alleged that the person associated with another, the person knew that the other person was a person of a kind referred to in subsection (2) or was reckless as to that fact.\n\t(4)\tA person may be guilty of an offence against subsection (1) in respect of associations with the same person or with different people.\n\t(5)\tThe following forms of associations will be disregarded for the purposes of this section unless the prosecution proves that the association was not reasonable in the circumstances:\n\t(a)\tassociations between close family members;\n\t(b)\tassociations occurring in the course of a lawful occupation, business or profession;\n\t(c)\tassociations occurring at a course of training or education of a prescribed kind between persons enrolled in the course;\n\t(d)\tassociations occurring at a rehabilitation, counselling or therapy session of a prescribed kind;\n\t(e)\tassociations occurring in lawful custody or in the course of complying with a court order;\n\t(f)\tassociations of a prescribed kind.\n\t(6)\tFor the avoidance of doubt, in proceedings for an offence against this section, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the defendant associated with another person for any particular purpose or that the association would have led to the commission of any offence.\n\t(7)\tIf a police officer has reasonable cause to suspect that 2 people are or have been associating with each other and that at least 1 of those people is a person of a kind referred to in subsection (2), the police officer may require 1 or both of those people to state all or any of their personal details.\n\t(8)\tIn this section—\ncriminal organisation has the same meaning as in Part 3B Division 2;\ndeclared organisation has the same meaning as in the Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008.\nDivision 5—Miscellaneous\n83GZF—Appeal\nThe commencement of an appeal under the Supreme Court Act 1935 against an order made under this Part does not, of itself, affect the operation of the order to which the appeal relates.\n83GZG—Evidentiary\n\t(1)\tSubject to this section, in any proceedings under this Part—\n\t(a)\ttranscripts of evidence or documents tendered in evidence, or material otherwise relied on by a court, in proceedings in which a person has been convicted of an offence; and\n\t(b)\tevidence or documents relating to the factual basis on which a person was convicted and sentenced for an offence,\nwill be admissible, and the court may draw any conclusions of fact that it considers proper from the evidence, document or other material.\n\t(2)\tSection 58 of the Young Offenders Act 1993 applies in relation to proceedings under this Part for the making, variation or revocation of a street gang control order as if they were proceedings for an offence.\n\t(3)\tSubject to this section, in any proceedings under this Part, an apparently genuine document purporting to be a police record of a person's antecedents (including any records of admissions of guilt on the basis of which a youth was dealt with by a police officer or family conference under the Young Offenders Act 1993 that are admissible under subsection (2)) or criminal history will be admissible without further proof as evidence of the facts referred to in the document, or to be inferred from the document.\n\t(4)\tAn affidavit of a police officer of or above the rank of superintendent will be admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving that evidence, a document or other material is of a kind referred to in subsection (1) or (3)).\n\t(5)\tEvidence, a document or other material will not be admitted in evidence under subsection (1) or (3) if the court is of the opinion—\n\t(a)\tthat the person by whom, or at whose direction, the evidence, document or material was prepared can and should be called by the party tendering the evidence, document or material to give evidence of the matters contained in the evidence, document or material; or\n\t(b)\tthat the evidentiary weight of the evidence, document or material is slight and is outweighed by the prejudice that might result to any of the parties from the admission of the evidence, document or material in evidence; or\n\t(c)\tthat it would be otherwise contrary to the interests of justice to admit the evidence, document or material in evidence.\n\t(6)\tIn any proceedings under this Part, an apparently genuine document purporting to be remarks made by a court in—\n\t(a)\tsentencing a person for an offence; or\n\t(b)\tgiving reasons for upholding or dismissing an appeal—\n\t(i)\tagainst a sentence for an offence; or\n\t(ii)\tagainst a conviction for an offence where the conviction is upheld,\nas to the facts which the court accepts or finds to have been established in the proceedings for the offence will be admissible without further proof, if relevant to an issue in the proceedings, as evidence of those facts.\n\t(7)\tIn determining whether to admit any material in evidence under this section, the court may receive evidence by affidavit of any matter pertaining to the admission of that material.\n\t(8)\tFor the purpose of determining the evidentiary weight, if any, of material admitted in evidence under this section, consideration may be given to the source from which the material was produced, the safeguards (if any) that have been taken to ensure its accuracy, and any other relevant matters.\n\t(9)\tNothing in this section limits the material that might be admissible in proceedings under this Part.\n83GZH—Standard of proof\n\t(1)\tAny question of fact to be decided by a court in proceedings under this Part is to be decided on the balance of probabilities.\n\t(2)\tThis section does not apply in relation to proceedings for an offence against this Part.\n83GZI—Evidence in other proceedings\n\t(1)\tIf, in any criminal proceedings, the court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a particular group was, at a particular time, a street gang within the meaning of paragraph (a) of the definition of street gang in section 83GH(1), the court may, on the application of the Director of Public Prosecutions, make a declaration to that effect.\n\t(2)\tIf a declaration is made in relation to a group under subsection (1), then that group will, for the purposes of any subsequent criminal proceedings, be taken to be a street gang (within the meaning of paragraph (a) of the definition of street gang in section 83GH(1)) in the absence of proof to the contrary.\n83GZJ—Service\n\t(1)\tIf a police officer has reasonable cause to suspect that a person is someone on whom an application, order or other document is required to be served by personal service under this Part, the officer may—\n\t(a)\trequire the person to state all or any of the person's personal details; and\n\t(b)\trequire the person to remain at a particular place for—\n\t(i)\tso long as may be necessary for the order to be served on the person; or\n\t(ii)\t2 hours,\nwhichever is the lesser; and\n\t(c)\tif the person refuses or fails to comply with a requirement under a preceding paragraph, or the officer has reasonable cause to suspect that the requirement will not be complied with, arrest and detain the person in custody (without warrant) for the period referred to in paragraph (b).\n\t(2)\tIf a person has been required to remain at a particular place in accordance with subsection (1)(b), personal service of a photocopy, faxed copy or printed electronic copy of the application, order or other document will be taken to be personal service of the application, order or other document on the person.\n\t(3)\tIf the person serving an application, order or other document which is required, under this Part, to be served on a person by personal service—\n\t(a)\thas reasonable cause to believe that the person is present at any premises; but\n\t(b)\tis unable to gain access to the person at the premises for the purpose of effecting personal service,\nthe application, order or other document may be served on the person by—\n\t(c)\tleaving it for the person at the premises with someone apparently over the age of 16 years; or\n\t(d)\tif the person serving the order is unable to gain access to such a person at the premises—affixing it to the premises at a prominent place at or near to the entrance to the premises.\n\t(4)\tA court dealing with any proceedings under this Part may make such orders as to service of an application, order or other document relating to the proceedings as it thinks fit.\n83GZK—Representation of unincorporated group\n\t(1)\tA group that is an unincorporated group may, in proceedings under this Part, be represented in the proceedings by a person who satisfies the court dealing with the proceedings that they are an appropriate representative of the group or a part of the group.\n\t(2)\tA person referred to in subsection (1) may be represented by legal counsel in the proceedings.\n83GZL—Costs\n\t(1)\tEach party to proceedings on an application under this Part must bear the party's own costs for the proceedings.\n\t(2)\tHowever, the Court may award costs against a party who has—\n\t(a)\tmade an application the court considers frivolous or vexatious; or\n\t(b)\tby an unreasonable act or omission, caused another party to incur costs in connection with the proceedings.\n\t(3)\tIf proceedings are delayed through the neglect or incompetence of a representative, the Court may, at the conclusion of those proceedings—\n\t(a)\tdisallow the whole or part of the costs as between the representative and his or her client (and, where appropriate, order the representative to repay costs already paid); or\n\t(b)\torder the representative to indemnify his or her client or any other party to the proceedings for costs resulting from the delay; or\n\t(c)\torder the representative to pay to the registrar of the Court for the credit of the Consolidated Account an amount fixed by the Court as compensation for time wasted.\n\t(4)\tThis section does not apply in relation to proceedings for an offence against this Part.\n83GZM—Presumption as to participation\nFor the purposes of any proceedings under this Part, a person is presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to be a participant in a street gang at a particular time if the person is, at that time, displaying (whether on an article of clothing, as a tattoo or otherwise) a logo, sign, identifier, mark or symbol that identifies and is distinctive to the group.\nIt is intended that a flag referred to in or appointed under the Flags Act 1953 of the Commonwealth, the national flag of another country or the flag of a State or Territory of the Commonwealth, is not to be distinctive to a street gang or other group for the purposes of this section unless it is displayed with modification, or in a particular manner or context, so as to be distinctive to the group.\n83GZN—Criminal intelligence\n\t(1)\tIn any proceedings under this Part before a court, the court—\n\t(a)\tmust, on the application of the Commissioner, take steps to maintain the confidentiality of information properly classified by the Commissioner as criminal intelligence, including steps to receive evidence and hear argument about the information in private in the absence of the parties to the proceedings and their representatives; and\n\t(b)\tmay take evidence consisting of or relating to information so classified by the Commissioner by way of affidavit of a police officer of or above the rank of superintendent.\n\t(2)\tThe duties imposed on a court by subsection (1) in relation to proceedings under this Part apply to any court dealing (whether on an appeal under this, or another, Act or otherwise) with information properly classified under this Part as criminal intelligence or with the question of whether information has been properly classified under this Part by the Commissioner as criminal intelligence.\n83GZO—Use of evidence or information for purposes of Act\n\t(1)\tDespite any other Act or law, evidence or information obtained by the lawful exercise of powers under an Act or law (whether before or after the commencement of this section) and evidence or information obtained incidentally to such an exercise of powers—\n\t(a)\tmay be used by law enforcement and prosecution authorities for the purposes of this Part; and\n\t(b)\tis not inadmissible in proceedings under this Part merely because the evidence or information was not obtained for the purposes of this Part.\n\t(2)\tDespite any other Act or law, information (whether obtained before or after the commencement of this section) properly classified by the Commissioner as criminal intelligence—\n\t(a)\tmay be used by law enforcement and prosecution authorities for the purposes of this Part; and\n\t(b)\tmay be admitted in evidence or otherwise used in proceedings under this Part.\n\t(3)\tNo civil or criminal liability lies against a person in respect of any use of evidence or information permitted by this section. \n83GZP—Delegation\nThe Commissioner—\n\t(a)\tmay not delegate the function of classifying information as criminal intelligence for the purposes of this Part except to a Deputy Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner of Police; and\n\t(b)\tmay not delegate any other function or power of the Commissioner under this Part except to a senior police officer.\n","sortOrder":31},{"sectionNumber":"Part 3C","sectionType":"part","heading":"Protection for working animals","content":"Part 3C—Protection for working animals\n83H—Interpretation\naccredited assistance dog means—\n\t(a)\ta dog accredited as an assistance dog under section 21 of the Dog and Cat Management Act 1995; or\n\t(b)\ta dog accredited as an assistance dog (however described) under a law of a State or Territory that provides for the accreditation of animals trained to assist a person with a disability to alleviate the effect of the disability;\ncorrectional services dog has the same meaning as in the Correctional Services Act 1982;\nharm means physical harm (whether temporary or permanent) but does not include mental harm;\npolice dog means a dog (including a drug detection dog within the meaning of the Controlled Substances Act 1984) that—\n\t(a)\thas completed training of a kind approved by the Commissioner of Police; and\n\t(b)\tis used by, or to assist, police officers in the performance of their official duties and functions;\npolice horse means a horse that—\n\t(a)\thas completed training of a kind approved by the Commissioner of Police; and\n\t(b)\tis used by, or to assist, police officers in the performance of their official duties and functions;\nserious harm, in relation to a working animal, means—\n\t(a)\tharm that endangers the animal's life; or\n\t(b)\tharm that results in the animal being so severely injured, so diseased or in such physical condition that it would be cruel not to destroy the animal; or\n\t(c)\tharm that consists of, or results in, serious and protracted impairment of a physical or mental function of the animal; or\n\t(d)\tharm that results in the animal being unable to satisfactorily perform its working function;\nworking animal means—\n\t(a)\ta police dog; or\n\t(b)\ta police horse; or\n\t(c)\ta correctional services dog; or\n\t(d)\tan accredited assistance dog;\nworking function, of a working animal, means the function or functions for which the animal has been trained and is ordinarily used (whether or not the working animal also performs other functions).\n\t(2)\tWithout limiting section 370, regulations made for the purposes of this Part may—\n\t(a)\tmake provision for or relating to facilitation of proof of the commission of offences against the Part;\n\t(b)\tbe of general application or vary in their application according to prescribed factors;\n\t(c)\tprovide that a matter or thing in respect of which regulations may be made is to be determined according to the discretion of the Minister or a specified person or body.\n83I—Causing death or serious harm etc to working animals\n\t(1)\tA person who, by an intentional act, causes the death of, or serious harm to, a working animal is guilty of an offence.\n\t(2)\tSubsection (1) does not apply to the death of a working animal, or the causing of serious harm to a working animal, that occurs in the following circumstances:\n\t(a)\twhere the death or serious harm is caused in the course of the provision of veterinary treatment to the working animal;\n\t(b)\twhere the death or serious harm is caused by, or with the consent of, the owner of the working animal or a person assisting the owner;\n\t(c)\twhere the death or serious harm occurs in the course of training the animal to perform its working function;\n\t(d)\twhere the death occurs under section 34B of the Animal Welfare Act 1985;\n\t(e)\twhere the death or serious harm occurs pursuant to an order under section 50 of the Dog and Cat Management Act 1995;\n\t(f)\twhere the death occurs under section 63 of the Dog and Cat Management Act 1995;\n\t(g)\tany other circumstances prescribed by the regulations.\n\t(3)\tIn proceedings for an offence against subsection (1), it is a defence for the defendant to prove that he or she did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to have known, that an animal the subject of the charge was a working animal.\n\t(4)\tIn proceedings for an offence against subsection (1), a defence that would, but for this subsection, be available to the defendant under Part 3 Division 2 will be taken not to be available to a defendant if—\n\t(a)\tthe working animal the subject of the charge is a police dog, police horse or a correctional services dog; and\n\t(b)\tthe death or serious harm occurs in the course of, or is related to—\n\t(i)\tthe commission of an offence by the defendant or a person in the company of the defendant; or\n\t(ii)\tthe defendant taking steps to avoid being taken into, or escape from, lawful custody; or\n\t(iii)\tthe defendant resisting another who is exercising a power in the course of his or her official duties or functions.\n\t(5)\tIn proceedings for an offence against subsection (1), the prosecution need not prove that the defendant knew that his or her act would cause death or serious harm to the working animal, or to a particular working animal.\n\t(6)\tThis section is in addition to, and does not derogate from, the Animal Welfare Act 1985.\n83J—Court may order compensation and other costs\n\t(1)\tA court may, on application by the prosecutor or on the court's own initiative, make an order requiring a person found guilty of an offence against section 83I to pay 1 or more of the following amounts:\n\t(a)\tan amount by way of compensation for veterinary and other expenses reasonably incurred in treating the working animal to which the offence relates;\n\t(b)\tan amount for reasonable rehabilitation or retraining of the working animal to which the offence relates, having regard to the primary function of the working animal;\n\t(c)\tif the working animal to which the offence relates is permanently unable to perform its primary function as a result of the offence—an amount equal to the actual or expected costs of replacing the working animal with one of similar abilities and training;\n\t(d)\tif the working animal to which the offence relates is permanently unable to perform its primary function as a result of the offence—an amount equal to the actual or expected costs of retiring the working animal (including, but not limited to, the costs of relocating and rehousing the animal, and retraining the animal to ensure it is adapted to life other than as a working animal);\n\t(e)\tany other amount the court thinks appropriate in the circumstances.\n\t(2)\tA court must, if it does not make an order under this section, give its reasons for not doing so.\n\t(3)\tCompensation under this section will be of such amount as the court considers appropriate having regard to any evidence before the court and to any representations made by or on behalf of the prosecutor or the person against whom the order is made.\n\t(4)\tCompensation may be ordered under this section in relation to an offence despite the fact that compensation may be ordered under some other statutory provision that relates more specifically to the offence or proceedings in respect of the offence.\n\t(5)\tThe amount paid to a person pursuant to an order under this section must be taken into consideration by a court or any other body in awarding compensation for the relevant loss or damage under any other Act or law.\n83K—Enforcement of order for compensation etc\nAn order under section 83J—\n\t(a)\twill, for the purposes of the Sentencing Act 2017, be taken to be a pecuniary sum (within the meaning of that Act); and\n\t(b)\tmay be enforced as if it were a compensation order made under section 124 of that Act.\n83L—Evidentiary\n\t(1)\tIn any proceedings for an offence against this Part, an apparently genuine document purporting to be signed by the Commissioner of Police and to certify that an animal specified in the certificate had completed the training specified in the certificate will, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be proof of the matters so certified.\n\t(2)\tIn any proceedings for an offence against this Part, an apparently genuine document purporting to be signed by the Dog and Cat Management Board and to certify that a dog specified in the certificate was accredited as an assistance dog under the Dog and Cat Management Act 1995 will, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be proof of the matters so certified.\n\t(3)\tIn any proceedings for an offence against this Part, an apparently genuine document purporting to be signed by a person or body that accredits animals as contemplated by section 9(2) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 of the Commonwealth and to certify that an animal specified in the certificate was the subject of a specified accreditation will, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be proof of the matters so certified.\n","sortOrder":32},{"sectionNumber":"Part 3D","sectionType":"part","heading":"Explosives offences","content":"Part 3D—Explosives offences\n83M—Interpretation\nexplosive device means (subject to subsection (2)(a)) any apparatus, machine, implement or materials used or apparently intended to be used or adapted for causing or aiding in causing any explosion in, or with, any explosive substance (and includes any part of any such apparatus, machine or implement);\nexplosive substance means (subject to subsection (2)(b))—\n\t(a)\tany substance used or manufactured with a view to produce a practical effect by explosion or a pyrotechnic effect; and\n\t(b)\ta substance, or substance of a kind, prescribed by the regulations;\npublic place has the same meaning as in the Summary Offences Act 1953.\n\t(2)\tThe Attorney‑General may, by notice in the Gazette—\n\t(a)\tdeclare that—\n\t(i)\tany specified apparatus, machine, implement or materials or kind of apparatus, machine, implement or materials; or\n\t(ii)\tany apparatus, machine, implement or materials used, possessed, supplied or manufactured in specified circumstances,\nis exempted from the definition of explosive device in subsection (1) (and may, by subsequent notice in the Gazette, vary or revoke any such declaration); or\n\t(b)\tdeclare that—\n\t(i)\ta specified substance or kind of substance; or\n\t(ii)\ta substance used, possessed, supplied or manufactured in specified circumstances,\nis exempted from the definition of explosive substance in subsection (1) (and may, by subsequent notice in the Gazette, vary or revoke any such declaration).\n83N—Explosive devices\n\t(1)\tA person who uses an explosive device without lawful excuse is guilty of an offence.\nMaximum penalty: Imprisonment for 20 years.\n\t(2)\tA person who has possession of an explosive device in a public place without lawful excuse is guilty of an offence.\n\t(3)\tA person who has possession of, supplies or takes a step in the process of manufacture of an explosive device without lawful excuse is guilty of an offence.\n\t(4)\tFor the purposes of subsection (3)—\n\t(a)\ta step in the process of manufacture of an explosive device includes, without limitation, any of the following when done for the purpose of manufacture of the device:\n\t(i)\tacquiring equipment, substances or materials;\n\t(ii)\tstoring equipment, substances or materials;\n\t(iii)\tcarrying, transporting, loading or unloading equipment, substances or materials;\n\t(iv)\tguarding or concealing equipment, substances or materials;\n\t(v)\tproviding or arranging finance (including finance for the acquisition of equipment, substances or materials);\n\t(vi)\tproviding or allowing the use of premises or jointly occupying premises; and\n\t(b)\tsupply includes offer to supply.\n83O—Explosive substances, prescribed equipment or instructions\n\t(1)\tA person who, in suspicious circumstances and without lawful excuse, uses, has possession of or supplies—\n\t(a)\tan explosive substance; or\n\t(b)\tequipment of a kind prescribed by the regulations; or\n\t(c)\tinstructions on how to make an explosive device,\n\t(2)\tA person will be taken to use, have possession of or supply a thing in suspicious circumstances for the purposes of this section if the person uses, has possession of or supplies the thing in circumstances that give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the person is intending to cause harm to another person or to cause damage to property (or to assist another person to cause such harm or damage).\n83P—Bomb hoaxes\n\t(a)\tplaces an article or substance in any place; or\n\t(b)\tsends an article or substance by any means of transportation,\nwith the intention of inducing in another person a false belief that the article or substance is likely to explode or ignite or discharge a dangerous or deleterious matter is guilty of an offence.\n\t(2)\tA person who, whether within or outside South Australia, makes a statement or conveys information to another person, knowing or believing the statement or information to be false, with the intention of inducing in that other person, or any other person, a belief that an article or substance that is liable to explode, ignite or discharge dangerous or harmful matter is present in a place in South Australia is guilty of an offence.\n\t(3)\tFor a defendant to be guilty of an offence against subsection (1) or (2) it is not necessary for the defendant to have any particular person in mind as the person in whom the defendant intends to induce the belief referred to in that subsection.\n","sortOrder":33},{"sectionNumber":"Part 4","sectionType":"part","heading":"Offences with respect to property","content":"Part 4—Offences with respect to property\n84—Preliminary\nbuilding means any building (whether used for non‑residential or residential purposes), and includes—\n\t(a)\ta part of a building; and\n\t(b)\ta structure, vehicle or vessel, or part of a structure, vehicle or vessel, used for residential purposes;\nto damage in relation to property includes—\n\t(a)\tto destroy the property;\n\t(b)\tto make an alteration to the property that depreciates its value;\n\t(c)\tto render the property useless or inoperative;\n\t(d)\tin relation to an animal—to injure, wound or kill the animal,\nand damage has a corresponding meaning;\nowner of property means a person wholly entitled to the property both at law and in equity.\n\t(2)\tWhere a person damages, or attempts to damage, property of which the person is not the owner, that property shall (whether or not that person has some legal or equitable interest in it) be regarded as property of another for the purposes of this Part.\n\t(3)\tIn proceedings for an offence against this Part in which it is necessary to quantify damage or potential damage in terms of a monetary amount—\n\t(a)\tno regard shall be had to any reduction or possible reduction of the damage through the intervention of some person other than the accused; and\n\t(b)\twhere actual damage occurred and was in fact reduced by such intervention, the damage shall be deemed to include the potential damage that was prevented by that intervention.\n85—Arson and other property damage\n\t(1)\tA person who, without lawful excuse, by fire or explosives, damages property that is a building or motor vehicle (whether the property belongs to the person or to another)—\nis guilty of arson.\n\t(2)\tA person who, without lawful excuse, damages (other than by fire or explosives) another's property that is a building or motor vehicle—\n\t(3)\tA person who, without lawful excuse, damages another's property (other than a building or motor vehicle)—\n\t(4)\tA person who, without lawful excuse, threatens to damage another's property—\n\t(a)\tintending to arouse a fear that the threat will be, or is likely to be, carried out; or\n\t(b)\tbeing recklessly indifferent as to whether such a fear is aroused,\n\t(b)\tfor an aggravated offence (other than an offence to which paragraph (c) applies)—imprisonment for 7 years;\n\t(c)\tfor an offence aggravated by a threat to commit arson—imprisonment for 15 years.\n\t(5)\tSubsection (4) applies to a threat directly or indirectly communicated by words (written or spoken) or by conduct, or partially by words and partially by conduct.\n85A—Recklessly endangering property\n\t(a)\ta person does an act knowing that the act creates a substantial risk of serious damage to the property of another; and\n\t(b)\tthe person does not have lawful authority to do so and knows that no such lawful authority exists,\nPenalty: Imprisonment for 6 years.\n\t(2)\tIt is a defence to a charge of an offence against this section for the accused to prove an honest belief that the act constituting the charge was reasonable and necessary for the protection of life or property.\n85B—Special provision for causing bushfire\n\t(1)\tA person who causes a bushfire—\n\t(a)\tintending to cause a bushfire; or\n\t(b)\tbeing recklessly indifferent as to whether his or her conduct causes a bushfire,\n\t(2)\tA bushfire is a fire that burns, or threatens to burn, out of control causing damage to vegetation (whether or not other property is also damaged or threatened).\n\t(3)\tAn offence is not committed against this section if—\n\t(a)\tthe bushfire only damages vegetation (or other property) on either or both of the following:\n\t(i)\tthe land of the person who causes the fire;\n\t(ii)\tthe land of a person who authorised, or consented, to the act of the person who caused the fire; or\n\t(b)\t—\n\t(i)\tthe bushfire is caused in the course of carrying out a fire prevention, fire suppression or other land management activity; and\n\t(ii)\tat the time the activity was carried out—\n\t(A)\tthere was in force a provision made by or under an Act or by a code of practice approved under an Act, that regulated or otherwise applied to the carrying out of the activity and the person in carrying out that activity acted in accordance with the provision; and\n\t(B)\tthe person believed that their conduct in carrying out the activity was justified having regard to all of the circumstances.\n\t(4)\tA court that finds a defendant guilty of an offence against this section must make an order under section 124 of the Sentencing Act 2017 requiring the defendant to pay compensation for injury, loss or damage resulting from the offence unless—\n\t(a)\tthe defendant is aged under 16 years of age; or\n\t(b)\tthe court is satisfied that the defendant has no means of paying compensation; or\n\t(c)\tthe court is otherwise satisfied that special circumstances exist.\n86—Possession of object with intent to damage property\n\t(a)\ta person has custody or control of an object intending to use the object, or to cause or permit a person to use the object, to damage property of another; and\n\t(b)\tthere is no lawful authority for such use of the object and the person knows that no such lawful authority exists,\nPenalty: Imprisonment for 2 years.\n\t(2)\tIt is a defence to a charge of an offence against this section for the accused to prove an honest belief that the intended damage to property was reasonable and necessary for the protection of life or property.\n86A—Using motor vehicle without consent\n\t(1)\tA person who, on a road or elsewhere, drives, uses or interferes with a motor vehicle without first obtaining the consent of the owner of the vehicle is guilty of an offence.\nPenalty: \nFor a first offence—imprisonment for 2 years;\nFor a subsequent offence—imprisonment for not less than 3 months and not more than 4 years.\n\t(2)\tWhere an adult court finds a person guilty of an offence against this section, the court must (whether or not it convicts the person of the offence and in addition to any other order that it may make in relation to the person) order that the person be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for a period of 12 months.\n\t(3)\tNotwithstanding the Young Offenders Act 1993 where the Youth Court finds a charge of an offence against this section proved against a child, the Court must (whether or not it convicts the child of the offence and in addition to any other order that it may make in relation to the child) order that the child be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for a period of 12 months (commencing, in the case of a child who has not attained the qualifying age for a driver's licence, not earlier than when the child attains that age).\n\t(4)\tThe disqualification prescribed by subsection (2) or (3) cannot be reduced or mitigated in any way or be substituted by any other penalty or sentence.\n\t(5)\tThe court may, in addition to imposing a penalty under this section, order the defendant to pay to the owner of the motor vehicle driven, used or interfered with in contravention of this section such sum as the court thinks proper by way of compensation for loss or damage suffered by the owner.\n\t(6)\tSubsections (1) and (5) do not apply to any person acting in the exercise of any power conferred, or the discharge of any duty imposed, under the Road Traffic Act 1961 or any other Act.\ndrive, driver's licence, motor vehicle, road and owner have the same meanings as in the Road Traffic Act 1961.\n","sortOrder":34},{"sectionNumber":"Part 4A","sectionType":"part","heading":"Computer offences","content":"Part 4A—Computer offences\n86B—Interpretation\ncomputer data includes data in any form in which it may be stored or processed in a computer (including a computer program or part of a computer program);\nelectronic communication means the communication of computer data between computers by means of an electronic communication network;\nelectronic communication network means devices and systems by which computer data is communicated between computers and includes—\n\t(a)\ta link or network that operates wholly or partially by wireless communication; and\n\t(b)\tthe world wide web;\nimpairment of electronic communication includes prevention or delay but does not include interception if the interception does not impair, prevent or delay the reception, at the intended destination, of the computer data that is being communicated;\nmodification of computer data includes—\n\t(a)\tdeletion or removal of the data;\n\t(b)\tan alteration of the data;\n\t(c)\tan addition to the data;\npossession of computer data includes possession of the medium or device in which the computer data is stored;\nserious computer offence means an offence against section 86E, 86F, 86G or 86H;\nserious offence means an offence for which a maximum penalty of life imprisonment or imprisonment for a term of at least 5 years is prescribed;\nuse—a person uses a computer if the person causes the computer to perform a function.\n86C—Meaning of unauthorised access to or modification of computer data\n\t(1)\tAccess to, or modification of, computer data is unauthorised unless it is done or made by the owner of the data or some other person who has an authorisation or licence (express or implied) from the owner of the data to have access or to make the modification.\n\t(2)\tA person is to be regarded as the owner of computer data if—\n\t(a)\tthe person brought the data into existence or stored the data in the computer for his or her own purposes; or\n\t(b)\tthe data was brought into existence or stored in the computer at the request or on behalf of that person; or\n\t(c)\tthe person has a proprietary interest in, or possessory rights over, the medium in which the computer data is stored entitling the person to determine what data is stored in the medium and in what form.\n\t(3)\tFor the purposes of an offence against this Part, the onus of establishing that access to, or modification of, computer data was unauthorised lies on the prosecution.\n86D—Meaning of unauthorised impairment of electronic communication\n\t(1)\tAn impairment of electronic communication is unauthorised unless it is caused by the person who is entitled to control use of the relevant electronic communication network or some other person who has an authorisation or licence (express or implied) from the person who is entitled to control use of the relevant electronic communication network to cause the impairment.\n\t(2)\tA person is to be regarded as being entitled to control use of the relevant electronic communication network if the person is entitled by law to determine who is to have access to the network for the purpose of sending or receiving electronic communications.\n\t(3)\tFor the purposes of an offence against this Part, the onus of establishing that an impairment of electronic communication was unauthorised lies on the prosecution.\n86E—Use of computer with intention to commit, or facilitate the commission of, an offence\n\t(a)\tuses a computer to cause (directly or indirectly)—\n\t(i)\tunauthorised access to or modification of computer data; or\n\t(ii)\tan unauthorised impairment of electronic communication; and\n\t(b)\tknows that the access, modification or impairment is unauthorised; and\n\t(c)\tintends, by that access, modification or impairment to commit, or to facilitate the commission (either by that person or someone else) of, a serious offence (the principal offence),\nMaximum penalty: The maximum penalty for an attempt to commit the principal offence.\n\t(2)\tAn offence may be committed under this section—\n\t(a)\twhether the principal offence was to be committed at the time the computer was used or later; and\n\t(b)\teven though it would have been impossible in the circumstances to commit the principal offence.\n\t(3)\tIf the principal offence is in fact committed—\n\t(a)\tthis section does not prevent the person who used the computer from being convicted as a principal offender or as an accessory to the commission of the principal offence; but\n\t(b)\ta person is not liable to be convicted of the principal offence (or as an accessory to the principal offence) and of an offence against this section.\n\t(4)\tA person cannot be convicted of an attempt to commit an offence against this section.\n86F—Use of computer to commit, or facilitate the commission of, an offence outside the State\n\t(a)\tuses a computer in this State to cause (directly or indirectly)—\n\t(i)\tunauthorised access to or modification of computer data; or\n\t(ii)\tan unauthorised impairment of electronic communication; and\nknows that the access, modification or impairment is unauthorised; and\n\t(b)\tintends, by that access, modification or impairment, to commit, or to facilitate the commission (either by that person or someone else) of, a prohibited act in another jurisdiction (the relevant jurisdiction),\nMaximum penalty: The maximum penalty under the law of this State for an attempt to commit the prohibited act in this State.\n\t(2)\tA prohibited act is an act that would—\n\t(a)\tif committed with intent in the relevant jurisdiction, constitute an offence for which a maximum penalty of life imprisonment or imprisonment for a term of at least 5 years is prescribed; and\n\t(b)\tif committed with intent in this State, constitute an offence for which a maximum penalty of life imprisonment or imprisonment for a term of at least 5 years is prescribed.\n\t(3)\tA person may be convicted of an offence against this section—\n\t(a)\twhether the prohibited act was to be committed at the time of the conduct to which the charge relates or later; and\n\t(b)\teven though it would have been impossible in the circumstances to commit the prohibited act.\n\t(4)\tA person cannot be convicted of an attempt to commit an offence against this section.\nact includes an omission or state of affairs that is (if it occurred in this State) capable of constituting an element of an offence.\n86G—Unauthorised modification of computer data\n\t(a)\tcauses (directly or indirectly) an unauthorised modification of computer data; and\n\t(b)\tknows that the modification is unauthorised; and\n\t(c)\tintends, by that modification, to cause harm or inconvenience by impairing access to, or by impairing the reliability, security or operation of, computer data, or is reckless as to whether such harm or inconvenience will ensue,\n86H—Unauthorised impairment of electronic communication\n\t(a)\tcauses (directly or indirectly) an unauthorised impairment of electronic communication; and\n\t(b)\tknows that the impairment is unauthorised; and\n\t(c)\tintends, by that impairment, to cause harm or inconvenience, or is reckless as to whether harm or inconvenience will ensue,\n86I—Possession of computer viruses etc with intent to commit serious computer offence\n\t(1)\tA person is guilty of an offence if the person—\n\t(a)\tproduces, supplies or obtains proscribed data or a proscribed object; or\n\t(b)\tis in possession or control of proscribed data or a proscribed object,\nwith the intention of committing, or facilitating the commission (either by that person or someone else) of, a serious computer offence.\nMaximum penalty: Imprisonment for 3 years.\nproscribed data means a computer virus or other computer data clearly designed or adapted to enable or facilitate the commission of a serious computer offence;\nproscribed object means a document or other object clearly designed or adapted to enable or facilitate the commission of a serious computer offence.\n1\tA disk, card or other data storage device containing a computer virus or other computer data adapted for the commission of a serious computer offence.\n","sortOrder":35},{"sectionNumber":"2","sectionType":"section","heading":"Instructions (whether in hard copy or electronic form) for carrying out a serious computer offence.","content":"2\tInstructions (whether in hard copy or electronic form) for carrying out a serious computer offence.\n\t(3)\tIf it is established in proceedings for an offence against this section that the defendant was in control of proscribed data, it is irrelevant—\n\t(a)\twhether the data is stored inside or outside the State; or\n\t(b)\twhether the defendant owned or was in possession of the medium or device in which the data was stored.\n\t(4)\tA person may be convicted of an offence against this section even though it would have been impossible in the circumstances to commit the intended offence.\n\t(5)\tA person cannot be convicted of an attempt to commit an offence against this section.\n","sortOrder":36},{"sectionNumber":"Part 5","sectionType":"part","heading":"Offences of dishonesty","content":"Part 5—Offences of dishonesty\n130—Interpretation\nbenefit means—\n\t(a)\ta benefit of a proprietary nature; or\n\t(b)\ta financial advantage; or\n\t(c)\ta benefit of a kind that might be conferred by the exercise of a public duty in a particular way;\ndeal—a person deals with property if the person—\n\t(a)\ttakes, obtains or receives the property; or\n\t(b)\tretains the property; or\n\t(c)\tconverts or disposes of the property; or\n\t(d)\tdeals with the property in any other way;\ndeceive means to engage in deception;\ndeception means a misrepresentation by words or conduct and includes—\n\t(a)\ta misrepresentation about a past, present or future fact or state of affairs; or\n\t(b)\ta misrepresentation about the intentions of the person making the misrepresentation or another person; or\n\t(c)\ta misrepresentation of law;\ndetriment means—\n\t(a)\ta detriment of a proprietary nature; or\n\t(b)\ta financial disadvantage; or\n\t(c)\tloss of an opportunity to gain a benefit; or\n\t(d)\ta detriment of a kind that might result from the exercise of a public duty in a particular way;\ndocument includes any record of information whether in documentary, magnetic, electronic or other form;\njury includes, where an offence is tried by a judge or magistrate sitting alone, the judge or magistrate acting as a tribunal of fact;\nlocal conditions in relation to a particular situation includes—\n\t(a)\tthe physical environment; or\n\t(b)\tthe cultural environment, including—\n\t(i)\tlanguage;\n\t(ii)\tlaw and customs;\n\t(iii)\tthe currency;\n\t(iv)\tthe level of prices that generally prevails for goods and services of various kinds;\nmachine means a machine, computer or device that stores information in electronic, magnetic or other form and includes anything designed for operation with such a machine, such as a credit card, smart card or other device;\nmanipulate, in relation to a machine, includes use of the machine to produce a particular result or effect and any act that affects how the machine operates or the result or effect of the machine's operation;\n1\tAn alteration to a computer program.\n2\tAn alteration to a computer database.\nowner of property means—\n\t(a)\ta person who has a proprietary interest in the property other than an equitable interest arising under—\n\t(i)\tan agreement to transfer or grant an interest in the property; or\n\t(ii)\ta constructive trust; or\n\t(b)\tin relation to property subject to a trust (other than a trust arising from an agreement to transfer or grant an interest in the property or a constructive trust)—a person who has a right to enforce the trust; or\n\t(c)\tin relation to property received from or on account of another by a person who is under an obligation to deal with the property or its proceeds in a particular way—the person from whom, or on whose account, the property was received; or\n\t(d)\ta person who is entitled to possession or control of the property,\n(and, if there are 2 or more owners of property, a reference in this Part to the owner is a reference to both or all of them);\nproceeds of property means money or property into which property has been converted by a transaction or series of transactions (involving sale, exchange, or any other form of dealing);\nproperty means real or personal property and includes—\n\t(a)\tmoney;\n\t(b)\tintangible property (including things in action);\n\t(c)\telectricity;\n\t(d)\ta wild creature that is tamed or ordinarily kept in captivity or is reduced (or in the course of being reduced) into someone's possession;\nsteal—a person steals property if the person commits theft of the property or obtains it by deception; and stolen has a corresponding meaning;\nstolen property means property stolen within or outside the State, but property ceases to be stolen property when—\n\t(a)\tit is restored to the person from whom it was stolen or other lawful custody; or\n\t(b)\tthe person from whom it was stolen ceases to have a right to restitution;\ntainted property means stolen property or property obtained from any other unlawful act or activity (within or outside the State), or the proceeds of such property (but property ceases to be tainted when it passes into the hands of a person who acquires it in good faith, without knowledge of the illegality, and for value);\ntransaction includes a gift.\n131—Dishonesty\n\t(1)\tA person's conduct is dishonest if the person acts dishonestly according to the standards of ordinary people and knows that he or she is so acting.\n\t(2)\tThe question whether a defendant's conduct was dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people is a question of fact to be decided according to the jury's own knowledge and experience and not on the basis of evidence of those standards.\n\t(3)\tA defendant's willingness to pay for property involved in an alleged offence of dishonesty does not necessarily preclude a finding of dishonesty.\n\t(4)\tA person does not act dishonestly if the person—\n\t(a)\tfinds property; and\n\t(b)\tkeeps or otherwise deals with it in the belief that the identity or whereabouts of the owner cannot be discovered by taking reasonable steps; and\n\t(c)\tis not under a legal or equitable obligation with which the retention of the property is inconsistent.\n\t(5)\tThe conduct of a person who acts in a particular way is not dishonest if the person honestly but mistakenly believes that he or she has a legal or equitable right to act in that way.\nA takes an umbrella violently from B honestly but mistakenly believing that B has stolen A's umbrella and that A is entitled to use force to get it back. In fact, it belongs to B. A is charged with robbery. A cannot be properly convicted on this charge because of his honest but mistaken belief (however unreasonable). However, he may still be guilty of an assault.\n\t(6)\tA person who asserts a legal or equitable right to property that he or she honestly believes to exist does not, by so doing, deal dishonestly with the property.\nA takes an umbrella violently from B honestly believing that the umbrella belongs to A and that A is entitled to possession of the umbrella (but knowing that she is not entitled to use force to get it back). The assertion of that possessory right (whether or not correctly founded in law) is not dishonest (and therefore cannot amount to theft) although the means used to get the umbrella back may well amount to some other offence.\n132—Consent of owner\n\t(1)\tA reference to the consent of the owner of property extends to—\n\t(a)\tthe implied consent of the owner (or owners); or\n\t(b)\tthe actual or implied consent of a person who has actual or implied authority to consent on behalf of the owner (or owners).\n\t(2)\tA person is taken to have the implied consent of another if the person honestly believes, from the words or conduct of the other, that he or she has the other's consent.\n\t(3)\tHowever, a person who knows that another's consent was obtained by dishonest deception is taken to act without consent.\n133—Operation of this Part\n\t(1)\tThis Part operates to the exclusion of offences of dishonesty that exist at common law or under laws of the Imperial Parliament.\n\t(2)\tHowever, the common law offence of conspiracy to defraud continues as part of the criminal law of the State.\nDivision 2—Theft\n134—Theft (and receiving)\n\t(1)\tA person is guilty of theft if the person deals with property—\n\t(a)\tdishonestly; and\n\t(b)\twithout the owner's consent; and\n\t(c)\tintending—\n\t(i)\tto deprive the owner permanently of the property; or\n\t(ii)\tto make a serious encroachment on the owner's proprietary rights.\n\t(a)\tfor a basic offence—imprisonment for 10 years;\n\t(2)\tA person intends to make a serious encroachment on an owner's proprietary rights if the person intends—\n\t(a)\tto treat the property as his or her own to dispose of regardless of the owner's rights; or\n\t(b)\tto deal with the property in a way that creates a substantial risk (of which the person is aware)—\n\t(i)\tthat the owner will not get it back; or\n\t(ii)\tthat, when the owner gets it back, its value will be substantially impaired.\n\t(3)\tIt is possible to commit theft as follows:\n\t(a)\ta person may commit theft of property that has come lawfully into his or her possession;\n\t(b)\ta person may commit theft of property by the misuse of powers that are vested in the person as agent or trustee or in some other capacity that allows the person to deal with the property.\nSuppose that land is vested in a trustee in a fiduciary capacity. She is empowered under the instrument of trust to mortgage the land for the purposes of the trust. The trustee dishonestly mortgages the land as security for a personal liability that is unrelated to the trust. In this case, the trustee commits theft of the interest created by the mortgage.\n\t(4)\tIf a person honestly believes that he or she has acquired a good title to property, but it later appears that the title is defective because of a defect in the title of the transferor or for some other reason, the later retention of the property, or any later dealing with the property, by the person cannot amount to theft.\n\t(5)\tTheft committed by receiving stolen property from another amounts to the offence of receiving but may be described either as theft or receiving in an instrument of charge and is, in any event, punishable as a species of theft.\n\t(6)\tIf a person is charged with receiving, the court may, if satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of theft but not that the theft was committed by receiving stolen property from another, find the defendant guilty of theft.\n135—Special provision with regard to land and fixtures\n\t(1)\tA trespass to land, or other physical interference with land, cannot amount to theft of the land (even if it results in acquisition of the land by adverse possession).\n\t(2)\tA thing attached to land, or forming part of land, can be stolen by severing it from the land.\n136—General deficiency\n\t(1)\tA person may be charged with, and convicted of, theft by reference to a general deficiency in money or other property.\n\t(2)\tIn such a case, it is not necessary to establish any particular act or acts of theft.\nDivision 3—Robbery\n137—Robbery\n\t(1)\tA person who commits theft is guilty of robbery if—\n\t(a)\tthe person—\n\t(i)\tuses force, or threatens to use force, against another in order to commit the theft; or\n\t(ii)\tuses force, or threatens to use force, against another in order to escape from the scene of the offence; and\n\t(b)\tthe force is used, or the threat is made, at the time of, or immediately before or after, the theft.\n\t(b)\tfor an aggravated offence—imprisonment for life.\n\t(3)\tIf 2 or more persons jointly commit robbery in company, each is guilty of aggravated robbery.\nSuppose that A and B plan to steal from a service station. A assaults the attendant while B takes money from the till. In this case, each is guilty of robbery on the principle enunciated by the High Court in McAuliffe v R ((1995) 183 CLR 108). Robbery committed in these circumstances is to be treated as aggravated robbery. In other words, the principle that, where robbery is committed jointly, each participant in the offence is guilty of aggravated robbery applies irrespective of whether all elements of robbery can be established against a particular person.\nDivision 4—Money laundering and dealing in instruments of crime\n138—Money laundering\n\t(1)\tA person who engages, directly or indirectly, in a transaction involving property the person knows to be tainted property is guilty of an offence.\nIn the case of a natural person—Imprisonment for 20 years.\nIn the case of a body corporate—$600 000.\n\t(2)\tA person who engages, directly or indirectly, in a transaction involving tainted property in circumstances in which the person ought reasonably to know that the property is tainted is guilty of an offence.\nIn the case of a natural person—Imprisonment for 4 years.\nIn the case of a body corporate—$120 000.\n\t(3)\tA transaction includes any of the following:\n\t(a)\tbringing property into the State;\n\t(b)\treceiving property;\n\t(c)\tbeing in possession of property;\n\t(d)\tconcealing property;\n\t(e)\tdisposing of property.\n138A—Dealing in instruments of crime\n\t(1)\tA person who deals in property is guilty of an offence if—\n\t(a)\tthe person knows that—\n\t(i)\tthe property is an instrument of crime; and\n\t(ii)\tthe dealing may facilitate the commission of a crime or assist an offender to escape detection or avoid any other consequence of the crime; and\n\t(b)\tthe person's conduct is dishonest.\nIn the case of a natural person—Imprisonment for 20 years.\nIn the case of a body corporate—$600 000.\n\t(2)\tA person who deals in property is guilty of an offence if—\n\t(a)\tthe property is an instrument of crime; and\n\t(b)\tthe person—\n\t(i)\tought reasonably to know that it is an instrument of crime; and\n\t(ii)\tis reckless about whether the dealing may facilitate the commission of a crime or assist an offender to escape detection or avoid any other consequence of the crime; and\n\t(c)\tthe person's conduct is dishonest.\nIn the case of a natural person—Imprisonment for 4 years.\nIn the case of a body corporate—$120 000.\ncrime means—\n\t(a)\tan indictable offence against the law of the State or a corresponding offence against the law of the Commonwealth, another State or a Territory, or a place outside Australia; or\n\t(b)\tany of the following offences:\n\t(i)\tan offence of a kind that is required to be prosecuted, and dealt with by the Magistrates Court, as a summary offence under a provision of Part 5 Division 2 of the Controlled Substances Act 1984; or\n\t(ii)\tan offence against section 68(3) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935; or\n\t(iii)\tan offence against section 28(1)(a) of the Summary Offences Act 1953;\ninstrument of crime means—\n\t(a)\tproperty that has been used or is intended for use for or in connection with the commission of a crime; or\n\t(b)\tproperty into which any such property has been converted.\nDivision 5—Deception\n139—Deception\nA person who deceives another and, by doing so—\n\t(a)\tdishonestly benefits him/herself or a third person; or\n\t(b)\tdishonestly causes a detriment to the person subjected to the deception or a third person,\n","sortOrder":37},{"sectionNumber":"Div 5A","sectionType":"division","heading":"Dishonest communication with children","content":"Division 5A—Dishonest communication with children\n139A—Dishonest communication with children\n\t(1)\tA person of or over the age of 18 years who—\n\t(a)\tknowingly communicates with a person under the age of 17 years or a person they believe is under the age of 17 years (the victim); and\n\t(b)\tmakes a false representation in such communication that—\n\t(i)\tthe person is younger than they are; or\n\t(ii)\tthe person is someone other than who they are; and\n\t(c)\tmeets or arranges to meet with the victim,\n\t(2)\tA person of or over the age of 18 years who—\n\t(a)\tknowingly communicates with a person under the age of 17 years or a person they believe is under the age of 17 years (the victim); and\n\t(b)\tmakes a false representation in such communication that—\n\t(i)\tthe person is younger than they are; or\n\t(ii)\tthe person is someone other than who they are,\nwith intent to commit an offence against the victim is guilty of an offence.\n\t(3)\tFor the purposes of this section, it does not matter that the victim is a fictitious person represented to the defendant as a real person.\nDivision 6—Dishonest dealings with documents\n140—Dishonest dealings with documents\n\t(1)\tFor the purposes of this section, a document is false if the document gives a misleading impression about—\n\t(a)\tthe nature, validity or effect of the document; or\n\t(b)\tany fact (such as, for example, the identity, capacity or official position of an apparent signatory to the document) on which its validity or effect may be dependent; or\n\t(c)\tthe existence or terms of a transaction to which the document appears to relate.\n\t(2)\tA document that is a true copy of a document that is false under the criteria prescribed by subsection (1) is also false.\n\t(3)\tA person engages in conduct to which this section applies if the person—\n\t(a)\tcreates a document that is false; or\n\t(b)\tfalsifies a document; or\n\t(c)\thas possession of a document knowing it to be false; or\n\t(d)\tproduces, publishes or uses a document knowing it to be false; or\n\t(e)\tdestroys, conceals or suppresses a document.\n\t(4)\tA person is guilty of an offence if the person dishonestly engages in conduct to which this section applies intending—\n\t(a)\tone of the following:\n\t(i)\tto deceive another, or people generally, or to facilitate deception of another, or people generally, by someone else;\n\t(ii)\tto exploit the ignorance of another, or the ignorance of people generally, about the true state of affairs;\n\t(iii)\tto manipulate a machine or to facilitate manipulation of a machine by someone else; and\n\t(b)\tby that means—\n\t(i)\tto benefit him/herself or another; or\n\t(ii)\tto cause a detriment to another.\n\t(5)\tA person cannot be convicted of an offence against subsection (4) on the basis that the person has concealed or suppressed a document unless it is established that—\n\t(a)\tthe person has taken some positive step to conceal or suppress the document; or\n\t(b)\tthe person was under a duty to reveal the existence of the document and failed to comply with that duty; or\n\t(c)\tthe person, knowing of the existence of the document, has responded dishonestly to inquiries directed at finding out whether the document, or a document of the relevant kind, exists.\n\t(6)\tA person who has, in his or her possession, without lawful excuse, any article for creating a false document or for falsifying a document is guilty of an offence.\nDivision 7—Dishonest manipulation of machines\n141—Dishonest manipulation of machines\n\t(1)\tA person who dishonestly manipulates a machine in order to—\n\t(b)\tcause a detriment to another,\n\t(2)\tA person who dishonestly takes advantage of the malfunction of a machine in order to—\n\t(b)\tcause a detriment to another,\nDivision 8—Dishonest exploitation of advantage\n142—Dishonest exploitation of position of advantage\n\t(1)\tThis section applies to the following advantages:\n\t(a)\tthe advantage that a person who has no disability or is not so severely disabled has over a person who is subject to a mental or physical disability1;\n\t(b)\tthe advantage that one person has over another where they are both in a particular situation and one is familiar with local conditions while the other is not2.\n\t(2)\tA person is guilty of an offence if the person dishonestly exploits an advantage to which this section applies in order to—\n\t(b)\tcause a detriment to another.\n1\tCompare R v Hinks [2000] 4 All ER 833.\n2\tCompare R v Lawrence [1972] AC 626.\nDivision 9—Miscellaneous offences of dishonesty\n143—Dishonest interference with merchandise\nA person who dishonestly interferes with merchandise, or a label attached to merchandise, so that the person or someone else can get the merchandise at a reduced price is guilty of an offence1.\n1\tCompare R v Morris [1984] AC 320.\n144—Making off without payment\n\t(1)\tA person who, knowing that payment for goods or services is required or expected, dishonestly makes off intending to avoid payment is guilty of an offence.\n\t(2)\tThis section does not apply if the transaction for the supply of the goods or services is—\n\t(a)\tunlawful; or\n\t(b)\tunenforceable as contrary to public policy.\n","sortOrder":38},{"sectionNumber":"Part 5A","sectionType":"part","heading":"Identity theft","content":"Part 5A—Identity theft\n144A—Interpretation\nclose relative—a person is a close relative of another if—\n\t(a)\tthey are spouses or domestic partners; or\n\t(b)\tone is (whether by blood or marriage) a grandparent, grandchild, parent, child, brother or sister of the other;\ncriminal purpose means the purpose of committing, or facilitating the commission of, an offence;\ndigital signature means encrypted electronic or computer data intended for the exclusive use of a particular person as a means of identifying himself or herself as the sender of an electronic communication;\nelectronic communication means a communication transmitted in the form of electronic or computer data;\nfalse identity—a person assumes a false identity if the person pretends to be, or passes himself or herself off as, some other person;\nThe other person may be—\n\t(a)\tliving or dead;\n\t(b)\treal or fictional;\n\t(c)\tnatural or corporate.\npersonal identification information—a person's personal identification information is information used to identify the person, and includes—\n\t(a)\tin the case of a natural person—\n\t(i)\tinformation about the person such as his or her name, address or other contact details, date or place of birth, marital status, relatives and so on;\n\t(ii)\tthe person's driver's licence or driver's licence number;\n\t(iii)\tthe person's passport or passport number;\n\t(iv)\tbiometric data relating to the person;\n\t(v)\tthe person's voice print;\n\t(vi)\teach of the following:\n\t(A)\tthe person's credit or debit card (whether in physical or digital form);\n\t(B)\tthe number and card verification code on such a card;\n\t(C)\tany data stored or encrypted on such a card;\n\t(vii)\tany means commonly used by the person to identify himself or herself (including a digital signature);\n\t(viii)\ta series of numbers or letters (or a combination of both) intended for use as a means of personal identification (including, to avoid doubt, a personal identification number (PIN) or other password or passcode);\n\t(b)\tin the case of a body corporate—\n\t(i)\tits name;\n\t(ii)\tits ABN;\n\t(iii)\tthe number of any bank account established in the body corporate's name or of any credit card issued to the body corporate;\nprohibited material means anything (including personal identification information) that enables a person to assume a false identity or to exercise a right of ownership that belongs to someone else to funds, credit, information or any other financial or non‑financial benefit;\npublic identification information means a person's name, address or other contact details, date or place of birth, marital status and relatives;\nvoice print means computer data recording the unique characteristics of a person's voice.\n144B—False identity etc\n\t(a)\tassumes a false identity; or\n\t(b)\tfalsely pretends—\n\t(i)\tto have particular qualifications; or\n\t(ii)\tto have, or to be entitled to act in, a particular capacity,\nmakes a false pretence to which this section applies.\n\t(2)\tA person who assumes a false identity makes a false pretence to which this section applies even though the person acts with the consent of the person whose identity is falsely assumed.\n\t(3)\tA person who makes a false pretence to which this section applies intending, by doing so, to commit, or facilitate the commission of, a criminal offence is guilty of an offence and liable to the penalty appropriate to an attempt to commit the criminal offence.\n144C—Misuse of personal identification information\n\t(1)\tA person who makes use of another person's personal identification information intending, by doing so, to commit, or facilitate the commission of, a criminal offence, is guilty of an offence and liable to the penalty appropriate to an attempt to commit the criminal offence.\n\t(2)\tThis section applies irrespective of whether the person whose personal identification information is used—\n\t(a)\tis living or dead; or\n\t(b)\tconsents to the use of the personal identification information.\n144D—Prohibited material\n\t(a)\tproduces prohibited material; or\n\t(b)\thas possession of prohibited material,\nintending to use the material, or to enable another person to use the material, for a criminal purpose is guilty of an offence.\n\t(2)\tA person who sells (or offers for sale) or gives (or offers to give) prohibited material to another person, knowing that the other person is likely to use the material for a criminal purpose is guilty of an offence.\n\t(3)\tA person who is in possession of equipment for making prohibited material intending to use it to commit an offence against this section is guilty of an offence.\n144DA—Possession of personal identification information\n\t(1)\tA person who, without reasonable excuse, has possession of personal identification information of another person (the victim) is guilty of an offence.\nMaximum penalty: Imprisonment for 2 years.\n\t(2)\tSubsection (1) does not apply if—\n\t(a)\tthe victim is a body corporate; or\n\t(b)\tthe personal identification information consists only of public identification information.\n\t(3)\tIf, in proceedings for an offence against subsection (1), the defendant establishes that—\n\t(a)\tin the ordinary course of a lawful occupation or activity undertaken by the defendant, the defendant has possession of personal information of other people generally or of a class of people to which the victim belongs; or\n\t(b)\tthe defendant and the victim are close relatives; or\n\t(c)\tthe defendant holds a power of attorney for the victim or is appointed under the Guardianship and Administration Act 1993 as a guardian or administrator in relation to the victim; or\n\t(d)\tthe personal identification information only related to 1 person and was readily publicly available,\nthen, despite section 5B, the prosecution will be required to prove that the defendant had possession of the relevant material without reasonable excuse.\n144E—Attempt offence excluded\nA person cannot be convicted of an attempt to commit an offence against this Part.\n144F—Application of Part\nThis Part does not apply—\n\t(a)\tto misrepresentation by a person under the age of 18 years for the purpose of—\n\t(i)\tobtaining alcohol, tobacco or any other product or service not lawfully available to persons under the age of 18; or\n\t(ii)\tgaining entry to premises to which access is not ordinarily allowed to persons under the age of 18; or\n\t(b)\tto any thing done by a person under that age to facilitate such a misrepresentation.\n","sortOrder":39},{"sectionNumber":"Part 5B","sectionType":"part","heading":"Cheating at gambling","content":"Part 5B—Cheating at gambling\n144G—Interpretation\nagreement includes an arrangement;\nbet includes—\n\t(a)\tplace, accept or withdraw a bet;\n\t(b)\tcause a bet to be placed, accepted or withdrawn;\nconduct means an act or omission to perform an act;\nencourage includes command, request, propose, advise, incite, induce, persuade, authorise, urge, pressure or threaten; \nengage in conduct means—\n\t(a)\tdo an act; or\n\t(b)\tomit to do an act;\nevent means an event (whether it takes place in this State or elsewhere) on which it is lawful to bet under a law of this State, another State, a Territory, or the Commonwealth;\nevent contingency means a contingency connected to an event, being a contingency on which it is lawful to bet under a law of this State, another State, a Territory, or the Commonwealth.\n\t(2)\tIn this Part, a reference to betting on an event includes a reference to betting on an event contingency.\n\t(3)\tFor the purposes of this Part, conduct will be taken to be conduct that corrupts a betting outcome if the conduct—\n\t(a)\taffects or, if engaged in, would or would be likely to affect the outcome of any type of betting on the event; and\n\t(b)\tis contrary to the standards of integrity that a reasonable person would expect of persons in a position to affect the outcome of any type of betting on an event.\n\t(4)\tFor the purposes of this Part, an agreement in respect of conduct that corrupts a betting outcome of an event is an agreement between 2 or more persons under which 1 or more persons agree to engage in conduct that corrupts a betting outcome of an event.\n\t(5)\tFor the purposes of this Part, obtaining a financial advantage includes—\n\t(a)\tobtaining a financial advantage for oneself or for another person; \n\t(b)\tinducing a third person to do something that results in obtaining a financial advantage for oneself or for another person;\n\t(c)\tretaining a financial advantage that one has,\nwhether the financial advantage is permanent or temporary.\n\t(6)\tFor the purposes of this Part, causing a financial disadvantage includes—\n\t(a)\tcausing a financial disadvantage to another person;\n\t(b)\tinducing a third person to do something that results in another person suffering a financial disadvantage,\nwhether the financial disadvantage is permanent or temporary.\n\t(7)\tIn proceedings for an offence against this Part, the defendant will be taken to have intended to obtain a financial advantage, or cause a financial disadvantage, if, and only if, it is proved that the defendant—\n\t(a)\tintended to obtain a financial advantage or to cause a financial disadvantage in connection with betting on an event; or\n\t(b)\twas aware that another person intended to obtain a financial advantage or to cause a financial disadvantage, in connection with betting on an event, as a result of the conduct the subject of the charge.\n\t(8)\tIn proceedings under this Part, it is not necessary to prove that a financial advantage was actually obtained or a financial disadvantage was actually caused.\n\t(9)\tIn this section, the conduct the subject of the charge means—\n\t(a)\tin the case of an offence against section 144H—the conduct that the defendant engaged in; or\n\t(b)\tin the case of an offence against section 144I(1)—the conduct the defendant offered to engage in; or\n\t(c)\tin the case of an offence against section 144I(2)—the conduct the defendant encouraged another person to engage in; or\n\t(d)\tin the case of an offence against section 144I(3)—the conduct the subject of the agreement; or\n\t(e)\tin the case of an offence against section 144J—the conduct, or the conduct the subject of the agreement, that the defendant encouraged another person to conceal.\n144H—Engaging in conduct that corrupts betting outcome of event\nA person who engages in conduct that corrupts a betting outcome of an event—\n\t(b)\tintending to obtain a financial advantage, or cause a financial disadvantage, in connection with any betting on the event,\n144I—Facilitating conduct that corrupts betting outcome of event\n\t(1)\tA person who offers to engage in conduct that corrupts a betting outcome of an event—\n\t(b)\tintending to obtain a financial advantage, or cause a financial disadvantage, in connection with any betting on the event,\n\t(2)\tA person who encourages another person to engage in conduct that corrupts a betting outcome of an event—\n\t(b)\tintending to obtain a financial advantage, or cause a financial disadvantage, in connection with any betting on the event,\n\t(3)\tA person who enters into an agreement in respect of conduct that corrupts a betting outcome of an event—\n\t(a)\tknowing that, or being reckless as to whether, the conduct the subject of the agreement corrupts a betting outcome of the event; and\n\t(b)\tintending to obtain a financial advantage, or cause a financial disadvantage, in connection with any betting on the event,\n144J—Concealing conduct or agreement\n\t(1)\tA person who encourages another person to conceal from a relevant authority conduct that corrupts a betting outcome of an event—\n\t(b)\tintending to obtain a financial advantage, or cause a financial disadvantage, in connection with any betting on the event,\n\t(2)\tA person who encourages another person to conceal from a relevant authority an agreement in respect of conduct that corrupts a betting outcome of an event—\n\t(a)\tknowing that, or being reckless as to whether, that conduct corrupts a betting outcome of the event; and\n\t(b)\tintending to obtain a financial advantage, or cause a financial disadvantage, in connection with any betting on the event,\nrelevant authority means—\n\t(a)\ta police officer or law enforcement authority; or\n\t(b)\ta body that has the official function of controlling, regulating or supervising an event or betting on an event; or\n\t(c)\tany other authority of a kind prescribed by regulation.\n144K—Use of corrupt conduct information or inside information for betting purposes\n\t(1)\tA person who possesses information in connection with an event that is corrupt conduct information, and who knows or is reckless as to whether the information is corrupt conduct information, is guilty of an offence if the person—\n\t(a)\tbets on the event; or\n\t(b)\tencourages another person to bet on the event in a particular way; or\n\t(c)\tcommunicates the information to another person who the first person knows or ought reasonably to know would or would be likely to bet on the event,\nand the corrupt conduct information is relevant to the bet.\n\t(2)\tA person who possesses information in connection with an event that is inside information, and who knows or is reckless as to whether the information is inside information, is guilty of an offence if the person—\n\t(a)\tbets on the event; or\n\t(b)\tencourages another person to bet on the event in a particular way; or\n\t(c)\tcommunicates the information to another person who the first person knows or ought reasonably to know would or would be likely to bet on the event,\nand the inside information is relevant to the bet.\nMaximum penalty: Imprisonment for 2 years.\n\t(3)\tFor the purposes of this section—\n\t(a)\tinformation in connection with an event is corrupt conduct information if the information is about conduct, or proposed conduct, that corrupts a betting outcome of the event; and\n\t(b)\tinformation in connection with an event will be taken to be inside information if the information—\n\t(i)\tis not generally available; and\n\t(ii)\tif it were generally available, would, or would be likely to, influence persons who commonly bet on the event in deciding whether or not to bet on the event or make any other betting decision; and\n\t(c)\tinformation will be taken to be generally available if—\n\t(i)\tit consists of matter that is readily observable by the public; or\n\t(ii)\tit has been made known in a manner that would, or would be likely to, bring it to the attention of the public; or\n\t(iii)\tit consists of deductions, conclusions or inferences made or drawn from information referred to in subparagraph (i) or (ii).\n\t(4)\tIn proceedings for an offence against subsection (1)(b) or (c) or subsection (2)(b) or (c), it is not necessary to prove that the person encouraged to bet, or to whom the information was communicated, actually bet on the event concerned.\n\t(5)\tA reference in this section to communicating information includes a reference to causing information to be communicated.\n\t(6)\tIf, on the trial of a person for an offence under subsection (1), the jury is not satisfied that the defendant is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied that the defendant is guilty of an offence under subsection (2), it may find the defendant not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of an offence under subsection (2), and the defendant is liable to punishment accordingly.\n","sortOrder":40},{"sectionNumber":"Part 6","sectionType":"part","heading":"Secret commissions","content":"Part 6—Secret commissions\n145—Interpretation\nbenefit includes an indirect benefit;\nindirect benefit—a benefit given or offered by a person (A) to another person (B) is taken to be an indirect benefit to a third person (C) if it is given or offered with the intention of influencing C and C, knowing of A's intention, acquiesces in A's act;\npublic agency means—\n\t(a)\tthe police force; or\n\t(b)\ta department or administrative unit of the public service; or\n\t(c)\tany other agency or instrumentality of the State; or\n\t(d)\ta body that is subject to control or direction by a Minister, agency or instrumentality of the State; or\n\t(e)\ta body whose members, or a majority of whose members, are appointed by the Governor or a Minister, agency or instrumentality of the State; or\n\t(f)\ta local government body; or\n\t(g)\ta planning assessment panel;\npublic officer means a member, officer or employee of a public agency.\n\t(2)\tA person, who works for a public agency by agreement between the person's employer and the public agency or an authority responsible for staffing the public agency, is to be regarded, for the purposes of this Part, as an employee of the public agency.\nDivision 2—Unlawful bias in commercial relationships\n146—Fiduciaries\n\t(1)\tFor the purposes of this Part, a person is to be regarded as a fiduciary of another (the principal) if—\n\t(a)\tthe person is an agent of the other (under an express or implied authority to act on behalf of the other); or\n\t(b)\tthe person is an employee of the other; or\n\t(c)\tthe person is a public officer and the other is the public agency of which the person is a member or for which the person acts; or\n\t(d)\tthe person is a partner and the other is another partner in the same partnership; or\n\t(e)\tthe person is an officer of a body corporate and the other is the body corporate; or\n\t(f)\tthe person is a lawyer and the other is a client; or\n\t(g)\tthe person is engaged on a commercial basis to provide advice or recommendations to the other on—\n\t(i)\tinvestment; or\n\t(ii)\tbusiness management; or\n\t(iii)\tthe sale or purchase of a business or real or personal property; or\n\t(h)\tthe person is engaged on a commercial basis to provide advice or recommendations to the other on any other subject and the terms or circumstances of the engagement are such that the other (that is, the principal) is reasonably entitled to expect—\n\t(i)\tthat the advice or recommendations will be disinterested; or\n\t(ii)\tthat, if a possible conflict of interest exists, it will be disclosed.\n\t(2)\tA reference to a fiduciary extends to a person who is to become one.\n147—Exercise of fiduciary functions\nA fiduciary exercises a fiduciary function if the fiduciary—\n\t(a)\texercises or intentionally refrains from exercising a power or function in the affairs of the principal; or\n\t(b)\tgives or intentionally refrains from giving advice, or makes or intentionally refrains from making a recommendation, to the principal; or\n\t(c)\texercises an influence that the fiduciary has because of the fiduciary's position as such over the principal or in the affairs of the principal.\n148—Unlawful bias\n\t(1)\tA fiduciary exercises an unlawful bias if—\n\t(a)\tthe fiduciary—\n\t(i)\thas received or expects to receive a benefit from a third party for exercising a fiduciary function in a particular way; and\n\t(ii)\texercises a fiduciary function in the relevant way without appropriate disclosure of the benefit or expected benefit; and\n\t(b)\tthe fiduciary's failure to make appropriate disclosure of the benefit or expected benefit is intentional or reckless.\n\t(2)\tA fiduciary makes appropriate disclosure of a benefit or expected benefit if the fiduciary discloses to the principal—\n\t(a)\tthe nature and value (or approximate value) of the benefit; and\n\t(b)\tthe identity of the third party from whom the benefit has been, or is to be, received.\n149—Offence for fiduciary to exercise unlawful bias\nA fiduciary who exercises an unlawful bias is guilty of an offence.\n150—Bribery\n\t(1)\tA person who bribes a fiduciary to exercise an unlawful bias is guilty of an offence.\n\t(2)\tA person bribes a fiduciary to exercise an unlawful bias if the person—\n\t(a)\tgives or offers to give a benefit intending that the fiduciary will, in return for the benefit, exercise a fiduciary function in a particular way; and\n\t(b)\tknows or believes that the fiduciary will not make an appropriate disclosure of the benefit or expected benefit to the principal or is reckless as to whether or not the fiduciary will make such a disclosure.\n\t(3)\tA fiduciary who accepts a bribe to exercise an unlawful bias is guilty of an offence.\n\t(4)\tA fiduciary accepts a bribe to exercise an unlawful bias if—\n\t(a)\ta person gives or offers to give a benefit intending that the fiduciary will, in return for the benefit, exercise a fiduciary function in a particular way; and\n\t(b)\tthe fiduciary accepts the benefit or the offer—\n\t(i)\tintending not to disclose the benefit or expected benefit to the principal; or\n\t(ii)\tlater forms the intention not to disclose it to the principal.\n\t(5)\tThis section applies even though the relevant fiduciary relationship had not been formed when the benefit was given or offered if, at the relevant time, the fiduciary and the person who gave or offered to give the benefit anticipated the formation of the relevant fiduciary relationship or the formation of fiduciary relationships of the relevant kind.\nDivision 3—Exclusion of defence\n151—Exclusion of defence\nIt is not a defence to a charge of an offence against this Part to establish that the provision or acceptance of benefits of the kind to which the charge relates is customary in a trade or business in which the fiduciary or the person giving or offering the benefit was engaged.\n","sortOrder":41},{"sectionNumber":"Part 6A","sectionType":"part","heading":"Serious criminal trespass","content":"Part 6A—Serious criminal trespass\n167—Sacrilege\n\t(a)\tbreaks and enters a place of divine worship and commits an offence to which this section applies1 in that place; or\n\t(b)\tbreaks out of a place of divine worship after committing an offence to which this section applies1 in that place,\nis guilty of sacrilege and liable to be imprisoned for life.\n1\tie theft or an offence of which theft is an element; an offence against the person; or an offence involving interference with, damage to, or destruction of, property punishable by imprisonment for 3 years or more.\n168—Serious criminal trespass\n\t(1)\tFor the purposes of this Act, a person commits a serious criminal trespass if the person enters or remains in a place (other than a place that is open to the public) as a trespasser with the intention of committing an offence to which this section applies1.\n\t(2)\tA place is to be regarded as open to the public if the public is admitted even though—\n\t(a)\ta charge is made for admission; or\n\t(b)\tthe occupier limits the purposes for which a person may enter or remain in the place by express or implied terms of a public invitation.\n\t(3)\tA person who enters or remains in a place with the consent of the occupier is not to be regarded as a trespasser unless that consent was obtained by—\n\t(a)\tforce; or\n\t(b)\ta threat; or\n\t(c)\tan act of deception.\n\t(4)\tA reference in this section to the occupier of a place extends to any person entitled to control access to the place.\n1\tie theft or an offence of which theft is an element; an offence against the person; or an offence involving interference with, damage to, or destruction of property punishable by imprisonment for 3 years or more.\n169—Serious criminal trespass—non-residential buildings\n\t(1)\tA person who commits a serious criminal trespass in a non-residential building is guilty of an offence.\n\t(b)\tfor an aggravated offence—imprisonment for 20 years.\nnon-residential building means a building or part of a building that is not a place of residence.\n170—Serious criminal trespass—places of residence\n\t(1)\tA person who commits a serious criminal trespass in a place of residence is guilty of an offence.\n\t(b)\tfor an aggravated offence—imprisonment for life.\n\t(2)\tA person who commits a serious criminal trespass in a place of residence is guilty of an aggravated offence if—\n\t(a)\tany of the factors that generally give rise to aggravation of an offence are applicable;1 or\n\t(b)\tanother person is lawfully present in the place of residence when the offence is committed and the offender knows of the other's presence or is reckless about whether anyone is in the place.\nplace of residence means a building, structure, vehicle or vessel, or part of a building, structure, vehicle or vessel, used as a place of residence.\n1\tSee section 5AA.\n170A—Criminal trespass—places of residence\n\t(1)\tA person who trespasses in a place of residence is guilty of an offence if another person is lawfully present in the place and the person knows of the other's presence or is reckless about whether anyone is in the place.\n\t(b)\tfor an aggravated offence—imprisonment for 5 years.\nplace of residence means a building, structure, vehicle or vessel, or part of a building, structure, vehicle or vessel, used as a place of residence.\n","sortOrder":42},{"sectionNumber":"Part 6B","sectionType":"part","heading":"Blackmail","content":"Part 6B—Blackmail\n171—Interpretation\ndemand includes an implied demand;\nharm means—\n\t(a)\tphysical or mental harm (including humiliation or serious embarrassment); or\n\t(b)\tharm to a person's property (including economic harm);\nmenace—a person who makes a threat menaces the person to whom the threat is addressed (the victim) if—\n\t(a)\tthe threat is a threat of harm to the victim or a third person (to be inflicted by the person making the threat or someone else); and\n\t(b)\tthe threat is unwarranted; and\n\t(c)\teither—\n\t(i)\tthe threat would be taken seriously by a reasonable person of normal stability and courage; or\n\t(ii)\tthe victim in fact takes the threat seriously because of a particular vulnerability known to the person making the threat;\nserious offence means an offence punishable by imprisonment;\nthreat includes an implied threat but, unless the threat is a threat of violence, does not include a threat made in the course of, or incidentally to—\n\t(a)\tcollective bargaining; or\n\t(b)\tnegotiations to secure a political or industrial advantage;\nunwarranted—a threat is unwarranted if—\n\t(a)\tthe carrying out of the threat would (if it were carried out in the State) constitute a serious offence; or\n\t(b)\tthe making of the threat is, in the circumstances in which it is made—\n\t(i)\timproper according to the standards of ordinary people; and\n\t(ii)\tknown by the person making the threat to be improper according to the standards of ordinary people.\n\t(2)\tThe question whether a defendant's conduct was improper according to the standards of ordinary people is a question of fact to be decided according to the jury's own knowledge and experience and not on the basis of evidence of those standards.\n172—Blackmail\n\t(1)\tA person who menaces another intending to get the other to submit to a demand is guilty of blackmail.\n\t(a)\tfor a basic offence—imprisonment for 15 years;\n\t(b)\tfor an aggravated offence—imprisonment for 20 years.\n\t(2)\tThe object of the demand is irrelevant.\n1\tThe person who makes the demand may be demanding marriage or access to children.\n2\tThe person who makes the demand may be seeking to influence the performance of a public duty.\nPart 6C—Piracy\n173—Interpretation\n\t(1)\tA person commits an act of piracy if—\n\t(a)\tthe person, acting without reasonable excuse, takes control of a ship, while it is in the course of a voyage, from the person lawfully in charge of it; or\n\t(b)\tthe person, acting without reasonable excuse, commits an act of violence against the captain or a member of the crew of a ship, while it is in the course of a voyage, in order to take control of the ship from the person lawfully in charge of it; or\n\t(c)\tthe person, acting without reasonable excuse, boards a ship, while it is in the course of a voyage, in order to—\n\t(i)\ttake control of the ship from the person lawfully in charge of it; or\n\t(ii)\tendanger the ship; or\n\t(iii)\tsteal or damage the ship's cargo; or\n\t(d)\tthe person boards a ship, while it is in the course of a voyage, in order to commit robbery or any other act of violence against a passenger or a member of the crew.\n\t(2)\tA person takes control of a ship from another if the person compels the other to navigate the ship in accordance with the person's directions.\n174—Piracy\nA person who commits an act of piracy is guilty of an offence.\n","sortOrder":43},{"sectionNumber":"Part 6D","sectionType":"part","heading":"Offences relating to human remains","content":"Part 6D—Offences relating to human remains\n175—Interpretation\ncremated means the reduction of the whole or any part of a human body involving the use of fire or heat, whether authorised under the Burial and Cremation Act 2013 or otherwise;\nhuman remains means the whole or any part of a human body (whatever its physical state may be) and includes the whole or any part of a human body that has been cremated;\ninterred, in relation to human remains, means—\n\t(a)\tthe placement of human remains in a mausoleum, vault, columbarium or other structure designed for the placement of such remains; or\n\t(b)\tthe burial in the earth of human remains (directly in the earth or in a container).\n176—Application of Part\n\t(1)\tThis Part does not apply to, or in relation to, an act or omission relating to human remains that is required or authorised by or under this Act or any other Act or law.\n\t(2)\tThis Part is in addition to, and does not derogate from, the Burial and Cremation Act 2013, the Coroners Act 2003 or any other Act or law relating to human remains.\n\t(3)\tThis Part applies to human remains whether or not the human remains are interred.\n177—Offence to destroy etc human remains to pervert course of justice\n\t(1)\tA person who knowingly—\n\t(a)\tdestroys, removes, conceals or alters human remains; or\n\t(b)\tperforms any other act or omission intended or likely to result in human remains being less likely to be found (whether by a police officer or otherwise),\nfor the purposes of—\n\t(c)\tconcealing the commission of an offence relating to the human remains; or\n\t(d)\tconcealing or destroying evidence consisting of the human remains; or\n\t(e)\timpeding an investigation of an offence relating to the human remains; or\n\t(f)\tinfluencing a decision by a person whether or not to charge a person with an offence relating to the human remains; or\n\t(g)\tinfluencing the outcome of legal proceedings relating to the human remains (whether the proceedings are in progress or proceedings that are to be or may be instituted at a later time),\n\t(2)\tDespite section 26 or any other provision of the Sentencing Act 2017, a court sentencing a person for an offence against this section where the person is also found guilty of causing the death of the decedent must direct that the sentence be cumulative on any sentence of imprisonment or detention in a training centre being served, or to be served, by the defendant (other than a sentence of life imprisonment) in relation to that causing of death.\n\t(3)\tIn proceedings for an offence against this section, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the defendant was aware of the identity of the person who allegedly committed the relevant offence.\n\t(4)\tA person may be found guilty of an offence against this section whether or not a person has been found guilty of the murder of, or otherwise causing the death of, the decedent.\n\t(5)\tA person may be found guilty of an offence against this section whether committed within or outside this State if a court of this State has jurisdiction to deal with the principal offender.\n178—Offence to defile etc human remains\n\t(a)\tknowingly destroys, removes, conceals or alters human remains; or\n\t(b)\tknowingly mutilates or defiles human remains; or\n\t(c)\tremoves any organ or body part from human remains; or\n\t(d)\tengages in sexual activity with human remains,\n179—Offence to fail to report find of or conceal human remains\n\t(1)\tA person who finds human remains, or a thing that the person reasonably suspects may be human remains, must, as soon as is reasonably practicable after the discovery—\n\t(a)\treport that fact to a police officer; and\n\t(b)\tinform the police officer of the location of the remains.\n\t(2)\tHowever, a person need not make a report under subsection (1)—\n\t(a)\tif the person believes on reasonable grounds that another person has reported the existence and location of the human remains or thing to a police officer, or that SA Police were otherwise aware of the existence and location of the remains or thing; or\n\t(b)\tif the State Coroner or a police officer has been notified of the relevant death in accordance with the Coroners Act 2003; or\n\t(c)\tif the person believes on reasonable grounds that the human remains are Aboriginal remains (within the meaning of the Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988) and the discovery of the human remains has been reported in accordance with that Act; or\n\t(d)\tin any other circumstances prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this subsection.\n\t(3)\tA police officer must, on being notified of the finding of human remains under subsection (1), immediately notify the State Coroner of that fact and of any information relating to the matter of which the police officer is aware.\n\t(4)\tA person who, having found human remains, or a thing that the person reasonably suspects may be human remains, conceals the human remains or thing is guilty of an offence.\n180—Alternative verdicts\nIf—\n\t(a)\ta jury is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a charge of an offence against section 177 has been established; but\n\t(b)\tthe Judge has instructed the jury that it is open to the jury on the evidence to find the defendant guilty of a specified offence against section 178 or 179; and\n\t(c)\tthe jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the specified offence against section 178 or 179 has been established,\nthe jury may return a verdict that the defendant is not guilty of the offence charged but is guilty of the specified offence against section 178 or 179.\n","sortOrder":44},{"sectionNumber":"Part 7","sectionType":"part","heading":"Offences of a public nature","content":"Part 7—Offences of a public nature\n237—Definitions\njudicial body means a court or any tribunal, body or person invested by law with judicial or quasi-judicial powers, or with authority to make any inquiry or to receive evidence;\njudicial officer means a person who alone or with others constitutes a judicial body;\njudicial proceedings means proceedings of any judicial body;\npublic officer means a public officer specified in Schedule 1 of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 2012 (and public office has a corresponding meaning);\nState instrumentality means an agency or instrumentality of the Crown or any body (whether or not incorporated) that is established by or under an Act and—\n\t(a)\tis comprised of persons, or has a governing body comprised of persons, a majority of whom are appointed by the Governor, a Minister or an agency or instrumentality of the Crown; or\n\t(b)\tis subject to control or direction by a Minister.\n238—Acting improperly\n\t(1)\tFor the purposes of this Part, a public officer acts improperly, or a person acts improperly in relation to a public officer or public office, if the officer or person knowingly or recklessly acts contrary to the standards of propriety generally and reasonably expected by ordinary decent members of the community to be observed by public officers of the relevant kind, or by others in relation to public officers or public offices of the relevant kind.\n\t(2)\tA person will not be taken to have acted improperly for the purposes of this Part unless the person's act was such that in the circumstances of the case the imposition of a criminal sanction is warranted.\n\t(3)\tWithout limiting the effect of subsection (2), a person will not be taken to have acted improperly for the purposes of this Part if—\n\t(a)\tthe person acted in the honest and reasonable belief that he or she was lawfully entitled to act in the relevant manner; or\n\t(b)\tthere was lawful authority or a reasonable excuse for the act; or\n\t(c)\tthe act was of a trivial character and caused no significant detriment to the public interest.\nact includes omission or refusal or failure to act;\npublic officer includes a former public officer.\n239—General attempt offence excluded\nA person may not be charged with or found guilty of an offence of attempting to commit an offence against this Part.\n240—Parliamentary privilege not affected\nNothing in this Part derogates from Parliamentary privilege.\nDivision 2—Impeding investigation of offences or assisting offenders\n241—Impeding investigation of offences or assisting offenders\n\t(1)\tSubject to subsection (2), a person (the accessory) who, knowing or believing that another person (the principal offender) has committed an offence, does an act with the intention of—\n\t(a)\timpeding investigation of the offence; or\n\t(b)\tassisting the principal offender to escape apprehension or prosecution or to dispose of proceeds of the offence,\n\t(2)\tAn accessory is not guilty of an offence against subsection (1)—\n\t(a)\tunless it is established that the principal offender committed—\n\t(i)\tthe offence that the accessory knew or believed the principal offender to have committed; or\n\t(ii)\tsome other offence committed in the same, or partly in the same, circumstances; or\n\t(b)\tif there is lawful authority or a reasonable excuse for the accessory's action.\n\t(3)\tSubject to subsection (4), the penalty for an offence against subsection (1) is—\n\t(a)\twhere the maximum penalty for the offence established as having been committed by the principal offender is imprisonment for life—imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years;\n\t(b)\twhere the maximum penalty for that offence is imprisonment for a term of 10 years or more (but not for life)—imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years;\n\t(c)\twhere the maximum penalty for that offence is imprisonment for a term of 7 years or more but less than 10 years—imprisonment for a term not exceeding 4 years;\n\t(d)\tin any other case—imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or a maximum penalty the same as the maximum penalty for that offence, whichever is the lesser.\n\t(4)\tWhere the offence established as having been committed by the principal offender is not the offence that the accessory knew or believed the principal offender to have committed, the penalty for an offence against subsection (1) is whichever is the lesser of—\n\t(a)\tthe penalty applicable under subsection (3); or\n\t(b)\tthe penalty that would be applicable under subsection (3) if the offence that the accessory knew or believed the principal offender to have committed were the offence established as having been committed by the principal offender.\n\t(5)\tWhere—\n\t(a)\ta person charged with an offence as a principal offender is found not guilty of the offence charged; but\n\t(b)\tthe court is satisfied that another person was guilty of the offence charged (or some other offence of which the accused might on the charge be found guilty),\nthe court may, if satisfied that the accused is guilty of an offence against subsection (1) as an accessory in relation to the offence charged (or that other offence), find the accused guilty of an offence against subsection (1).\n\t(6)\tAn accessory may be found guilty of an offence against this section whether committed within or outside this State if a court of this State has jurisdiction to deal with the principal offender.\n","sortOrder":45},{"sectionNumber":"Div 2A","sectionType":"division","heading":"Offences relating to providing false or misleading information to a court","content":"Division 2A—Offences relating to providing false or misleading information to a court\n241A—False or misleading information entered into electronic court management system\n\t(1)\tA person who enters information into an ECMS knowing that the information is false or misleading is guilty of an offence.\nMaximum penalty: $10 000.\n\t(2)\tA person who provides information to another person knowing that the information—\n\t(a)\tis false or misleading; and\n\t(b)\twill be, or is likely to be, provided to a court (whether by use of an ECMS or otherwise),\nMaximum penalty: $10 000.\ncourt includes a body prescribed by the regulations;\nECMS means an electronic court management system prescribed by the regulations;\nenters information into an ECMS includes—\n\t(a)\tuploads information or documents; or\n\t(b)\ttakes any other action prescribed by the regulations;\ninformation means information, or information of a kind, prescribed by the regulations.\nDivision 3—Offences relating to judicial proceedings\n242—Perjury and subornation\n\t(1)\tA person who makes a false statement under oath is guilty of perjury.\n\t(2)\tA person who counsels, procures, induces, aids or abets another to make a false statement under oath is guilty of subornation of perjury.\n\t(3)\tIn proceedings on a charge of perjury or subornation of perjury, an apparently genuine document that appears to be a transcript of evidence given in other judicial proceedings is to be accepted as evidence—\n\t(a)\tof the evidence given in those other proceedings; and\n\t(b)\twhere evidence appears from the transcripts to have been given by a particular person—that it was so given; and\n\t(c)\twhere evidence appears from the transcript to have been given under oath—that it was so given.\n\t(4)\tIt is not necessary for the conviction of a person for perjury or subornation of perjury that evidence of the perjury be corroborated.\n\t(5)\tFor the purposes of this section—\n\t(a)\toath includes an affirmation;\nstatement includes an interpretation by an interpreter; and\n\t(b)\ta statement will be taken to be false if it is false in a material particular and—\n\t(i)\tin the case of perjury—the person by whom it was made knew it to be false or did not believe it to be true; or\n\t(ii)\tin the case of subornation of perjury—the person who counselled, procured, induced, aided or abetted the other person to make the statement knew it to be false or did not believe it to be true.\n243—Fabricating, altering or concealing evidence\n\t(a)\tfabricates evidence or alters, conceals or destroys anything that may be required in evidence at judicial proceedings; or\n\t(b)\tuses any evidence or thing knowing it to have been fabricated or altered,\nwith the intention of—\n\t(c)\tinfluencing a decision by a person whether or not to institute judicial proceedings; or\n\t(d)\tinfluencing the outcome of judicial proceedings (whether proceedings that are in progress or proceedings that are to be or may be instituted at a later time),\n244—Offences relating to witnesses\n\t(1)\tSubject to this section, a person who gives, offers or agrees to give a benefit to another person who is or may be required to be a witness in judicial proceedings (whether proceedings that are in progress or proceedings that are to be or may be instituted at a later time) or to a third person as a reward or inducement for the other person's—\n\t(a)\tnot attending as a witness at, giving evidence at or producing a thing in evidence at the proceedings; or\n\t(b)\twithholding evidence or giving false evidence at the proceedings,\n\t(2)\tSubject to this section, a person, who is or may be required to be a witness at judicial proceedings (whether proceedings that are in progress or proceedings that are to be or may be instituted at a later time), who seeks, accepts or agrees to accept a benefit (whether for himself or herself or for a third person) as a reward or inducement for—\n\t(a)\tnot attending as a witness at, giving evidence at or producing a thing in evidence at the proceedings; or\n\t(b)\twithholding evidence or giving false evidence at the proceedings,\n\t(3)\tSubject to this section, a person who prevents or dissuades, or attempts to prevent or dissuade, another person from—\n\t(a)\tattending as a witness at judicial proceedings (whether proceedings that are in progress or proceedings that are to be or may be instituted at a later time); or\n\t(b)\tgiving evidence at, or producing a thing in evidence at, such proceedings,\n\t(4)\tA person is not guilty of an offence against subsection (3) unless the person knows that, or is recklessly indifferent as to whether, the other person is or may be required to be a witness or to produce a thing in evidence at the proceedings.\n\t(5)\tA person who does an act with the intention of deceiving another person in any way in order to affect the evidence of the other person at judicial proceedings (whether proceedings that are in progress or proceedings that are to be or may be instituted at a later time) is guilty of an offence.\n\t(6)\tA person is not guilty of an offence against this section if there is lawful authority or a reasonable excuse for his or her action.\n245—Offences relating to jurors\n\t(1)\tA person who gives, offers or agrees to give a benefit to another person who is or is to be a juror or to a third person as a reward or inducement for the other person's—\n\t(a)\tnot attending as a juror; or\n\t(b)\tacting or not acting as a juror in a way that might influence the outcome of judicial proceedings,\n\t(2)\tA person, who is or is to be a juror, who seeks, accepts or agrees to accept a benefit (whether for himself or herself or for a third person) as a reward or inducement for—\n\t(a)\tnot attending as a juror; or\n\t(b)\tacting or not acting as a juror in a way that might influence the outcome of judicial proceedings,\n\t(3)\tSubject to this section, a person who prevents or dissuades, or attempts to prevent or dissuade, another person from attending as a juror at judicial proceedings is guilty of an offence.\n\t(4)\tA person is not guilty of an offence against subsection (3)—\n\t(a)\tunless the person knows that, or is recklessly indifferent as to whether, the other person is or may be required to attend as a juror at the proceedings; or\n\t(b)\tif there is lawful authority or a reasonable excuse for his or her action.\n\t(5)\tA person who—\n\t(a)\ttakes an oath as a member of a jury in proceedings knowing that he or she has not been selected to be a member of the jury; or\n\t(b)\ttakes the place of a member of a jury in proceedings knowing that he or she is not a member of the jury,\n\t(a)\tif the person acted with the intention of influencing the outcome of the proceedings—imprisonment for 10 years;\n\t(b)\tin any other case—imprisonment for 2 years.\n246—Confidentiality of jury deliberations and identities\n\t(1)\tThis section applies in relation to juries in criminal, civil or coronial proceedings in a court of the State, the Commonwealth, a Territory or another State whether instituted before or after the commencement of this section.\n\t(2)\tA person must not disclose protected information if the person is aware that, in consequence of the disclosure, the information will, or is likely to, be published.\n\t(3)\tA person must not solicit or obtain protected information with the intention of publishing or facilitating the publication of that information.\n\t(4)\tA person must not publish protected information.\n\t(5)\tSubsection (2) does not prohibit disclosing protected information—\n\t(a)\tto a court; or\n\t(b)\tto a Royal Commission; or\n\t(ba)\tto the Independent Commission Against Corruption under the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 2012; or\n\t(c)\tto the Director of Public Prosecutions, a member of the staff of the Director's Office or a member of the police force for the purpose of an investigation concerning an alleged contempt of court or alleged offence relating to jury deliberations or a juror's identity; or\n\t(d)\tas part of a fair and accurate report of an investigation referred to in paragraph (c); or\n\t(e)\tto a person in accordance with an authorisation granted by the Attorney-General to conduct research into matters relating to juries or jury service.\n\t(6)\tSubsection (3) does not prohibit soliciting or obtaining protected information—\n\t(a)\tin the course of proceedings in a court; or\n\t(b)\tby a Royal Commission; or\n\t(ba)\tby the Independent Commission Against Corruption under the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 2012; or\n\t(c)\tby the Director of Public Prosecutions, a member of the staff of the Director's Office or a member of the police force for the purpose of an investigation concerning an alleged contempt of court or alleged offence relating to jury deliberations or a juror's identity; or\n\t(d)\tby a person in accordance with an authorisation granted by the Attorney-General to conduct research into matters relating to juries or jury service.\n\t(7)\tSubsection (4) does not prohibit publishing protected information—\n\t(a)\tin accordance with an authorisation granted by the Attorney-General to conduct research into matters relating to juries or jury service; or\n\t(b)\tas part of a fair and accurate report of—\n\t(i)\tproceedings in respect of an alleged contempt of court, an alleged offence against this section or an alleged offence otherwise relating to jury deliberations or a juror's identity; or\n\t(ii)\tproceedings by way of appeal from proceedings referred to in subparagraph (i); or\n\t(iii)\tif the protected information relates to jury deliberations—proceedings by way of appeal from the proceedings in the course of which the deliberations took place if the nature or circumstances of the deliberations is an issue relevant to the appeal.\n\t(8)\tThis section does not prohibit a person—\n\t(a)\tduring the course of proceedings, publishing or otherwise disclosing, with the permission of the court or otherwise with lawful excuse, information that identifies, or is likely to identify, the person or another person as, or as having been, a juror in the proceedings; or\n\t(b)\tafter proceedings have been completed, publishing or otherwise disclosing—\n\t(i)\tinformation that identifies, or is likely to identify, the person as, or as having been, a juror in the proceedings; or\n\t(ii)\tinformation that identifies, or is likely to identify, another person as, or as having been, a juror in the proceedings if the other person has consented to the publication or disclosure of that information.\n\t(9)\tThis section does not apply in relation to information about a prosecution for an alleged offence against this section if, before the prosecution was instituted, that information had been published generally to the public.\n\t(10)\tProceedings for an offence against this section must not be commenced without the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.\n\t(11)\tIn this section—\nprotected information means—\n\t(a)\tparticulars of statements made, opinions expressed, arguments advanced and votes cast by members of a jury in the course of their deliberations, other than anything said or done in open court; or\n\t(b)\tinformation that identifies, or is likely to identify, a person as, or as having been, a juror in particular proceedings;\npublish, in relation to protected information, means communicate or disseminate the information in such a way or to such an extent that it is available to, or likely to come to the notice of, the public or a section of the public.\n247—Harassment to obtain information about jury's deliberations\n\t(1)\tA person who harasses a juror or former juror for the purpose of obtaining information about the deliberations of a jury is guilty of an offence.\n\t(3)\tFor the purposes of this section, the deliberations of a jury include statements made, opinions expressed, arguments advanced or votes cast by members of the jury in the course of their deliberations.\n248—Threats or reprisals relating to persons involved in criminal investigations or judicial proceedings\nwith the intention of inducing a person who is or may be involved in a criminal investigation or judicial proceedings, to act or not to act in a way that might influence the outcome of the investigation or proceedings, is guilty of an offence.\non account of anything said or done by a person involved in a criminal investigation or judicial proceedings in good faith in the conduct of the investigation or proceedings, is guilty of an offence.\n\t(3)\tFor the purposes of this section, a person stalks another if the person does any of the following, in a manner that could reasonably be expected to arouse the other person's apprehension or fear:\n\t(a)\tfollows the other person; or\n\t(b)\tloiters outside the place of residence of the other person or some other place frequented by the other person; or\n\t(c)\tenters or interferes with property in the possession of the other person; or\n\t(d)\tgives or sends offensive material to the other person, or leaves offensive material where it will be found by, given to or brought to the attention of the other person; or\n\t(e)\tpublishes or transmits offensive material by means of the Internet or some other form of electronic communication in such a way that the offensive material will be found by, or brought to the attention of, the other person; or\n\t(f)\tcommunicates with the other person, or to others about the other person, by way of mail, telephone (including associated technology), facsimile transmission or the Internet or some other form of electronic communication; or\n\t(g)\tkeeps the other person under surveillance; or\n\t(h)\tacts in any other way.\n\t(4)\tFor the purposes of this section—\n\t(a)\ta person is involved in a criminal investigation if the person is involved in such an investigation as a witness, victim or legal practitioner or is otherwise assisting a law enforcement body with its inquiries; and\n\t(b)\ta person is involved in judicial proceedings if the person is—\n\t(i)\ta judicial officer or other officer at judicial proceedings; or\n\t(ii)\tinvolved in such proceedings as a witness, juror or legal practitioner,\nwhether the proceedings are in progress or are proceedings that are to be or may be instituted at a later time.\nDivision 4—Offences relating to public officers\n249—Bribery or corruption of public officers\n\t(1)\tA person who improperly gives, offers or agrees to give a benefit to a public officer or former public officer or to a third person as a reward or inducement for—\n\t(a)\tan act done or to be done, or an omission made or to be made, by the public officer or former public officer in his or her official capacity; or\n\t(b)\tthe exercise of power or influence that the public officer or former public officer has or had, or purports or purported to have, by virtue of his or her office,\n\t(2)\tA public officer or former public officer who improperly seeks, accepts or agrees to accept a benefit from another person (whether for himself or herself or for a third person) as a reward or inducement for—\n\t(a)\tan act done or to be done, or an omission made or to be made, in his or her official capacity; or\n\t(b)\tthe exercise of power or influence that the public officer or former public officer has or had, or purports or purported to have, by virtue of his or her office,\n\t(3)\tIn proceedings for an offence against this section, the court must, in determining whether the accused acted improperly in relation to a benefit, take into account any public disclosure of the benefit made by or with the approval of the accused, or any disclosure of the benefit made to a proper authority by or with the approval of the accused.\n250—Threats or reprisals against public officers\nwith the intention of influencing the manner in which a public officer discharges or performs his or her official duties or functions, is guilty of an offence.\non account of anything said or done by a public officer in good faith in the discharge or performance or purported discharge or performance of his or her official duties or functions, is guilty of an offence.\n\t(3)\tFor the purposes of this section, a person stalks another if the person does any of the following, in a manner that could reasonably be expected to arouse the other person's apprehension or fear:\n\t(a)\tfollows the other person; or\n\t(b)\tloiters outside the place of residence of the other person or some other place frequented by the other person; or\n\t(c)\tenters or interferes with property in the possession of the other person; or\n\t(d)\tgives or sends offensive material to the other person, or leaves offensive material where it will be found by, given to or brought to the attention of the other person; or\n\t(e)\tpublishes or transmits offensive material by means of the Internet or some other form of electronic communication in such a way that the offensive material will be found by, or brought to the attention of, the other person; or\n\t(f)\tcommunicates with the other person, or to others about the other person, by way of mail, telephone (including associated technology), facsimile transmission or the Internet or some other form of electronic communication; or\n\t(g)\tkeeps the other person under surveillance; or\n\t(h)\tacts in any other way.\n251—Abuse of public office\n\t(1)\tA public officer who improperly—\n\t(a)\texercises power or influence that the public officer has by virtue of his or her public office; or\n\t(b)\trefuses or fails to discharge or perform an official duty or function; or\n\t(c)\tuses information that the public officer has gained by virtue of his or her public office,\nwith the intention of—\n\t(d)\tsecuring a benefit for himself or herself or for another person; or\n\t(e)\tcausing injury or detriment to another person,\n\t(2)\tA former public officer who improperly uses information that he or she gained by virtue of his or her public office with the intention of—\n\t(a)\tsecuring a benefit for himself or herself or for another person; or\n\t(b)\tcausing injury or detriment to another person,\n\t(3)\tThis section does not apply in relation to the use of information by a member of Parliament in the course of, or for the purposes of, the proper exercise of the functions of a member of Parliament (which include, without limitation, receiving information from constituents and making enquiries on behalf of constituents).\n252—Demanding or requiring benefit on basis of public office\n\t(a)\tdemands or requires from another person a benefit (whether for himself or herself or for a third person); and\n\t(b)\tin making the demand or requirement—\n\t(i)\tsuggests or implies that it should be complied with because the person holds a public office (whether or not the person in fact holds that office); and\n\t(ii)\tknows that there is no legal entitlement to the benefit,\n\t(2)\tSubsection (1) does not apply to a demand made by a public officer to a proper authority in relation to the officer's remuneration or conditions of appointment or employment.\n253—Offences relating to appointment to public office\n\t(1)\tA person who improperly—\n\t(a)\tgives, offers or agrees to give a benefit to another in connection with the appointment or possible appointment of a person to a public office; or\n\t(b)\tseeks, accepts or agrees to accept a benefit (whether for himself or herself or for a third person) on account of an act done or to be done with regard to the appointment or possible appointment of a person to a public office,\n\t(2)\tIn subsection (1)—\nbenefit does not include—\n\t(a)\tsalary or allowances payable in the ordinary course of business or employment; or\n\t(b)\tfees or other remuneration paid to a person for services provided to another person in the ordinary course of business or employment in consideration for assistance provided to the other person in qualifying for, preparing an application for or determining suitability for such an appointment.\nDivision 5—Escape, rescue and harbouring of persons subject to detention\n254—Escape or removal from lawful custody\n\t(1)\tSubject to this section, a person subject to lawful detention who—\n\t(a)\tescapes, or attempts to escape, from custody; or\n\t(b)\tremains unlawfully at large,\n\t(2)\tA child is not guilty of an offence against subsection (1) in respect of an act or omission that constitutes an offence against section 48 of the Young Offenders Act 1993.\n\t(2a)\tA term of imprisonment to which a person is sentenced for an offence against subsection (1) is cumulative on any other term of imprisonment or detention in a training centre that the person is liable to serve.\n\t(3)\tA person who, knowing that, or being recklessly indifferent as to whether, another person is subject to lawful detention—\n\t(a)\tassists in the escape or attempted escape of the other person from custody; or\n\t(b)\twithout lawful authority, removes, or attempts to remove, the other person from custody,\n\t(4)\tA person having custody or authority in respect of another person subject to lawful detention who, knowing that, or being recklessly indifferent as to whether, there is no legal authority to do so—\n\t(a)\treleases or procures the release of, or attempts to release or procure the release of, the other person from custody; or\n\t(b)\tpermits the other person to escape from custody,\n255—Harbouring or employing escapee etc\nA person who, knowing that, or being recklessly indifferent as to whether, another person has escaped from custody or is otherwise unlawfully at large—\n\t(a)\tharbours or employs the other person; or\n\t(b)\tassists the other person to remain unlawfully at large,\nDivision 6—Attempt to obstruct or pervert course of justice or due administration of law\n256—Attempt to obstruct or pervert course of justice or due administration of law\n\t(1)\tA person who attempts to obstruct or pervert the course of justice or the due administration of the law in a manner not otherwise dealt with in the preceding provisions of this Part is guilty of an offence.\n\t(2)\tWhere—\n\t(a)\ta person charged with an offence against any of the preceding provisions of this Part is found not guilty of the offence charged; but\n\t(b)\tthe court is satisfied that the accused is guilty of an offence against subsection (1),\nthe court may, if the maximum penalty prescribed for an offence against subsection (1) is the same as or less than the maximum penalty prescribed for the offence charged, find the accused guilty of an offence against subsection (1).\nDivision 7—Criminal defamation\n257—Criminal defamation\n\t(1)\tA person who, without lawful excuse, publishes defamatory matter concerning another living person—\n\t(a)\tknowing the matter to be false or being recklessly indifferent as to whether the matter is true or false; and\n\t(b)\tintending to cause serious harm, or being recklessly indifferent as to whether the publication of the defamatory matter will cause serious harm, to a person (whether the person defamed or not),\nMaximum penalty: Imprisonment for 3 years.\n\t(2)\tA person charged with an offence against this section has a lawful excuse for the publication of the defamatory matter concerning the other person if the person charged would, having regard only to the circumstances happening before or at the time of the publication, have a defence to an action for damages for defamation if such an action were instituted against him or her by the other person in respect of the publication of the defamatory matter.\n\t(3)\tOn a trial before a jury of an information for an offence against this section—\n\t(a)\tthe question whether the matter published is capable of bearing a defamatory meaning is a question for determination by the judge; and\n\t(b)\tthe question whether the matter published does bear a defamatory meaning is a matter for the jury; and\n\t(c)\tthe jury may give a general verdict of guilty or not guilty on the issues as a whole.\n\t(4)\tProceedings for an offence against this section must not be commenced without the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.\n\t(5)\tIn any proceedings for an offence against this section, a certificate apparently signed by the Director of Public Prosecutions certifying his or her consent to the proceedings is, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to be accepted as proof of the Director's consent.\nDivision 8—Offences limited in relation to industrial disputes and restraint of trade\n258—Offences limited in relation to industrial disputes and restraint of trade\n\t(1)\tAn agreement or combination by two or more persons to do, or procure to be done, an act in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute as defined in the Industrial Relations Act (S.A.) 1972 is not punishable as a conspiracy unless the act, if committed by one person, would be punishable as an indictable offence.\n\t(2)\tNo person is liable to any punishment for doing, or conspiring to do, an act on the ground that the act restrains, or tends to restrain, the free course of trade unless the act constitutes an offence against this Act.\n","sortOrder":46},{"sectionNumber":"Part 7A","sectionType":"part","heading":"Goods contamination and comparable offences","content":"Part 7A—Goods contamination and comparable offences\n259—Interpretation\nact prejudicing public health or safety includes—\n\t(a)\tinterference with the provision of water, electricity, gas, sewerage, drainage, or waste disposal in a way that prejudices, or could prejudice, the health or safety of the public;\n\t(b)\tinterference with a transport or communication system in a way that prejudices, or could prejudice, the health or safety of the public;\n\t(c)\tinterference with any other facility, system or service on which the health or safety of the public is dependent in a way that prejudices, or could prejudice, the health or safety of the public;\nbenefit extends to non-material benefits (or what might be conceived to be benefits)—so that a person who (for example) engages in conduct out of anger or malice is taken to gain a benefit from that conduct by indulging that anger or malice;\nconsumer of goods means a purchaser of the goods or a person who consumes or uses the goods;\nto contaminate goods means to contaminate or interfere with the goods;\ngoods means any article or substance offered for sale, or intended to be offered for sale, to the public;\npublic includes a section of the public (such as consumers of goods of a particular description);\nthreat includes—\n\t(a)\ta threat to be implied from conduct;\n\t(b)\ta conditional threat.\n260—Unlawful acts of goods contamination or other acts prejudicing the health or safety of the public\n\t(1)\tA person is guilty of an offence if the person commits an act to which this section applies intending—\n\t(a)\tto cause prejudice, to create a risk of prejudice, or to create an apprehension of a risk of prejudice, to the health or safety of the public; and\n\t(b)\tby doing so—\n\t(i)\tto gain a benefit for himself, herself or another; or\n\t(ii)\tto cause loss or harm to another; or\n\t(iii)\tto cause public alarm or anxiety.\nMaximum penalty: Imprisonment for 15 years.\n\t(2)\tA person commits an act to which this section applies if the person—\n\t(a)\tcontaminates goods or commits some other act prejudicing public health or safety; or\n\t(b)\tmakes it appear that—\n\t(i)\tgoods have been, or are about to be, contaminated; or\n\t(ii)\tsome other act prejudicing public health or safety has been, or is about to be, committed; or\n\t(c)\tmakes a threat to contaminate goods or to commit some other act prejudicing public health or safety; or\n\t(d)\tfalsely claims that goods have been or are about to be contaminated, or some other act prejudicing public health or safety has been, or is about to be, committed.\n\t(3)\tIn this section, a reference to the contamination of goods is limited to contamination in a way that prejudices or could prejudice the health or safety of a consumer.\n261—Goods contamination unrelated to issues of public health and safety\nA person is guilty of an offence if the person—\n\t(a)\tcontaminates goods; or\n\t(b)\tmakes it appear that goods have been, or are about to be contaminated; or\n\t(c)\tthreatens to contaminate goods; or\n\t(d)\tfalsely claims that goods have been or are about to be contaminated,\nintending—\n\t(e)\tto influence the public against purchasing the goods or goods of the relevant class or to create an apprehension that the public will be so influenced; and\n\t(f)\tby doing so—\n\t(i)\tto gain a benefit for himself, herself or another; or\n\t(ii)\tto cause loss or harm to another.\n","sortOrder":47},{"sectionNumber":"Part 7B","sectionType":"part","heading":"Accessories","content":"Part 7B—Accessories\n267—Aiding and abetting\nA person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of an offence is liable to be prosecuted and punished as a principal offender.\n","sortOrder":48},{"sectionNumber":"Part 7C","sectionType":"part","heading":"Derivative liability for certain offences","content":"Part 7C—Derivative liability for certain offences\n267AA—Offence where unlawfully supplied firearm used in subsequent offence\n\t(1)\tA person (the accused) commits an offence against this section if—\n\t(a)\the or she is found guilty of a prescribed firearm offence in which he or she supplied a firearm to another person; and\n\t(b)\tthat firearm is used in the commission of—\n\t(i)\tan offence against this Act; or\n\t(ii)\tan offence under the law of another jurisdiction consisting of conduct that would, if engaged in this State, be an offence against this Act,\n(the subsequent offence); and\n\t(c)\ta person (the subsequent offender) has been found guilty of the subsequent offence.\nMaximum penalty: Imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term that may be imposed for the subsequent offence.\n\t(2)\tFor the purposes of subsection (1)—\n\t(a)\tthe subsequent offence may be committed before or after the accused is found guilty of the prescribed firearm offence; and\n\t(b)\tthe subsequent offender need not be the person to whom the accused supplied the firearm in respect of the prescribed firearm offence.\n\t(3)\tFor the purposes of subsection (1)(c), a reference to a person being found guilty of a subsequent offence will be taken to include a reference to a finding of a court under Part 8A that the objective elements of the offence are established (whether or not the person was found not criminally responsible due to mental incompetence, or was found to be mentally unfit to stand trial, pursuant to Division 2 or 3 of that Part).\n\t(4)\tAt the trial of an accused for an offence against this section, the prosecution need not prove the accused knew or suspected, or ought to have known or suspected, that—\n\t(a)\tthe firearm referred to in subsection (1)(a) would be, or was, used in the commission of an offence against this Act; or\n\t(b)\tthe subsequent offender would commit, or be found guilty of, an offence against this Act.\n\t(5)\tA person may be charged with an offence against this section and the prescribed firearm offence in the same instrument of charge.\nprescribed firearm offence means an offence against section 10C(10) or 14(1)(b) of the Firearms Act 1977 or section 22(2)(a) or 45(9) of the Firearms Act 2015.\n","sortOrder":49},{"sectionNumber":"Part 7D","sectionType":"part","heading":"Recruiting etc children to engage in certain criminal activities","content":"Part 7D—Recruiting etc children to engage in certain criminal activities\n267AB—Recruiting etc child for criminal activity\n\t(1)\tA prescribed adult who takes any step to require, recruit or encourage a child—\n\t(a)\tto commit a major indictable offence; or\n\t(b)\tto engage in conduct that would, if undertaken by the prescribed adult, constitute a major indictable offence; or\n\t(c)\tto engage in conduct that would, if undertaken by the prescribed adult, constitute aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of a major indictable offence,\n\t(a)\tin the case where the relevant major indictable offence has a maximum penalty of imprisonment for more than 15 years—that maximum penalty; or\n\t(b)\tin the case where the relevant major indictable offence has a maximum penalty of imprisonment for not more than 15 years—imprisonment for 15 years.\n\t(2)\tA prescribed adult may be found guilty of an offence against this section—\n\t(a)\twhether or not the child does, in fact, engage in conduct, or agrees to engage in conduct, that would constitute the relevant major indictable offence; or\n\t(b)\twhether or not the child has been charged with, or found guilty of, the relevant major indictable offence; or\n\t(c)\twhether the relevant major indictable offence is, or is to be, committed within or outside this State.\nchild means a person who is under the age of 18 years;\ncriminal organisation has the same meaning as in Part 3B Division 2;\nprescribed adult means—\n\t(a)\ta member of a criminal organisation or street gang who is 18 years of age or more; or\n\t(b)\ta person who is 21 years of age or more;\nstreet gang has the same meaning as in Part 3BA.\n","sortOrder":50},{"sectionNumber":"Part 8","sectionType":"part","heading":"Intoxication","content":"Part 8—Intoxication\n267A—Definitions\nalleged offence means the offence with which the defendant is charged but also extends to any other offence of which the defendant could be found guilty on the charge;\nconsciousness includes—\n\t(a)\tvolition;\n\t(b)\tintention;\n\t(c)\tknowledge;\n\t(d)\tany other mental state or function relevant to criminal liability;\nconsumption of a drug includes—\n\t(a)\tinjection of the drug (either by the person to whom the drug is administered or someone else); and\n\t(b)\tinhalation of the drug; and\n\t(c)\tany other means of introducing the drug into the body;\ndrug means alcohol or any other substance that is capable (either alone or in combination with other substances) of influencing mental functioning;\nintoxication means a temporary disorder, abnormality or impairment of the mind that results from the consumption or administration of a drug;\nmedical practitioner means a registered medical practitioner or registered dentist;\nobjective element of an offence means an element of the offence that is not a subjective element;\nrecreational use of a drug—consumption of a drug is to be regarded as recreational use of the drug unless—\n\t(a)\tthe drug is administered against the will, or without the knowledge, of the person who consumes it; or\n\t(b)\tthe consumption occurs accidentally; or\n\t(c)\tthe person who consumes the drug does so under duress, or as a result of fraud or reasonable mistake; or\n\t(d)\tthe consumption is therapeutic;\nself-induced—see subsections (2) and (3);\nserious harm means—\n\t(a)\tserious mental or physical harm; or\n\t(b)\tloss of, or damage to property, where the amount or value of the loss or damage exceeds $10 000;\nsubjective element of an offence means a mental element of the offence and includes voluntariness;\ntherapeutic—the consumption of a drug is to be regarded as therapeutic if—\n\t(2)\tIntoxication resulting from the recreational use of a drug is to be regarded as self‑induced.\n\t(3)\tIf a person becomes intoxicated as a result of the combined effect of the therapeutic consumption of a drug and the recreational use of the same or another drug, the intoxication is to be regarded as self‑induced even though in part attributable to therapeutic consumption.\n268—Mental element of offence to be presumed in certain cases\n\t(1)\tIf the objective elements of an alleged offence are established against a defendant but the defendant's consciousness was (or may have been) impaired by intoxication to the point of criminal irresponsibility at the time of the alleged offence, the defendant is nevertheless to be convicted of the offence if it is established that the defendant—\n\t(a)\tformed an intention to commit the offence before becoming intoxicated; and\n\t(b)\tconsumed intoxicants in order to strengthen his or her resolve to commit the offence.\n\t(2)\tIf the objective elements of an alleged offence are established against a defendant but the defendant's consciousness was (or may have been) impaired by self-induced intoxication to the point of criminal irresponsibility at the time of the alleged offence, the defendant is nevertheless to be convicted of the offence if the defendant would, if his or her conduct had been voluntary and intended, have been guilty of the offence.\n\t(3)\tHowever, subsection (2) does not extend to—\n\t(a)\ta case in which it is necessary to establish that the defendant foresaw the consequences of his or her conduct; or\n\t(b)\texcept where the alleged offence is an offence against section 48 (rape)—a case in which it is necessary to establish that the defendant was aware of the circumstances surrounding his or her conduct.\nA, whose consciousness is impaired by self-induced intoxication to the point of criminal irresponsibility at the time of the alleged offence, beats B up and B dies of the injuries. In this case, A could be convicted of manslaughter but not of murder (because A is taken to have intended to do the act that results in death but not the death).\n\t(4)\tIf—\n\t(a)\tthe objective elements of an alleged offence are established against a defendant but the defendant's consciousness was (or may have been) impaired by self-induced intoxication to the point of criminal irresponsibility at the time of the alleged offence; and\n\t(b)\tthe defendant's conduct resulted in death; and\n\t(c)\tthe defendant is not liable to be convicted of the offence under subsection (1) or (2); and\n\t(d)\tthe defendant's conduct, if judged by the standard appropriate to a reasonable and sober person in the defendant's position, falls so short of that standard that it amounts to criminal negligence,\nthe defendant may be convicted of manslaughter and liable to imprisonment for life.\n\t(a)\tthe objective elements of an alleged offence are established against a defendant but the defendant's consciousness was (or may have been) impaired by self‑induced intoxication to the point of criminal irresponsibility at the time of the alleged offence; and\n\t(b)\tthe defendant's conduct resulted in serious harm (but not death); and\n\t(c)\tthe defendant is not liable to be convicted of the offence under subsection (1) or (2); and\n\t(d)\tthe defendant's conduct, if judged by the standard appropriate to a reasonable and sober person in the defendant's position, falls so short of that standard that it amounts to criminal negligence,\nthe defendant may be convicted of causing serious harm by criminal negligence.\n\t(6)\tA defendant's consciousness is taken to have been impaired to the point of criminal irresponsibility at the time of the alleged offence if it is impaired to the extent necessary at common law for an acquittal by reason only of the defendant's intoxication.\n269—Question of intoxication must be specifically raised\n\t(1)\tOn the trial of a defendant who was (or may have been) intoxicated at the time of the alleged offence, the question whether the defendant's consciousness was, or may have been, impaired by intoxication to the point of criminal irresponsibility—\n\t(a)\tis not to be put to the jury by the judge, the prosecutor or the defendant; and\n\t(b)\tif raised by the jury itself, is to be withdrawn from the jury's consideration,\nunless the defendant or the prosecutor specifically asks the judge to address the jury on that question.\n\t(2)\tA defendant's consciousness is taken to have been impaired to the point of criminal irresponsibility at the time of an alleged offence if, because of impairment of consciousness, a subjective element of the alleged offence cannot be established against the defendant.\n","sortOrder":51},{"sectionNumber":"Part 8A","sectionType":"part","heading":"Mental impairment","content":"Part 8A—Mental impairment\n269A—Interpretation\nauthorised person means a person authorised by the Minister to exercise the powers of an authorised person under this Part;\nconsumption of a drug includes—\n\t(a)\tinjection of the drug (either by the person to whom the drug is administered or someone else); and\n\t(b)\tinhalation of the drug; and\n\t(c)\tany other means of introducing the drug into the body;\ncontinuing supervision order—see section 269UB;\ndefence—a defence exists if, even though the objective elements of an offence are found to exist, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of an exclusion, limitation or reduction of criminal liability at common law or by statute;\ndefensible—a defendant's conduct is to be regarded as defensible in proceedings under this Part if, on the trial of the offence to which the proceedings relate, a defence might be found to exist;\n","sortOrder":52},{"sectionNumber":"Div 3A","sectionType":"division","heading":"order—see section 269NB;","content":"Division 3A order—see section 269NB;\ndrug means alcohol or any other substance that is capable (either alone or in combination with other substances) of influencing mental functioning;\nintoxication means a temporary disorder, abnormality or impairment of the mind that results from the consumption or administration of a drug;\njudge includes magistrate;\nlimiting term for a supervision order—see section 269O;\nmedical practitioner means a registered medical practitioner or registered dentist;\nmental illness means a pathological infirmity of the mind (including a temporary one of short duration)1;\nmental impairment includes—\n\t(a)\ta mental illness; or\n\t(b)\tan intellectual disability; or\n\t(c)\ta disability or impairment of the mind resulting from senility;\nMinister means the Minister responsible for the administration of the Mental Health Act 1993;\nnext of kin of a person means a person's spouse, domestic partner, parents and children;\nobjective element of an offence means an element of an offence that is not a subjective element;\nprescribed authority means—\n\t(a)\tthe person for the time being performing the duties, or holding or acting in the position, of the Clinical Director, Forensic Mental Health Service South Australia; or\n\t(b)\tif no such position exists—the person declared by the regulations to be the prescribed authority for the purposes of this Part;\npsychiatrist means a person registered under the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law as a specialist in psychiatry;\nrecreational use of a drug—consumption of a drug is to be regarded as recreational use of the drug unless—\n\t(a)\tthe drug is administered against the will, or without the knowledge, of the person who consumes it; or\n\t(b)\tthe consumption occurs accidentally; or\n\t(c)\tthe person who consumes the drug does so under duress, or as a result of fraud or reasonable mistake; or\n\t(d)\tthe consumption is therapeutic;\nself-induced—see subsections (2a) and (2b);\nsubjective element of an offence means voluntariness, intention, knowledge or some other mental state that is an element of the offence;\nsupervision order—see section 269O;\ntherapeutic—the consumption of a drug is to be regarded as therapeutic if—\n\t(ii)\tis consumed for a purpose recommended by the manufacturer and in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions;\ntraining centre means a training centre established for the detention of youths;\nvictim, in relation to an offence or conduct that would, but for the perpetrator's mental impairment, have constituted an offence, means a person who suffered significant mental or physical injury as a direct consequence of the offence or the conduct;\nyouth has the same meaning as in the Young Offenders Act 1993.\n\t(2)\tFor the purposes of this Part—\n\t(a)\tthe question whether a person was mentally competent to commit an offence is a question of fact;\n\t(b)\tthe question whether a person is mentally unfit to stand trial on a charge of an offence is a question of fact.\n\t(2a)\tIntoxication resulting from the recreational use of a drug is to be regarded as self‑induced.\n\t(2b)\tIf a person becomes intoxicated as a result of the combined effect of the therapeutic consumption of a drug and the recreational use of the same or another drug, the intoxication is to be regarded as self‑induced even though in part attributable to therapeutic consumption.\n\t(3)\tIn applying a provision of this Part to a youth who is being or has been dealt with as a youth (and not as an adult)—\n\t(a)\ta reference to custody in a prison is to be read as detention in a training centre; and\n\t(b)\ta reference to the Parole Board is to be read as a reference to the Training Centre Review Board.\n1\tA condition that results from the reaction of a healthy mind to extraordinary external stimuli is not a mental illness, although such a condition may be evidence of mental illness if it involves some abnormality and is prone to recur (see R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30).\n269AB—Reference to finding of not guilty to include finding of mental incompetence\nA reference to a person being found not guilty of an offence in any Act, legislative instrument or other law will, unless the contrary intention appears, be taken to include a reference to a finding of a court under this Part that the objective elements of the offence are established but the person is not criminally responsible due to mental incompetence.\n269B—Distribution of judicial functions between judge and jury\n\t(1)\tAn investigation under this Part by the Supreme Court or the District Court into—\n\t(a)\ta defendant's mental competence to commit an offence or a defendant's mental fitness to stand trial; or\n\t(b)\twhether elements of the offence have been established,\nis to be conducted before a jury unless the defendant has elected to have the matter dealt with by a judge sitting alone.\n\t(2)\tThe same jury may deal with issues arising under this Part about a defendant's mental competence to commit an offence, or fitness to stand trial, and the issues on which the defendant is to be tried, unless the trial judge thinks there are special reasons to have separate juries.\n\t(3)\tAny other powers or functions conferred on a court by this Part are to be exercised by the court constituted of a judge sitting alone.\n\t(4)\tThe defendant's right to elect to have an investigation under this Part conducted by a judge sitting alone is not subject to any statutory qualification.1\n1\tThe intention is to ensure that the right to elect for trial by judge alone is unfettered by the statutory qualifications on that right imposed by the Juries Act 1927 (thus preserving the principle enunciated in R v T [1999] SASC 429 on this point).\n269BA—Charges on which alternative verdicts are possible\n\t(1)\tA person charged with an offence is taken, for the purposes of this Part, to be charged in the alternative with any lesser offence for which a conviction is possible on that charge.\n\t(2)\tIt follows that a trial of a charge on which an alternative verdict for a lesser offence is possible is taken to be a trial of a charge of each of the offences for which a conviction is possible.\nDivision 2—Mental competence to commit offences\n269C—Mental competence\n\t(1)\tA person is mentally incompetent to commit an offence if, at the time of the conduct alleged to give rise to the offence, the person is suffering from a mental impairment and, in consequence of the mental impairment—\n\t(a)\tdoes not know the nature and quality of the conduct; or\n\t(b)\tdoes not know that the conduct is wrong; that is, the person could not reason about whether the conduct, as perceived by reasonable people, is wrong; or\nParagraph (b) adopts the test as stated and excludes from consideration whether the defendant could reason with a moderate degree of sense and composure as set out in R v Porter (1936) 55 CLR 182.\n\t(c)\tis totally unable to control the conduct.\n\t(2)\tIf, on an investigation under this Division, a person is found to be mentally incompetent to commit an offence and the trial judge is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the mental impairment at the time of the conduct alleged to give rise to the offence was substantially caused by self‑induced intoxication (whether the intoxication occurred at the time of the relevant conduct or at any other time before the relevant conduct), the person may not be dealt with under this Part but may (if appropriate) be dealt with under Part 8.\n\t(3)\tHowever, despite the fact that the judge is satisfied that the person's mental impairment at the time of the conduct alleged to give rise to the offence was substantially caused by self‑induced intoxication, the judge may nevertheless make an order that the person be dealt with under this Part after taking into account—\n\t(a)\tthe time and circumstances of when and how the intoxication caused the mental impairment; and\n\t(b)\tthe interests of justice; and\n\t(c)\twhether the making of such an order would affect public confidence in the administration of justice.\n269D—Presumption of mental competence\nA person's mental competence to commit an offence is to be presumed unless the person is found, on an investigation under this Division, to have been mentally incompetent to commit the offence.\n269E—Reservation of question of mental competence\n\t(1)\tIf, on the trial of a person for an offence—\n\t(a)\tthe defendant raises a defence of mental incompetence; or\n\t(b)\tthe court decides, on application by the prosecution or on its own initiative, that the defendant's mental competence to commit the offence should be investigated in the interests of the proper administration of justice,\nthe question of the defendant's mental competence to commit the offence must be separated from the remainder of the trial.\n\t(2)\tThe trial judge has a discretion to proceed first with the trial of the objective elements of the offence or with the trial of the mental competence of the defendant.\n\t(3)\tIf, at committal proceedings for a charge of an indictable offence, the question of the defendant's mental competence to commit the offence arises, the question must be reserved for consideration by the court of trial.\n269F—What happens if trial judge decides to proceed first with trial of defendant's mental competence to commit offence\nIf the trial judge decides that the defendant's mental competence to commit the offence is to be tried first, the court proceeds as follows.\nA—Trial of defendant's mental competence\n\t(1)\tThe court—\n\t(a)\tmust hear relevant evidence and representations put to the court by the prosecution and the defence on the question of the defendant's mental competence to commit the offence; and\n\t(b)\tmay require the defendant to undergo an examination by a psychiatrist or other appropriate expert and require the results of the examination to be reported to the court.\n\t(b)\tif the judge considers the examination and report necessary to prevent a possible miscarriage of justice—on the judge's own initiative.\n\t(3)\tAt the conclusion of the trial of the defendant's mental competence, the court must decide whether it has been established, on the balance of probabilities, that the defendant was at the time of the alleged offence mentally incompetent to commit the offence and—\n\t(a)\tif so—must record a finding to that effect;\n\t(b)\tif not—must record a finding that the presumption of mental competence has not been displaced and proceed with the trial in the normal way.\n\t(a)\tdispense with, or terminate, an investigation into a defendant's mental competence to commit an offence; and\n\t(b)\trecord a finding that the defendant was mentally incompetent to commit the offence.\nB—Trial of objective elements of offence\n\t(1)\tIf the court records a finding that the defendant was mentally incompetent to commit the offence, the court must hear evidence and representations put to the court by the prosecution and the defence relevant to the question whether the court should find that the objective elements of the offence are established.\n\t(2)\tIf the court is satisfied that the objective elements of the offence are established beyond reasonable doubt, the court must record a finding that the objective elements of the offence are established.\n\t(3)\tIf the court finds that the objective elements of the offence are established, the court must record a finding of conduct proved but not criminally responsible due to mental incompetence, and (subject to Division 3A) declare the defendant to be liable to supervision under Division 4 Subdivision 2; but otherwise the court must find the defendant not guilty of the offence and discharge the defendant.\n\t(4)\tOn the trial of the objective elements of an offence, the court is to exclude from consideration any question of whether the defendant's conduct is defensible.\n269G—What happens if trial judge decides to proceed first with trial of objective elements of offence\nIf the trial judge decides to proceed first with the trial of the objective elements of the offence, the court proceeds as follows.\nA—Trial of objective elements of offence\n\t(1)\tThe court must first hear evidence and representations put to the court by the prosecution and the defence relevant to the question whether the court should find that the objective elements of the offence are established against the defendant.\n\t(2)\tIf the court is satisfied that the objective elements of the offence are established beyond reasonable doubt, the court must record a finding that the objective elements of the offence are established; but otherwise the court must find the defendant not guilty of the offence and discharge the defendant.\n\t(3)\tOn the trial of the objective elements of an offence, the court is to exclude from consideration any question of whether the defendant's conduct is defensible.\nB—Trial of defendant's mental competence\n\t(1)\tIf the court records a finding that the objective elements of the offence are established, the court—\n\t(a)\tmust hear relevant evidence and representations put to the court by the prosecution and the defence on the question of the defendant's mental competence to commit the offence; and\n\t(b)\tmay require the defendant to undergo an examination by a psychiatrist or other appropriate expert and require the results of the examination to be reported to the court.\n\t(b)\tif the judge considers the examination and report necessary to prevent a possible miscarriage of justice—on the judge's own initiative.\n\t(3)\tAt the conclusion of the trial of the defendant's mental competence, the court must decide whether it has been established, on the balance of probabilities, that the defendant was at the time of the alleged offence mentally incompetent to commit the offence and—\n\t(a)\tif so—must declare that the defendant was mentally incompetent to commit the offence, record a finding of conduct proved but not criminally responsible due to mental incompetence, and (subject to Division 3A) declare the defendant to be liable to supervision under Division 4 Subdivision 2;\n\t(b)\tif not—must record a finding that the presumption of mental competence has not been displaced and proceed with the trial in the normal way.\n\t(4)\tIf the trial is to proceed under subsection B(3)(b), the objective elements of the offence are to be accepted as established.\n\t(a)\tdispense with, or terminate, an investigation into a defendant's mental competence to commit an offence; and\n\t(b)\tdeclare that the defendant was mentally incompetent to commit the offence, record a finding of conduct proved but not criminally responsible due to mental incompetence, and (subject to Division 3A) declare the defendant to be liable to supervision under Division 4 Subdivision 2.\nDivision 3—Mental unfitness to stand trial\n269H—Mental unfitness to stand trial\nA person is mentally unfit to stand trial on a charge of an offence if the person's mental processes are so disordered or impaired that the person is—\n\t(a)\tunable to understand, or to respond rationally to, the charge or the allegations on which the charge is based; or\n\t(b)\tunable to exercise (or to give rational instructions about the exercise of) procedural rights (such as, for example, the right to challenge jurors); or\n\t(c)\tunable to understand the nature of the proceedings, or to follow the evidence or the course of the proceedings.\n269I—Presumption of mental fitness to stand trial\nA person's mental fitness to stand trial is to be presumed unless it is established, on an investigation under this Division, that the person is mentally unfit to stand trial.\n269J—Order for investigation of mental fitness to stand trial\n\t(1)\tIf there are reasonable grounds to suppose that a person is mentally unfit to stand trial, the court before which the person is to be tried may order an investigation under this Division of the defendant's mental fitness to stand trial.\n\t(2)\tThe court's power to order an investigation into the defendant's mental fitness to stand trial may be exercised—\n\t(b)\tif the judge considers the investigation necessary to prevent a possible miscarriage of justice—on the judge's own initiative.\n\t(3)\tIf a court orders an investigation into the defendant's mental fitness to stand trial after the trial begins, the court may adjourn or discontinue the trial to allow for the investigation.\n\t(4)\tIf a court before which committal proceedings for an indictable offence are conducted is of the opinion that the defendant may be mentally unfit to stand trial, the committal proceedings may continue, but the court must raise for consideration by the court of trial the question whether there should be an investigation under this Division of the defendant's mental fitness to stand trial.\n269K—Preliminary prognosis of defendant's condition\n\t(1)\tBefore formally embarking on an investigation under this Division of a defendant's mental fitness to stand trial, a court may require production of psychiatric or other expert reports that may exist on the defendant's mental condition and may, if it thinks fit, itself have a report prepared on the defendant's mental condition.\n\t(2)\tIf it appears from a report that the defendant is mentally unfit to stand trial but there is a reasonable prospect that the defendant will regain the necessary mental capacity over the next 12 months, the court may adjourn the defendant's trial for not more than 12 months.\n\t(3)\tIf after the adjournment the court is of the opinion that the grounds on which the investigation was thought to be necessary no longer exist, the court may revoke the order for the investigation and the trial will then proceed in the normal way.\n269L—Trial judge's discretion about course of trial\nIf the court orders an investigation into a defendant's mental fitness to stand trial, the question of the defendant's mental fitness to stand trial may, at the discretion of the trial judge, be separately tried before any other issue that is to be tried or after a trial of the objective elements of the alleged offence.\n269M—What happens if trial judge decides to proceed first with trial of defendant's mental fitness to stand trial\nIf the trial judge decides that the defendant's mental fitness to stand trial is to be tried first, the court proceeds as follows.\nA—Trial of defendant's mental fitness to stand trial\n\t(1)\tThe court—\n\t(a)\tmust hear relevant evidence and representations put to the court by the prosecution and the defence on the question of the defendant's mental fitness to stand trial; and\n\t(b)\tmay require the defendant to undergo an examination by a psychiatrist or other appropriate expert and require the results of the examination to be reported to the court.\n\t(b)\tif the judge considers the examination and report necessary to prevent a possible miscarriage of justice—on the judge's own initiative.\n\t(3)\tAt the conclusion of the trial of the defendant's mental fitness to stand trial, the court must decide whether it has been established, on the balance of probabilities, that the defendant is mentally unfit to stand trial and—\n\t(a)\tif so—must record a finding to that effect;\n\t(b)\tif not—must proceed with the trial in the normal way.\n\t(a)\tdispense with, or terminate, an investigation into a defendant's fitness to stand trial; and\n\t(b)\trecord a finding that the defendant is mentally unfit to stand trial.\nB—Trial of objective elements of offence\n\t(1)\tIf the court records a finding that the defendant is mentally unfit to stand trial, the court must hear evidence and representations put to the court by the prosecution and the defence relevant to the question whether a finding should be recorded under this section that the objective elements of the offence are established.\n\t(2)\tIf the court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the objective elements of the offence are established, the court must record a finding to that effect, and (subject to Division 3A) declare the defendant to be liable to supervision under Division 4 Subdivision 2; but otherwise the court must find the defendant not guilty of the offence and discharge the defendant.\n\t(3)\tOn the trial of the objective elements of an offence under this section, the court is to exclude from consideration any question of whether the defendant's conduct is defensible.\n269N—What happens if trial judge decides to proceed first with trial of objective elements of offence\nIf the trial judge decides to proceed first with the trial of the objective elements of the offence, the court proceeds as follows.\nA—Trial of objective elements of offence\n\t(1)\tThe court must first hear evidence and representations put to the court by the prosecution and the defence relevant to the question whether the court should find that the objective elements of the offence are established.\n\t(2)\tIf the court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the objective elements of the offence are established, the court must record a finding to that effect; but otherwise the court must find the defendant not guilty of the offence and discharge the defendant.\n\t(3)\tOn the trial of the objective elements of an offence under this section, the court is to exclude from consideration any question of whether the defendant's conduct is defensible.\nB—Trial of defendant's mental fitness to stand trial\n\t(1)\tIf the court records a finding that the objective elements of the offence are established, the court—\n\t(a)\tmust hear relevant evidence and representations put to the court by the prosecution and the defence on the question of the defendant's mental fitness to stand trial; and\n\t(b)\tmay require the defendant to undergo an examination by a psychiatrist or other appropriate expert and require the results of the examination to be reported to the court.\n\t(b)\tif the judge considers the examination and report necessary to prevent a possible miscarriage of justice—on the judge's own initiative.\n\t(3)\tIf the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the defendant is mentally unfit to stand trial, the court must record a finding to that effect, and (subject to Division 3A) declare the defendant to be liable to supervision under Division 4 Subdivision 2.\n\t(4)\tIf the court is not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the defendant is mentally unfit to stand trial, the court must proceed with the trial of the remaining issues (or may, at its discretion, re-start the trial).\n\t(a)\tdispense with, or terminate, an investigation into a defendant's mental fitness to stand trial; and\n\t(b)\tdeclare that the defendant is mentally unfit to stand trial, and declare the defendant to be liable to supervision under this Part.\nDivision 3A—Disposition of persons with mental impairment charged with summary and minor indictable offences\n","sortOrder":53},{"sectionNumber":"Subdiv 1","sectionType":"subdivision","heading":"Principle on which court is to act","content":"Subdivision 1—Principle on which court is to act\n269NA—Principle on which court is to act\n\t(1)\tThe paramount consideration of the court in determining whether to release a defendant under this Division, or the conditions of a licence, must be to protect the safety of the community (whether as individuals or in general).\n\t(2)\tThe paramount consideration of the safety of the community outweighs the principle that restrictions on the defendant's freedom and personal autonomy should be kept to a minimum.\n","sortOrder":54},{"sectionNumber":"Subdiv 2","sectionType":"subdivision","heading":"Making, variation and revocation of Division 3A orders","content":"Subdivision 2—Making, variation and revocation of Division 3A orders\n269NB—Division 3A orders\n\t(1)\tThis section applies in respect of a defendant who has been charged with a summary offence or a minor indictable offence in relation to which the court has found—\n\t(a)\ton an investigation under Division 2—that the objective elements of the offence are established but the defendant is not criminally responsible because the defendant was mentally incompetent to commit the offence; or\n\t(b)\ton an investigation under Division 3—that the objective elements of the offence are established but the defendant is mentally unfit to stand trial for the offence.\n\t(2)\tThe court may—\n\t(a)\tdismiss the charge and release the defendant unconditionally; or\n\t(b)\tdeclare the defendant to be liable to supervision under Division 4 Subdivision 2; or\n\t(c)\tmake an order (a Division 3A order) releasing the defendant on licence for the period (which must not exceed 5 years) specified by the court in the licence; or\n\t(d)\tadjourn the proceedings; or\n\t(e)\tremand the defendant on bail; or\n\t(f)\tmake any other order that the court thinks fit.\n\t(3)\tIf a Division 3A order is made releasing the defendant on licence, the licence is subject to the following conditions:\n\t(a)\tthe conditions imposed by subsection (4);\n\t(b)\tany other condition decided by the court and specified in the licence.\n\t(4)\tSubject to this Act, every licence under subsection (2)(c) is subject to the following conditions:\n\t(a)\ta condition prohibiting the defendant from possessing a firearm or ammunition (both within the meaning of the Firearms Act 2015) or any part of a firearm;\n\t(b)\ta condition requiring the defendant to submit to such tests (including testing without notice) for gunshot residue as may be reasonably required by a person or body specified by the court.\n\t(5)\tA court may only vary or revoke the conditions imposed by subsection (4) if the defendant satisfies the court, by evidence given on oath, that—\n\t(b)\tthe possession of a firearm, ammunition or part of a firearm by the defendant does not represent an undue risk to the safety of the public.\n\t(6)\tWithout limiting the generality of subsection (3)(b), release on licence under a Division 3A order may, for example, be subject to—\n\t(b)\ta condition that the defendant be under the care of a responsible person (who must be specified in the licence); or\n\t(c)\ta condition that the defendant undergo assessment or treatment (or both) relating to the defendant's mental condition; or\n\t(d)\ta condition that the defendant be monitored by use of an electronic device approved under section 4 of the Correctional Services Act 1982; or\n\t(e)\tany other condition that the court thinks fit.\n\t(7)\tFor the purpose of assisting a court to determine proceedings under this Division, the court may require the Crown to provide the court with a report setting out, so far as reasonably ascertainable, the views of—\n\t(a)\tthe next of kin of the defendant; and\n\t(b)\tthe victim (if any) of the defendant's conduct.\n269NC—Court may direct defendant to surrender firearm etc\n\t(1)\tThe court by which a defendant is declared to be liable to a Division 3A order may, in relation to the condition imposed by section 269NB(4)(a), direct the defendant to immediately surrender at a police station specified by the court any firearm, ammunition or part of a firearm owned or possessed by the defendant.\n\t(2)\tNo criminal liability attaches to a person to the extent that the person is complying with a direction under this section.\n\t(3)\tThe Commissioner of Police must deal with any surrendered firearm, ammunition or part of a firearm in accordance with the scheme set out in the regulations.\n\t(4)\tNo compensation is payable by the Crown or any other person in respect of the exercise of a function or power under this section.\n\t(5)\tThe regulations may provide for the payment, recovery or waiver of fees in respect of this section.\n269ND—Variation or revocation of condition of Division 3A order\nAt any time during the period that a defendant is subject to a Division 3A order, the court may, on the application of the Crown, the defendant, the Parole Board, the Public Advocate or another person with a proper interest in the matter (including a person who has been specified in the licence as a responsible person), vary or revoke the order and, if the order is revoked, make, in substitution for the order, any other order that the court might have made under this Division in the first instance.\n269NDA—Revision of Division 3A orders\n\t(1)\tIf a person who has been released on licence under this Division contravenes or is likely to contravene a condition of the licence, the court by which the Division 3A order was made may, on application by the Crown (which may be made, in a case of urgency, by telephone), review the order.\n\t(2)\tOn an application for a review being made, the court may make an interim order in such terms as the court thinks appropriate in the circumstances, including an order that the person be detained in a specified place for a specified period pending the determination of the review.\n\t(3)\tAfter allowing the Crown and the person subject to the order a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the application for review, the court may do 1 or more of the following:\n\t(a)\tconfirm the present terms of the Division 3A order;\n\t(b)\tamend the order by varying the conditions of the licence;\n\t(c)\trevoke the order and declare the defendant to be liable to supervision under Division 4 Subdivision 2;\nSubdivision 3—Administrative detention for defendant released on licence under this Division\n269NE—Administrative detention for defendant released on licence under this Division\n\t(1)\tIf a defendant who has been released on licence under a Division 3A order contravenes or is likely to contravene a condition of the licence, the prescribed authority may issue an order (an administrative detention order) that the defendant be detained in a specified place for a specified period (which must not exceed 14 days).\n\t(2)\tAn administrative detention order must—\n\t(a)\tbe directed to the Commissioner of Police and police officers generally; and\n\t(b)\tbe in writing in the form approved by the Minister.\n\t(3)\tA person in respect of whom an administrative detention order has been issued who is taken into the care and control of a police officer under this Subdivision must be given a copy of the order as soon as practicable.\n\t(4)\tThe progress and circumstances of a person detained under an administrative detention order must be reviewed as soon as reasonably practicable after the person is so detained—\n\t(a)\tto determine whether an application should be made to the court for a review of the Division 3A order to which the person is subject; and\n\t(b)\tfor any other purpose as the prescribed authority thinks fit in the circumstances.\n\t(5)\tDespite subsection (1), a person who has been detained under an administrative detention order cannot be detained under another such order unless a period of at least 14 days has elapsed since the expiry of the previous administrative detention order.\n269NF—Powers of police officers relating to persons in respect of whom an administrative detention order has been issued\n\t(1)\tThis section applies to a person in respect of whom an administrative detention order has been issued under section 269NE.\n\t(2)\tA police officer may, subject to this section, exercise the following powers in relation to a person to whom this section applies:\n\t(a)\tthe police officer may take the person into the officer's care and control;\n\t(b)\tthe police officer may transport the person from place to place;\n\t(c)\tthe police officer may restrain the person and otherwise use force in relation to the person as reasonably required in the circumstances;\n\t(d)\tthe police officer may enter and remain in a place where the officer reasonably suspects the person may be found;\n\t(e)\tthe police officer may use reasonable force to break into a place when that is reasonably required in order to take the person into the officer's care and control;\n\t(f)\tthe police officer may search the person's clothing or possessions and take possession of anything in the person's possession that the person may use to cause harm to the person's self or others or property.\n\t(3)\tA police officer who takes the person into the officer's care and control must, as soon as practicable, transport the person, or arrange for the person to be transported by some other police officer, in accordance with the administrative detention order.\n\t(4)\tThe powers conferred by this section continue to be exercisable as reasonably required for the purpose of enabling or facilitating the medical examination or treatment of the person.\n\t(5)\tA search of a person must be carried out expeditiously and in a manner that avoids, as far as reasonably practicable, causing the person any humiliation or offence.\n\t(6)\tAnything taken into the possession of a police officer under this section may be held for as long as is necessary for reasons of safety, but must otherwise be returned to the person from whom it was taken or dealt with according to law.\nSubdivision 4—Custody, supervision and care\n269NG—Custody, supervision and care\n\t(1)\tIf a defendant is committed to detention under this Division, the defendant is in the custody of the Minister and the Minister may give directions for the custody, supervision and care of the defendant the Minister considers appropriate.\n\t(2)\tThe Minister may—\n\t(a)\tplace the defendant under the custody, supervision and care of another; and\n\t(b)\tif there is no practicable alternative—direct that a defendant be kept in custody in a prison.\n\t(3)\tSupervisory responsibilities arising from conditions on which a person is released on licence are to be divided between the Parole Board and the Minister in the following way:\n\t(a)\tthe supervisory responsibilities are to be exercised by the Minister insofar as they relate to treating or monitoring the mental condition of the person; and\n\t(b)\tthe supervisory responsibilities are in all other respects to be exercised by the Parole Board.\n\t(4)\tThe Minister or the Parole Board (as the case may be) may delegate a power or function under this section—\n\t(a)\tto a person for the time being performing particular duties or holding or acting in a particular position; or\n\t(b)\tto any other person or body that, in the delegator's opinion, is competent to perform or exercise the relevant functions or powers.\n\t(5)\tA delegation under subsection (4)—\n\t(a)\tmust be by instrument in writing; and\n\t(b)\tmay be absolute or conditional; and\n\t(c)\tdoes not derogate from the ability of the delegator to act in any matter; and\n\t(d)\tis revocable at will by the delegator.\n","sortOrder":55},{"sectionNumber":"Subdiv 5","sectionType":"subdivision","heading":"Effect of supervening imprisonment on Division 3A order","content":"Subdivision 5—Effect of supervening imprisonment on Division 3A order\n269NH—Effect of supervening imprisonment on Division 3A order\n\t(1)\tIf a person who has been released on licence under this Division commits an offence while subject to the licence and is sentenced to imprisonment for the offence, the Division 3A order is suspended for the period the person is in prison serving the term of imprisonment.\n\t(2)\tIn determining when the term of a Division 3A order comes to an end, the period of a suspension under subsection (1) is not to be taken into account.\nDivision 4—Disposition of persons declared to be liable to supervision under this Division\nSubdivision 1—Principle on which court is to act\n269NI—Principle on which court is to act\n\t(1)\tThe paramount consideration of the court in determining whether to release a defendant under this Division, or the conditions of a licence, must be to protect the safety of the community (whether as individuals or in general).\n\t(2)\tThe paramount consideration of the safety of the community outweighs the principle that restrictions on the defendant's freedom and personal autonomy should be kept to a minimum.\nSubdivision 2—Making, variation and revocation of supervision orders\n269O—Supervision orders\n\t(1)\tThe court by which a defendant is declared to be liable to supervision under this Subdivision may—\n\t(a)\trelease the defendant unconditionally; or\n\t(b)\tmake an order (a supervision order)—\n\t(i)\tcommitting the defendant to detention under this Subdivision; or\n\t(ii)\treleasing the defendant on licence on the following conditions:\n\t(A)\tthe conditions imposed by subsection (1a);\n\t(B)\tany other condition decided by the court and specified in the licence.\n\t(1aa)\tWithout limiting the generality of subsection (1)(b)(ii)(B), release on licence under a supervision order may, for example, be subject to—\n\t(b)\ta condition that the defendant undergo assessment or treatment (or both) relating to the defendant's mental condition; or\n\t(c)\ta condition that the defendant be monitored by use of an electronic device approved under section 4 of the Correctional Services Act 1982; or\n\t(d)\tany other condition that the court thinks fit.\n\t(1a)\tSubject to this Act, every licence under subsection (1)(b)(ii) is subject to the following conditions:\n\t(a)\ta condition prohibiting the defendant from possessing a firearm or ammunition (both within the meaning of the Firearms Act 2015) or any part of a firearm;\n\t(b)\ta condition requiring the defendant to submit to such tests (including testing without notice) for gunshot residue as may be reasonably required by a person or body specified by the court.\n\t(1b)\tA court may only vary or revoke the conditions imposed by subsection (1a) if the defendant satisfies the court, by evidence given on oath, that—\n\t(b)\tthe possession of a firearm, ammunition or part of a firearm by the defendant does not represent an undue risk to the safety of the public.\n\t(2)\tIf a court makes a supervision order, the court must fix a term (a limiting term) equivalent to the period of imprisonment or supervision (or the aggregate period of imprisonment and supervision) that would, in the court's opinion, have been appropriate if the defendant had been convicted of the offence of which the objective elements have been established1.\n\t(3)\tAt the end of the limiting term, a supervision order in force against the defendant under this Division lapses.\n1\tThe court should fix a limiting term by reference to the sentence that would have been imposed if the defendant had been found guilty of the relevant offence and without taking account of the defendant's mental impairment.\n269OA—Court may direct defendant to surrender firearm etc\n\t(1)\tThe court by which a defendant is declared to be liable to supervision under this Subdivision may, in relation to a supervision order that is subject to the condition imposed by section 269O(1a)(a), direct the defendant to immediately surrender at a police station specified by the court any firearm, ammunition or part of a firearm owned or possessed by the defendant.\n\t(2)\tNo criminal liability attaches to a person to the extent that he or she is complying with a direction under this section.\n\t(3)\tThe Commissioner of Police must deal with any surrendered firearm, ammunition or part of a firearm in accordance with the scheme set out in the regulations.\n\t(4)\tNo compensation is payable by the Crown or any other person in respect of the exercise of a function or power under this section.\n\t(5)\tThe regulations may provide for the payment, recovery or waiver of fees in respect of this section.\n269P—Variation or revocation of supervision order\n\t(1)\tAt any time during the limiting term, the court may, on the application of the Crown, the defendant, Parole Board, the Public Advocate, the Commissioner for Victims' Rights or another person with a proper interest in the matter, vary or revoke a supervision order.\n\t(1a)\tOn an application under subsection (1), the court may do 1 or more of the following:\n\t(a)\tconfirm the present terms of the supervision order;\n\t(b)\tvary the terms of the order;\n\t(c)\trevoke the order and make in substitution for the order any other order that the court might have made under this Subdivision in the first instance;\n\t(2)\tIf the court refuses an application by or on behalf of a defendant for variation or revocation of a supervision order, a later application for variation or revocation of the order cannot be made by or on behalf of the defendant for six months or such greater or lesser period as the court may direct on refusing the application.\n269Q—Report on mental condition of defendant\n\t(1)\tIf a defendant is declared to be liable to supervision under this Subdivision, the Minister must, within 30 days after the date of the declaration, prepare and submit to the court by which the declaration was made a report, prepared by a psychiatrist or other appropriate expert, on the mental condition of the defendant containing—\n\t(a)\ta diagnosis and prognosis of the condition; and\n\t(b)\ta suggested treatment plan for managing the defendant's condition.\n\t(2)\tIf a supervision order is made against the defendant, the Minister must arrange to have prepared and submitted to the court, at intervals of not more than 12 months during the limiting term, a report containing—\n\t(a)\ta statement of any treatment that the defendant has undergone since the last report; and\n\t(b)\tany changes to the prognosis of the defendant's condition and the treatment plan for managing the condition.\n269R—Reports and statements to be provided to court\n\t(1)\tFor the purpose of assisting the court to determine proceedings under this Subdivision, the Crown must provide the court with a report setting out, so far as reasonably ascertainable, the views of—\n\t(a)\tthe next of kin of the defendant; and\n\t(b)\tthe victim (if any) of the defendant's conduct; and\n\t(c)\tif a victim was killed as a result of the defendant's conduct—the next of kin of the victim.\n\t(2)\tA report is not, however, required under subsection (1) if the purpose of the proceeding is—\n\t(a)\tto determine whether a defendant who has been released on licence should be detained or subjected to a more rigorous form of supervision; or\n\t(b)\tto vary, in minor respects, the conditions on which a defendant is released on licence.\n\t(3)\tIf a court is fixing a limiting term in proceedings under this Subdivision relating to an alleged indictable offence or prescribed summary offence, a person who has suffered injury, loss or damage resulting from the defendant's conduct may furnish the court with a statement of a kind referred to in section 14 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (a victim impact statement), as if the defendant had been convicted of the offence and the court was determining sentence (and the court must deal with the statement in all respects as if it were a statement furnished under that section).\n\t(4)\tHowever, the court need not comply with section 14(4) and (5) of the Sentencing Act 2017 if the court is satisfied that—\n\t(a)\tthe defendant is incapable of understanding the victim impact statement; or\n\t(b)\thaving regard to the nature of the defendant's mental impairment, it would be inappropriate for the defendant to be present.\n\t(5)\tIf a court is fixing a limiting term in proceedings under this Subdivision, the Crown or the Commissioner for Victim's Rights may furnish the court with a statement of a kind referred to in section 15 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (a neighbourhood impact statement or a social impact statement) as if the court were determining sentence for an offence (and the court must deal with the statement in all respects as if it were a statement furnished under that section).\nprescribed summary offence has the same meaning as in section 14 of the Sentencing Act 2017.\n269T—Matters to which court is to have regard\n\t(1)\tIn deciding proceedings under this Subdivision, the court should have regard to—\n\t(a)\tthe nature of the defendant's mental impairment; and\n\t(b)\twhether the defendant is, or would if released be, likely to endanger another person, or other persons generally; and\n\t(c)\twhether there are adequate resources available for the treatment and support of the defendant in the community; and\n\t(d)\twhether the defendant is likely to comply with the conditions of a licence; and\n\t(e)\tother matters that the court thinks relevant.\n\t(2)\tThe court cannot release a defendant under this Subdivision, or significantly reduce the degree of supervision to which a defendant is subject unless the court—\n\t(a)\thas considered a report (an expert report) prepared by a psychiatrist or other appropriate expert who has personally examined the defendant, on—\n\t(i)\tthe mental condition of the defendant; and\n\t(ii)\tthe possible effects of the proposed action on the behaviour of the defendant; and\n\t(b)\thas considered the report most recently submitted to the court by the Minister under this Subdivision; and\n\t(ba)\tis satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the safety of the person or any member of the public will not be seriously endangered by the person's release; and\n\t(c)\thas considered the report on the attitudes of victims and next of kin prepared under this Subdivision; and\n\t(d)\tis satisfied that—\n\t(i)\tthe defendant's next of kin; and\n\t(ii)\tthe victim (if any) of the defendant's conduct; and\n\t(iii)\tif a victim was killed as a result of the defendant's conduct—the next of kin of the victim,\nhave been given reasonable notice of the proceedings.\n\t(2a)\tThe court may, if it considers it necessary for the purpose of assisting the court to decide proceedings under this Subdivision, require further additional expert reports to be provided to the court.\n\t(3)\tNotice need not be given under subsection (2)(d) to a person whose whereabouts have not, after reasonable inquiry, been ascertained.\n269U—Revision of supervision orders\n\t(1)\tIf a person who has been released on licence under this Subdivision contravenes or is likely to contravene a condition of the licence, the court by which the supervision order was made may, on application by the Crown (which may be made, in a case of urgency, by telephone), review the supervision order.\n\t(1a)\tOn an application for a review being made, the court may make an interim order in such terms as the court thinks appropriate in the circumstances, including an order that the person be detained in a specified place for a specified period pending the determination of the review.\n\t(2)\tAfter allowing the Crown and the person subject to the order a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the application for review, the court may do 1 or more of the following:\n\t(a)\tconfirm the present terms of the supervision order;\n\t(b)\tamend the order so that it ceases to provide for release on licence and provides instead for detention;\n\t(c)\tamend the order by varying the conditions of the licence;\n\t(3)\tWhen an application for review of a supervision order is made, the court may issue a warrant to have the person subject to the order arrested and brought before the court and may, if appropriate, make orders for detention of that person until the application is determined.\nSubdivision 3—Continuing supervision orders\n269UA—Application for continuing supervision\n\t(1)\tIf a defendant is declared to be liable to supervision under Subdivision 2, whether before or after the commencement of this section, the Crown may, while the defendant remains liable to supervision, apply to the Supreme Court to have the defendant declared to be liable to supervision under a continuing supervision order.\n\t(2)\tAn application cannot be made under subsection (1) more than 12 months before the end of the limiting term fixed in respect of the relevant supervision order (and the limiting term will be taken to continue until the application is determined by the Court).\n\t(3)\tThe Court must give the defendant at least 14 days written notice of the date on which it intends to conduct the proceedings to determine the application.\n\t(4)\tThe Court must, before determining an application under this section, direct that 1 or more legally qualified medical practitioners (to be nominated by a prescribed authority for the purpose) inquire into the mental condition of the defendant and report to the Court on the mental condition of the defendant, including—\n\t(a)\ta diagnosis and prognosis of the condition; and\n\t(b)\ta suggested treatment plan for managing the defendant's condition.\n\t(5)\tEach of the following persons is entitled to appear and be heard in proceedings under this section and must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to call and give evidence, to examine or cross‑examine witnesses, and to make submissions to the Court:\n\t(a)\tthe defendant (personally or by counsel);\n\t(b)\tthe Director of Public Prosecutions;\n\t(c)\tthe Commissioner for Victims' Rights;\n\t(d)\twith the permission of the Court—any other person with a proper interest in the matter.\n\t(6)\tThe Court may also take the following matters into consideration when determining an application under this section:\n\t(a)\tany relevant remarks made by the court by which the defendant was declared to be liable to supervision under Subdivision 2;\n\t(b)\tthe behaviour of the defendant while under supervision;\n\t(c)\tany treatment, care and rehabilitation of the defendant while under supervision;\n\t(d)\tany reports tendered, and submissions made, to the Court under this section;\n\t(e)\tthe likelihood of the defendant committing an offence of a violent nature should the defendant no longer be liable to supervision;\n\t(f)\tthe character, antecedents, age, means and physical and mental condition of the defendant;\n\t(g)\tthe probable circumstances of the defendant should the defendant no longer be liable to supervision;\n\t(h)\tany other matters that the Court thinks are relevant.\n\t(7)\tIf the Court is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the defendant to whom the application relates could, if unsupervised, pose a serious risk to the safety of the community or a member of the community, the Court must declare that, on the expiry of the supervision order under Subdivision 2, the defendant is liable to continuing supervision under this Subdivision.\n269UB—Continuing supervision orders\n\t(1)\tIf, under section 269UA, the Supreme Court declares a defendant to be liable to continuing supervision, the Court may make an order (a continuing supervision order)—\n\t(a)\tcommitting the defendant to detention under this Subdivision; or\n\t(b)\treleasing the defendant on licence.\n\t(2)\tIf a continuing supervision order is made releasing the defendant on licence, the licence is subject to the following conditions:\n\t(a)\tthe conditions imposed by subsection (3);\n\t(b)\tany other condition decided by the Court and specified in the licence.\n\t(3)\tSubject to this Act, every licence under this Subdivision is subject to the following conditions:\n\t(a)\ta condition prohibiting the defendant from possessing a firearm or ammunition (both within the meaning of the Firearms Act 2015) or any part of a firearm;\n\t(b)\ta condition requiring the defendant to submit to such tests (including testing without notice) for gunshot residue as may be reasonably required by a person or body specified by the Court.\n\t(4)\tWithout limiting the generality of subsection (2)(b), release on licence under a continuing supervision order may, for example, be subject to—\n\t(b)\ta condition that the defendant undergo assessment or treatment (or both) relating to the defendant's mental condition; or\n\t(c)\ta condition that the defendant be monitored by use of an electronic device approved under section 4 of the Correctional Services Act 1982; or\n\t(d)\tany other condition that the Court thinks fit.\n\t(5)\tThe Court may only vary or revoke the conditions imposed by subsection (3) if the defendant satisfies the Court, by evidence given on oath, that—\n\t(b)\tthe possession of a firearm, ammunition or part of a firearm by the defendant does not represent an undue risk to the safety of the public.\n\t(6)\tA continuing supervision order remains in force against the defendant until the order is revoked by the Court.\n269UC—Variation or revocation of continuing supervision order\n\t(1)\tAt any time after a continuing supervision order has been made in respect of a defendant, the Supreme Court may, on the application of the Crown, the defendant, the Parole Board, the Public Advocate or another person with a proper interest in the matter, vary or revoke the order.\n\t(2)\tIf the Court refuses an application by or on behalf of a defendant for variation or revocation of a continuing supervision order, a later application for variation or revocation of the order cannot be made by or on behalf of the defendant for 12 months or such greater or lesser period as the Court may direct on refusing the application.\n269UD—Appeal\n\t(1)\tAn appeal lies to the Full Court against a decision by the Supreme Court—\n\t(a)\tto make a declaration and order under this Subdivision; or\n\t(b)\tnot to make a declaration and order under this Subdivision.\n\t(2)\tAn appeal under this section may be instituted by the Crown or by the defendant.\n\t(3)\tSubject to a contrary order of the Full Court, an appeal cannot be commenced after 10 days from the date of the decision against which the appeal lies.\n\t(4)\tOn an appeal, the Full Court—\n\t(a)\tmay—\n\t(i)\tconfirm or annul the decision subject to appeal; or\n\t(ii)\tremit the decision subject to appeal to the Supreme Court for further consideration or reconsideration; and\n\t(b)\tmay make consequential or ancillary orders.\nSubdivision 4—Administrative detention for defendant released on licence under this Division\n269UE—Administrative detention for defendant released on licence under this Division\n\t(1)\tIf a defendant who has been released on licence under a supervision order or a continuing supervision order contravenes or is likely to contravene a condition of the licence, the prescribed authority may issue an order (an administrative detention order) that the defendant be detained in a specified place for a specified period (which must not exceed 14 days).\n\t(2)\tAn administrative detention order must—\n\t(a)\tbe directed to the Commissioner of Police and police officers generally; and\n\t(b)\tbe in writing in the form approved by the Minister.\n\t(3)\tA person in respect of whom an administrative detention order has been issued who is taken into the care and control of a police officer under this Subdivision must be given a copy of the order as soon as practicable.\n\t(4)\tThe progress and circumstances of a person detained under an administrative detention order must be reviewed as soon as reasonably practicable after the person is so detained—\n\t(a)\tto determine whether an application should be made to the court for a review of the supervision order or continuing supervision order to which the person is subject; and\n\t(b)\tfor any other purpose as the prescribed authority thinks fit in the circumstances.\n\t(5)\tDespite subsection (1), a person who has been detained under an administrative detention order cannot be detained under another such order unless a period of at least 14 days has elapsed since the expiry of the previous administrative detention order.\n269UF—Powers of police officers relating to persons in respect of whom an administrative detention order has been issued\n\t(1)\tThis section applies to a person in respect of whom an administrative detention order has been issued under section 269UE.\n\t(2)\tA police officer may, subject to this section, exercise the following powers in relation to a person to whom this section applies:\n\t(a)\tthe police officer may take the person into the officer's care and control;\n\t(b)\tthe police officer may transport the person from place to place;\n\t(c)\tthe police officer may restrain the person and otherwise use force in relation to the person as reasonably required in the circumstances;\n\t(d)\tthe police officer may enter and remain in a place where the officer reasonably suspects the person may be found;\n\t(e)\tthe police officer may use reasonable force to break into a place when that is reasonably required in order to take the person into the officer's care and control;\n\t(f)\tthe police officer may search the person's clothing or possessions and take possession of anything in the person's possession that the person may use to cause harm to the person's self or others or property.\n\t(3)\tA police officer who takes the person into the officer's care and control must, as soon as practicable, transport the person, or arrange for the person to be transported by some other police officer, in accordance with the administrative detention order.\n\t(4)\tThe powers conferred by this section continue to be exercisable as reasonably required for the purpose of enabling or facilitating the medical examination or treatment of the person.\n\t(5)\tA search of a person must be carried out expeditiously and in a manner that avoids, as far as reasonably practicable, causing the person any humiliation or offence.\n\t(6)\tAnything taken into the possession of a police officer under this section may be held for as long as is necessary for reasons of safety, but must otherwise be returned to the person from whom it was taken or dealt with according to law.\nSubdivision 5—Custody, supervision and care\n269V—Custody, supervision and care\n\t(1)\tIf a defendant is committed to detention under this Division, the defendant is in the custody of the Minister and the Minister may give directions for the custody, supervision and care of the defendant the Minister considers appropriate.\n\t(2)\tThe Minister may—\n\t(a)\tplace the defendant under the custody, supervision and care of another; and\n\t(b)\tif there is no practicable alternative—direct that a defendant be kept in custody in a prison.\n\t(3)\tSupervisory responsibilities arising from conditions on which a person is released on licence are to be divided between the Parole Board and the Minister in the following way:\n\t(a)\tthe supervisory responsibilities are to be exercised by the Minister insofar as they relate to treating or monitoring the mental condition of the person; and\n\t(b)\tthe supervisory responsibilities are in all other respects to be exercised by the Parole Board.\n\t(4)\tThe Minister or the Parole Board (as the case may be) may delegate a power or function under this section—\n\t(a)\tto a person for the time being performing particular duties or holding or acting in a particular position; or\n\t(b)\tto any other person or body that, in the delegator's opinion, is competent to perform or exercise the relevant functions or powers.\n\t(5)\tA delegation under subsection (4)—\n\t(a)\tmust be by instrument in writing; and\n\t(b)\tmay be absolute or conditional; and\n\t(c)\tdoes not derogate from the ability of the delegator to act in any matter; and\n\t(d)\tis revocable at will by the delegator.\n","sortOrder":56},{"sectionNumber":"Subdiv 6","sectionType":"subdivision","heading":"Effect of supervening imprisonment on an order under Division 4","content":"Subdivision 6—Effect of supervening imprisonment on an order under Division 4\n269VA—Effect of supervening imprisonment\n\t(1)\tIf a person who has been released on licence under this Division commits an offence while subject to the licence and is sentenced to imprisonment for the offence, the supervision order is suspended for the period the person is in prison serving the term of imprisonment.\n\t(2)\tIn determining when the term of a supervision order comes to an end, the period of a suspension under subsection (1) is not to be taken into account.\n","sortOrder":57},{"sectionNumber":"Div 4A","sectionType":"division","heading":"Interstate transfer of persons subject to supervision order","content":"Division 4A—Interstate transfer of persons subject to supervision order\n269VB—Interpretation\nChief Psychiatrist means the person appointed to the position of Chief Psychiatrist under the Mental Health Act 2009;\ncorresponding law means a law, or a part of a law, of another State or a Territory of the Commonwealth declared by the regulations to be a corresponding law for the purposes of this Part;\ncorresponding Minister, in relation to a participating jurisdiction, means the Minister or Ministers of that jurisdiction who is or are responsible for the administration of the corresponding law of that jurisdiction;\nguardian—a person is the guardian of another if the person is acting or appointed under any Act or law as the guardian of the other;\ninterstate supervision order means an order made under a corresponding law that corresponds or substantially corresponds to a supervision order;\nparticipating jurisdiction means another State or a Territory of the Commonwealth in which a corresponding law is in force;\nSouth Australian Minister means the Minister administering this Part or, if there is more than 1 Minister administering this Part, those Ministers acting jointly;\nsupervision order means—\n\t(a)\ta Division 3A order; or\n\t(b)\ta supervision order or a continuing supervision order made under Division 4.\n269VC—Informed consent\nFor the purposes of this Division, a person is to be taken to have given informed consent to a transfer or interim disposition only if the person gives written consent to the transfer or disposition (as the case requires) after—\n\t(a)\tthe person has been given a clear explanation of the process involved in the transfer or disposition and the reasons for the transfer or disposition, containing sufficient information to enable the person to make a balanced judgment; and\n\t(b)\tany relevant questions asked by the person have been answered and the person has understood the answers.\n269VD—Transfer of persons from South Australia to another participating jurisdiction\n\t(1)\tA person who is subject to a supervision order may be transferred to a participating jurisdiction if—\n\t(a)\tthe transfer is permitted under a corresponding law in that participating jurisdiction; and\n\t(b)\tthe South Australian Minister makes an order under this section authorising the transfer.\n\t(2)\tThe South Australian Minister may make an order under this section authorising a transfer if—\n\t(a)\tthe Chief Psychiatrist has certified in writing that the transfer is for the benefit of the person subject to the supervision order; and\n\t(b)\tthe South Australian Minister is satisfied that the transfer is permitted under a corresponding law in the participating jurisdiction; and\n\t(c)\tthe South Australian Minister is satisfied that—\n\t(i)\tthe person subject to the order has given informed consent to the transfer; or\n\t(ii)\tif the person is incapable of giving informed consent—his or her guardian has given informed consent to the transfer.\n\t(3)\tOn the transfer of a person from South Australia in accordance with an order under this section, the supervision order to which the person is subject is in force only if the person returns to South Australia and while the person is in South Australia.\n269VE—Transfer of persons from participating jurisdiction to South Australia\n\t(1)\tA person who is subject to an interstate supervision order may be transferred to South Australia if—\n\t(a)\tthe transfer is permitted by or under a corresponding law in the participating jurisdiction in which the supervision order was made; and\n\t(b)\tthe South Australian Minister has agreed to the transfer and determined an interim disposition for the person.\n\t(2)\tThe South Australian Minister may agree to a transfer of a person to South Australia and determine an interim disposition if—\n\t(a)\tthe Chief Psychiatrist has certified in writing that the transfer is for the benefit of the person and there are facilities or services available for the custody, care or treatment of the person (as the case requires); and\n\t(b)\tthe South Australian Minister is satisfied that the transfer is necessary for the maintenance or re‑establishment of family relationships or relationships with people who can assist in supporting the person; and\n\t(c)\tthe South Australian Minister is satisfied that—\n\t(i)\tthe person subject to the order has given informed consent to the transfer and interim disposition; or\n\t(ii)\tif the person is incapable of giving informed consent—his or her guardian has given informed consent to the transfer and interim disposition.\n\t(3)\tThe interim dispositions that the South Australian Minister may determine under this section are—\n\t(a)\tthat the person be released on licence as if the person were subject to a Division 3A order releasing the person on licence subject to the conditions imposed by section 269NB(4) and any other conditions imposed by the Minister; or\n\t(b)\tthat the person be detained as if the person were subject to a supervision order under Division 4 committing the person to detention; or\n\t(c)\tthat the person be released on licence as if the person were subject to a supervision order under Division 4 releasing the person on licence subject to the conditions imposed by section 269O(1a) and any other conditions imposed by the Minister.\n\t(4)\tOn the transfer of a person to South Australia under this section—\n\t(a)\tif the interim disposition is that the person be detained—the person is to be so detained; and\n\t(b)\tif the interim disposition is that the person be released on licence—the person is taken to have been so released on licence under a Division 3A order or a supervision order made under Division 4.\n\t(5)\tNothing in this section is to be taken as requiring the South Australian Minister to agree to a transfer of a person to South Australia.\nDivision 5—Miscellaneous\n269W—Counsel to have independent discretion\n\t(1)\tIf the defendant is unable to instruct counsel on questions relevant to an investigation under this Part, the counsel may act, in the exercise of an independent discretion, in what he or she genuinely believes to be the defendant's best interests.\n\t(2)\tIf the counsel for the defendant in criminal proceedings (apart from proceedings under this Part) has reason to believe that the defendant is unable, because of mental impairment, to give rational instructions on questions relevant to the proceedings (including whether to be tried by judge alone), the counsel may act, in the exercise of an independent discretion, in what the counsel genuinely believes to be the defendant's best interests.\n269WA—Power to order examination etc in pre-trial proceedings\n\t(1)\tIf in pre-trial proceedings it appears to the court that it might expedite the trial to order the examination of the defendant under this section in anticipation of trial, the court may, by order—\n\t(a)\trequire the defendant to undergo an examination by a psychiatrist or other appropriate expert; and\n\t(b)\trequire that the results of the examination be reported to the court.\n\t(2)\tThe prosecution and the defence are entitled to access to the report.\n269X—Power of court to deal with defendant before proceedings completed\n\t(1)\tIf there is to be an investigation into a defendant's mental competence to commit an offence, or mental fitness to stand trial, or a court conducting committal proceedings reserves the question whether there should be such an investigation for consideration by the court of trial, the court by which the investigation is to be conducted, or the court reserving the question for consideration, may—\n\t(a)\trelease the defendant on bail to appear later for the purposes of the investigation; or\n\t(b)\tcommit the defendant to custody (in which case the defendant will, subject to subsections (4) and (5), be detained as if the defendant had been remanded in custody awaiting trial or sentence) until the conclusion of the investigation.\n\t(2)\tIf a court declares a defendant to be liable to supervision under this Part, but unresolved questions remain about how the court is to deal with the defendant, the court may—\n\t(a)\trelease the defendant on bail to appear subsequently to be dealt with by the court; or\n\t(b)\tcommit the defendant to custody (being an appropriate form of custody determined, from time to time, by the Minister) until some subsequent date when the defendant is to be brought again before the court.\n\t(3)\tA defendant committed to custody under subsection (1)(b) is in the custody of the CE (regardless of where the defendant is detained or the form of custody in which the defendant is detained) and, subject to subsections (4) and (5), the CE may give such directions as to the custody, supervision and care of the defendant as the CE considers appropriate.\n\t(4)\tIf, at the time at which a defendant is committed to custody under subsection (1)(b), the defendant is an involuntary inpatient at a treatment centre in accordance with the Mental Health Act 2009 (because the defendant is subject to an inpatient treatment order under that Act)—\n\t(a)\tthe defendant must continue to be confined at the treatment centre for the duration of the inpatient treatment order and each subsequent inpatient treatment order that follows on from that order (if any); and\n\t(b)\tat the conclusion of the confinement referred to in paragraph (a), the defendant will (subject to subsection (5)) be detained as if the defendant had been remanded in custody awaiting trial or sentence.\n\t(5)\tIf, at any time during the detention of a defendant under subsection (1)(b), the designated officer is satisfied that the defendant is not being detained in an appropriate form of custody, the designated officer may determine an appropriate form of custody and that determination is sufficient authorisation for the detention of the defendant in that alternative form of custody.\n\t(6)\tThe regulations may make provision in relation to the manner in which the designated officer is to determine an appropriate form of custody for the purposes of subsection (5).\nCE has the same meaning as in the Correctional Services Act 1982;\ndesignated officer means the person, or holder of the office, prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this section.\n269Y—Appeals\n\t(1)\tAn appeal lies to the appropriate appellate court against a declaration that a defendant is liable to supervision under Division 3A or Division 4 Subdivision 2 in the same way as an appeal against a conviction.\n\t(2)\tAn appeal lies to the appropriate appellate court against a supervision order in the same way as an appeal against sentence.\n\t(3)\tAn appeal lies with the permission of the court of trial or the appropriate appellate court against a key decision by the court of trial.\n\t(4)\tA key decision is—\n\t(a)\ta decision that the defendant was, or was not, mentally competent to commit the offence charged against the defendant; or\n\t(b)\ta decision that the defendant is, or is not, mentally unfit to stand trial; or\n\t(c)\ta decision that the objective elements of an offence are established against the defendant.\n\t(5)\tOn an appeal, the appellate court may exercise one or more of the following powers:\n\t(a)\tconfirm, set aside, vary or reverse a decision of the court of trial;\n\t(b)\tdirect a retrial of the case or an issue arising in the case;\n\t(c)\tmake any finding or exercise any power that could have been made or exercised by the court of trial;\n\t(d)\tmake ancillary orders and directions.\n269Z—Counselling of next of kin and victims\n\t(1)\tIf an application is made under Division 4 that might result in a defendant being released from detention, the Minister must ensure that counselling services in respect of the application are made available to—\n\t(a)\tthe defendant's next of kin; and\n\t(b)\tthe victim (if any) of the defendant's conduct; and\n\t(c)\tif a victim was killed as a result of the defendant's conduct—the next of kin of the victim.\n\t(2)\tA person does not, in disclosing information about the defendant during the course of providing counselling under this section, breach any code or rule of professional ethics.\n269ZA—Exclusion of evidence\nA finding made on an investigation into a defendant's fitness to stand trial does not establish an issue estoppel against the defendant in any later (civil or criminal) proceedings, and evidence of such a finding is not admissible against the defendant in criminal proceedings against the defendant.\n269ZB—Arrest of person who escapes from detention etc\n\t(1)\tIf a person who is committed to detention under this Part—\n\t(a)\tescapes from the detention; or\n\t(b)\tis absent, without proper authority, from the place of detention,\nthe person may be arrested without warrant, and returned to the place of detention, by a police officer or an authorised person.\n\t(2)\tA Judge or other proper officer of a court by which a person is released on licence under this Part may, if satisfied that there are proper grounds to suspect that the person may have contravened or failed to comply with a condition of the licence, issue a warrant to have the person arrested and brought before the court.\n","sortOrder":58},{"sectionNumber":"Part 9","sectionType":"part","heading":"Miscellaneous and procedure","content":"Part 9—Miscellaneous and procedure\nDivision 1—Punishment for certain common law offences\n270—Punishment for certain offences\n\t(1)\tAny person convicted of any of the following common law offences, that is to say:\n\t(b)\tkeeping a common bawdy house or a common ill-governed and disorderly house;\n\t(c)\tany cheat or fraud punishable at common law,\nshall be liable to be imprisoned for a term not exceeding two years.\n\t(2)\tAny person convicted of any of the following common law offences, that is to say, any conspiracy to cheat or defraud, or to extort money or goods, or falsely to accuse of any crime, or to obstruct, prevent, pervert or defeat the course of public justice, shall be liable to be imprisoned for a term not exceeding seven years.\nDivision 2—Attempts\n270A—Attempts\n\t(1)\tSubject to subsection (2), a person who attempts to commit an offence (whether the offence is constituted by statute or common law) shall be guilty of the offence of attempting to commit that offence.\n\t(2)\tWhere under a provision of any other Act, or any other provision of this Act, an attempt is constituted as an offence, this section—\n\t(a)\tdoes not apply in relation to that offence; and\n\t(b)\tdoes not operate to create a further or alternative offence with which a person who commits the former offence might be charged.\n\t(3)\tThe penalty for an attempt to which this section applies shall be as follows:\n\t(a)\tin the case of attempted murder or attempted treason, the penalty shall be life imprisonment or imprisonment for some lesser term;\n\t(b)\twhere the penalty or maximum penalty for the principal offence (not being treason or murder) is life imprisonment, the penalty for the attempt shall be imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve years;\n\t(c)\tin any other case, the penalty for the attempt shall be a penalty not exceeding a maximum of two-thirds of the maximum penalty prescribed for the principal offence.\n\t(4)\tWhere the principal offence is an indictable offence, an attempt to commit that offence shall also be an indictable offence; where the principal offence is a minor indictable offence, an attempt to commit that offence shall also be a minor indictable offence; and where the principal offence is a summary offence, an attempt to commit that offence shall also be a summary offence.\n270AB—Attempted manslaughter\n\t(a)\ta person attempts to kill another or is a party to an attempt to kill another; and\n\t(b)\the would, if the attempt had been successfully carried to completion, have been guilty of manslaughter rather than murder,\nhe shall be guilty of attempted manslaughter.\n\t(2)\tThe penalty for attempted manslaughter is imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve years.\n\t(3)\tIf on the trial of a person for attempted murder the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged but is satisfied that the accused is guilty of attempted manslaughter, the jury shall acquit the accused of attempted murder but may find him guilty of attempted manslaughter.\nDivision 3—Assaults with intent\n270B—Assaults with intent\n\t(1)\tSubject to subsection (2), a person who assaults another with intent to commit an offence to which this section applies is guilty of an offence.\n\t(2)\tWhere under a provision of any other Act, or any other provision of this Act, an assault with intent to commit an offence to which this section applies is constituted as an offence, this section—\n\t(a)\tdoes not apply in relation to that offence; and\n\t(b)\tdoes not operate to create a further or alternative offence with which a person who commits the former offence might be charged.\n\t(3)\tThe penalty for assault to which this section applies shall be—\n\t(a)\timprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years; or\n\t(b)\timprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term that may be imposed for an attempt to commit the principal offence,\nwhichever is the greater maximum penalty.\n\t(4)\tThis section applies to the following offences:\n\t(a)\tan offence against the person;\n\t(b)\ttheft or an offence of which theft is an element;\n\t(c)\tan offence involving interference with, damage to, or destruction of property punishable by imprisonment for 3 years or more.\nDivision 4—Preparatory conduct\n270C—Going equipped for commission of offence of dishonesty or offence against property\n\t(1)\tA person who is, in suspicious circumstances, in possession of an article intending to use it to commit an offence to which this section applies is guilty of an offence.\n\t(a)\tif the maximum penalty for the intended offence is life imprisonment or imprisonment for 14 years or more—imprisonment for 7 years;\n\t(b)\tin any other case—imprisonment for one-half the maximum period of imprisonment fixed for the intended offence.\n\t(2)\tThis section applies to the following offences:\n\t(a)\ttheft (or receiving) or an offence of which theft is an element;\n\t(b)\tan offence against Part 6A (Serious criminal trespass);\n\t(c)\tunlawfully driving, using or interfering with a motor vehicle;\n\t(d)\tan offence against Part 5 Division 6 (Dishonest dealings with documents);\n\t(e)\tan offence against Part 5 Division 7 (Dishonest manipulation of machines);\n\t(f)\tan offence involving interference with, damage to or destruction of property punishable by imprisonment for 3 years or more.\n\t(3)\tA person is in suspicious circumstances if it can be reasonably inferred from the person's conduct or circumstances surrounding the person's conduct (or both) that the person—\n\t(a)\tis proceeding to the scene of a proposed offence; or\n\t(b)\tis keeping the scene of a proposed offence under surveillance; or\n\t(c)\tis in, or in the vicinity of, the scene of a proposed offence awaiting an opportunity to commit the offence.\n270D—Going equipped for commission of offence against the person\n\t(1)\tA person who is armed, at night, with a dangerous or offensive weapon intending to use the weapon to commit an offence against the person is guilty of an offence.\n\t(2)\tThe maximum penalty for an offence against this section is—\n\t(a)\tif the offender has been previously convicted of an offence against the person or an offence against this section (or a corresponding previous enactment)—imprisonment for 10 years;\n\t(b)\tin any other case—imprisonment for 7 years.\nDivision 5—Apprehension of offenders\n271—General power of arrest\n\t(1)\tA person may, without warrant, arrest and detain a person liable to arrest and detention under this section.\n\t(2)\tA person who arrests and detains another under this section must take the necessary action to have the other person delivered into the custody of a member of the police force forthwith.\n\t(3)\tA person is liable to arrest and detention under this section if the person is in the act of committing, or has just committed—\n\t(a)\tan indictable offence; or\n\t(b)\ttheft (whether the theft is a summary or indictable offence); or\n\t(c)\tan offence against the person (whether the offence is summary or indictable); or\n\t(d)\tan offence involving interference with, damage to or destruction of property (whether the offence is summary or indictable).\n273—Judge's warrant for arrest of person charged\n\t(1)\tWhenever it is made to appear to a judge, by affidavit or certificate, that any person is charged with any offence other than treason for which he may be prosecuted in the Supreme Court, it shall be lawful for the judge to issue a warrant and thereby to cause that person to be apprehended and brought before a judge or a justice in order to be bound, with or without two sufficient sureties, in such sum as is stated in the warrant, with condition to appear in that Court at the time mentioned in the warrant and to answer the information.\n\t(2)\tWhere any such person neglects or refuses to become so bound, it shall be lawful for the judge or justice to commit him to gaol until he becomes so bound or is discharged by order of a judge.\nDivision 14—Provision as to persons convicted of offence\n329—Provision as to persons convicted of an offence\nA person who has been convicted of any offence shall not, by reason of that conviction, suffer any legal disability except such as is prescribed by an Act of the State or the Commonwealth.\n","sortOrder":59},{"sectionNumber":"Part 12","sectionType":"part","heading":"Regulations","content":"Part 12—Regulations\n370—Regulations\n\t(1)\tThe Governor may make such regulations as are contemplated by, or as are necessary or expedient for the purposes of, this Act.\n\t(2)\tWithout limiting subsection (1), the regulations may impose a penalty (not exceeding a fine of $2 500) for contravention of, or non-compliance with, a regulation.\n","sortOrder":60},{"sectionNumber":"Sch 11","sectionType":"schedule","heading":"Abolition of certain offences","content":"Schedule 11—Abolition of certain offences\n1—Certain common law offences abolished\nThe following common law offences are abolished:\n\t(1)\tcompounding an offence; and\n\t(2)\tmisprision of felony; and\n\t(3)\tmaintenance, including champerty; and\n\t(4)\tembracery; and\n\t(5)\tinterference with witnesses; and\n\t(6)\tescape; and\n\t(7)\trescue; and\n\t(8)\tbribery or corruption in relation to judges or judicial officers; and\n\t(9)\tbribery or corruption in relation to public officers; and\n\t(10)\tbuying or selling of a public office; and\n\t(11)\tobstructing the exercise of powers conferred by statute; and\n\t(12)\toppression by a public officer; and\n\t(13)\tbreach of trust or fraud by a public officer; and\n\t(14)\tneglect of duty by a public officer; and\n\t(15)\trefusal to serve in public office; and\n\t(16)\tforcible entry and forcible detainer; and\n\t(17)\triot; and\n\t(18)\trout; and\n\t(19)\tunlawful assembly; and\n\t(20)\taffray; and\n\t(21)\tchallenges to fight; and\n\t(22)\tpublic nuisance; and\n\t(23)\tpublic mischief; and\n\t(24)\teavesdropping; and\n\t(25)\tbeing a common barrator, a common scold or a common night walker; and\n\t(26)\tcriminal libel, including obscene or seditious libel; and\n\t(27)\tpublicly exposing one's person; and\n\t(28)\tindecent exhibitions; and\n\t(29)\tspreading infectious disease; and\n\t(30)\tabortion.\n2—Certain offences under Imperial law abolished\nAn Act of the Imperial Parliament has no further force or effect in this State to the extent that it enacts an offence of a kind referred to in clause 1.\n3—Special provisions relating to maintenance and champerty\n\t(1)\tLiability in tort for conduct constituting maintenance or champerty at common law is abolished.\n\t(2)\tThe abolition of criminal and civil liability for maintenance and champerty does not affect—\n\t(a)\tany civil cause of action accrued before the abolition;\n\t(b)\tany rule of law relating to the avoidance of a champertous contract as being contrary to public policy or otherwise illegal;\n\t(c)\tany rule of law relating to misconduct on the part of a legal practitioner who is party to or concerned in a champertous contract or arrangement.\nTHE TREASON ACT 1351\nThe Act 25 Edward III Stat. 5, c 2: \"A Declaration which Offences shall be adjudged Treason\" reads as follows:\n\nITEM, Whereas divers Opinions have been before this Time in what Case Treason shall be said, and in what not; The King, at the Request of the Lords and of the Commons, hath made a Declaration in the Manner as hereafter followeth; that is to say, When a Man doth compass or imagine the Death of our Lord the King, or of our Lady his Queen, or of their eldest Son and Heir; or if a Man do violate the King's Companion, or the King's eldest Daughter unmarried, or the Wife of the King's Eldest Son and Heir; or if a Man do levy War against our Lord the King in his Realm, or be adherent to the King's Enemies in his Realm, giving to them Aid and Comfort, in the Realm, or elsewhere, and thereof be probably attainted of open Deed by the People of their Condition… And if a Man slea the Chancellor, Treasurer, or the King's Justices of the one Bench or the other, Justices in Eyre, or Justices of Assize and all other Justices assigned to hear and determine, being in their Places, doing their Offices. And it is to be understood, that in the Cases above rehearsed, that ought to be judged Treason which extends to our Lord the King, and his Royal Majesty: And of such Treason the Forfeiture of the Escheats pertaineth to our Sovereign Lord, as well of the Lands and Tenements holden of other, as of himself… And because that many other like Cases of Treason may happen in Time to come, which a Man cannot think nor declare at this present Time; it is accorded, That if any other Case, supposed Treason, which is not above specified, doth happen before any Justices, the Justices shall tarry without any going to Judgment of the Treason till the Cause be shewed and declared before the King and his Parliament, whether it ought to be judged Treason or other Felony. And, if percase any Man of this Realm, ride armed covertly or secretly, with Men of Arms against any other, to slay him, or rob him, or take him, or retain him till he hath made Fine or Ransom for to have his Deliverance, it is not the Mind of the King nor his Council, that in such Case it shall be judged Treason, but shall be judged Felony or Trespass, according to the Laws of the Land of old Time used, and according as the Case requireth. And if in such Case, or other like, before this Time any Justices have judged Treason, and for this Cause the Lands and Tenements have come into the King's Hands as Forfeit, the chief Lords of the Fee shall have the Escheats of the Tenements holden of them, whether that the same Tenements be in the King's Hands, or in others, by Gift or in other Manner; saving always to our Lord the King the year, and the Waste, and the Forfeitures of Chattles, which pertain to him in the Cases above named; and that the Writs of Scire facias be granted in such Case against the Land-Tenants without other original, and without allowing the Protection of our Lord the King, in the said Suit; and that of the Lands which be in the King's Hands, Writs be granted to the Sherrif of the Counties where the Lands be, to deliver them out of the King's Hands without Delay.\nA Uxint pur ceo qe diverses opinions ount este einz ces heures qen cas quant il avient doit estre dit treson & en quel cas noun le Roi a la requeste des Seignurs & de la Communalte ad fait declarissement qe ensuit cest assavoir Quant homme fait compasser ou imaginer la mort nostre Seignur le Roi ma dame sa compaigne ou de lour fitz primer & heir ou si homme violast la compaigne le Roi ou leisnesce fill le Roi nient marie ou la compaigne leisne fitz & heir du Roi & si homme leve de guerre contre nostre dit Seignur le Roi en son Roialme ou soit aherdant as enemys nostre Seignur le Roi en le Roialme donant a eux eid ou confort en son Roialme ou par aillours & de ceo provablement soit atteint de overt faite par gentz de lour condition… & si homme tuast Chanceller Tresorer ou Justice nostre Seignur le Roi del un Baunk ou del autre Justice en Eir & des assises & toutes autres Justices assignez a oier & terminer esteiantz en lours places en fesantz lours offices. Et fait a entendre qen les cases suisnomez doit estre ajugge treson qe sestent a nostre Seignur le Roi & a sa roial majeste & de tiele manere de treson la forfeiture des eschetes appartient a nostre Seignur le Roi sibien des terres & tenemenz tenuz des autres come de lui meismes… Et pur ceo qe plusurs autres cases de semblable treson purront escheer en temps a venir queux homme ne purra penser ne declarer en present Assentu est qe si autre cas supposee treson qe nest especifie paramount aviegne de novel devant ascunes Justices demoerge la Justices saunz aler au juggement de treson tanqe par devant nostre Seignur le Roi en son parlement soit le cas monstree & desclarre le que ceo doit estre ajugge treson ou autre felonie. Et si par cas ascun homme de cest roialme chivache arme descovert ou secrement od gentz armees contre ascun autre pur lui tuer ou derober ou pur lui prendre & retenir tanqil face fyn ou raunceon pur sa deliverance avoir nest pas lentent du Roi & de son conseil qe en tiel cas soit ajugge treson einz soit ajugge felonie ou trespass solonc la lei de la terre auncienement usee & solonc ceo qe le cas demand. Et si en tieu cas ou autre semblable devant ces heures ascune Justice eit ajugge treson & par celle cause les terres & tenemenz soient devenuz en la main nostre Seignur le Roi come forfaitz eient les chiefs Seignures de fee lours eschetes des tenemenz de eux tenuz le quel qe les tenemenz soient en la main nostre Seignur le Roi ou en la main des autres par donn ou en autre manere Sauvant totefoitz a nostre Seignur le Roi lan & le wast & autres forfaitures des chateux qe a lui attenent en les cases suisnomes & qe briefs de Scire facias vers les terres tenantz soient grantez en tieu cas saunz autre originale & saunz allower la protection nostre Seignur le Roi en la dite seute & qe de les terres qe sont en la main le Roi soit grante brief as viscontes des countees la ou les terres serront de ostier la main le Roi saunz outre delaie.\nTHE TREASON ACT 1795\nThe Act 36 George III C. 7 reads as follows:\nAn Act for the Safety and Preservation of His Majesty's Person and Government against treasonable and seditious Practices and Attempts.—[18th December 1795.]\n\t\nWE, your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal Subjects, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, of Great Britain, in this present Parliament assembled, duly considering the daring Outrages offered to your Majesty's most Sacred Person, in your Passage to and from your Parliament at the Opening of this present Session, and also the continued Attempts of wicked and evil-disposed Persons to disturb the Tranquility of this your Majesty's Kingdom, particularly by the Multitude of seditious Pamphlets and Speeches daily printed, published, and dispersed, with unremitted Industry, and with a transcendant boldness, in Contempt of your Majesty's Royal Person and Dignity, and tending to the Overthrow of the Laws, Government, and happy Constitution of these Realms, have judged that it is become necessary to provide a further Remedy against all such treasonable and seditious Practices and Attempts: We, therefore, calling to Mind the good and wholesome Provisions which have at different Times been made by the Wisdom of Parliament for the averting such Dangers, and more especially for the Security and Preservation of the Persons of the Sovereigns of these Realms, do most humbly beseech your Majesty that it may be enacted; and be it enacted by the King's most Excellency Majesty, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same, That if any Person or Persons whatsoever, after the Day of the passing of this Act, during the natural Life of our most Gracious Sovereign Lord the King, (whom Almighty God preserve and bless with a long and prosperous Reign,) and until the End of the next Session of Parliament after a Demise of the Crown, shall, within the Realm or without, compass, imagine, invent, devise, or intend Death or Destruction, or any bodily Harm tending to Death or Destruction, Maim or Wounding, Imprisonment or Restraint, of the person of the same our Sovereign Lord the King, his Heirs and Successors, or to deprive or depose him or them from the Style, Honour, or Kingly Name of the Imperial Crown of this Realm, or of any other of his Majesty's Dominions or Countries; or to levy War against his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, within this Realm, in order, by Force or Constraint, to compel him or them to change his or their Measures or Counsels, or in order to put any Force or Constraint upon, or to intimidate, or overawe, both Houses, or either House of Parliament; or to move or stir any Foreigner or Stranger with Force to invade this Realm, or any other his Majesty's Dominions or Countries, under the Obeisance of his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors; and such Compassings, Imaginations, Inventions, Devices, or Intentions, or any of them, shall express, utter or declare, by publishing any Printing or Writing, or by any overt Act or Deed; being legally convicted thereof, upon the Oaths of two lawful and credible Witnesses, upon Trial, or otherwise convicted or attainted by due Course of Law, then every such Person and Persons, so as aforesaid offending, shall be deemed, declared, and adjudged to be a Traitor and Traitors, and shall suffer Pains of Death, and also lose and forfeit as in Cases of High Treason.\n\tII.\tAnd be it further enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That if any Person or Persons within that Part of Great Britain, called England, at any Time from and after the Day of passing this Act, during three Years from the Day of passing this Act, and until the End of the then next Session of Parliament, shall maliciously and advisedly, by Writing, Printing, Preaching, or other Speaking, express, publish, utter, or declare any Words or Sentences to incite or stir up the People to Hatred or Contempt of the Person of his Majesty, his Heirs or Successors, or the Government and Constitution of this Realm, as by Law established, then every such Person and Persons, being thereof legally convicted, shall be liable to such Punishment as may by Law be inflicted in Cases of High Misdemeanours; and if any Person or Persons shall, after being so convicted, offend a second Time, and be thereupon convicted, before any Commission of Oyer and Terminer, or Gaol Delivery, or in his Majesty's Court of King's Bench, such Person or Persons may, on such second Conviction, be adjudged, at the Discretion of the Court, either to suffer such Punishment as may now by Law be inflicted in Cases of High Misdemeanours, or to be banished this Realm, or to be transported to such Place as shall be appointed by his Majesty for the Transportation of Offenders; which Banishment or Transportation shall be for such Term as the Court may appoint, not exceeding seven Years.\n\tIII.\tAnd be it further enacted, That if any Offender or Offenders, who shall be so ordered by any such Court as aforesaid to be banished the Realm, or transported beyond the Seas, in Manner aforesaid, shall be afterwards at large within any Part of the Kingdom of Great Britain, without some lawful Cause, before the Expiration of the Term for which such Offender or Offenders shall have been ordered to be banished or transported beyond the Seas as aforesaid, every such Offender being so at large as aforesaid, being thereof lawfully convicted, shall suffer Death, as in Cases of Felony without Benefit of Clergy; and such Offender or Offenders may be Tried, either before Justices of Assize, Oyer and Terminer, Great Sessions, or Gaol Delivery, for the County, City, Liberty, Borough, or Place, where such Offender or Offenders shall be apprehended and taken, or from whence he, she, or they was or were ordered to be banished or transported; and the Clerk of Assize, Clerk of the Peace, or other Clerk or Officer of the Court, having the Custody of the Records where such Orders of Banishment or Transportation shall be made, shall, at the Request of the Prosecutor, or any other Person on his Majesty's Behalf, make out and give a Certificate in Writing, signed by him, containing the Effect and Substance only (omitting the formal Part) of every Indictment and Conviction of such Offender or Offenders, and of the Order for his, her, or their Banishment or Transportation, to the Justices of Assize, Oyer and Terminer, Great Sessions, or Gaol Delivery, where such Offender or Offenders shall be indicted (not taking for the same more than two Shillings and six Pence); which Certificate shall be sufficient Proof of the Conviction and Order for Banishment or Transportation of such Offender or Offenders.\n\tIV.\tProvided always, That no Person or Persons, by virtue of this present Act, shall for any Misdemeanour incur any the Penalties hereinbefore mentioned, unless he, she, or they be prosecuted within six Calendar Months next after the Offence committed, and the Prosecution brought to Trial or Judgment within the first Term, Sittings, Assizes, or Sessions in which, by the Course of the Court wherein such Prosecution shall be depending, the Prosecutor could bring on such Trial, or cause such Judgment to be entered, or in the Term, Sittings, Assizes, or Session which shall next ensue, unless the Court in which such Prosecution shall be depending, or before which such Trial ought to be had, shall, on special Ground stated by Motion in open Court, think fit to enlarge the Time for the Trial thereof, or unless the Defendant shall be prosecuted to or towards an Outlawry; and that no Person shall, upon Trial, be convicted by virtue of this Act, for any Misdemeanour, but by the Oaths of two credible Witnesses.\n\tV.\tProvided always, and be it further enacted, That all and every Person or Persons that shall at any Time be accused, or indicted, or prosecuted, for any Offence made or declared to be Treason by this Act, shall be entitled to the Benefit of the Act of Parliament, made in the seventh Year of his late Majesty King William the Third, intituled, An Act for regulating of Trials in Cases of Treason and Misprision of Treason; and also to the Provisions made by another Act of Parliament, passed in the seventh Year of her late Majesty Queen Anne, intituled, An Act for improving the Union of the two Kingdoms.\n\tVI.\tProvided also, and be it enacted, That nothing in this Act contained shall extend, or be construed to extend, to prevent or affect any Prosecution by Information or Indictment at the Common Law, for any Offence within the Provisions of this Act, unless the Party shall have been first prosecuted under this Act.\nTHE TREASON ACT 1817\nThe Act 57 George III C. 6 reads as follows:\nAn Act to make perpetual certain Parts of an Act of the Thirty-sixth Year of His present Majesty, for the Safety and Preservation of His Majesty's Person and Government against Treasonable and Seditious Practices and Attempts; and for the Safety and Preservation of the Person of His Royal Highness The Prince Regent against Treasonable Practices and Attempts.—[17th March 1817.]\n\t\nWHEREAS by an Act passed in the Thirty sixth Year of His present Majesty's Reign, intituled An Act for the Safety and Preservation of His Majesty's Person and Government against Treasonable and Seditious Practices and Attempts, it was amongst other Things enacted, that if any Person or Persons whatsoever, after the Day of the passing of that Act, during the natural Life of His Majesty, and until the End of the next Session of Parliament after the Demise of the Crown, should, within the Realm or without, compass, imagine, invent, devise or intend Death or Destruction, or any bodily Harm tending to Death or Destruction, Maim or Wounding, Imprisonment or Restraint of the Person of His Majesty, His Heirs and Successors, or to deprive or depose Him or them from the Stile, Honour or Kingly Name of the Imperial Crown of this Realm, or of any other of His Majesty's Dominions or Countries, or to levy War against His Majesty, His Heirs and Successors, within this Realm, in order by Force or Constraint to compel Him or them to change His or their Measures or Counsels, or in order to put any Force or Constraint upon or to intimidate or overawe both Houses or either House of Parliament, or to move or stir any Foreigner or Stranger with Force to invade this Realm or any other His Majesty's Dominions or Countries under the Obeisance of His Majesty, His Heirs and Successors, and such Compassings, Imaginations, Inventions, Devices or Intentions, or any of them, should express, utter or declare, by publishing any Printing or Writing, or by any overt Act or Deed, being legally convicted thereof upon the Oaths of Two lawful and credible Witnesses upon Trial, or otherwise convicted or attainted by due Course of Law, then every such Person and Persons so as aforesaid offending should be deemed, declared and adjudged to be a Traitor and Traitors, and should suffer Pains of Death, and also lose and forfeit as in cases of High Treason: And Whereas it is necessary and expedient that such of the Provisions of the said Act as would expire at the End of the next Session of Parliament after the Demise of the Crown should be further continued and made perpetual; Be it therefore enacted by The King's Most Excellent Majesty, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same, That all and every the hereinbefore recited Provisions which relate to the Heirs and Successors of His Majesty, the Sovereigns of these Realms, shall be and the same are hereby made perpetual.\n\tII.\tAnd Whereas, in consequence of the daring Outrages offered to the Person of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, in the Exercise and Administration of the Royal Power and Authority to the Crown of these Realms belonging, in His Passage to and from the Parliament, at the Opening of this present Session, it is expedient, for the Security and Preservation of the Person of the same His Royal Highness The Prince Regent, to extend certain of the Provisions of the said Act; Be it therefore enacted, That if any Person or Persons whatsoever, after the Day of passing this Act, during the Period in which His Royal Highness The Prince Regent shall remain in the Personal Exercise of the Royal Authority, shall, within the Realm or without, compass, imagine, invent, devise or intend Death or Destruction, or any bodily Harm tending to Death or Destruction, Maim or Wounding, Imprisonment or Restraint, of the Person of the same His Royal Highness The Prince Regent, and such Compassings, Imaginations, Inventions, Devises or Intentions, or any of them, shall express, utter or declare, by publishing any Printing or Writing, or by any overt Act or Deed, being legally convicted thereof upon the Oaths of Two lawful and credible Witnesses upon Trial, or otherwise convicted or attainted by due Course of Law, then every such Person and Persons so as aforesaid offending shall be deemed, declared and adjudged to be a Traitor and Traitors, and shall suffer Pains of Death, and also lose and forfeit as in cases of High Treason.\n\tIII.\tAnd Whereas it is expedient to extend the Provisions of a certain Act passed in the Thirty ninth and Fortieth Years of the Reign of His present Majesty, intituled An Act for regulating Trials for High Treason and Misprision of Treason in certain cases; Be it therefore enacted, That from and after the passing of this Act, all and every the Clauses, Provisions and Regulations in the said Act contained shall extend and be deemed, taken and construed to extend, to all and every case of High Treason in compassing or imagining the Death of His Royal Highness The Prince Regent, and Misprision of such Treason, where the overt Act or overt Acts which shall be alleged in the Indictment for such Offence shall be Assassination or Killing of His Royal Highness The Prince Regent, or any direct Attempt against His Life, or any direct Attempt against His Person whereby His Life may be endangered or His Person may suffer bodily Harm.\n\tIV.\tProvided, and be it further enacted, That all and every Person and Persons that shall at any Time be accused, or indicted or prosecuted for any Offence made or declared to be High Treason by this Act, shall be entitled to the Benefit of the Act made in the Seventh Year of His Late Majesty King William the Third, intituled An Act for regulating of Trials in Cases of Treason and Misprision of Treason; and also to the Provisions made by another Act, passed in the Seventh Year of Her Late Majesty Queen Anne, intituled An Act for improving the Union of the Two Kingdoms; save and except in Cases of High Treason in compassing or imagining the Death of any Heir or Successor of His Majesty, or the Death of His Royal Highness The Prince Regent, and of Misprision of such Treason, where the overt Act or overt Acts of such Treason which shall be alleged in the Indictment for such Offence shall be Assassination or Killing of any Heir or Successor of His Majesty, or Assassination or Killing of His Royal Highness The Prince Regent, or any direct Attempt against the Life of any Heir or Successor of His Majesty, or any such Attempt against the Life of the Prince Regent, or any Direct Attempt against the Person of any Heir or Successor of His Majesty, or against the Person of The Prince Regent, whereby the Life of such Heir or Successor, or the Life of The Prince Regent, may be endangered, or the Person of such Heir or Successor, or of The Prince Regent, may suffer bodily Harm.\n\tV.\tProvided also, and be it enacted, That nothing in this Act contained shall extend or be construed to extend to prevent or affect any Prosecution, by Information or Indictment, to which any Person or Persons would have been or would be liable if this Act had not been enacted, for any Offence within the Provisions of this Act, unless the Party shall have been first prosecuted under this Act.\n\tVI.\tProvided also, and be it enacted, That the Statute of the Fifty fourth Year of His Majesty's Reign, intituled An Act to alter the Punishment in certain Cases of High Treason, shall have the same Effect as to Sentences and Judgments to be pronounced and awarded under this Act, as if this Act had been made and passed before the said Act of the Fifty fourth Year of His Majesty's Reign.\nLegislative history\nNotes\n\t•\tThis version is comprised of the following:\n5.7.2003 (Reprint No 41)\nSchedules \n\t•\tAmendments of this version that are uncommenced are not incorporated into the text.\n\t•\tPlease note—References in the legislation to other legislation or instruments or to titles of bodies or offices are not automatically updated as part of the program for the revision and publication of legislation and therefore may be obsolete.\n\t•\tEarlier versions of this Act (historical versions) are listed at the end of the legislative history.\n\t•\tFor further information relating to the Act and subordinate legislation made under the Act see the Index of South Australian Statutes or www.legislation.sa.gov.au.\nLegislation repealed by principal Act\nThe Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 repealed the following:\nAn Act for adopting certain Acts of Parliament passed in the First Year of the Reign of Her Majesty Queen Victoria in the Administration of Justice in South Australia in like manner as other Laws of England are applied therein (No. 14 of 1842)\nAn Act for amending the Law of Evidence and Practice on Criminal Trials (No. 13 of 1867)\nTreason Felony Act 1868\nHabitual Criminals Act 1870\nAn Act to abolish Forfeitures for Treason and Felony, and to otherwise amend the law relating thereto (No. 25 of 1874)\nThe Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1876\nConspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1878\nThe Criminal Law Consolidation Amendment Act 1885\nThe Criminal Law Amendment Act 1902\nHabitual Criminals Amendment Act 1907\nCriminal Law Amendment Act 1917\nCriminal Appeals Act 1924\nCriminal Law Amendment Act 1925\nCriminal Law Act 1927\nCriminal Informations Act 1929\nCriminal Law Act 1929\nLegislation amended by principal Act\nThe Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 amended the following:\nThe Children's Protection Act 1899\nJustices Act 1921\nMaintenance Act 1926\nBushfires Act 1933\nPrincipal Act and amendments\nNew entries appear in bold.\nYear\nNo\nTitle\nAssent\nCommencement\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935\n21.12.1935\n2.1.1936 (Gazette 2.1.1936 p1)\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1940\n5.12.1940\n5.12.1940\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1952\n27.11.1952\n27.11.1952\n Coroners Act Amendment Act 1952\n4.12.1952\n4.12.1952\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1956\n29.11.1956\n29.11.1956\n Statute Law Revision Act 1957\n14.11.1957\n14.11.1957\n Maintenance Act Amendment Act 1965\n23.12.1965\n27.1.1966 (Gazette 27.1.1966 p145)\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1966\n24.2.1966\n24.2.1966\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act (No. 2) 1969\n11.12.1969\n31.8.1970 (Gazette 20.8.1970 p701)\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act (No. 3) 1969\n11.12.1969\n17.9.1970 (Gazette 17.9.1970 p1198)\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1969\n8.1.1970\n8.1.1970\n Age of Majority (Reduction) Act 1971\n8.4.1971\n15.4.1971 (Gazette 15.4.1971 p1598)\n Fisheries Act 1971\n22.4.1971\n1.12.1971 (Gazette 30.11.1971 p2261)\n Corporal Punishment Abolition Act 1971\n14.10.1971\n18.11.1971 (Gazette 18.11.1971 p2070)\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1971\n3.12.1971\n3.12.1971\n Local and District Criminal Courts Act Amendment Act 1972\n27.4.1972\n9.11.1972 (Gazette 9.11.1972 p2252)\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1972\n21.9.1972\n2.11.1972 (Gazette 2.11.1972 p2132)\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1972\n9.11.1972\n9.11.1972\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act (No. 3) 1972\n16.11.1972\n1.2.1973 (Gazette 1.2.1973 p377)\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act (No. 5) 1972\n23.11.1972\n15.2.1973 (Gazette 15.2.1973 p497)\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act (No. 6) 1972\n30.11.1972\n15.2.1973 (Gazette 15.2.1973 p496)\n Statute Law Revision Act 1973\n6.12.1973\n6.12.1973\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1974\n4.4.1974\n4.4.1974\n Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Act 1975\n2.10.1975\n2.10.1975\n Statute Law Revision Act (No. 3) 1975\n20.11.1975\n20.11.1975\n South Australian Health Commission Act 1976\n2.12.1976\nrepealed by Health Care Act 2008 on 1.7.2008 without coming into operation\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1976\n Statutes Amendment (Capital Punishment Abolition) Act 1976\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1978\n16.3.1978\n1.7.1979 (Gazette 14.6.1979 p1824)\n Criminal Law (Prohibition of Child Pornography) Act 1978\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1980\n13.11.1980\n11.12.1980 (Gazette 11.12.1980 p2119)\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1981\n11.2.1982 (Gazette 11.2.1982 p361)\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act (No. 2) 1981\n Statutes Amendment (Jurisdiction of Courts) Act 1981\n1.2.1982 (Gazette 28.1.1982 p209)\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1983\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act (No. 2) 1983\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act (No. 3) 1983\n Statutes Amendment (Criminal Law Consolidation and Police Offences) Act 1983\n22.12.1983\n22.12.1983 (Gazette 22.12.1983 p1718)\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1984\n Statute Law Revision Act 1984\nSch 1—1.1.1985 (Gazette 13.12.1984 p1811)\n Statutes Amendment (Oaths and Affirmations) Act 1984\n1.7.1984 (Gazette 28.6.1984 p1897)\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act (No. 2) 1984\n Evidence Act Amendment Act (No. 3) 1984\n Police Offences Act Amendment Act 1985\n2.5.1985\ns 37—10.5.1985 (Gazette 9.5.1985 p1398)\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1985\n1.11.1985\n1.12.1985 (Gazette 14.11.1985 p1478)\n Statutes Amendment (Victims of Crime) Act 1986\n20.3.1986\n1.10.1986 (Gazette 4.9.1986 p696) except s 26 which will not be brought into operation (the section it inserted was deleted by 51/1988)\n Statutes Amendment (Parole) Act 1986\n20.11.1986\n8.12.1986 (Gazette 27.11.1986 p1700)\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1986\n4.12.1986\n1.2.1987 (Gazette 15.1.1987 p52)\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act (No. 2) 1986\n4.12.1986\n18.12.1986 (Gazette 18.12.1986 p1877)\n Criminal Law (Enforcement of Fines) Act 1987\n30.4.1987\nSch 2—21.6.1987 (Gazette 4.6.1987 p1430)\n Statutes Amendment and Repeal (Sentencing) Act 1988\n5.5.1988\nss 28, 29 & 40—12.5.1988 (Gazette 12.5.1988 p1181); ss 26, 27 & 30—39—1.1.1989 (Gazette 15.12.1988 p2009)\n Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1988\n Statutes Amendment (Criminal Law Consolidation and Summary Offences) Act 1988\n15.12.1988\n6.3.1989 (Gazette 23.2.1989 p539)\n Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) Act 1991\n24.4.1991\n6.6.1991 (Gazette 6.6.1991 p1776)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Abolition of Year-and-a-day Rule) Amendment Act 1991\n Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991\n21.11.1991\n6.7.1992 (Gazette 25.6.1992 p1869)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Self-Defence) Amendment Act 1991\n Statutes Repeal and Amendment (Courts) Act 1991\n Statutes Amendment (Crimes Confiscation and Restitution) Act 1991\n16.1.1992 (Gazette 16.1.1992 p126)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Rape) Amendment Act 1992\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Detention of Insane Offenders) Amendment Act 1992\n14.5.1992\n6.7.1992 (Gazette 25.6.1992 p1880)\n Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) Act 1992\n14.5.1992\n Statutes Amendment and Repeal (Public Offences) Act 1992\n21.5.1992\n Statutes Amendment (Illegal Use of Motor Vehicles) Act 1992\n21.5.1992\n6.7.1992 (Gazette 2.7.1992 p209) except the part of s 4 which inserted new s 86B which will not be brought into operation (new s 86B was deleted by 62/1993)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Application of Criminal Law) Amendment Act 1992\n Statutes Amendment (Right of Reply) Act 1992\n26.11.1992\ns 4—1.1.1993 (Gazette 10.12.1992 p1752)\n Evidence (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 1993\n13.5.1993\n15.7.1993 (Gazette 15.7.1993 p520)\n Statutes Amendment (Courts) Act 1993\n27.5.1993\nss 24—26—1.7.1993 (Gazette 24.6.1993 p2047)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Stalking) Amendment Act 1994\n14.4.1994\n1.6.1994 (Gazette 12.5.1994 p1187)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Sexual Intercourse) Amendment Act 1994\n12.5.1994\n26.5.1994 (Gazette 26.5.1994 p1262)\n Domestic Violence Act 1994\n1.8.1994 (Gazette 14.7.1994 p68)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Child Sexual Abuse) Amendment Act 1994\n28.7.1994 (Gazette 28.7.1994 p170)\n Statutes Amendment (Courts) Act 1994\n2.6.1994\n9.6.1994 (Gazette 9.6.1994 p1669)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Felonies and Misdemeanours) Amendment Act 1994\n27.10.1994\n1.1.1995 (Gazette 8.12.1994 p1942)\n Statutes Amendment (Female Genital Mutilation and Child Protection) Act 1995\n27.4.1995\ns 4—27.4.1997 (s 7(5) Acts Interpretation Act 1915)\n Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) Act 1995\n27.4.1995\ns 12—10.7.1995 (Gazette 29.6.1995 p2973)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Appeals) Amendment Act 1995\n7.12.1995\n4.1.1996 (Gazette 4.1.1996 p2) except s 10—12.9.1996 (Gazette 12.9.1996 p1124)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Mental Impairment) Amendment Act 1995\n7.12.1995\n2.3.1996 (Gazette 11.1.1996 p94)\n Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) Act 1996\n15.8.1996\nss 8—12—17.10.1996 (Gazette 17.10.1996 p1361)\n Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 1996\n19.12.1996\n7.7.1997 (Gazette 12.6.1997 p2962)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Self Defence) Amendment Act 1997\n Statutes Amendment (References to Banks) Act 1997\n12.6.1997\nPt 4 (s 6)—3.7.1997 (Gazette 3.7.1997 p4)\n Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) Act 1998\n3.9.1998\nPt 3 (ss 5—7)—13.12.1998 (Gazette 3.12.1998 p1676)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Contamination of Goods) Amendment Act 1999\n Statutes Amendment (Sentencing—Miscellaneous) Act 1999\n18.3.1999\nPt 2 (ss 4 & 5)—16.5.1999 (Gazette 13.5.1999 p2502)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Intoxication) Amendment Act 1999\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Juries) Amendment Act 1999\n16.5.1999 (Gazette 13.5.1999 p2502)\n Financial Sector Reform (South Australia) Act 1999\n17.6.1999\nSch (item 16)—1.7.1999 being the date specified under s 3(16) of the Financial Sector Reform (Amendments and Transitional Provisions) Act (No. 1) 1999 of the Commonwealth as the transfer date for the purposes of that Act: s 2(2)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Serious Criminal Trespass) Amendment Act 1999\n2.12.1999\n25.12.1999 (Gazette 23.12.1999 p3668)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Sexual Servitude) Amendment Act 2000\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Appeals) Amendment Act 2000\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Mental Impairment) Amendment Act 2000\n13.7.2000\n29.10.2000 (Gazette 26.10.2000 p2786)\n Statutes Amendment and Repeal (Attorney-General's Portfolio) Act 2000\n20.7.2000\nPt 6 (s 14)—14.8.2000 (Gazette 10.8.2000 p444)\n Legal Assistance (Restrained Property) Amendment Act 2001\ns 6—12.4.2001 (Gazette 12.4.2001 p1582)\n Statutes Amendment (Stalking) Act 2001\n8.11.2001\nPt 2 (s 4)—13.1.2002 (Gazette 10.1.2002 p4)\n Statutes Amendment (Courts and Judicial Administration) Act 2001\n6.12.2001\nPt 4 (ss 7 & 8)—3.2.2002 (Gazette 24.1.2002 p346)\n Statutes Amendment (Bushfires) Act 2002\nPt 2 (s 4)—31.10.2002 (Gazette 31.10.2002 p3979)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Offences of Dishonesty) Amendment Act 2002\n16.1.2003 (Gazette 16.1.2003 p180) except ss 4—8, 12—16—5.7.2003 (Gazette 15.5.2003 p1979) and except s 10—29.10.2000 (commencement amended by 23/2004 s 30)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Territorial Application of the Criminal Law) Amendment Act 2002\n7.11.2002\n1.12.2002 (Gazette 28.11.2002 p4292)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Abolition of Time Limit for Prosecution of Certain Sexual Offences) Amendment Act 2003\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Self Defence) Amendment Act 2003\n24.7.2003\n27.7.2003 (Gazette 24.7.2003 p3103)\n Statutes Amendment (Honesty and Accountability in Government) Act 2003\n31.7.2003\nPt 2 (ss 4 & 5)—29.4.2004 (Gazette 29.4.2004 p1173) \n Criminal Law Consolidation (Identity Theft) Amendment Act 2003\n11.12.2003\nPt 2 (s 4)—5.9.2004 (Gazette 2.9.2004 p3544)\n Statutes Amendment (Computer Offences) Act 2004\n4.3.2004\nPt 2 (s 4)—30.5.2004 (Gazette 22.4.2004 p1086) \n Statutes Amendment (Courts) Act 2004\n8.7.2004\nPt 3 (ss 5 & 6) and Pt 12 (s 30)—1.9.2004 (Gazette 26.8.2004 p3402)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Intoxication) Amendment Act 2004\n4.11.2004\n25.11.2004 (Gazette 25.11.2004 p4406)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Child Pornography) Amendment Act 2004\n16.12.2004\nPt 2 (ss 4—7)—30.1.2005 (Gazette 13.1.2005 p67)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Criminal Neglect) Amendment Act 2005\n7.4.2005\n14.4.2005 (Gazette 14.4.2005 p874)\n Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005\n9.6.2005\nSch 1 (cl 5)—2.4.2006 (Gazette 16.2.2006 p578)\n Statutes Amendment (Sentencing of Sex Offenders) Act 2005\n14.7.2005\nPt 3 (ss 10—18)—15.5.2006 (Gazette 20.4.2006 p1128) immediately after Statutes Amendment and Repeal (Aggravated Offences) Act 2005 comes into operation\n Defamation Act 2005\n27.10.2005\nSch 1 (cl 4)—1.1.2006: s 2\n Justices of the Peace Act 2005\n17.11.2005\nSch 2 (cl 16)—1.7.2006 (Gazette 22.6.2006 p2012)\n Statutes Amendment and Repeal (Aggravated Offences) Act 2005 as amended by 44/2006\n1.12.2005\nPt 2 (ss 4—17, 19—21 & 24)—15.5.2006 (Gazette 20.4.2006 p1127); ss 18, 22 & 23—18.1.2007 (Gazette 18.1.2007 p234) immediately after Statutes Amendment (Justice Portfolio) Act 2006 comes into operation\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Instruments of Crime) Amendment Act 2005\n1.12.2005\n6.3.2006 (Gazette 16.2.2006 p578)\n Statutes Amendment (Criminal Procedure) Act 2005\nPt 2 (ss 4 & 5)—1.3.2007 (Gazette 1.3.2007 p672)\n Controlled Substances (Serious Drug Offences) Amendment Act 2005\nSch 1 (cll 3 & 6)—3.12.2007 (Gazette 22.11.2007 p4294)\n Statutes Amendment (Vehicle and Vessel Offences) Act 2005\nPt 2 (ss 4—12)—30.7.2006 (Gazette 27.7.2006 p2400)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Throwing Objects at Vehicles) Amendment Act 2006\n10.9.2006 (Gazette 7.9.2006 p3165)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Dangerous Driving) Amendment Act 2006\n13.8.2006 (Gazette 10.8.2006 p2642)\n Development (Panels) Amendment Act 2006\nSch 1 (cl 1)—23.11.2006 (Gazette 23.11.2006 p4078)\n Statutes Amendment (New Rules of Civil Procedure) Act 2006\n6.7.2006\nPt 22 (ss 89—101)—4.9.2006 (Gazette 17.8.2006 p2831)\n Statutes Amendment (Domestic Partners) Act 2006\n14.12.2006\nPt 22 (ss 66—68)—1.6.2007 (Gazette 26.4.2007 p1352)\n Statutes Amendment (Justice Portfolio) Act 2006\n14.12.2006\nPt 10 (ss 15 & 16) & Pt 28 (s 60)—18.1.2007 (Gazette 18.1.2007 p234)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Drink Spiking) Amendment Act 2007\n15.2.2007\n1.4.2007 (Gazette 29.3.2007 p929) except new s 32C(2), (3) and (4) definitions of controlled drug, licensed premises, prescribed label and prescription drug (as inserted by s 4)—16.12.2007 (Gazette 13.12.2007 p4811)\n Summary Offences (Gatecrashers at Parties) Amendment Act 2007\n15.2.2007\nSch 1 (cl 1)—1.4.2007 (Gazette 29.3.2007 p930)\n Statutes Amendment (Young Offenders) Act 2007\n29.11.2007\nPt 2 (s 4)—3.2.2008 (Gazette 31.1.2008 p349)\n Statutes Amendment (Public Order Offences) Act 2008\n17.4.2008\nPt 2 (ss 4 & 5)—8.6.2008 (Gazette 5.6.2008 p1871)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Rape and Sexual Offences) Amendment Act 2008\n17.4.2008\nPt 2 (ss 4—16) & Sch 1 (cl 7)—23.11.2008 (Gazette 20.11.2008 p5171)\n Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008\n15.5.2008\nSch 1 (cll 3 & 4)—4.9.2008 (Gazette 4.9.2008 p4227)\n Firearms (Firearms Prohibition Orders) Amendment Act 2008\n12.6.2008\nSch 1 (cl 1)—27.11.2008 (Gazette 27.11.2008 p5277)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Double Jeopardy) Amendment Act 2008\n10.7.2008\n3.8.2008 (Gazette 31.7.2008 p3519)\n Statutes Amendment (Property Offences) Act 2009\n17.9.2009\nPt 2 (ss 4—6)—20.12.2009 (Gazette 17.12.2009 p6351)\n Statutes Amendment (Recidivist Young Offenders and Youth Parole Board) Act 2009\n5.11.2009\nPt 2 (s 4)—27.6.2010 (Gazette 17.6.2010 p3077)\n Statutes Amendment (Victims of Crime) Act 2009\n10.12.2009\nPt 3 (s 16)—19.9.2010 (Gazette 16.9.2010 p4868)\n Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009\n10.12.2009\nSch 1 (cl 5)—9.12.2011 (Gazette 20.10.2011 p4269)\n Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (South Australia) Act 2010\nSch 1 (cl 9)—1.7.2010 (Gazette 1.7.2010 p3338)\n Statutes Amendment (Driving Offences) Act 2010\n14.10.2010\nPt 2 (ss 4—7)—21.8.2011 (Gazette 18.8.2011 p3490)\n Evidence (Discreditable Conduct) Amendment Act 2011\n22.9.2011\nPt 3 (s 5)—1.6.2012 (Gazette 31.5.2012 p2637)\n Summary Offences (Tattooing, Body Piercing and Body Modification) Amendment Act 2011\n6.10.2011\nSch 1 (cl 1)—15.12.2012 (Gazette 15.11.2012 p5008)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Child Pornography) Amendment Act 2011\n Education and Early Childhood Services (Registration and Standards) Act 2011\n8.12.2011\nSch 3 (cll 15—17)—1.1.2012 (Gazette 15.12.2011 p4986)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Looting) Amendment Act 2012\n19.4.2012\n19.5.2012: s 2\n Statutes Amendment (Serious and Organised Crime) Act 2012\n10.5.2012\nPt 6 (ss 28—38)—17.6.2012 (Gazette 14.6.2012 p2756)\n Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) Act 2012\n24.5.2012\nPt 2 (s 4)—5.8.2012 (Gazette 2.8.2012 p3302)\n Statutes Amendment (Serious Firearm Offences) Act 2012\n27.9.2012\nPt 5 (ss 24—28)—15.10.2012 (Gazette 15.10.2012 p4652); ss 29 & 30—4.3.2013 (Gazette 21.2.2013 p485)\n Statutes Amendment (Courts Efficiency Reforms) Act 2012\n22.11.2012\nPt 4 (ss 10—12)—11.3.2013 (Gazette 7.3.2013 p760)\n Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012\n6.12.2012\nSch 3 (cll 12 & 13)—1.9.2013 (Gazette 23.5.2013 p2006)\n—\n—\n Supreme Court Criminal Rules 2013\n—\n1.1.2013: see s 283(2) (repealed)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Cheating at Gambling) Amendment Act 2013\n28.3.2013\n12.5.2013 (Gazette 9.5.2013 p1424)\n Statutes Amendment (Appeals) Act 2013\n28.3.2013\nPt 2 (ss 4—10) & Sch 1—5.5.2013 (Gazette 26.4.2013 p1185)\n Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) Act 2013\n18.4.2013\nPt 3 (s 5)—9.6.2013 (Gazette 6.6.2013 p2498)\n Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio No 2) Act 2013\n24.10.2013\nPt 2 (s 4)—17.5.2014 (Gazette 8.5.2014 p1630)\n Statutes Amendment (Electronic Monitoring) Act 2013\nPt 3 (s 8)—5.12.2015 (s 7(5) Acts Interpretation Act 1915)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Protection for Working Animals) Amendment Act 2013\n31.12.2013 (Gazette 19.12.2013 p4925)\n Statutes Amendment (Dangerous Driving) Act 2013\nPt 2 (ss 4 & 5)—26.1.2014 (Gazette 23.1.2014 p344)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Sexual Offences—Cognitive Impairment) Amendment Act 2014\n11.12.2014\n30.3.2015 (Gazette 15.1.2015 p308)\n Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) Act 2014\n11.12.2014\nPt 4 (ss 6—10)—1.4.2015 (Gazette 19.2.2015 p793)\n Statutes Amendment (Serious and Organised Crime) Act 2015\nPt 2 (ss 4—8)—6.8.2015 (Gazette 6.8.2015 p3752)\n Statutes Amendment (Firearms Offences) Act 2015\n26.11.2015\nPt 2 (s 4)—7.2.2016 (Gazette 4.2.2016 p368)\n Firearms Act 2015\n17.12.2015\nSch 1 (cll 5—8)—1.7.2017 (Gazette 27.6.2017 p2619)\n Youth Justice Administration Act 2016\n17.3.2016\nSch 1 (cl 3)—1.12.2016 (Gazette 8.9.2016 p3677)\n Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) Act 2016\nPt 4 (ss 6—9)—16.6.2016: s 2(1)\n Dog and Cat Management (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2016\n14.7.2016\nSch 1 (cll 1 & 2)—1.7.2017 (Gazette 19.4.2017 p1101)\n Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2016\n24.11.2016\nSch 1 (cl 1)—16.12.2016 (Gazette 15.12.2016 p4988)\n Statutes Amendment (Courts and Justice Measures) Act 2016\n8.12.2016\nPt 3 (s 6)—8.12.2016: s 2(1)\n Statutes Amendment (Planning, Development and Infrastructure) Act 2017\n28.2.2017\nPt 9 (ss 27 to 29)—1.7.2019 (Gazette 27.6.2019 p2322) (s 29 is of no effect because of other amendments)\n Summary Procedure (Indictable Offences) Amendment Act 2017\n14.6.2017\nSch 2 (cll 5—12 & 41)—5.3.2018 (Gazette 12.12.2017 p4961)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Mental Impairment) Amendment Act 2017\n14.6.2017\n23.10.2017 except s 4, consumption (as inserted by s 5(1)), s 5(2) to (5), (7) to (9), new s 269C(2) (as inserted by s 6(3)), ss 7(1), 8(1), (3), 9(1), 10(1), new Division 3A of Part 8A (except Subdivision 3) (as inserted by s 11), ss 22(2) and 28—27.11.2017 (Gazette 17.10.2017 p4336) and except new s 269C(3) (as inserted by s 6(3))—6.9.2018 (Gazette 6.9.2018 p3412) and except continuing supervision order (as inserted by s 5(1)), s 5(6), Subdivision 3 of new Division 3A of Part 8A (as inserted by s 11), ss 23 and 27—14.6.2019 (s 7(5) Acts Interpretation Act 1915) (Section 15(4) is of no effect because it purports to delete a reference that had already been removed.)\n Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017\n18.7.2017\nSch 1 (cll 3 & 4)—22.10.2018 (Gazette 19.12.2017 p5118) \n Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) (No 2) Act 2017\nPt 4 (ss 5 to 9)—24.10.2017\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Criminal Organisations) Amendment Act 2017\n Liquor Licensing (Liquor Review) Amendment Act 2017\n28.11.2017\nSch 1 (cl 2)—18.11.2019 (Gazette 7.11.2019 p3759)\n Statutes Amendment (Sentencing) Act 2017\n28.11.2017\nPt 8 (ss 14 to 16)—30.4.2018 (Gazette 6.2.2018 p612)\n Statutes Amendment (Extremist Material) Act 2017\nPt 2 (s 4)—23.1.2018 (Gazette 23.1.2018 p282)\n Statutes Amendment (Explosives) Act 2017\nPt 2 (ss 4 to 6)—1.5.2018 (Gazette 6.2.2018 p611)\n Children's Protection Law Reform (Transitional Arrangements and Related Amendments) Act 2017\nPt 12 (ss 62 to 66)—22.10.2018 (Gazette 19.12.2017 p5119) (ss 63 to 66 are of no effect because of other amendments)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Dishonest Communication with Children) Amendment Act 2018\n12.7.2018\n13.8.2018 (Gazette 9.8.2018 p3047)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Children and Vulnerable Adults) Amendment Act 2018\n2.8.2018\n6.9.2018 (Gazette 30.8.2018 p3253)\n Statutes Amendment (Domestic Violence) Act 2018\n6.12.2018\nPt 3 (ss 5 & 6)—31.1.2019 (Gazette 24.1.2019 p272)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Foster Parents and Other Positions of Authority) Amendment Act 2019\n22.10.2018 except ss 5 to 8—9.5.2019: s 2\n Statutes Amendment (Child Exploitation and Encrypted Material) Act 2019\n11.7.2019\nPt 3 (ss 5 to 8)—24.10.2019 (Gazette 24.10.2019 p3572)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Assaults on Prescribed Emergency Workers) Amendment Act 2019\n1.8.2019\nPt 2 (ss 4 to 9)—3.10.2019 (Gazette 3.10.2019 p3398)\n Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) (No 2) Act 2019\n19.9.2019\nPt 3 (ss 5, 6, 8 & 9)—3.10.2019 immediately after s 4 of 17/2019 came into operation: s 2(2); s 7 immediately after s 7 of 17/2019 came into operation: s 2(3)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Child-Like Sex Dolls Prohibition) Amendment Act 2019\nPt 2 (ss 4 to 8)—3.1.2020: s 2(1)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (False or Misleading Information) Amendment Act 2019\n5.12.2019\n18.6.2020 (Gazette 11.6.2020 p3304)\n Statutes Amendment (Legalisation of Same Sex Marriage Consequential Amendments) Act 2019\n19.12.2019\nPt 3 (ss 6 & 7)—1.5.2020 (Gazette 30.4.2020 p838)\n Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) Act 2020\nPt 3 (ss 5 to 7)—1.10.2020: s 2(1); ss 8 & 9—1.4.2021 (Gazette 25.3.2021 p1050)\n Statutes Amendment (Abolition of Defence of Provocation and Related Matters) Act 2020\n10.12.2020\nPt 3 (ss 5, 6, 8 & 9)—1.2.2021; s 7 & Sch 1 (cl 1)—29.3.2021 (Gazette 27.1.2021 p163)\n Termination of Pregnancy Act 2021\n11.3.2021\nSch 1 (cll 2 to 4)—7.7.2022 (Gazette 23.6.2022 p1919)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Causing Death by Use of Motor Vehicle) Amendment Act 2021\n8.4.2021\n29.8.2022 (Gazette 25.8.2022 p2609)\n Statutes Amendment (COVID-19 Permanent Measures) Act 2021\n17.6.2021\nPt 4 (s 6)—9.9.2021 (Gazette 18.8.2021 p3099)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Driving at Extreme Speed) Amendment Act 2021\n1.7.2021\n16.12.2021 (Gazette 16.12.2021 p4401) except ss 7 & 8—29.8.2022 immediately after 11/2021 (Gazette 25.8.2022 p2609)\n Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2021\n1.7.2021\nSch 1 (cl 7)—31.1.2023 (Gazette 11.8.2022 p2489)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Bushfires) Amendment Act 2021\n Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (CPIPC Recommendations) Amendment Act 2021\nSch 1 (cll 12 to 14 & 76)—7.10.2021: s 2\n Statutes Amendment (Child Sexual Abuse) Act 2021\n9.12.2021\nPt 2 (ss 4 to 8)—1.6.2022 (Gazette 17.2.2022 p490)\n Statutes Amendment (Child Sex Offences) Act 2022\n14.7.2022\nPt 3 (ss 8 to 18)—1.10.2022 (Gazette 23.9.2022 p6135)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Human Remains) Amendment Act 2022\n6.10.2022\n16.12.2022 (Gazette 15.12.2022 p6904)\n Statutes Amendment (Stealthing and Consent) Act 2022\nPt 2 (s 3)—8.3.2023 (Gazette 2.3.2023 p464)\n Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) (No 3) Act 2022\nPt 3 (s 5)—8.12.2022: s 2(1)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Child Sexual Abuse) Amendment Act 2023\n8.6.2023\nPt 2 (s 3)—22.6.2023: s 2\n Statutes Amendment (Sexual Offences) Act 2023\n21.6.2023\nPt 4 (ss 6 to 10)—1.10.2023 (Gazette 14.9.2023 p3237)\n Statutes Amendment (Serious Vehicle and Vessel Offences) Act 2023\n13.7.2023\nPt 2 (ss 3 to 9)—1.1.2024 (Gazette 25.10.2023 p3602)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Criminal Organisations—Prescribed Places) Amendment Act 2023\nPt 2 (s 2)—15.9.2023\n Statutes Amendment (Identity Theft) Act 2024\nPt 2 (ss 3 to 7)—1.4.2025 (Gazette 13.2.2025 p138)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Recruiting Children to Commit Crime) Amendment Act 2024\n16.12.2024 (Gazette 5.12.2024 p4544)\n Sentencing (Serious Child Sex Offenders) Amendment Act 2024\nSch 1 (cl 2)—28.4.2025 (Gazette 12.3.2025 p289)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Section 20A) Amendment Act 2024\n21.11.2024\n1.5.2025 (Gazette 6.3.2025 p256)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Stalking and Harassment) Amendment Act 2025\n13.2.2025\nPt 2 (ss 3 & 4)—8.6.2025 (Gazette 15.5.2025 p1171)\n Animal Welfare Act 2025\n27.2.2025\nSch 1 (cll 1 & 2)—uncommenced\n Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio and Other Justice Measures) Act 2025\nPt 4 (s 9)—12.3.2025: s 2(1)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Mental Competence) Amendment Act 2025\n27.3.2025\nPt 2 (ss 3 to 8)—14.7.2025 (Gazette 5.6.2025 p1385)\n Children and Young People (Safety and Support) Act 2025\n12.6.2025\nSch 2 (cl 14)—uncommenced\n Dog and Cat Management (Breeder Reforms) Amendment Act 2025\n26.6.2025\nSch 1 (cl 1)—17.11.2025 (Gazette 30.10.2025 p4240)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Defences—Intoxication) Amendment Act 2025\n3.7.2025\n1.9.2025 (Gazette 28.8.2025 p3609)\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Coercive Control) Amendment Act 2025\n11.9.2025\nPt 2 (ss 3 to 5)—uncommenced\n Criminal Law Consolidation (Street Gangs) Amendment Act 2025\n5.11.2025\nPt 2 (ss 3 & 4)—16.2.2026 (Gazette 12.2.2026 p241)\n Carers Recognition (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2025\n4.12.2025\nSch 1 (cll 1 & 2)—1.7.2026 (Gazette 19.2.2026 p361)\nProvisions amended since 3 February 1976\n\t•\tLegislative history prior to 3 February 1976 appears in marginal notes and footnotes included in the consolidation of this Act contained in Volume 3 of The Public General Acts of South Australia 1837-1975 at page 125.\n\t•\tCertain textual alterations were made to this Act by the Commissioner of Statute Revision when preparing the reprint of the Act that incorporated all amendments in force as at 1 January 1985. A Schedule of these alterations was laid before Parliament on 12 February 1985.\nNew entries appear in bold.\nEntries that relate to provisions that have been deleted appear in italics.\nProvision\nHow varied\nCommencement\nPt 1\n\ns 2\nomitted under Legislation Revision and Publication Act 2002\ns 3\namended by 83/1976 s 2\n\namended by 115/1976 s 3\n\namended by 107/1981 s 3\n\namended by 49/1984 s 2\n\ndeleted in pursuance of the Acts Republication Act 1967\ns 4\ns 5\n\ns 5(1)\ns 5(1) redesignated as s 5 in pursuance of the Acts Republication Act 1967\n\ns 5 redesignated as s 5(1) by 90/1986 s 3(b)\n\namended by 19/2015 s 4(1)\naggravated offence\ninserted by 62/2005 s 4\napproved carer\ninserted by 64/2017 s 62\nbasic offence\ninserted by 62/2005 s 4\nbestiality\ninserted by 10/2008 s 4(1)\ncarnal knowledge\ndeleted by 83/1976 s 3(a)\ncattle\ndeleted by 62/2005 s 4\ninserted by 69/1986 s 17\n\namended by 43/1994 s 4\ncriminal organisation\ninserted by 12/2012 s 28(1)\n\namended by 19/2015 s 4(2)\ndomestic partner\ninserted by 43/2006 s 66(1)\ndrive\ninserted by 81/2005 s 4(1)\ndriver's licence\ninserted by 81/2005 s 4(1)\ndwelling-house\nfirearm\ninserted by 103/1988 s 3(a)\n\nsubstituted by 46/2015 Sch 1 cl 5\nfoster parent\ninserted by 6/2019 s 4\nFull Court\ninserted by 28/2008 s 4\n\nsubstituted by 9/2013 s 4\n\ndeleted by 18/2017 Sch 2 cl 5\nlocal government body\ninserted by 26/2002 s 3\n\nsubstituted by 15/2006 Sch 1 cl 1\n23.11.2006\n\nsubstituted by 5/2017 s 27(1)\nmotor vehicle\ninserted by 81/2005 s 4(2)\nmotor vessel\ninserted by 81/2005 s 4(2)\noffensive weapon\ninserted by 80/1999 s 3\nthe Parole Board\nplanning assessment panel\ninserted by 5/2017 s 27(2)\nproperty\nsubstituted by 90/1986 s 3(a)\nrape\ndeleted by 83/1976 s 3(b)\nserious and organised crime offence\ninserted by 12/2012 s 28(2)\nsexual intercourse\ninserted by 83/1976 s 3(b)\n\nsubstituted by 98/1985 s 3\n\namended by 19/1994 s 3\n\namended by 10/2008 s 4(2), (3)\nspouse\ninserted by 43/2006 s 66(2)\nvehicle\ninserted by 81/2005 s 4(3)\nvessel\ninserted by 81/2005 s 4(3)\ns 5(2)\n\ninserted by 90/1986 s 3(b)\n\nsubstituted by 59/1994 s 3\ns 5(3)\ninserted by 10/2008 s 4(4)\ns 5AA\ninserted by 62/2005 s 5\ns 5AA(1)\namended by 31/2005 s 10\n\namended by 81/2005 s 5(1)\n\namended by 14/2006 s 4(1)\n\namended by 43/2006 s 67(1)\n\namended by 57/2007 s 4(1), (2)\n3.2.2008\n\namended by 8/2008 s 4\n\namended by 18/2010 s 4(1)\n\namended by 10/2012 s 4(1)\n\namended by 12/2012 s 29(1)\n\namended by 28/2016 s 6(1)\n\namended by 25/2017 Sch 1 cl 3\n\namended by 38/2018 s 5(1)\n\namended by 17/2019 s 4(1), (2), (4)\n\n(k)(ii) deleted by 17/2019 s 4(3)\n\namended by 9/2022 s 8\n\namended by 25/2025 Sch 2 cl 14\ns 5AA(1a)\ninserted by 81/2005 s 5(2)\n\namended by 14/2006 s 4(2), (3)\n\namended by 18/2010 s 4(2), (3)\ns 5AA(1ab)\ninserted by 24/2023 s 3(1)\ns 5AA(1b)\ninserted by 14/2006 s 4(4)\n\namended by 18/2010 s 4(4)\ns 5AA(1c)\ninserted by 18/2010 s 4(5)\ns 5AA(1d)\ninserted by 28/2021 s 4\n\namended by 24/2023 s 3(2)\ns 5AA(2a) and (2b)\ninserted by 12/2012 s 29(2)\ns 5AA(4)\namended by 12/2012 s 29(3)\ns 5AA(4a)\ninserted by 38/2018 s 5(2)\n\namended by 35/2025 s 3\ns 5AA(5)\n\nCFS\ninserted by 10/2012 s 4(2)\ncircumstances of heightened risk\ncognitive impairment\ninserted by 28/2016 s 6(2)\nharm\ninserted by 24/2023 s 3(3)\nmajor defect\nmaterial defect\ninserted by 24/2023 s 3(4)\nspouse\ndeleted by 43/2006 s 67(2)\nstreet race\ns 5AB\ninserted by 37/2024 Sch 1 cl 2 \n28.4.2025\ns 5A\ninserted by 115/1976 s 4\ns 5B\ninserted by 35/1992 s 4\ns 5C\ninserted by 63/1992 s 2\n\ndeleted by 28/2002 s 3\n1.12.2002\ns 5D\ninserted by 59/1994 s 4\nPt 1A\ninserted by 28/2002 s 4\n1.12.2002\ns 5H\n\ns 5H(3)\nsubstituted by 12/2025 s 3\nPt 2\nheading amended by 59/1994 Sch 1\ns 6\ns 7\n\ns 8\n\ns 8(1)\ns 9\n\ns 9(1)\ns 9(2)\n\ns 10\ns 10A\ninserted by 115/1976 s 5\nPt 3\n\namended by 33/2012 s 24\nPt 3 Div 1\n\ns 11\namended by 115/1976 s 6\n\ns 12\ns 12A\ninserted by 59/1994 s 5\n\namended by 7/2021 Sch 1 cl 2\ns 12A Note\nomitted under Legislation Revision and Publication Act 2002\ns 13\n\ns 13(1)\ns 13 redesignated as s 13(1) by 81/2005 s 6\ns 13(2) and (3)\ninserted by 81/2005 s 6\ns 13A\ninserted by 45/1983 s 2\ns 13A(12)\ninserted by 29/2021 Sch 1 cl 7\n31.1.2023\ns 14\namended by 51/1983 s 2\n\ndeleted by 91/1986 s 3\ns 14A\nsubstituted by 51/1983 s 3\n\ndeleted by 91/1986 s 3\nPt 3 Div 1A\ninserted by 4/2005 s 4\n14.4.2005\nsubstituted by 6/2018 s 4\ns 13B\ninserted by 6/2018 s 5\ns 14\n\ns 14(1)\namended by 6/2018 s 6(1)—(3)\ns 14(2)\namended by 6/2018 s 6(1), (2)\ns 14(3)\nsubstituted by 6/2018 s 6(4)\ns 14(4) before substitution by 6/2018\n\ncognitive impairment\ninserted by 28/2016 s 7(1)\nvulnerable adult\namended by 28/2016 s 7(2)\ns 14(4)\nsubstituted by 6/2018 s 6(4)\ns 14A\ninserted by 6/2018 s 7\nPt 3 Div 2\n\nsubstituted by 43/2020 s 5\ns 14B\ninserted by 43/2020 s 6\ns 15\nsubstituted by 68/1991 s 2\n\nsubstituted by 10/1997 s 2\ns 15(1)\namended by 28/2003 s 4(1)\ns 15(2)\namended by 28/2003 s 4(2)\n\namended by 31/2025 s 3(1)\ns 15(2a)\ninserted by 31/2025 s 3(2)\ns 15(6)\ninserted by 31/2025 s 3(3)\ns 15A\ninserted by 10/1997 s 2\ns 15A(1)\namended by 28/2003 s 5(1)\ns 15A(2)\namended by 28/2003 s 5(2)\n\namended by 31/2025 s 4(1)\ns 15A(2a)\ninserted by 31/2025 s 4(2)\ns 15A(3)\namended by 2/2007 Sch 1 cl 1\n1.4.2007\ns 15A(5)\ninserted by 31/2025 s 4(3)\ns 15B\ninserted by 28/2003 s 6\ns 15B(1)\ns 15B redesignated as s 15B(1) by 43/2020 s 7\ns 15B(2) and (3)\ninserted by 43/2020 s 7\ns 15C\ninserted by 28/2003 s 6\nss 15D—15F\ninserted by 43/2020 s 8\nPt 3 Div 3\n\ns 16\ns 17\ndeleted by 63/1992 s 3\nheading preceding s 18\ndeleted by 107/1981 s 4\ns 18\ndeleted by 107/1981 s 4\n\ninserted by 40/1991 s 2\nPt 3 Div 4\n\nheading preceding s 19\nsubstituted by 90/1986 s 4\ns 19\n\nsubstituted by 90/1986 s 4\ns 19(1)\nsubstituted by 62/2005 s 6(1)\ns 19(2)\nsubstituted by 62/2005 s 6(1)\n\namended by 40/2009 s 4\n\namended by 17/2019 s 5\n\namended by 21/2019 s 5\ns 19(4)\ninserted by 62/2005 s 6(2)\nPt 3 Div 5\n\nheading preceding s 19AA\ninserted by 7/1994 s 3\n1.6.1994\n\namended by 1/2025 s 3\ns 19AA\ninserted by 7/1994 s 3\n1.6.1994\namended by 1/2025 s 4(1)\ns 19AA(1)\namended by 55/2001 s 4(a), (b)\n13.1.2002\n\namended by 1/2025 s 4(2)—(9)\ns 19AA(2)\namended by 62/2005 s 7\n\nsubstituted by 1/2025 s 4(10)\ns 19AA(2a)\ninserted by 1/2025 s 4(10)\ns 19AA(3)\namended by 1/2025 s 4(11)\ns 19AA(4)\namended by 1/2025 s 4(12)\ns 19AA(5)\namended by 1/2025 s 4(13)\ns 19AA(6)\ninserted by 55/2001 s 4(c)\n13.1.2002\nPt 3 Div 6\n\nheading preceding s 19A\n\nsubstituted by 81/2005 s 7\ns 19AAB\ninserted by 81/2005 s 8\nRegistrar of Motor Vehicles\ninserted by 28/2021 s 5\ns 19A\n\nheading amended by 24/2023 s 4\ns 19A(1)\namended by 81/2005 s 9(1), (2)\n\namended by 90/2013 s 4(1)\ns 19A(2)\ndeleted by 81/2005 s 9(3)\ns 19A(3)\namended by 81/2005 s 9(4)—(6)\n\namended by 90/2013 s 4(2)\ns 19A(4)\namended by 62/2005 s 8(1)—(5)\n\ndeleted by 81/2005 s 9(7)\ns 19A(5)\namended by 62/2005 s 8(6)\n\namended by 81/2005 s 9(8), (9)\n\nsubstituted by 18/2010 s 5(1)\ns 19A(6)\namended by 51/1988 s 27\ns 19A(7)\namended by 62/2005 s 8(7)\n\namended by 81/2005 s 9(10)\ns 19A(10) before deletion by 81/2005\n\nharm and serious harm\n inserted by 62/2005 s 8(8)\ns 19A(10)\ndeleted by 81/2005 s 9(11)\ns 19A(10) and (11)\ninserted by 18/2010 s 5(2)\ns 19AB\ninserted by 81/2005 s 10\ns 19AB(1)\namended by 24/2023 s 5(1)\ns 19AB(2)\namended by 24/2023 s 5(2)\ns 19ABA\ninserted by 24/2023 s 6\ns 19AC\ninserted by 14/2006 s 5\ns 19AC(1)\namended by 90/2013 s 5\ns 19AD\ninserted by 18/2010 s 6\ns 19ADA\ninserted by 28/2021 s 6\ns 19AE\ninserted by 11/2021 s 4\n\nheading amended by 24/2023 s 7(1)\ns 19AE(1)\namended by 28/2021 s 7(1)\n\namended by 24/2023 s 7(2)\ns 19AE(1a)\ninserted by 28/2021 s 7(2)\ns 19AE(10a)— (10d)\ninserted by 28/2021 s 7(3)\ns 19AE(13)\namended by 24/2023 s 7(3)\ns 19AE(14)\n\nRegistrar of Motor Vehicles\ndeleted by 28/2021 s 7(4)\ns 19AF\ninserted by 11/2021 s 4\n\nheading amended by 24/2023 s 8(1)\ns 19AF(1)\nsubstituted by 28/2021 s 8(1)\n\namended by 24/2023 s 8(2), (3)\ns 19AF(1a)\ninserted by 28/2021 s 8(1)\ns 19AF(10)\namended by 28/2021 s 8(2)\n\namended by 24/2023 s 8(4)\ns 19AF(13a)—(13d)\ninserted by 28/2021 s 8(3)\ns 19AF(17)\nsubstituted by 28/2021 s 8(4)\n\namended by 24/2023 s 8(5)\ns 19B\ns 19B(1)\namended by 24/2023 s 9(1)\ns 19B(2)\namended by 81/2005 s 11(1), (2)\n\namended by 28/2021 s 9(1)\n\namended by 24/2023 s 9(2)\ns 19B(3)\namended by 28/2021 s 9(2)\n\namended by 24/2023 s 9(3)\ns 19B(4)\ninserted by 14/2006 s 6\ns 19B(4a)\ninserted by 18/2010 s 7\ns 19B(5)\ninserted by 14/2006 s 6\nPt 3 Div 7\n\nsubstituted by 62/2005 s 9\ns 20\n\ns 20(3)\namended by 17/2019 s 6(1), (2)\n\namended by 21/2019 s 6(1)\ns 20(4)\namended by 17/2019 s 6(3), (4)\n\namended by 21/2019 s 6(2)\ns 20AA\ns 20AA(6)\namended by 34/2020 s 5(1)\ns 20AA(9)\n\npharmacy\ninserted by 25/2021 s 6(1)\npharmacy services\ninserted by 25/2021 s 6(1)\nprescribed emergency worker\namended by 25/2021 s 6(2), (3)\n\namended by 8/2025 Sch 1 cl 1\n\namended by 28/2025 Sch 1 cl 1\nrecklessly\ninserted by 34/2020 s 5(2)\nretrieval medicine\ninserted by 21/2019 s 7\nrural area\ninserted by 21/2019 s 7\ns 20AB\ns 20AB(4)\n\nharm\nsubstituted by 34/2020 s 6\ns 20AC\nPt 3 Div 7AA\ninserted by 38/2018 s 6\ns 20A\n\ns 20A(a1)\ninserted by 54/2024 s 3(1)\ns 20A(1)\namended by 54/2024 s 3(2)\ns 20A(3)\namended by 35/2025 s 4\ns 20A(4)\nsubstituted by 54/2024 s 3(3)\ns 20A(5) and (6)\ninserted by 54/2024 s 3(3)\nPt 3 Div 7AAB\ninserted by 35/2025 s 5\nPt 3 Div 7A\n\ninserted by 62/2005 s 10\ns 21\n\nlesser offence\namended by 9/2006 s 4\n\namended by 33/2012 s 25(1), (2)\ns 22\n\ninserted by 62/2005 s 10\ns 23\namended by 107/1981 s 5\n\ns 24\namended by 51/1983 s 4\n\ns 24(2)\namended by 17/2019 s 8\n\namended by 21/2019 s 8\ns 25\n\ns 26\ns 27\n\ndeleted by 62/2005 s 10\ns 28\n\ns 29\n\ns 29(1)\namended by 62/2005 s 11(1)\ns 29(2)\namended by 62/2005 s 11(2), (3)\ns 29(3)\namended by 62/2005 s 11(4), (5)\n\namended by 17/2019 s 9\n\namended by 21/2019 s 9\ns 29(4) and (5)\ninserted by 81/2005 s 12\ns 29A\ninserted by 33/2012 s 26\ns 30\n\ndeleted by 6/2018 s 8\ns 31\ns 31(1)\namended by 62/2005 s 12(1)\n\namended by 62/2017 s 4(1)\ns 31(2)\namended by 62/2005 s 12(2)\n\namended by 62/2017 s 4(2)\nPt 3 Div 7AB\n\ninserted by 33/2012 s 27\ns 32\n\ninserted by 103/1988 s 3(b)\n\namended by 26/1992 s 4\ns 32AA\ninserted by 33/2012 s 28\nPt 3 Div 7B\ninserted by 9/2006 s 5\nPt 3 Div 7C\ninserted by 1/2007 s 4\n1.4.2007 except s 32C(2) and (3) definitions of controlled drug, prescribed label and prescription drug—16.12.2007\ns 32C\n\ns 32C(4)\n\nlicensed premises\ninserted by 1/2007 s 4\n16.12.2007\n\namended by 49/2017 Sch 1 cl 2\n18.11.2019\nPt 3 Div 8\n\nheading preceding s 33\ns 33\n\ns 33(1)\namended by 26/2002 s 19(1) (Sch 2)\nss 33A and 33B\nss 34 and 35\n\nss 36 and 37\ns 38\namended by 51/1983 s 5\n\ndeleted by 91/1986 s 5\ns 38A\nsubstituted by 51/1983 s 6\n\ndeleted by 91/1986 s 5\nPt 3 Div 8A\ninserted by 25/2017 Sch 1 cl 4\nPt 3 Div 9 before substitution by 62/2005\n\nheading preceding s 39\ns 39\namended by 107/1981 s 6\n\namended by 69/1991 s 15(a)\n\nsubstituted by 22/1994 Sch cl 1(a)\n1.8.1994\ns 40\namended by 107/1981 s 7\ns 41\n\ns 42\ns 43\n(a) deleted by 107/1981 s 8(a)\n\namended by 107/1981 s 8(b)\n\ns 45\ns 46\namended by 16/1986 s 14\n\ndeleted by 62/1993 s 24\ns 47\n\namended by 90/1986 s 6\n\ndeleted by 62/1993 s 24\nPt 3 Div 9\nsubstituted by 62/2005 s 13\nPt 3 Div 10 before deletion by 62/2005\n\nheading preceding s 47A\ninserted by 103/1988 s 3(c)\n\ns 47A\ninserted by 103/1988 s 3(c)\nPt 3 Div 10\ndeleted by 62/2005 s 14\nPt 3 Div 11\n\ns 46 \ns 46(3)\namended by 25/2022 s 3\n8.3.2023\ns 47\ns 48 before substitution by 10/2008\nsubstituted by 83/1976 s 4\n\ns 48(1) redesignated as s 48 in pursuance of the Acts Republication Act 1967\n\namended by 98/1985 s 4\n\ns 48(2)\ndeleted by 107/1981 s 9\ns 48\nsubstituted by 10/2008 s 5\ns 48A\ns 49\nsubstituted by 83/1976 s 4\ns 49(1)\n\namended by 31/2005 s 11(1)\ns 49(2)\ndeleted by 107/1981 s 10(a)\ns 49(3)\namended by 107/1981 s 10(b)\n\namended by 62/2005 s 15(1)\n\namended by 31/2005 s 11(2)\n\namended by 44/2006 s 15\n\namended by 9/2022 s 9\ns 49(4)\namended by 107/1981 s 10(c)\ns 49(5)\namended by 107/1981 s 10(d)\n\namended by 62/2005 s 15(2)\n\nsubstituted by 10/2008 s 6\ns 49(5a)\ninserted by 10/2008 s 6\n\namended by 46/2011 Sch 3 cl 15\n\ndeleted by 41/2017 s 5(1)\n\nThe amendment to s 49(5a) purportedly made by s 63 of 64/2017 is of no effect because of its deletion by 41/2017.\n\ninserted by 57/2021 s 4\ns 49(6)\namended by 107/1981 s 10(e)\n\nsubstituted by 33/1991 s 7\n\namended by 62/2005 s 15(3), (4)\ns 49(9)\ninserted by 41/2017 s 5(2)\n\namended by 6/2019 s 5\ns 50 before substitution by 41/2017\n\ninserted by 10/2008 s 7\ns 50(8)\namended by 46/2011 Sch 3 cl 16\ns 50\nsubstituted by 41/2017 s 6\namended by 17/2023 s 3(1)\ns 50(8)\nThe amendment to s 50(8) purportedly made by s 64 of 64/2017 is of no effect because of the substitution of s 50 by 41/2017.\n\ns 50(13)\namended by 6/2019 s 6\ns 50(14)\ninserted by 17/2023 s 3(2)\ns 51\n\ninserted by 23/2014 s 4\n30.3.2015\nss 52—55\ns 56\nsubstituted by 107/1981 s 11\n\nsubstituted by 62/2005 s 16\ns 56(1)\namended by 9/2022 s 10(1), (2)\ns 56(2)\namended by 31/2005 s 12\n\ndeleted by 9/2022 s 10(3)\ns 57\n\ns 57(1)\nsubstituted by 10/2008 s 8(1)\n\namended by 57/2021 s 5(1)\ns 57(1a)\ninserted by 57/2021 s 5(2)\ns 57(4)\ninserted by 10/2008 s 8(2)\n\namended by 46/2011 Sch 3 cl 17\n\nsubstituted by 41/2017 s 7\n\nThe amendment to s 57(4) purportedly made by s 65 of 64/2017 is of no effect because of its substitution by 41/2017.\n\namended by 6/2019 s 7\ns 57A\nsubstituted by 83/1976 s 5\ns 57A(2) and (3)\ns 57B\ndeleted by 83/1976 s 6\ns 58\n\ns 58(1)\namended by 92/1978 s 2(a)\n\namended by 107/1981 s 12\n\namended by 9/2022 s 11(1), (2)\ns 58(3)—(6)\ninserted by 92/1978 s 2(b)\n\ndeleted by 114/1983 s 3\n22.12.1983\ns 58A\ninserted by 84/1983 s 2\n\ndeleted by 52/2004 s 4\ns 59\nsubstituted by 83/1976 s 7\n\namended by 62/2005 s 17\nss 60—62\ndeleted by 83/1976 s 7\ns 60\ns 64 amended by 83/1976 s 8(a), (b)\n\ns 64(c) deleted by 83/1976 s 8(c)\n\ns 64 amended by 107/1981 s 14\n\ns 64 amended by 50/1984 s 3(1) (Sch 1)\n\ns 64 amended by 59/1994 Sch 1\n\ns 64 amended by 20/2000 s 3\n\ns 64 redesignated as s 60 by 52/2004 s 5\n\namended by 62/2005 s 18 as amended by 44/2006 s 60\ns 61\ns 65 amended by 83/1976 s 9\n\ns 65 amended by 59/1994 Sch 1\n\ns 65 redesignated as s 61 by 52/2004 s 6\ns 63\namended by 107/1981 s 13\n\ndeleted by 20/2000 s 2\ns 64—see s 60\n\ns 65—see s 61\n\nPt 3 Div 11A\ninserted by 52/2004 s 7\namended by 25/2014 s 6\ns 62\n\nadministering\ninserted by 13/2019 s 5(1)\nchild\ndeleted by 43/2011 s 3(1)\nchild exploitation material\nchild pornography amended to read child exploitation material by 25/2014 s 7(1)\n\namended by 25/2014 s 7(2)\n\nsubstituted by 26/2019 s 4(1)\nchild-like sex doll\ninserted by 26/2019 s 4(1)\nchild pornography\namended by 43/2011 s 3(2), (3)\ndeal with\ninserted by 13/2019 s 5(2)\ndisseminate\namended by 25/2014 s 7(3)\n\namended by 26/2019 s 4(2)\nencourage\ninserted by 13/2019 s 5(3)\nhosting\ninserted by 13/2019 s 5(3)\nmaterial\namended by 26/2019 s 4(3)\npornographic nature\nsubstituted by 25/2014 s 7(4)\nrelevant industry regulatory authority\ninserted by 13/2019 s 5(4)\nwebsite\ninserted by 13/2019 s 5(4)\ns 63\namended by 31/2005 s 13\n\namended by 25/2014 s 8\n\namended by 26/2019 s 5\n\namended by 9/2022 s 12\ns 63AA\ninserted by 26/2019 s 6\n\namended by 9/2022 s 13\ns 63A\n\ns 63A(1)\namended by 31/2005 s 14\n\namended by 25/2014 s 9(1)\n\namended by 26/2019 s 7(1), (2)\n\namended by 9/2022 s 14\ns 63A(3)\namended by 25/2014 s 9(2)\n\ndeleted by 29/2022 s 5\ns 63AAB\ninserted by 26/2019 s 8\n\namended by 9/2022 s 15\ns 63AB\ninserted by 13/2019 s 6\ns 63B\n\ns 63B(1)\namended by 31/2005 s 15(1)\n\namended by 43/2011 s 4(1)—(3)\n\namended by 9/2022 s 16(1), (2)\ns 63B(3)\namended by 31/2005 s 15(2)\n\namended by 43/2011 s 4(4), (5)\n\namended by 9/2022 s 16(3), (4)\ns 63B(3a)\ninserted by 9/2022 s 16(5)\ns 63B(4)\ns 63B(4a)\ninserted by 57/2021 s 6\ns 63B(5)\ns 63B(6)\n\nsubstituted by 41/2017 s 8\n\nThe amendment to s 63B(6) purportedly made by s 66 of 64/2017 is of no effect because of its substitution by 41/2017.\n\namended by 6/2019 s 8\ns 63B(7)\ns 63C\n\ns 63C(2)\namended by 13/2019 s 7(1), (2)\ns 63C(2a)\ninserted by 11/2013 s 5\n\namended by 13/2019 s 7(3), (4)\ns 63C(2b)\ninserted by 11/2013 s 5\n\namended by 13/2019 s 7(5), (6)\ns 63C(3)\namended by 25/2014 s 10\n\namended by 13/2019 s 7(7), (8)\ns 63C(4)\namended by 13/2019 s 7(9), (10)\ns 63D\ninserted by 13/2019 s 8\nPt 3 Div 11B\ninserted by 57/2021 s 7\nPt 3 Div 12\n\nheading preceding s 65A\n\namended by 21/2023 s 6\ns 65A\namended by 21/2023 s 7(1)\ns 65A(1)\namended by 26/2002 s 19(1) (Sch 2)\ncommercial sexual acts\ninserted by 21/2023 s 7(2)\ncommercial sexual services\ndeleted by 21/2023 s 7(2)\nsexual servitude\namended by 21/2023 s 7(3)\ns 66\n\ns 66(1)\namended by 31/2005 s 16(1), (2)\n\namended by 44/2006 s 16(1)\n\namended by 21/2023 s 8(1), (2)\ns 66(2)\namended by 31/2005 s 16(3), (4)\n\namended by 44/2006 s 16(2)\n\namended by 21/2023 s 8(1), (2)\ns 67\n\namended by 21/2023 s 9(2)\namended by 21/2023 s 9(1)\ns 68\n\namended by 21/2023 s 10(1)\ns 68(1)\namended by 31/2005 s 17(1)\n\namended by 9/2022 s 17(1)\n\namended by 21/2023 s 10(2), (3)\ns 68(2)\namended by 31/2005 s 17(2)\n\namended by 9/2022 s 17(2), (3)\n\namended by 21/2023 s 10(2), (3)\ns 68(3)\namended by 31/2005 s 17(3)\n\namended by 9/2022 s 17(4), (5)\n\namended by 21/2023 s 10(3)—(5)\nPt 3 Div 13\n\ns 69 before substitution by 10/2008\ns 69(1) redesignated as s 69 in pursuance of the Acts Republication Act 1967\n\ns 69(2)\ndeleted by 107/1981 s 15\ns 69\nsubstituted by 10/2008 s 9\ns 72\nsubstituted by 83/1976 s 11\n\nsubstituted by 10/2008 s 10\nPt 3 Div 14\n\ns 72A\ninserted by 14/2003 s 3\ns 73\nsubstituted by 83/1976 s 12\ns 73(2a)\ninserted by 57/2021 s 8\ns 73(5)\nsubstituted by 9/1992 s 2\n\ndeleted by 10/2008 s 11\ns 74 before deletion by 10/2008\ndeleted by 107/1984 s 9\n\ninserted by 23/1994 s 3\n28.7.1994\ns 74(11)\n\nsexual offence\namended by 20/2000 s 5\n\namended by 31/2005 s 18\ns 74\ndeleted by 10/2008 s 12\ns 75\namended by 83/1976 s 13\n\namended by 51/1983 s 7\n\nsubstituted by 59/1994 s 6\n\namended by 10/2008 s 13\ns 76\namended by 83/1976 s 14\n\namended by 20/2000 s 6\n\namended by 10/2008 s 14\ns 76A\namended by 83/1976 s 15\n\ndeleted by 98/1985 s 5\ns 77\namended by 83/1976 s 16\n\ndeleted by 51/1988 s 28\ns 77A\namended by 83/1976 s 17\n\ndeleted by 51/1988 s 29\nPt 3 Div 15\n\ns 78\n\namended by 46/2019 s 6\ns 79\n\namended by 46/2019 s 7\nheading preceding s 80\nsubstituted by 83/1976 s 18\n\nPt 3 Div 16\n\ns 80\n\ns 80(1)\namended by 83/1976 s 19(a)\n\ns 80(1a)\ninserted by 83/1976 s 19(b)\n\ns 80(2)\namended by 83/1976 s 19(c)\n\nPt 3 Div 17 before deletion by 7/2021\n\ns 81\n\ns 81(1) and (2)\ns 82\ns 82A\n\ns 82A(1)\ns 82A(4)\namended by 14/1978 s 3\n1.7.1979\ns 82A(5) and (9)\nheading preceding s 83\nPt 3 Div 17\ndeleted by 7/2021 Sch 1 cl 3\nPt 3 Div 18\n\ns 83\n\ns 83(1)\n\nPt 3A\ninserted by 8/2008 s 5\ns 83CA\ninserted by 61/2017 s 4\nPt 3B\ninserted by 12/2012 s 30\nPt 3B Div 1\n\ninserted by 19/2015 s 5\ns 83D\n\ns 83D(1)\namended by 19/2015 s 6(1)\ns 83D(2)\namended by 19/2015 s 6(2)\ns 83G\n\ns 83G(1)\namended by 19/2015 s 7\nPt 3B Div 2\ninserted by 19/2015 s 8\ns 83GA\n\ns 83GA(2)\namended by 25/2023 s 2(1)\ns 83GA(5a)\ninserted by 25/2023 s 2(2)\ns 83GA(6)\namended by 25/2023 s 2(3)\ns 83GC\n\ns 83GC(2)\ndeleted by 47/2017 s 3\ns 83GD\n\ns 83GD(3)\ndeleted by 47/2017 s 4\ns 83GE\n\ns 83GE(2)\ndeleted by 47/2017 s 5\ns 83GF\n\ns 83GF(1)\namended by 53/2017 s 14\nPt 3BA\ninserted by 45/2025 s 3\nPt 3C\ninserted by 83/2013 s 4\n31.12.2013\n\ndeleted by 8/2025 Sch 1 cl 2\ns 83H\n\ns 83H(1)\n\naccredited assistance dog\naccredited guide dog amended to read accredited assistance dog by 33/2016 Sch 1 cl 1(1)\n\namended by 33/2016 Sch 1 cl 1(2), (3)\nguide dog\ndeleted by 33/2016 Sch 1 cl 1(4)\nworking animal\namended by 33/2016 Sch 1 cl 1(5)\ns 83K\namended by 53/2017 s 15(1), (2)\ns 83L\n\ns 83L(2)\namended by 33/2016 Sch 2 cl 2\nPt 3D\ninserted by 62/2017 s 5\nPt 4 before substitution 90/1986\namended by 107/1981 ss 16—19\n\namended by 16/1986 ss 15—18\nPt 4\nsubstituted by 90/1986 s 7\ns 84\n\ns 84(1)\n\nbuilding\ninserted by 40/2009 s 5\ns 85 before substitution by 40/2009\n\ns 85(1)\namended by 69/1991 s 15(b)\n\namended by 69/2001 s 7(a)—(f)\n3.2.2002\ns 85(3)\namended by 69/1991 s 15(c)\n\namended by 69/2001 s 7(g)—(l)\n3.2.2002\ns 85\nsubstituted by 40/2009 s 6\ns 85A\ninserted by 35/1992 s 5\ns 85B\ninserted by 24/2002 s 4\ns 85B(1)\namended by 33/2021 s 3(1)\ns 85B(3)\namended by 9/2025 s 9\ns 85B(4)\ninserted by 33/2021 s 3(2)\ns 86\n\ns 86(1)\namended by 69/1991 s 15(d)\n\nsubstituted by 35/1992 s 6\ns 86A\ninserted by 37/1992 s 4\ns 86A(3)\namended by 34/2020 s 7(1), (2)\ns 87\ndeleted by 69/1991 s 15(e)\nPt 4A\ninserted by 2/2004 s 4\nPt 5 before deletion by 26/2002\n\ns 130\n\namended by 33/1999 Sch (item 16(a))\n\ns 131\n\ns 132\n\ns 133\nss 134 and 135\ndeleted by 59/1994 s 7\nheading preceding s 136\nss 136 and 137\n\ns 138\namended by 107/1981 s 20\n\ns 139\namended by 16/1986 s 19\n\ns 140\n\n15.5.2003\ns 141\namended by 16/1986 s 20\n\ns 142\n\namended by 16/1986 s 21\n\ns 143\n\nheading preceding s 144\ns 144\n\ns 145\n\ns 146\n\nheading preceding s 147\nss 147 and 148\n\ns 149\namended by 16/1986 s 22\n\ns 150\n\ns 151\namended by 16/1986 s 23\n\nheading preceding s 152\ns 152\n\nss 152A and 153\n\ns 153A\n\nheading preceding s 154\ninserted by 50/1984 s 3(1) (Sch 1)\n\ns 154\n\nheading preceding s 155\ns 155\n\ns 156\ndeleted by 107/1981 s 21\ns 157\ns 158\n\ns 159\n\ns 160\n\nss 161 and 162\n\ns 163\n\nss 164 and 165\n\ns 166\n\nPt 5\ninserted by 26/2002 s 4\nPt 5 Div 2\n\ns 134\n\ns 134(1)\namended by 10/2012 s 5\nPt 5 Div 3\n\ns 137\n\ns 137(1)\namended by 62/2005 s 19(1)\ns 137(2)\ndeleted by 62/2005 s 19(2)\ns 137(3)\namended by 62/2005 s 19(3)\nPt 5 Div 4\n\namended by 63/2005 s 4\ns 138A\ninserted by 63/2005 s 5\ns 138A(3)\n\ncrime\namended by 80/2005 Sch 1 cl 3(1)\nserious drug offence\ndeleted by 80/2005 Sch 1 cl 3(2)\nPt 5 Div 5\n\ns 139\namended by 62/2005 s 20\nPt 5 Div 5A\ninserted by 4/2018 s 4\n13.8.2018\ns 139A\n\ns 139A(1)\namended by 9/2022 s 18(1), (2)\ns 139A(2)\namended by 9/2022 s 18(3), (4)\ns 139A(3)\nsubstituted by 9/2022 s 18(5)\nPt 5 Div 6\n\ns 140\n\ns 140(4)\namended by 62/2005 s 21\nPt 5A\ninserted by 60/2003 s 4\n5.9.2004\ns 144A\n\nclose relative\ninserted by 29/2024 s 3(1)\npersonal identification information\namended by 29/2024 s 3(2)—(4)\npublic identification information\ninserted by 29/2024 s 3(5)\nserious criminal offence\ndeleted by 29/2024 s 3(6)\ns 144B\n\ns 144B(3)\namended by 29/2024 s 4\ns 144C\n\ns 144C(1)\namended by 29/2024 s 5\ns 144D\n\ns 144D(1)—(3)\namended by 29/2024 s 6\ns 144DA\ninserted by 29/2024 s 7\ns 144F\namended by 37/2011 Sch 1 cl 1\n15.12.2012\nPt 5B\ninserted by 7/2013 s 4\nPt 6\ninserted by 26/2002 s 4\ns 145\n\ns 145(1)\n\npublic agency\namended by 5/2017 s 28\nheading preceding s 167\nsubstituted by 80/1999 s 4\n\ndeleted by 26/2002 s 5\nPt 6A\nheading inserted by 26/2002 s 5\ns 167\ns 167 note\namended by 26/2002 s 6\ns 168\n\ns 168 note\namended by 26/2002 s 7\ns 169\n\ns 169(1)\namended by 62/2005 s 22(1)\ns 169(2)\ndeleted by 62/2005 s 22(2)\ns 170\n\ns 170(1)\namended by 62/2005 s 23(1)\ns 170(2)\nsubstituted by 62/2005 s 23(2)\ns 170A\ninserted by 80/1999 s 5\ns 170A(1)\namended by 62/2005 s 24\ns 171\n\ns 172\ndeleted by 59/1994 s 8\ns 173\n\ndeleted by 80/1999 s 6\nheading preceding s 174\ninserted by 50/1984 s 3(1)(Sch 1)\n\ns 174\n\nheading preceding s 175\ns 175\n\nheading preceding s 176\ns 176\n\ns 177\n\ns 178\n\ns 179\n\ns 180\n\nss 181 and 182\nheading preceding s 183\ns 183\n\nheading preceding s 184\ns 184\n\ns 185\n\ns 186\n\ns 187\n\nss 188—192\n\ns 193\n\ns 194\n\nheading preceding s 195\ns 195\n\nheading preceding s 196\ns 196\n\ns 197\ns 197A\n\ns 198\n\ns 199\ns 200\n\nheading preceding s 201\namended by 51/1988 s 30\n\ns 201\namended by 16/1986 s 24\n\ndeleted by 51/1988 s 31\ns 202\n\ns 203\nheading preceding s 204\ns 204\n\ns 205\namended by 107/1981 s 22\n\nheading preceding s 206\ns 206\n\ns 207\namended by 115/1976 s 7\n\nss 208 and 209\n\ns 210\n\ns 211\n\nheading preceding s 211A\ninserted by 95/1996 Sch 2, cl 1\n7.7.1997\n\ns 211A\ninserted by 95/1996 Sch 2, cl 1\n7.7.1997\n\nPt 6\nheading deleted by 26/2002 s 8\ns 212\namended by 30/1997 s 6\n3.7.1997\n\namended by 33/1999 Sch (item 16(b))\n\nss 213—216\n\nheading preceding s 217\nss 217 and 218\n\nheading preceding s 219\nss 219—221\n\ns 222\n\namended by 33/1999 Sch (item 16(c))\n\ns 223\n\nheading preceding s 224\ns 224—227\n\ns 228\n\ns 229\n\ns 230\n\ns 231\n\ns 232\n\nheading preceding s 233\nss 233 and 234\n\ns 235\ns 236\n\nPt 6B\ninserted by 26/2002 s 8\ns 172\n\ns 172(1)\namended by 12/2012 s 31\nPt 6C\ninserted by 26/2002 s 8\nPt 6D\ninserted by 13/2022 s 3\nPt 7 before substitution by 35/1992\namended by 115/1976 s 8\n\namended by 107/1981 s 23\n\namended by 56/1984 s 4\n1.7.1984\n\namended by 46/1985 s 37\n10.5.1985\nPt 7\nsubstituted by 35/1992 s 7\nPt 7 Div 1\n\ns 237\n\nlocal government body\ndeleted by 26/2002 s 9\npublic officer\namended by 36/2003 s 4\n\nsubstituted by 54/2016 Sch 1 cl 1\n16.12.2016\n\nThe amendments purportedly made by 5/2017 s 29(1) and (2) are of no effect because of other amendments.\n\namended by 38/2021 Sch 1 cl 12\nPt 7 Div 2A\ninserted by 36/2019 s 4\n18.6.2020\nPt 7 Div 3\n\ns 244\n\ns 244(1)—(3) and (5)\namended by 12/2012 s 32\ns 245\n\ns 245(1)—(3) and (5)\namended by 12/2012 s 33\ns 246\nsubstituted by 16/1999 s 3\ns 246(5)\namended by 52/2012 Sch 3 cl 12(1)\n\namended by 38/2021 Sch 1 cl 13(1)\ns 246(6)\namended by 52/2012 Sch 3 cl 12(2)\n\namended by 38/2021 Sch 1 cl 13(2)\ns 246(8)\namended by 17/2006 s 89\ns 247\n\ns 247(1)\namended by 16/1999 s 4(a)\ns 247(2)\ndeleted by 16/1999 s 4(b)\ns 248\nsubstituted by 13/2008 Sch 1 cl 3\ns 248(1) and (2)\namended by 12/2012 s 34\ns 248(4)\namended by 52/2012 Sch 3 cl 13\nPt 7 Div 4\n\ns 249\n\ns 249(1) and (2)\namended by 12/2012 s 35\ns 250\nsubstituted by 13/2008 Sch 1 cl 4\ns 250(1) and (2)\namended by 12/2012 s 36\ns 251\n\ns 251(1)\ns 251 redesignated as s 251(1) by 36/2003 s 5\n\namended by 12/2012 s 37(1)\ns 251(2)\ninserted by 36/2003 s 5\n\namended by 12/2012 s 37(2)\ns 251(3)\ninserted by 38/2021 Sch 1 cl 14\nPt 7 Div 5\n\ns 254\n\ns 254(2)\namended by 57/2000 s 14(a)\n14.8.2000\ns 254(2a)\ninserted by 57/2000 s 14(b)\n14.8.2000\nPt 7 Div 7\n\ns 257\n\ns 257(2)\namended by 50/2005 Sch 1 cl 4\n1.1.2006\nPt 7A\ninserted by 2/1999 s 2\nPt 7B\nPt 8 renumbered Pt 7A by 15/1999 s 2\n\nPt 7A renumbered Pt 7B pursuant to the Acts Republication Act 1967\ns 267\nsubstituted by 59/1994 s 9\ns 268\namended by 107/1981 s 24\n\ndeleted by 35/1992 s 8\ns 269\ndeleted by 59/1994 s 9\nPt 7C\ninserted by 40/2015 s 4\n7.2.2016\ns 267AA\n\ns 267AA(3)\namended by 12/2025 s 4\ns 267AA(6)\n\nprescribed firearm offence\namended by 46/2015 Sch 1 cl 6\nPt 7D\ninserted by 35/2024 s 3\n16.12.2024\ns 267AB\n\ns 267AB(3)\n\nprescribed adult\namended by 45/2025 s 4(1)\nstreet gang\ninserted by 45/2025 s 4(2)\nPt 8\ninserted by 15/1999 s 3\ns 267A\n\ns 267A(1)\ns 267A redesignated as s 267A(1) by 40/2004 s 4(5)\nalleged offence\ninserted by 40/2004 s 4(1)\nconsumption\ndrug\nintoxication\ninserted by 19/2017 s 4\nmedical practitioner\nrecreational use\nself-induced\nserious harm\ntherapeutic\ninserted by 40/2004 s 4(4)\ns 267A(2) and (3)\ninserted by 40/2004 s 4(5)\ns 268\n\ns 268(2)\nsubstituted by 40/2004 s 5\ns 268(3)\ninserted by 40/2004 s 5\n\nsubstituted by 10/2008 s 15\ns 268(4)—(6)\ninserted by 40/2004 s 5\ns 269\n\ns 269(1)\namended by 40/2004 s 6\nPt 8A\ninserted by 91/1995 s 3\nPt 8A Div 1\n\ns 269A\n\ns 269A(1)\n\nauthorised person\namended by 39/2000 s 3(a)\nconsumption\ninserted by 19/2017 s 5(1)\ncontinuing supervision order\ninserted by 19/2017 s 5(1)\ndefence\ndefensible\nDivision 3A order\ninserted by 19/2017 s 5(2)\ndrug\ninserted by 19/2017 s 5(2)\nintoxication\n\nsubstituted by 19/2017 s 5(3)\nlimiting term\ninserted by 19/2017 s 5(4)\nmedical practitioner\ninserted by 19/2017 s 5(4)\nmental impairment\namended by 39/2000 s 3(c)\n\namended by 19/2017 s 5(5)\nMinister\ninserted by 39/2000 s 3(d)\nnext of kin\namended by 43/2006 s 68\nprescribed authority\ninserted by 19/2017 s 5(6)\npsychiatrist\namended by 5/2010 Sch 1 cl 9\nrecreational use\ninserted by 19/2017 s 5(7)\nself-induced\ninserted by 19/2017 s 5(7)\ntherapeutic\ninserted by 19/2017 s 5(8)\ntraining centre\ninserted by 6/2016 Sch 1 cl 3(1)\nyouth\ninserted by 6/2016 Sch 1 cl 3(2)\ns 269A(2a) and (2b)\ninserted by 19/2017 s 5(9)\ns 269A(3)\ninserted by 6/2016 Sch 1 cl 3(3)\ns 269AB\ninserted by 12/2025 s 5\ns 269B\n\ns 269B(4)\ninserted by 39/2000 s 4\ns 269BA\ninserted by 39/2000 s 5\nPt 8A Div 2\n\ns 269C\n\ns 269C(1)\namended by 19/2017 s 6(1), (2)\n\ns 269C redesignated as s 269C(1) by 19/2017 s 6(3)\ns 269C(2)\ninserted by 19/2017 s 6(3)\ns 269C(3)\ninserted by 19/2017 s 6(3)\ns 269E\n\ns 269E(3)\namended by 18/2017 Sch 2 cl 6\ns 269F\n\ns 269F A.(3)\nsubstituted by 39/2000 s 6(a)\ns 269F A.(4)\ndeleted by 39/2000 s 6(a)\ns 269F B.(3)\namended by 19/2017 s 7(2)\n\namended by 19/2017 s 7(1)\n\namended by 12/2025 s 6\ns 269F B.(4)\ninserted by 39/2000 s 6(b)\ns 269G\n\ns 269G A.(2)\namended by 26/2002 s 10(a) (commencement amended by 23/2004 s 30)\ns 269G A.(3)\ninserted by 39/2000 s 7(a)\ns 269G B.(3)\nsubstituted by 39/2000 s 7(b)\n\namended by 26/2002 s 10(b) (commencement amended by 23/2004 s 30)\n\namended by 19/2017 s 8(2)\n\namended by 19/2017 s 8(1)\n\namended by 12/2025 s 7(1)\ns 269G B.(4)\nsubstituted by 39/2000 s 7(b)\ns 269G B.(5)\namended by 26/2002 s 10(c) (commencement amended by 23/2004 s 30)\n\namended by 19/2017 s 8(4)\n\namended by 19/2017 s 8(3)\n\namended by 12/2025 s 7(2)\ns 269J\n\ns 269J(4)\namended by 18/2017 Sch 2 cl 7\nPt 8A Div 3\n\ns 269M\n\ns 269M A.(3)\nsubstituted by 39/2000 s 8(a)\ns 269M A.(4)\ndeleted by 39/2000 s 8(a)\ns 269M B.(2)\nsubstituted by 39/2000 s 8(b)\n\namended by 19/2017 s 9(2)\n\namended by 19/2017 s 9(1)\ns 269M B.(3)\ninserted by 39/2000 s 8(b)\ns 269N\n\ns 269N A.(2)\nsubstituted by 39/2000 s 9\ns 269N A.(3)\ninserted by 39/2000 s 9\ns 269N B.(3)\namended by 19/2017 s 10(2)\n\namended by 19/2017 s 10(1)\nPt 8A Div 3A\n\nPt 8A Div 3A Subdiv 1\nPt 8A Div 3A Subdiv 2\ns 269NB\n\ns 269NB(1)\namended by 12/2025 s 8\nPt 8A Div 3A Subdiv 3\nPt 8A Div 3A Subdivs 4 and 5\nPt 8A Div 4\n\namended by 19/2017 s 12\nPt 8A Div 4 Subdiv 1\ninserted by 19/2017 s 13\nPt 8A Div 4 Subdiv 2\n\ninserted by 19/2017 s 14\ns 269O\n\ns 269O(1)\namended by 33/2012 s 29(1)\n\namended by 78/2013 s 8\n5.12.2015\n\namended by 19/2017 s 15(1), (2)\ns 269O(1aa)\ninserted by 19/2017 s 15(3)\ns 269O(1a)\ninserted by 33/2012 s 29(2)\n\namended by 46/2015 Sch 1 cl 7\ns 269O(1b)\ninserted by 33/2012 s 29(2)\ns 269OA\ninserted by 33/2012 s 30\ns 269OA(1)\namended by 19/2017 s 16(1), (2)\ns 269P\n\ns 269P(1)\namended by 19/2017 s 17(1), (2)\ns 269P(1a)\ninserted by 19/2017 s 17(3)\ns 269Q\n\ns 269Q(1)\namended by 39/2000 s 10\n\namended by 19/2017 s 18\ns 269Q(2)\namended by 39/2000 s 10\ns 269R\n\ns 269R(1)\ns 269R(2)\namended by 79/2009 s 16(1)\ns 269R(3)\n\namended by 53/2017 s 16(1)\ns 269R(4)\n\namended by 53/2017 s 16(2)\ns 269R(5)\n\namended by 53/2017 s 16(3)\ns 269R(6)\nprescribed summary offence\namended by 53/2017 s 16(4)\ns 269S\ndeleted by 19/2017 s 20\ns 269T\n\ns 269T(1)\namended by 19/2017 s 21(1)\ns 269T(2)\namended by 39/2000 s 11(a), (b)\n\namended by 19/2017 s 21(1)—(3)\ns 269T(2a)\ninserted by 39/2000 s 11(c)\n\nsubstituted by 19/2017 s 21(4)\ns 269U\nsubstituted by 39/2000 s 12\ns 269U(1)\namended by 19/2017 s 22(1)\ns 269U(1a)\ninserted by 19/2017 s 22(2)\ns 269U(2)\nsubstituted by 19/2017 s 22(2)\nPt 8A Div 4 Subdivs 3 and 4\ninserted by 19/2017 s 23\nPt 8A Div 4 Subdiv 5\n\ninserted by 19/2017 s 24\ns 269V\n\ns 269V(1)\namended by 39/2000 s 13\n\namended by 19/2017 s 25\ns 269V(2) and (3)\namended by 39/2000 s 13\ns 269V(4) and (5)\ninserted by 52/2009 s 4\n27.6.2010\nPt 8A Div 4 Subdiv 6\n\ninserted by 19/2017 s 26\ns 269VA\ninserted by 39/2000 s 14\nPt 8A Div 4A\ninserted by 19/2017 s 27\nPt 8A Div 5\n\ns 269W\n\ns 269W(1)\ns 269W redesignated as s 269W(1) by 39/2000 s 15\ns 269W(2)\ninserted by 39/2000 s 15\ns 269WA\ninserted by 39/2000 s 16\ns 269X\n\ns 269X(1)\namended by 18/2017 Sch 2 cl 8\n\namended by 34/2020 s 8(1)\ns 269X(2)\namended by 34/2020 s 8(2)\ns 269X(3)—(7)\ninserted by 34/2020 s 8(3)\ns 269Y\n\ns 269Y(1)\namended by 19/2017 s 28\ns 269Y(3)\nsubstituted by 39/2000 s 17\n\namended by 17/2006 s 90\ns 269Y(4)\ninserted by 39/2000 s 17\ns 269Y(5)\ninserted by 26/2002 s 11\ns 269Z\n\ns 269Z(1)\namended by 39/2000 s 18\ns 269ZB\n\ns 269ZB(1)\namended by 19/2017 s 29\nPt 9\n\nPt 9 Div 1\n\nheading preceding s 270\n\ns 270\n\ns 270(1)\n(a) deleted by 107/1981 s 25\n\namended by 35/1992 s 9(a)\n\n(d) and (e) deleted by 35/1992 s 9(b)\n\ns 270(2)\nPt 9 Div 2\n\nheading preceding s 270A\n\ns 270A\ns 270AB\ninserted by 45/1983 s 3\ns 270AB(1)\nPt 9 Div 3\n\nheading preceding s 270B\n\nsubstituted by 59/1994 Sch 1\n\ns 270B\ns 270B(1)\nsubstituted by 59/1994 Sch 1\ns 270B(2)\ns 270B(4)\ninserted by 26/2002 s 12(a)\ns 270B note\ndeleted by 26/2002 s 12(b)\nPt 9 Div 4\ninserted by 26/2002 s 13\nPt 9 Div 5\n\nheading preceding s 271\ns 271\nsubstituted by 59/1994 s 10\ns 271(3)\namended by 26/2002 s 14\ns 272\n\ndeleted by 59/1994 s 10\ns 273\nPt 9 Div 6 before deletion by 18/2017\n\ns 274\ns 274(2)\n\namended by 43/1994 s 5\ns 275\n\ns 275(1)\n\namended by 26/1992 s 5\ns 275(3)—(5)\ninserted by 12/2012 s 38\ns 276\n\ns 276(1)\ns 276(2)\n\namended by 26/1992 s 6\ns 278\n\ns 278(1)\namended by 62/1993 s 26\n\ns 278(2a)\ninserted by 10/2008 s 16(1)\n\n(c) deleted by 34/2011 s 5(1)\ns 278(3)\nsubstituted by 34/2011 s 5(2)\ns 278(4)\ninserted by 10/2008 s 16(2)\nsexual offence\namended by 34/2011 s 5(3), (4)\n\namended by 28/2016 s 8\ns 279\ns 280\n\ns 280(2)\ns 281\n\ns 281(1)\namended by 17/2006 s 91\nheading preceding s 281A\ninserted by 109/1981 s 59\n\ns 281A\ninserted by 109/1981 s 59\n\ndeleted by 69/1991 s 15(f)\nPt 9 Div 7 before deletion by 18/2017\n\nheading preceding s 282\ninserted by 109/1981 s 60\n\ns 282\ns 283\n\ns 283(2)\nPt 9 Div 8 before deletion by 18/2017\n\nheading preceding s 284\ns 285A\ninserted by 108/1981 s 2\ns 285AB\ninserted by 43/2012 s 10\ns 285B\ninserted by 45/1983 s 4\nss 285BA\ninserted by 74/2005 s 4\ns 285BA(1)—(3)\nsubstituted by 17/2012 s 4(1)\ns 285BA(5)\ndeleted by 17/2012 s 4(2)\nss 285BB and 285BC\ninserted by 74/2005 s 4\ns 285C\ninserted by 78/1984 s 2\ns 285C(1)\namended by 43/1994 s 6\ns 285C(3)\ns 285C(5)\namended by 17/2006 s 92(1)\ns 285C(6)\namended by 17/2006 s 92(2), (3)\ns 285C(7)\ns 285C(8)\n\nevidence\ndeleted by 90/1986 s 8\ns 287\ndeleted by 10/2001 s 6(a)\ns 288\nsubstituted by 76/1992 s 4\ns 288A\ninserted by 76/1992 s 4\n\nsubstituted by 74/2005 s 5\ns 288AB\ninserted by 74/2005 s 5\ns 288B\ninserted by 76/1992 s 4\ns 290\nPt 9 Div 9 before deletion by 18/2017\n\nheading preceding s 291\ninserted by 27/1995 s 12\n10.7.1995\n\ns 291\n\ninserted by 27/1995 s 12\n10.7.1995\nheading preceding s 292\ns 292\namended by 22/1992 s 3\n\ns 293\namended by 22/1992 s 4\n\ns 293A\namended by 78/1988 s 2\n\nsubstituted by 22/1992 s 5\n\nPt 9 Div 10 before deletion by 18/2017\n\nheading preceding s 294\ns 295\n\ns 295(1)\n\ns 295(2)\ns 295(3)\ns 296\namended by 115/1976 s 9\n\ndeleted by 49/1984 s 3\nPt 9 Div 11 before substitution by 23/2004\n\nheading preceding s 297\ns 297\n\ns 297\ns 297(4)\n\ns 297(5)\n\ndeleted by 51/1988 s 32\ns 297(6)\ns 297(7) and (8)\ns 298\ndeleted by 51/1988 s 33\ns 299\nsubstituted by 16/1986 s 25\n\ndeleted by 51/1988 s 33\nPt 9 Div 11 before deletion by 18/2017\nsubstituted by 23/2004 s 5\n1.9.2004\nPt 9 Div 12 before deletion by 18/2017\n\nheading preceding s 299A\ns 299A\n\ns 299A(1)\namended by 15/2008 Sch 1 cl 1\n27.11.2008\n\namended by 46/2015 Sch 1 cl 8\ns 299A(6)\n\namended by 43/1994 s 7\n\namended by 56/2005 Sch 2 cl 16\n1.7.2006\nheading preceding s 300\ns 300\n\ns 300A\namended by 49/1987 Sch 2\n21.6.1987\n\nss 300B—300D\ns 300E\n\nss 300F and 300G\ns 300H\n\nheading preceding s 301\namended by 115/1976 s 10(1)\n\ns 301\n\ninserted by 16/1986 s 26\n\ns 301A\ns 302\n\ninserted by 69/1986 s 18\n\nss 303—306\ns 309\ns 310\nsubstituted by 67/1980 s 3\n\namended by 69/1986 s 19\n\ns 311\nss 313 and 313A\ns 314\namended by 115/1976 s 11\n\nheading preceding s 315\namended by 51/1988 s 36\n\nss 315 and 316\n\ndeleted by 51/1988 s 37\ns 317\n\namended by 51/1988 s 38\n\ndeleted by 26/2002 s 15\ns 318\namended by 51/1988 s 39\n\ndeleted by 26/2002 s 15\nheading preceding s 319\ns 319\n\namended by 90/1986 s 9\n\ns 320\ns 321\n\ns 323\ns 328\nPt 9 Divs  6—12\ndeleted by 18/2017 Sch 2 cl 9\nPt 9 Div 13 before deletion by 43/2020\n\nheading preceding s 328A\nPt 9 Div 13\ndeleted by 43/2020 s 9\nPt 9 Div 14\n\nheading preceding s 329\ns 329\ninserted by 49/1984 s 4\n\nPt 9 Div 15\ninserted by 26/2002 s 16\n\ndeleted by 18/2017 Sch 2 cl 10\nPt 10\ndeleted by 49/1984 s 5\n\ninserted by 28/2008 s 5\n\nPt 10A\ninserted by 28/2008 s 5\n\nPt 11 before deletion by 18/2017\n\nsubstituted by 17/2006 s 93\ns 347\ndeleted by 67/1980 s 4\ns 348\n\nancillary order\ninserted by 75/1991 s 9\n16.1.1992\n\namended by 43/1994 s 8(a)\n\namended by 22/1994 Sch cl 1(b)\n1.8.1994\n\namended by 59/1998 s 5\n\n(a) and (b) deleted by 19/2005 Sch 1 cl 5\n2.4.2006\n\namended by 85/2009 Sch 1 cl 5\n9.12.2011\nconviction\ninserted by 90/1995 s 3(a)\ninserted by 90/1995 s 3(a)\nDistrict Criminal Court\ndeleted by 43/1994 s 8(b)\nFull Court\ndeleted by 28/2008 s 6\ninformation\n\namended by 43/1994 s 8(c)\nissue antecedent to trial\ninserted by 90/1995 s 3(b)\njudge\namended by 43/1994 s 8(d)\nMaster\ndeleted 50/1984 s 3(1) (Sch 1)\nquestion of law\ninserted by 90/1995 s 3(c)\n\ndeleted by 67/1996 s 8\nsentence\namended by 13/1999 s 4\ns 348A\ninserted by 67/1980 s 5\n\ndeleted by 49/1991 Sch 2\ns 349\ns 349(1) redesignated as s 349 in pursuance of the Acts Republication Act 1967\nheading preceding s 350\ns 350 before substitution by 90/1995\namended by 67/1980 s 6\n\ns 350 before substitution by 17/2006\nsubstituted by 90/1995 s 4\ns 350(a1)\ninserted by 67/1996 s 9(a)\ns 350(1)\namended by 67/1996 s 9(b)\ns 350(2)\namended by 67/1996 s 9(c)\ns 350(3)\namended by 67/1996 s 9(d)\ns 350(4)\namended by 67/1996 s 9(e)\ns 350\nsubstituted by 17/2006 s 94\ns 351\namended by 67/1980 s 7\n\nsubstituted by 90/1995 s 5\ns 351(1)\namended by 67/1996 s 10\ns 351A\ninserted by 67/1980 s 8\n\ndeleted by 37/1993 Sch\n15.7.1993\n\ninserted by 90/1995 s 5\ns 351A(1)\namended by 67/1996 s 11\ns 351B\ninserted by 90/1995 s 5\ns 351B(1)\namended by 67/1996 s 12\n\namended by 47/2013 s 4\n17.5.2014\nheading preceding s 352\ns 352\namended by 67/1980 s 9\n\namended by 43/1994 s 9\n\nsubstituted by 90/1995 s 6\ns 352(1)\namended by 13/1999 s 5\n\namended by 31/2000 s 2\n\namended by 17/2006 s 95(1)\n\namended by 28/2008 s 7\n\namended by 9/2013 s 5(1)\ns 352(2)\ndeleted by 17/2006 s 95(2)\n\ninserted by 9/2013 s 5(2)\ns 353\n\ns 353(1) and (2)\ns 353(2a)\ninserted by 31/2000 s 3\n\namended by 28/2008 s 8(1)\ns 353(3)\nsubstituted by 28/2008 s 8(2)\ns 353(3a)\ninserted by 90/1995 s 7\n\namended by 9/2013 s 6\ns 353(4)\namended by 67/1980 s 10(a)\n\nsubstituted by 23/2004 s 6\n1.9.2004\n\namended by 28/2016 s 9\ns 353(5)\ninserted by 67/1980 s 10(b)\n\nsubstituted by 59/1998 s 6\ns 353A\ninserted by 9/2013 s 7\ns 354\n\ns 354(4)\ndeleted by 26/2002 s 17\ns 354A\ninserted by 75/1991 s 10\n16.1.1992\ns 354A(3)\nsubstituted by 59/1998 s 7\ns 354A(4)\ninserted by 59/1998 s 7\ns 355\n\ns 355(1)\n\namended by 17/2006 s 96\ns 356A\ninserted by 43/1994 s 10\nheading preceding s 357\ns 357\namended by 115/1976 s 12\n\namended by 33/1991 s 8\n\nsubstituted by 90/1995 s 8\ns 357(1)\namended by 17/2006 s 97\ns 357(3) and (4)\ninserted by 9/2013 s 8\ns 358\n\namended by 43/1994 s 11\n\ndeleted by 90/1995 s 9\ns 360\ndeleted by 10/2001 s 6(b)\ns 361 before substitution by 62/2016\n\ns 361(1)\namended by 17/2006 s 98\ns 361(1a) and (1b)\ninserted by 43/2012 s 11(1)\ns 361(3)\ninserted by 43/2012 s 11(2)\ns 361\nsubstituted by 62/2016 s 6\n8.12.2016\ns 362\ns 363\n\ns 363(2)\ndeleted by 10/2001 s 6(c)\ns 364\n\ns 364(1)\ns 364(3)\namended by 33/1991 s 9\ns 364(4)\namended by 17/2006 s 99\ns 364(5)\ns 365\n\ns 365(1), (2) and (4)\namended by 50/1984 s 3(1)(Sch 1)\ns 366\n\ns 366(1)\n\namended by 17/2006 s 100\ns 366(2)\ns 366(3)\n\ns 367\namended by 67/1980 s 11\n\namended by 17/2006 s 101\n\ndeleted by 9/2013 s 9\ns 368\n\namended by 43/1994 s 12\n\ndeleted by 90/1995 s 10\n12.9.1996\nheading preceding s 369\ns 369\n\ns 369(1)\ns 369 amended by 115/1976 s 13\n\ns 369 amended by 49/1991 Sch 2\n\ns 369 redesignated as s 369(1) by 9/2013 s 10\ns 369(2)\ninserted by 9/2013 s 10\nPt 11\nPt 12\ninserted by 26/2002 s 18\nSchs 1 and 2\n\nSch 3 before deletion by 18/2017\n\nall rules revoked by 5.01 of Supreme Court Criminal Rules 2013\n1.1.2013\nSch 3\nAppendix to Rules\nSchs 8 and 9\ndeleted by 115/1976 s 14\nSch 10\nSch 11\ninserted by 35/1992 s 10 (Sch)\ncl 1\n\ncl 1(30)\ninserted by 7/2021 Sch 1 cl 4\nTransitional etc provisions associated with Act or amendments\nStatutes Amendment (Crimes Confiscation and Restitution) Act 1991\n11—Transitional provision\nThe amendments made by this Part apply in respect of proceedings commenced either before or after the commencement of this Part.\nStatutes Repeal and Amendment (Courts) Act 1991\n22—Transitional provisions—general\n\t(1)\tThis section applies to amendments made by this Act or the Justices Amendment Act 1991.\n\t(2)\tThe following transitional provisions apply in relation to those amendments:\n\t(a)\tif the effect of the amendment is to reduce the penalty for an offence, the amendment applies whether the offence was committed before or after the amendment takes effect;\n\t(b)\tif the effect of the amendment is to increase the penalty for an offence, the amendment applies only to offences committed after it takes effect;\n\t(c)\tif the effect of the amendment is to increase or remove a time limit for commencing proceedings for an offence, the previous limit applies in respect of an offence committed before the amendment takes effect;\n\t(d)\tan amendment affecting the classification of an offence as summary or indictable does not apply in relation to an offence committed before the amendment takes effect.\nCriminal Law Consolidation (Detention of Insane Offenders) Amendment Act 1992\n6—Transitional provisions\n\t(1)\tA person who is, immediately prior to the commencement of this Act, being kept in custody during the Governor's pleasure pursuant to section 292 or 293 of the principal Act will, on that commencement, be taken to be detained until further order of the court pursuant to the principal Act as amended by this Act.\n\t(2)\tA person who is, immediately prior to the commencement of this Act, subject to a licence pursuant to section 293A of the principal Act will, on that commencement, be taken to have been released by the court on licence pursuant to the principal Act as amended by this Act.\nCriminal Law Consolidation (Appeals) Amendment Act 1995\n11—Transitional provision\n\t(1)\tIf an information was laid in the Supreme Court or the District Court before the commencement of this Act, the amendments effected by this Act do not apply to the proceedings founded on that information or any related proceedings and the provisions of the principal Act affected by the amendments continue to apply as if the amendments had not been made.\n\t(2)\tIf an information is laid in the Supreme Court or the District Court on or after the commencement of this Act, the amendments effected by this Act apply to the proceedings founded on the information and any related proceedings.\nCriminal Law Consolidation (Mental Impairment) Amendment Act 1995, Sch\n2—Transitional provision\nThe principal Act, as amended by this Act, applies to all trials commencing after the commencement of this Act (whether the offence is alleged to have been committed before or after the commencement of this Act).\nCriminal Law Consolidation (Appeals) Amendment Act 2000\n4—Transitional provision\nThe amendments effected by this Act only apply in relation to proceedings for offences alleged to have been committed after its commencement.\nStatutes Amendment (Courts and Judicial Administration) Act 2001\n8—Transitional provision\nThe amendments made to the principal Act by this Part do not apply in respect of an offence committed before the commencement of this Part.\nCriminal Law Consolidation (Offences of Dishonesty) Amendment Act 2002, Sch 1\n2—Transitional provision\n\t(1)\tThe principal Act as in force before the commencement of this Act applies to offences committed before the commencement of this Act.\n\t(2)\tThe principal Act as amended by this Act applies to offences committed on or after the commencement of this Act.\nControlled Substances (Serious Drug Offences) Amendment Act 2005, Sch 1\n6—Transitional provision\nAn amendment to the principal Act effected by a provision of this Act only applies in relation to an offence if the offence is committed on or after the commencement of the provision.\nCriminal Law Consolidation (Rape and Sexual Offences) Amendment Act 2008, Sch 1\n7—Transitional provision—Persistent sexual abuse of a child\nFor the avoidance of doubt, the repeal of section 74 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 does not affect any proceedings for an offence against that section commenced prior to the repeal of that section.\nStatutes Amendment (Courts Efficiency Reforms) Act 2012\n12—Transitional provision\nThe amendments made to the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 by this Part are to be considered procedural rather than substantive.\nStatutes Amendment (Appeals) Act 2013, Sch 1—Transitional provision\n\tThe amendments effected by this Act apply in relation to appeals instituted after the commencement of this Act, regardless of whether the offence to which the appeal relates was committed, or allegedly committed, before or after the commencement of this Act.\nStatutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) (No 2) Act 2017, Pt 4\n9—Sentencing for offences under previous law\n\t(1)\tA sentence imposed on a person, before the commencement of this section, in respect of an offence against section 50 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (as in force before the commencement of section 6 of this Act) is taken to be, and always to have been, not affected by error or otherwise manifestly excessive merely because—\n\t(a)\tthe trial judge did not ask any question of the trier of fact directed to ascertaining which acts of sexual exploitation, or which particulars of the offence as alleged, the trier of fact found to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt and the person was not sentenced on the view of the facts most favourable to the person; and\n\t(b)\tthe sentencing court sentenced the person consistently with the verdict of the trier of fact but having regard to the acts of sexual exploitation determined by the sentencing court to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\n\t(2)\tWhere, after the commencement of this section, a person is to be sentenced for an offence against section 50 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (as in force before the commencement of section 6 of this Act) the following provisions apply:\n\t(a)\ta verdict of guilt handed down by the trier of fact in relation to the offence is taken to be, and always to have been, a finding by the trier of fact that the person is guilty of the acts of sexual exploitation comprising the course of conduct alleged by the information;\n\t(b)\tnotwithstanding paragraph (a), in sentencing the person for the offence, the sentencing court may determine which alleged acts of sexual exploitation the sentencing court finds proved beyond a reasonable doubt and may disregard any acts of sexual exploitation that the sentencing court is not satisfied were proved beyond a reasonable doubt;\n\t(c)\tfor the avoidance of doubt, the sentencing court need not ask any question of the trier of fact directed to ascertaining which acts of sexual exploitation, or which particulars of the offence as alleged, the trier of fact found to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt and, unless it has so determined in accordance with paragraph (b), need not sentence the person on the view of the facts most favourable to the person.\n\t(3)\tThis section does not apply in relation to the particular matter that was the subject of the determination in Chiro v The Queen [2017] HCA 37 (13 September 2017).\nExcept as provided in subsection (3), this section negates the effect of the determination of the High Court in Chiro v The Queen [2017] HCA 37 (13 September 2017).\nCriminal Law Consolidation (Criminal Organisations) Amendment Act 2017, Sch 1\n1—Transitional provision\nAn amendment of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 made by this Act will apply only in respect of an offence alleged to have occurred after the commencement of this Act.\nSummary Procedure (Indictable Offences) Amendment Act 2017, Sch 2 Pt 14\n41—Transitional provision\nThe amendments made by this Act apply to proceedings relating to an offence that are commenced after the commencement of this Act, regardless of when the offence occurred (and the Acts amended by this Act, as in force before the commencement of this Act, continue to apply to proceedings that were commenced before the commencement of this Act).\nStatutes Amendment (Explosives) Act 2017, Pt 2\n6—Review\n\t(1)\tThe Attorney‑General must undertake a review of the operation and effectiveness of the amendments effected by this Part.\n\t(2)\tThe review required under this section must commence not later than 3 years after the commencement of this Part.\n\t(3)\tThe Attorney‑General must prepare a report based on the review and must, within 12 sitting days after the report is prepared, cause copies of the report to be laid before each House of Parliament.\nStatutes Amendment (Abolition of Defence of Provocation and Related Matters) Act 2020, Sch 1\n1—Transitional provision—amendments to Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935\nSection 15B(2) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (as enacted by this Act) will be taken not to apply in relation to a trial that commenced before the commencement of this clause.\nStatutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) Act 2020, Pt 3\n9—Transitional provision\n\t(1)\tIf, immediately before the relevant day, a defendant is in any form of custody pursuant to an order of a court under section 269X(1)(b) or (2)(b) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935, the custody of the defendant may, after the relevant day, be determined as if the defendant had been committed to custody in accordance with section 269X(1)(b) or (2)(b) (as the case may be) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 as in force after the relevant day.\nrelevant day means the day on which section 8 of this Part comes into operation.\nIndependent Commissioner Against Corruption (CPIPC Recommendations) Amendment Act 2021, Sch 1 Pt 21—Savings and transitional provisions\n76—Savings and transitional regulations\nRegulations may be made under any Act amended by this Act (including under the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 2012 as in force after the commencement of this Act) to make provisions of a saving or transitional nature consequent on the enactment of this Act or on the commencement of specified provisions of this Act.\nCriminal Law Consolidation (Section 20A) Amendment Act 2024, Sch 1\n1—Transitional provision\nThe amendments to section 20A of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 effected by section 3 of this Act do not apply to an offence allegedly committed before the commencement of section 3.\nHistorical versions\nRetrospective amendment not included in Reprints 33—38 (see s 10 of 26/2002)\n\nReprint—1.1.1985\n\nReprint No 1—6.6.1991\n\nReprint No 2—31.10.1991\n\nReprint No 3—12.12.1991\n\nReprint No 4—16.1.1992\n\nReprint No 5—16.4.1992\n\nReprint No 6—6.7.1992\n\nReprint No 7—12.11.1992\n\nReprint No 8—1.1.1993\n\nReprint No 9—1.7.1993\n\nReprint No 10—15.7.1993\n\nReprint No 11—1.6.1994\n\nReprint No 12—9.6.1994\n\nReprint No 13—1.8.1994\n\nReprint No 14 —1.1.1995\n\nReprint No 15—10.7.1995\n\nReprint No 16—4.1.1996\n\nReprint No 17—2.3.1996\n\nReprint No 18—12.9.1996\n\nReprint No 19—17.10.1996\n\nReprint No 20—27.3.1997\n\nReprint No 21—27.4.1997\n\nReprint No 22—7.7.1997 does not contain 30/1997\n\nReprint No 23—7.7.1997\n\nReprint No 24—13.12.1998\n\nReprint No 25—11.3.1999\n\nReprint No 26—1.4.1999\n\nReprint No 27—16.5.1999\n\nReprint No 28—1.7.1999\n\nReprint No 29—25.12.1999\n\nReprint No 30 —8.6.2000\n\nReprint No 31—6.7.2000\n\nReprint No 32—14.8.2000\n\nReprint No 33—29.10.2000\n\nReprint No 34—12.4.2001\n\nReprint No 35—13.1.2002\n\nReprint No 36—3.2.2002\n\nReprint No 37—31.10.2002\n\nReprint No 38—1.12.2002\n\nReprint No 39—16.1.2003\n\nReprint No 40—17.6.2003\n\nReprint No 41—5.7.2003\n\nReprint No 42—27.7.2003\n\n1.9.2004 (electronic only)\n\n5.9.2004\n\n14.4.2005\n\n1.1.2006\n\n2.4.2006\n\n1.7.2006\n\n4.9.2006 (electronic only)\n\n23.11.2006\n\n1.4.2007\n\n16.12.2007\n\n3.2.2008\n\n23.11.2008 (electronic only)\n\n27.11.2008\n\n27.6.2010\n\n9.12.2011\n\n15.12.2012\n\n1.1.2013 (electronic only)\n\n5.5.2013 (electronic only)\n\n31.12.2013\n\n17.5.2014\n\n30.3.2015\n\n5.12.2015\n\n7.2.2016\n\n8.12.2016 (electronic only)\n\n16.12.2016\n\n23.10.2017 (electronic only)\n\n30.4.2018 (electronic only)\n\n13.8.2018\n\n18.11.2019\n\n18.6.2020\n\n9.9.2021 (electronic only)\n\n31.1.2023\n\n8.3.2023\n\n16.12.2024\n\n28.4.2025 (electronic only)\n\n","sortOrder":61}],"analysis":{"issue_detection":{"absurdities":[],"contradictions":[]},"kimi_summary":{"_metrics":{"completionTokens":835},"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":9,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"The Act has expanded dramatically from its 1935 origins as a consolidation of existing criminal law. Major expansions include: Part 3BA (street gangs, 2019), Division 11B (institutional child sexual abuse reporting, 2018), Part 5B (cheating at gambling, 2013), Part 6D (human remains offences, 2015), and extensive computer/cybercrime provisions (Part 4A). The original 'consolidation' purpose has been overtaken by active legislative expansion into new areas of social concern, particularly organised crime and child protection."},"complexity_factors":["Extensive cross-referencing between Parts and Divisions (e.g., 'harm' defined in s.21 but used throughout)","Multiple overlapping definitions of 'criminal organisation' across Parts 3B, 3BA and 3B","Nested aggravation provisions in s.5AA with 15+ separate circumstances, each with sub-conditions","Complex mental element provisions requiring proof of 'reckless indifference' or 'knowing' participation","Detailed procedural frameworks for street gang control orders (83GT-83GZA) with interim orders, variations, and appeals","Alternative verdict provisions scattered throughout requiring juries to navigate offence hierarchies","Special sentencing rules for serious child sex offenders (s.5AB) overriding normal sentencing discretion","Interaction with multiple other Acts (Sentencing Act, Road Traffic Act, Children and Young People Act, etc.)","Presumptions and reverse onus provisions (e.g., s.5B on lawful authority, s.83E(7) on gang participation)","Temporal scope issues with offences extending to conduct before commencement (e.g., s.50(6) on unlawful sexual relationships)"],"plain_english_summary":"This is South Australia's **Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935**, the state's primary criminal code that defines virtually all serious criminal offences and their penalties.\n\n**What it covers:**\n\n- **Homicide and violence** — murder, manslaughter, assault, causing harm, stalking, choking in domestic settings, and serious vehicle/vessel offences (including dangerous driving causing death)\n\n- **Sexual offences** — rape, unlawful sexual intercourse, child sexual abuse, child exploitation material, institutional child sexual abuse, sexual servitude, and incest\n\n- **Property and dishonesty** — theft, robbery, burglary, arson, computer crimes, money laundering, identity theft, and cheating at gambling\n\n- **Public order and organised crime** — riot, affray, participation in criminal organisations, and street gang control orders (including special powers to ban people from associating with gang members)\n\n- **Defences** — self-defence, defence of property, duress, sudden emergency, and special provisions for family violence circumstances\n\n- **Mental impairment** — detailed procedures for dealing with defendants who are mentally unfit to stand trial or were mentally incompetent when offending\n\n**Key features:**\n\n- **Aggravated offences** — most crimes carry higher penalties if committed in specified circumstances (using weapons, against vulnerable victims, for criminal organisations, etc.)\n\n- **Mandatory life sentences** — for serious child sex offenders who reoffend\n\n- **Abolished old defences** — provocation, necessity, and marital coercion no longer exist (though duress and sudden emergency were codified)\n\n- **Extra-territorial reach** — South Australian law applies to conduct outside the state if there's a sufficient connection to SA\n\n- **Modern additions** — includes 21st-century crimes like cybercrime, child-like sex dolls, food spiking, and complex organised crime controls\n\n**Who it affects:** Everyone in South Australia, plus people whose conduct affects the state from elsewhere. It governs what police can charge, what prosecutors must prove, and what penalties courts can impose."},"summary":{"complexity_score":1,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"Scope assessment is not possible — the legislation text was not successfully retrieved. The page returned was a website error notice following a URL structure change on the SA Legislation website on 24 March 2026. No legislative content was available for review."},"complexity_factors":["No actual legislative content was retrievable — the source URL returned a 'Page Not Found' error","Analysis is based on a website error page, not the legislation itself","Complexity cannot be meaningfully assessed without the statutory text"],"plain_english_summary":"## ⚠️ Content Unavailable\n\nThe legislation content you attempted to retrieve — the **Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA)** — could not be loaded. The link or bookmark used appears to be outdated following a website update on **24 March 2026** by the South Australian Office of Parliamentary Counsel.\n\n**What we know about this Act generally:**\nThe Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 is South Australia's principal criminal law statute. It defines serious criminal offences — including **murder, manslaughter, sexual offences, assault, and property crimes** — and sets out the penalties for each. It affects:\n- **Ordinary South Australians** who may be victims or accused of crime\n- **Police, prosecutors, and defence lawyers** who rely on it daily\n- **Courts** determining guilt and sentencing\n\n**What to do:** Visit [legislation.sa.gov.au](https://www.legislation.sa.gov.au) directly and search for the Act by name, or email OPCWeb@sa.gov.au to report the broken link."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":8,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"The Act’s scope and operation have been altered repeatedly by amending Acts and specific transitional provisions. Part 6 of the notes lists multiple amendment‑specific transitional provisions that either extend, restrict or clarify the temporal reach of amendments (for example, provisions from 1991, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2013, 2017, 2020, 2021 and 2024). Some amendments change penalty exposure or procedural classification and explicitly state whether they apply to offences or proceedings begun before or after commencement (see Part 6 transitional citations). The presence of those transitional clauses indicates the Act’s substantive application has been adjusted over time and that different versions may apply depending on when an offence was committed or when proceedings were started."},"complexity_factors":["Extensive and technical definitions in s5 that are referenced throughout the Act (eg. aggravated offence, vehicle, firearm, sexual intercourse).","Broad, multi‑element aggravation framework in s5AA with many distinct factual circumstances and specialised subrules for vehicles/vessels.","Procedural requirements linking charging instruments, jury findings and sentencing (s5AA(3)–(4)), increasing prosecutorial and trial complexity.","Presence of mandatory indeterminate sentencing for certain child sex offences (s5AB(1)), creating severe sentencing consequences and legal thresholds.","Layered statutory regime for immediate licence disqualification/suspension with Commissioner discretion and timing rules (ss13b–17).","Multiple offence provisions with variable maximum penalties (eg. s20 assault, s20AA offences against emergency workers), requiring careful statutory application.","Complex supervisory and detention scheme (ss269UB–269V, 269UE–269UF) including licence conditions, AD orders, police powers, custody allocation, and delegation rules.","Interstate transfer rules requiring clinical certification and informed consent (ss269VD–269VE), adding administrative and interjurisdictional complexity.","Numerous transitional and savings provisions from multiple subsequent amending Acts with different temporal application rules (Part 6), complicating retrospective application.","Cross‑references to many external statutes (eg. Firearms Act 2015, Road Traffic Act 1961, Correctional Services Act 1982, Mental Health Act 2009) which require users to consult other laws for full effect."],"plain_english_summary":"### What this law does, in practical terms\n- The Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 is a central criminal statute that (a) defines many criminal offences and legal terms, (b) sets out how some offences become “aggravated” (and the consequences), (c) creates special procedural steps and penalties for particular types of offending (for example, certain child sex offences, driving offences, and offences against emergency workers), and (d) provides for long-term supervision, detention and interstate transfer mechanisms for some detained or supervised people.\n\n### Who it affects\n- People accused or convicted of criminal offences in South Australia: the Act sets elements and penalties for core offences (for example, assault at s20 and related provisions) and for aggravated variants (s5AA). It also affects people subject to supervision orders and continuing supervision orders (Divisions discussed in notes, e.g. ss269UB–269V and following). \n- Police, prosecutors and courts: the Act gives police powers (including to detain under administrative detention orders, ss269UE–269UF), requires prosecutors to state alleged aggravating circumstances on charging instruments (s5AA(3)), and gives courts power to impose conditions and supervision (ss269UB–269UC). \n- Administrative decision‑makers: the Commissioner of Police, the Parole Board, the Minister (and the Chief Psychiatrist for transfer decisions) all have functions and discretions under the Act (eg. ss13b–13d; 269V; 269VD–269VE).\n\n### How it works mechanically (selected features from the notes)\n- Definitions and cross‑references set the baseline: s5 contains extensive definitions that the rest of the Act uses (for example, what counts as an \"aggravated offence\", who counts as a \"child\", definitions of vehicles, firearms, place of worship, and cross‑references to other statutes such as the Firearms Act 2015 and Road Traffic Act 1961). Notes and references in s5 form part of the Act unless non‑substantive (s5(2)).\n\n- Aggravation regime: s5AA lists many factual circumstances that, if present, make an offence \"aggravated\" (examples include causing or intending severe pain, use or threat with an offensive weapon, offences against police or corrections officers acting in the course of duty, offences involving children under specified ages, victims aged over 60, offences committed in company, offences for the benefit of a criminal organisation, and many vehicle/vessel‑specific aggravators). The prosecution must state the alleged aggravating circumstances on the charging instrument (s5AA(3)); a jury that finds an aggravated offence guilty should specify which aggravating factors were established (s5AA(4)). The section also defines associated terms and includes rules about how knowledge is to be inferred (eg. recklessness can count as \"taken to know\", s5AA(2)).\n\n- Mandatory indeterminate sentence for certain child sex offences: s5AB(1) creates a mandatory penalty of indeterminate duration for a \"triggering child sex offence\" committed by a \"serious child sex offender\" (the quoted note indicates this consequence is present in the Act).\n\n- Immediate licence disqualification/suspension and police procedural rules: ss13b–17 set out how withdrawal of immediate licence disqualification notices is given (ss13b–13d), that withdrawal notices must specify reasons (s13c), and that the Commissioner can authorise fresh notices with timing consequences (s13d). Section 14 states no compensation is payable by the Crown or a police officer for exercising powers under that section unless the exercise was other than in good faith. Section 16 clarifies when a person is taken to be \"charged\" for procedural purposes. Section 17 prescribes when the disqualification/suspension period starts and ends and lists triggering events.\n\n- Alternative verdicts: on trials for murder or manslaughter the jury may return specified lesser verdicts (ss19B(1)–(5)), including some statutory driving or vessel offences as alternatives.\n\n- Assault and offences against emergency workers: s20 defines assault (elements and exclusions) and prescribes maximum penalties for basic and aggravated assault and assault causing harm (s20(3)–(4)). s20AA creates separate, higher maximum penalties for intentional or reckless conduct causing harm to prescribed emergency workers acting in the course of their duties; it also contains a limited defence where a defendant proves they did not and could not reasonably have known the victim was such a worker (s20AA(5)). The definition of \"harm\" in this context includes causing human biological material to contact the victim (s20AA(6)–(7)).\n\n- Supervision, continuing supervision orders and release on licence: the Act provides for continuing supervision orders and licences with specified conditions. Examples of possible licence conditions include residence at specified premises (s269UB(4)(a)), mental‑health assessment or treatment (s269UB(4)(b)), monitoring by an approved electronic device (s269UB(4)(c)), and any other condition the court thinks fit (s269UB(4)(d)). The Court may vary or revoke conditions only if the defendant, on oath, satisfies the Court of cogent reasons and that firearm possession does not present undue risk (s269UB(5)). Continuing supervision orders remain in force until revoked (s269UB(6)). The Court may vary or revoke a continuing supervision order on application by specified parties (Crown, defendant, Parole Board, Public Advocate or other person with proper interest) (s269UC(1)), and the Act sets limits on repeat applications by a defendant (s269UC(2)). Appeals against Supreme Court decisions about such orders lie to the Full Court with tight time limits (s269UD(1)–(3)).\n\n- Administrative detention orders (AD orders) and related police powers: a prescribed authority may issue an AD order detaining a licence‑released defendant for up to 14 days if they contravene or are likely to contravene a licence condition (s269UE(1)). AD orders must be directed to the Commissioner of Police and be in an approved written form (s269UE(2)). A detained person must be given a copy of the order (s269UE(3)) and the circumstances of detention must be reviewed to consider applying to court for review (s269UE(4)). A person cannot be detained under consecutive AD orders unless at least 14 days have passed after expiry of the previous order (s269UE(5)). Police powers in relation to persons under AD orders are expressly set out (s269UF(2)–(6)): taking into police care/control, transporting, restraining and using reasonable force, entering premises where the person is reasonably suspected to be (including forcible entry where reasonably required), searching clothing/possessions, and temporarily holding items necessary to prevent harm (s269UF). The Act requires searches to be done expeditiously and to avoid unnecessary humiliation (s269UF(5)).\n\n- Custody, delegation and supervisory split: a person detained under the Division is in the custody of the Minister, who can direct custody, supervision and care and may place the person under another's custody or, if no practicable alternative, order prison custody (s269V(1)–(2)). Supervisory responsibilities arising from licence conditions are split between the Minister (mental‑health treatment/monitoring responsibilities, s269V(3)(a)) and the Parole Board (other supervisory responsibilities, s269V(3)(b)). Both may delegate powers in writing; delegations are revocable and do not remove the original power (s269V(4)–(5)).\n\n- Interstate transfer of supervision orders: Division 4A (ss269VB–269VE) sets rules for transferring people subject to supervision orders between participating jurisdictions. Transfers require certification by the Chief Psychiatrist that transfer is for the person’s benefit, informed consent from the person (or guardian if incapable), and that the receiving/issuing jurisdiction permits such transfers under corresponding law (s269VD(2); s269VE(1)–(2)). On transfer, South Australian supervision orders operate only while the person is in South Australia (s269VD(3)).\n\n- Transitional and savings rules for amendments: Part 6 in the notes lists many transitional provisions arising from subsequent amending Acts. Those transitional rules specify whether amendments apply to offences or proceedings before or after amendment, set out temporal limits on application of changed penalties, and create saving or review obligations in particular amendments (see the collection of transitional provisions in Part 6 notes, e.g. the 1991, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2013, 2017, 2020, 2021 and 2024 transitional clauses cited).\n\n### Claimed aims (as expressed in the framework) and the concrete trade‑offs they create\n- The Act treats certain factual circumstances as aggravating and requires those circumstances to be stated and, if proved, identified by the jury (s5AA(1), (3)–(4)). Mechanically, that increases prosecutorial specificity and tribunal findings about which aggravating facts are proven. Trade‑offs: prosecutors must prepare charging instruments that specify aggravators (administrative/compliance cost, s5AA(3)); courts or juries must identify which aggravators were proved (administrative burden, s5AA(4)). This in turn affects which maximum penalties apply at sentencing (see assault maxima at s20(3)–(4) and the emergency‑worker maxima at s20AA).\n\n- The Act creates administrative detention powers (ss269UE–269UF) and gives police specific search/transport/restraint powers when AD orders are in force. Mechanically, that places decision‑making power with a prescribed authority to issue AD orders and with operational execution by police (s269UE(2); s269UF). Trade‑offs and risks: the notes show (a) AD orders can last up to 14 days and be reissued only after 14 days (s269UE(1), (5)); (b) detained persons must be given a copy of the order and their circumstances reviewed promptly (s269UE(3)–(4)), imposing administrative steps; and (c) professional discretion is concentrated in the prescribed authority, the Commissioner and police (s269UE(2); s269UF), which creates implementation choices about when and how powers are used.\n\n- The Act places important decision points with executive and clinical actors for supervision and interstate transfer (eg. Minister and Chief Psychiatrist approvals for transfers, ss269VD–269VE), and splits supervisory responsibilities between the Minister and the Parole Board (s269V(3)). Mechanically, that requires co‑ordination between administrative, clinical and parole authorities and gives those actors discretion to approve, vary or revoke orders or transfers (ss269UC; 269VD–269VE). The notes also record formal delegation powers (s269V(4)–(5)), which permit administrative delegation but preserve the delegator’s ability to act.\n\n### Who pays / bears costs (from the text)\n- Individuals subject to the Act bear the primary legal cost via criminal sanctions or supervisory conditions when found guilty or subject to supervision orders (see s5AB(1) for mandatory indeterminate sentences for certain child sex offences; ss269UB–269V for supervision conditions and custody). \n- The Crown is protected from compensation claims for the exercise (or purported exercise) of particular police powers under a named section, except where an officer acted other than in good faith (s14). That reduces the Crown’s immediate financial liability for actions taken under those powers but the notes still preserve officer liability for bad‑faith conduct.\n\n### Discretion and compliance burdens (from the text)\n- Discretion: the Commissioner of Police determines forms/manner for withdrawal of licence notices (s13b) and may authorise fresh notices (s13d). The Minister and the Parole Board exercise supervision and custodial directions and may delegate powers (s269V(1)–(5)). The Chief Psychiatrist must certify transfers as beneficial before the Minister may authorise interstate transfers (s269VD(2)). A prescribed authority may issue AD orders (s269UE(1)–(2)). These are explicit delegation and decision nodes in the Act.\n\n- Compliance burdens: prosecutors must state aggravating circumstances on the charging instrument (s5AA(3)). Courts and juries should identify which aggravators are found (s5AA(4)). Persons detained under AD orders must be given a copy of the order and the detention must be reviewed promptly (ss269UE(3)–(4)). Licence‑disqualification withdrawal notices must state reasons (s13c). Ongoing supervision orders can include multiple, specific conditions (s269UB(4)(a)–(d)) and can be varied/revoked only on specified evidentiary showing by a defendant (s269UB(5)).\n\n### Implementation and legal change risk (from the notes)\n- The Act’s operation has been modified repeatedly by later amending Acts. Part 6 lists many transitional provisions that control when amendments apply (for example, whether an amendment applies to offences committed before change or only after, and whether proceedings already commenced are affected). These transitional rules create legal‑temporal complexity for prosecutors, courts and defendants about which version of the law applies in any given case (see Part 6 transitional citations). \n- Delegations and split supervisory responsibilities allocate discretionary power across different institutional actors (Minister, Parole Board, Commissioner, Chief Psychiatrist). That produces implementation choices and coordination requirements between clinical, administrative and policing functions (ss269V; 269VD–269VE). \n\n### Bottom line (neutral, mechanical)\n- The Act establishes a detailed statutory framework of definitions, aggravating circumstance rules, specified offences and penalty limits, procedural requirements for charging and trial (including alternative verdicts), mechanisms for short‑term administrative detention and police powers, and a supervisory regime for long‑term continuing supervision orders, including interstate transfer rules. Many decision points and administrative requirements sit with police, prosecutorial and executive actors (Commissioner, Minister, Parole Board, Chief Psychiatrist). The Act has been the subject of many targeted amendments with transitional provisions that explicitly govern the temporal reach of those changes (Part 6)."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/criminal-law-consolidation-act-1935","history":"/api/acts/criminal-law-consolidation-act-1935/history","analysis":"/api/acts/criminal-law-consolidation-act-1935/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/criminal-law-consolidation-act-1935/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/criminal-law-consolidation-act-1935/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/criminal-law-consolidation-act-1935/documents"}}