{"id":"BILL-r7382","name":"Criminal Code Amendment (State Sponsors of Terrorism) Bill 2025","slug":"criminal-code-amendment-state-sponsors-of-terrorism-bill-2025","collection":"bill","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":446029,"registerId":"commonwealth-BILL-r7382-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-05-05","status":"royal_assent","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[],"analysis":{"summary":{"status_summary":"The Criminal Code Amendment (State Sponsors of Terrorism) Act 2025 received royal assent on 6 November 2025 as Act No. 60 of 2025.","complexity_score":8,"likely_questions":["How are foreign state entities listed as state sponsors of terrorism?","When do the main provisions of the Act commence?"],"complexity_factors":["new parallel regime alongside existing terrorist organisation provisions","detailed listing criteria, multiple offence divisions and extended orders across twenty Acts"],"plain_english_summary":"The Act creates a new Criminal Code framework to designate foreign state entities as state sponsors of terrorism, criminalise state terrorist acts and related conduct, and extend existing counter‑terrorism orders and penalties to those designations. It applies extra‑territorially to Australians and to conduct targeting or occurring in Australia, requires ministerial agreements and briefings for listings, and amends multiple Commonwealth laws. It matters because it expands criminal liability, investigative powers and control orders against individuals and entities linked to designated state sponsors."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":8,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The Act implements the Bill’s stated purpose: to create a statutory framework for listing foreign state entities as state sponsors of terrorism, to criminalise a broad range of conduct connected with state‑sponsored terrorist acts, and to extend existing counter‑terror powers to state actors. The core scope—criminalisation, listing/delisting mechanisms, ministerial decision points, extension of control/detention orders, and consequential amendments to other statutes—remained aligned with the Bill and the explanatory materials. \n\nThere were no substantive additions that materially expanded the policy beyond that original purpose. One notable narrower outcome in passage was that a PJCIS oversight amendment recommended by the committee was not adopted, which leaves executive discretion and ministerial roles as originally framed rather than expanding parliamentary monitoring. The Act does, however, include a retrospective specification power (s110.3(4)) and significant extraterritorial reach (s114.2) that were part of the Bill and materially affect scope and reach, but do not amount to an expansion beyond the Bill’s originally stated intent."},"complexity_factors":["Inserts an entirely new Part 5.3A comprising sections 110.1–114.4 with multiple new Divisions (111–114) and Subdivisions","Large number of defined terms (foreign state entity, member of an entity, state sponsor of terrorism, state terrorist act, targeted at Australia, terrorist act) with cross‑references (see s110.1–110.2)","Broad extraterritorial application (extended geographical jurisdiction, s114.2) and numerous cross‑references to existing Criminal Code fault and corporate liability provisions (s114.1 referencing ss12.2–12.6)","Multiple strict liability elements and several reversed evidential/legal burdens for exceptions (e.g. strict liability notes in 111.2(2), evidential burden notes in s111.4(5), legal burden in s112.2(2) and s112.5(4))","High maximum penalties (up to life imprisonment) across offences, and multiple gradations of fault (know, reckless, strict liability) increasing conditional logic (Divisions 111–113)","Significant delegation to executive instruments: regulations to specify entities, legislative instruments to amend names, notifiable instruments for delisting (ss110.3, 110.4, 110.5)","Wide consequential amendments to 20+ Acts (Schedules 2–3) changing operation of control orders, symbol offences, immunities and many statutory definitions (e.g. Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 s13A)","Interplay with existing preventive powers (control orders, preventative detention, post‑sentence orders) requiring alignment across Parts 5.3 and new Part 5.3A (Schedule 2 additions such as new s104.1A)","Retrospective specification permitted for prior conduct (s110.3(4)), adding temporal complexity and legal challenge vectors","Parliamentary oversight provision complexity: PJCIS review powers over disallowable instruments plus altered disallowance period rules (s110.7)"],"plain_english_summary":"**What this Act does, in plain English**\n\n- Mechanically, the Act inserts a new Part 5.3A into the Criminal Code (sections 110.1–114.4) that: (a) creates a legal process to list a *foreign state entity* as a “state sponsor of terrorism” (see s110.3); (b) creates a set of criminal offences tied to *state terrorist acts* and dealings with listed state sponsors (Divisions 111–113); and (c) makes a broad set of consequential amendments across many Commonwealth laws so those new offences interact with existing counter‑terror powers and other statutes (Schedules 2–3).  The Act also amends some sentencing and symbol offences (Schedule 4).\n\n- The government (through the AFP Minister) proposes a listing by regulation, the Foreign Affairs Minister must give written agreement, and the Leader of the Opposition must be briefed before a regulation is made (s110.3(3),(5)). The Governor‑General makes the regulation that specifies the listed entity. The AFP Minister can later make a notifiable declaration to delist or may amend the name of a listed entity by legislative instrument (s110.4–110.6).\n\n- The new criminal offences cover: engaging in or planning a state terrorist act (offences with maximum penalties up to life imprisonment — e.g. s111.2, s111.6); providing/receiving training, possessing items or documents connected with state terrorist acts (s111.3–111.5); support, recruitment, membership, directing activities, funding or associating with a state sponsor of terrorism (Division 112); and financing offences (Division 113). Many offences apply extraterritorially (s114.2) and may be prosecuted even if the particular terrorist act never occurs (see, e.g., s111.6(3), s113.1(2)).\n\n- Some elements are strict liability or treat certain matters as not requiring proof of knowledge (see s111.2(2) and many subsections marked “strict liability applies”).  Several defences and narrow exceptions are included (for example: legal work, certain humanitarian or UN/ICRC duties — see s112.5(4), s112.8, s113.3).  In multiple places the defendant bears an evidential or, in a few cases, a legal burden to prove an exception (see notes to s111.4(5), s111.5(5), s112.2(2), s112.5(4)).\n\n- The Attorney‑General’s written consent is required before proceedings for offences in Divisions 111–113 can be commenced (s114.4(1)); however arrests/charges may be made before consent is given (s114.4(2)).\n\n- Existing counter‑terror powers — control orders, preventative detention orders and post‑sentence orders — are explicitly extended to cover state terrorist acts and state sponsors (see the new references added by Schedule 2, e.g. new s104.1A and amendments to Divisions 104, 105 and 105A).\n\n- The Act removes a civil immunity barrier for foreign states in proceedings relating to “state terrorism” by inserting section 13A in the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (item 49, Schedule 3), so foreign states are not immune for proceedings that concern state terrorism.\n\n**Who is affected**\n\n- Foreign state entities and their members who are specified by regulation as state sponsors of terrorism (s110.3).  If specified, those entities (and persons who assist them) can be the subject of criminal offences and civil proceedings in Australia (s114.1; item 49, Schedule 3).\n\n- Australian citizens and permanent residents: many offences are triggered if the defendant is an Australian citizen or permanent resident, or if the terrorist act is targeted at Australia (see s111.2(1), and the repeated “either (i)–(ii)” formulation across Divisions 111–113).\n\n- Individuals and organisations that deal with listed entities (banks, companies, foreign business partners, NGOs, humanitarian organisations, legal practitioners) will face compliance risks and possible criminal liability if their dealings meet the statutory elements (see Divisions 112–113 and the defences in s112.8 and s113.3).\n\n- Commonwealth enforcement agencies (AFP, AG’s office) and ministers (AFP Minister, Foreign Affairs Minister, Attorney‑General) — they decide listings, delistings, and whether prosecutions proceed (ss110.3, 110.5, 114.4).\n\n**Why it matters (practical effects and trade‑offs)**\n\n- It creates a new *state‑actor* track alongside the existing terrorist organisation law.  Mechanically this brings foreign state actors within the Criminal Code’s counter‑terror framework (new Part 5.3A; see s110.3 and Division 111–113).\n\n- Decision‑making and discretion: listing is driven by executive Ministers rather than the courts. The AFP Minister must be satisfied on reasonable grounds and must obtain the Foreign Affairs Minister’s written agreement before the Governor‑General can make a regulation (s110.3(3),(5)). That concentrates the initial decision in the executive branch and embeds diplomatic input (s110.3(5)(a)).\n\n- Enforcement and prosecution are centrally controlled: the Attorney‑General’s written consent is required before proceedings may be commenced (s114.4(1)). This adds an additional gate in the prosecution pipeline and imports national security and foreign relations considerations into charging decisions.\n\n- Compliance and private costs: the Act creates criminal liability (including very high maximum penalties) for a broad range of conduct that can arise in ordinary commercial, humanitarian, legal or personal interactions with a listed state‑entity or its members. Banks, charities, law firms, contractors and other businesses that deal with foreign governments will likely increase due diligence, restrict dealings, and incur legal/compliance costs to manage the risk (Divisions 112–113; see also s112.8 for narrow exceptions).\n\n- Legal uncertainty and burdens on defendants: the Act contains strict liability elements and shifts evidential/legal burdens onto defendants for some exceptions (e.g. a defendant must prove certain exceptions or take steps to cease membership; see s111.4(5) note, s112.2(2), s112.5(4)). The Parliamentary Scrutiny Committee and others raised concerns about reversed burdens and impacts on expression and rights.\n\n- Humanitarian activity and service delivery: the stated defences for humanitarian activity are narrow (explicit UN agencies and ICRC protection in s112.8 and s113.3), and civil society actors (ACFID, Save the Children, Australian Red Cross) have flagged that the exemptions may be insufficiently broad to protect routine humanitarian operations in environments where state actors are present. The Act leaves the scope of permissible humanitarian engagement relatively constrained.\n\n- Extraterritorial reach and corporate liability: offences apply beyond Australia’s borders (s114.2), and corporate liability rules are extended so that foreign state entities that are legal persons can be treated as committing offences (s114.1(1)–(2)). This increases legal exposure for multinational companies and financial intermediaries with global operations.\n\n- Diplomatic and foreign‑relations costs: naming a foreign state entity as a state sponsor of terrorism (and allowing civil proceedings against it) is an action with clear diplomatic consequences. The Act builds in Foreign Affairs Minister agreement (s110.3(5)(a)), but listing and prosecution still create the risk of retaliatory measures, trade or consular complications, and enforcement difficulties.\n\n**Key implementation levers to watch (sections cited)**\n\n- Who decides and how: AFP Minister satisfaction on reasonable grounds and Foreign Affairs agreement (s110.3(3),(5)); Governor‑General makes regulations.\n- Changing or removing names: AFP Minister may amend regulations by legislative instrument to add aliases (s110.4).\n- Delisting: AFP Minister may make a notifiable declaration after consulting Foreign Affairs (s110.5(1),(4)).  Applications for delisting may be made by the PJCIS or the foreign country (s110.6).\n- Parliamentary oversight of the legislative instrument: the PJCIS may review the regulations and report (s110.7).\n- Prosecution gate: Attorney‑General’s written consent required (s114.4).\n- Extension of control/preventative/post‑sentence orders to state terrorist acts (Schedule 2: new s104.1A; amendments to Divisions 104, 105, 105A).\n- Civil liability: foreign state immunity exception for state terrorism inserted into the Foreign States Immunities Act (item 49, Schedule 3).\n\n**Costs, incentives and likely behavioural effects (concise)**\n\n- Who pays: individuals (criminal penalties), civil plaintiffs and defendants (litigation costs), businesses and NGOs (compliance and risk mitigation costs), and taxpayers (enforcement, legal advice, diplomatic measures).\n- Who decides: AFP Minister, Foreign Affairs Minister (agreement), Governor‑General (regulations), Attorney‑General (prosecution consent).  These actors determine listings, delistings, and whether to prosecute (ss110.3, 110.5, 114.4).\n- Behaviour changes: banks and service providers will raise compliance checks and may refuse dealings; NGOs may alter operations or seek narrow exemptions; individuals will avoid knowingly associating with listed entities; foreign states may respond diplomatically or change behaviour to avoid being listed.\n\n**Implementation risks and trade‑offs**\n\n- Risk of under‑ or over‑inclusiveness in listing decisions: “reasonable grounds” is the statutory threshold (s110.3(3)), which requires balancing intelligence secrecy with legal sufficiency.  Errors in listing are hard to reverse quickly (delisting requires an AFP Minister declaration; s110.5).\n\n- Political/diplomatic discretion vs. legal predictability: ministerial control increases speed and executive flexibility but reduces judicial or parliamentary adjudication of the listing decision.\n\n- Freedom of expression and association issues: the law extends prohibitions and symbol offences to state sponsors (amendment to s80.2E; Schedule 3), and contains provisions that may affect ordinary speech or lawful association; the Act expressly preserves implied freedom of political communication to the extent applicable (see s112.7(6) and related notes), but scrutiny bodies raised concerns about freedome of expression and mandatory minimum sentences.\n\n- Narrow humanitarian/legal exemptions: the Act protects certain UN/ICRC activity and narrow legal work (s112.8(1)(e); s112.5(4)), but broader humanitarian exemptions sought by NGOs were not fully included and remain an implementation risk for aid organisations.\n\n**Bottom line (mechanics before rationale)**\n\nMechanically, the Act adds a statutory listing route for foreign state actors, creates new criminal offences and severe penalties tied to those listings, extends pre‑existing counter‑terror measures to apply to state actors, and removes foreign‑state immunity for proceedings concerning “state terrorism”. The government’s stated purpose is to close a legal gap that previously prevented state actors from being treated like non‑state terrorist organisations; the Act implements that aim while concentrating important listing, prosecutorial and delisting discretions in Ministers and the Attorney‑General (see ss110.3, 110.5, 114.4). The trade‑offs are concentrated benefits in executive flexibility and perceived deterrence versus diffuse costs of compliance, legal uncertainty, constrained humanitarian work, potential speech/association impacts, and diplomatic risk (see Divisions 111–113; s110.3; s112.8; item 49 Schedule 3)."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/criminal-code-amendment-state-sponsors-of-terrorism-bill-2025","history":"/api/acts/criminal-code-amendment-state-sponsors-of-terrorism-bill-2025/history","analysis":"/api/acts/criminal-code-amendment-state-sponsors-of-terrorism-bill-2025/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/criminal-code-amendment-state-sponsors-of-terrorism-bill-2025/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/criminal-code-amendment-state-sponsors-of-terrorism-bill-2025/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/criminal-code-amendment-state-sponsors-of-terrorism-bill-2025/documents"}}