{"id":"F2017L00387","name":"Competition and Consumer (Industry Code—Sugar) Regulations 2017","slug":"competition-and-consumer-industry-code-sugar-regulations-2017","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":439162,"registerId":"F2017L00387-fast-fetch-1775955283003","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-12","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"Competition and Consumer (Industry Code—Sugar) Regulations 2017","content":"---\nmeta-content-style-type: text/css\nmeta-content-type: application/xhtml+xml; charset=utf-8\nmeta-generator: Aspose.Words for .NET 22.10.0\n---\n\n?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\" standalone=\"no\"?>\n\n![](image.001.jpeg)\n\n \n\nCompetition and Consumer (Industry Code—Sugar) Regulations 2017\n\nI, General the Honourable Sir Peter Cosgrove AK MC (Ret’d), Governor‑General of the Commonwealth of Australia, acting with the advice of the Federal Executive Council, make the following regulations.\n\nDated 04 April 2017\n\nPeter Cosgrove\n\nGovernor‑General\n\nBy His Excellency’s Command\n\nScott Morrison\n\nTreasurer\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nContents\n\n1 Name\n\n2 Commencement\n\n3 Authority\n\n4 Code of conduct\n\n5 Authorisation of certain conduct\n\n6 High Court’s jurisdiction unaffected\n\n7 Review of Code\n\nSchedule 1—Sugar Code of Conduct\n\nPart 1—Preliminary\n\n1 Name of code\n\n2 Purposes of code\n\n3 Definitions\n\nPart 2—Obligation to act in good faith\n\n4 Application of this Part\n\n5 Obligation to act in good faith\n\nPart 3—Supply contracts\n\nDivision 1—Entering into supply contracts\n\n6 Application of this Division\n\n7 Requirement for supply contracts\n\n8 Individual contracts\n\n9 Collective contracts\n\n10 Terms of supply contract about sale of on‑supply sugar\n\nDivision 2—Arbitration of disputed terms of intended supply contracts\n\n11 Application of this Division\n\n12 Arbitration of disputed terms of intended supply contract\n\nPart 4—Arbitration of terms of intended on‑supply agreements\n\n13 Application of this Part\n\n14 Appointment of an independent arbitrator\n\n15 Determining a term in dispute\n\n16 Conduct of the arbitration\n\n17 On‑supply agreement taken to have been made\n\n18 Terminating the arbitration\n\n19 Costs of the arbitration\n\n1  Name\n\n  This instrument is the Competition and Consumer (Industry Code—Sugar) Regulations 2017.\n\n2  Commencement\n\n (1) Each provision of this instrument specified in column 1 of the table commences, or is taken to have commenced, in accordance with column 2 of the table. Any other statement in column 2 has effect according to its terms.\n\n \n\n- Commencement information\n- Column 1 Column 2 Column 3\n- Provisions Commencement Date/Details\n- 1. The whole of this instrument The day after this instrument is registered. 5 April 2017\n\n\nNote: This table relates only to the provisions of this instrument as originally made. It will not be amended to deal with any later amendments of this instrument.\n\n (2) Any information in column 3 of the table is not part of this instrument. Information may be inserted in this column, or information in it may be edited, in any published version of this instrument.\n\n3  Authority\n\n  This instrument is made under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010.\n\n4  Code of conduct\n\n  For the purposes of section 51AE of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010, the code set out in Schedule 1:\n\n (a) is prescribed for the purposes of Part IVB of that Act; and\n\n (b) is a mandatory industry code.\n\n5  Authorisation of certain conduct\n\n  For the purposes of subparagraph 51(1)(a)(ii) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010, anything that is done in accordance with the code set out in Schedule 1 is specified, and specifically authorised by this regulation.\n\n6  High Court’s jurisdiction unaffected\n\n  The code set out in Schedule 1 is not intended to affect the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 75 of the Constitution.\n\n7  Review of Code\n\n (1) The Minister administering section 51AE of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 must cause a review to be undertaken of the operation of the Sugar Code of Conduct.\n\n (2) The review must start before the end of the period of 18 months after the commencement of this section.\n\nSchedule 1—Sugar Code of Conduct\n\nNote: See section 4.\n\nPart 1—Preliminary\n\n \n\n1  Name of code\n\n  This code is the Sugar Code of Conduct.\n\n2  Purposes of code\n\n  The purposes of this code are:\n\n (a) to regulate the conduct of growers, mill owners and marketers of sugar in relation to contracts or agreements for the supply of cane or the on‑supply of sugar; and\n\n (b) to ensure that supply contracts between growers and mill owners have the effect of guaranteeing a grower’s choice of the marketing entity for the grower economic interest sugar manufactured from the cane the grower supplies; and\n\n (c) to require and provide for pre‑contractual arbitration of the terms of agreements for the supply of cane or the on‑supply of sugar if the parties fail to agree to those terms;\n\nto the extent that those contracts or agreements have at least one party that is a corporation.\n\nNote: Corporation is defined in section 4 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010.\n\n3  Definitions\n\n  In this code:\n\nAgriculture Minister has the same meaning as in the Biosecurity Act 2015.\n\nbargaining representative, for a group of growers, means a person with the written authority of each grower who is a member of the group.\n\ncane means sugar cane.\n\ncrushing season means, for any calendar year, the season for the harvesting and crushing of cane starting in the year.\n\ngrower means a person who supplies, or proposes to supply, cane to a mill.\n\ngrower economic interest sugar has the meaning given by subparagraph 10(1)(c)(ii).\n\nmarketer means an entity that has made an agreement with a mill owner, or is negotiating an agreement with a mill owner, for the mill owner to supply the entity with sugar manufactured by the mill owner, but does not include an entity that supplies or will supply the cane from which the sugar is or will be manufactured.\n\nmill means a building or other structure that is equipped for the manufacture of sugar from cane.\n\nmill owner means an entity owning or having control of a mill, and includes an entity controlling the business of a mill.\n\nmill‑related entity means:\n\n (a) a mill owner; or\n\n (b) a related body corporate of the mill owner.\n\non‑supply agreement has the meaning given by clause 13.\n\non‑supply sugar, to which a supply contract relates, means the raw sugar manufactured, or to be manufactured, from the cane supplied, or to be supplied, under the contract.\n\nrelated body corporate: a body corporate is a related body corporate of another body corporate if they are related to each other within the meaning of section 50 of the Corporations Act 2001.\n\nsugar does not include any by‑products of sugar (such as molasses).\n\nsugar cane means any plant or part of a plant, whether or not the part has been crushed, of the genus Saccharum or any hybrid of sugar cane.\n\nsupply contract means a written contract, complying with or otherwise consistent with Part 3, made between a grower and a mill owner for the supply of cane by the grower to the mill, and includes a supply contract taken to have been made because of subclause 12(2) and clause 17.\n\nPart 2—Obligation to act in good faith\n\n \n\n4  Application of this Part\n\n  This Part applies to:\n\n (a) the parties to a supply contract or an on‑supply agreement; or\n\n (b) the proposed parties to a proposed supply contract or a proposed on‑supply agreement;\n\nif at least one of the parties or proposed parties is a corporation.\n\nNote: Corporation is defined in section 4 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010.\n\n5  Obligation to act in good faith\n\n (1) Each party to a supply contract or an on‑supply agreement must act towards another party with good faith, within the meaning of the unwritten law from time to time, in relation to:\n\n (a) the contract or agreement; and\n\n (b) this code.\n\n (2) Each person who proposes to become a party to a proposed supply contract or a proposed on‑supply agreement must act towards another proposed party with good faith, within the meaning of the unwritten law from time to time, in relation to:\n\n (a) any dealing or dispute relating to the proposed contract or agreement; and\n\n (b) the negotiation of the proposed contract or agreement; and\n\n (c) this code.\n\n (3) Without limiting subclauses (1) and (2), each party or proposed party:\n\n (a) must act reasonably, fairly, honestly and co‑operatively; and\n\n (b) must not mislead, harass, intimidate or oppress any other party or proposed party.\n\nPart 3—Supply contracts\n\nDivision 1—Entering into supply contracts\n\n6  Application of this Division\n\n  This Division applies to a supply of cane from a grower to a mill owner if:\n\n (a) either the grower or the mill owner is a corporation, or both the grower and the mill owner are corporations; and\n\nNote: Corporation is defined in section 4 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010.\n\n (b) the grower is not a related body corporate of the mill owner; and\n\n (c) there is no other Australian law that specifically relates to supply contracts and that would apply to a supply contract between the grower and the mill owner for the supply of that cane.\n\n7  Requirement for supply contracts\n\n (1) A grower may supply cane to a mill for a crushing season only if the grower has a supply contract with the mill owner for the season.\n\n (2) A supply contract may be for one or more crushing seasons.\n\n (3) A supply contract may be either:\n\n (a) an individual contract (see clause 8); or\n\n (b) a collective contract (see clause 9).\n\n (4) An interested third party may be a party to a supply contract between a mill owner and a grower.\n\n (5) Each of the parties to a supply contract must sign the contract.\n\n8  Individual contracts\n\n  An individual contract:\n\n (a) is a supply contract made directly between a grower and a mill owner; and\n\n (b) may be for all or part of the supply of cane grown by the grower.\n\n9  Collective contracts\n\n (1) A collective contract is a supply contract made between 2 or more growers (a group of growers) and a mill owner.\n\n (2) Each grower in a group of growers must sign the collective contract.\n\n (3) A group of growers may appoint a bargaining representative to negotiate a collective contract on behalf of the group.\n\n (4) There may be more than one collective contract in force at the same time for a mill.\n\n (5) A grower may be a party to more than one collective contract.\n\n10  Terms of supply contract about sale of on‑supply sugar\n\n (1) A supply contract for cane between a grower and a mill owner must include each of the following:\n\n (a) a term providing for the amount, or the basis for working out the amount, of the payment to the grower for the supply of the cane (the cane payment);\n\n (b) unless the grower and mill owner otherwise agree—a term (a related sugar pricing term) requiring the amount of the cane payment to be worked out in a stated way by linking that amount to the sale price of the on‑supply sugar to which the supply contract relates;\n\n (c) if the supply contract includes a related sugar pricing term, both of the following, unless the grower and mill owner otherwise agree:\n\n (i) a term requiring the mill owner to bear the sale price exposure for the sale of a proportion of the on‑supply sugar that is worked out in a stated way;\n\n (ii) a term (a GEI sugar price exposure term) requiring the grower to bear the sale price exposure for the sale of the remaining on‑supply sugar (the grower economic interest sugar);\n\n (d) if the supply contract includes a GEI sugar price exposure term:\n\n (i) a term (a GEI sugar marketing term) requiring the mill owner to have an agreement with a stated entity (the GEI sugar marketing entity) to sell the quantity of the on‑supply sugar that is at least equal to the quantity of the grower economic interest sugar; and\n\n (ii) unless the grower and mill owner otherwise agree, a term providing for an entity nominated by the grower to be the GEI sugar marketing entity;\n\n (e) if the supply contract provides for an entity nominated by the grower to be the GEI sugar marketing entity—a term requiring the mill owner to deliver for sale the quantity of the on‑supply sugar that is at least equal to the quantity of the grower economic interest sugar, as directed by the entity, within a stated reasonable period.\n\n (2) However, paragraph (1)(d) does not apply if the supply contract states that the mill owner will sell the on‑supply sugar.\n\n (3) Without limiting paragraph (1)(e), the stated period must be reasonable having regard to the likely period in which the mill owner could deliver the on‑supply sugar for sale to a related body corporate of the mill owner.\n\nDivision 2—Arbitration of disputed terms of intended supply contracts\n\n11  Application of this Division\n\n  This Division applies to a supply of cane from a grower to a mill owner if:\n\n (a) either the grower or the mill owner is a corporation, or both the grower and the mill owner are corporations; and\n\nNote: Corporation is defined in section 4 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010.\n\n (b) the grower is not a related body corporate of the mill owner.\n\n12  Arbitration of disputed terms of intended supply contract\n\n (1) A party negotiating a supply contract may, by written notice to the other party, refer a dispute about any proposed term of the intended agreement to be determined by an independent arbitrator appointed by the parties.\n\n (2) Subject to subclauses (3) to (5), if the grower or mill owner refers a dispute about a proposed term of the intended supply contract to arbitration, clauses 14 to 19 of this code (other than subclause 14(1)) apply to the arbitration as if the intended supply contract were an intended on‑supply agreement.\n\n (3) Subclause (4) applies if a GEI sugar marketing term is a proposed term of the intended supply contract and the grower proposes to nominate an entity to be the GEI sugar marketing entity.\n\n (4) A term of the intended supply contract must not have the effect of unreasonably treating the grower less favourably than the grower would be likely to be treated if a mill‑related entity were to be the GEI sugar marketing entity.\n\n (5) Without limiting subclause (4), a term of the intended supply contract would have the effect of unreasonably treating the grower less favourably for the purposes of that subclause if the effect were that the grower would unreasonably pay more for a service provided by the mill owner under the intended supply contract than the grower would pay for the service if a mill‑related entity were the GEI sugar marketing entity.\n\n (6) Any dispute that may be referred to arbitration under this Division is not to be referred to arbitration under any other law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory.\n\nPart 4—Arbitration of terms of intended on‑supply agreements\n\n \n\n13  Application of this Part\n\n  This Part applies to negotiation of an agreement (an on‑supply agreement) between a mill owner and a marketer for the supply of grower economic interest sugar manufactured by the mill owner if:\n\n (a) both the mill owner and the marketer are bodies corporate; and\n\n (b) at least one of the parties is a corporation; and\n\nNote: Corporation is defined in section 4 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010.\n\n (c) the sugar is intended ultimately to be exported from Australia; and\n\n (d) the mill owner and the marketer have not entered into such an agreement; and\n\n (e) if a person who supplied some or all of the cane from which the sugar is manufactured is a body corporate—that body corporate and the mill owner are not related bodies corporate.\n\n14  Appointment of an independent arbitrator\n\n (1) A party (the first party) negotiating an on‑supply agreement may, by written notice to the other party, refer a dispute about any proposed term of the intended agreement to be determined by an independent arbitrator appointed by the parties.\n\n (2) The notice must state:\n\n (a) which proposed term is in dispute; and\n\n (b) the nature of the dispute about the term; and\n\n (c) what outcome the first party wants.\n\n (3) If:\n\n (a) the parties to the negotiation fail to agree on the appointment of an arbitrator within 10 days after the notice was given; and\n\n (b) the first party requests the Treasurer to appoint an arbitrator;\n\nthe Treasurer, in consultation with the Agriculture Minister, may appoint an independent arbitrator.\n\n (4) If an arbitrator is appointed, the first party must give the arbitrator a copy of the notice as soon as practicable after the arbitrator is appointed.\n\n15  Determining a term in dispute\n\n (1) The arbitrator must, within 30 days after appointment or within that period as extended under subclause (2), determine the term in dispute and notify the parties to the negotiation accordingly.\n\n (2) The arbitrator may extend the 30 day period by a further period not exceeding 30 days if the arbitrator considers it to be reasonably required. The arbitrator must give written notice of the extension, and the reasons for the extension, to the parties to the negotiation.\n\n (3) The arbitrator may only decide the dispute by deciding the term in dispute.\n\n (4) The arbitrator must not determine a term that would result in the acquisition of property otherwise than on just terms.\n\n (5) In this clause:\n\nacquisition of property has the same meaning as in paragraph 51(xxxi) of the Constitution.\n\njust terms has the same meaning as in paragraph 51(xxxi) of the Constitution.\n\n16  Conduct of the arbitration\n\n (1) In making the determination, the arbitrator may take into account written representations made by a person, if the arbitrator considers that the person has sufficient interest in the terms of the agreement.\n\n (2) The arbitration must be conducted in accordance with the Resolution Institute Arbitration Rules 2016, except to the extent (if any) that those rules are inconsistent with this code.\n\n17  On‑supply agreement taken to have been made\n\n  If each term in dispute has been determined under clause 15, the parties to the negotiation are taken to have made an on‑supply agreement that includes:\n\n (a) any terms agreed between the parties; and\n\n (b) each term determined under clause 15.\n\n18  Terminating the arbitration\n\n  The parties to the negotiation may, before being notified of the arbitrator’s determination, terminate the arbitration if they have entered into an on‑supply agreement.\n\n19  Costs of the arbitration\n\n  The parties to arbitration under this Part:\n\n (a) must bear their own costs of attending arbitration; and\n\n (b) are equally liable for the following costs of arbitration unless they agree otherwise:\n\n (i) the cost of the arbitrator;\n\n (ii) the cost of room hire;\n\n (iii) the cost of any additional input (including expert reports) agreed by all parties to be necessary to the conduct of the arbitration; and\n\n (c) are liable for any other costs determined by the arbitrator.\n\n \n","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"Unauthenticated. Configure AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY or use a provider module. Learn more: https://ai-sdk.dev/unauthenticated-ai-gateway","source":"analysis-cron"},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":6,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The instrument's operative scope is set within the Code itself: it applies to supply and on‑supply contracts where at least one party is a corporation, excludes related bodies corporate, and limits application where another specific Australian law applies (Schedule cll 2, 3, 6). The regulations implement those stated purposes (Schedule cl 2), authorise conduct under the Competition and Consumer Act (reg 5) and preserve High Court jurisdiction (reg 6). There is no text in the instrument that expands or narrows that stated scope beyond its own provisions."},"complexity_factors":["Cross‑statutory interaction: the Code sits under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 and relies on terms (eg. 'corporation') defined in other statutes (see regs 3 and Schedule cl 3).","Definition‑dependent scope: many operative rules apply only where at least one party is a corporation and exclude related bodies corporate (Schedule cll 3, 6, 13), requiring factual legal analysis of corporate relationships.","Good faith standard is tethered to the unwritten law (Schedule cl 5), creating interpretive uncertainty about its content and enforcement.","Detailed contractual architecture: mandatory written supply contracts, options for individual or collective contracts, and specific required terms about pricing and marketing (Schedule Part 3, cls 7–10).","Arbitration regime: time limits, procedure adoption (Resolution Institute Rules), evidence allowances and cost‑sharing rules (Schedule Part 3 Div 2 and Part 4, cls 12, 14–19) increase procedural complexity.","Discretionary executive role: Treasurer (in consultation with Agriculture Minister) may appoint an arbitrator if parties fail to agree (Schedule cl 14(3)), introducing administrative discretion.","Constitutional constraint: arbitrator is barred from deciding terms that amount to acquisition of property other than on just terms (Schedule cl 15(4)), requiring constitutional analysis in disputes.","Preclusion of parallel arbitration: disputes referred under the Code cannot be referred to other Commonwealth/State/Territory arbitration (Schedule cl 12(6)), affecting forum strategy and access to remedies."],"plain_english_summary":"These regulations prescribe a mandatory Sugar Code of Conduct that governs written supply contracts and related on‑supply agreements between sugar growers, mill owners and marketers when at least one party is a corporation. The Code requires parties to negotiate and perform in good faith, guarantees a grower’s ability to nominate a marketer for their grower economic interest sugar, and creates a pre‑contract arbitration process (including cost rules and a mechanism for Treasurer appointment of an arbitrator). It affects growers, mills, marketers and corporates contracting in the sugar supply chain."},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":5,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The legislation remains focused on its original purpose: regulating commercial relationships in the sugar industry between growers, mill owners, and marketers. The scope covers contract formation, good faith obligations, and dispute resolution mechanisms as originally intended. No significant mission creep or expansion beyond the sugar industry supply chain is evident."},"complexity_factors":["15 defined terms in clause 3, including technical industry terms like 'grower economic interest sugar' and 'mill-related entity'","Nested conditional logic in clause 10, with multiple 'unless otherwise agreed' exceptions and cascading requirements (paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) only apply if preceding conditions are met)","Cross-referencing between Parts: Part 3 Division 2 arbitration provisions incorporate Part 4 clauses by reference (clause 12(2)), requiring readers to jump between sections","Dual application triggers throughout (corporation status tests in clauses 4, 6, 11, and 13) that must be checked before provisions apply","Constitutional safeguards embedded in clause 15(4)-(5) requiring compliance with section 51(xxxi) 'just terms' for property acquisition","Incorporation of external rules (Resolution Institute Arbitration Rules 2016) by reference in clause 16(2), creating external dependency"],"plain_english_summary":"This legislation creates a mandatory code of conduct for Australia’s sugar industry, governing how cane growers, mill owners and sugar marketers negotiate and enter supply and marketing contracts. It requires written contracts, protects growers’ choice of marketer, mandates good‑faith dealing, allows binding arbitration, and permits collective bargaining where at least one party is a corporation.\n\nIt matters because it curbs mill-owner coercion, secures growers’ marketing rights and dispute resolution, and aims to protect farmer incomes while stabilising commercial relationships across the supply chain."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/competition-and-consumer-industry-code-sugar-regulations-2017","history":"/api/acts/competition-and-consumer-industry-code-sugar-regulations-2017/history","analysis":"/api/acts/competition-and-consumer-industry-code-sugar-regulations-2017/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/competition-and-consumer-industry-code-sugar-regulations-2017/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/competition-and-consumer-industry-code-sugar-regulations-2017/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/competition-and-consumer-industry-code-sugar-regulations-2017/documents"}}