{"id":"BILL-s1413","name":"Competition and Consumer Amendment (Divestiture Powers) Bill 2024","slug":"competition-and-consumer-amendment-divestiture-powers-bill-2024","collection":"bill","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":445982,"registerId":"commonwealth-BILL-s1413-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-05-05","status":"introduced","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[],"analysis":{"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":6,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The Bill is consistent with its stated purpose: it adds a divestiture power as a specific remedy to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. It does not, on its face, broaden the Act into unrelated areas; rather it expands the range of remedies available to address excessive market power. The change is additive (a new remedy) rather than a repurposing of the legislation beyond its original competition-enforcement objectives."},"complexity_factors":["Introduces a new court-ordered structural remedy (divestiture directions) interacting with existing competition laws","Requires an ACCC application plus Federal Court determination — two institutional actors with distinct roles","Outcome depends on complex factual and economic determinations (market definition, market power, necessity of divestiture)","Directions can be multifaceted (ownership change, asset transfers, timing requirements), requiring detailed drafting and enforcement mechanisms","Cross-references and overlap with existing remedies (merger control, misuse of market power, behavioural orders) increase conditional logic","Practical implementation involves transactional, valuation and cross-border issues that add procedural complexity"],"plain_english_summary":"**What this Bill changes (mechanics)\n\n- The Bill adds a new power to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 allowing the Federal Court, if the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) applies, to give directions (orders) that are designed to reduce a company’s market power or market share.  These directions can require structural changes (for example, selling assets or shares) or other actions that will reduce a firm’s ability to control a market.\n\n- The mechanism is court-led: the ACCC brings an application, the Court decides whether to make directions, and the Court specifies what must be done and by when. The Bill does not create a new criminal offence — it provides a civil remedy enforced by the Court.\n\nWho this affects\n\n- Corporations with a substantial presence in a market: firms that the ACCC alleges hold excessive market power or share and that the Court accepts should be reduced.\n- Shareholders, owners and potential buyers of business assets: divestiture orders can force changes in ownership or the sale of business lines or assets.\n- Competitors and potential entrants: they may gain access to assets or increased competitive opportunities if divestiture happens.\n- Consumers and downstream purchasers: they may be indirectly affected through changes in prices, service quality, or product availability resulting from any divestiture and the costs firms incur complying with orders.\n- The ACCC and the Federal Court: the ACCC gains a remedy to seek structural change; the Court gains discretion to craft and enforce those remedies.\n\nWhy it matters (official purpose and an operational test)\n\n- The Bill’s stated purpose is to give the regulator (the ACCC) a court-based tool to remedy cases where a firm’s market power is judged excessive and where reducing that power requires structural change rather than (or in addition to) fines or behavioural orders.\n\n- Tested against implementation trade-offs: the remedy substitutes for negotiation or voluntary divestment by giving the ACCC a path to compel structural change through judicial orders. That creates enforcement power but also introduces costs and practical difficulties: valuation of assets for sale, timing for divestment, effects on contract counterparties, and possible cross-border complications when assets or owners are overseas.\n\nConcrete mechanics, incentives and costs (what changes, who pays, who decides, and how behaviour will change)\n\n- Who decides: the ACCC decides whether to apply to the Court; the Federal Court decides whether to make directions and defines their content, timing and enforcement conditions.\n- Who pays: companies subject to directions will bear direct compliance costs (legal and transactional), potential sale discounts if assets must be sold quickly or under constraints, and indirect costs such as management distraction. Some costs may pass to consumers via higher prices or reduced investment, depending on how firms adjust. Buyers of divested assets (often competitors or financial investors) may capture concentrated benefits.\n- Behavioural change: firms may change merger and investment plans to avoid being targeted; they may pre-emptively restructure to reduce the risk of divestiture; parties to contracts may seek stronger protections against forced transfers; foreign investors may reassess acquisitions in Australia.\n\nImplementation and legal risks\n\n- Judicial discretion: outcomes depend on the Court’s valuation of market power and on practical drafting of directions. That creates uncertainty for firms and potential complexity in enforcement.\n- Evidence complexity: proving excessive market power or that divestiture is necessary will typically require complex economic and market evidence (market definition, share calculations, entry conditions), increasing litigation cost and time.\n- Transactional complexity: forcing changes in ownership or forced sales raises questions about valuation, timing, continuity of service, third‑party contracts, financing of buyers, and cross-border regulatory approvals.\n- Risk of concentrated benefits and diffuse costs: any successful divestiture will concentrate benefits on buyers of divested assets (who may gain market position) while costs (legal, compliance, possible price effects) are spread across the firm’s customers and shareholders.\n\nInteraction with existing law and incentives\n\n- The remedy sits alongside existing competition enforcement tools (merger control, misuse of market power claims, penalties and behavioural orders). It is a structural (not punitive) remedy aimed at reducing power rather than solely punishing past conduct.\n- Because it is a court-ordered structural remedy, it changes incentives for firms and investors around mergers, vertical integration, and how disputes with the ACCC are settled.\n\nPractical trade-offs for policymakers and businesses\n\n- Benefit: provides a direct mechanism to restore or increase competition where structural power is causing competitive harm and where other remedies are insufficient.\n- Cost and risk: introduces legal and transactional complexity, uncertainty for investment and M&A, and potential disruption to business operations and contracts. Enforcement will be resource-intensive for the regulator and the courts.\n\n(Analysis grounded in the Bill’s effect: giving the ACCC a path to seek court orders that reduce a corporation’s market power or share; all characterisations of likely effects derive from that mechanical change.)"},"summary":{"status_summary":"The bill was introduced in the Senate on 20 March 2024, its second reading was negatived on 26 June 2024 and it has been restored to the Notice Paper.","complexity_score":4,"likely_questions":["What powers does the bill grant to the court?","What is the current status of the bill in the Senate?"],"complexity_factors":["amendment to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010","court directions for market power reduction"],"plain_english_summary":"The bill amends the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 to let courts, on application by the ACCC, issue directions aimed at reducing a corporation’s market power or market share. It targets firms with substantial market influence and gives the ACCC a judicial remedy to address harmful concentrations of market power. Legislative progress has been started but not completed."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/competition-and-consumer-amendment-divestiture-powers-bill-2024","history":"/api/acts/competition-and-consumer-amendment-divestiture-powers-bill-2024/history","analysis":"/api/acts/competition-and-consumer-amendment-divestiture-powers-bill-2024/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/competition-and-consumer-amendment-divestiture-powers-bill-2024/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/competition-and-consumer-amendment-divestiture-powers-bill-2024/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/competition-and-consumer-amendment-divestiture-powers-bill-2024/documents"}}