{"id":"BILL-r7386","name":"Commonwealth Parole Board (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2025","slug":"commonwealth-parole-board-consequential-and-transitional-provisions-bill-2025","collection":"bill","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":446056,"registerId":"commonwealth-BILL-r7386-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-05-05","status":"royal_assent","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[],"analysis":{"summary":{"status_summary":"The bill received royal assent on 8 April 2026 and is now Act No. 33 of 2026.","complexity_score":4,"likely_questions":["What happens to a federal offender who already has a parole order when the new Act commences?","How does the Board handle reconsideration of a parole refusal under the new rules?"],"complexity_factors":["extensive amendments to the Crimes Act 1914 across multiple sections","detailed transitional provisions for existing orders and pending decisions"],"plain_english_summary":"The Act moves parole decision-making for federal offenders from the Attorney‑General to the Commonwealth Parole Board, setting new decision points (make, refuse, defer up to three months, and rescind pre‑release if a serious risk) and allowing the Board to request and share information with relevant agencies. Transitional rules preserve existing orders and transfer outstanding notices and reconsiderations to the Board.\n\nIt affects federal offenders, state/territory corrective services and victims; it commenced with Part 2 of the Commonwealth Parole Board Act 2026 and requires a review 3–4 years after commencement."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":6,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The Act stays within its primary, original purpose: to implement the operational transfer of parole decision‑making for federal offenders from the Attorney‑General to a newly established Commonwealth Parole Board and to manage the transitional and consequential changes to the Crimes Act 1914. It does, however, introduce substantive operational powers for the Board that go beyond a simple transfer of title: notably pre‑release rescission (19APC), an express power to amend release dates (19APA(1)(da)), and clarified, broadened information‑sharing arrangements (Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 item 5). These additions are consequential to enabling the Board to function and to manage risk, rather than a divergence into unrelated subject matter, so they do not amount to a significant expansion of scope beyond the Act’s stated intent."},"complexity_factors":["Multiple new sections inserted into Part IB of the Crimes Act (19AKB, 19AKC, 19AKD, 19AKE, 19AKF, 19APC–19APF) with interlocking procedural timelines","Cross‑references throughout the Crimes Act replacing references to the Attorney‑General with the Commonwealth Parole Board in many existing sections (items 4–36 of Schedule 1)","Distinction and interaction between 'rescission' (pre‑release) and 'revocation' (post‑release) requiring separate processes and legal effects (19APC–19APF)","Conditional reconsideration windows with default and extended periods (standard 12 months, extendable to 24 months) (19AKC)","New duties with short statutory timelines for notices and submissions (14‑day deadlines in 19AKF and 19APD)","Expanded definitions and \"relevant persons\" list for information sharing (Schedule 1 item 39 and Schedule 2 item 5) and transitional carry‑over of pre‑commencement information","Transitional rule‑making power with express limits (Schedule 2 item 6) that nonetheless allows a broad range of practical transitional prescriptions","Operational changes that require coordination with state/territory sentences and timing rules (19AKE)","Saved existing orders and preservation of judicial review rights during transition (Schedule 2 items 2 and 4)","Interplay with the separate Commonwealth Parole Board Act (administrative powers, information gathering and assistance provisions exist in that Act), increasing cross‑legislative navigation"],"plain_english_summary":"**What the law changes, simply put**\n\n- Mechanically, this Act rewrites parts of the Crimes Act 1914 so that an independent Commonwealth Parole Board — not the Attorney‑General — makes parole decisions for federal offenders. Key new or altered powers appear as sections 19AKB, 19AKC, 19AKD, 19AKE and related provisions.\n\n- The Act also creates transitional rules to carry existing parole orders, notices and judicial review rights over into the new system, and gives a limited power to the Minister to make rules needed for the transition (subject to enumerated limits).\n\n**Who is affected**\n\n- Federal offenders (people convicted of Commonwealth offences) whose parole decisions were previously made by the Attorney‑General or the Commonwealth Parole Office. See new sections 19AKB–19AKD for how decisions are to be made.\n- Victims and their representatives, state/territory corrective services, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and a range of Commonwealth and state agencies that will be asked to provide information to or receive information from the Parole Board (see amendments around \"relevant persons\", e.g. insertion into section 20BZ and transitional item 5).\n- The Attorney‑General’s Department and other agencies that will supply records and pre‑release reports; and the Commonwealth budget which must carry the Board’s operating costs.\n\n**What the Board must do and how it works (mechanics)**\n\n- Timing and decisions: Before the end of a person’s non‑parole period the Parole Board must either (a) make a parole order, (b) refuse to make one, or (c) defer the decision to up to 3 months after the end of the non‑parole period (new section 19AKB). If the Board refuses, it must reconsider within a standard 12‑month window (19AKC), which may be extended up to 24 months.\n\n- Making an order: If the Board decides to make a parole order it must make it in writing as soon as possible and must state whether release is subject to supervision and, if relevant, the day supervision ends (19AKD). The Board may, in some cases, order release up to 30 days before the end of the non‑parole period (19AKD(3)).\n\n- Pre‑release rescission: The Board may rescind (cancel) a parole order or licence during the \"relevant pre‑release period\" (the period from when the order was made until the day of release) for specified reasons: serious unmitigable risk to community safety, serious unmitigable risk to the person’s own safety, the person requests rescission, or there has been a substantial change in matters the Board relied on (19APC). The person must be notified and given 14 days to submit reasons why the rescission should not remain in effect (19APD). If rescission remains, it is treated as a refusal (19APE). Note: the Act distinguishes \"rescission\" (pre‑release cancellation) from \"revocation\" (after release) (19APF).\n\n- Amendments to existing powers: The Board may amend parole orders while a person is under sentence, including changing the release date (inserting an express power at 19APA(1)(da)). Certain terrorism‑related parole restrictions remain: the Board cannot make parole orders for specified terrorism offenders unless \"exceptional circumstances\" are shown (recast at 19ALB).\n\n- Information sharing and evidence: The Act updates definitions and the list of \"relevant persons\" who may receive or be required to provide Parole Board information (Schedule 1 inserts the Chair and members into the list at 20BZ; Schedule 2 confirms that information acquired before commencement counts for the Board’s information powers). The Board’s enabling Act (separately) contains specific information‑gathering and disclosure powers; this Act aligns the Crimes Act with those arrangements.\n\n- Transitional measures: Existing parole orders and licences made under the old regime continue in force under the new Act (Schedule 2, item 2). If the Attorney‑General had refused parole before commencement but had not given a statutory notice, the Board must give the notice within 14 days (Schedule 2, item 3). Ongoing judicial review rights preserved (Schedule 2, item 4).\n\n**Stated purpose and a quick test against practical trade‑offs**\n\n- Official claim: the provisions are intended to remove primary parole decision‑making from political actors and vest it in an independent, expert Parole Board (the Parole Board Act and this consequential Act together effect that transfer).\n\n- Practical effects and trade‑offs: the Act does remove the formal decision‑making role of the Attorney‑General, but:\n  - appointment and governance remain connected to executive processes (members are appointed by the Governor‑General on the Attorney‑General’s recommendation and the Minister can make rules); that preserves an executive link to composition and rules‑making (see definition changes and rule power in Schedule 2, item 6 and Schedule 1 insertions about the Chair). \n  - the Board has new operational powers not clearly available to the Attorney‑General previously — most notably explicit pre‑release rescission (19APC), and an express power to change a parole release date (19APA(1)(da)). Those are substantive changes to how cases are managed, not mere renamings of decision‑makers.\n  - information sharing is broadened in practical terms (existing records before commencement count, Schedule 2 item 5), and several agencies are expressly listed as \"relevant persons\", which increases the number of parties that must or may provide material to the Board and who may receive Parole Board information.\n\n**Who pays, who decides, and how behaviours change**\n\n- Who pays: Commonwealth funding will be required to operate the Parole Board and to resource extra administrative work across agencies (pre‑release reports, information provision and case management). Individual applicants (prisoners) may face different practical costs (e.g. legal assistance, preparing submissions), and agencies may absorb record‑management costs.\n\n- Who decides: The Commonwealth Parole Board is the decision‑maker for federal parole matters (see 19AKB–19AKD). The Attorney‑General’s direct decision role is removed for those matters, but the Attorney‑General still recommends appointments and may request advice from the Board in other areas (this Act preserves advisory interactions elsewhere in the Parole Board Bill).\n\n- Behaviour change: Departments and state/territory corrective services will need to deliver timely pre‑release material and to adapt to statutory notice timelines (14 days for refusal/deferral notices (19AKF), and 14 days to respond to a rescission notice (19APD)). Offenders will have new procedural pathways (reconsideration windows at 19AKC, and a 14‑day submission right if the Board rescinds a pre‑release order (19APD)). The Board’s discretion to rescind orders shortly before release may increase the use of pre‑release risk management rather than post‑release revocation in some cases.\n\n**Implementation risks, compliance burden and incentives**\n\n- Implementation risk: setting up a new national board, staffing, drafting and publishing procedures, and aligning Commonwealth and state records is administratively non‑trivial. Transitional rules (Schedule 2, item 6) permit practical fixes, but those rules cannot create offences, expand arrest/detention powers or amend the Act text directly.\n\n- Compliance burden and incentives: agencies named as \"relevant persons\" will face a statutory requirement to provide information where reasonably able (the broader Parole Board Act contains explicit compulsion powers). That shifts effort and record‑sharing costs onto corrective services, AFP, DPPs, Customs, Defence, Tax Office and others. The Board’s rescue and amendment powers create incentives for more detailed, up‑to‑date pre‑release reporting; prisoners have a stronger procedural right to reasons and short submissions where orders are rescinded or refused.\n\n- Bureaucratic discretion and oversight: the Board has broad discretion in decision‑making (the Parole Board Act gives that discretion), but this Act also gives the Board specific procedural duties and timelines. Appointment via executive recommendation and the Minister’s rule power leave governance levers in the hands of the executive branch (appointment and rules), even as day‑to‑day parole decisions shift to an expert body.\n\n**Concrete legal changes to watch in practice**\n\n- Pre‑release rescission (19APC) — a new mechanism that can cancel an order after it is made but before release, with a short submission window (19APD) and a statutory effect that equates unresolved rescission to a refusal (19APE).\n- Reconsideration timing (19AKC) — potential repeated deferrals up to a 24‑month ceiling for reconsideration, with a 12‑month default.\n- Express power to change release dates in parole orders (19APA(1)(da)).\n- Transitional preservation of existing orders and judicial review rights (Schedule 2 items 2 and 4).\n\n**Bottom line**\n\nMechanically, the Act shifts parole decision‑making for federal offenders from the Attorney‑General to a statutorily established Commonwealth Parole Board, preserves existing orders during the transition, adds specific procedural and substantive powers for the Board (notably pre‑release rescission and power to amend release dates), and broadens and clarifies information‑sharing arrangements. The change reduces the Attorney‑General’s formal decision role but retains executive influence via appointments and rule‑making. See particularly sections 19AKB–19AKD, 19AKC, 19APC–19APF, and the transitional items in Schedule 2."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/commonwealth-parole-board-consequential-and-transitional-provisions-bill-2025","history":"/api/acts/commonwealth-parole-board-consequential-and-transitional-provisions-bill-2025/history","analysis":"/api/acts/commonwealth-parole-board-consequential-and-transitional-provisions-bill-2025/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/commonwealth-parole-board-consequential-and-transitional-provisions-bill-2025/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/commonwealth-parole-board-consequential-and-transitional-provisions-bill-2025/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/commonwealth-parole-board-consequential-and-transitional-provisions-bill-2025/documents"}}