{"id":"C2004A00250","name":"Common Informers (Parliamentary Disqualifications) Act 1975","slug":"common-informers-parliamentary-disqualifications-act-1975","collection":"act","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":"28 of 1975","makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":31189,"registerId":"commonwealth-C2004A00250-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-01","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"Short title [see Note 1]","content":"#### 1 Short title \\[see Note 1\\]\n\n  This Act may be cited as the Common Informers (Parliamentary Disqualifications) Act 1975.","sortOrder":0},{"sectionNumber":"2","sectionType":"section","heading":"Commencement [see Note 1]","content":"#### 2 Commencement \\[see Note 1\\]\n\n  This Act shall come into operation on the day on which it receives the Royal Assent.","sortOrder":1},{"sectionNumber":"3","sectionType":"section","heading":"Penalty for sitting when disqualified","content":"#### 3 Penalty for sitting when disqualified\n\n  (1) Any person who, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, has sat as a senator or as a member of the House of Representatives while he or she was a person declared by the Constitution to be incapable of so sitting shall be liable to pay to any person who sues for it in the High Court a sum equal to the total of:\n    (a) $200 in respect of his or her having so sat on or before the day on which the originating process in the suit is served on him or her; and\n    (b) $200 for every day, subsequent to that day, on which he or she is proved in the suit to have so sat.\n  (2) A suit under this section shall not relate to any sitting of a person as a senator or as a member of the House of Representatives at a time earlier than 12 months before the day on which the suit is instituted.\n  (3) The High Court shall refuse to make an order in a suit under this Act that would, in the opinion of the Court, cause the person against whom it was made to be penalized more than once in respect of any period or day of sitting as a senator or as a member of the House of Representatives.","sortOrder":2},{"sectionNumber":"4","sectionType":"section","heading":"Suits not to be brought under section 46 of the Constitution","content":"#### 4 Suits not to be brought under section 46 of the Constitution\n\n  On and after the date of commencement of this Act, a person is not liable to pay any sum under section 46 of the Constitution and no suit shall be instituted, continued, heard or determined in pursuance of that section.","sortOrder":3},{"sectionNumber":"5","sectionType":"section","heading":"Jurisdiction","content":"#### 5 Jurisdiction\n\n  Original jurisdiction is conferred on the High Court in suits under this Act and no other court has jurisdiction in such a suit.","sortOrder":4}],"analysis":{"issue_detection":{"absurdities":[{"type":"other","section":"3(1)(a)","severity":"high","reasoning":"While not a logical flaw in the strict sense, the static nominal penalty creates a structural absurdity: the Act purports to deter unconstitutional parliamentary sitting, yet the maximum penalty for sitting on the day of service is $200 — a sum a disqualified member earns in roughly 15 minutes. The mechanism is logically self-defeating as a deterrent instrument.","confidence":0.82,"description":"The penalty of $200 per sitting day has not been adjusted since 1975 and is now economically trivial, rendering the deterrent mechanism effectively meaningless against a parliamentarian earning approximately $230,000+ per year."},{"type":"other","section":"3(1)(a) and 3(1)(b)","severity":"medium","reasoning":"The retrospective flat-fee capped at $200 for all pre-service sitting — regardless of duration — combined with the 12-month lookback in s3(2) means the Act structurally rewards delayed suit initiation by the informer but does not proportionately penalise prolonged pre-service disqualified sitting. The logic of deterrence is inverted for the pre-service period.","confidence":0.85,"description":"The penalty structure creates a perverse incentive to continue sitting after being served. Section 3(1)(a) fixes a flat $200 for all sitting prior to and including the day of service, regardless of how long the person has been sitting unlawfully. Section 3(1)(b) then charges $200 per day only for days after service. A person who sat unlawfully for 364 days before service pays the same $200 as someone who sat for one day before service."},{"type":"other","section":"3(1) read with 3(2)","severity":"low","reasoning":"The inclusion of 'before commencement' in s3(1) suggests an intention to capture historical disqualified sitting, but the rolling 12-month limitation in s3(2) made this provision self-extinguishing within approximately one year of the Act's commencement. The drafting creates the appearance of retrospective coverage that was always structurally illusory beyond a narrow transitional window.","confidence":0.88,"description":"Section 3(1) permits suits relating to conduct 'before or after the commencement of this Act' but s3(2) limits the lookback to 12 months before the suit is instituted. For conduct before commencement (pre-1975), the 12-month window means that by approximately 1976, all pre-commencement conduct became permanently time-barred. The 'before commencement' language in s3(1) is therefore rendered entirely spent and serves no ongoing operative purpose."},{"type":"impossible_compliance","section":"3(3)","severity":"medium","reasoning":"The Act provides no priority rule, no consolidation mechanism, and no stay of proceedings for competing suits. Multiple informers could simultaneously sue the same defendant for the same period of disqualified sitting. The Court cannot penalise more than once per period, meaning at most one plaintiff can succeed, but the Act gives no guidance on which suit prevails, potentially rendering subsequent suits entirely futile while still requiring full High Court proceedings.","confidence":0.79,"description":"The protection against double penalisation in s3(3) requires the High Court to refuse orders that would penalise a person 'more than once in respect of any period or day.' However, the Act permits multiple informers to independently bring suits in respect of overlapping periods. The Court must refuse duplicative orders, but there is no mechanism to prevent multiple suits being commenced — creating a situation where the Court may be required to hear and determine suits it is then obliged to refuse to resolve in favour of the plaintiff."},{"type":"impossible_compliance","section":"3(1)(b)","severity":"medium","reasoning":"The phrase 'proved in the suit' implies evidence adduced at trial. However, sitting days occurring between the hearing and judgment, or between judgment and any appeal, cannot logically be 'proved in the suit' through the ordinary evidentiary process. The Act provides no mechanism for updating the evidentiary record post-hearing to capture ongoing disqualified sitting, creating a logical gap where continued unlawful sitting after the hearing date escapes the penalty provision.","confidence":0.72,"description":"Section 3(1)(b) imposes a $200 penalty for every day after service on which the defendant 'is proved in the suit to have so sat.' This requires proof at trial of future sitting days that had not yet occurred when the suit was commenced or perhaps even when it was heard — creating an evidentiary impossibility for sitting that occurs after the hearing but before judgment."}],"contradictions":[{"severity":"high","section_a":"3(1)","section_b":"4","confidence":0.78,"description":"Section 3(1) creates civil liability enforceable by any person ('common informer') as a replacement regime, while section 4 abolishes the equivalent liability under s46 of the Constitution. However, section 46 of the Constitution is a constitutional provision that an ordinary Act of Parliament cannot extinguish — the Constitution can only be altered by referendum under s128. Section 4 purports to render s46 inoperative by statute, which is constitutionally questionable and creates a direct tension between the statutory scheme and the constitutional text it claims to supersede."},{"severity":"medium","section_a":"3(2)","section_b":"3(1)","confidence":0.83,"description":"Section 3(1) expressly extends liability to sitting 'before or after the commencement of this Act,' suggesting broad temporal reach including historical conduct. Section 3(2) then imposes a 12-month limitation period running from institution of suit. These two provisions are in structural tension: s3(1) appears to grant a right in respect of pre-commencement conduct while s3(2) simultaneously operates to extinguish that right for any conduct older than 12 months — which, for all pre-1975 conduct, occurred immediately upon commencement."},{"severity":"medium","section_a":"3(3)","section_b":"5","confidence":0.75,"description":"Section 3(3) requires the High Court to refuse orders causing double penalisation, but section 5 vests exclusive original jurisdiction in the High Court with no other court having jurisdiction. With no consolidation mechanism and no ability for another court to manage competing suits, the High Court must individually hear multiple suits brought by different informers for the same conduct — potentially to judgment — before it can determine whether a subsequent order would constitute double penalisation. This creates a structural contradiction where the Court's duty to refuse double penalisation cannot be effectively discharged without first expending full judicial resources on suits it may be bound to refuse."}]},"summary":{"complexity_score":4,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The Act does exactly what its title suggests — it replaces the common informer mechanism in section 46 of the Constitution with a modernised (if still modest) statutory equivalent. The scope is narrow, focused, and consistent with its original intent: regulating financial penalties for disqualified MPs sitting in Parliament, while consolidating jurisdiction exclusively in the High Court."},"complexity_factors":["Requires understanding of the Australian Constitution (particularly section 46 and the disqualification provisions) to fully grasp the context","The concept of 'common informer' — a private citizen suing to enforce a public law — is unfamiliar to most modern readers","The interaction between this Act and a specific constitutional provision (s46) creates a layer of constitutional law overlay","Jurisdictional restriction to the High Court alone is an unusual procedural feature","The double-jeopardy-style protection against multiple suits adds a nuanced procedural dimension","Retrospective application (covering conduct before commencement) adds interpretive complexity"],"plain_english_summary":"## Common Informers (Parliamentary Disqualifications) Act 1975\n\n### What does this law do?\nThis Act deals with what happens when a Member of Parliament (Senator or Member of the House of Representatives) sits in Parliament when they are **legally disqualified** from doing so under the Australian Constitution.\n\n### Who can be disqualified from Parliament?\nThe Constitution lists various reasons a person cannot sit in Parliament — for example, holding certain government jobs, being a citizen of a foreign country, or being bankrupt. This Act doesn't change *who* is disqualified; it just sets up the consequences if a disqualified person sits anyway.\n\n### What are the consequences?\nAny member of the public (called a \"common informer\" — historically, someone who sues on behalf of the public to enforce a law) can sue a disqualified MP in the **High Court** (Australia's highest court). If successful, the disqualified MP must pay:\n- **$200** for having sat while disqualified (up to the date they were served with the lawsuit), plus\n- **$200 for every additional day** they are proven to have sat after that.\n\nThese are quite modest penalties by today's standards, reflecting the Act's age.\n\n### Important limits:\n- A lawsuit can only cover sitting that occurred **within the last 12 months**.\n- A disqualified MP **cannot be penalised twice** for the same period of sitting — so multiple lawsuits about the same days are blocked by the court.\n- **Only the High Court** can hear these cases — no other court has the power.\n\n### What did this replace?\nBefore this Act, the same issue was covered by **section 46 of the Constitution** itself. This Act effectively replaced that constitutional provision with its own system. From the date this Act commenced, people **can no longer sue** under section 46 of the Constitution — only under this Act.\n\n### Why does this matter to you?\nIf you ever believed an MP was sitting in Parliament while constitutionally disqualified (for example, during the 2017–2018 dual citizenship crisis), this Act is the mechanism that theoretically allowed any ordinary Australian to take legal action in the High Court. In practice, the low penalty amounts ($200/day) make such suits more of a constitutional safeguard than a practical deterrent."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"The Act replaces and constrains the pre-existing route under section 46 of the Constitution by abolishing liability and suits under that section from commencement and creating a new statutory remedy. Under the Act the remedy is a private suit in the High Court with fixed monetary amounts, a 12‑month look‑back limit, a service‑triggered per‑day liability, and an express prohibition on multiple penalisation for the same period (see ss 3–5)."},"complexity_factors":["Short, self-contained statutory scheme with a single civil remedy (s 3)","Interaction with the Constitution via exclusion of s 46 remedies (s 4)","Procedural and evidential gatekeeping because all suits must be brought in the High Court (s 5)","Retroactive coverage of sittings before commencement combined with a 12‑month limitation period (s 3(1), s 3(2))","Timing-triggered liability (different fixed amount for sittings before service versus per‑day liability after service) (s 3(1)(a)–(b))","Judicial discretion to prevent double penalisation (s 3(3))"],"plain_english_summary":"What this law does\n\n- Gives anyone the right to sue in the High Court for money if a person sat in the Australian Parliament while that person was constitutionally declared incapable of sitting (for example, because of an applicable disqualification). (See s 3(1), s 5.)\n- Sets the money that can be recovered: $200 for any sitting on or before the day the defendant is served with the originating process, plus $200 for each day after that on which the person is proved to have sat. (See s 3(1)(a)–(b).)\n- Limits suits so they can only cover sittings within the 12 months before the suit is started. (See s 3(2).)\n- Requires the High Court to refuse any order that would penalise the same period or day more than once. (See s 3(3).)\n- Removes the possibility of bringing or continuing suits under section 46 of the Constitution from the date this Act starts. (See s 4.)\n- Confers original jurisdiction on the High Court for suits under this Act; no other court can hear these suits. The Act takes effect on the day it receives Royal Assent and may be cited by its short title. (See ss 1–2, 5.)\n\nWho is affected and who pays\n\n- Persons who have sat as a senator or member of the House of Representatives while constitutionally ineligible can be ordered to pay the statutory sums to the person who sues and wins in the High Court. (See s 3(1).)\n- The claimant (the person who sues) bears the cost and effort of bringing a High Court proceeding to recover the sums. (See s 3(1), s 5.)\n\nHow it works mechanically\n\n- A private individual starts an action in the High Court under this Act. If the court proves the defendant sat while constitutionally ineligible, the defendant becomes liable to pay the fixed sums described above. The day the originating process is served is the trigger for the split between the single $200 amount (for earlier sittings) and the per-day $200 amounts for subsequent sittings. (See s 3(1)(a)–(b).)\n- Claims are time-limited to the 12 months before the suit is instituted, so the remedy cannot reach back indefinitely. (See s 3(2).)\n- The High Court must avoid ordering a defendant to be penalised more than once for the same sitting period. (See s 3(3).)\n- Section 4 removes any parallel remedy under section 46 of the Constitution from the Act’s commencement date, so plaintiffs must proceed under this statute in the High Court rather than under s 46. (See s 4, s 5.)\n\nStated purpose claims and practical trade-offs\n\n- The Act’s text creates a private, court-enforced monetary remedy for parliamentary sittings by persons constitutionally incapable of sitting (s 3). The text also eliminates suits and liabilities under s 46 of the Constitution (s 4). Those are the purpose-claims explicit in the instrument.\n\n- Costs and who bears them: defendants (disqualified parliamentarians who sat) face potential monetary liability and High Court litigation exposure; claimants bear the cost and delay of High Court litigation to obtain the sums. (See s 3(1), s 5.)\n\n- Incentives and behaviour: by making recovery possible only through private suits in the High Court and by fixing the recovery amounts, the Act creates a private enforcement incentive but also sets predictable financial exposure (s 3(1)). The 12‑month look‑back limit (s 3(2)) constrains long‑tail liability and reduces open-ended risk.\n\n- Trade-offs and opportunity costs: confining jurisdiction to the High Court centralises decision‑making but raises the procedural and cost threshold for claimants compared with lower courts. Removing s 46 remedies (s 4) eliminates parallel constitutional proceedings, concentrating enforcement into the statutory route (s 4, s 5).\n\n- Implementation risks and compliance burden: the cost and formality of High Court proceedings create a practical barrier to bringing many claims (s 5). Defendants must defend in the High Court if sued under this Act. The statutory per-day liability that begins after service creates a timing-related exposure tied to the commencement of proceedings (s 3(1)).\n\n- Bureaucratic discretion: the Act vests decision-making authority in the High Court rather than in an administrative body; there is no statutory role for executive agencies in deciding liability or awards under this Act (s 5).\n\nEffects on private choice and markets\n\n- The Act primarily affects members of Parliament (and potential litigants) and does not impose regulatory obligations on businesses or market participants. The main private-choice effects are on whether potential plaintiffs choose to sue in the High Court and on the litigation and reputational decisions of persons who might be subject to suit. (See ss 3–5.)\n\nKey statutory limits to note\n\n- Monetary amounts are fixed in the statute (s 3(1)).\n- Claims are limited to the prior 12 months (s 3(2)).\n- The High Court cannot order double penalisation for the same period (s 3(3)).\n- Suits under s 46 of the Constitution are excluded from the date the Act commences (s 4)."},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The legislation remains tightly focused on its original purpose: replacing the constitutional common informer procedure with a statutory equivalent. It has not expanded beyond penalizing disqualified parliamentarians and reallocating jurisdiction from the general constitutional provision to this specific Act."},"complexity_factors":["Very short statute — only 5 operative sections","No defined terms section; relies on external constitutional concepts ('person declared by the Constitution to be incapable of so sitting')","Simple arithmetic formula for penalties (flat $200 per day)","Minimal cross-referencing (only to section 46 of the Constitution and the High Court's jurisdiction)","Straightforward temporal limitation (12-month lookback period in section 3(2))","Single clear jurisdictional provision (section 5) with no exceptions or carve-outs"],"plain_english_summary":"**What this law does:**\n\nThis Act creates a **civil penalty system** for politicians who sit in Parliament when they're not legally allowed to (for example, because they hold dual citizenship, have a conflict of interest, or are bankrupt — situations the Constitution says disqualify someone from being a member).\n\n**How it works:**\n\n- **Who can sue?** Any ordinary person (called a \"common informer\" — basically, a private citizen acting as a whistleblower) can take a disqualified politician to the **High Court** and claim money from them.\n- **How much?** The penalty is **$200 per day** the politician sat while disqualified, with a minimum of $200. This applies to sitting days both before and after the lawsuit starts.\n- **Time limit:** You can only claim for the **last 12 months** of sitting — anything older is off-limits.\n- **No double-dipping:** The High Court won't make someone pay twice for the same day.\n\n**Why it matters:**\n\nBefore this law, the Constitution (section 46) had a similar penalty, but it was **£100 per day** (an old British amount) and was confusing to use. This Act:\n- Replaces the old constitutional penalty with a clearer, modern system\n- **Blocks** anyone from using the old section 46 of the Constitution anymore\n- Gives the **High Court exclusive power** to hear these cases — no other court can touch them\n\n**In short:** It's a mechanism for citizens to financially punish politicians who illegally cling to their parliamentary seats, while tidying up an outdated constitutional provision."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/common-informers-parliamentary-disqualifications-act-1975","history":"/api/acts/common-informers-parliamentary-disqualifications-act-1975/history","analysis":"/api/acts/common-informers-parliamentary-disqualifications-act-1975/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/common-informers-parliamentary-disqualifications-act-1975/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/common-informers-parliamentary-disqualifications-act-1975/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/common-informers-parliamentary-disqualifications-act-1975/documents"}}