{"id":"civil-liability-act-1936","name":"Civil Liability Act 1936","slug":"civil-liability-act-1936","collection":"act","jurisdiction":"sa","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":31770,"registerId":"sa-civil-liability-act-1936-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-01","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"Part 1","sectionType":"part","heading":"Preliminary","content":"Part 1—Preliminary\n1—Short title\nThis Act may be cited as the Civil Liability Act 1936.\n2—Act to bind the Crown\nThis Act binds the Crown in right of South Australia and, so far as the legislative power of the Parliament of South Australia permits, the Crown in all its other capacities.\n3—Interpretation\n\t(1)\tIn this Act, unless the contrary intention appears—\naccident means an incident out of which personal injury arises and includes a motor accident;\nbrother includes half-brother and step-brother;\nchild includes son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter, step-son and step-daughter;\nconsequential mental harm means mental harm that is a consequence of bodily injury to the person suffering the mental harm;\nConsumer Price Index means the Consumer Price Index (all groups index for Adelaide) published by the Australian Statistician under the Census and Statistics Act 1905 (Cwth);\ncontributory negligence means a failure by a person who suffers harm to exercise reasonable care and skill for his or her own protection or for the protection of his or her own interests;\ndamages means compensation or damages for harm and includes solatium but does not include—\n\t(a)\tworkers compensation; or\n\t(b)\tcompensation under a statutory scheme for compensating victims of crime;\ndomestic partner, in relation to any cause of action arising under this Act, means—\n\t(a)\ta person declared under the Family Relationships Act 1975 to have been a domestic partner on the day on which the cause of action arose; or\n\t(b)\ta person who was in a registered relationship on the day on which the cause of action arose;\ndrive includes ride, and driver and rider have corresponding meanings;\nduty of care means a duty to take reasonable care or to exercise reasonable skill (or both);\nharm includes loss of life, personal injury, damage to property, economic loss and loss of any other kind;\nhealth care service includes—\n\t(a)\ta diagnostic service;\n\t(b)\ta therapeutic service;\n\t(c)\tany other service directed at maintaining or restoring health;\nintoxicated—a person is intoxicated if under the influence of alcohol or a drug to the extent that the person's capacity to exercise due care and skill is impaired;\nmedical expenses includes—\n\t(a)\tthe fees of medical practitioners and other professional medical advisers and therapists; and\n\t(b)\tthe cost of hospitalisation; and\n\t(c)\tthe cost of medicines and therapeutic appliances;\nmental harm means impairment of a person's mental condition;\nmotor accident means an incident in which personal injury is caused by or arises out of the use of a motor vehicle;\nmotor vehicle means—\n\t(a)\ta motor vehicle as defined in the Motor Vehicles Act 1959; or\n\t(b)\ta vehicle operated on a railway, tramway or other fixed track or path by—\n\t(i)\ta person who holds a contract, licence or authority under the Passenger Transport Act 1994; or\n\t(ii)\ta person who holds an accreditation under the Rail Safety Act 1996;\nMVA motor accident means a motor accident where the motor vehicle is a motor vehicle as defined in the Motor Vehicles Act 1959;\nnegligence means failure to exercise reasonable care and skill, and includes a breach of a tortious, contractual or statutory duty of care;\nnon-economic loss means—\n\t(a)\tpain and suffering; or\n\t(b)\tloss of amenities of life; or\n\t(c)\tloss of expectation of life; or\n\t(d)\tdisfigurement;\nobvious risk—see section 36;\nparent includes father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, step-father and step-mother;\npassenger compartment of a motor vehicle means a part of the vehicle designed for the carriage of passengers;\npersonal injury or injury means bodily injury and includes—\n\t(a)\tmental harm;\n\t(b)\tdeath;\nprecaution includes any action to avoid or reduce the risk of harm;\nprescribed discount rate means—\n\t(a)\tif no percentage is fixed by regulation for the purposes of this definition—5 per cent; or\n\t(b)\tif such a percentage is fixed by regulation—the percentage so fixed;\nprescribed maximum means—\n\t(a)\tin relation to an injury arising from an accident that occurred during 2002—$2.2 million; or\n\t(b)\tin relation to an injury arising from an accident that occurred in a subsequent calendar year—a sum (calculated to the nearest multiple of $10) that bears to $2.2 million the same proportion as the Consumer Price Index for the September quarter of the preceding year bears to the Consumer Price Index for the September quarter 2001;\nprescribed minimum means—\n\t(a)\tin relation to an injury arising from an accident that occurred during 2002—$2 750; or\n\t(b)\tin relation to an injury arising from an accident that occurred in a subsequent calendar year—a sum (calculated to the nearest multiple of $10) that bears to $2 750 the same proportion as the Consumer Price Index for the September quarter of the preceding year bears to the Consumer Price Index for the September quarter 2001;\npure mental harm means mental harm other than consequential mental harm;\nregistered relationship means a relationship that is registered under the Relationships Register Act 2016, and includes a corresponding law registered relationship under that Act;\nsister includes half-sister and step-sister;\nspouse, in relation to any cause of action arising under this Act, means a person who was legally married to another on the day on which the cause of action arose;\nState average weekly earnings means the amount determined in accordance with the regulations by reference to publications of the Australian Statistician.\n\t(2)\tFor the purposes of this Act, personal injury will arise from a motor accident if the personal injury is caused by or arises out of the use of a motor vehicle.\n4—Application of Act\n\t(1)\tThis Act is intended to apply to the exclusion of inconsistent laws of any other place to the determination of liability and the assessment of damages for harm arising from an accident occurring in this State. \n\t(2)\tSubsection (1) is intended to extend, and not to limit in any way, the application of this Act in accordance with its terms. \n\t(4)\tThis Act does not affect a right to compensation under Part 4 of the Return to Work Act 2014.\n","sortOrder":0},{"sectionNumber":"Part 3","sectionType":"part","heading":"Liability for animals","content":"Part 3—Liability for animals\n18—Liability for animals\n\t(1)\tSubject to this section, liability for injury, damage or loss caused by an animal shall be determined in accordance with the principles of the law of negligence.\n\t(2)\tIn determining the standard of care to be exercised in relation to the keeping, management and control of an animal, a court shall take into account—\n\t(a)\tthe nature and disposition of the animal (which shall be determined according to the facts of the particular case and not according to any legal categorisation); and\n\t(b)\tany other relevant matters.\n\t(3)\tIt is not necessary for a person seeking damages for injury, damage or loss caused by an animal to establish prior knowledge on the part of any other person of a vicious, dangerous or mischievous propensity of the animal.\n\t(4)\tIn any proceedings relating to injury, damage or loss caused by an animal, it shall not be a circumstance of excuse, mitigation or justification that the injury, damage or loss was caused by reason of the animal straying onto a public street or road.\n\t(5)\tIn an action arising from injury, damage or loss caused by an animal to an employee, it shall not be presumed that the employee voluntarily assumed risks attendant upon his employment that may have arisen from working in proximity to animals.\n\t(6)\tA court in determining whether a reasonable standard of care was exercised in a particular case shall take into account measures taken—\n\t(a)\tfor the custody and control of the animal; and\n\t(b)\tto warn against any vicious, dangerous or mischievous propensity that it might exhibit.\n\t(7)\tNotwithstanding subsection (6), the fact that in a particular case no measures were taken for the custody and control of an animal, or to warn against any vicious, dangerous or mischievous propensity that it might exhibit, does not necessarily show that a reasonable standard of care was not exercised.\n\t(8)\tWhere a person incites, or knowingly permits, an animal to cause injury, damage or loss to another, he shall be liable in trespass for that injury, damage or loss.\n\t(9)\tSubject to subsection (10), this section operates to the exclusion of any other principles upon which liability for injury, damage or loss caused by an animal would, but for this subsection, be determined in tort.\n\t(10)\tThis section—\n\t(a)\tdoes not affect an action in nuisance where an animal is the cause of, or involved in, the nuisance; and\n\t(b)\tdoes not derogate from any other statutory right or remedy; and\n\t(c)\tdoes not affect any cause of action that arose before the commencement of the Wrongs Act Amendment Act 1983.\n","sortOrder":1},{"sectionNumber":"Part 4","sectionType":"part","heading":"Occupiers liability","content":"Part 4—Occupiers liability\n19—Interpretation\nIn this Part, unless the contrary intention appears—\ndangerous includes unsafe;\nlandlord includes a landlord under a statutory tenancy;\noccupier of premises means a person in occupation or control of the premises, and includes a landlord;\npremises means—\n\t(a)\tland; or\n\t(b)\ta building or structure (including a moveable building or structure); or\n\t(c)\ta vehicle (including an aircraft or a ship, boat or vessel).\n20—Occupier's duty of care\n\t(1)\tSubject to this Part, the liability of the occupier of premises for injury, damage or loss attributable to the dangerous state or condition of the premises shall be determined in accordance with the principles of the law of negligence.\n\t(2)\tIn determining the standard of care to be exercised by the occupier of premises, a court shall take into account—\n\t(a)\tthe nature and extent of the premises; and\n\t(b)\tthe nature and extent of the danger arising from the state or condition of the premises; and\n\t(c)\tthe circumstances in which the person alleged to have suffered injury, damage or loss, or the property of that person, became exposed to that danger; and\n\t(d)\tthe age of the person alleged to have suffered injury, damage or loss, and the ability of that person to appreciate the danger; and\n\t(e)\tthe extent (if at all) to which the occupier was aware, or ought to have been aware, of—\n\t(i)\tthe danger; and\n\t(ii)\tthe entry of persons onto the premises; and\n\t(f)\tthe measures (if any) taken to eliminate, reduce or warn against the danger; and\n\t(g)\tthe extent (if at all) to which it would have been reasonable and practicable for the occupier to take measures to eliminate, reduce or warn against the danger; and\n\t(h)\tany other matter that the court thinks relevant.\n\t(3)\tThe fact that an occupier has not taken any measures to eliminate, reduce or warn against a danger arising from the state or condition of premises does not necessarily show that the occupier has failed to exercise a reasonable standard of care.\n\t(4)\tSubject to any Act or law to the contrary, an occupier's duty of care may be reduced or excluded by contract but no contractual reduction or exclusion of the duty affects the rights of any person who is a stranger to the contract.\n\t(5)\tWhere an occupier is, by contract or by reason of some other Act or law, subject to a higher standard of care than would be applicable apart from this subsection, the question of whether the occupier is liable for injury, damage or loss shall be determined by reference to that higher standard of care.\n\t(6)\tAn occupier owes no duty of care to a trespasser unless—\n\t(a)\tthe presence of trespassers on the premises, and their consequent exposure to danger, were reasonably foreseeable; and\n\t(b)\tthe nature or extent of the danger was such that measures which were not in fact taken should have been taken for their protection.\n21—Landlord's liability limited to breach of duty to repair\nThe liability under this Part of a landlord who is not in occupation of premises is limited to injury, damage or loss arising from—\n\t(a)\tan act or omission on the part of the landlord in carrying out an obligation to maintain or repair the premises; or\n\t(b)\ta failure on the part of the landlord to carry out an obligation to maintain or repair the premises.\n22—Exclusion of conflicting common law principles\n\t(1)\tSubject to subsection (2), this Part operates to the exclusion of any other principles on which liability for injury, damage or loss attributable to the state or condition of premises would, but for this Part, be determined in tort.\n\t(2)\tThis Part does not apply to a case where an occupier causes a dangerous state or condition of premises, or allows premises to fall into a dangerous state or condition, intending to cause injury, damage or loss to another.\n","sortOrder":2},{"sectionNumber":"Part 5","sectionType":"part","heading":"Wrongful acts or neglect causing death","content":"Part 5—Wrongful acts or neglect causing death\n23—Liability for death caused wrongfully\nWhenever the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death was caused under such circumstances as amount in law to an indictable offence.\n24—How to bring action etc\n\t(1)\tEvery such action shall be for the benefit of the spouse, domestic partner, parent, brother, sister and child of the person whose death has been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor or administrator of the person deceased.\n\t(2)\tIn every such action, the court may, subject to this Act, give such damages as it thinks proportioned to the harm resulting from the death to the parties respectively for whom and for whose benefit the action is brought.\n\t(2a)\tIn any such action in respect of the death of any person after the passing of the Wrongs Act Amendment Act 1939 damages may be awarded in respect of any medical expenses incurred as a result of the injury causing the death and the funeral expenses of the deceased person if such expenses have been incurred by the parties for whose benefit the action is brought.\n\t(2aa)\tIn assessing damages under this section in any action based on a death occurring after the passing of the Wrongs Act Amendment Act 1956 there shall not be taken into account—\n\t(a)\tany sum paid or payable on the death of the deceased under any contract of assurance or insurance, whether made before or after the passing of the said Act;\n\t(b)\tany sum paid or payable consequent on the death of the deceased person as a gratuity to any person for whose benefit the action is brought;\n\t(c)\tany superannuation payments or benefits consequent upon the death of the deceased person;\n\t(d)\tany sum paid or payable consequent upon the death of the deceased person under any contributory medical hospital death or funeral benefit scheme;\n\t(e)\tany sum paid or payable as a social service benefit or pension by the Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia, or the United Kingdom, or the State of South Australia to or in respect of any person for whose benefit the action is brought;\n\t(f)\tany sum recovered or recoverable for the benefit of the estate of the deceased under section 3(2) of the Survival of Causes of Action Act 1940 (which permits the recovery of damages for certain kinds of non-economic loss where the deceased dies of a dust-related condition).\n\t(3)\tThe amount so recovered, after deducting the costs not recovered from the defendant, shall be divided amongst the before-mentioned parties in such shares as the court finds and directs.\n\t(4)\tWhere a deceased person is survived by a spouse and a domestic partner, the action shall, subject to this section, be brought for the benefit of both.\n\t(5)\tAn action need not be brought under this section for the benefit of a person who has, by notice in writing served upon the executor or administrator of the deceased, renounced the benefit of this section.\n\t(6)\tWhere the court considers it appropriate that any person for whose benefit an action lies under this section should present an independent claim for the benefit of an action under this section, it may permit or require that person to appear or be represented in the proceedings in all respects as if he were a separate party to the proceedings.\n\t(7)\tNo action lies against the executor or administrator for failing to bring an action for the benefit of a domestic partner if he brings the action without notice of the claim of the domestic partner under this section, but the interest of any such domestic partner in the action shall be recognised by the court if application for recognition is made to the court before the proceedings are finally determined.\n25—Restriction of actions and time of commencement\nNot more than one action shall lie under this Part for and in respect of the same subject matter of complaint; and every such action shall be commenced within three years after the death of the deceased person.\n26—Particulars of person for whom damages claimed\nIn every such action the plaintiff shall be required to deliver to the defendant or his solicitor, full particulars of the person or persons for whom and on whose behalf the action is brought, and of the nature of the claim in respect of which damages are sought to be recovered.\n27—Provision where no executor or administrator or action not commenced within 6 months\n\t(1)\tIn any case falling under section 23, if there is no executor or administrator of the deceased person or, there being such an executor or administrator, no action is commenced under this Part within six months after the death of the deceased person, then an action may be brought by and in the name or names of the person or all or any of the persons for whose benefit an action could have been brought under this Part by an executor or administrator of the deceased person.\n\t(2)\tEvery action brought under this section shall be for the benefit of the same persons and shall be subject to the same regulations and procedure as nearly as may be as if brought by or in the name of an executor or administrator of the deceased person.\n28—Liability to parents of person wrongfully killed\n\t(1)\tWhenever the death of an infant is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the infant to maintain an action to recover damages, the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to pay to the surviving parents or parent of the child such sum—\n\t(a)\twhere the death occurred before the commencement of the Wrongs Act Amendment Act 1974—not exceeding one thousand dollars; or\n\t(b)\twhere the death occurred after the commencement of the Wrongs Act Amendment Act 1974—not exceeding $10 000,\nas the court thinks just by way of solatium for the suffering caused to the parents or parent by the death of the child.\n\t(2)\tWhere both parents bring an action to recover any sum of money payable under this section, the amount recovered after deducting the costs not recovered from the defendant, shall be divided between the parents in such shares as the court directs.\n\t(3)\tWhere both parents survive the child and either of them does not join in bringing an action under this section, the other may bring an action for such amount as he claims to be due to him or her.\nparent means the father or mother of a child.\n29—Liability to surviving spouse or domestic partner of person wrongfully killed\n\t(1)\tWhenever the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled that person to maintain an action to recover damages, the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to pay to the surviving spouse or domestic partner of the deceased person such sum—\n\t(a)\twhere the death occurred before the commencement of the Wrongs Act Amendment Act 1974—not exceeding one thousand four hundred dollars; or\n\t(b)\twhere the death occurred after the commencement of the Wrongs Act Amendment Act 1974—not exceeding $10 000,\nas the court thinks just by way of solatium for the suffering caused to the spouse or domestic partner by that death.\n\t(2)\tWhere the deceased person is survived by a spouse and a domestic partner, they may both claim solatium under this section, but the total amount awarded by way of solatium in any such case shall not exceed the amount that could have been awarded if the deceased had been survived by a single spouse or domestic partner.\n\t(3)\tWhere, in any proceedings under this section, a spouse and a domestic partner both claim solatium under this section, any solatium awarded by the court shall be apportioned between the claimants in such manner as the court thinks just.\n\t(4)\tIn proceedings for solatium by a spouse, it is not necessary for the court to inquire if the deceased was also survived by a domestic partner (but a domestic partner may, at any time before the proceedings are finally determined, apply to the court to be joined as a party to the proceedings).\n30—Further provisions as to solatium etc\n\t(1)\tThe rights conferred by sections 28 and 29 shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any rights conferred on the parent, spouse or domestic partner by any other provision of this Act.\n\t(2)\tIn an action brought to enforce any right given under section 28 or 29 the court may in its discretion refuse to order the payment of any sum by way of solatium if, having regard to the conduct of the plaintiff in relation to the deceased person, or to the relations which existed between the plaintiff and the deceased person, or for any other sufficient reason, it considers that no such payment should be made.\n\t(3)\tAny cause of action conferred on any person by section 28 or 29 shall not, on the death of that person, survive for the benefit of his estate.\n\t(4)\tA cause of action conferred on a person by section 28 or 29 is exercisable notwithstanding that the death of the person injured by the wrongful act, neglect or default was caused in circumstances which in law amount to an indictable offence.\n","sortOrder":3},{"sectionNumber":"Part 6","sectionType":"part","heading":"Negligence","content":"Part 6—Negligence\n","sortOrder":4},{"sectionNumber":"Div 1","sectionType":"division","heading":"Duty of care","content":"Division 1—Duty of care\n31—Standard of care\n\t(1)\tFor determining whether a person (the defendant) was negligent, the standard of care required of the defendant is that of a reasonable person in the defendant's position who was in possession of all information that the defendant either had, or ought reasonably to have had, at the time of the incident out of which the harm arose.\n\t(2)\tThe reasonable person in the defendant's position will be taken to be sober unless—\n\t(a)\tthe defendant was intoxicated; and\n\t(b)\tthe intoxication was wholly attributable to the use of drugs in accordance with the prescription or instructions of a medical practitioner; and\n\t(c)\tthe defendant was complying with the instructions and recommendations of the medical practitioner and the manufacturer of the drugs as to what he or she should do, or avoid doing, while under the influence of the drugs,\nand, in that event, the reasonable person will be taken to be intoxicated to the same extent as the defendant.\n32—Precautions against risk\n\t(1)\tA person is not negligent in failing to take precautions against a risk of harm unless—\n\t(a)\tthe risk was foreseeable (that is, it is a risk of which the person knew or ought to have known); and\n\t(b)\tthe risk was not insignificant; and\n\t(c)\tin the circumstances, a reasonable person in the person's position would have taken those precautions.\n\t(2)\tIn determining whether a reasonable person would have taken precautions against a risk of harm, the court is to consider the following (amongst other relevant things):\n\t(a)\tthe probability that the harm would occur if precautions were not taken;\n\t(b)\tthe likely seriousness of the harm;\n\t(c)\tthe burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of harm;\n\t(d)\tthe social utility of the activity that creates the risk of harm.\n33—Mental harm—duty of care\n\t(1)\tA person (the defendant) does not owe a duty to another person (the plaintiff ) to take care not to cause the plaintiff mental harm unless a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have foreseen that a person of normal fortitude in the plaintiff's position might, in the circumstances of the case, suffer a psychiatric illness.\n\t(2)\tFor the purposes of this section—\n\t(a)\tin a case of pure mental harm, the circumstances of the case to which the court is to have regard include the following:\n\t(i)\twhether or not the mental harm was suffered as the result of a sudden shock;\n\t(ii)\twhether the plaintiff witnessed, at the scene, a person being killed, injured or put in peril;\n\t(iii)\tthe nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and any person killed, injured or put in peril;\n\t(iv)\twhether or not there was a pre-existing relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant;\n\t(b)\tin a case of consequential mental harm, the circumstances of the case include the nature of the bodily injury out of which the mental harm arose.\n\t(3)\tThis section does not affect the duty of care of a person (the defendant) to another (the plaintiff) if the defendant knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the plaintiff is a person of less than normal fortitude.\n","sortOrder":5},{"sectionNumber":"Div 2","sectionType":"division","heading":"Causation","content":"Division 2—Causation\n34—General principles\n\t(1)\tA determination that negligence caused particular harm comprises the following elements:\n\t(a)\tthat the negligence was a necessary condition of the occurrence of the harm (factual causation); and\n\t(b)\tthat it is appropriate for the scope of the negligent person's liability to extend to the harm so caused (scope of liability).\n\t(2)\tWhere, however, a person (the plaintiff) has been negligently exposed to a similar risk of harm by a number of different persons (the defendants) and it is not possible to assign responsibility for causing the harm to any one or more of them—\n\t(a)\tthe court may continue to apply the principle under which responsibility may be assigned to the defendants for causing the harm1; but\n\t(b)\tthe court should consider the position of each defendant individually and state the reasons for bringing the defendant within the scope of liability.\n\t(3)\tFor the purpose of determining the scope of liability, the court is to consider (amongst other relevant things) whether or not and why responsibility for the harm should be imposed on the negligent party.\nNote—\n","sortOrder":6},{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"See Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd  [2002] 3 WLR 89.","content":"1\tSee Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd  [2002] 3 WLR 89.\n35—Burden of proof\nIn determining liability for negligence, the plaintiff always bears the burden of proving, on the balance of probabilities, any fact relevant to the issue of causation.\n","sortOrder":7},{"sectionNumber":"Div 3","sectionType":"division","heading":"Assumption of risk","content":"Division 3—Assumption of risk\n36—Meaning of obvious risk\n\t(1)\tFor the purposes of this Division, an obvious risk to a person who suffers harm is a risk that, in the circumstances, would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the position of that person.\n\t(2)\tObvious risks include risks that are patent or matters of common knowledge.\n\t(3)\tA risk may be obvious even though it is of low probability.\n37—Injured persons presumed to be aware of obvious risks\n\t(1)\tIf, in an action for damages for negligence, a defence of voluntary assumption of risk (volenti non fit injuria) is raised by the defendant and the risk is an obvious risk, the plaintiff is taken to have been aware of the risk unless the plaintiff proves, on the balance of probabilities, that he or she was not actually aware of the risk.\n\t(2)\tFor the purposes of this section, a person is aware of a risk if the person is aware of the type or kind of risk, even if the person is not aware of the precise nature, extent or manner of occurrence of the risk.\n\t(3)\tHowever, in order to establish a defence of voluntary assumption of risk, it is necessary to establish that the risk was such that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would have taken steps (which the plaintiff did not in fact take) to avoid it.\n38—No duty to warn of obvious risk\n\t(1)\tA person (the defendant) does not owe a duty of care to another person (the plaintiff) to warn of an obvious risk to the plaintiff.\n\t(2)\tSubsection (1) does not apply if—\n\t(a)\tthe plaintiff has requested advice or information about the risk from the defendant; or\n\t(b)\tthe defendant is required to warn the plaintiff of the risk by a written law; or\n\t(c)\tthe risk is a risk of death or of personal injury to the plaintiff from the provision of a health care service by the defendant.\n\t(3)\tSubsection (2) does not give rise to a presumption of a duty to warn of a risk in the circumstances referred to in that subsection.\n39—No liability for materialisation of inherent risk\n\t(1)\tA person is not liable in negligence for harm suffered by another person as a result of the materialisation of an inherent risk.\n\t(2)\tAn inherent risk is a risk of something occurring that cannot be avoided by the exercise of reasonable care and skill.\n\t(3)\tThis section does not operate to exclude liability in connection with a duty to warn of a risk.\n","sortOrder":8},{"sectionNumber":"Div 4","sectionType":"division","heading":"Negligence on the part of persons professing to have a particular skill","content":"Division 4—Negligence on the part of persons professing to have a particular skill\n40—Standard of care to be expected of persons professing to have a particular skill\nIn a case involving an allegation of negligence against a person (the defendant) who holds himself or herself out as possessing a particular skill, the standard to be applied by a court in determining whether the defendant acted with due care and skill is, subject to this Division, to be determined by reference to—\n\t(a)\twhat could reasonably be expected of a person professing that skill; and\n\t(b)\tthe relevant circumstances as at the date of the alleged negligence and not a later date.\n41—Standard of care for professionals\n\t(1)\tA person who provides a professional service incurs no liability in negligence arising from the service if it is established that the provider acted in a manner that (at the time the service was provided) was widely accepted in Australia by members of the same profession as competent professional practice.\n\t(2)\tHowever, professional opinion cannot be relied on for the purposes of this section if the court considers that the opinion is irrational.\n\t(3)\tThe fact that there are differing professional opinions widely accepted in Australia by members of the same profession does not prevent any one or more (or all) of those opinions being relied on for the purposes of this section.\n\t(4)\tProfessional opinion does not have to be universally accepted to be considered widely accepted.\n\t(5)\tThis section does not apply to liability arising in connection with the giving of (or the failure to give) a warning, advice or other information in respect of a risk of death of or injury associated with the provision of a health care service.\n","sortOrder":9},{"sectionNumber":"Div 5","sectionType":"division","heading":"Liability of road authorities","content":"Division 5—Liability of road authorities\n42—Liability of road authorities\n\t(1)\tA road authority is not liable in tort for a failure—\n\t(a)\tto maintain, repair or renew a road; or\n\t(b)\tto take other action to avoid or reduce the risk of harm that results from a failure to maintain, repair or renew a road.\n\t(2)\tIn this section—\nroad means a street, road or thoroughfare to which public access is available to vehicles or pedestrians (or both), and includes—\n\t(a)\ta bridge, viaduct, busway (including the O-Bahn) or subway;\n\t(b)\tan alley, laneway or walkway;\n\t(c)\ta carpark;\n\t(d)\ta footpath;\n\t(e)\ta structure associated with a road;\nroad authority means—\n\t(a)\ta body or person in which the ownership of a road is vested by statute, or to which the care, control and management of a road is assigned by statute; or\n\t(b)\tif the road is on land of the Crown—the Crown or the Minister responsible for the care, control and management of the land; or\n\t(c)\tany other public authority or public body that is in fact responsible for the care, control and management of a road;\nvehicle includes—\n\t(a)\ta motor vehicle;\n\t(b)\ta bicycle;\n\t(c)\tan animal that is being ridden;\n\t(d)\tan animal that is being used to draw a vehicle,\nbut does not include a tram or other vehicle (except an O-Bahn bus) that is driven on a fixed track.\n","sortOrder":10},{"sectionNumber":"Div 6","sectionType":"division","heading":"Exclusion of liability for criminal conduct","content":"Division 6—Exclusion of liability for criminal conduct\n43—Exclusion of liability for criminal conduct\n\t(1)\tLiability for damages is excluded if the court—\n\t(a)\tis satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accident occurred while the injured person was engaged in conduct constituting an indictable offence; and\n\t(b)\tis satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the injured person's conduct contributed materially to the risk of injury.\n\t(2)\tHowever, the court may award damages despite this exclusionary principle if satisfied that—\n\t(a)\tthe circumstances of the particular case are exceptional; and\n\t(b)\tthe principle would, in the circumstances of the particular case, operate harshly and unjustly.\n\t(3)\tFor the purposes of subsection (1)(a), a relevant conviction or acquittal is to be accepted as conclusive evidence of guilt or innocence of the offence to which it relates.\n\t(4)\tThis section—\n\t(a)\tapplies where damages are claimed for personal injury—\n\t(i)\tarising from a motor accident (whether caused intentionally or unintentionally); or\n\t(ii)\tarising from an accident caused wholly or in part—\n\t(A)\tby negligence; or\n\t(B)\tby some other unintentional tort on the part of a person other than the injured person; or\n\t(C)\tby breach of a contractual duty of care; and\n\t(b)\tif an injured person dies as a result of injury arising in the manner described in paragraph (a)—applies where damages for harm resulting from the death are claimed under Part 5; and\n\t(c)\tdoes not affect the operation of a rule of law relating to joint illegal enterprises.\n","sortOrder":11},{"sectionNumber":"Part 7","sectionType":"part","heading":"Contributory negligence","content":"Part 7—Contributory negligence\n44—Standard of contributory negligence\n\t(1)\tThe principles that are applicable in determining whether a person has been negligent also apply in determining whether a person who suffered harm (the plaintiff) has been contributorily negligent.\n\t(2)\tThis section is not to derogate from any provision of this Act for reduction of damages on account of contributory negligence.\n45—Contributory negligence in cases brought on behalf of dependants of deceased person\nIn a claim for damages brought on behalf of the dependants of a deceased person, the court is to have regard to any contributory negligence on the part of the deceased person.\n46—Presumption of contributory negligence where injured person intoxicated\n\t(1)\tIf the injured person was intoxicated at the time of the accident, and contributory negligence is alleged by the defendant, contributory negligence will, subject to this section, be presumed.\n\t(2)\tThe injured person may, however, rebut the presumption by establishing on the balance of probabilities—\n\t(a)\tthat the intoxication did not contribute to the accident; or\n\t(b)\tthat the intoxication was not self-induced; or\n\t(c)\t—\n\t(i)\tthe intoxication is wholly attributable to the use of drugs in accordance with the prescription or instructions of a medical practitioner; and\n\t(ii)\tthe injured person was complying with the instructions and recommendations of the medical practitioner and the manufacturer of the drugs as to what he or she should do, or avoid doing, while under the influence of the drugs.\n\t(3)\tUnless the presumption of contributory negligence is rebutted, the court must assess damages on the basis that the damages to which the injured person would be entitled in the absence of contributory negligence are to be reduced, on account of contributory negligence, by 25 per cent or a greater percentage determined by the court to be appropriate in the circumstances of the case.\n\t(4)\tIf, in the case of a motor accident, the injured person was the driver of a motor vehicle involved in the accident and the evidence establishes—\n\t(a)\tthat the concentration of alcohol in the injured person's blood was .15 grams or more in 100 millilitres of blood; or\n\t(b)\tthat the driver was so much under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a drug as to be incapable of exercising effective control of the vehicle,\nthe minimum reduction prescribed by subsection (3) is to be increased to 50 per cent.\n47—Presumption of contributory negligence where injured person relies on care and skill of person known to be intoxicated\n\t(1)\tIf—\n\t(a)\tthe injured person—\n\t(i)\twas of or above the age of 16 years at the time of the accident; and\n\t(ii)\trelied on the care and skill of a person who was intoxicated at the time of the accident; and\n\t(iii)\twas aware, or ought to have been aware, that the other person was intoxicated; and\n\t(b)\tthe accident was caused through the negligence of the other person; and\n\t(c)\tthe defendant alleges contributory negligence on the part of the injured person,\ncontributory negligence will, subject to this section, be presumed.\n\t(2)\tSubject to the following exception, the presumption is irrebuttable.\nException—\nThe injured person may rebut the presumption by establishing, on the balance of probabilities, that—\n\t(a)\tthe intoxication did not contribute to the accident; or\n\t(b)\tthe injured person could not reasonably be expected to have avoided the risk.\n\t(3)\tIn a case in which contributory negligence is to be presumed under this section, the court must apply a fixed statutory reduction of 25 per cent in the assessment of damages.\n\t(4)\tA passenger in a motor vehicle is taken, for the purposes of this section, to rely on the care and skill of the driver.\n\t(5)\tIf, in the case of a motor accident, the evidence establishes—\n\t(a)\tthat the concentration of alcohol in the driver's blood was .15 grams or more in 100 millilitres of blood; or\n\t(b)\tthat the driver was so much under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a drug as to be incapable of exercising effective control of the vehicle,\nthe fixed statutory reduction prescribed by subsection (3) is increased to 50 per cent.\n\t(6)\tThis section operates to the exclusion of the defence of volenti non fit injuria insofar as it relates to the voluntary assumption of a risk arising from the intoxication of another.\n48—Evidentiary provision relating to intoxication\n\t(1)\tA finding by a court that there was present in the blood of a person, at or about the time of an accident, a concentration of alcohol of .08 or more grams in 100 millilitres of blood is to be accepted, for the purposes of this Part, as conclusive evidence of the facts so found and that the person was intoxicated at the time of the accident.\n\t(2)\tA finding by a court that a person was at or about the time of an accident so much under the influence of alcohol or a drug as to be unable to exercise effective control of a motor vehicle is to be accepted, for the purposes of this Part, as conclusive evidence that the person was, at the time of the accident, so much under the influence of alcohol or a drug as to be unable to exercise effective control of the motor vehicle.\n49—Non-wearing of seatbelt etc\n\t(1)\tIf the injured person was injured in a motor accident, was of or above the age of 16 years at the time of the accident and—\n\t(a)\tthe injured person was not, at the time of the accident, wearing a seatbelt as required under the Road Traffic Act 1961; or\n\t(b)\tone of the following factors contributed to the accident or the extent of the injury:\n\t(i)\tthe injured person was not wearing a safety helmet as required under the Road Traffic Act 1961;\n\t(ii)\tthe injured person was a passenger in or on a motor vehicle with a passenger compartment but was not in the passenger compartment at the time of the accident,\ncontributory negligence will, subject to this section, be presumed.\n\t(2)\tSubject to the following exception, the presumption is irrebuttable.\nException—\nIn the case mentioned in subsection (1)(b)(ii)—the injured person may rebut the presumption by establishing, on the balance of probabilities, that the injured person could not reasonably be expected to have avoided the risk.\n\t(3)\tIn a case in which contributory negligence is to be presumed under this section, the court must apply a fixed statutory reduction of 25 per cent in the assessment of damages.\n50—How case is dealt with where damages are liable to reduction on account of contributory negligence\n\t(1)\tIf damages are liable to reduction on account of actual or presumed contributory negligence, the court is to proceed in accordance with this section.\n\t(2)\tFirst, the court is to assess the damages to which the injured person would be entitled if there were no reduction for contributory negligence.\n\t(3)\tSecondly, the court is to—\n\t(a)\tdetermine the extent of the injured person's contributory negligence, leaving out of the account factors for which a fixed statutory reduction is prescribed by this Part but taking into account the injured person's intoxication (if relevant) and factors that would, apart from this Part, amount to contributory negligence; and\n\t(b)\tdetermine a percentage reduction to be made on account of these forms of contributory negligence (which cannot be less in a case involving intoxication than the relevant minimum prescribed by this Part); and\n\t(c)\tthen reduce the amount assessed under subsection (2) by the percentage determined under this subsection.\n\t(4)\tThirdly, the court is to apply any applicable fixed statutory reduction to the amount assessed under subsection (2) and reduced, if required, under subsection (3), and, if 2 or more fixed statutory reductions are required, the court is to make them in series.\nSuppose that an amount of $100 000 is subject to 2 fixed statutory reductions of 25 per cent. In this case, the amount is first reduced to $75 000 and then reduced to $56 250.\n\t(5)\tThere is no necessary correlation between a finding of contributory negligence in relation to a cause of action under this Part and an apportionment of liability in relation to a different cause of action arising from the same facts.\nSuppose that A and B are both drivers of motor vehicles that come into collision as a result of the negligence of both with resultant personal injuries to each other and also to C, a passenger in B's vehicle. Suppose that B's damages are reduced by 60 per cent under this Part as a result of actual or presumptive contributory negligence causally related to the occurrence of the accident. This is not to imply that, in A's action against B, no reduction beyond 40 per cent can be made on a similar basis. In C's action against A and B, responsibility will be apportioned between A and B without regard to the provisions of this Part.\n","sortOrder":12},{"sectionNumber":"Part 7A","sectionType":"part","heading":"Child abuse—liability of institutions","content":"Part 7A—Child abuse—liability of institutions\nDivision 1—Preliminary\n50A—Interpretation\n\t(1)\tIn this Part—\nabuse, of a child, includes any of the following:\n\t(a)\tsexual abuse of the child;\n\t(b)\tserious physical abuse of the child;\n\t(c)\tpsychological abuse of the child related to sexual abuse or serious physical abuse of the child;\nabuse claim means a claim arising from the abuse of a child by a person associated with an institution while the child was under the care, supervision, control or authority of the institution;\nakin to an employee—see subsections (2) and (3);\nassociated trust, of an institution—see section 50B;\nassociated with, an institution—see section 50C;\nchild means a person under 18 years of age;\ncurrent office holder—see section 50I;\ndesignated carer means a person in whose care a child is placed under the Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017 but excludes a person who provides care at or on behalf of—\n\t(a)\ta children's residential facility (within the meaning of the Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017); or\n\t(b)\ta residential facility established or licensed under the Family and Community Services Act 1972; or\n\t(c)\tany other facility that provides non‑family based care to children or young people;\nemployee, of an institution, includes a person who is akin to an employee of the institution;\nfunction includes a power, authority or duty;\nhead, of an institution, means the person who—\n\t(a)\tis acknowledged by the institution as its head; or\n\t(b)\tif paragraph (a) does not apply—has overall responsibility for the institution;\ninstitution—\n\t(a)\tmeans an entity (whether private or public) that is responsible for a child and provides an activity, program or service of a kind that gives an opportunity for a person to have contact with a child; and\n\t(b)\tdoes not include a family;\nnominee, for an institution, means a person who is the institution's nominee because of a nomination or court order under section 50J;\noffice of authority, in an institution, includes—\n\t(a)\ta position as a member of a management committee of the institution; and\n\t(b)\ta position in which the holder is concerned with, or takes part in, the management of the institution.\n\t(2)\tFor the purposes of the definition of employee, a person is akin to an employee of an institution if the person carries out activities as an integral part of the activities carried on by the institution and does so for the benefit of the institution, but a person is not akin to an employee if—\n\t(a)\tthe activities are carried out for a recognisably independent business of the person or of another person or institution; or\n\t(b)\tthe activities carried on by the person are the activities of a designated carer carried on in the person's capacity as a designated carer.\n\t(3)\tThe regulations may, despite subsection (2), prescribe circumstances in which a person will be akin to an employee or not akin to an employee.\n50B—Meaning of associated trust\n\t(1)\tFor the purposes of this Part, a trust is an associated trust of an institution if the institution uses the trust to carry out its functions or activities and—\n\t(a)\tthe institution has, directly or indirectly, any of the following powers:\n\t(i)\ta power to control the application of income of the trust or the distribution of property of the trust;\n\t(ii)\ta power to obtain the beneficial enjoyment of the property or income of the trust, with or without the consent of another entity;\n\t(iii)\ta power to appoint or remove a trustee or beneficiary of the trust;\n\t(iv)\ta power to determine the outcome of any other decision about the trust's operations; or\n\t(b)\ta member or manager of the institution has, under the trust deed for the trust, a power mentioned in paragraph (a); or\n\t(c)\ta trustee is accustomed to acting, or is under a formal or informal obligation to act, according to the directions, instructions or wishes of the institution or a member or manager of the institution.\n\t(2)\tA reference in Division 5 or Division 6 to an associated trust of an institution includes a trust in relation to which an order is in force under section 50J(5) (in relation to any abuse claim against the institution).\n50C—When persons are associated with institution\n\t(1)\tFor the purposes of this Part, the persons associated with an institution include—\n\t(a)\tan officer, office holder, representative, leader, owner, employee, agent, volunteer or contractor of the institution; and\n\t(b)\tfor an institution that is a religious organisation—a minister of religion, religious leader or member of the personnel of the organisation; and\n\t(c)\tif the institution has delegated the care, supervision, control or authority over a child to another entity (the delegate)—\n\t(i)\tif the delegate is an individual—the delegate; and\n\t(ii)\ta person who would be a person mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) if the delegate were the delegating institution; and\n\t(d)\ta designated carer (other than a designated carer who is the parent or guardian of the child (within the meaning of the Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017)); and\n\t(e)\ta person, or person of a class, prescribed by regulation.\n\t(2)\tA person is not associated with an institution only because the person is associated with an entity that is funded or regulated by the institution.\n50D—Application of Part\n\t(1)\tThis Part, other than Division 2 and Division 3, applies in relation to a cause of action whether it arose before or after the commencement of this Part.\n\t(2)\tThis Part binds the Crown not only in right of South Australia but also, so far as the legislative power of the Parliament permits, the Crown in all its other capacities.\nDivision 2—Duty of institutions to prevent child abuse\n50E—Duty to prevent child abuse\n\t(1)\tAn institution has a duty to take all reasonable steps to prevent the abuse of a child by a person associated with the institution while the child is under the care, supervision, control or authority of the institution.\n\t(2)\tSubsection (1) does not apply to abuse of a child by a person associated with an institution in circumstances wholly unrelated to that person's association with the institution.\n\t(3)\tIf an institution has delegated, by means of contract or otherwise, the care, supervision, control or authority over a child to whom the claim relates to another institution, subsection (1) does not apply to abuse of the child by a person associated with the delegate institution in circumstances wholly unrelated to that person's association with the delegator institution or the delegate institution.\n50F—Proof of whether duty was breached\n\t(1)\tThis section applies if a person associated with an institution abuses a child while the child is under the care, supervision, control or authority of the institution.\n\t(2)\tThe institution is taken to have breached its duty under section 50E unless the institution proves it took all reasonable steps to prevent the abuse.\n\t(3)\tIn deciding whether the institution took all reasonable steps to prevent the abuse, the matters that are relevant include—\n\t(a)\tthe nature of the institution; and\n\t(b)\tthe resources that were reasonably available to the institution; and\n\t(c)\tthe relationship between the institution and the child; and\n\t(d)\tthe position in which the institution placed the person in relation to the child, including the extent to which the position gave the person—\n\t(i)\tauthority, power or control over the child; or\n\t(ii)\tan ability to achieve intimacy with the child or gain the child's trust; and\n\t(e)\tthe probability that the abuse would occur if precautions against a risk of abuse were not taken; and\n\t(f)\tthe burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of abuse; and\n\t(g)\tthe social utility of the activity that creates the risk of abuse; and\n\t(h)\twhether the institution complied with any applicable standard (however described) in respect of child safety; and\n\t(i)\tany matter prescribed by the regulations; and\n\t(j)\tany other matter a court considers relevant.\nDivision 3—Vicarious liability of institutions\n50G—Institutions vicariously liable for abuse of child by employee\n\t(1)\tAn institution is vicariously liable for abuse of a child by an employee of the institution if—\n\t(a)\tthe apparent performance by the employee of a role in which the institution placed the employee supplies the occasion for the abuse of the child by the employee; and\n\t(b)\tthe employee takes advantage of that occasion to abuse the child; and\n\t(c)\tthe abuse occurred while the child was under the care, supervision, control or authority of the institution.\n\t(2)\tIn determining if the apparent performance by the employee of a role in which the institution placed the employee supplied the occasion for the abuse of a child, a court is to take into account whether the institution placed the employee in a position in which the employee has 1 or more of the following:\n\t(a)\tauthority, power or control over the child;\n\t(b)\tthe trust of the child;\n\t(c)\tthe ability to achieve intimacy with the child.\n\t(3)\tThis section does not affect, and is in addition to, the common law as it applies with respect to vicarious liability.\nDivision 4—Liability of particular institutions and office holders\n50H—Liability of incorporated institution that was unincorporated at time of abuse\n\t(1)\tThis section applies if—\n\t(a)\ta person (the claimant) suffered abuse as a child by a person associated with an institution (the associated person) while the claimant was under the care, supervision, control or authority of the institution; and\n\t(b)\tthe claimant has or had a cause of action against—\n\t(i)\ta person (the former office holder) who held an office of authority in the institution (the relevant office) when the cause of action accrued, founded on the former office holder's responsibility for the institution or for the associated person; or\n\t(ii)\tthe institution, in accordance with section 50J; and\n\t(c)\tthe institution was an unincorporated body when the cause of action accrued; and\n\t(d)\tthe institution is an incorporated body; and\n\t(e)\t—\n\t(i)\tif the cause of action is against the former office holder—the claimant is able to maintain proceedings on the cause of action, or would be able to maintain proceedings on the cause of action if the former office holder still held the relevant office; or\n\t(ii)\tif the cause of action is against the institution—the claimant is able to maintain proceedings on the cause of action, or would be able to maintain proceedings on the cause of action if the institution was still an unincorporated body.\n\t(2)\tA proceeding for the claimant's cause of action may be commenced or continued against the institution.\n\t(3)\tThe following apply for the purposes of a proceeding commenced or continued under subsection (2) if the cause of action is against the former office holder:\n\t(a)\tany liability that the former office holder has or would have had in relation to the cause of action is taken to be a liability of the institution;\n\t(b)\tanything done by the former office holder is taken to have been done by the institution;\n\t(c)\ta duty or obligation that the former office holder would have had in relation to the proceeding is a duty or obligation of the institution;\n\t(d)\tthe institution may rely on any defence or immunity that would have been available to the former office holder as a defendant in the proceeding;\n\t(e)\tany right of the former office holder to be indemnified (including under an insurance policy) in respect of damages awarded in an abuse claim extends to, and indemnifies, the institution.\n50I—Liability of current office holder of unincorporated institution\n\t(1)\tThis section applies if—\n\t(a)\ta person (the claimant) suffered abuse as a child by a person associated with an institution (the associated person) while the claimant was under the care, supervision, control or authority of the institution; and\n\t(b)\tthe claimant has or had a cause of action against a person (the former office holder) who held an office of authority in the institution (the relevant office) when the cause of action accrued, founded on the former office holder's responsibility for the institution or for the associated person; and\n\t(c)\tthe institution was an unincorporated body when the cause of action accrued; and\n\t(d)\tthe institution is an unincorporated body; and\n\t(e)\tthe former office holder no longer holds the relevant office; and\n\t(f)\tthe claimant would be able to maintain an action on the cause of action if the former office holder still held the relevant office.\n\t(2)\tA proceeding for the claimant's cause of action may be commenced or continued against the current holder of the relevant office (the current office holder) in the name of the office.\n\t(3)\tThe following apply for the purposes of a proceeding commenced or continued under subsection (2):\n\t(a)\tany liability that the former office holder has or would have had in relation to the cause of action is taken to be a liability of the current office holder;\n\t(b)\tanything done by the former office holder is taken to have been done by the current office holder;\n\t(c)\ta duty or obligation that the former office holder would have had in relation to the proceeding is a duty or obligation of the current office holder;\n\t(d)\tthe current office holder may rely on any defence or immunity that would have been available to the former office holder as a defendant in the proceeding;\n\t(e)\tany right of the former office holder to be indemnified (including under an insurance policy) in respect of damages awarded in an abuse claim extends to, and indemnifies, the current office holder.\n50J—Claim against unincorporated institution and nomination of appropriate defendant\n\t(1)\tThis section applies in relation to an institution that is an unincorporated body.\n\t(2)\tA proceeding for an abuse claim may be commenced against the institution.\n\t(3)\tA notice of a claim must be given to the head of the institution in accordance with any requirements prescribed by the regulations.\n\t(4)\tThe institution may nominate a person, with the person's consent, to be the appropriate defendant for the purposes of an abuse claim against the institution.\n\t(5)\tOn application by the claimant, a court may order that the trustee of a trust is the institution's nominee if the court is satisfied—\n\t(a)\tthe trust is, or used to be, an associated trust of the institution; and\n\t(b)\tfor a trust that is no longer an associated trust of the institution—a reason for causing the trust to cease to be an associated trust was to try to avoid trust property being applied to satisfy a liability that may be found under a decision on an abuse claim; and\n\t(c)\tthe order would be appropriate.\n\t(6)\tSubsection (5) applies if—\n\t(a)\tat least 120 days have passed since a proceeding for an abuse claim was commenced against the institution; and\n\t(b)\teither—\n\t(i)\tthere is no nominee for the institution; or\n\t(ii)\ta court is satisfied the institution's nominee does not have sufficient assets to satisfy a liability that may be found under a decision on the abuse claim.\n\t(7)\tA court may—\n\t(a)\torder the institution to do the following within 28 days or any other period the court considers appropriate:\n\t(i)\tidentify to the court any trusts that are, or used to be, associated trusts of the institution;\n\t(ii)\tprovide particular information about the financial capacity of the trusts; and\n\t(b)\tmake any other orders, and give the directions, it considers appropriate for the purposes of establishing—\n\t(i)\twhether a trust is, or used to be, an associated trust of the institution; or\n\t(ii)\tthe financial capacity of a trust mentioned in subparagraph (i); or\n\t(iii)\twhether a nominee of the institution has sufficient assets to satisfy a liability that may be found under a decision on the abuse claim; or\n\t(iv)\twhether it would be appropriate to make an order in relation to a trustee under subsection (5).\n50K—Proceeding against nominee of unincorporated institution\nDespite any Act or other law or instrument (including any trust deed), the following apply if, under section 50J, there is a nominee for an institution:\n\t(a)\ta proceeding for an abuse claim may be commenced or continued against the nominee;\n\t(b)\tany liability of the institution under the court's decision on the abuse claim is incurred by the nominee;\n\t(c)\tanything done by the institution is taken to have been done by the nominee;\n\t(d)\ta duty or obligation of the institution in relation to the proceeding is a duty or obligation of the nominee;\n\t(e)\tthe institution must continue to participate in the proceeding and a court may make an order or give a direction relating to the institution as if it were a person;\n\t(f)\ta court may make a substantive finding in the proceeding against the institution as if it were a person;\n\t(g)\tthe nominee may rely on any defence or immunity that would be available to the institution as a defendant in the proceeding if the institution were a person;\n\t(h)\tany right of the institution to be indemnified (including under an insurance policy) in respect of damages awarded in an abuse claim extends to, and indemnifies, the nominee;\n\t(i)\tif there is more than 1 nominee, the nominees must file a single defence and proceed as a single defendant.\nDivision 5—Satisfaction of liability\n50L—Assets available to satisfy liability of institution\n\t(1)\tThis section applies if an institution has a liability under a judgment in, or settlement of, an abuse claim.\n\t(2)\tThe institution may satisfy the liability out of the assets of the institution and the assets of an associated trust of the institution.\n50M—Assets available to satisfy liability of nominee\n\t(1)\tThis section applies if an institution's nominee has a liability under a judgment in, or settlement of, an abuse claim.\n\t(2)\tIf the nominee is the trustee of an associated trust of the institution, the nominee may satisfy the liability out of the assets of the trust and the assets of the institution.\n\t(3)\tOtherwise, the nominee may satisfy the liability out of its assets and the assets of the institution.\n50N—Assets available to satisfy liability of current office holder\n\t(1)\tThis section applies if, under section 50I(3), a current office holder has a liability under a judgment in, or settlement of, an abuse claim.\n\t(2)\tThe current office holder is not personally liable but may satisfy the liability out of the assets of the institution and the assets of an associated trust of the institution.\n50O—Satisfaction of liability by trustee of associated trust\n\t(1)\tThis section applies in relation to a liability that, under section 50L, 50M or 50N, may be satisfied out of the assets of an associated trust of an institution.\n\t(2)\tThe trustee of the associated trust may pay an amount in satisfaction of the liability and, for that purpose, may realise assets of the trust.\n\t(3)\tThe satisfaction of the liability is a proper expense for which the trustee may be indemnified out of the trust property, irrespective of any limitation on any right of indemnity the trustee may have.\n\t(4)\tThe liability of the trustee of the associated trust as the institution's nominee is limited to the value of the trust property.\n\t(5)\tThe trustee is not liable for a breach of trust only because of doing anything authorised by this section.\n50P—References to liability\nA reference in this Division to a liability under a judgment in, or settlement of, an abuse claim includes any costs associated with a proceeding for the claim.\nDivision 6—Miscellaneous\n50Q—Entities may act despite other laws and duties\nAn institution, an institution's nominee, a current office holder or the trustee of an associated trust of an institution may act under Division 5, and the trustee of an associated trust of an institution may consent to being the institution's nominee, despite—\n\t(a)\tanother law; or\n\t(b)\tthe terms of the associated trust (including a trust for a charitable purpose); or\n\t(c)\ta duty, whether as the current holder of an office in the institution or as trustee or otherwise.\n50R—Continuity of institutions\n\t(1)\tFor the purposes of Division 4, it is sufficient that an institution (the current institution) is substantially the same as it was at the time when the cause of action accrued (the relevant time).\n\t(2)\tWithout limiting the generality of subsection (1), the current institution is substantially the same as it was at the relevant time if the class or type of member and the primary purposes or work of the current institution are substantially the same as they were at the relevant time.\n\t(3)\tSubsections (1) and (2) have effect regardless of whether, after the relevant time—\n\t(a)\tthe name of the institution changed; or\n\t(b)\tthe organisational structure of the institution changed; or\n\t(c)\tthe institution became incorporated; or\n\t(d)\tthe geographic area in which the members of the institution carried out the purposes or work of the institution changed.\n\t(4)\tIf there is no institution that is the same institution, or substantially the same institution, as the institution at the relevant time (the old institution), a relevant successor of the old institution is taken to be the same institution as the old institution.\n\t(5)\tFor the purposes of subsection (4), an institution (also the current institution) is a relevant successor of the old institution if—\n\t(a)\tall or part of the old institution merged into the current institution; or\n\t(b)\tall or part of the old institution merged with 1 or more other entities to form the current institution; or\n\t(c)\tthe current institution is the remainder of the old institution after part of the old institution ceased to be part of the old institution; or\n\t(d)\tin a case in which there is at least 1 institution interposed, over time, between the old institution and the current institution—at least 1 of the following circumstances applies to each link in the chain between the old institution and the current institution:\n\t(i)\tall or part of an earlier institution merged into another institution;\n\t(ii)\tall or part of an earlier institution merged with 1 or more other entities to form another institution;\n\t(iii)\tan institution is the remainder of an earlier institution after part of the earlier institution ceased to be part of the earlier institution;\n\t(iv)\tan institution as it is at a particular time is substantially the same as it was at an earlier time.\n\t(6)\tIf more than 1 institution (a current institution) is a relevant successor of the old institution the following applies:\n\t(a)\teach current institution is jointly and severally liable for the abuse of a child by a person associated with the old institution while the child was under the care, supervision, control or authority of the old institution;\n\t(b)\ta current institution which is a relevant successor of the old institution may recover contribution from another current institution which is also a relevant successor of the old institution;\n\t(c)\tan action for contribution may be brought—\n\t(i)\tby way of third party proceedings, or proceedings between the parties, in an action in which damages are sought from the institution entitled to contribution; or\n\t(ii)\tby way of a separate action brought against the institution from which contribution is sought;\n\t(d)\tif it is fair and equitable to do so, a court may exempt an institution from liability to make contribution or order that the contribution to be recovered is to amount to a complete indemnity;\n\t(e)\tan action for contribution may be brought even though—\n\t(i)\tjudgment in an action in which damages are sought for the relevant abuse has not yet been given; or\n\t(ii)\tthe person who suffered the abuse has released the institution from which contribution is sought from liability or has obtained judgment against that institution; or\n\t(iii)\ta notice that would be required if the person who suffered the abuse were to obtain a judgment against the institution from which contribution is sought has not been given; or\n\t(iv)\tthe time within which the person who suffered the abuse could have commenced an action against the contributory has expired;\n\t(f)\tdespite paragraph (e)—\n\t(i)\tif an institution is liable to indemnify another institution against that other institution's liability, the institution is (to the extent of the liability to indemnify) not entitled to contribution from the other institution under this section; and\n\t(ii)\ta contractual limitation or exclusion of liability operates to limit or exclude an entitlement to contribution under this section if—\n\t(A)\tit arises from a contract made before the occurrence of the act or omission that gave rise to the liability; and\n\t(B)\tit would, assuming the institution who suffered primary harm had brought an action for damages against the institution from which contribution is sought, have limited or excluded that institution's right to recover damages;\n\t(g)\ta court may determine any action for contribution according to what is fair and equitable in all of the circumstances.\n\t(7)\tIn this section—\ncontributory means the institution (or institutions) seeking contribution under this section and the institution (or institutions) from which contribution is sought.\n50S—Continuity of offices\n\t(1)\tThis section applies for the purposes of section 50I.\n\t(2)\tIt is sufficient that an office in the institution is substantially the same as it was when the relevant cause of action accrued.\n\t(3)\tIf there is no current office in the institution that is the same or substantially the same as the relevant office mentioned in section 50I(1)(b), the current head of the institution is taken to be the current office holder.\n50T—Corporations Act displacement\nSections 50K to 50Q are declared to be Corporations legislation displacement provisions for the purposes of section 5G of the Corporations Act 2001 of the Commonwealth in relation to the Corporations legislation generally.\n50U—Proceedings despite previous judgment\n\t(1)\tSubject to subsection (2), proceedings on a cause of action may be commenced against a person or institution in accordance with this Part even though a judgment was given in relation to the cause of action before the commencement of this Part on the ground that the person or institution was not an appropriate defendant.\n\t(2)\tProceedings on a cause of action in circumstances contemplated by subsection (1) may only be commenced if a court, being satisfied that it is just and reasonable to do so, grants leave for the action to be commenced.\n\t(3)\tIn granting leave under subsection (2) for proceedings on a cause of action to be commenced, a court may make any order the court considers to be necessary for the proceedings to proceed or otherwise appropriate in the circumstances.\n","sortOrder":13},{"sectionNumber":"Part 7B","sectionType":"part","heading":"Child abuse—setting aside settlements","content":"Part 7B—Child abuse—setting aside settlements\n50V—Meaning of affected agreement\n\t(1)\tIn this Part, affected agreement means an agreement—\n\t(a)\tthat prevents the commencement or maintenance of proceedings on a cause of action to which section 3A of the Limitation of Actions Act 1936 applies if—\n\t(i)\tthe agreement occurred before the commencement of that section; and\n\t(ii)\tat the time of the agreement, a limitation period applying to the cause of action had expired; or\n\t(b)\tthat prevents the commencement or maintenance of proceedings on a cause of action in respect of an abuse claim (within the meaning of Part 7A) if—\n\t(i)\tthe agreement occurred before the commencement of Part 7A; and\n\t(ii)\tat the time of the agreement, proceedings on the cause of action could not be commenced or maintained against a person or institution that would have been liable under Part 7A for child abuse had the Part been in force.\n\t(2)\tFor the purposes of this section, a limitation period is taken to have expired even if it were possible at the time to seek the leave of a court to extend the period.\n50W—Court may set aside affected agreement\n\t(1)\tA person (the applicant) who, because of an affected agreement, is prevented from commencing or maintaining proceedings on a cause of action to which section 3A of the Limitation of Actions Act 1936 applies, or in respect of an abuse claim (within the meaning of Part 7A), may—\n\t(a)\tcommence proceedings on the cause of action in a court with sufficient jurisdiction to hear the cause of action; and\n\t(b)\tapply to the court to set aside the affected agreement.\n\t(2)\tThe court may set aside an affected agreement if it is just and reasonable to do so.\n\t(3)\tThe court may consider the following in making its decision to set aside the affected agreement:\n\t(a)\tthe extent to which the existence of the limitation period or barriers to identifying an appropriate defendant materially contributed to the applicant's decision to enter into the agreement;\n\t(b)\tthe circumstances in which the agreement was negotiated and entered into, including—\n\t(i)\twhether negotiations were affected by an imbalance of power; and\n\t(ii)\twhether the applicant was legally represented; and\n\t(iii)\twhether the defendant (or other parties) engaged in unfair or oppressive conduct;\n\t(c)\tany other matter the court considers relevant.\n\t(4)\tSection 67C(1) of the Evidence Act 1929 does not prevent evidence being adduced in proceedings under this section, even if the evidence is of a communication made, or a document prepared, in connection with an attempt to negotiate a settlement of the dispute to which the affected agreement relates.\n\t(5)\tIf the court decides to set aside an affected agreement it may also set aside any of the following that gives effect to the agreement:\n\t(a)\ta contract, deed or other agreement;\n\t(b)\tan order or judgment of the court or of a lower court.\n\t(6)\tHowever, the court must not set aside the following:\n\t(a)\ta deed of release signed by or on behalf of the applicant in acceptance of an offer under the National Redress Scheme and an agreement relating to a relevant prior payment that has been taken into account in the offer;\n\t(b)\ta contract of insurance.\n\t(7)\tIn this section—\nNational Redress Scheme means the National Redress Scheme for Institutional Child Sexual Abuse established under the National Redress Scheme for Institutional Child Sexual Abuse Act 2018 of the Commonwealth.\n50X—Effect of setting aside affected agreement\n\t(1)\tAn affected agreement and anything else set aside under this Part is void.\n\t(2)\tAn amount paid or other consideration given under the affected agreement—\n\t(a)\tis not recoverable despite the agreement being void; and\n\t(b)\tmay be taken into account by the court in determining damages in proceedings for a cause of action to which the affected agreement related.\n","sortOrder":14},{"sectionNumber":"Part 8","sectionType":"part","heading":"Damages for personal injury","content":"Part 8—Damages for personal injury\n51—Application of this Part\nThis Part applies—\n\t(a)\twhere damages are claimed for personal injury arising from—\n\t(i)\ta motor accident (whether caused intentionally or unintentionally); or\n\t(ii)\tan accident caused wholly or in part by—\n\t(A)\tnegligence; or\n\t(B)\tsome other unintentional tort on the part of a person other than the injured person; or\n\t(C)\ta breach of a contractual duty of care; or\n\t(b)\twhere personal injury arising in the manner described in paragraph (a) results in death and damages are claimed under Part 5 for harm resulting from the death.\n52—Damages for non-economic loss\n\t(1)\tDamages may only be awarded for non-economic loss if—\n\t(a)\tthe injured person's ability to lead a normal life was significantly impaired by the injury for a period of at least 7 days; or\n\t(b)\tmedical expenses of at least the prescribed minimum have been reasonably incurred in connection with the injury.\n\t(2)\tIf damages are to be awarded for non-economic loss, other than in relation to personal injury arising from an MVA motor accident, they must be assessed as follows:\n\t(a)\tthe injured person's total non-economic loss is to be assigned a numerical value (the scale value) on a scale running from 0 to 60 (the scale reflecting 60 equal gradations of non-economic loss, from a case in which the non‑economic loss is not severe enough to justify any award of damages to a case in which the injured person suffers non-economic loss of the gravest conceivable kind);\n\t(b)\tthe damages for non-economic loss are to be calculated in relation to an injury arising from an accident that occurred during 2002 by multiplying the scale value by $1 710;\n\t(c)\tthe damages for non-economic loss are to be calculated in relation to an injury arising from an accident that occurred during 2003 as follows:\n\t(i)\tif the scale value is 10 or less—by multiplying the scale value by $1 150;\n\t(ii)\tif the scale value is 20 or less but more than 10—by adding to $11 500 an amount calculated by multiplying the number by which the scale value exceeds 10 by $2 300;\n\t(iii)\tif the scale value is 30 or less but more than 20—by adding to $34 500 an amount calculated by multiplying the number by which the scale value exceeds 20 by $3 450;\n\t(iv)\tif the scale value is 40 or less but more than 30—by adding to $69 000 an amount calculated by multiplying the number by which the scale value exceeds 30 by $4 600;\n\t(v)\tif the scale value is 50 or less but more than 40—by adding to $115 000 an amount calculated by multiplying the number by which the scale value exceeds 40 by $5 750;\n\t(vi)\tif the scale value is 60 or less but more than 50—by adding to $172 500 an amount calculated by multiplying the number by which the scale value exceeds 50 by $6 900;\n\t(d)\tthe damages for non-economic loss in relation to an injury arising from an accident that occurred in a subsequent calendar year are to be calculated in accordance with paragraph (c) but the amount arrived at is to be adjusted (to the nearest multiple of $10) by multiplying it by a proportion obtained by dividing the Consumer Price Index for the September quarter of the previous calendar year by the Consumer Price Index for the September quarter 2002.\nSuppose that A is injured in an accident that occurred in 2003 and claims damages for personal injury. The case is one in which the criteria under which damages for non-economic loss may be awarded are satisfied. In assessing those damages, A's total non-economic loss is assigned by the court a scale value of 23. The damages for non-economic loss will, therefore, be $44 850, calculated as follows:\n\n\t(3)\tSubject to subsection (4), if damages are to be awarded for non‑economic loss in relation to personal injury arising from an MVA motor accident, they must be assessed as follows:\n\t(a)\tthe injured person's total non‑economic loss is to be assigned a numerical value (an injury scale value) on a scale running from 0 to 100;\n\t(b)\tin assessing the injury scale value, the court must apply any rules prescribed by the regulations;\n\t(c)\tthe damages for non‑economic loss are to be calculated as follows:\n\t(i)\tif the injury scale value is assessed as 31 or less but more than 10 (see subsection (4))—by adding to $2 000 (indexed) an amount calculated by multiplying the number by which the injury scale value exceeds 10 by $1 000 (indexed);\n\t(ii)\tif the injury scale value is assessed as 45 or less but more than 31—by adding to $23 000 (indexed) an amount calculated by multiplying the number by which the injury scale value exceeds 31 by $3 000 (indexed);\n\t(iii)\tif the injury scale value is assessed as 66 or less but more than 45—by adding to $65 000 (indexed) an amount calculated by multiplying the number by which the injury scale value exceeds 45 by $5 000 (indexed);\n\t(iv)\tif the injury scale value is assessed as 78 or less but more than 66—by adding to $170 000 (indexed) an amount calculated by multiplying the number by which the injury scale value exceeds 66 by $10 000 (indexed);\n\t(v)\tif the injury scale value is assessed as 79 or more—$300 000 (indexed).\n\t(4)\tA person who suffers personal injury arising from an MVA motor accident may only be awarded damages for non‑economic loss if the injury scale value that applies under subsection (3)(a) in relation to the injury exceeds 10.\n\t(5)\tHowever, a court may award damages for non‑economic loss in a case that would otherwise be excluded by operation of subsection (4) if satisfied—\n\t(a)\tthat the consequences of the personal injury with respect to non‑economic loss are exceptional when judged by comparison with other cases involving the same injury; and\n\t(b)\tthat the application of the threshold set by that subsection would, in the circumstances of the particular case, be harsh and unjust.\n\t(6)\tAn assessment of damages for non‑economic loss under subsection (5) must be based on an injury scale value that should rarely be more than 25% higher than the injury scale value that applies under subsection (3)(a) in relation to the injury.\n\t(7)\tAn amount applying under subsection (3) (and followed by the word \"(indexed)\") is to be adjusted on 1 July of each year, beginning on 1 July 2014, by multiplying the stated amount by a proportion obtained by dividing the Consumer Price Index for the March quarter of that year by the Consumer Price Index for the March quarter 2013 (with the amount so adjusted being calculated to the nearest multiple of $10).\n\t(8)\tIn connection with the operation of subsection (7), the amount to be applied with respect to a particular injury is the amount applying under subsection (3) at the time of occurrence of that injury.\n53—Damages for mental harm\n\t(1)\tDamages may only be awarded for mental harm if the injured person—\n\t(a)\twas physically injured in the accident or was present at the scene of the accident when the accident occurred; or\n\t(b)\tis a parent, spouse, domestic partner or child of a person killed, injured or endangered in the accident.\n\t(2)\tDamages may only be awarded for pure mental harm if the harm consists of a recognised psychiatric illness.\n\t(3)\tDamages may only be awarded for economic loss resulting from consequential mental harm if the harm consists of a recognised psychiatric illness.\n54—Damages for loss of earning capacity\n\t(1)\tIf the injured person was incapacitated for work, damages for loss of earning capacity are not to be awarded in respect of the first week of the incapacity.\n\t(2)\tTotal damages for loss of earning capacity (excluding interest awarded on damages for any past loss) are not to exceed the prescribed maximum.\n\t(3)\tIn a case in which an action is brought for the benefit of the dependants of a deceased person, the total amount awarded to compensate economic loss resulting from the death of the deceased person (apart from expenses—such as funeral expenses—actually incurred as a result of the death) cannot exceed the prescribed maximum and if before the date of death the deceased person received damages to compensate loss of earning capacity, the limit is to be reduced by the amount of those damages.\n55—Lump sum compensation for future losses\nIf—\n\t(a)\tan injured person is to be compensated by way of lump sum for loss of future earnings or other future losses; and\n\t(b)\tan actuarial multiplier is used for the purpose of calculating the present value of the future losses,\nthen, in determining the actuarial multiplier, a prescribed discount rate is to be applied.\n56—Exclusion of interest on damages compensating non-economic loss or future loss\nInterest is not to be awarded on damages compensating non-economic or future loss.\n56A—Additional provisions relating to motor vehicle injuries (economic loss)\n\t(1)\tAny entitlement to damages for economic loss in relation to personal injury arising from an MVA motor accident applies subject to the provisions of this section.\n\t(2)\tA person who suffers personal injury arising from an MVA motor accident may only be awarded damages for loss or impairment of future earning capacity if the injury scale value that applies under the regulations in relation to the injury exceeds 7.\n\t(3)\tHowever, a court may award damages in a case that would otherwise be excluded by operation of subsection (2) if satisfied—\n\t(a)\tthat the consequences of the personal injury with respect to loss or impairment of future earning capacity are exceptional; and\n\t(b)\tthat the application of the threshold set by that subsection would, in the circumstances of the particular case, be harsh and unjust.\n\t(4)\tIn assessing damages for loss or impairment of future earning capacity in relation to personal injury arising from an MVA motor accident (other than with respect to a discount that would, apart from this section, be made for the usual vicissitudes of life)—\n\t(a)\ta court must not take into account—\n\t(i)\tany inference as to a circumstance in respect of which the court is unable to evaluate the chance of it occurring; or\n\t(ii)\tany inference as to a circumstance that the court evaluates as having less than a 20% chance of occurring; and\n\t(b)\tan award of damages must be arrived at by taking into account the several circumstances on which a court may rely, the chance of each occurring, and the combination of those chances; and\n\t(c)\ta court must, when making an award of damages, state—\n\t(i)\tthe circumstances that have been taken into account for the purposes of the award; and\n\t(ii)\tthe inferences that the court has drawn from those circumstances; and\n\t(iii)\tthe court's evaluation of the chances of each circumstance relied on occurring; and\n\t(iv)\tits determination of the resultant award of damages.\n\t(5)\tDamages awarded for any form of loss or impairment of earning capacity (whether past or future) in relation to personal injury arising from an MVA motor accident must, after applying a discount rate (if any), and any other principle arising under this Act or at common law, including so as to take into account any actual or presumed contributory negligence, be discounted by a further 20%.\n\t(6)\tThe maximum amount of damages that may be awarded to an employed person for loss in relation to personal injury arising from an MVA motor accident due to the loss of employer superannuation contributions is the relevant percentage of damages payable for the loss or impairment of the earning capacity on which the entitlement to those contributions is based.\n\t(7)\tIn subsection (6)—\nrelevant percentage means the percentage of earnings that is the minimum percentage required by law to be paid as employer superannuation contributions.\n\t(8)\tThe maximum amount of damages that may be awarded to a self‑employed person for economic loss in relation to personal injury arising from an MVA motor accident due to the loss of superannuation contributions made by or on behalf of the person is the relevant percentage of damages payable for the loss or impairment of the earning capacity on which the entitlement to those contributions is based (but nothing in this subsection gives rise to an entitlement to damages beyond damages awarded for loss or impairment of earning capacity).\n\t(9)\tIn subsection (8)—\nrelevant percentage means the percentage of earnings that is the minimum percentage required by law to be paid as employer superannuation contributions for the benefit of an employee who earns the same amount as the self‑employed person.\n57—Exclusion of damages for cost of management or investment\nDamages are not to be awarded to compensate for the cost of the investment or management of the amount awarded.\n58—Damages in respect of gratuitous services\n\t(1)\tDamages are not to be awarded—\n\t(a)\tto allow for the recompense of gratuitous services except services of a parent, spouse, domestic partner or child of the injured person; or\n\t(b)\tto allow for the reimbursement of expenses, other than reasonable out-of-pocket expenses, voluntarily incurred, or to be voluntarily incurred, by a person rendering gratuitous services to the injured person.\n\t(2)\tDamages awarded to allow for the recompense of gratuitous services of a parent, spouse, domestic partner or child are not to exceed an amount equivalent to 4 times State average weekly earnings.\n\t(3)\tHowever, the court may make an award in excess of the limit prescribed by subsection (2) if satisfied that—\n\t(a)\tthe gratuitous services are reasonably required by the injured person; and\n\t(b)\tit would be necessary, if the services were not provided gratuitously by a parent, spouse, domestic partner or child of the injured person to engage another person to provide the services for remuneration,\nbut, in that event, the damages awarded are not to reflect a rate of remuneration for the person providing the services in excess of State average weekly earnings.\n\t(4)\tDespite the preceding subsections, in a case involving an injured person who has suffered personal injury arising from an MVA motor accident—\n\t(a)\tdamages referred to in subsection (1) are not to be awarded unless—\n\t(i)\tthe injury scale value that applies under the regulations in relation to the injury exceeds 10; and\n\t(ii)\tthe services are provided or to be provided—\n\t(A)\tfor at least 6 hours per week; and\n\t(B)\tfor a period of at least 6 consecutive months; and\n\t(b)\tany hourly rate used for the purposes of determining any damages awarded to allow for the recompense of gratuitous services of a parent, spouse, domestic partner or child is not to exceed a rate prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this paragraph.\n\t(5)\tFurthermore, in a case involving a person who is a participant in the Scheme under the Motor Vehicle Accidents (Lifetime Support Scheme) Act 2013, subsection (1) operates subject to the qualification that damages are not to be awarded for the recompense of gratuitous services of a parent, spouse, domestic partner or child of the participant in respect of any assessed treatment, care and support needs, as defined or determined under that Act (whether being past or future needs), that relate to the motor vehicle injury (as defined by that Act) in respect of which the person is a participant in that Scheme.\n\t(6)\tA reference in subsection (5) to a person who is a participant in the Scheme under the Motor Vehicle Accidents (Lifetime Support Scheme) Act 2013 will be taken to include a reference to a person who has been an interim participant in that Scheme (and who has received any treatment, care and support needs under that Act).\n58A—Limitations on damages for participants in lifetime support scheme\n\t(1)\tNo damages may be awarded to a person who is a participant in the Scheme under the Motor Vehicle Accidents (Lifetime Support Scheme) Act 2013 in respect of any of the treatment, care and support needs of the person, or any excluded treatment, care and support needs, as defined or determined under that Act (whether being past or future needs), that relate to the motor vehicle injury (as defined by that Act) in respect of which the person is a participant in that Scheme and that arise (or will arise) during the period in respect of which the person is a participant in the Scheme.\n\t(2)\tSubsection (1) applies—\n\t(a)\twhether or not the treatment, care and support needs are assessed treatment, care and support needs under the Motor Vehicle Accidents (Lifetime Support Scheme) Act 2013; and\n\t(b)\twhether or not the Lifetime Support Authority is required to make a payment in respect of the treatment, care and support needs concerned; and\n\t(c)\twhether or not any treatment, care, support or service is provided on a gratuitous basis.\n\t(3)\tA reference in subsection (1) to a person who is a participant in the Scheme under the Motor Vehicle Accidents (Lifetime Support Scheme) Act 2013 will be taken to include a reference to a person who has been an interim participant in that Scheme (and who has received any treatment, care and support needs under that Act).\n58B—Additional provisions relating to death on account of a motor vehicle injury\n\t(1)\tAny entitlement to damages for loss of financial support in respect of the death of a person arising from an MVA motor accident (a relevant loss of financial support claim) applies subject to the provisions of this section.\n\t(2)\tIn making an award in relation to a relevant loss of financial support claim that will provide for the future (other than with respect to a discount that would, apart from this section, be made for the usual vicissitudes of life)—\n\t(a)\ta court must not take into account—\n\t(i)\tany inference as to a circumstance in respect of which the court is unable to evaluate the chance of it occurring; or\n\t(ii)\tany inference as to a circumstance that the court evaluates as having less than a 20% chance of occurring; and\n\t(b)\tan award of damages must be arrived at by taking into account the several circumstances on which a court may rely, and the combination of those chances; and\n\t(c)\ta court must, when making an award of damages, state—\n\t(i)\tthe circumstances that have been taken into account for the purposes of the award; and\n\t(ii)\tthe inferences that the court has drawn from those circumstances; and\n\t(iii)\tthe court's evaluation of the chances of each circumstance occurring; and\n\t(iv)\tits determination of the resultant award of damages.\n\t(3)\tDamages awarded in relation to a relevant loss of financial support claim must, after applying a discount rate (if any), and any other principle arising under this Act or at common law, including so as to take into account any actual or presumed contributory negligence, be discounted by a further 20%.\n","sortOrder":15},{"sectionNumber":"Part 9","sectionType":"part","heading":"Miscellaneous","content":"Part 9—Miscellaneous\nDivision 1—Rights as between employer and employee\n59—Rights as between employer and employee\n\t(1)\tNotwithstanding any Act or law, or the provisions express or implied of any contract or agreement, where an employee commits a tort for which his employer is vicariously liable—\n\t(a)\tthe employee shall not be liable to indemnify the employer in respect of the vicarious liability incurred by the employer; and\n\t(b)\tunless the employee is otherwise entitled to indemnity in respect of his liability, the employer shall be liable to indemnify the employee in respect of liability incurred by the employee in respect of the tort.\n\t(2)\tWhere an employer is proceeded against for the tort of his employee, and the employee is entitled pursuant to a policy of insurance or contract of indemnity to be indemnified in respect of liability that he may incur in respect of the tort, the employer shall be subrogated to the rights of the employee under that policy or contract in respect of the liability incurred by him (the employer), arising from the commission of the tort.\n\t(3)\tWhere a person commits serious and wilful misconduct in the course of his employment and that misconduct constitutes a tort, the provisions of this section shall not apply in respect of that tort.\nDivision 2—Remedies against certain shipowners\n60—Remedy against shipowners and others for injuries\n\t(1)\tIf it is alleged that the owners of any ship are liable to pay damages in respect of personal injuries, including fatal injuries, caused by the ship or sustained on, in, or about the ship, in any port or harbour in the State, in consequence of the wrongful act, neglect, or default of the owners of the ship, or the master or officers or crew thereof, or any other person in the employment of the owners of the ship, or of any defect in the ship or its apparel or equipment, and at any time that ship is found in any port or river in the State or in any water within three miles of the coast of the State, the Supreme Court or the local court of full jurisdiction nearest to the ship may, upon its being shown to the court by any person applying in accordance with rules of court that the owners are probably liable to pay damages in respect of such injuries and that none of the owners resides in the State, issue an order directed to any officer of the Supreme Court or of the said local court, or of the Minister of Marine, or of any authority exercising the powers vested in the said Minister named in the order, requiring such officer to detain the ship until such time as the owners, agent, master, or consignee thereof have paid such compensation, or have given security, to be approved by a Judge of the Supreme Court, or as the case may be, by a judge or magistrate of the said local court, to abide the event of any proceedings that may be instituted in respect of the injuries, and to pay all costs and damages that may be awarded thereon.\n\t(2)\tThe officer to whom the order is directed may detain the ship in accordance with the order.\n\t(3)\tIn any legal proceedings in relation to such injuries as aforesaid, the person giving security may be made the defendant, and shall be stated to be the owner of the ship which has caused the injuries, and the production of the order of the judge or magistrate made in relation to the security shall in the said proceedings be conclusive evidence that the defendant is the owner of the ship.\n\t(4)\tIf the owner of a ship is a corporation, such corporation shall, for the purpose of this section, be deemed to reside in the State if it has an office in the State at which service of process can be effected.\n\t(5)\tIf a ship after detention in pursuance of this section or after service on the master of any notice of an order for detention under this section, proceeds to sea before the ship is released by the officer detaining it, the master of the ship, and also the owner, and any person who sends the ship to sea, if that owner or person is party or privy to the offence, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a penalty not exceeding four hundred dollars.\n\t(6)\tIf the master proceeds to sea with the ship in contravention of subsection (5) of this section, and takes to sea any person authorised to detain the ship or any person assisting any person so authorised, the owner and master of the ship shall each be liable to pay all expenses of and incidental to the taking to sea of any such person, in addition to any penalty imposable under subsection (5).\n\t(7)\tThe words person applying in this section shall include an employer who has paid compensation, or against whom a claim for compensation has been made, under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1932 or under any corresponding subsequent enactment, if he shows the court that he probably is or will become entitled to be indemnified under that Act or enactment, and in such case this section shall apply as if the employer were a person claiming damages in respect of personal injuries.\n\t(8)\tThe jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under this section may be exercised by a single judge of that court sitting in chambers.\nDivision 3—Damage by aircraft\n61—Damage by aircraft\naircraft damage means personal injury, loss of life, material loss, damage or destruction in South Australia that is not covered by the Commonwealth Act but would, assuming the aircraft had been engaged in trade and commerce among the States, have been covered by the Commonwealth Act;\nCommonwealth Act means the Damage by Aircraft Act 1999 (Cwth).\n\t(2)\tWords and expressions used in this section that are defined in the Commonwealth Act have the same respective meanings as in the Commonwealth Act.\n\t(3)\tSubject to the following qualifications, liability for aircraft damage is to be determined on the same principles as under the Commonwealth Act.\n\t(4)\tThe following qualifications apply:\n\t(a)\ta person who uses an aircraft as a passenger or for the transportation of passengers or goods is not to be regarded as an operator of the aircraft if the person reasonably relies on the skill of another (not being an employee) to operate the aircraft;\n\t(b)\tif aircraft damage results from the unauthorised use of an aircraft, a person (other than the unauthorised user) who is liable for damage as owner or operator of the aircraft is entitled to be indemnified against that liability by the person (not being an employee) who used the aircraft without proper authority;\n\t(c)\tif aircraft damage results from an impact between an aircraft or part of an aircraft and a person or object (other than a person or object in the aircraft), liability is to be determined according to principles of negligence unless—\n\t(i)\tthe impact occurs while the aircraft is in flight; or\n\t(ii)\tthe impact is caused by the aircraft or part of the aircraft crashing or falling to the ground;\n\t(d)\texemplary damages are not to be awarded for aircraft damage unless the defendant is shown to have caused the damage intentionally or recklessly.\n\t(5)\tThis section does not apply to damage arising from operations of any of the following kinds carried out from an aircraft:\n\t(a)\tseeding;\n\t(b)\tthe spreading of fertiliser, weedicide, pesticide or other agricultural chemicals;\n\t(c)\tfirefighting;\n\t(d)\tthe dispersal of pollutants;\n\t(e)\tany similar operations,\nunless the damage is caused by an impact between the aircraft or part of the aircraft and the ground or an impact between a substantial thing dropping or falling from the aircraft and the ground.\n62—Exclusion of liability for trespass or nuisance\nCommonwealth Acts means the Air Navigation Act 1920 (Cwth) and the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cwth);\nland includes a building, structure or other property on land (whether affixed to the land or not);\nrelevant air navigation regulations means the regulations governing air navigation under the Commonwealth Acts including those regulations as they apply to air navigation in South Australia under the Air Navigation Act 1937.\n\t(2)\tNo action for trespass or nuisance arises by reason only of the flight of an aircraft over land, or the ordinary incidents of such a flight, if—\n\t(a)\tthe aircraft flies at a height that is reasonable having regard to prevailing weather conditions and other relevant circumstances; and\n\t(b)\tthe aircraft is operated in accordance with the relevant air navigation regulations.\nDivision 4—Abolition of rule of common employment\n63—Abolition of rule of common employment\n\t(1)\tWhere any injury or damage is suffered by a servant by reason of the wrongful act, neglect or default of a fellow servant, the employer of those servants shall be liable in damages in respect of that injury or damage in the same manner and in the same cases as if those servants had not been engaged in a common employment.\n\t(2)\tThis section applies to any injury or damage arising from a wrongful act, neglect or default committed after the enactment of this section, whether the contract of employment was made before or is made after the enactment of this section.\n\t(3)\tEmployer in this section includes the Crown and instrumentalities of the Crown.\nDivision 5—Actions in tort relating to spouses and domestic partners\n64—Abolition of rule as to unity of spouses\n\t(1)\tSubject to this section, where any injury or damage is suffered by any person by reason of the wrongful act, neglect or default of his spouse, the spouse shall be liable in respect of that injury or damage in all respects as if the injured person and the person by reason of whose wrongful act neglect or default the injury or damage is suffered were not married.\n\t(2)\tThis section shall not be construed as entitling any person to maintain an action in trespass or ejectment against his spouse in respect of a matrimonial home.\n\t(3)\tIf proceedings are brought pursuant to this section, the court may dismiss the proceedings if it appears to the court that no substantial benefit would accrue to either party from the continuation of the proceedings.\n65—Spouse or domestic partner may claim for loss or impairment of consortium\n\t(1)\tIf a person causes injury to another by wrongful act, neglect or default, the person will (whether or not the injury results in death) be liable in damages to the spouse or domestic partner of the injured person for loss or injury suffered by the spouse or domestic partner as a result of the loss or impairment of consortium.\n\t(2)\tDamages for the loss or impairment of consortium suffered by the spouse or domestic partner of an injured person on account of personal injury arising from an MVA motor accident will not be awarded unless the injury scale value that applies under the regulations in relation to the injury exceeds 10.\n66—Damages where injured spouse or domestic partner participated in business\n\t(1)\tWhere spouses or domestic partners are jointly engaged in the conduct of a business, and either of them suffers an injury as a result of which his or her participation in the conduct of the business ceases or is impaired, the other spouse or domestic partner (as the case may be) shall be entitled to recover from a person whose wrongful act, neglect or default caused the injury compensation for loss that he or she has suffered or continues to suffer by reason of the fact that the participation of his or her spouse or domestic partner (as the case may be) in the conduct of the business has ceased or has been impaired.\n\t(2)\tIn this section—\nbusiness includes any professional or commercial undertaking;\ninjury includes an injury that results in death.\nDivision 6—Limitation on the award of damages for the costs of raising a child\n67—Limitation on the award of damages for the costs of raising a child\n\t(1)\tIn an action to which this section applies, no damages are to be awarded to cover the ordinary costs of raising a child.\n\t(2)\tThe ordinary costs of raising a child include all costs associated with the child's care, upbringing, education and advancement in life except, in the case of a child who is mentally or physically disabled, any amount by which those costs would reasonably exceed what would be incurred if the child were not disabled.\n\t(3)\tThis section applies to—\n\t(a)\tan action for negligence resulting in the unintended conception of a child; or\n\t(b)\tan action for negligence resulting in the failure of an attempted abortion; or\n\t(c)\tan action for negligence resulting in the birth of a child from a pregnancy that would have been aborted but for the negligence; or\n\t(d)\tan action for innocent misrepresentation resulting in—\n\t(i)\tthe unintended conception of a child; or\n\t(ii)\tthe birth of a child from a pregnancy that would have been aborted but for the misrepresentation; or\n\t(e)\tan action for damages for breach of a statutory or implied warranty of merchantable quality, or fitness for purpose, in a case where a child is conceived as a result of the failure of a contraceptive device.\ncontraceptive device includes any medicine or substance used to prevent conception;\ninnocent misrepresentation means any misrepresentation by words or conduct made without an intention to deceive.\n","sortOrder":16},{"sectionNumber":"Div 7","sectionType":"division","heading":"Abolition of actions of seduction, enticement and harbouring","content":"Division 7—Abolition of actions of seduction, enticement and harbouring\n68—Abolition of actions for enticement, seduction and harbouring\nThe following actions at common law are abolished—\n\t(a)\tthe action for seduction; and\n\t(b)\tthe action for enticement; and\n\t(c)\tthe action for harbouring.\n","sortOrder":17},{"sectionNumber":"Div 8","sectionType":"division","heading":"Unreasonable delay in resolution of claim","content":"Division 8—Unreasonable delay in resolution of claim\n69—Definitions\nIn this Division—\ndependant of a deceased person means any person on whose behalf an action could (assuming that he or she had been financially dependent on the deceased person) be brought under Part 5;\npersonal injury includes—\n\t(a)\ta disease;\n\t(b)\tany impairment of a physical or mental condition.\n70—Damages for unreasonable delay in resolution of a claim\n\t(1)\tDamages in the nature of exemplary damages may be awarded, on a claim by the personal representative of a deceased person, against another person (the person in default) if the conditions prescribed by subsection (2) are satisfied.\n\t(2)\tThe conditions for an award of damages under this section are as follows:\n\t(a)\tthe deceased person suffered personal injury giving rise to a right to compensation or damages; and\n\t(b)\tthe deceased person made a claim in writing (giving a reasonable indication of the grounds of the claim) for compensation or damages for the personal injury; and\n\t(c)\ta person (the person in default) unreasonably delayed the resolution of the claim knowing, or in circumstances in which he or she ought to have known, that the deceased person was, because of advanced age, illness or injury, at risk of dying before the resolution of the claim; and\n\t(d)\tthe person in default is—\n\t(i)\tthe person against whom the deceased person's claim lay; or\n\t(ii)\tsome other person who controlled or had an interest in the defence of the claim; and\n\t(e)\tthe deceased person died before compensation or damages for non-economic loss were finally determined by agreement between the parties or by judgment or decision of a court or tribunal; and\n\t(f)\tdamages have not been recovered and are not recoverable under section 3(2) of the Survival of Causes of Action Act 1940.\n\t(3)\tFor the purposes of subsection (2)—\n\t(a)\tthe question whether a person has unreasonably delayed resolution of a claim is to be determined in the context of the proceedings as a whole (including negotiations and other non-curial proceedings) and the conduct of the deceased person and any other parties to the proceedings;\n\t(b)\ta lawful fee agreement between a legal practitioner and client does not give the legal practitioner an interest in the defence of the claim;\n\t(c)\tif a judgment or decision of a court or tribunal is liable to appeal, then—\n\t(i)\tif there is no appeal—the judgment or decision finally determines compensation or damages on the date it is given; but\n\t(ii)\tif there is an appeal—there is no final determination of compensation or damages until the appeal is determined.\n\t(4)\tA court or tribunal that has, or would have had, jurisdiction in an action for damages, workers compensation or other monetary compensation for the personal injury has jurisdiction to award damages on a claim under this section but such a claim must be brought before the court or tribunal within 3 years after the deceased person's death (either as a separate proceeding or by introducing it as an additional claim in existing proceedings for damages or compensation for the personal injury).\n\t(5)\tIn determining the amount of the damages to be awarded under this section, the court or tribunal is to have regard to—\n\t(a)\tthe need to ensure that the person in default does not benefit from the unreasonable delay in the resolution of the deceased person's claim; and\n\t(b)\tthe need to punish the person in default for the unreasonable delay; and\n\t(c)\tany other relevant factor.\n\t(6)\tDamages may be awarded under this section despite any statutory restriction on the award of exemplary or punitive damages but, if the deceased person's claim was for worker's compensation, the damages cannot exceed the total amount of the compensation for non-economic loss to which the deceased person would have been entitled if the claim had been resolved immediately before his or her death.\n\t(7)\tDamages awarded under this section are to be paid, at the direction of the court or tribunal—\n\t(a)\tto the dependants of the deceased person in proportions determined by the court or tribunal; or\n\t(b)\tto the estate of the deceased person.\n\t(8)\tIn exercising its discretion under subsection (7), the court or tribunal—\n\t(a)\tis to make an award to dependants rather than to the estate unless there are no dependants or there is some other good reason to the contrary; and\n\t(b)\tin apportioning between dependants is to have regard to other relevant statutory entitlements (if any) that arise on the death of the deceased person.\n\t(9)\tThis section applies if the deceased person died on or after the commencement of this section (whether the circumstances out of which the personal injury claim arose occurred before or after that date).\n71—Regulations\n\t(1)\tThe Governor may make regulations for the purposes of this Division.\n\t(2)\tThe regulations may (for example) deal with any aspect of the procedure to be followed in proceedings under this Division.\n","sortOrder":18},{"sectionNumber":"Div 9","sectionType":"division","heading":"Liability for perjury in civil actions","content":"Division 9—Liability for perjury in civil actions\n72—Liability for perjury in civil actions\n\t(1)\tSubject to this section, a person who gives perjured evidence in civil proceedings is liable for damage suffered by any other person in consequence of the perjury.\n\t(2)\tIn proceedings under this section, the plaintiff must establish—\n\t(a)\tthat the defendant—\n\t(i)\thas been convicted of perjury; or\n\t(ii)\thas been found guilty of contempt of court on the ground of having committed perjury; or\n\t(iii)\thas been committed for trial on a charge of perjury but by reason of the fact that no indictment has been preferred, or a nolle prosequi has been entered, has not been tried on that charge; and\n\t(b)\tthat the perjured evidence was material to the outcome of the proceedings in which it was given.\n\t(3)\tWhere the defendant has not been convicted of perjury, or been found guilty of contempt of court on the ground of having committed perjury, the evidence upon which a liability is alleged to arise under this section must be corroborated in a material particular.\n\t(4)\tIt is no defence to an action under this section that the perjured evidence was accepted as true by the court before which it was given.\n\t(5)\tIn proceedings under this section, an apparently genuine document that appears to be a transcript of evidence given in the proceedings in which the perjured evidence is alleged to have been given shall be accepted as evidence—\n\t(a)\tof the evidence given in those proceedings; and\n\t(b)\twhere evidence appears from the transcript to have been given by a particular person—that it was in fact given by that person.\n","sortOrder":19},{"sectionNumber":"Div 10","sectionType":"division","heading":"Racial victimisation","content":"Division 10—Racial victimisation\n73—Racial victimisation\nact of racial victimisation means a public act inciting hatred, serious contempt or severe ridicule of a person or group of persons on the ground of their race but does not include—\n\t(a)\tpublication of a fair report of the act of another person; or\n\t(b)\tpublication of material in circumstances in which the publication would be subject to a defence of absolute privilege in proceedings for defamation; or\n\t(c)\ta reasonable act, done in good faith, for academic, artistic, scientific or research purposes or for other purposes in the public interest (including reasonable public discussion, debate or expositions);\ndetriment means—\n\t(a)\tinjury, damage or loss; or\n\t(b)\tdistress in the nature of intimidation, harassment or humiliation;\npublic act means—\n\t(a)\tany form of communication with the public; or\n\t(b)\tconduct in a public place;\nrace of a person means the nationality, country of origin, colour or ethnic origin of the person or of another person with whom the person resides or associates.\n\t(2)\tAn act of racial victimisation that results in detriment is actionable as a tort by the person who suffers the detriment.\n\t(3)\tIn an action for damages for racial victimisation, damages may be awarded to compensate any form of detriment.\n\t(4)\tThe total amount of the damages that may be awarded for the same act or series of acts cannot exceed $40 000.\n\t(5)\tIn applying the limit fixed by subsection (4), the court must take into account damages awarded by a court in criminal proceedings on convicting the defendant, in respect of the same act or series of acts, of the offence or a series of offences of racial vilification1.\n\t(6)\tBefore a court awards damages for an act of racial victimisation, the court must—\n\t(a)\ttake reasonable steps to ensure that all persons who may have been harmed by the act are given a reasonable opportunity to claim damages in the proceedings; or\n\t(b)\ttake other action that appears reasonable and necessary in the circumstances to protect the interests of possible claimants who are not before the court.\nNote—\n1\tSee section 6 of the Racial Vilification Act 1996.\n","sortOrder":20},{"sectionNumber":"Div 11","sectionType":"division","heading":"Good samaritans","content":"Division 11—Good samaritans\n74—Good samaritans\nemergency assistance means—\n\t(a)\temergency medical assistance; or\n\t(b)\tany other form of assistance to a person whose life or safety is endangered in a situation of emergency;\ngood samaritan means—\n\t(a)\ta person who, acting without expectation of payment or other consideration, comes to the aid of a person who is apparently in need of emergency assistance; or\n\t(b)\ta medically qualified person who, acting without expectation of payment or other consideration, gives advice by telephone or some other form of telecommunication about the treatment of a person who is apparently in need of emergency medical assistance;\nmedically qualified—a person is to be regarded as medically qualified if the person—\n\t(a)\tis a registered medical practitioner; or\n\t(b)\thas professional qualifications in some field of health care that are statutorily recognised; or\n\t(c)\tworks or has worked as an ambulance officer or in some other recognised paramedical capacity.\n\t(2)\tA good samaritan incurs no personal civil liability for an act or omission done or made in good faith and without recklessness in assisting a person in apparent need of emergency assistance.\n\t(3)\tA medically qualified good samaritan incurs no personal civil liability for advice given about the assistance to be given to a person in apparent need of emergency medical assistance.\n\t(4)\tHowever—\n\t(a)\tthe immunity does not extend to a liability that falls within the ambit of a scheme of compulsory third party motor vehicle insurance; and\n\t(b)\tthe immunity does not operate if the good samaritan's capacity to exercise due care and skill was, at the relevant time, significantly impaired by alcohol or another recreational drug.\n","sortOrder":21},{"sectionNumber":"Div 11A","sectionType":"division","heading":"Food donors and distributors","content":"Division 11A—Food donors and distributors\n74A—Food donors and distributors\n\t(1)\tIn this section, a reference to a food donor or distributor is a reference to a person who, acting without expectation of payment or other consideration and for a charitable or benevolent purpose, donates or distributes food with the intention that the consumer of the food would not have to pay for the food and to the agents or employees of such a person.\n\t(2)\tA food donor or distributor incurs no civil liability for loss of life or personal injury arising from consumption of the food donated or distributed.\n\t(3)\tHowever, the immunity does not operate if the food donor or distributor knew or was recklessly indifferent to the fact that when the food left the possession or control of the food donor or distributor it was unsafe within the meaning of the Food Act 2001.\n\t(4)\tThe Minister must, as soon as practicable after the second anniversary of the commencement of this section—\n\t(a)\tcause a report to be prepared on the operation of this section; and\n\t(b)\tcause a copy of the report to be laid before each House of Parliament.\n","sortOrder":22},{"sectionNumber":"Div 11B","sectionType":"division","heading":"Supply of food in customers' containers","content":"Division 11B—Supply of food in customers' containers\n74B—Supplying food in customers' own containers\n\t(1)\tA person who sells food to a customer in a container supplied by the customer incurs no civil liability for any personal injury caused by the use of the container.\n\t(2)\tThe immunity under subsection (1) extends to the agents and employees of the person selling the food.\n\t(3)\tHowever, the immunity does not operate—\n\t(a)\tif the use of the container by the person selling the food was negligent; or\n\t(b)\tif use of the container was unlawful under any Act; or\n\t(c)\tif the food was subject to a recall order at the time it was sold.\n\t(4)\tIn this section, the terms food and recall order have the same meaning as in the Food Act 2001.\n","sortOrder":23},{"sectionNumber":"Div 12","sectionType":"division","heading":"Effect of apology on liability","content":"Division 12—Effect of apology on liability\n75—Effect of apology on liability\n\t(1)\tAn apology made by or on behalf of a person in connection with any matter alleged to have been caused by the person—\n\t(a)\tdoes not constitute an express or implied admission of fault or liability by the person in connection with that matter; and\n\t(b)\tis not relevant to the determination of fault or liability in connection with that matter.\n\t(2)\tEvidence of an apology made by or on behalf of a person in connection with any matter alleged to have been caused by the person is not admissible in any civil proceedings as evidence of the fault or liability of the person in connection with that matter.\n\t(3)\tThis section does not apply in relation to—\n\t(a)\tliability in respect of the tort of defamation; and\n\t(b)\tcivil liability of a kind that is excluded from the operation of this section by regulation.\napology means an expression of sympathy or regret, or of a general sense of benevolence or compassion, in connection with any matter, whether or not the apology admits or implies an admission of fault in connection with the matter.\n","sortOrder":24},{"sectionNumber":"Div 12A","sectionType":"division","heading":"Exclusion of civil liability where Crown publishes certain information","content":"Division 12A—Exclusion of civil liability where Crown publishes certain information\n75A—Exclusion of civil liability where Crown publishes certain information\n\t(1)\tSubject to this section, no civil liability (whether in tort, contract, equity or otherwise) arises out of the publication by, or on behalf of, the Crown of information of a kind, or in circumstances, prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this section.\n\t(2)\tNothing in subsection (1) affects the civil liability of—\n\t(a)\tthe person who was the author or originator of the information; or\n\t(b)\ta person who publishes the information other than on behalf of the Crown.\n\t(3)\tFor the purposes of this section, the Crown, and any person acting on behalf of the Crown, will be taken not to be the author or originator of information where the information published consists of an extract of information provided to, or otherwise in the possession of, the Crown.\n\t(4)\tExcept as contemplated by subsections (1) and (3), this section is in addition to, and does not derogate from, the Defamation Act 2005.\n","sortOrder":25},{"sectionNumber":"Div 13","sectionType":"division","heading":"Regulations","content":"Division 13—Regulations\n76—Assessment of motor vehicle injuries\n\t(1)\tThe regulations may, in relation to any claim, entitlement or award of damages in respect of personal injury arising from an MVA motor accident—\n\t(a)\tauthorise an insurer or the nominal defendant under Part 4 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 to require a claimant to submit to an assessment or examination of a prescribed kind; and\n\t(b)\trequire that an examination or assessment be undertaken by an accredited health professional (see subsection (2)) in order to obtain advice and evidence in relation to any relevant matter; and\n\t(c)\tspecify procedures to be followed in connection with any examination or assessment, including as to the determination or selection of an accredited health professional who is to undertake the examination or assessment; and\n\t(d)\tspecify the maximum number of examinations or assessments that may be made in a particular case; and\n\t(e)\tprescribe rules that are to be applied with respect to the determination of any injury scale value under this Act; and\n\t(f)\twithout limiting a preceding paragraph, make provision for the provision of advice or evidence about diagnosis, causation, prognosis, future requirements for treatment, care or support, or other matters that are relevant to any assessment of damages or liability in respect of the injury; and\n\t(g)\tmake provision for the preparation and furnishing of reports and other information or material, including as to the procedures or processes associated with requesting any report, document or other material, the form of any report, document or other material, and the persons to whom any report, document or other material is to be provided or made available; and\n\t(h)\tprovide for any other matter that may be relevant to assessing or determining a claim or entitlement, or making an award of damages.\n\t(2)\tThe designated Minister may establish an accreditation scheme with respect to health professionals in connection with regulations under this section.\n\t(3)\tThe accreditation scheme—\n\t(a)\tmay provide for a term or a period of accreditation, and for the suspension or cancellation of accreditation on specified grounds; and\n\t(b)\tmay specify terms or conditions of accreditation; and\n\t(c)\tmay provide for any aspect of the scheme to be administered or managed by a person or body specified by the designated Minister; and\n\t(d)\tmay provide that a person holding an accreditation, registration or other form of authorisation or status under another scheme recognised by the designated Minister will be taken to hold an accreditation under this section; and\n\t(e)\tmay be amended or substituted by the designated Minister from time to time.\n\t(4)\tThe rules that are to apply for the purpose of assessing injury scale values (ISVs) for multiple injuries must include 1 or more provisions that adopt the following principles:\n\t(a)\ta court must consider the range of ISVs for the dominant injury of the multiple injuries;\n\t(b)\tin order to reflect the level of adverse impact of multiple injuries on an injured person, a court may assess the ISV for the multiple injuries as being higher in the range of ISVs for the dominant injury of the multiple injuries than the ISV that the court would assess for the dominant injury only;\n\t(c)\tif a court considers that the level of impact of multiple injuries on an injured person is so severe that the maximum ISV for the dominant injury is inadequate to reflect the level of impact, the court may make an assessment of the ISV for the multiple injuries that is higher than the maximum ISV for the dominant injury, subject to the following qualifications:\n\t(i)\tthe ISV for multiple injuries cannot exceed 100;\n\t(ii)\tthe ISV for multiple injuries should rarely be more than 25% higher than the maximum ISV for the dominant injury.\n\t(5)\tIn connection with the operation of subsection (4), a dominant injury, in relation to multiple injuries, is—\n\t(a)\tsubject to paragraph (b)—the injury of the multiple injuries having the highest range; or\n\t(b)\tif the highest range for 2 or more of the injuries of the multiple injuries is the same—the injury of those injuries selected as the dominant injury by a court assessing an ISV.\n\t(6)\tSubsections (4) and (5) do not limit any other principle or provision that may apply under the regulations in relation to the assessment and determination of an ISV for a particular injury.\n\t(7)\tFor the purposes of the rules that are to apply for the purpose of assessing any injury scale value under a designated section (being rules that determine a substantive matter rather than prescribe a procedural matter), the relevant regulations are the regulations applying at the time of the occurrence of the relevant injury.\n\t(8)\tIf a person fails to comply with a requirement prescribed under subsection (1) in respect of a claim or proceedings made or commenced by the person—\n\t(a)\tin the case of a claim—a person or body to which the claim has been made may decline to consider or deal with the claim while the failure continues; and\n\t(b)\tthe person is not entitled, until he or she complies with the requirement, to commence proceedings or to continue proceedings that have been commenced in respect of the personal injury.\n\t(9)\tIn addition, the regulations may—\n\t(a)\trequire an insurer or the nominal defendant under Part 4 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 to pay for the costs of examinations and assessments, and for the preparation and furnishing of reports, documents or other material, in prescribed circumstances (subject to any limits specified in the regulations); and\n\t(b)\tlimit the liability of an insurer or the nominal defendant under Part 4 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 to pay for the costs of examinations and assessments, and for the preparation and furnishing of reports, documents or other material, in connection with a claim (and any such regulation may provide that prescribed costs (if any) be borne by a claimant and will have effect according to its terms and despite a liability that would otherwise arise under Part 4 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 or any other Act or law); and\n\t(c)\trequire an insurer or the nominal defendant under Part 4 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 to make a contribution (determined in accordance with the regulations) towards the costs of the accreditation scheme established by the Minister under this section (including so that the scheme is fully‑funded through the making of those contributions).\n\t(10)\tA regulation under subsection (1)(e) may only be made on the recommendation of the designated Minister.\n\t(11)\tBefore the designated Minister makes a recommendation under subsection (10), the designated Minister must consult with—\n\t(a)\tthe Attorney‑General; and\n\t(b)\tThe South Australian Branch of the Australian Medical Association Incorporated; and\n\t(c)\tThe Law Society of South Australia.\n\t(12)\tIf an association referred to in subsection (11) objects to any matter contained in a regulation under subsection (10), the designated Minister must, at the request of that association, prepare a report that—\n\t(a)\tprovides information about the consultation that has been undertaken; and\n\t(b)\tsets out the objection that has been made (including the reasons put forward by the association for its objection).\n\t(13)\tThe Minister must cause a copy of a report under subsection (12) to be laid before both Houses of Parliament as soon as is reasonably practicable after the request is made.\n\t(14)\tIn addition, a regulation that would have the effect of changing the injury scale value applying with respect to a particular injury so that a person who suffers that injury (and no other injury) would, on account of that change, no longer have a right to damages for non‑economic loss under section 52(3) and (4) cannot come into operation until the time for disallowance of the regulation has passed.\n\t(15)\tNothing in this section is intended to prevent or restrict a court from exercising any judicial power or from determining a matter according to law.\n\t(16)\tIn this section—\ndesignated Minister means the Minister from time to time designated by the Governor by proclamation to be the designated Minister for the purposes of this section;\ndesignated section means any of the following sections:\n\t(a)\tsection 52;\n\t(b)\tsection 56A;\n\t(c)\tsection 58;\n\t(d)\tsection 65;\nhealth professional means—\n\t(a)\ta registered health practitioner under the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (other than a student); or\n\t(b)\ta person who is within a class brought within the ambit of this definition by the regulations.\n77—Regulations—general provisions\n\t(1)\tWithout limiting section 76, the Governor may make such regulations as are contemplated by this Act or as are necessary or expedient for the purposes of this Act.\n\t(2)\tA regulation under this Act may—\n\t(a)\trefer to or incorporate, wholly or partially and with or without modification, a document prepared or published by a specified body, either as in force at the time the regulation is made or as in force from time to time; and\n\t(b)\tbe of general or limited application; and\n\t(c)\tmake different provision according to the persons or circumstances to which it is expressed to apply; and\n\t(d)\tprovide that a matter is to be determined according to the discretion of a prescribed person or body.\nLegislative history\nNotes\n\t•\tAmendments of this version that are uncommenced are not incorporated into the text.\n\t•\tPlease note—References in the legislation to other legislation or instruments or to titles of bodies or offices are not automatically updated as part of the program for the revision and publication of legislation and therefore may be obsolete.\n\t•\tEarlier versions of this Act (historical versions) are listed at the end of the legislative history.\n\t•\tFor further information relating to the Act and subordinate legislation made under the Act see the Index of South Australian Statutes or www.legislation.sa.gov.au.\nFormerly\nWrongs Act 1936\nPrincipal Act and amendments\nNew entries appear in bold.\nYear\nNo\nTitle\nAssent\nCommencement\nWrongs Act 1936\n13.8.1936\n13.8.1936\nWrongs Act Amendment Act 1939\n22.11.1939\n22.11.1939\nWrongs Act Amendment Act 1940\n28.11.1940\n28.11.1940\nWrongs Act Amendment Act 1944\n23.11.1944\n23.11.1944\nWrongs Act Amendment Act 1951\n13.12.1951\n13.12.1951\nStatute Law Revision Act 1952\n4.12.1952\n4.12.1952\nLimitation of Actions and Wrongs Acts Amendment Act 1956\n8.11.1956\n8.11.1956\nWrongs Act Amendment Act 1956\n22.11.1956\n22.11.1956\nWrongs Act Amendment Act 1958\n27.11.1958\n27.11.1958\nWrongs Act Amendment Act 1959\n10.12.1959\n10.12.1959\nStatutes Amendment (Law of Property and Wrongs) Act 1972\n30.3.1972\n18.5.1972 (Gazette 18.5.1972 p1926)\nStatutes Amendment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1972\n27.4.1972\n18.5.1972 (Gazette 18.5.1972 p1926)\nWrongs Act Amendment Act 1974\n17.10.1974\n28.11.1974 (Gazette 28.11.1974 p3373)\nStatute Law Revision Act (No. 2) 1975\nWrongs Act Amendment Act 1975\n29.1.1976 (Gazette 29.1.1976 p356)\nWrongs Act Amendment Act 1983\nWrongs Act Amendment Act (No. 2) 1983\nWrongs Act Amendment Act 1986\n24.12.1986\n8.2.1987 (Gazette 5.2.1987 p250)\nWrongs Act Amendment Act 1987\n30.4.1987\n5.7.1987 (Gazette 28.5.1987 p1384)\nWrongs Act Amendment Act 1988\n5.5.1988\n8.2.1987: s 2\nWrongs Amendment Act 1991\nStatutes Amendment (Motor Vehicles and Wrongs) Act 1993\n4.3.1993\n3.5.1993 (Gazette 29.4.1993 p1476)\nStatutes Amendment (Courts) Act 1993\n27.5.1993\ns 42—28.10.1993 (Gazette 27.10.1993 p1892)\nStatutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) Act 1994\n26.5.1994\n7.7.1994 (Gazette 7.7.1994 p4)\nPassenger Transport Act 1994\n26.5.1994\nSch 4—1.7.1994 (Gazette 30.6.1994 p1843)\nCriminal Law Consolidation (Felonies and Misdemeanours) Amendment Act 1994\n27.10.1994\n1.1.1995 (Gazette 8.12.1994 p1942)\nRacial Vilification Act 1996\n12.12.1996\n6.7.1998 (Gazette 2.7.1998 p9)\nStatutes Amendment (References to Banks) Act 1997\n12.6.1997\nPt 13 (s 19)—3.7.1997 (Gazette 3.7.1997 p4)\nNon-Metropolitan Railways (Transfer) Act 1997\n31.7.1997\n11.9.1997 (Gazette 11.9.1997 p703)\nStatutes Amendment (Motor Accidents) Act 1998\n17.9.1998\nPt 3 (s 13) and Pt 4 (s 14)—29.10.1998 (Gazette 17.9.1998 p902)\nFinancial Sector Reform (South Australia) Act 1999\n17.6.1999\nSch (item 64)—1.7.1999 being the date specified under s 3(16) of the Financial Sector Reform (Amendments and Transitional Provisions) Act (No. 1) 1999 of the Commonwealth as the transfer date for the purposes of that Act: s 2(2)\nWrongs (Damage by Aircraft) Amendment Act 2000\n20.4.2000\n9.11.2000 (Gazette 9.11.2000 p3004)\nLaw Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001\n3.8.2001\ns 9(1)—16.8.2001 (Gazette 16.8.2001 p3046)\nWrongs (Liability and Damages for Personal Injury) Amendment Act 2002\n12.9.2002\n1.12.2002 (Gazette 28.11.2002 p4293)\nLaw Reform (Delay in Resolution of Personal Injury Claims) Act 2002\n28.11.2002\ns 4—10.3.2003 (Gazette 13.2.2003 p581)\nStatute Law Revision Act 2003\n23.10.2003\nSch 1—24.11.2003 (Gazette 13.11.2003 p4048)\nLaw Reform (Ipp Recommendations) Act 2004\n8.4.2004\nPt 2 (ss 4—72)—1.5.2004 (Gazette 29.4.2004 p1172)\nDefamation Act 2005\n27.10.2005\nSch 1 (cll 2 & 3)—1.1.2006: s 2\nDust Diseases Act 2005\n8.12.2005\nSch 1 (cl 1)—8.2.2006: s 2\nStatutes Amendment (Domestic Partners) Act 2006\n14.12.2006\nPt 15 (ss 42—51)—1.6.2007 (Gazette 26.4.2007 p1352)\nStatutes Amendment (Justice Portfolio) Act 2006\n14.12.2006\nPt 6 (ss 8—10)—18.1.2007 (Gazette 18.1.2007 p234)\nCivil Liability (Food Donors and Distributors) Amendment Act 2008\n11.12.2008\n12.12.2008 (Gazette 11.12.2008 p5474)\nStatutes Amendment and Repeal (Fair Trading) Act 2009\n23.7.2009\nPt 3 (ss 7 & 8)—1.1.2011 (Gazette 9.12.2010 p5580)\nMotor Vehicle Accidents (Lifetime Support Scheme) Act 2013\n23.5.2013\nSch 2 (cll 2—8, 21 & 23)—1.7.2013 (Gazette 20.6.2013 p2629)\nReturn to Work Act 2014\n6.11.2014\nSch 9 (cl 3)—1.7.2015 (Gazette 4.12.2014 p6610)\nCivil Liability (Disclosure of Information) Amendment Act 2014\n27.11.2014\n2.10.2015 (Gazette 10.9.2015 p4221)\nStatutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) Act 2016\nPt 3 (s 5)—16.6.2016: s 2(1)\nStatutes Amendment (Registered Relationships) Act 2017\n26.4.2017\nPt 4 (s 8)—1.8.2017 (Gazette 1.8.2017 p3039)\nCivil Liability (Institutional Child Abuse Liability) Amendment Act 2021\n9.12.2021\n1.8.2022 (Gazette 28.7.2022 p2373)\nCivil Liability (BYO Containers) Amendment Act 2022\nStatutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio and Other Justice Measures) Act 2023\n23.2.2023\nPt 4 (s 7)—22.6.2023 (Gazette 15.6.2023 p1774)\nChildren and Young People (Safety and Support) Act 2025\n12.6.2025\nSch 2 (cll 9 & 10)—uncommenced\nProvisions amended since 3 February 1976\n\t•\tLegislative history prior to 3 February 1976 appears in marginal notes and footnotes included in the consolidation of this Act contained in Volume 11 of The Public General Acts of South Australia 1837-1975 at page 642.\nNew entries appear in bold.\nEntries that relate to provisions that have been deleted appear in italics.\nProvision\nHow varied\nCommencement\nPt 1\n\nPt 1 heading\nPt A1 heading inserted by 44/2003 s 3(1) (Sch 1)\n24.11.2003\n\nPt 1 heading inserted by 9/2004 s 4\n\nPt A1 heading renumbered Pt 1 heading under Legislation Revision and Publication Act 2002\ns 1\nsubstituted by 9/2004 s 5\ns 2\nsubstituted by 9/2004 s 6\ns 3\nsubstituted by 116/1983 s 2\n\ndeleted by 9/2004 s 7\ns 3\ns 3A redesignated as s 3 by 9/2004 s 8(6)\ns 3(1)\ns 3 redesignated as s 3(1) by 15/2013 Sch 2(3)\naccident\ninserted by 9/2004 s 8(1)\nconsequential mental harm\nConsumer Price Index\ncontributory negligence\ndamages\ndomestic partner\ninserted by 43/2006 s 42(1)\n\nsubstituted by 13/2017 s 8(1)\ndrive\nduty of care\nharm\nhealth care service\nintoxicated\nthe judgment first given\ndeleted by 9/2004 s 8(2)\nmedical expenses\nmental harm\nmotor accident\n\namended by 15/2013 Sch 2 cl 2(1)\nmotor vehicle\nMVA motor accident\ninserted by 15/2013 Sch 2 cl 2(2)\nnegligence\nnewspaper\ndeleted by 50/2005 Sch 1 cl 2\nnon-economic loss\ninserted by 9/2004 s 8(3)\nobvious risk\ninserted by 9/2004 s 8(3)\npassenger compartment\npersonal injury or injury\nprecaution\nprescribed discount rate\nprescribed maximum\nprescribed minimum\npure mental harm\nputative spouse\ndeleted by 43/2006 s 42(2)\nregistered relationship\ninserted by 13/2017 s 8(2)\nspouse\nsubstituted by 43/2006 s 42(3)\nState average weekly earnings\ninserted by 9/2004 s 8(5)\ns 3(2)\ninserted by 15/2013 Sch 2 cl 2(3)\ns 3B\ninserted by 116/1983 s 3\n\nomitted under Legislation Revision and Publication Act 2002\n10.3.2003\ns 4\ninserted by 9/2004 s 9\ns 4(3)\ndeleted by 39/2009 s 7\ns 4(4)\namended by 16/2014 Sch 9 cl 3\n1.7.2015\nPt 2 before deletion by 50/2005\n\nPt 2 heading\nPt 1 heading deleted and Pt 2 heading inserted by 9/2004 s 10\ns 6\namended by 116/1983 s 4\ns 7\n\ns 7(1)\namended by 116/1983 s 5\n\namended by 30/1997 s 19\n3.7.1997\n\namended by 33/1999 Sch (item 64)\n1.7.1999\ns 8\namended by 116/1983 s 6\ns 10\n\ns 10(1)\namended by 116/1983 s 7\ns 11\namended by 116/1983 s 8\ns 14\namended by 116/1983 s 9\nPt 2\ndeleted by 50/2005 Sch 1 cl 3\nPt 3\nPt 1A comprising s 17A and heading inserted by 116/1983 s 10\nPt 3 heading\nPt 1A heading deleted and Pt 3 heading inserted by 9/2004 s 11\ns 18\ns 17A redesignated as s 18 by 9/2004 s 12\nPt 4\nPt 1B comprising s 17B—17E and heading inserted by 45/1987 s 3\n5.7.1987\nPt 4 heading\nPt 1B heading deleted and Pt 4 heading inserted by 9/2004 s 13\ns 19\ns 17B redesignated as s 19 by 9/2004 s 14\ns 20\ns 17C redesignated as s 20 by 9/2004 s 15\ns 21\ns 17D redesignated as s 21 by 9/2004 s 16\ns 22\ns 17E redesignated as s 22 by 9/2004 s 17\nPt 5\n\nPt 5 heading\nPt 2 heading deleted and Pt 5 heading inserted by 9/2004 s 18\ns 23\ns 19 amended by 59/1994 Sch 2\n1.1.1995\n\ns 19 redesignated as s 23 by 9/2004 s 19\ns 24\ns 20 redesignated as s 24 by 9/2004 s 20(2)\ns 24(1)\namended by 43/2006 s 43(1)\ns 24(2)\ns 20(2) substituted by 9/2004 s 20(1)\ns 24(2aa)\ns 20(2aa)(i)—(v) redesignated as s 20(2aa)(a)—(e) by 44/2003 s 3(1) (Sch 1)\n24.11.2003\n\namended by 78/2005 Sch 1 cl 1\n8.2.2006\ns 24(4)\namended by 43/2006 s 43(2)\ns 24(7)\namended by 43/2006 s 43(3), (4)\ns 25\ns 21 redesignated as s 25 by 9/2004 s 21\ns 26\ns 22 redesignated as s 26 by 9/2004 s 22\ns 27\ns 23 redesignated as s 27 by 9/2004 s 23(2)\ns 27(1)\ns 23(1) amended by 9/2004 s 23(1)\ns 28\ns 23A redesignated as s 28 by 9/2004 s 24\ns 28(1)\namended by 44/2006 s 8\ns 29\ns 23B redesignated as s 29 by 9/2004 s 25\ns 29(1)\namended by 44/2006 s 9\n\namended by 43/2006 s 44(1)\ns 29(2)\namended by 43/2006 s 44(2)—(4)\ns 29(3)\namended by 43/2006 s 44(5)\ns 29(4)\nsubstituted by 43/2006 s 44(6)\ns 30\ns 23C redesignated as s 30 by 9/2004 s 26(5)\ns 30(1)\ns 23C(1) amended by 9/2004 s 26(1)\n\namended by 43/2006 s 45\ns 30(2)\ns 23C(2) amended by 9/2004 s 26(2)\ns 30(3)\ns 23C(3) amended by 9/2004 s 26(3)\ns 30(4)\ns 23C(4) amended by 59/1994 Sch 2\n1.1.1995\n\ns 23C(4) amended by 9/2004 s 26(4)\nPt 6\ninserted by 9/2004 s 27\ns 38\n\ns 38(2)\namended by 39/2009 s 8\nPt 7\ninserted by 9/2004 s 27\ns 46\ns 24J redesignated as s 46 by 9/2004 s 40(2)\ns 46(2)\ns 24J(2) amended by 9/2004 s 40(1)\ns 47\ns 24K redesignated as s 47 by 9/2004 s 41\ns 48\ns 24L redesignated as s 48 by 9/2004 s 41\ns 49\ns 24M redesignated as s 49 by 9/2004 s 41\ns 50\ns 24N redesignated as s 50 by 9/2004 s 41\nPts 7A and 7B\ninserted by 52/2021 s 4\n1.8.2022\nPt 8 \nPt 2A comprising ss 24—24O and headings inserted by 21/2002 s 3\nPt 8 heading\nPt 2A heading deleted and Pt 8 heading inserted by 9/2004 s 28\nPt 8 Div 1\nPt 2A Div 1 deleted by 9/2004 s 29\ns 51\ninserted by 9/2004 s 29\nPt 8 Div 2 heading\nPt 2A Div 2 heading deleted by 9/2004 s 30\ns 52\ns 24B redesignated as s 52 by 9/2004 s 31\ns 52(2)\namended by 15/2013 Sch 2 cl  3(1)\ns 52(3)—(8)\ninserted by 15/2013 Sch 2 cl 3(2)\ns 24C\ndeleted by 9/2004 s 32\ns 53\ninserted by 9/2004 s 32\ns 53(1)\namended by 43/2006 s 46\ns 54\ns 24D redesignated as s 54 by 9/2004 s 33(2)\ns 54(3)\ninserted by 9/2004 s 33(1)\ns 55\ns 24E redesignated as s 55 by 9/2004 s 34\ns 56\ns 24F redesignated as s 56 by 9/2004 s 35\ns 56A\ninserted by 15/2013 Sch 2 cl 4\ns 57\ns 24G redesignated as s 57 by 9/2004 s 36\ns 58\ns 24H redesignated as s 58 by 9/2004 s 37\ns 58(1)—(3)\namended by 43/2006 s 47\ns 58(4)—(6)\ninserted by 15/2013 Sch 2 cl 5\nss 58A and 58B\ninserted by 15/2013 Sch 2 cl 6\nPt 8 Div 3 heading\nPt 2A Div 3 heading deleted by 9/2004 s 38\ns 24I\ndeleted by 9/2004 s 39\nss 24J—24N—see ss 46—50\n\nPt 8 Div 4\nPt 2A Div 4 deleted by 9/2004 s 42\nPt 9\n\nPt 9 heading\nPt 3 heading deleted and Pt 9 heading inserted by 9/2004 s 43\nPt 3 Div 1 heading\nheading preceding s 24 deleted and Pt 3 Div 1 heading inserted by 8/2000 s 4 (Sch)\n\ns 24\n\nss 25—27\nPt 3 Div 2 heading\nheading preceding s 27A deleted and Pt 3 Div 2 heading inserted by 8/2000 s 4 (Sch)\n\ns 27A\n\ns 27B\nPt 9 Div 1\n\nPt 9 Div 1 heading\nheading preceding s 27C and Pt 3 Div 3 heading inserted by 8/2000 s 4 (Sch)\n\nPt 3 Div 3 heading deleted and Pt 9 Div 1 heading inserted by 9/2004 s 44\ns 59\ns 27C redesignated as s 59 by 9/2004 s 45\nPt 3 Div 4\ndeleted by 9/2004 s 46\nPt 3 Div 4 heading\nheading preceding s 28 deleted and Pt 3 Div 4 heading inserted by 8/2000 s 4 (Sch)\nPt 9 Div 2\n\nPt 9 Div 2 heading\nheading preceding s 29 deleted and Pt 3 Div 5 heading inserted by 8/2000 s 4 (Sch)\n\nPt 3 Div 5 heading redesignated as Pt 9 Div 2 heading by 9/2004 s 47\ns 60\ns 29 redesignated as s 60 by 9/2004 s 48\nPt 9 Div 3\nPt 3 Div 6 inserted by 8/2000 s 3\n\nPt 3 Div 6 redesignated as Pt 9 Div 3 by 9/2004 s 49\ns 61\ns 29A redesignated as s 61 by 9/2004 s 50\ns 62\ns 29B redesignated as s 62 by 9/2004 s 51\nPt 9 Div 4\n\nPt 9 Div 4 heading \nheading preceding s 30 deleted and Pt 3 Div 7 heading inserted by 8/2000 s 4 (Sch)\n\nPt 3 Div 7 heading redesignated as Pt 9 Div 4 heading by 9/2004 s 52\ns 63\ns 30 redesignated as s 63 by 9/2004 s 53\ns 31 and heading\ndeleted by 116/1983 s 11\nPt 9 Div 5\n\nPt 9 Div 5 heading\nheading preceding s 32 deleted and Pt 3 Div 8 heading inserted by 8/2000 s 4 (Sch)\n\nPt 3 Div 8 heading redesignated as Pt 9 Div 5 heading by 9/2004 s 54\n\namended by 43/2006 s 48\ns 64\ns 32 redesignated as s 64 by 9/2004 s 55\ns 64(3)\nsubstituted by 4/2023 s 7\n22.6.2023\ns 65\ns 33 redesignated as s 65 by 9/2004 s 56\n\nsubstituted by 43/2006 s 49\ns 65(1)\ns 65 redesignated as s 65(1) by 15/2013 Sch 2 cl 7\ns 65(2)\ninserted by 15/2013 Sch 2 cl 7\ns 66\ns 34 redesignated as s 66 by 9/2004 s 57\ns 66(1)\namended by 43/2006 s 50(1), (2)\ns 66(2)\n\ninjury\namended by 43/2006 s 50(3)\nPt 9 Div 6\ninserted by 9/2004 s 58\nPt 9 Div 7\n\nPt 9 Div 7 heading\nheading preceding s 35 deleted and Pt 3 Div 9 heading inserted by 8/2000 s 4 (Sch)\n\nPt 3 Div 9 heading redesignated as Pt 3 Div 7 heading by 9/2004 s 59\ns 68\ns 35 redesignated as s 68 by 9/2004 s 60\nPt 3 Div 10\ninserted by 126/1986 s 3 \n8.2.1987\n\namended by 41/1988 s 3\n8.2.1987\n\namended by 38/1991 s 2\n\namended by 5/1993 s 18\n3.5.1993\n\namended by 62/1993 s 42\n28.10.1993\n\namended by 21/1994 s 31\n7.7.1994\n\namended by 30/1994 Sch 4 cl 2(e)\n1.7.1994\n\namended by 53/1997 s 12\n11.9.1997\n\namended by 67/1998 s 13\n29.10.1998\n\ndeleted by 21/2002 s 4\nPt 9 Div 8\nPt 3 Div 10A inserted by 38/2002 s 4\n10.3.2003\n\nPt 3 Div 10A redesignated as Pt 9 Div 8 by 9/2004 s 61\ns 69\ns 35B redesignated as s 69 by 9/2004 s 62\ndependant\namended by 44/2006 s 10\ns 70\ns 35C redesignated as s 70 by 9/2004 s 63\ns 71\ns 35D redesignated as s 71 by 9/2004 s 64\nPt 9 Div 9\n\nHeading preceding s 36\ninserted by 87/1983 s 2\n\ndeleted by 8/2000 s 4 (Sch)\nPt 9 Div 9 heading\nPt 3 Div 11 heading inserted by 8/2000 s 4 (Sch)\n\nPt 3 Div 11 heading redesignated as Pt 9 Div 9 heading by 9/2004 s 65\ns 72\ns 36 inserted by 87/1983 s 2\n\ns 36 redesignated as s 72 by 9/2004 s 66\nPt 9 Div 10\n\nHeading preceding s 37\ninserted by 92/1996 s 7\n6.7.1998\n\ndeleted by 8/2000 s 4 (Sch)\nPt 9 Div 10 heading\nPt 3 Div 12 heading inserted by 8/2000 s 4 (Sch)\n\nPt 3 Div 12 heading redesignated as Pt 9 Div 10 heading by 9/2004 s 67\ns 73\ns 37 inserted by 92/1996 s 7\n6.7.1998\n\ns 37 redesignated as s 73 by 9/2004 s 68\nPt 9 Div 11\nPt 3 Div 13 inserted by 21/2002 s 5\n\nPt 3 Div 13 redesignated as Pt 9 Div 11 by 9/2004 s 69\ns 74\ns 38 redesignated as s 74 by 9/2004 s 70\nPt 9 Div 11A\ninserted by 51/2008 s 4\n12.12.2008\nPt 9 Div 11B\ninserted by 6/2022 s 2\nPt 9 Div 12 before substitution by 28/2016\nPt 3 Div 14 inserted by 21/2002 s 5\n\nPt 3 Div 14 redesignated as Pt 9 Div 12 by 9/2004 s 71\ns 75\ns 39 redesignated as s 75 by 9/2004 s 72\nPt 9 Div 12\nsubstituted by 28/2016 s 5\nPt 9 Div 12A\ninserted by 19/2014 s 4\n2.10.2015\nPt 9 Div 13\ninserted by 15/2013 Sch 2 cl 8\nTransitional etc provisions associated with Act or amendments\nWrongs Act Amendment Act 1986\n4—Transitional provision\nThe amendments made by this Act do not affect a cause of action that arose before the commencement of this Act.\nWrongs Act Amendment Act 1987\n4—Operation of this Act\nThis Act does not affect a cause of action that arose before its commencement and does not give rise to a cause of action in relation to an event that occurred before its commencement.\nStatutes Amendment (Motor Vehicles and Wrongs) Act 1993\n19—Transitional provision\nThe amendments made by this Act do not affect a cause of action, right or liability that arose before the commencement of this Act.\nStatutes Amendment (Motor Accidents) Act 1998\n14—Transitional provision\n\t(1)\tAn amendment made by this Act does not affect a cause of action, right or liability that arose before the commencement of the amendment.\n\t(2)\tHowever, subsection (1) does not derogate from the operation of section 105 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959.\nWrongs (Liability and Damages for Personal Injury) Amendment Act 2002\n6—Transitional provision\n\t(1)\tThe amendments made by sections 3 and 4 of this Act are applicable to an action in which damages are claimed for personal injury if the accident out of which the action arises occurs on or after the commencement of those sections.\n\t(2)\tIf the accident out of which the action arises occurred before the commencement of sections 3 and 4 of this Act, the principal Act (if relevant to the action) applies as if the amendments made by those sections had not been made.\nSuppose that A was exposed to asbestos in 1986 but is not diagnosed with asbestosis until 2004. The assessment of A's damages for personal injury would be determined in accordance with the law that applied before the commencement of sections 3 and 4 of the Wrongs Act (Liability and Assessment of Damages for Personal Injury) Amendment Act 2002.\n7—Report on implications of these amendments\nAs soon as practicable after the expiration of 2 years from the commencement of this Act, the Economic and Finance Committee must investigate and report to the Parliament on the effect of the amendments on the availability and cost of public liability insurance.\nLaw Reform (Ipp Recommendations) Act 2004, Sch 1\n1—Transitional provision\n\t(1)\tThe amendments made by the Law Reform (Ipp Recommendations) Act 2004 (the Ipp Recommendations Act) are intended to apply only prospectively.\n\t(2)\tIf a cause of action that is based wholly or partly on an event that occurred before the commencement of the Ipp Recommendations Act arises after the commencement of the Ipp Recommendations Act, it will be determined as if the amendments had not been enacted.\nSuppose that A was exposed to asbestos in 1990 but a resultant illness is not diagnosed until after the commencement of the Ipp Recommendations Act. An action is then brought in negligence in which damages are claimed for personal injury. The amendments made by the Ipp Recommendations Act would not affect the determination of liability or the assessment of damages.\n\t(3)\tAs soon as practicable after the expiration of 3 years from the commencement of this Schedule, the Economic and Finance Committee must investigate and report to the Parliament on the effect of the Ipp Recommendations Act on the availability and cost of insurance to persons.\nStatutes Amendment (Domestic Partners) Act 2006\n51—Transitional provision\nAn amendment made by this Act to the Civil Liability Act 1936 applies only in relation to a cause of action that arises after the commencement of this section.\nMotor Vehicle Accidents (Lifetime Support Scheme) Act 2013, Sch 2\n21—Civil Liability Act—transitional provisions\n\t(1)\tIn this clause—\nprincipal Act means the Civil Liability Act 1936.\n\t(2)\tAn amendment made by this Act—\n\t(a)\tthat amends section 52, 58 or 65 of the principal Act; or\n\t(b)\tthat inserts section 56A, 58A or 58B into the principal Act,\ndoes not affect a cause of action, right or liability that arose before the commencement of the amendment.\n\t(3)\tSection 58A of the principal Act (as inserted by this Act) applies in relation to a person who is a participant in the Scheme under this Act in respect of a motor vehicle injury that results from an MVA motor accident (as defined by the principal Act) occurring on or after the commencement of section 5 of this Act.\n\t(4)\tSubclauses (2) and (3) do not derogate from the operation of section 105 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959.\n\t(5)\tTo avoid doubt, section 76(14) of the principal Act (as enacted by this Act) does not apply in relation to a regulation that prescribes the injury scale values that are to apply on the commencement of section 52(3) of the principal Act (as enacted by this Act).\n23—Contribution to liabilities of Authority—transitional provisions\n\t(1)\tThe Treasurer may, after consultation with MAC and the Authority, determine an amount that (in the opinion of the Treasurer) represents the amount derived by MAC from premiums in respect of policies of insurance under Part 4 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 in respect of any treatment, care and support needs of persons who become participants in the Scheme under this Act after the commencement of the Scheme and the commencement of section 58A of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (as inserted by this Act), including so as to provide an amount with respect to unexpended risk reserves held by MAC that are attributable to road accidents for which provision is made but for which liability does not eventually arise.\n\t(2)\tThe Treasurer may make a determination under subclause (1)—\n\t(a)\tin respect of past and future premiums payable under Part 4 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (applying such estimates as the Treasurer thinks fit); and\n\t(b)\ton the basis of—\n\t(i)\testimates with respect to reductions in the liability and financial requirements of MAC in the future; and\n\t(ii)\testimates with respect to the liabilities and financial requirements of the Authority under this Act in the future,\nand after taking into account such other matters as the Treasurer thinks fit.\n\t(3)\tAn amount determined by the Treasurer under subclause (1) will be payable by MAC (from out of the Compulsory Third Party Fund established under Part 4 of the Motor Accident Commission Act 1992) to the Authority (for payment into the Lifetime Support Scheme Fund established under Part 7 of this Act) at a time determined by the Treasurer after consultation with MAC and the Authority.\n\t(4)\tThis clause operates despite any provision in the Motor Accident Commission Act 1992 about payments into or out of the Compulsory Third Party Fund.\n\t(5)\tIn this clause—\nMAC means the Motor Accident Commission.\nHistorical versions\nReprint No 1—31.10.1991\n\nReprint No 2—3.5.1993\n\nReprint No 3—28.10.1993\n\nReprint No 4—7.7.1994\n\nReprint No 5—1.1.1995\n\nReprint No 6—3.7.1997\n\nReprint No 7—11.9.1997\n\nReprint No 8—6.7.1998\n\nReprint No 9—29.10.1998\n\nReprint No 10—1.7.1999\n\nReprint No 11—9.11.2000\n\nReprint No 12—16.8.2001\n\nReprint No 13—1.12.2002\n\nReprint No 14—10.3.2003\n\nReprint No 15—24.11.2003\n\n8.2.2006\n\n12.12.2008\n\n1.7.2015\n\n2.10.2015\n\n1.8.2022\n\n","sortOrder":26}],"analysis":{"issue_detection":{"absurdities":[],"contradictions":[]},"kimi_summary":{"_metrics":{"completionTokens":743},"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":9,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"The Act has grown dramatically from its 1936 origins as a simple 'Wrongs Act' consolidating tort law. The 2004 Ipp reforms added extensive negligence and damages restrictions. The 2013 Lifetime Support Scheme amendments created parallel motor vehicle compensation schemes. Most significantly, the 2021 child abuse amendments (Parts 7A and 7B) added entirely new institutional liability frameworks with retroactive effect, complex corporate veil-piercing mechanisms, and settlement-setting aside powers — transforming a personal injury statute into a vehicle for historical abuse redress."},"complexity_factors":["Multiple overlapping compensation schemes with different rules (general negligence vs motor vehicle accidents vs Lifetime Support Scheme)","Extensive cross-referencing between Parts and to other Acts (Motor Vehicles Act, Return to Work Act, Corporations Act, etc.)","Complex mathematical formulas for damages with CPI indexation, prescribed discount rates, and tiered calculations","Nested exceptions and qualifications throughout (e.g., s 38: no duty to warn of obvious risk, except in 3 circumstances, but s 38(3) says those exceptions don't create presumptions)","Retroactive and transitional provisions with multiple commencement dates affecting different causes of action","47 defined terms in s 3 alone, many with their own sub-definitions","Part 7A's elaborate machinery for pursuing unincorporated institutions — involving nominees, associated trusts, current office holders, and continuity rules","Presumptions of contributory negligence that are rebuttable, irrebuttable, or partially rebuttable depending on circumstances","Multiple injury scale value (ISV) regimes with different thresholds and calculation methods"],"plain_english_summary":"This is South Australia's main law governing civil liability — essentially, who can be sued for compensation when someone suffers harm, and how much they might have to pay.\n\n**What it covers:**\n\n- **Negligence claims** — the core rules for when someone can sue for careless conduct causing injury, including special rules for professionals, road authorities, and mental harm claims\n- **Damages caps and calculations** — strict limits on compensation amounts, especially for motor vehicle accidents, with complex formulas involving \"injury scale values\" and indexation\n- **Child abuse liability** — extensive provisions (Parts 7A and 7B) making institutions vicariously liable for abuse by employees and associated persons, with mechanisms to pursue unincorporated institutions and set aside old settlements\n- **Wrongful death** — who can claim when someone dies due to another's fault, and how damages are divided among family members\n- **Occupiers' liability** — duties of property owners regarding dangerous conditions\n- **Animal liability** — rules for injuries caused by animals\n- **Contributory negligence** — when injured people are partly at fault, including presumptions of fault for intoxicated persons or those not wearing seatbelts\n- **Various immunities** — protecting good samaritans, food donors, people who apologise, and others from being sued\n\n**Who it affects:** Anyone injured in South Australia (or their families), plus institutions, employers, property owners, professionals, and insurers. The motor vehicle provisions particularly affect drivers, passengers, and the Lifetime Support Scheme for catastrophic injuries.\n\n**Why it matters:** This Act heavily restricts common law rights. It caps damages, creates thresholds for claims (especially for motor accidents), reverses burdens of proof in some child abuse cases, and provides numerous defences and immunities. The 2021 child abuse amendments significantly expanded institutional accountability for historical abuse."},"summary":{"complexity_score":1,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"Scope assessment is not possible. No legislative text was returned — only a website error page. The actual Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) cannot be assessed for scope changes from this submission."},"complexity_factors":["No legislative text was retrievable — the source URL returned a '404 Page Not Found' error","The content provided consists entirely of website navigation elements and an error message, not statutory provisions","Complexity cannot be meaningfully assessed without access to the actual legislation","A score of 1 reflects the absence of any analysable legal content, not the simplicity of the underlying Act"],"plain_english_summary":"**No legislation content could be retrieved.**\n\nThe link provided for the *Civil Liability Act 1936* (SA) returned a **'Page Not Found'** error from the South Australian legislation website. This appears to be caused by a broken or outdated hyperlink following a website update in March 2026.\n\n**What this means for you:** No actual legislative text was supplied for analysis. Any summary of the *Civil Liability Act 1936* (SA) produced here would be based on general knowledge rather than the current authorised text — which could be inaccurate or out of date.\n\n**What you should do:**\n- Visit [www.legislation.sa.gov.au](https://www.legislation.sa.gov.au) directly and search for the *Civil Liability Act 1936*\n- Update any bookmarks or links created before 24 March 2026\n- Report broken links to OPCWeb@sa.gov.au"},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":8,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"Yes. The Act's scope has expanded substantially since the 1936 Wrongs Act. The present text (as consolidated and amended) retains the original consolidation of general tort rules but adds detailed, policy‑prescriptive regimes: statutory standards and scales for damages (Part 8: s 51–56A), fixed presumptions and reductions for contributory behaviour (Part 7: s 46–49), a comprehensive institutional child‑abuse liability and nominee/trust regime (Parts 7A and 7B: s 50A–50X inserted 2021–2022), and numerous targeted immunities and procedural mechanisms (good samaritans s 74; food donors s 74A; apology s 75; Crown publication s 75A). The legislative history shows many staged amendments and transitional rules (e.g. Ipp 2004 changes intended to be prospective; Motor Vehicle/Lifetime Support changes 2013) that change who may recover, how damages are assessed, and how liability may be satisfied (see transitional clauses and amendment entries in the legislative history)."},"complexity_factors":["Length and breadth: many Parts covering diverse topics (animals, occupiers, negligence, death, damages, specialised child‑abuse regime, MVAs, immunities).","Extensive cross‑referencing to other statutes and schemes (Motor Vehicles Act 1959, Motor Accident Commission, Return to Work Act, Corporations Act displacement provisions).","Detailed quantitative rules: statutory scales, indexed amounts, thresholds, and prescribed discount rates for damages (s 52, 55–56, definitions in s 3).","Multiple statutory presumptions and fixed percentage reductions for contributory negligence (s 46–49) interacting with general apportionment rules (s 50).","Significant delegation to regulations and ministerial discretion for substantive assessment rules and accreditation procedures (s 76–77), with required consultation processes.","New specialised regimes added by amendment (Part 7A and Part 7B) introducing nominee, trust, continuity and asset‑satisfaction rules that are legally and administratively intricate (s 50H–50O, 50J–50K, 50R–50S).","Transitional provisions and non‑retrospectivity clauses in multiple amendments increase the factual/legal complexity of which rules apply to which claims (legislative history and transitional clauses).","Evidentiary and procedural requirements (notice, assessments, accreditation, corollary obligations on insurers) that create multi‑party interactions and potential litigation over process compliance (s 50J, s 76)."],"plain_english_summary":"### What this law does, mechanically\n\n- Consolidates and sets the rules for civil wrongs (torts) in South Australia, governing who is liable for harm, how liability is proved, and how damages are calculated and limited.\n- Replaces or displaces inconsistent common law and earlier statutes for accidents occurring in this State (s 4).\n- Defines key legal concepts used throughout (accident, negligence, personal injury, non‑economic loss, motor accident, etc.) (s 3).\n- Establishes rules for particular categories of liability:\n  - Animals: liability is determined by negligence principles; a plaintiff need not show prior knowledge of a vicious propensity (s 18).\n  - Occupiers: occupiers’ duty is the negligence standard with statutory factors to weigh (s 19–21).\n  - Wrongful death: who may bring a claim, how damages are distributed, and time limits (s 23–30).\n  - Negligence generally: statutory tests for standard of care, precautions, causation and burden of proof (s 31–35).\n  - Assumption of risk: what counts as an obvious risk; no duty to warn of obvious risks in general (s 36–39).\n  - Professionals: statutory standard and the ‘‘widely accepted practice’’ defence (s 40–41).\n  - Road authorities: statutory exclusion from tort liability for failure to maintain roads (s 42).\n  - Criminal conduct: exclusion of liability where the injured person was engaged in an indictable offence, subject to exceptions (s 43).\n- Sets out contributory negligence rules including statutory presumptions and fixed percentage reductions for intoxication, reliance on an intoxicated person, and failure to wear seatbelts/helmets (s 44–50).\n- Creates a specialised regime for institutional child‑abuse claims (inserted as Part 7A):\n  - Duty: institutions must take all reasonable steps to prevent abuse by persons associated with them; the institution bears the evidentiary burden to prove it took all reasonable steps (s 50E–50F).\n  - Vicarious liability: institutions can be vicariously liable where an employee’s role supplied the occasion for abuse (s 50G).\n  - Special rules for unincorporated institutions, nominees, associated trusts and how liabilities may be satisfied from institutional or trust assets (s 50H–50O, 50J–50K).\n  - Transitional and continuity rules to capture successor institutions and offices (s 50R–50S).\n- Damages and limits (Part 8):\n  - Rules for when non‑economic loss (pain and suffering, loss of amenities) is payable and statutory scales for assessment, including special injury‑scale rules for motor vehicle accidents (s 51–52, 52(3)).\n  - Thresholds and caps: minimums and maximums for some awards and indexed sums; limits on interest for non‑economic and future losses (s 52, 55–56).\n  - Specific provisions for motor vehicle accidents (MVA): injury scale values, thresholds for economic and non‑economic loss, rules on discounting, and an additional 20% discount for economic loss tied to MVA claims (s 56A, 58A, 58B).\n  - Limits on awards for gratuitous services, costs of managing damages, and ordinary child‑raising costs (s 57–58, 67).\n- Miscellaneous immunities, procedural and evidentiary rules:\n  - Good Samaritan and food‑donor/distributor protections (s 74, 74A, 74B).\n  - Apology: apologies are not treated as admissions of fault and are inadmissible to prove liability in civil proceedings (s 75).\n  - Crown publication immunity when regulations prescribe certain information to be published by the Crown (s 75A).\n  - Court powers about unreasonable delay in resolving claims and ability to set aside certain settlement agreements in historical child‑abuse contexts (Pt 7B: s 50V–50X; Pt 9 Div 8: s 69–71).\n- Delegations and administrative architecture:\n  - The Governor or designated Minister may make regulations that touch on substantive matters (assessment rules, injury scale values, accreditation of medical assessors) and the Act expressly contemplates rules, ministerial recommendations and consultation requirements (s 76–77).\n\nOfficially stated purposes (as presented in the legislative material)\n\n- The Act consolidates civil wrongs law and, through later amendments, establishes statutory tests, caps, thresholds and special regimes (for example, institutional child‑abuse liability and MVA injury scales). Several amendments (for example the Ipp recommendations implemented by the 2004 Act) are presented in historical materials as intended to apply prospectively to standardise liability and reduce uncertain or very large awards.\n\nTesting those purpose‑claims against costs, incentives and trade‑offs (source‑grounded)\n\n- Who pays: defendants, institutions, nominees, trustees and their insurers ultimately bear monetary liability under judgments or settlements. The Act creates specific channels for satisfying judgments from institutional assets and associated trusts (s 50L–50O). For MVAs, insurers and the nominal defendant face administrative obligations under regulation (s 76(1)(a), (9)).\n\n- Who decides and discretion: courts mediate liability and damage assessments within statutory frameworks (e.g. scale values, thresholds) but substantial discretion remains to courts on causation, scope of liability and the apportionment of contributory negligence (s 34, 31, 50(3)). The Governor/Minister and regulations can change substantive implementing rules (injury scale rules, accreditation and assessment processes) subject to consultation and, in some cases, delay before coming into force (s 76(7), (10)–(14); s 77).\n\n- Compliance burden and administrative cost: institutions and nominees face procedural steps (notice requirements for claims—s 50J(3)), potential obligations to identify associated trusts and disclose financial capacity (s 50J(7)(a)), and the evidentiary burden to show they took \"all reasonable steps\" when abuse occurs (s 50F). The accreditation scheme and mandated examinations for MVA claims create administrative costs for health professionals, insurers and claimants (s 76(1)–(3), (9)).\n\n- Incentives and behavioural changes: the institutional duty to take all reasonable steps and vicarious liability rules (s 50E–50G) create a legal incentive for institutions to implement screening, supervision and safer practices. At the same time, the power to nominate a defendant and to satisfy liabilities from associated trust assets (s 50J–50O) shifts where financial responsibility is sourced, which affects trustees and institutions' asset management choices.\n\n- Concentrated benefits and diffuse costs: rules that permit recovery from institutional assets and associated trusts concentrate liability onto identifiable entities (s 50L–50O). By contrast, the costs of compliance, accreditation and potential higher insurance premiums could be spread across service users, insurers and public bodies.\n\n- Rent‑seeking/capture and implementation risk: the Act delegates substantive rule‑making (injury scale rules, accreditation terms) to regulation and ministerial recommendation with specified consultation steps (s 76(10)–(13)). That delegation concentrates technical control in the executive and invites stakeholder lobbying over the content of rules that determine the quantum of awards and assessment procedures.\n\n- Interaction with private choice and markets: statutory caps, fixed reductions for conduct (seatbelt, intoxication—s 46–49) and the 20% extra discount for economic loss in MVAs (s 56A(5), 58B(3)) change expected compensation flows and therefore affect insurance pricing and decisions by employers, institutions and service providers.\n\n- Opportunity costs and trade‑offs: limiting some heads of recovery (no interest on non‑economic/future loss—s 56; limits for gratuitous services—s 58) reduces potential payouts but transfers risk to injured persons and insurance schemes; conversely, making institutions vicariously liable and enabling claims against nominees increases potential recoveries for claimants but imposes governance and compliance costs on institutions, trustees and insurers (s 50G, 50J–50O).\n\nImplementation risks and safeguards\n\n- The Act contains transitional provisions (historical schedule) that protect some pre‑existing causes of action from retrospective application (e.g. many amendments are stated to apply prospectively in transitional clauses). The Part 7A child‑abuse provisions themselves include procedural safeguards (notice rules, court powers to nominate appropriate defendants, and limits on trustee liability) (s 50D, 50J, 50O).\n\nBottom line (mechanical effect):\n\nThe Civil Liability Act 1936 sets statutory boundaries for negligence and related claims in South Australia: it defines duties and standards, creates presumptions and fixed reductions for contributory conduct, prescribes detailed methods for valuing non‑economic and some economic losses (notably MVAs), and builds a distinct framework for institutional child‑abuse claims that includes novel asset and nominee rules. These mechanical rules alter where and how money is recovered (courts, nominees, trusts), who must prove or bear particular evidentiary burdens (institutions in abuse cases—s 50F), and who has power to make implementing detail (Minister/regulations—s 76–77)."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/civil-liability-act-1936","history":"/api/acts/civil-liability-act-1936/history","analysis":"/api/acts/civil-liability-act-1936/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/civil-liability-act-1936/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/civil-liability-act-1936/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/civil-liability-act-1936/documents"}}