{"id":"F2018L01409","name":"Autonomous Sanctions (Designated Persons and Entities and Declared Persons – Myanmar) List 2018","slug":"autonomous-sanctions-designated-persons-and-entities-and-declared-persons-myanmar-list-2018","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":98095,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2018L01409-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-02","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"Part 1","sectionType":"part","heading":"Preliminary","content":"## Part 1—Preliminary","sortOrder":0},{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"Name of Instrument","content":"#### 1 Name of Instrument\n\n  This Instrument is the Autonomous Sanctions (Designated Persons and Entities and Declared Persons – Myanmar) List 2018.","sortOrder":1},{"sectionNumber":"3","sectionType":"section","heading":"Authority","content":"#### 3 Authority\n\n  This Instrument is made under paragraphs 6(a) and (b) of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011.","sortOrder":2},{"sectionNumber":"Part 2","sectionType":"part","heading":"Designations of persons and entities and declarations of persons","content":"## Part 2—Designations of persons and entities and declarations of persons","sortOrder":3},{"sectionNumber":"4","sectionType":"section","heading":"Designated persons and entities and declared persons","content":"#### 4 Designated persons and entities and declared persons\n\n  (1) For paragraph 6(a) of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011, each person and entity mentioned in an item in Schedule 1 is a designated person or entity for Myanmar.\n  (2) For paragraph 6(b) of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011, each person mentioned in an item in Schedule 1 is a declared person for the Myanmar.","sortOrder":4},{"sectionNumber":"Part 3","sectionType":"part","heading":"Continuation of effect of designations and declarations","content":"## Part 3—Continuation of effect of designations and declarations","sortOrder":5},{"sectionNumber":"5","sectionType":"section","heading":"Purpose of this Part","content":"#### 5 Purpose of this Part\n\n  This Part is made for the purposes of subregulation 9(3) of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011.","sortOrder":6},{"sectionNumber":"6","sectionType":"section","heading":"Continuation of effect of designations and declarations on and after date of making of the Autonomous Sanctions (Designated Persons and Entities and Declared Persons — Myanmar) Amendment (No. 2) Instrument 2024","content":"#### 6 Continuation of effect of designations and declarations on and after date of making of the Autonomous Sanctions (Designated Persons and Entities and Declared Persons – Myanmar) Amendment (No. 2) Instrument 2024\n\n  (1) The designations, under paragraph 6(a) of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011, of the persons mentioned in items 1 to 5 in Part 1 of Schedule 1 continue to have effect.\n  (2) The declarations, under paragraph 6(b) of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011, of the persons mentioned in items 1 to 5 in Part 1 of Schedule 1 continue to have effect.","sortOrder":7}],"analysis":{"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"Unauthenticated. Configure AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY or use a provider module. Learn more: https://ai-sdk.dev/unauthenticated-ai-gateway","source":"analysis-cron"},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":2,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"The instrument has grown significantly beyond its original 2018 scope. Originally focused on five military commanders responsible for operations in Rakhine State (items 1-5), it has expanded through amendments in 2023 and 2024 to include: the entire military leadership of the 2021 coup (Min Aung Hlaing, Soe Win, and senior generals); civilian political figures who joined the military's State Administration Council; and critical military-controlled economic entities including banks and logistics companies. The scope has shifted from targeting specific operational commanders to a comprehensive sanctions regime against the junta's political, military and economic infrastructure."},"complexity_factors":["Very short instrument (approximately 7 operative sections)","No defined terms section - relies entirely on definitions in the parent Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011","Simple declaratory structure: 'X is a designated person' with no conditional logic or exceptions","Minimal cross-referencing - only references to paragraphs 6(a), 6(b) and subregulation 9(3) of the parent regulations","Content is primarily a data table (Schedule) listing names, dates of birth, and identifying information rather than legal rules","Part 3 contains a simple 'continuation' provision preserving existing designations through a technical amendment, with no nested conditions"],"plain_english_summary":"This instrument adds named Myanmar individuals and organisations to Australia’s sanctions blacklist under the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011, imposing asset freezes, financial prohibitions and travel bans. It targets senior Tatmadaw figures, civilian members of the junta and military‑linked businesses and banks.\n\nThe measures bar Australians and Australian entities from dealing with listed parties and deny them entry to Australia, aiming to pressure the military regime over the 2021 coup and alleged human‑rights abuses; compliance checks are required to avoid criminal penalties."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":5,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"The instrument has expanded beyond the narrower 2018 listing to include additional senior military leaders, members of the State Administration Council and several major Myanmar financial institutions and conglomerates via 2023 and 2024 amendment instruments. Early entries (items 1–5) are retained and continuity is expressly preserved (s 6). Later items (for example items 6–21 in Part 1) add top-level military command and political council members; Part 2 adds major military-linked conglomerates and banks. Mechanically, the scope shifted from a set of individual military commanders to a broader set that includes senior leadership and significant commercial entities, increasing the sanctions’ reach into Myanmar’s political and economic structures (see Schedule 1 and the instrument references to Amendment Instruments 2023/2024)."},"complexity_factors":["Multiple cross-references to the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 (not self-contained) (see s 3–4)","Schedule lists 21 individuals and 7 entities with multiple alternate names and identifying data (dates of birth, service numbers, aliases)","Several amendment instruments referenced (Amendment Instrument 2023; Amendment (No.1) and (No.3) Instruments 2024) increasing the list over time","Part 3 contains a continuity provision linking to subregulation 9(3) of the Regulations (adds temporal conditioning)","Some entries include overlapping or duplicate identity data (e.g. two possible birth dates for some individuals), which requires careful matching in compliance systems","No standalone definitions section in the instrument — users must read the Regulations/Act to understand legal consequences","Schedule mixes persons and entities across Parts with many aliases per entry, increasing matching and screening complexity","References to previous instruments for the \"Instrument of first designation\" require checking multiple instruments to trace listing history"],"plain_english_summary":"**What this instrument does (mechanics)\n\n- This is a secondary-legislation instrument that adds specific people and organisations to Australia’s autonomous sanctions list for Myanmar. It does this under the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 (see s 3 and s 4). The listed names appear in Schedule 1.\n\n- The instrument treats each person and entity in Schedule 1 as a \"designated person or entity\" for Myanmar under paragraph 6(a) of the Regulations, and each named person as a \"declared person\" under paragraph 6(b) (see s 4). Those cross‑references mean the consequences and prohibitions in the Autonomous Sanctions Act/Regulations can be applied to the listed parties.\n\n- Part 3 (especially s 6) confirms that certain earlier designations continue to have effect after an Amendment Instrument made in 2024; it is a continuity clause to preserve previously made listing decisions (see s 5–6).\n\n- Schedule 1 sets out the listed individuals (Part 1) and entities (Part 2). The individuals include current and former senior military officers, members of the State Administration Council and named political figures. The entities include large military-linked conglomerates and Myanmar banks (see Schedule 1, Parts 1–2).\n\nWhy it matters (legal and practical effects)\n\n- Being on this list does not itself set out detailed prohibitions in this instrument. Rather, the listing triggers the legal machinery in the Autonomous Sanctions Act and Regulations. That machinery provides the practical sanctions tools — typically things like asset freezes, prohibitions on providing certain goods or services, and restrictions on dealings with listed persons or entities. Those effects flow from the Regulations/Act once a person or entity is designated or declared (see s 3–4 referencing the Regulations).\n\n- The list directly affects the named individuals and companies (they face legal restrictions on dealing with Australian persons and businesses) and it imposes a compliance and enforcement burden on Australian banks, businesses, and other parties who must ensure they do not contravene the sanctions by dealing with listed parties.\n\nWho pays and who decides\n\n- Who decides: the Federal Executive (through instruments made under the Regulations) decides the listings (see s 3). The instrument records which instrument first listed each name and any amendment instruments that added new names.\n\n- Who pays: the immediate legal costs fall on the listed individuals and entities (loss of access to Australian financial services, frozen assets, inability to contract with Australian firms). Downstream costs fall on Australian banks, importers/exporters, financial intermediaries and any Australian business that previously contracted with the listed parties, which must put in place screening, reporting and potentially restructure commercial arrangements to avoid breaching the sanctions.\n\nIncentives, trade-offs and implementation risks\n\n- Incentives created: listed parties have an incentive to move assets or transactions outside Australian jurisdiction and to use intermediaries or third-country channels to continue business. Australian firms have an incentive to avoid onboarding or transacting with entities that have any connection to the listed parties.\n\n- Compliance costs: firms must implement or strengthen sanctions screening, customer‑due‑diligence and transaction‑monitoring systems. Financial institutions will incur ongoing costs to block or report transactions and to seek licences if necessary.\n\n- Trade-offs and substitution effects: restricting direct Australian contacts with listed entities may divert trade and finance to other jurisdictions, or encourage the creation of front companies and nominee arrangements to evade controls. That raises enforcement complexity and the risk of unintended collateral effects on unlisted but economically connected third parties.\n\n- Concentrated benefits and diffuse costs: the tangible regulatory burden concentrates on the listed parties and their close commercial network; the costs of compliance and reduced market access are distributed across Australian firms and consumers (through higher compliance costs and potentially disrupted supply chains).\n\nKey documentary points and cross‑references\n\n- Authority: made under paragraphs 6(a) and 6(b) of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 (s 3).\n- Listing mechanism: s 4 steps the Schedule into the Regulations as designations/declarations.\n- Continuity: Part 3 and s 6 preserve the effect of earlier designations after the 2024 Amendment Instrument (s 5–6).\n- Substance of the Schedule: Schedule 1 (Part 1) lists 21 named individuals (senior military figures, State Administration Council members and identified political figures). Schedule 1 (Part 2) lists 7 entities including Myanmar Economic Corporation, Myanmar Economic Holdings Public Company Ltd, and several banks and trading companies.\n\nPractical implementation notes for businesses and advisers\n\n- Any Australian person or entity that deals with Myanmar or Myanmar-related counterparties should screen their counterparty lists against this Schedule and the primary Regulations/Act.\n\n- Where a listed person or entity is a shareholder, director, beneficial owner, or linked commercial counterparty, businesses should get legal advice about potential exposure and licence applications.\n\n- Monitoring: because the instrument has been amended (see references to Amendment Instruments 2023 and 2024 in the Schedule), advisers should treat the list as dynamic and check the active Regulations and Federal Register entries for updates.\n\n(References in this summary use the instrument’s internal section headings: see s 3–6 and Schedule 1, Parts 1–2.)"}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/autonomous-sanctions-designated-persons-and-entities-and-declared-persons-myanmar-list-2018","history":"/api/acts/autonomous-sanctions-designated-persons-and-entities-and-declared-persons-myanmar-list-2018/history","analysis":"/api/acts/autonomous-sanctions-designated-persons-and-entities-and-declared-persons-myanmar-list-2018/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/autonomous-sanctions-designated-persons-and-entities-and-declared-persons-myanmar-list-2018/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/autonomous-sanctions-designated-persons-and-entities-and-declared-persons-myanmar-list-2018/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/autonomous-sanctions-designated-persons-and-entities-and-declared-persons-myanmar-list-2018/documents"}}