{"id":"C2004A05069","name":"Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996","slug":"australian-law-reform-commission-act-1996","collection":"act","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":"37 of 1996","makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":27091,"registerId":"commonwealth-C2004A05069-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-01","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"Part 1","sectionType":"part","heading":"Preliminary","content":"## Part 1—Preliminary","sortOrder":0},{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"Short title","content":"#### 1 Short title\n\n  This Act may be cited as the Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996.","sortOrder":1},{"sectionNumber":"2","sectionType":"section","heading":"Commencement","content":"#### 2 Commencement\n\n  (1) Subject to subsection (2), this Act commences on a day to be fixed by Proclamation.\n  (2) If this Act does not commence under subsection (1) within the period of 6 months beginning on the day on which this Act receives the Royal Assent, it commences on the first day after the end of that period.","sortOrder":2},{"sectionNumber":"3","sectionType":"section","heading":"Definitions","content":"#### 3 Definitions\n\n  In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears:\n\n> Commission means the Australian Law Reform Commission.\n\n> Commonwealth laws means:\n\n    (a) laws (including Territory laws) made by, or by the authority of, the Parliament; and\n    (b) any other laws (including Territory laws) that the Parliament has power to repeal or amend.\n\n> judicial office means:\n\n    (a) an office of a judge, magistrate or justice of a federal court or a court of a State or Territory; or\n    (b) an office whose holder has, under an Act of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, the same status as a judge, magistrate or justice of a federal court or a court of a State or Territory.\n\n> laws includes common law and equity rules.\n\n> management advisory committee means the management advisory committee established under section 27.\n\n> management advisory committee member means a member of the management advisory committee.\n\n> member means a member of the Commission, and includes the President.\n\n> Parliamentary Committee means a Committee of either House, or of both Houses, of the Parliament.\n\n> President means the President of the Commission, and includes any person for the time being acting in the office of President.\n\n> reference means a reference to the Commission by the Attorney‑General under this Act.","sortOrder":3},{"sectionNumber":"4","sectionType":"section","heading":"Extension to external Territories","content":"#### 4 Extension to external Territories\n\n  This Act extends to the external Territories.","sortOrder":4},{"sectionNumber":"Part 2","sectionType":"part","heading":"Establishment and constitution of the Commission","content":"## Part 2—Establishment and constitution of the Commission","sortOrder":5},{"sectionNumber":"5","sectionType":"section","heading":"Establishment of the Commission","content":"#### 5 Establishment of the Commission\n\n  (1) This section establishes a commission called the Australian Law Reform Commission.\n  (2) For the purposes of the finance law (within the meaning of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013):\n    (a) the Commission is a listed entity; and\n    (b) the President is the accountable authority of the Commission; and\n    (c) the following persons are officials of the Commission:\n    (i) the President;\n    (ii) the other members;\n    (iii) the staff of the Commission referred to in subsection 43(1); and\n    (d) the purposes of the Commission include the functions of the Commission referred to in section 21.","sortOrder":6},{"sectionNumber":"6","sectionType":"section","heading":"Constitution of the Commission","content":"#### 6 Constitution of the Commission\n\n  (1) The Commission consists of:\n    (a) a President; and\n    (b) up to 6 other members.\n  (2) The performance of the Commission’s functions, and the exercise of its powers, are not affected merely because of 1 or more vacancies in its membership.\n  (3) Subject to paragraph (1)(b), the Attorney‑General may, from time to time, appoint such other part‑time members of the Commission as the Attorney‑General considers necessary to enable the Commission to perform its functions.","sortOrder":7},{"sectionNumber":"7","sectionType":"section","heading":"Appointment of members","content":"#### 7 Appointment of members\n\n  (1) The members are to be appointed by:\n    (a) for a full‑time member—the Governor‑General; and\n    (b) for a part‑time member—the Attorney‑General, by written instrument.\n  (2) A person must not be appointed as a member unless he or she:\n    (a) is the holder of a judicial office; or\n    (b) is, and has been for at least 5 years, a legal practitioner of the High Court, or of the Supreme Court of a State or Territory; or\n    (c) is a graduate in law of a university, and has experience as a member of the academic staff of a tertiary educational institution; or\n    (d) is, in the opinion of the Governor‑General or the Attorney‑General (as the case may be), suitable for appointment because of the person’s special qualifications, training or experience.","sortOrder":8},{"sectionNumber":"8","sectionType":"section","heading":"Full‑time and part‑time appointments","content":"#### 8 Full‑time and part‑time appointments\n\n  (1) The President must be appointed as a full‑time member.\n  (2) The other members may be appointed either as full‑time or part‑time members.\n  (3) If the President is or becomes the holder of a judicial office, the President may carry out any of the duties of that office.","sortOrder":9},{"sectionNumber":"9","sectionType":"section","heading":"Durations, terms and conditions of appointments","content":"#### 9 Durations, terms and conditions of appointments\n\n  (1) Subject to sections 17 and 18, a member holds office for the term (of at least 6 months but not longer than 5 years) specified in his or her appointment, but is eligible for re‑appointment.\n  (2) A member’s appointment is subject to the terms and conditions (if any) set out in it.","sortOrder":10},{"sectionNumber":"10","sectionType":"section","heading":"Appointment and service not to affect a tenure or rights of judicial office holders","content":"#### 10 Appointment and service not to affect a tenure or rights of judicial office holders\n\n  (1) If a person who holds a judicial office is appointed as a member, the appointment does not affect, and is taken never to have affected:\n    (a) the person’s tenure of that office; or\n    (b) the person’s rights or privileges as the holder of that office.\n  (2) If a person who holds a judicial office serves as a member, that service does not affect, and is taken never to have affected:\n    (a) the person’s tenure of that office; or\n    (b) the person’s rights or privileges as the holder of that office.\n  (3) Any service as a member by the holder of a judicial office is taken for all purposes to be, or to have been, service as the holder of that office.\n  (4) For the purposes of this section, a person’s rights and privileges as the holder of a judicial office are taken to include his or her rank, title, status, precedence, salary and allowances, as the holder of that office.","sortOrder":11},{"sectionNumber":"11","sectionType":"section","heading":"Arrangements for appointment of State and Territory judges","content":"#### 11 Arrangements for appointment of State and Territory judges\n\n  (1) For the purposes of appointing a judge, magistrate or justice of a court of a State as a member, the Governor‑General or the Attorney‑General (as the case may be) may enter into any necessary arrangement with the Governor of the State.\n  (2) For the purposes of appointing a judge, magistrate or justice of a court of the Australian Capital Territory or of the Northern Territory as a member, the Governor‑General or the Attorney‑General (as the case may be) may enter into any necessary arrangement with the Chief Minister of the Territory.\n  (3) An arrangement may provide, among other things, for the Commonwealth to reimburse the State or Territory with respect to the services of the person to be appointed.","sortOrder":12},{"sectionNumber":"13","sectionType":"section","heading":"Acting appointment: President","content":"#### 13 Acting appointment: President\n\n  (1) The Attorney‑General may, by written instrument, appoint a member or a person who is qualified to be a member to act as President:\n    (a) during a vacancy in the office of President, whether or not an appointment has previously been made to the office; or\n    (b) during any period, or during all periods, when the President is absent from duty or from Australia or is, for any other reason, unable to perform the functions of the office.\n\n> Note: For rules that apply to acting appointments, see section 33A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.\n\n  (2) The appointment may be expressed to have effect:\n    (a) for a period specified in the instrument of appointment; or\n    (b) in the circumstances specified in the instrument of appointment (including whenever the President is on leave, for example).\n\n> Note: For rules that apply to acting appointments, see section 33A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.\n\n  (3) If the Attorney‑General appoints a person who is not a member, the person is taken to be a member for the period of the appointment.","sortOrder":13},{"sectionNumber":"14","sectionType":"section","heading":"Acting appointments: full‑time members","content":"#### 14 Acting appointments: full‑time members\n\n  The Attorney‑General may appoint a part‑time member to act as a full‑time member (other than the President) during any period, or during all periods, when the full‑time member is, for any reason, unable to perform the functions of the office.\n\n> Note: For rules that apply to acting appointments, see section 33A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.","sortOrder":14},{"sectionNumber":"15","sectionType":"section","heading":"Directions to perform duties on a full‑time basis","content":"#### 15 Directions to perform duties on a full‑time basis\n\n  (1) The Attorney‑General may, in writing, direct a part‑time member to perform the duties of his or her office on a full‑time basis in the circumstances, and for the period, specified in the direction.\n  (2) While a part‑time member performs duties on a full‑time basis in accordance with a direction, the member is to be paid the same remuneration and allowances as are payable to a full‑time member.","sortOrder":15},{"sectionNumber":"16","sectionType":"section","heading":"Remuneration and allowances","content":"#### 16 Remuneration and allowances\n\n  (1) A member who is not the holder of a judicial office is to be paid such remuneration as the Remuneration Tribunal determines.\n  (2) The member is to be paid the prescribed allowances.\n  (3) This section has effect subject to the Remuneration Tribunal  \n  Act 1973.","sortOrder":16},{"sectionNumber":"17","sectionType":"section","heading":"Termination of full‑time appointments","content":"#### 17 Termination of full‑time appointments\n\n  (1) The Governor‑General may terminate a full‑time member’s appointment for misbehaviour, or physical or mental incapacity.\n  (2) The Governor‑General must terminate a full‑time member’s appointment if the member:\n    (a) becomes bankrupt; or\n    (b) applies to take the benefit of any law for the relief of bankrupt or insolvent debtors; or\n    (c) compounds with his or her creditors; or\n    (d) makes an assignment of his or her remuneration for the benefit of his or her creditors.\n  (3) If a full‑time member engages in paid employment outside the duties of the member’s office without the Attorney‑General’s approval, the Governor‑General must terminate the member’s appointment.\n  (4) Subsections (1), (2) and (3) do not apply to a full‑time member who holds a judicial office.\n  (5) If a full‑time member who is the holder of a judicial office stops holding that office, the Governor‑General may terminate the member’s appointment.","sortOrder":17},{"sectionNumber":"17A","sectionType":"section","heading":"Termination of part‑time appointments","content":"#### 17A Termination of part‑time appointments\n\n  (1) The Attorney‑General may terminate a part‑time member’s appointment for misbehaviour, or physical or mental incapacity.\n  (2) The Attorney‑General must terminate a part‑time member’s appointment if the member:\n    (a) becomes bankrupt; or\n    (b) applies to take the benefit of any law for the relief of bankrupt or insolvent debtors; or\n    (c) compounds with his or her creditors; or\n    (d) makes an assignment of his or her remuneration for the benefit of his or her creditors.\n  (3) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to a part‑time member who holds a judicial office.\n  (4) If a part‑time member who is the holder of a judicial office stops holding that office, the Attorney‑General may terminate the member’s appointment.","sortOrder":18},{"sectionNumber":"18","sectionType":"section","heading":"Resignation","content":"#### 18 Resignation\n\n  A member may resign from the office of member by signing a written resignation and delivering it to:\n    (a) if the member is a full‑time member—the Governor‑General; or\n    (b) if the member is a part‑time member—the Attorney‑General.","sortOrder":19},{"sectionNumber":"19","sectionType":"section","heading":"Leave of absence for full‑time members","content":"#### 19 Leave of absence for full‑time members\n\n  (1) A full‑time member has the recreation leave entitlements determined by the Remuneration Tribunal.\n  (2) The Attorney‑General may grant the President leave of absence (except recreation leave) on such terms and conditions as to remuneration or otherwise as the Attorney‑General determines.\n  (3) The President may grant a full‑time member leave of absence (except recreation leave) on such terms and conditions as to remuneration or otherwise as the President determines.\n  (4) This section has effect subject to the Remuneration Tribunal  \n  Act 1973.","sortOrder":20},{"sectionNumber":"Part 3","sectionType":"part","heading":"The Commission’s functions, powers and reports","content":"## Part 3—The Commission’s functions, powers and reports","sortOrder":21},{"sectionNumber":"20","sectionType":"section","heading":"Reference to the Commission","content":"#### 20 Reference to the Commission\n\n  (1) The Attorney‑General may refer a matter to the Commission, either at the Commission’s suggestion or on his or her own initiative.\n  (2) The Attorney‑General may alter the terms of a reference.\n  (3) The Attorney‑General may give the Commission directions about the order in which it is to deal with references.","sortOrder":22},{"sectionNumber":"21","sectionType":"section","heading":"The Commission’s functions","content":"#### 21 The Commission’s functions\n\n  (1) The Commission has the following functions in relation to matters referred to it by the Attorney‑General:\n    (a) to review Commonwealth laws relevant to those matters for the purposes of systematically developing and reforming the law, particularly by:\n    (i) bringing the law into line with current conditions and ensuring that it meets current needs; and\n    (ii) removing defects in the law; and\n    (iii) simplifying the law; and\n    (iv) adopting new or more effective methods for administering the law and dispensing justice; and\n    (v) providing improved access to justice;\n    (b) to consider proposals for making or consolidating Commonwealth laws about those matters;\n    (c) to consider proposals for the repeal of obsolete or unnecessary laws about those matters;\n    (d) to consider proposals for uniformity between State and Territory laws about those matters;\n    (e) to consider proposals for complementary Commonwealth, State and Territory laws about those matters.\n  (2) It is a function of the Commission to report to the Attorney‑General on the results of any review or consideration it carries out under subsection (1), and to include in the report any recommendations it wants to make.","sortOrder":23},{"sectionNumber":"22","sectionType":"section","heading":"Interim reports","content":"#### 22 Interim reports\n\n  (1) The Commission may, before making its report on a reference, make an interim report to the Attorney‑General on its work on the reference.\n  (2) The Attorney‑General may, before the Commission makes its report on a reference, direct it to make an interim report to the Attorney‑General on its work on the reference.","sortOrder":24},{"sectionNumber":"23","sectionType":"section","heading":"Reports to be tabled","content":"#### 23 Reports to be tabled\n\n  The Attorney‑General must cause each report and interim report of the Commission on a matter that is the subject of a reference to be tabled in each House of the Parliament within 15 sitting days of that House after the Attorney‑General receives it.","sortOrder":25},{"sectionNumber":"24","sectionType":"section","heading":"How the Commission is to perform its functions","content":"#### 24 How the Commission is to perform its functions\n\n  (1) In performing its functions, the Commission must aim at ensuring that the laws, proposals and recommendations it reviews, considers or makes:\n    (a) do not trespass unduly on personal rights and liberties or make the rights and liberties of citizens unduly dependent on administrative, rather than judicial, decisions; and\n    (b) are, as far as practicable, consistent with Australia’s international obligations that are relevant to the matter.\n  (2) The Commission, when formulating recommendations, must have regard to the effect that the recommendations may have on:\n    (a) the costs of getting access to, and dispensing, justice; and\n    (b) persons and businesses who would be affected by the recommendations (including the economic effect, for example).","sortOrder":26},{"sectionNumber":"25","sectionType":"section","heading":"The Commission’s powers","content":"#### 25 The Commission’s powers\n\n  The Commission has power to do everything necessary or convenient to be done for, or in connection with, the performance of its functions.","sortOrder":27},{"sectionNumber":"26","sectionType":"section","heading":"Commission to comply with certain requirements and directions","content":"#### 26 Commission to comply with certain requirements and directions\n\n  (1) If a House of the Parliament, or a Parliamentary Committee, requires the Commission to give it any information about the performance of the Commission’s functions, or the exercise of its powers, the Commission must comply with the requirement.\n  (2) The information that may be required under subsection (1) includes information about the Commission’s expenditure or proposed expenditure.\n  (2A) In the capacity of CEO of the Commission, the President must act in accordance with any policies determined, and comply with any directions given, in writing by the Attorney‑General.\n\n> Note: Section 19 of the Public Service Act 1999 has the effect that the President is not subject to direction by any Minister in relation to the exercise of powers by the President under section 15 or Division 1 or 2 of Part 4 of that Act in relation to particular individuals.\n\n  (3) The Commission must comply with a direction of the Attorney‑General under subsection 20(3) or 22(2).","sortOrder":28},{"sectionNumber":"Part 4","sectionType":"part","heading":"Management, meetings and staff","content":"An Act to establish the Australian Law Reform Commission, and for related purposes\n\n## Part 1—Preliminary\n\n#### 1 Short title\n\n  This Act may be cited as the Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996.\n\n#### 2 Commencement\n\n  (1) Subject to subsection (2), this Act commences on a day to be fixed by Proclamation.\n  (2) If this Act does not commence under subsection (1) within the period of 6 months beginning on the day on which this Act receives the Royal Assent, it commences on the first day after the end of that period.\n\n#### 3 Definitions\n\n  In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears:\n\n> Commission means the Australian Law Reform Commission.\n\n> Commonwealth laws means:\n\n    (a) laws (including Territory laws) made by, or by the authority of, the Parliament; and\n    (b) any other laws (including Territory laws) that the Parliament has power to repeal or amend.\n\n> judicial office means:\n\n    (a) an office of a judge, magistrate or justice of a federal court or a court of a State or Territory; or\n    (b) an office whose holder has, under an Act of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, the same status as a judge, magistrate or justice of a federal court or a court of a State or Territory.\n\n> laws includes common law and equity rules.\n\n> management advisory committee means the management advisory committee established under section 27.\n\n> management advisory committee member means a member of the management advisory committee.\n\n> member means a member of the Commission, and includes the President.\n\n> Parliamentary Committee means a Committee of either House, or of both Houses, of the Parliament.\n\n> President means the President of the Commission, and includes any person for the time being acting in the office of President.\n\n> reference means a reference to the Commission by the Attorney‑General under this Act.\n\n#### 4 Extension to external Territories\n\n  This Act extends to the external Territories.\n\n## Part 2—Establishment and constitution of the Commission\n\n#### 5 Establishment of the Commission\n\n  (1) This section establishes a commission called the Australian Law Reform Commission.\n  (2) For the purposes of the finance law (within the meaning of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013):\n    (a) the Commission is a listed entity; and\n    (b) the President is the accountable authority of the Commission; and\n    (c) the following persons are officials of the Commission:\n    (i) the President;\n    (ii) the other members;\n    (iii) the staff of the Commission referred to in subsection 43(1); and\n    (d) the purposes of the Commission include the functions of the Commission referred to in section 21.\n\n#### 6 Constitution of the Commission\n\n  (1) The Commission consists of:\n    (a) a President; and\n    (b) up to 6 other members.\n  (2) The performance of the Commission’s functions, and the exercise of its powers, are not affected merely because of 1 or more vacancies in its membership.\n  (3) Subject to paragraph (1)(b), the Attorney‑General may, from time to time, appoint such other part‑time members of the Commission as the Attorney‑General considers necessary to enable the Commission to perform its functions.\n\n#### 7 Appointment of members\n\n  (1) The members are to be appointed by:\n    (a) for a full‑time member—the Governor‑General; and\n    (b) for a part‑time member—the Attorney‑General, by written instrument.\n  (2) A person must not be appointed as a member unless he or she:\n    (a) is the holder of a judicial office; or\n    (b) is, and has been for at least 5 years, a legal practitioner of the High Court, or of the Supreme Court of a State or Territory; or\n    (c) is a graduate in law of a university, and has experience as a member of the academic staff of a tertiary educational institution; or\n    (d) is, in the opinion of the Governor‑General or the Attorney‑General (as the case may be), suitable for appointment because of the person’s special qualifications, training or experience.\n\n#### 8 Full‑time and part‑time appointments\n\n  (1) The President must be appointed as a full‑time member.\n  (2) The other members may be appointed either as full‑time or part‑time members.\n  (3) If the President is or becomes the holder of a judicial office, the President may carry out any of the duties of that office.\n\n#### 9 Durations, terms and conditions of appointments\n\n  (1) Subject to sections 17 and 18, a member holds office for the term (of at least 6 months but not longer than 5 years) specified in his or her appointment, but is eligible for re‑appointment.\n  (2) A member’s appointment is subject to the terms and conditions (if any) set out in it.\n\n#### 10 Appointment and service not to affect a tenure or rights of judicial office holders\n\n  (1) If a person who holds a judicial office is appointed as a member, the appointment does not affect, and is taken never to have affected:\n    (a) the person’s tenure of that office; or\n    (b) the person’s rights or privileges as the holder of that office.\n  (2) If a person who holds a judicial office serves as a member, that service does not affect, and is taken never to have affected:\n    (a) the person’s tenure of that office; or\n    (b) the person’s rights or privileges as the holder of that office.\n  (3) Any service as a member by the holder of a judicial office is taken for all purposes to be, or to have been, service as the holder of that office.\n  (4) For the purposes of this section, a person’s rights and privileges as the holder of a judicial office are taken to include his or her rank, title, status, precedence, salary and allowances, as the holder of that office.\n\n#### 11 Arrangements for appointment of State and Territory judges\n\n  (1) For the purposes of appointing a judge, magistrate or justice of a court of a State as a member, the Governor‑General or the Attorney‑General (as the case may be) may enter into any necessary arrangement with the Governor of the State.\n  (2) For the purposes of appointing a judge, magistrate or justice of a court of the Australian Capital Territory or of the Northern Territory as a member, the Governor‑General or the Attorney‑General (as the case may be) may enter into any necessary arrangement with the Chief Minister of the Territory.\n  (3) An arrangement may provide, among other things, for the Commonwealth to reimburse the State or Territory with respect to the services of the person to be appointed.\n\n#### 13 Acting appointment: President\n\n  (1) The Attorney‑General may, by written instrument, appoint a member or a person who is qualified to be a member to act as President:\n    (a) during a vacancy in the office of President, whether or not an appointment has previously been made to the office; or\n    (b) during any period, or during all periods, when the President is absent from duty or from Australia or is, for any other reason, unable to perform the functions of the office.\n\n> Note: For rules that apply to acting appointments, see section 33A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.\n\n  (2) The appointment may be expressed to have effect:\n    (a) for a period specified in the instrument of appointment; or\n    (b) in the circumstances specified in the instrument of appointment (including whenever the President is on leave, for example).\n\n> Note: For rules that apply to acting appointments, see section 33A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.\n\n  (3) If the Attorney‑General appoints a person who is not a member, the person is taken to be a member for the period of the appointment.\n\n#### 14 Acting appointments: full‑time members\n\n  The Attorney‑General may appoint a part‑time member to act as a full‑time member (other than the President) during any period, or during all periods, when the full‑time member is, for any reason, unable to perform the functions of the office.\n\n> Note: For rules that apply to acting appointments, see section 33A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.\n\n#### 15 Directions to perform duties on a full‑time basis\n\n  (1) The Attorney‑General may, in writing, direct a part‑time member to perform the duties of his or her office on a full‑time basis in the circumstances, and for the period, specified in the direction.\n  (2) While a part‑time member performs duties on a full‑time basis in accordance with a direction, the member is to be paid the same remuneration and allowances as are payable to a full‑time member.\n\n#### 16 Remuneration and allowances\n\n  (1) A member who is not the holder of a judicial office is to be paid such remuneration as the Remuneration Tribunal determines.\n  (2) The member is to be paid the prescribed allowances.\n  (3) This section has effect subject to the Remuneration Tribunal  \n  Act 1973.\n\n#### 17 Termination of full‑time appointments\n\n  (1) The Governor‑General may terminate a full‑time member’s appointment for misbehaviour, or physical or mental incapacity.\n  (2) The Governor‑General must terminate a full‑time member’s appointment if the member:\n    (a) becomes bankrupt; or\n    (b) applies to take the benefit of any law for the relief of bankrupt or insolvent debtors; or\n    (c) compounds with his or her creditors; or\n    (d) makes an assignment of his or her remuneration for the benefit of his or her creditors.\n  (3) If a full‑time member engages in paid employment outside the duties of the member’s office without the Attorney‑General’s approval, the Governor‑General must terminate the member’s appointment.\n  (4) Subsections (1), (2) and (3) do not apply to a full‑time member who holds a judicial office.\n  (5) If a full‑time member who is the holder of a judicial office stops holding that office, the Governor‑General may terminate the member’s appointment.\n\n#### 17A Termination of part‑time appointments\n\n  (1) The Attorney‑General may terminate a part‑time member’s appointment for misbehaviour, or physical or mental incapacity.\n  (2) The Attorney‑General must terminate a part‑time member’s appointment if the member:\n    (a) becomes bankrupt; or\n    (b) applies to take the benefit of any law for the relief of bankrupt or insolvent debtors; or\n    (c) compounds with his or her creditors; or\n    (d) makes an assignment of his or her remuneration for the benefit of his or her creditors.\n  (3) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to a part‑time member who holds a judicial office.\n  (4) If a part‑time member who is the holder of a judicial office stops holding that office, the Attorney‑General may terminate the member’s appointment.\n\n#### 18 Resignation\n\n  A member may resign from the office of member by signing a written resignation and delivering it to:\n    (a) if the member is a full‑time member—the Governor‑General; or\n    (b) if the member is a part‑time member—the Attorney‑General.\n\n#### 19 Leave of absence for full‑time members\n\n  (1) A full‑time member has the recreation leave entitlements determined by the Remuneration Tribunal.\n  (2) The Attorney‑General may grant the President leave of absence (except recreation leave) on such terms and conditions as to remuneration or otherwise as the Attorney‑General determines.\n  (3) The President may grant a full‑time member leave of absence (except recreation leave) on such terms and conditions as to remuneration or otherwise as the President determines.\n  (4) This section has effect subject to the Remuneration Tribunal  \n  Act 1973.\n\n## Part 3—The Commission’s functions, powers and reports\n\n#### 20 Reference to the Commission\n\n  (1) The Attorney‑General may refer a matter to the Commission, either at the Commission’s suggestion or on his or her own initiative.\n  (2) The Attorney‑General may alter the terms of a reference.\n  (3) The Attorney‑General may give the Commission directions about the order in which it is to deal with references.\n\n#### 21 The Commission’s functions\n\n  (1) The Commission has the following functions in relation to matters referred to it by the Attorney‑General:\n    (a) to review Commonwealth laws relevant to those matters for the purposes of systematically developing and reforming the law, particularly by:\n    (i) bringing the law into line with current conditions and ensuring that it meets current needs; and\n    (ii) removing defects in the law; and\n    (iii) simplifying the law; and\n    (iv) adopting new or more effective methods for administering the law and dispensing justice; and\n    (v) providing improved access to justice;\n    (b) to consider proposals for making or consolidating Commonwealth laws about those matters;\n    (c) to consider proposals for the repeal of obsolete or unnecessary laws about those matters;\n    (d) to consider proposals for uniformity between State and Territory laws about those matters;\n    (e) to consider proposals for complementary Commonwealth, State and Territory laws about those matters.\n  (2) It is a function of the Commission to report to the Attorney‑General on the results of any review or consideration it carries out under subsection (1), and to include in the report any recommendations it wants to make.\n\n#### 22 Interim reports\n\n  (1) The Commission may, before making its report on a reference, make an interim report to the Attorney‑General on its work on the reference.\n  (2) The Attorney‑General may, before the Commission makes its report on a reference, direct it to make an interim report to the Attorney‑General on its work on the reference.\n\n#### 23 Reports to be tabled\n\n  The Attorney‑General must cause each report and interim report of the Commission on a matter that is the subject of a reference to be tabled in each House of the Parliament within 15 sitting days of that House after the Attorney‑General receives it.\n\n#### 24 How the Commission is to perform its functions\n\n  (1) In performing its functions, the Commission must aim at ensuring that the laws, proposals and recommendations it reviews, considers or makes:\n    (a) do not trespass unduly on personal rights and liberties or make the rights and liberties of citizens unduly dependent on administrative, rather than judicial, decisions; and\n    (b) are, as far as practicable, consistent with Australia’s international obligations that are relevant to the matter.\n  (2) The Commission, when formulating recommendations, must have regard to the effect that the recommendations may have on:\n    (a) the costs of getting access to, and dispensing, justice; and\n    (b) persons and businesses who would be affected by the recommendations (including the economic effect, for example).\n\n#### 25 The Commission’s powers\n\n  The Commission has power to do everything necessary or convenient to be done for, or in connection with, the performance of its functions.\n\n#### 26 Commission to comply with certain requirements and directions\n\n  (1) If a House of the Parliament, or a Parliamentary Committee, requires the Commission to give it any information about the performance of the Commission’s functions, or the exercise of its powers, the Commission must comply with the requirement.\n  (2) The information that may be required under subsection (1) includes information about the Commission’s expenditure or proposed expenditure.\n  (2A) In the capacity of CEO of the Commission, the President must act in accordance with any policies determined, and comply with any directions given, in writing by the Attorney‑General.\n\n> Note: Section 19 of the Public Service Act 1999 has the effect that the President is not subject to direction by any Minister in relation to the exercise of powers by the President under section 15 or Division 1 or 2 of Part 4 of that Act in relation to particular individuals.\n\n  (3) The Commission must comply with a direction of the Attorney‑General under subsection 20(3) or 22(2).\n\n## Part 4—Management, meetings and staff\n\n### Division 1—Management structure\n\n#### 27 Management advisory committee\n\n  (1) The Attorney‑General may, by written instrument, establish a committee (the management advisory committee) to advise the President on matters that are relevant to the proper discharge of the Commission’s functions (including in relation to strategic planning, for example).\n  (2) However, the management advisory committee must not attempt to compromise the independence or impartiality of the Commission in any way.\n  (3) The Attorney‑General is to appoint the members of the management advisory committee.\n  (4) The Attorney‑General may dissolve the management advisory committee at any time.\n  (5) The President may decide any matters about the management advisory committee that are not provided for in this Act.\n\n#### 34 President to be CEO\n\n  The President is the Chief Executive Officer of the Commission.\n\n#### 35 Delegations by the President\n\n  The President may, in writing, delegate all or any of the President’s powers to a member of the Commission, or to an employee of the Commission.\n\n### Division 2—Meetings and proceedings of the Commission\n\n#### 36 Meetings of the Commission\n\n  (1) The President must convene:\n    (a) at least 2 meetings each financial year; and\n    (b) any other meetings that the President thinks necessary for the efficient performance of the Commission’s functions.\n  (2) The President must convene a meeting on receiving a written request to do so signed by a majority of the other members.\n  (3) The President must preside at all meetings at which he or she is present.\n  (5) If the President is not present at a meeting, the members who are present must elect one of their number to preside.\n  (6) A quorum is constituted by a majority of the members of the Commission.\n  (7) Questions arising at a meeting must be determined by a majority of the votes of the members present and voting.\n  (8) The person presiding at a meeting has a deliberative vote and, if there is an equality of votes, also has a casting vote.\n\n#### 37 Conduct of meetings\n\n  The Commission may regulate proceedings at its meetings as it thinks fit. It must keep minutes of those proceedings.\n\n#### 38 Commission may inform itself in any way\n\n  For the purposes of reviewing or considering anything that is the subject of a reference, the Commission may inform itself in any way it thinks fit.\n\n### Division 4—Staff and consultants\n\n#### 43 Staff of the Commission\n\n  (1) The staff of the Commission are to be persons engaged under the Public Service Act 1999.\n  (2) For the purposes of that Act:\n    (a) the President and the staff together constitute a Statutory Agency; and\n    (b) the President is the Head of that Statutory Agency.\n\n#### 44 Commission may engage consultants\n\n  The President may engage persons with suitable qualifications and experience as consultants to the Commission.\n\n## Part 5—Finance\n\n#### 45 Law Reform Special Account\n\n  (1) The Law Reform Special Account is established by this section.\n  (2) The Law Reform Special Account is a special account for the purposes of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013.\n  (3) The following amounts must be credited to the Law Reform Special Account:\n    (a) amounts appropriated by the Parliament for the purposes of the Account;\n    (b) amounts received by the Commission in relation to performing any of its functions, or exercising any of its powers, under this Act;\n    (c) amounts of any gifts given, or bequests made, for the purposes of the Account.\n\n> Note: An Appropriation Act provides for amounts to be credited to a special account if any of the purposes of the special account is a purpose that is covered by an item in the Appropriation Act.\n\n  (4) The Law Reform Special Account may be debited for the following purposes:\n    (a) to pay the costs, expenses and other obligations incurred by the Commonwealth in the performance of the Commission’s functions;\n    (b) to pay any remuneration and allowances payable to a person under this Act;\n    (c) to pay the expenses of administering the Account;\n    (d) to pay any amount that is required or permitted to be repaid;\n    (e) to reduce the balance of the Account (and, therefore, the available appropriation for the Account) without making a real or notional payment.\n\n> Note: See section 80 of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (which deals with special accounts).\n\n## Part 6—Miscellaneous\n\n#### 51 Regulations\n\n  The Governor‑General may make regulations prescribing matters:\n    (a) required or permitted by this Act to be prescribed; or\n    (b) necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect to this Act.","sortOrder":29},{"sectionNumber":"Division 1","sectionType":"division","heading":"Management structure","content":"An Act to establish the Australian Law Reform Commission, and for related purposes\n\n## Part 1—Preliminary\n\n#### 1 Short title\n\n  This Act may be cited as the Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996.\n\n#### 2 Commencement\n\n  (1) Subject to subsection (2), this Act commences on a day to be fixed by Proclamation.\n  (2) If this Act does not commence under subsection (1) within the period of 6 months beginning on the day on which this Act receives the Royal Assent, it commences on the first day after the end of that period.\n\n#### 3 Definitions\n\n  In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears:\n\n> Commission means the Australian Law Reform Commission.\n\n> Commonwealth laws means:\n\n    (a) laws (including Territory laws) made by, or by the authority of, the Parliament; and\n    (b) any other laws (including Territory laws) that the Parliament has power to repeal or amend.\n\n> judicial office means:\n\n    (a) an office of a judge, magistrate or justice of a federal court or a court of a State or Territory; or\n    (b) an office whose holder has, under an Act of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, the same status as a judge, magistrate or justice of a federal court or a court of a State or Territory.\n\n> laws includes common law and equity rules.\n\n> management advisory committee means the management advisory committee established under section 27.\n\n> management advisory committee member means a member of the management advisory committee.\n\n> member means a member of the Commission, and includes the President.\n\n> Parliamentary Committee means a Committee of either House, or of both Houses, of the Parliament.\n\n> President means the President of the Commission, and includes any person for the time being acting in the office of President.\n\n> reference means a reference to the Commission by the Attorney‑General under this Act.\n\n#### 4 Extension to external Territories\n\n  This Act extends to the external Territories.\n\n## Part 2—Establishment and constitution of the Commission\n\n#### 5 Establishment of the Commission\n\n  (1) This section establishes a commission called the Australian Law Reform Commission.\n  (2) For the purposes of the finance law (within the meaning of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013):\n    (a) the Commission is a listed entity; and\n    (b) the President is the accountable authority of the Commission; and\n    (c) the following persons are officials of the Commission:\n    (i) the President;\n    (ii) the other members;\n    (iii) the staff of the Commission referred to in subsection 43(1); and\n    (d) the purposes of the Commission include the functions of the Commission referred to in section 21.\n\n#### 6 Constitution of the Commission\n\n  (1) The Commission consists of:\n    (a) a President; and\n    (b) up to 6 other members.\n  (2) The performance of the Commission’s functions, and the exercise of its powers, are not affected merely because of 1 or more vacancies in its membership.\n  (3) Subject to paragraph (1)(b), the Attorney‑General may, from time to time, appoint such other part‑time members of the Commission as the Attorney‑General considers necessary to enable the Commission to perform its functions.\n\n#### 7 Appointment of members\n\n  (1) The members are to be appointed by:\n    (a) for a full‑time member—the Governor‑General; and\n    (b) for a part‑time member—the Attorney‑General, by written instrument.\n  (2) A person must not be appointed as a member unless he or she:\n    (a) is the holder of a judicial office; or\n    (b) is, and has been for at least 5 years, a legal practitioner of the High Court, or of the Supreme Court of a State or Territory; or\n    (c) is a graduate in law of a university, and has experience as a member of the academic staff of a tertiary educational institution; or\n    (d) is, in the opinion of the Governor‑General or the Attorney‑General (as the case may be), suitable for appointment because of the person’s special qualifications, training or experience.\n\n#### 8 Full‑time and part‑time appointments\n\n  (1) The President must be appointed as a full‑time member.\n  (2) The other members may be appointed either as full‑time or part‑time members.\n  (3) If the President is or becomes the holder of a judicial office, the President may carry out any of the duties of that office.\n\n#### 9 Durations, terms and conditions of appointments\n\n  (1) Subject to sections 17 and 18, a member holds office for the term (of at least 6 months but not longer than 5 years) specified in his or her appointment, but is eligible for re‑appointment.\n  (2) A member’s appointment is subject to the terms and conditions (if any) set out in it.\n\n#### 10 Appointment and service not to affect a tenure or rights of judicial office holders\n\n  (1) If a person who holds a judicial office is appointed as a member, the appointment does not affect, and is taken never to have affected:\n    (a) the person’s tenure of that office; or\n    (b) the person’s rights or privileges as the holder of that office.\n  (2) If a person who holds a judicial office serves as a member, that service does not affect, and is taken never to have affected:\n    (a) the person’s tenure of that office; or\n    (b) the person’s rights or privileges as the holder of that office.\n  (3) Any service as a member by the holder of a judicial office is taken for all purposes to be, or to have been, service as the holder of that office.\n  (4) For the purposes of this section, a person’s rights and privileges as the holder of a judicial office are taken to include his or her rank, title, status, precedence, salary and allowances, as the holder of that office.\n\n#### 11 Arrangements for appointment of State and Territory judges\n\n  (1) For the purposes of appointing a judge, magistrate or justice of a court of a State as a member, the Governor‑General or the Attorney‑General (as the case may be) may enter into any necessary arrangement with the Governor of the State.\n  (2) For the purposes of appointing a judge, magistrate or justice of a court of the Australian Capital Territory or of the Northern Territory as a member, the Governor‑General or the Attorney‑General (as the case may be) may enter into any necessary arrangement with the Chief Minister of the Territory.\n  (3) An arrangement may provide, among other things, for the Commonwealth to reimburse the State or Territory with respect to the services of the person to be appointed.\n\n#### 13 Acting appointment: President\n\n  (1) The Attorney‑General may, by written instrument, appoint a member or a person who is qualified to be a member to act as President:\n    (a) during a vacancy in the office of President, whether or not an appointment has previously been made to the office; or\n    (b) during any period, or during all periods, when the President is absent from duty or from Australia or is, for any other reason, unable to perform the functions of the office.\n\n> Note: For rules that apply to acting appointments, see section 33A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.\n\n  (2) The appointment may be expressed to have effect:\n    (a) for a period specified in the instrument of appointment; or\n    (b) in the circumstances specified in the instrument of appointment (including whenever the President is on leave, for example).\n\n> Note: For rules that apply to acting appointments, see section 33A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.\n\n  (3) If the Attorney‑General appoints a person who is not a member, the person is taken to be a member for the period of the appointment.\n\n#### 14 Acting appointments: full‑time members\n\n  The Attorney‑General may appoint a part‑time member to act as a full‑time member (other than the President) during any period, or during all periods, when the full‑time member is, for any reason, unable to perform the functions of the office.\n\n> Note: For rules that apply to acting appointments, see section 33A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.\n\n#### 15 Directions to perform duties on a full‑time basis\n\n  (1) The Attorney‑General may, in writing, direct a part‑time member to perform the duties of his or her office on a full‑time basis in the circumstances, and for the period, specified in the direction.\n  (2) While a part‑time member performs duties on a full‑time basis in accordance with a direction, the member is to be paid the same remuneration and allowances as are payable to a full‑time member.\n\n#### 16 Remuneration and allowances\n\n  (1) A member who is not the holder of a judicial office is to be paid such remuneration as the Remuneration Tribunal determines.\n  (2) The member is to be paid the prescribed allowances.\n  (3) This section has effect subject to the Remuneration Tribunal  \n  Act 1973.\n\n#### 17 Termination of full‑time appointments\n\n  (1) The Governor‑General may terminate a full‑time member’s appointment for misbehaviour, or physical or mental incapacity.\n  (2) The Governor‑General must terminate a full‑time member’s appointment if the member:\n    (a) becomes bankrupt; or\n    (b) applies to take the benefit of any law for the relief of bankrupt or insolvent debtors; or\n    (c) compounds with his or her creditors; or\n    (d) makes an assignment of his or her remuneration for the benefit of his or her creditors.\n  (3) If a full‑time member engages in paid employment outside the duties of the member’s office without the Attorney‑General’s approval, the Governor‑General must terminate the member’s appointment.\n  (4) Subsections (1), (2) and (3) do not apply to a full‑time member who holds a judicial office.\n  (5) If a full‑time member who is the holder of a judicial office stops holding that office, the Governor‑General may terminate the member’s appointment.\n\n#### 17A Termination of part‑time appointments\n\n  (1) The Attorney‑General may terminate a part‑time member’s appointment for misbehaviour, or physical or mental incapacity.\n  (2) The Attorney‑General must terminate a part‑time member’s appointment if the member:\n    (a) becomes bankrupt; or\n    (b) applies to take the benefit of any law for the relief of bankrupt or insolvent debtors; or\n    (c) compounds with his or her creditors; or\n    (d) makes an assignment of his or her remuneration for the benefit of his or her creditors.\n  (3) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to a part‑time member who holds a judicial office.\n  (4) If a part‑time member who is the holder of a judicial office stops holding that office, the Attorney‑General may terminate the member’s appointment.\n\n#### 18 Resignation\n\n  A member may resign from the office of member by signing a written resignation and delivering it to:\n    (a) if the member is a full‑time member—the Governor‑General; or\n    (b) if the member is a part‑time member—the Attorney‑General.\n\n#### 19 Leave of absence for full‑time members\n\n  (1) A full‑time member has the recreation leave entitlements determined by the Remuneration Tribunal.\n  (2) The Attorney‑General may grant the President leave of absence (except recreation leave) on such terms and conditions as to remuneration or otherwise as the Attorney‑General determines.\n  (3) The President may grant a full‑time member leave of absence (except recreation leave) on such terms and conditions as to remuneration or otherwise as the President determines.\n  (4) This section has effect subject to the Remuneration Tribunal  \n  Act 1973.\n\n## Part 3—The Commission’s functions, powers and reports\n\n#### 20 Reference to the Commission\n\n  (1) The Attorney‑General may refer a matter to the Commission, either at the Commission’s suggestion or on his or her own initiative.\n  (2) The Attorney‑General may alter the terms of a reference.\n  (3) The Attorney‑General may give the Commission directions about the order in which it is to deal with references.\n\n#### 21 The Commission’s functions\n\n  (1) The Commission has the following functions in relation to matters referred to it by the Attorney‑General:\n    (a) to review Commonwealth laws relevant to those matters for the purposes of systematically developing and reforming the law, particularly by:\n    (i) bringing the law into line with current conditions and ensuring that it meets current needs; and\n    (ii) removing defects in the law; and\n    (iii) simplifying the law; and\n    (iv) adopting new or more effective methods for administering the law and dispensing justice; and\n    (v) providing improved access to justice;\n    (b) to consider proposals for making or consolidating Commonwealth laws about those matters;\n    (c) to consider proposals for the repeal of obsolete or unnecessary laws about those matters;\n    (d) to consider proposals for uniformity between State and Territory laws about those matters;\n    (e) to consider proposals for complementary Commonwealth, State and Territory laws about those matters.\n  (2) It is a function of the Commission to report to the Attorney‑General on the results of any review or consideration it carries out under subsection (1), and to include in the report any recommendations it wants to make.\n\n#### 22 Interim reports\n\n  (1) The Commission may, before making its report on a reference, make an interim report to the Attorney‑General on its work on the reference.\n  (2) The Attorney‑General may, before the Commission makes its report on a reference, direct it to make an interim report to the Attorney‑General on its work on the reference.\n\n#### 23 Reports to be tabled\n\n  The Attorney‑General must cause each report and interim report of the Commission on a matter that is the subject of a reference to be tabled in each House of the Parliament within 15 sitting days of that House after the Attorney‑General receives it.\n\n#### 24 How the Commission is to perform its functions\n\n  (1) In performing its functions, the Commission must aim at ensuring that the laws, proposals and recommendations it reviews, considers or makes:\n    (a) do not trespass unduly on personal rights and liberties or make the rights and liberties of citizens unduly dependent on administrative, rather than judicial, decisions; and\n    (b) are, as far as practicable, consistent with Australia’s international obligations that are relevant to the matter.\n  (2) The Commission, when formulating recommendations, must have regard to the effect that the recommendations may have on:\n    (a) the costs of getting access to, and dispensing, justice; and\n    (b) persons and businesses who would be affected by the recommendations (including the economic effect, for example).\n\n#### 25 The Commission’s powers\n\n  The Commission has power to do everything necessary or convenient to be done for, or in connection with, the performance of its functions.\n\n#### 26 Commission to comply with certain requirements and directions\n\n  (1) If a House of the Parliament, or a Parliamentary Committee, requires the Commission to give it any information about the performance of the Commission’s functions, or the exercise of its powers, the Commission must comply with the requirement.\n  (2) The information that may be required under subsection (1) includes information about the Commission’s expenditure or proposed expenditure.\n  (2A) In the capacity of CEO of the Commission, the President must act in accordance with any policies determined, and comply with any directions given, in writing by the Attorney‑General.\n\n> Note: Section 19 of the Public Service Act 1999 has the effect that the President is not subject to direction by any Minister in relation to the exercise of powers by the President under section 15 or Division 1 or 2 of Part 4 of that Act in relation to particular individuals.\n\n  (3) The Commission must comply with a direction of the Attorney‑General under subsection 20(3) or 22(2).\n\n## Part 4—Management, meetings and staff\n\n### Division 1—Management structure\n\n#### 27 Management advisory committee\n\n  (1) The Attorney‑General may, by written instrument, establish a committee (the management advisory committee) to advise the President on matters that are relevant to the proper discharge of the Commission’s functions (including in relation to strategic planning, for example).\n  (2) However, the management advisory committee must not attempt to compromise the independence or impartiality of the Commission in any way.\n  (3) The Attorney‑General is to appoint the members of the management advisory committee.\n  (4) The Attorney‑General may dissolve the management advisory committee at any time.\n  (5) The President may decide any matters about the management advisory committee that are not provided for in this Act.\n\n#### 34 President to be CEO\n\n  The President is the Chief Executive Officer of the Commission.\n\n#### 35 Delegations by the President\n\n  The President may, in writing, delegate all or any of the President’s powers to a member of the Commission, or to an employee of the Commission.\n\n### Division 2—Meetings and proceedings of the Commission\n\n#### 36 Meetings of the Commission\n\n  (1) The President must convene:\n    (a) at least 2 meetings each financial year; and\n    (b) any other meetings that the President thinks necessary for the efficient performance of the Commission’s functions.\n  (2) The President must convene a meeting on receiving a written request to do so signed by a majority of the other members.\n  (3) The President must preside at all meetings at which he or she is present.\n  (5) If the President is not present at a meeting, the members who are present must elect one of their number to preside.\n  (6) A quorum is constituted by a majority of the members of the Commission.\n  (7) Questions arising at a meeting must be determined by a majority of the votes of the members present and voting.\n  (8) The person presiding at a meeting has a deliberative vote and, if there is an equality of votes, also has a casting vote.\n\n#### 37 Conduct of meetings\n\n  The Commission may regulate proceedings at its meetings as it thinks fit. It must keep minutes of those proceedings.\n\n#### 38 Commission may inform itself in any way\n\n  For the purposes of reviewing or considering anything that is the subject of a reference, the Commission may inform itself in any way it thinks fit.\n\n### Division 4—Staff and consultants\n\n#### 43 Staff of the Commission\n\n  (1) The staff of the Commission are to be persons engaged under the Public Service Act 1999.\n  (2) For the purposes of that Act:\n    (a) the President and the staff together constitute a Statutory Agency; and\n    (b) the President is the Head of that Statutory Agency.\n\n#### 44 Commission may engage consultants\n\n  The President may engage persons with suitable qualifications and experience as consultants to the Commission.\n\n## Part 5—Finance\n\n#### 45 Law Reform Special Account\n\n  (1) The Law Reform Special Account is established by this section.\n  (2) The Law Reform Special Account is a special account for the purposes of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013.\n  (3) The following amounts must be credited to the Law Reform Special Account:\n    (a) amounts appropriated by the Parliament for the purposes of the Account;\n    (b) amounts received by the Commission in relation to performing any of its functions, or exercising any of its powers, under this Act;\n    (c) amounts of any gifts given, or bequests made, for the purposes of the Account.\n\n> Note: An Appropriation Act provides for amounts to be credited to a special account if any of the purposes of the special account is a purpose that is covered by an item in the Appropriation Act.\n\n  (4) The Law Reform Special Account may be debited for the following purposes:\n    (a) to pay the costs, expenses and other obligations incurred by the Commonwealth in the performance of the Commission’s functions;\n    (b) to pay any remuneration and allowances payable to a person under this Act;\n    (c) to pay the expenses of administering the Account;\n    (d) to pay any amount that is required or permitted to be repaid;\n    (e) to reduce the balance of the Account (and, therefore, the available appropriation for the Account) without making a real or notional payment.\n\n> Note: See section 80 of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (which deals with special accounts).\n\n## Part 6—Miscellaneous\n\n#### 51 Regulations\n\n  The Governor‑General may make regulations prescribing matters:\n    (a) required or permitted by this Act to be prescribed; or\n    (b) necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect to this Act.","sortOrder":30},{"sectionNumber":"27","sectionType":"section","heading":"Management advisory committee","content":"#### 27 Management advisory committee\n\n  (1) The Attorney‑General may, by written instrument, establish a committee (the management advisory committee) to advise the President on matters that are relevant to the proper discharge of the Commission’s functions (including in relation to strategic planning, for example).\n  (2) However, the management advisory committee must not attempt to compromise the independence or impartiality of the Commission in any way.\n  (3) The Attorney‑General is to appoint the members of the management advisory committee.\n  (4) The Attorney‑General may dissolve the management advisory committee at any time.\n  (5) The President may decide any matters about the management advisory committee that are not provided for in this Act.","sortOrder":31},{"sectionNumber":"34","sectionType":"section","heading":"President to be CEO","content":"#### 34 President to be CEO\n\n  The President is the Chief Executive Officer of the Commission.","sortOrder":32},{"sectionNumber":"35","sectionType":"section","heading":"Delegations by the President","content":"#### 35 Delegations by the President\n\n  The President may, in writing, delegate all or any of the President’s powers to a member of the Commission, or to an employee of the Commission.","sortOrder":33},{"sectionNumber":"Division 2","sectionType":"division","heading":"Meetings and proceedings of the Commission","content":"An Act to establish the Australian Law Reform Commission, and for related purposes\n\n## Part 1—Preliminary\n\n#### 1 Short title\n\n  This Act may be cited as the Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996.\n\n#### 2 Commencement\n\n  (1) Subject to subsection (2), this Act commences on a day to be fixed by Proclamation.\n  (2) If this Act does not commence under subsection (1) within the period of 6 months beginning on the day on which this Act receives the Royal Assent, it commences on the first day after the end of that period.\n\n#### 3 Definitions\n\n  In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears:\n\n> Commission means the Australian Law Reform Commission.\n\n> Commonwealth laws means:\n\n    (a) laws (including Territory laws) made by, or by the authority of, the Parliament; and\n    (b) any other laws (including Territory laws) that the Parliament has power to repeal or amend.\n\n> judicial office means:\n\n    (a) an office of a judge, magistrate or justice of a federal court or a court of a State or Territory; or\n    (b) an office whose holder has, under an Act of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, the same status as a judge, magistrate or justice of a federal court or a court of a State or Territory.\n\n> laws includes common law and equity rules.\n\n> management advisory committee means the management advisory committee established under section 27.\n\n> management advisory committee member means a member of the management advisory committee.\n\n> member means a member of the Commission, and includes the President.\n\n> Parliamentary Committee means a Committee of either House, or of both Houses, of the Parliament.\n\n> President means the President of the Commission, and includes any person for the time being acting in the office of President.\n\n> reference means a reference to the Commission by the Attorney‑General under this Act.\n\n#### 4 Extension to external Territories\n\n  This Act extends to the external Territories.\n\n## Part 2—Establishment and constitution of the Commission\n\n#### 5 Establishment of the Commission\n\n  (1) This section establishes a commission called the Australian Law Reform Commission.\n  (2) For the purposes of the finance law (within the meaning of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013):\n    (a) the Commission is a listed entity; and\n    (b) the President is the accountable authority of the Commission; and\n    (c) the following persons are officials of the Commission:\n    (i) the President;\n    (ii) the other members;\n    (iii) the staff of the Commission referred to in subsection 43(1); and\n    (d) the purposes of the Commission include the functions of the Commission referred to in section 21.\n\n#### 6 Constitution of the Commission\n\n  (1) The Commission consists of:\n    (a) a President; and\n    (b) up to 6 other members.\n  (2) The performance of the Commission’s functions, and the exercise of its powers, are not affected merely because of 1 or more vacancies in its membership.\n  (3) Subject to paragraph (1)(b), the Attorney‑General may, from time to time, appoint such other part‑time members of the Commission as the Attorney‑General considers necessary to enable the Commission to perform its functions.\n\n#### 7 Appointment of members\n\n  (1) The members are to be appointed by:\n    (a) for a full‑time member—the Governor‑General; and\n    (b) for a part‑time member—the Attorney‑General, by written instrument.\n  (2) A person must not be appointed as a member unless he or she:\n    (a) is the holder of a judicial office; or\n    (b) is, and has been for at least 5 years, a legal practitioner of the High Court, or of the Supreme Court of a State or Territory; or\n    (c) is a graduate in law of a university, and has experience as a member of the academic staff of a tertiary educational institution; or\n    (d) is, in the opinion of the Governor‑General or the Attorney‑General (as the case may be), suitable for appointment because of the person’s special qualifications, training or experience.\n\n#### 8 Full‑time and part‑time appointments\n\n  (1) The President must be appointed as a full‑time member.\n  (2) The other members may be appointed either as full‑time or part‑time members.\n  (3) If the President is or becomes the holder of a judicial office, the President may carry out any of the duties of that office.\n\n#### 9 Durations, terms and conditions of appointments\n\n  (1) Subject to sections 17 and 18, a member holds office for the term (of at least 6 months but not longer than 5 years) specified in his or her appointment, but is eligible for re‑appointment.\n  (2) A member’s appointment is subject to the terms and conditions (if any) set out in it.\n\n#### 10 Appointment and service not to affect a tenure or rights of judicial office holders\n\n  (1) If a person who holds a judicial office is appointed as a member, the appointment does not affect, and is taken never to have affected:\n    (a) the person’s tenure of that office; or\n    (b) the person’s rights or privileges as the holder of that office.\n  (2) If a person who holds a judicial office serves as a member, that service does not affect, and is taken never to have affected:\n    (a) the person’s tenure of that office; or\n    (b) the person’s rights or privileges as the holder of that office.\n  (3) Any service as a member by the holder of a judicial office is taken for all purposes to be, or to have been, service as the holder of that office.\n  (4) For the purposes of this section, a person’s rights and privileges as the holder of a judicial office are taken to include his or her rank, title, status, precedence, salary and allowances, as the holder of that office.\n\n#### 11 Arrangements for appointment of State and Territory judges\n\n  (1) For the purposes of appointing a judge, magistrate or justice of a court of a State as a member, the Governor‑General or the Attorney‑General (as the case may be) may enter into any necessary arrangement with the Governor of the State.\n  (2) For the purposes of appointing a judge, magistrate or justice of a court of the Australian Capital Territory or of the Northern Territory as a member, the Governor‑General or the Attorney‑General (as the case may be) may enter into any necessary arrangement with the Chief Minister of the Territory.\n  (3) An arrangement may provide, among other things, for the Commonwealth to reimburse the State or Territory with respect to the services of the person to be appointed.\n\n#### 13 Acting appointment: President\n\n  (1) The Attorney‑General may, by written instrument, appoint a member or a person who is qualified to be a member to act as President:\n    (a) during a vacancy in the office of President, whether or not an appointment has previously been made to the office; or\n    (b) during any period, or during all periods, when the President is absent from duty or from Australia or is, for any other reason, unable to perform the functions of the office.\n\n> Note: For rules that apply to acting appointments, see section 33A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.\n\n  (2) The appointment may be expressed to have effect:\n    (a) for a period specified in the instrument of appointment; or\n    (b) in the circumstances specified in the instrument of appointment (including whenever the President is on leave, for example).\n\n> Note: For rules that apply to acting appointments, see section 33A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.\n\n  (3) If the Attorney‑General appoints a person who is not a member, the person is taken to be a member for the period of the appointment.\n\n#### 14 Acting appointments: full‑time members\n\n  The Attorney‑General may appoint a part‑time member to act as a full‑time member (other than the President) during any period, or during all periods, when the full‑time member is, for any reason, unable to perform the functions of the office.\n\n> Note: For rules that apply to acting appointments, see section 33A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.\n\n#### 15 Directions to perform duties on a full‑time basis\n\n  (1) The Attorney‑General may, in writing, direct a part‑time member to perform the duties of his or her office on a full‑time basis in the circumstances, and for the period, specified in the direction.\n  (2) While a part‑time member performs duties on a full‑time basis in accordance with a direction, the member is to be paid the same remuneration and allowances as are payable to a full‑time member.\n\n#### 16 Remuneration and allowances\n\n  (1) A member who is not the holder of a judicial office is to be paid such remuneration as the Remuneration Tribunal determines.\n  (2) The member is to be paid the prescribed allowances.\n  (3) This section has effect subject to the Remuneration Tribunal  \n  Act 1973.\n\n#### 17 Termination of full‑time appointments\n\n  (1) The Governor‑General may terminate a full‑time member’s appointment for misbehaviour, or physical or mental incapacity.\n  (2) The Governor‑General must terminate a full‑time member’s appointment if the member:\n    (a) becomes bankrupt; or\n    (b) applies to take the benefit of any law for the relief of bankrupt or insolvent debtors; or\n    (c) compounds with his or her creditors; or\n    (d) makes an assignment of his or her remuneration for the benefit of his or her creditors.\n  (3) If a full‑time member engages in paid employment outside the duties of the member’s office without the Attorney‑General’s approval, the Governor‑General must terminate the member’s appointment.\n  (4) Subsections (1), (2) and (3) do not apply to a full‑time member who holds a judicial office.\n  (5) If a full‑time member who is the holder of a judicial office stops holding that office, the Governor‑General may terminate the member’s appointment.\n\n#### 17A Termination of part‑time appointments\n\n  (1) The Attorney‑General may terminate a part‑time member’s appointment for misbehaviour, or physical or mental incapacity.\n  (2) The Attorney‑General must terminate a part‑time member’s appointment if the member:\n    (a) becomes bankrupt; or\n    (b) applies to take the benefit of any law for the relief of bankrupt or insolvent debtors; or\n    (c) compounds with his or her creditors; or\n    (d) makes an assignment of his or her remuneration for the benefit of his or her creditors.\n  (3) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to a part‑time member who holds a judicial office.\n  (4) If a part‑time member who is the holder of a judicial office stops holding that office, the Attorney‑General may terminate the member’s appointment.\n\n#### 18 Resignation\n\n  A member may resign from the office of member by signing a written resignation and delivering it to:\n    (a) if the member is a full‑time member—the Governor‑General; or\n    (b) if the member is a part‑time member—the Attorney‑General.\n\n#### 19 Leave of absence for full‑time members\n\n  (1) A full‑time member has the recreation leave entitlements determined by the Remuneration Tribunal.\n  (2) The Attorney‑General may grant the President leave of absence (except recreation leave) on such terms and conditions as to remuneration or otherwise as the Attorney‑General determines.\n  (3) The President may grant a full‑time member leave of absence (except recreation leave) on such terms and conditions as to remuneration or otherwise as the President determines.\n  (4) This section has effect subject to the Remuneration Tribunal  \n  Act 1973.\n\n## Part 3—The Commission’s functions, powers and reports\n\n#### 20 Reference to the Commission\n\n  (1) The Attorney‑General may refer a matter to the Commission, either at the Commission’s suggestion or on his or her own initiative.\n  (2) The Attorney‑General may alter the terms of a reference.\n  (3) The Attorney‑General may give the Commission directions about the order in which it is to deal with references.\n\n#### 21 The Commission’s functions\n\n  (1) The Commission has the following functions in relation to matters referred to it by the Attorney‑General:\n    (a) to review Commonwealth laws relevant to those matters for the purposes of systematically developing and reforming the law, particularly by:\n    (i) bringing the law into line with current conditions and ensuring that it meets current needs; and\n    (ii) removing defects in the law; and\n    (iii) simplifying the law; and\n    (iv) adopting new or more effective methods for administering the law and dispensing justice; and\n    (v) providing improved access to justice;\n    (b) to consider proposals for making or consolidating Commonwealth laws about those matters;\n    (c) to consider proposals for the repeal of obsolete or unnecessary laws about those matters;\n    (d) to consider proposals for uniformity between State and Territory laws about those matters;\n    (e) to consider proposals for complementary Commonwealth, State and Territory laws about those matters.\n  (2) It is a function of the Commission to report to the Attorney‑General on the results of any review or consideration it carries out under subsection (1), and to include in the report any recommendations it wants to make.\n\n#### 22 Interim reports\n\n  (1) The Commission may, before making its report on a reference, make an interim report to the Attorney‑General on its work on the reference.\n  (2) The Attorney‑General may, before the Commission makes its report on a reference, direct it to make an interim report to the Attorney‑General on its work on the reference.\n\n#### 23 Reports to be tabled\n\n  The Attorney‑General must cause each report and interim report of the Commission on a matter that is the subject of a reference to be tabled in each House of the Parliament within 15 sitting days of that House after the Attorney‑General receives it.\n\n#### 24 How the Commission is to perform its functions\n\n  (1) In performing its functions, the Commission must aim at ensuring that the laws, proposals and recommendations it reviews, considers or makes:\n    (a) do not trespass unduly on personal rights and liberties or make the rights and liberties of citizens unduly dependent on administrative, rather than judicial, decisions; and\n    (b) are, as far as practicable, consistent with Australia’s international obligations that are relevant to the matter.\n  (2) The Commission, when formulating recommendations, must have regard to the effect that the recommendations may have on:\n    (a) the costs of getting access to, and dispensing, justice; and\n    (b) persons and businesses who would be affected by the recommendations (including the economic effect, for example).\n\n#### 25 The Commission’s powers\n\n  The Commission has power to do everything necessary or convenient to be done for, or in connection with, the performance of its functions.\n\n#### 26 Commission to comply with certain requirements and directions\n\n  (1) If a House of the Parliament, or a Parliamentary Committee, requires the Commission to give it any information about the performance of the Commission’s functions, or the exercise of its powers, the Commission must comply with the requirement.\n  (2) The information that may be required under subsection (1) includes information about the Commission’s expenditure or proposed expenditure.\n  (2A) In the capacity of CEO of the Commission, the President must act in accordance with any policies determined, and comply with any directions given, in writing by the Attorney‑General.\n\n> Note: Section 19 of the Public Service Act 1999 has the effect that the President is not subject to direction by any Minister in relation to the exercise of powers by the President under section 15 or Division 1 or 2 of Part 4 of that Act in relation to particular individuals.\n\n  (3) The Commission must comply with a direction of the Attorney‑General under subsection 20(3) or 22(2).\n\n## Part 4—Management, meetings and staff\n\n### Division 1—Management structure\n\n#### 27 Management advisory committee\n\n  (1) The Attorney‑General may, by written instrument, establish a committee (the management advisory committee) to advise the President on matters that are relevant to the proper discharge of the Commission’s functions (including in relation to strategic planning, for example).\n  (2) However, the management advisory committee must not attempt to compromise the independence or impartiality of the Commission in any way.\n  (3) The Attorney‑General is to appoint the members of the management advisory committee.\n  (4) The Attorney‑General may dissolve the management advisory committee at any time.\n  (5) The President may decide any matters about the management advisory committee that are not provided for in this Act.\n\n#### 34 President to be CEO\n\n  The President is the Chief Executive Officer of the Commission.\n\n#### 35 Delegations by the President\n\n  The President may, in writing, delegate all or any of the President’s powers to a member of the Commission, or to an employee of the Commission.\n\n### Division 2—Meetings and proceedings of the Commission\n\n#### 36 Meetings of the Commission\n\n  (1) The President must convene:\n    (a) at least 2 meetings each financial year; and\n    (b) any other meetings that the President thinks necessary for the efficient performance of the Commission’s functions.\n  (2) The President must convene a meeting on receiving a written request to do so signed by a majority of the other members.\n  (3) The President must preside at all meetings at which he or she is present.\n  (5) If the President is not present at a meeting, the members who are present must elect one of their number to preside.\n  (6) A quorum is constituted by a majority of the members of the Commission.\n  (7) Questions arising at a meeting must be determined by a majority of the votes of the members present and voting.\n  (8) The person presiding at a meeting has a deliberative vote and, if there is an equality of votes, also has a casting vote.\n\n#### 37 Conduct of meetings\n\n  The Commission may regulate proceedings at its meetings as it thinks fit. It must keep minutes of those proceedings.\n\n#### 38 Commission may inform itself in any way\n\n  For the purposes of reviewing or considering anything that is the subject of a reference, the Commission may inform itself in any way it thinks fit.\n\n### Division 4—Staff and consultants\n\n#### 43 Staff of the Commission\n\n  (1) The staff of the Commission are to be persons engaged under the Public Service Act 1999.\n  (2) For the purposes of that Act:\n    (a) the President and the staff together constitute a Statutory Agency; and\n    (b) the President is the Head of that Statutory Agency.\n\n#### 44 Commission may engage consultants\n\n  The President may engage persons with suitable qualifications and experience as consultants to the Commission.\n\n## Part 5—Finance\n\n#### 45 Law Reform Special Account\n\n  (1) The Law Reform Special Account is established by this section.\n  (2) The Law Reform Special Account is a special account for the purposes of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013.\n  (3) The following amounts must be credited to the Law Reform Special Account:\n    (a) amounts appropriated by the Parliament for the purposes of the Account;\n    (b) amounts received by the Commission in relation to performing any of its functions, or exercising any of its powers, under this Act;\n    (c) amounts of any gifts given, or bequests made, for the purposes of the Account.\n\n> Note: An Appropriation Act provides for amounts to be credited to a special account if any of the purposes of the special account is a purpose that is covered by an item in the Appropriation Act.\n\n  (4) The Law Reform Special Account may be debited for the following purposes:\n    (a) to pay the costs, expenses and other obligations incurred by the Commonwealth in the performance of the Commission’s functions;\n    (b) to pay any remuneration and allowances payable to a person under this Act;\n    (c) to pay the expenses of administering the Account;\n    (d) to pay any amount that is required or permitted to be repaid;\n    (e) to reduce the balance of the Account (and, therefore, the available appropriation for the Account) without making a real or notional payment.\n\n> Note: See section 80 of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (which deals with special accounts).\n\n## Part 6—Miscellaneous\n\n#### 51 Regulations\n\n  The Governor‑General may make regulations prescribing matters:\n    (a) required or permitted by this Act to be prescribed; or\n    (b) necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect to this Act.","sortOrder":34},{"sectionNumber":"36","sectionType":"section","heading":"Meetings of the Commission","content":"#### 36 Meetings of the Commission\n\n  (1) The President must convene:\n    (a) at least 2 meetings each financial year; and\n    (b) any other meetings that the President thinks necessary for the efficient performance of the Commission’s functions.\n  (2) The President must convene a meeting on receiving a written request to do so signed by a majority of the other members.\n  (3) The President must preside at all meetings at which he or she is present.\n  (5) If the President is not present at a meeting, the members who are present must elect one of their number to preside.\n  (6) A quorum is constituted by a majority of the members of the Commission.\n  (7) Questions arising at a meeting must be determined by a majority of the votes of the members present and voting.\n  (8) The person presiding at a meeting has a deliberative vote and, if there is an equality of votes, also has a casting vote.","sortOrder":35},{"sectionNumber":"37","sectionType":"section","heading":"Conduct of meetings","content":"#### 37 Conduct of meetings\n\n  The Commission may regulate proceedings at its meetings as it thinks fit. It must keep minutes of those proceedings.","sortOrder":36},{"sectionNumber":"38","sectionType":"section","heading":"Commission may inform itself in any way","content":"#### 38 Commission may inform itself in any way\n\n  For the purposes of reviewing or considering anything that is the subject of a reference, the Commission may inform itself in any way it thinks fit.","sortOrder":37},{"sectionNumber":"Division 4","sectionType":"division","heading":"Staff and consultants","content":"An Act to establish the Australian Law Reform Commission, and for related purposes\n\n## Part 1—Preliminary\n\n#### 1 Short title\n\n  This Act may be cited as the Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996.\n\n#### 2 Commencement\n\n  (1) Subject to subsection (2), this Act commences on a day to be fixed by Proclamation.\n  (2) If this Act does not commence under subsection (1) within the period of 6 months beginning on the day on which this Act receives the Royal Assent, it commences on the first day after the end of that period.\n\n#### 3 Definitions\n\n  In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears:\n\n> Commission means the Australian Law Reform Commission.\n\n> Commonwealth laws means:\n\n    (a) laws (including Territory laws) made by, or by the authority of, the Parliament; and\n    (b) any other laws (including Territory laws) that the Parliament has power to repeal or amend.\n\n> judicial office means:\n\n    (a) an office of a judge, magistrate or justice of a federal court or a court of a State or Territory; or\n    (b) an office whose holder has, under an Act of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, the same status as a judge, magistrate or justice of a federal court or a court of a State or Territory.\n\n> laws includes common law and equity rules.\n\n> management advisory committee means the management advisory committee established under section 27.\n\n> management advisory committee member means a member of the management advisory committee.\n\n> member means a member of the Commission, and includes the President.\n\n> Parliamentary Committee means a Committee of either House, or of both Houses, of the Parliament.\n\n> President means the President of the Commission, and includes any person for the time being acting in the office of President.\n\n> reference means a reference to the Commission by the Attorney‑General under this Act.\n\n#### 4 Extension to external Territories\n\n  This Act extends to the external Territories.\n\n## Part 2—Establishment and constitution of the Commission\n\n#### 5 Establishment of the Commission\n\n  (1) This section establishes a commission called the Australian Law Reform Commission.\n  (2) For the purposes of the finance law (within the meaning of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013):\n    (a) the Commission is a listed entity; and\n    (b) the President is the accountable authority of the Commission; and\n    (c) the following persons are officials of the Commission:\n    (i) the President;\n    (ii) the other members;\n    (iii) the staff of the Commission referred to in subsection 43(1); and\n    (d) the purposes of the Commission include the functions of the Commission referred to in section 21.\n\n#### 6 Constitution of the Commission\n\n  (1) The Commission consists of:\n    (a) a President; and\n    (b) up to 6 other members.\n  (2) The performance of the Commission’s functions, and the exercise of its powers, are not affected merely because of 1 or more vacancies in its membership.\n  (3) Subject to paragraph (1)(b), the Attorney‑General may, from time to time, appoint such other part‑time members of the Commission as the Attorney‑General considers necessary to enable the Commission to perform its functions.\n\n#### 7 Appointment of members\n\n  (1) The members are to be appointed by:\n    (a) for a full‑time member—the Governor‑General; and\n    (b) for a part‑time member—the Attorney‑General, by written instrument.\n  (2) A person must not be appointed as a member unless he or she:\n    (a) is the holder of a judicial office; or\n    (b) is, and has been for at least 5 years, a legal practitioner of the High Court, or of the Supreme Court of a State or Territory; or\n    (c) is a graduate in law of a university, and has experience as a member of the academic staff of a tertiary educational institution; or\n    (d) is, in the opinion of the Governor‑General or the Attorney‑General (as the case may be), suitable for appointment because of the person’s special qualifications, training or experience.\n\n#### 8 Full‑time and part‑time appointments\n\n  (1) The President must be appointed as a full‑time member.\n  (2) The other members may be appointed either as full‑time or part‑time members.\n  (3) If the President is or becomes the holder of a judicial office, the President may carry out any of the duties of that office.\n\n#### 9 Durations, terms and conditions of appointments\n\n  (1) Subject to sections 17 and 18, a member holds office for the term (of at least 6 months but not longer than 5 years) specified in his or her appointment, but is eligible for re‑appointment.\n  (2) A member’s appointment is subject to the terms and conditions (if any) set out in it.\n\n#### 10 Appointment and service not to affect a tenure or rights of judicial office holders\n\n  (1) If a person who holds a judicial office is appointed as a member, the appointment does not affect, and is taken never to have affected:\n    (a) the person’s tenure of that office; or\n    (b) the person’s rights or privileges as the holder of that office.\n  (2) If a person who holds a judicial office serves as a member, that service does not affect, and is taken never to have affected:\n    (a) the person’s tenure of that office; or\n    (b) the person’s rights or privileges as the holder of that office.\n  (3) Any service as a member by the holder of a judicial office is taken for all purposes to be, or to have been, service as the holder of that office.\n  (4) For the purposes of this section, a person’s rights and privileges as the holder of a judicial office are taken to include his or her rank, title, status, precedence, salary and allowances, as the holder of that office.\n\n#### 11 Arrangements for appointment of State and Territory judges\n\n  (1) For the purposes of appointing a judge, magistrate or justice of a court of a State as a member, the Governor‑General or the Attorney‑General (as the case may be) may enter into any necessary arrangement with the Governor of the State.\n  (2) For the purposes of appointing a judge, magistrate or justice of a court of the Australian Capital Territory or of the Northern Territory as a member, the Governor‑General or the Attorney‑General (as the case may be) may enter into any necessary arrangement with the Chief Minister of the Territory.\n  (3) An arrangement may provide, among other things, for the Commonwealth to reimburse the State or Territory with respect to the services of the person to be appointed.\n\n#### 13 Acting appointment: President\n\n  (1) The Attorney‑General may, by written instrument, appoint a member or a person who is qualified to be a member to act as President:\n    (a) during a vacancy in the office of President, whether or not an appointment has previously been made to the office; or\n    (b) during any period, or during all periods, when the President is absent from duty or from Australia or is, for any other reason, unable to perform the functions of the office.\n\n> Note: For rules that apply to acting appointments, see section 33A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.\n\n  (2) The appointment may be expressed to have effect:\n    (a) for a period specified in the instrument of appointment; or\n    (b) in the circumstances specified in the instrument of appointment (including whenever the President is on leave, for example).\n\n> Note: For rules that apply to acting appointments, see section 33A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.\n\n  (3) If the Attorney‑General appoints a person who is not a member, the person is taken to be a member for the period of the appointment.\n\n#### 14 Acting appointments: full‑time members\n\n  The Attorney‑General may appoint a part‑time member to act as a full‑time member (other than the President) during any period, or during all periods, when the full‑time member is, for any reason, unable to perform the functions of the office.\n\n> Note: For rules that apply to acting appointments, see section 33A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.\n\n#### 15 Directions to perform duties on a full‑time basis\n\n  (1) The Attorney‑General may, in writing, direct a part‑time member to perform the duties of his or her office on a full‑time basis in the circumstances, and for the period, specified in the direction.\n  (2) While a part‑time member performs duties on a full‑time basis in accordance with a direction, the member is to be paid the same remuneration and allowances as are payable to a full‑time member.\n\n#### 16 Remuneration and allowances\n\n  (1) A member who is not the holder of a judicial office is to be paid such remuneration as the Remuneration Tribunal determines.\n  (2) The member is to be paid the prescribed allowances.\n  (3) This section has effect subject to the Remuneration Tribunal  \n  Act 1973.\n\n#### 17 Termination of full‑time appointments\n\n  (1) The Governor‑General may terminate a full‑time member’s appointment for misbehaviour, or physical or mental incapacity.\n  (2) The Governor‑General must terminate a full‑time member’s appointment if the member:\n    (a) becomes bankrupt; or\n    (b) applies to take the benefit of any law for the relief of bankrupt or insolvent debtors; or\n    (c) compounds with his or her creditors; or\n    (d) makes an assignment of his or her remuneration for the benefit of his or her creditors.\n  (3) If a full‑time member engages in paid employment outside the duties of the member’s office without the Attorney‑General’s approval, the Governor‑General must terminate the member’s appointment.\n  (4) Subsections (1), (2) and (3) do not apply to a full‑time member who holds a judicial office.\n  (5) If a full‑time member who is the holder of a judicial office stops holding that office, the Governor‑General may terminate the member’s appointment.\n\n#### 17A Termination of part‑time appointments\n\n  (1) The Attorney‑General may terminate a part‑time member’s appointment for misbehaviour, or physical or mental incapacity.\n  (2) The Attorney‑General must terminate a part‑time member’s appointment if the member:\n    (a) becomes bankrupt; or\n    (b) applies to take the benefit of any law for the relief of bankrupt or insolvent debtors; or\n    (c) compounds with his or her creditors; or\n    (d) makes an assignment of his or her remuneration for the benefit of his or her creditors.\n  (3) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to a part‑time member who holds a judicial office.\n  (4) If a part‑time member who is the holder of a judicial office stops holding that office, the Attorney‑General may terminate the member’s appointment.\n\n#### 18 Resignation\n\n  A member may resign from the office of member by signing a written resignation and delivering it to:\n    (a) if the member is a full‑time member—the Governor‑General; or\n    (b) if the member is a part‑time member—the Attorney‑General.\n\n#### 19 Leave of absence for full‑time members\n\n  (1) A full‑time member has the recreation leave entitlements determined by the Remuneration Tribunal.\n  (2) The Attorney‑General may grant the President leave of absence (except recreation leave) on such terms and conditions as to remuneration or otherwise as the Attorney‑General determines.\n  (3) The President may grant a full‑time member leave of absence (except recreation leave) on such terms and conditions as to remuneration or otherwise as the President determines.\n  (4) This section has effect subject to the Remuneration Tribunal  \n  Act 1973.\n\n## Part 3—The Commission’s functions, powers and reports\n\n#### 20 Reference to the Commission\n\n  (1) The Attorney‑General may refer a matter to the Commission, either at the Commission’s suggestion or on his or her own initiative.\n  (2) The Attorney‑General may alter the terms of a reference.\n  (3) The Attorney‑General may give the Commission directions about the order in which it is to deal with references.\n\n#### 21 The Commission’s functions\n\n  (1) The Commission has the following functions in relation to matters referred to it by the Attorney‑General:\n    (a) to review Commonwealth laws relevant to those matters for the purposes of systematically developing and reforming the law, particularly by:\n    (i) bringing the law into line with current conditions and ensuring that it meets current needs; and\n    (ii) removing defects in the law; and\n    (iii) simplifying the law; and\n    (iv) adopting new or more effective methods for administering the law and dispensing justice; and\n    (v) providing improved access to justice;\n    (b) to consider proposals for making or consolidating Commonwealth laws about those matters;\n    (c) to consider proposals for the repeal of obsolete or unnecessary laws about those matters;\n    (d) to consider proposals for uniformity between State and Territory laws about those matters;\n    (e) to consider proposals for complementary Commonwealth, State and Territory laws about those matters.\n  (2) It is a function of the Commission to report to the Attorney‑General on the results of any review or consideration it carries out under subsection (1), and to include in the report any recommendations it wants to make.\n\n#### 22 Interim reports\n\n  (1) The Commission may, before making its report on a reference, make an interim report to the Attorney‑General on its work on the reference.\n  (2) The Attorney‑General may, before the Commission makes its report on a reference, direct it to make an interim report to the Attorney‑General on its work on the reference.\n\n#### 23 Reports to be tabled\n\n  The Attorney‑General must cause each report and interim report of the Commission on a matter that is the subject of a reference to be tabled in each House of the Parliament within 15 sitting days of that House after the Attorney‑General receives it.\n\n#### 24 How the Commission is to perform its functions\n\n  (1) In performing its functions, the Commission must aim at ensuring that the laws, proposals and recommendations it reviews, considers or makes:\n    (a) do not trespass unduly on personal rights and liberties or make the rights and liberties of citizens unduly dependent on administrative, rather than judicial, decisions; and\n    (b) are, as far as practicable, consistent with Australia’s international obligations that are relevant to the matter.\n  (2) The Commission, when formulating recommendations, must have regard to the effect that the recommendations may have on:\n    (a) the costs of getting access to, and dispensing, justice; and\n    (b) persons and businesses who would be affected by the recommendations (including the economic effect, for example).\n\n#### 25 The Commission’s powers\n\n  The Commission has power to do everything necessary or convenient to be done for, or in connection with, the performance of its functions.\n\n#### 26 Commission to comply with certain requirements and directions\n\n  (1) If a House of the Parliament, or a Parliamentary Committee, requires the Commission to give it any information about the performance of the Commission’s functions, or the exercise of its powers, the Commission must comply with the requirement.\n  (2) The information that may be required under subsection (1) includes information about the Commission’s expenditure or proposed expenditure.\n  (2A) In the capacity of CEO of the Commission, the President must act in accordance with any policies determined, and comply with any directions given, in writing by the Attorney‑General.\n\n> Note: Section 19 of the Public Service Act 1999 has the effect that the President is not subject to direction by any Minister in relation to the exercise of powers by the President under section 15 or Division 1 or 2 of Part 4 of that Act in relation to particular individuals.\n\n  (3) The Commission must comply with a direction of the Attorney‑General under subsection 20(3) or 22(2).\n\n## Part 4—Management, meetings and staff\n\n### Division 1—Management structure\n\n#### 27 Management advisory committee\n\n  (1) The Attorney‑General may, by written instrument, establish a committee (the management advisory committee) to advise the President on matters that are relevant to the proper discharge of the Commission’s functions (including in relation to strategic planning, for example).\n  (2) However, the management advisory committee must not attempt to compromise the independence or impartiality of the Commission in any way.\n  (3) The Attorney‑General is to appoint the members of the management advisory committee.\n  (4) The Attorney‑General may dissolve the management advisory committee at any time.\n  (5) The President may decide any matters about the management advisory committee that are not provided for in this Act.\n\n#### 34 President to be CEO\n\n  The President is the Chief Executive Officer of the Commission.\n\n#### 35 Delegations by the President\n\n  The President may, in writing, delegate all or any of the President’s powers to a member of the Commission, or to an employee of the Commission.\n\n### Division 2—Meetings and proceedings of the Commission\n\n#### 36 Meetings of the Commission\n\n  (1) The President must convene:\n    (a) at least 2 meetings each financial year; and\n    (b) any other meetings that the President thinks necessary for the efficient performance of the Commission’s functions.\n  (2) The President must convene a meeting on receiving a written request to do so signed by a majority of the other members.\n  (3) The President must preside at all meetings at which he or she is present.\n  (5) If the President is not present at a meeting, the members who are present must elect one of their number to preside.\n  (6) A quorum is constituted by a majority of the members of the Commission.\n  (7) Questions arising at a meeting must be determined by a majority of the votes of the members present and voting.\n  (8) The person presiding at a meeting has a deliberative vote and, if there is an equality of votes, also has a casting vote.\n\n#### 37 Conduct of meetings\n\n  The Commission may regulate proceedings at its meetings as it thinks fit. It must keep minutes of those proceedings.\n\n#### 38 Commission may inform itself in any way\n\n  For the purposes of reviewing or considering anything that is the subject of a reference, the Commission may inform itself in any way it thinks fit.\n\n### Division 4—Staff and consultants\n\n#### 43 Staff of the Commission\n\n  (1) The staff of the Commission are to be persons engaged under the Public Service Act 1999.\n  (2) For the purposes of that Act:\n    (a) the President and the staff together constitute a Statutory Agency; and\n    (b) the President is the Head of that Statutory Agency.\n\n#### 44 Commission may engage consultants\n\n  The President may engage persons with suitable qualifications and experience as consultants to the Commission.\n\n## Part 5—Finance\n\n#### 45 Law Reform Special Account\n\n  (1) The Law Reform Special Account is established by this section.\n  (2) The Law Reform Special Account is a special account for the purposes of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013.\n  (3) The following amounts must be credited to the Law Reform Special Account:\n    (a) amounts appropriated by the Parliament for the purposes of the Account;\n    (b) amounts received by the Commission in relation to performing any of its functions, or exercising any of its powers, under this Act;\n    (c) amounts of any gifts given, or bequests made, for the purposes of the Account.\n\n> Note: An Appropriation Act provides for amounts to be credited to a special account if any of the purposes of the special account is a purpose that is covered by an item in the Appropriation Act.\n\n  (4) The Law Reform Special Account may be debited for the following purposes:\n    (a) to pay the costs, expenses and other obligations incurred by the Commonwealth in the performance of the Commission’s functions;\n    (b) to pay any remuneration and allowances payable to a person under this Act;\n    (c) to pay the expenses of administering the Account;\n    (d) to pay any amount that is required or permitted to be repaid;\n    (e) to reduce the balance of the Account (and, therefore, the available appropriation for the Account) without making a real or notional payment.\n\n> Note: See section 80 of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (which deals with special accounts).\n\n## Part 6—Miscellaneous\n\n#### 51 Regulations\n\n  The Governor‑General may make regulations prescribing matters:\n    (a) required or permitted by this Act to be prescribed; or\n    (b) necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect to this Act.","sortOrder":38},{"sectionNumber":"43","sectionType":"section","heading":"Staff of the Commission","content":"#### 43 Staff of the Commission\n\n  (1) The staff of the Commission are to be persons engaged under the Public Service Act 1999.\n  (2) For the purposes of that Act:\n    (a) the President and the staff together constitute a Statutory Agency; and\n    (b) the President is the Head of that Statutory Agency.","sortOrder":39},{"sectionNumber":"44","sectionType":"section","heading":"Commission may engage consultants","content":"#### 44 Commission may engage consultants\n\n  The President may engage persons with suitable qualifications and experience as consultants to the Commission.","sortOrder":40},{"sectionNumber":"Part 5","sectionType":"part","heading":"Finance","content":"## Part 5—Finance","sortOrder":41},{"sectionNumber":"45","sectionType":"section","heading":"Law Reform Special Account","content":"#### 45 Law Reform Special Account\n\n  (1) The Law Reform Special Account is established by this section.\n  (2) The Law Reform Special Account is a special account for the purposes of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013.\n  (3) The following amounts must be credited to the Law Reform Special Account:\n    (a) amounts appropriated by the Parliament for the purposes of the Account;\n    (b) amounts received by the Commission in relation to performing any of its functions, or exercising any of its powers, under this Act;\n    (c) amounts of any gifts given, or bequests made, for the purposes of the Account.\n\n> Note: An Appropriation Act provides for amounts to be credited to a special account if any of the purposes of the special account is a purpose that is covered by an item in the Appropriation Act.\n\n  (4) The Law Reform Special Account may be debited for the following purposes:\n    (a) to pay the costs, expenses and other obligations incurred by the Commonwealth in the performance of the Commission’s functions;\n    (b) to pay any remuneration and allowances payable to a person under this Act;\n    (c) to pay the expenses of administering the Account;\n    (d) to pay any amount that is required or permitted to be repaid;\n    (e) to reduce the balance of the Account (and, therefore, the available appropriation for the Account) without making a real or notional payment.\n\n> Note: See section 80 of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (which deals with special accounts).","sortOrder":42},{"sectionNumber":"Part 6","sectionType":"part","heading":"Miscellaneous","content":"## Part 6—Miscellaneous","sortOrder":43},{"sectionNumber":"51","sectionType":"section","heading":"Regulations","content":"#### 51 Regulations\n\n  The Governor‑General may make regulations prescribing matters:\n    (a) required or permitted by this Act to be prescribed; or\n    (b) necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect to this Act.","sortOrder":44}],"analysis":{"kimi_summary":{"_metrics":{"completionTokens":510},"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":4,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The legislation remains focused on its original purpose of establishing and governing the Australian Law Reform Commission. The scope has not expanded beyond law reform, membership governance, and administrative arrangements."},"complexity_factors":["Multiple appointment pathways with different authorities (Governor‑General vs Attorney‑General)","Nested conditions for termination of appointments (ss 17, 17A) with exceptions for judicial office holders","Cross‑references to other Acts including Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013, Public Service Act 1999, Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973, and Acts Interpretation Act 1901","Special account mechanics requiring understanding of appropriation and debit rules","Dual capacity provisions for President as CEO and member","Acting appointment rules with multiple triggering circumstances"],"plain_english_summary":"This Act creates the **Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC)** — an independent body that reviews and recommends changes to Australian laws.\n\n**What the Commission does:**\n- The Attorney‑General can \"refer\" (ask) the Commission to examine specific legal issues\n- The Commission reviews Commonwealth laws to:\n  - Update outdated laws\n  - Fix problems in the law\n  - Simplify complex laws\n  - Improve how justice is delivered\n  - Make justice more accessible\n- It can also look at making laws consistent across States and Territories\n\n**Who runs it:**\n- A **President** (full‑time, must be appointed by the Governor‑General)\n- Up to **6 other members** (can be full‑time or part‑time)\n- Members must be judges, experienced lawyers (5+ years), law academics, or have special expertise\n\n**Key features:**\n- The Commission is **independent** — the management advisory committee cannot compromise this\n- Members who are judges keep their judicial status and protections\n- The Commission reports to the Attorney‑General, who must table reports in Parliament within 15 sitting days\n- It has a **special bank account** (the Law Reform Special Account) funded by Parliament, gifts, and bequests\n- Staff are public servants under the Public Service Act 1999\n\n**Why it matters:**\nThe ALRC is Australia's permanent law reform body. It provides expert, independent advice to government on how to improve Australia's legal system — making laws fairer, clearer, and more effective for everyone."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":4,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The statutory text itself establishes the Commission, its membership, functions, reporting obligations and finance arrangements. Nothing in the Act’s text indicates an outward change to the Commission’s statutory scope from its core purpose as set out in s.21. The Act confines the Commission to work on matters referred by the Attorney‑General and sets process and governance rules consistent with that referral‑driven scope (ss.20, 21)."},"complexity_factors":["Multiple appointment routes and authorities: Governor‑General for full‑time members and Attorney‑General for part‑time members (s.7)","Interplay between protections for judicial office holders and Commission service (s.10)","Ministerial powers to refer, alter and prioritise references and to require interim reports (ss.20, 22) combined with mandatory Commission compliance (s.26(3))","Dual roles and lines of accountability: President is both CEO/accountable authority and a member with delegation powers (ss.5(2)(b), 34, 35)","Funding routed through a statutory special account with specified credits and debits and subject to finance law (s.45)","Public Service Act linkage for staff and agency status, affecting staffing, procurement and direction (s.43)","Termination and resignation rules differ between full‑time and part‑time members and exclude judicial office holders in specific cases (ss.17, 17A, 10)","Management advisory committee is appointed and dissolvable by the Attorney‑General but constrained by an independence requirement (s.27)"],"plain_english_summary":"# What this Act does, who it affects, and how it works\n\n- What it changes mechanically\n  - Establishes the Australian Law Reform Commission (the Commission) as a statutory body (s.5). It sets the Commission's membership, offices and operating rules (Parts 2–4). It creates a dedicated fund (the Law Reform Special Account) to pay the Commission’s costs (s.45). It gives the Governor‑General and the Attorney‑General specific appointment, termination and direction powers for members (ss.7, 17, 17A, 20–22, 26). It requires the Attorney‑General to table Commission reports in Parliament (s.23). The President is the Commission’s CEO and the accountable authority for finance purposes (ss.5(2)(b), 34).\n\n- The stated purpose and official rationale (as set out in the Act)\n  - The Act says the Commission’s functions are to review Commonwealth laws referred to it by the Attorney‑General with a view to developing and reforming the law, including: updating laws to current conditions, removing defects, simplifying law, improving administration and access to justice, and considering consolidation, repeal or harmonisation between jurisdictions (s.21). The Act allows the Commission to report and make recommendations to the Attorney‑General (s.21(2)).\n\n- Who pays (funding and payments)\n  - Parliament funds the Commission through appropriations credited to the Law Reform Special Account (s.45(3)(a)). The Account may also receive fees or money the Commission earns from performing its functions and gifts or bequests (s.45(3)(b)–(c)). The Account is the source for the Commission’s operating costs and member remuneration (s.45(4)(a)–(b)). The President is the Commission’s accountable authority for finance law purposes (s.5(2)(b)).\n\n- Who decides and where discretion sits\n  - Attorney‑General: refers matters to the Commission, may alter referral terms, may direct the order in which references are dealt with and may require interim reports (ss.20(1)–(3), 22(2)). The Attorney‑General appoints part‑time members and the management advisory committee and may dissolve that committee (ss.6(3), 27(3)–(4)). The Attorney‑General may terminate part‑time members (s.17A). In the President’s capacity as CEO, the President must comply with written policies and directions given by the Attorney‑General (s.26(2A)).\n  - Governor‑General: appoints full‑time members (including the President) and may terminate full‑time members in specified circumstances (ss.7(1)(a), 17).\n  - Remuneration Tribunal: sets pay for members who are not judicial office holders (s.16(1)).\n  - President: presides at meetings, is CEO, may delegate powers, decides internal matters not covered by the Act and convenes meetings (ss.34–36, 35, 27(5)).\n\n- What the Commission does in practice (behavioural effects)\n  - The Commission acts when the Attorney‑General refers a matter (s.20). It may gather information in any way it thinks fit to review a reference (s.38), publish interim reports (s.22), and must send final reports that the Attorney‑General forwards to Parliament (s.23). The Commission’s work therefore consists of research, consultation, drafting reports and recommendations. Because references come from the Attorney‑General, the Commission’s agenda is referral‑driven (s.20).\n\n- Costs, incentives, trade-offs and implementation points the Act creates (text‑linked)\n  - Agenda control and opportunity cost: the Commission can only act on matters referred by the Attorney‑General (s.20(1)). That concentrates control over which laws get reviewed in one ministerial office; work the Commission might otherwise do is foregone unless referred (s.20). This is an explicit allocation of the Commission’s scarce research capacity.\n  - Directions and administrative oversight: the Attorney‑General may give directions about the order of references and require interim reports (ss.20(3), 22(2)); the Commission must comply with those directions (s.26(3)). The President must follow written policies and directions by the Attorney‑General in the President’s capacity as CEO (s.26(2A)). Those clauses create formal channels for ministerial influence on process and reporting, while the Act elsewhere protects the Commission’s role to make independent recommendations (s.21). The Act also contains a note that the Public Service Act affects the President’s relationship to ministerial direction (note to s.26(2A)).\n  - Independence mechanisms and limits: the Act requires the management advisory committee not to attempt to compromise Commission independence (s.27(2)) and gives the President delegation and internal governance functions (ss.35, 27(5)). At the same time the Attorney‑General appoints members (part‑time) and the management committee and can dissolve that committee (ss.6(3), 27(3)–(4)), so some institutional checks on ministerial control are internal rather than absolute.\n  - Recruitment and capability constraints: members must meet specified qualifications (judicial office, 5+ years as a senior legal practitioner, academic law experience, or special qualifications) (s.7(2)). The President may direct a part‑time member to work full time and must pay them full‑time rates while so directed (s.15). Those provisions affect how the Commission can scale work and what mix of staff and members it uses.\n  - Accountability and transparency obligations: the Attorney‑General must table Commission reports in each House within 15 sitting days of receipt (s.23). Parliament and its committees can require the Commission to provide information about its performance and expenditure; the Commission must comply (s.26(1)–(2)). Those obligations increase public visibility and administrative compliance costs for the Commission.\n  - Financial and administrative regime: the Law Reform Special Account centralises funding receipts and expenditure (s.45). The Commission’s staff are public servants employed under the Public Service Act (s.43(1)), and the President and staff together constitute a Statutory Agency with the President as Head for the Public Service Act (s.43(2)). That subjects Commission staffing and procurement to Public Service rules and related compliance.\n\n- Effects on private enterprise, competition and individual choice (limited and indirect)\n  - The Act itself does not regulate markets or private firms directly. It empowers the Commission to review Commonwealth laws (s.21) and to make recommendations that could later change regulation or law affecting businesses, consumers and markets. Those substantive effects depend on later legislative action following Commission recommendations; the Act controls only the process by which reviews happen (s.21).\n\n- Compliance burden and administrative discretion (who pays, who decides, what behaviour changes)\n  - Who pays: Parliament via appropriations to the Law Reform Special Account; the Commission may also receive money for services and gifts (s.45(3)). The Account pays operational costs and remuneration (s.45(4)).\n  - Who decides: Attorney‑General controls references and many appointment/direction powers (ss.20, 22, 26, 27); Governor‑General appoints full‑time members (s.7); President manages operations and may delegate (ss.34–35). Remuneration Tribunal sets non‑judicial member pay (s.16).\n  - What behaviour changes: Ministers choose the Commission’s workload by making referrals (s.20); the Commission conducts reviews, consults, writes interim and final reports, and provides recommendations to the Attorney‑General (ss.22, 21). Parliament may request information and will receive and table the Commission’s reports (ss.26, 23).\n\n- Implementation risk and potential trade‑offs to note\n  - Concentration of agenda setting in the Attorney‑General (s.20) creates a trade‑off between responsiveness to executive priorities and the Commission independently initiating inquiries. The Act makes that trade‑off explicit.\n  - Resourcing and recruitment rules (ss.7, 15, 43, 45) mean the Commission’s capacity to complete referrals will depend on staffing and funding decisions governed by public finance and Public Service rules.\n  - The Act places formal reporting and compliance duties on the Commission (ss.23, 26), which embed transparency but also create administrative work that uses staff time.\n\n- Bottom line (mechanics and incentives)\n  - Mechanically, the Act builds a small, specialist statutory body that carries out law‑reform reviews when asked by the Attorney‑General, reports to the Attorney‑General and then to Parliament, and is funded via a special public account (ss.5, 20–23, 45). Incentively, the Act concentrates control over what gets studied in the Attorney‑General’s office while providing statutory protections for member qualifications, judicial office holders and internal governance. The Act delegates operational control to the President as CEO but preserves ministerial levers over referrals, reporting order and certain appointments (ss.26(2A), 34, 20)."},"issue_detection":{"absurdities":[{"type":"circular_definition","section":"3 (definition of 'management advisory committee') and 27(1)","severity":"medium","reasoning":"The definition in s3 presupposes the committee exists as a fixed reference point, but s27(1) grants only a power, not a duty, to establish it. The term 'management advisory committee member' is similarly defined in s3, compounding the issue. If the committee is never established, both definitions are permanently vacuous.","confidence":0.82,"description":"Circular definition: the definition of 'management advisory committee' in s3 refers to 'the management advisory committee established under section 27', but s27(1) makes establishment of that committee discretionary ('may...establish'). If the Attorney-General never exercises that discretion, the defined term refers to a non-existent body, yet the definition treats it as a settled, established entity."},{"type":"impossible_compliance","section":"36(6) and 6(1)","severity":"medium","reasoning":"When the Commission consists only of a President (all other positions vacant), s36(2) requires a majority of 'other members' to sign a written request. Zero members cannot form a majority, making the meeting-request mechanism permanently inoperative in a minimally constituted Commission. Yet s6(2) expressly preserves full functionality despite vacancies.","confidence":0.85,"description":"The quorum requirement of 'a majority of the members of the Commission' can produce absurd results given the Commission's variable size. The Commission consists of a President plus up to 6 others (s6(1)), meaning membership can range from 1 to 7. With only a President appointed and no other members, a majority quorum of 1 out of 1 is trivially satisfied by the President alone, yet s36(2) requires a written request signed by 'a majority of the other members' to compel a meeting — which is impossible if there are no other members."},{"type":"self_contradicting","section":"10(3) and 10(1)-(2)","severity":"medium","reasoning":"The deeming provision in s10(3) conflicts with the practical reality acknowledged in s8(3) that the President 'may carry out any of the duties of that office', implying the roles are distinct. If they were truly the same for 'all purposes', there would be no need to separately authorise carrying out judicial duties. The 'for all purposes' language is overbroad and self-contradicting against the very structure that distinguishes the two roles.","confidence":0.72,"description":"Section 10(3) deems service as a Commission member by a judicial office holder to be 'for all purposes' service as the holder of that judicial office. This produces the absurdity that the Commission member is simultaneously deemed to be performing two distinct roles — their judicial duties and their Commission duties — as if they are one and the same, which is legally fictitious and potentially problematic for superannuation, judicial accountability, and conflict-of-interest purposes."},{"type":"other","section":"17(4) and 17(1)-(3)","severity":"high","reasoning":"Section 17(4) removes all Governor-General termination powers over judicial office holders who are full-time members. The only recourse is the discretionary power in s17(5) if they cease to hold judicial office. A full-time President (the accountable authority for finance law purposes under s5(2)(b)) who becomes bankrupt or engages in serious misbehaviour cannot be terminated under this Act if they hold a judicial office. This undermines governance accountability.","confidence":0.88,"description":"Full-time members who hold a judicial office are completely exempt from all termination grounds (misbehaviour, incapacity, bankruptcy, paid outside employment) under s17(4). This means a full-time President who is a judicial office holder cannot be terminated for misbehaviour or even bankruptcy, creating an effectively irremovable officer — an absurd outcome for a body charged with reforming the law."},{"type":"other","section":"19(3) and 19(2)","severity":"low","reasoning":"Section 35 allows the President to delegate 'all or any' of the President's powers to any member. This would include the s19(3) leave-granting power. A member holding that delegation could theoretically grant leave to the President, bypassing the s19(2) requirement for Attorney-General approval of presidential leave. The drafters likely did not intend s35's broad delegation power to undermine s19(2)'s specific check.","confidence":0.65,"description":"Section 19(3) allows the President to grant leave to full-time members, but s19(2) requires the Attorney-General to grant leave to the President. This means the President can grant leave to themselves indirectly — by delegating the President's powers under s35 to another member, that member could then grant leave to the President without Attorney-General involvement, circumventing the intended oversight mechanism."},{"type":"self_contradicting","section":"27(2) and 27(1), 27(3), 27(4)","severity":"medium","reasoning":"The prohibition in s27(2) is aspirational but structurally undermined by s27(3)'s unilateral Attorney-General appointment power and the Attorney-General's power to dissolve the committee at will (s27(4)). The committee exists at the pleasure of the referring minister, giving that minister indirect influence over the Commission's strategic direction — precisely what s27(2) purports to prevent.","confidence":0.78,"description":"The management advisory committee is prohibited from attempting to 'compromise the independence or impartiality of the Commission in any way' (s27(2)), yet its members are appointed solely by the Attorney-General (s27(3)) — the very minister who refers matters to the Commission and can direct the order of references. A committee of Attorney-General appointees advising the Commission on 'strategic planning' creates a structural tension with the independence it is simultaneously forbidden to compromise."},{"type":"other","section":"45(4)(e)","severity":"low","reasoning":"This provision, while standard in PGPA-era legislation, is logically absurd on its face: it authorises an account debit that involves no payment of any kind. It exists to manage appropriation accounting rather than actual money flows, but within this Act's finance provisions it reads as authorising nothing while purporting to authorise something.","confidence":0.6,"description":"The Law Reform Special Account may be debited 'to reduce the balance of the Account (and, therefore, the available appropriation for the Account) without making a real or notional payment'. This is a provision that authorises debiting an account without any actual transfer of money — a legal fiction that serves to formally extinguish appropriations. While used in Commonwealth finance law, it is inherently self-contradicting: a debit that is neither real nor notional is not a financial transaction in any meaningful sense."}],"contradictions":[{"severity":"medium","section_a":"26(2A)","section_b":"24(1)(a) and the Commission's independence mandate","confidence":0.7,"description":"Section 26(2A) requires the President, as CEO, to comply with all written policies and directions of the Attorney-General. Section 24(1)(a) requires the Commission to ensure its recommendations do not make rights 'unduly dependent on administrative, rather than judicial, decisions'. The Attorney-General — an administrative official — can direct the Commission's CEO on management matters, creating a structural tension with the independence the Commission is meant to embody and protect."},{"severity":"low","section_a":"6(3)","section_b":"6(1)(b)","confidence":0.58,"description":"Section 6(1)(b) limits the Commission to 'up to 6 other members', but s6(3) states the Attorney-General may appoint 'such other part-time members as the Attorney-General considers necessary', subject to paragraph (1)(b). While the cross-reference preserves the cap textually, s6(3) frames the appointment power in open-ended 'necessity' terms that sits in tension with a hard numerical ceiling, potentially causing confusion about whether the cap is a genuine constraint or a soft limit."},{"severity":"medium","section_a":"7(1)(a)","section_b":"8(1) and 13(1)","confidence":0.8,"description":"Section 7(1)(a) provides that full-time members are appointed by the Governor-General. Section 8(1) requires the President to be a full-time member, so the President must be appointed by the Governor-General. However, s13(1) allows the Attorney-General to appoint an acting President, and s13(3) deems that person to be a member for the period — meaning an acting President appointed by the Attorney-General holds a full-time position (with full-time powers) without Governor-General appointment, contradicting s7(1)(a)'s allocation of that appointment power."},{"severity":"medium","section_a":"17(3)","section_b":"17(4)","confidence":0.85,"description":"Section 17(3) mandates termination of a full-time member who engages in outside paid employment without Attorney-General approval. Section 17(4) exempts full-time judicial office holders from this obligation entirely. Section 8(3) then expressly permits the President (who may be a judicial office holder) to 'carry out any of the duties of that office' — which is paid employment outside Commission duties. The combined effect is that a judicially-appointed full-time President can receive judicial salary for performing judicial duties, which would trigger mandatory termination for any other full-time member, but is explicitly permitted and exempt for judicial office holders."},{"severity":"low","section_a":"36(7)","section_b":"36(8)","confidence":0.72,"description":"Section 36(7) requires questions to be determined by 'a majority of the votes of the members present and voting'. Section 36(8) gives the presiding person a casting vote only in the case of 'equality of votes'. However, if only 2 members are present (the minimum theoretically possible at a validly constituted quorum with a very small Commission), a tied vote of 1-1 triggers the casting vote. But the casting vote holder already has a deliberative vote, meaning their vote counts twice while the other member's counts once — a structural voting inequality not reconciled in the text."},{"severity":"low","section_a":"35","section_b":"26(2A)","confidence":0.62,"description":"Section 35 permits the President to delegate 'all or any' of the President's powers to any member or employee. Section 26(2A) imposes personal obligations on 'the President' to comply with Attorney-General directions. If the President delegates all powers, it is unclear whether the delegatee inherits the obligation to comply with Attorney-General directions, or whether the President personally retains that obligation while being unable to act on it. The interaction between broad delegation and personal compliance obligations is unresolved."}]},"summary":{"complexity_score":5,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The Act remains focused on its original purpose: establishing, structuring, and governing the Australian Law Reform Commission. There is no evidence of scope creep. The Act has been updated over time to align with modern public governance frameworks (e.g., references to the PGPA Act 2013 and Public Service Act 1999), but these are administrative modernisations consistent with the original intent rather than expansions of scope."},"complexity_factors":["Multiple overlapping appointment mechanisms with different rules for full-time vs part-time members, and judicial vs non-judicial office holders","Layered governance structure involving the Governor-General, Attorney-General, President/CEO, and management advisory committee with distinct powers for each","Special protections for members who hold judicial office (judges/magistrates) requiring careful distinction throughout the Act","Cross-references to multiple external Acts (Public Governance Performance and Accountability Act 2013, Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973, Public Service Act 1999, Acts Interpretation Act 1901)","Tension between ALRC independence/impartiality and Attorney-General direction powers that requires nuanced interpretation","Significant document repetition in the source text creating apparent (but not actual) structural complexity","Termination provisions with mandatory vs discretionary distinctions depending on member type and circumstances"],"plain_english_summary":"## What This Law Does\n\nThis Act creates and runs the **Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC)** — a permanent, independent government body whose job is to review and recommend improvements to Australian federal laws.\n\nThink of the ALRC as a team of legal experts hired to look at existing laws and ask: *Are these laws still fair, up-to-date, and working properly?* They then report back to the Attorney-General (the federal government's chief law officer) with recommendations for change.\n\n---\n\n## Who Is Involved?\n\n**The Commission itself** consists of:\n- A full-time President (the boss, appointed by the Governor-General)\n- Up to 6 other members (appointed by the Attorney-General)\n- Members must be judges, experienced lawyers (at least 5 years' practice), law academics, or people with special relevant expertise\n\n**The Attorney-General** (a senior federal government minister) controls *what* the ALRC investigates by issuing \"references\" — formal requests to examine a particular area of law. The ALRC cannot investigate things on its own initiative; it needs a reference first.\n\n---\n\n## What Does the ALRC Actually Do?\n\nWhen given a topic to investigate, the ALRC can:\n- Review existing federal laws to see if they're outdated, unfair, or confusing\n- Suggest new laws or simplify existing ones\n- Recommend scrapping laws that are no longer needed\n- Look at making laws consistent across states and territories\n- Consider how to improve access to justice (making it easier and cheaper for ordinary people to use the legal system)\n\nThe ALRC must present its findings in a **report** to the Attorney-General, who is legally required to table (formally present) that report in Parliament within 15 sitting days.\n\n---\n\n## Key Rules the ALRC Must Follow\n\nWhen making recommendations, the ALRC must:\n- Protect people's personal rights and freedoms\n- Be consistent with Australia's international legal obligations\n- Consider the practical costs and economic impacts of any proposed changes on people and businesses\n\n---\n\n## Important Limits on Independence\n\nWhile the ALRC is designed to be independent and impartial (unbiased), there are some checks:\n- The Attorney-General can direct the order in which topics are investigated\n- The Attorney-General can require interim (progress) reports\n- The President (as CEO) must follow written policies and directions from the Attorney-General on management matters\n- Parliament can require the ALRC to provide information about its work and spending\n\n---\n\n## Funding\n\nThe ALRC is funded through a dedicated **Law Reform Special Account**, which receives money from Parliament. The ALRC can also accept gifts and bequests (money left in wills).\n\n---\n\n## Why Does This Matter to You?\n\nThe ALRC's work directly shapes Australian law. Past ALRC reports have influenced major changes to laws on privacy, family violence, elder abuse, criminal justice, and much more. While most Australians will never deal with the ALRC directly, its recommendations affect the laws that govern everyday life."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/australian-law-reform-commission-act-1996","history":"/api/acts/australian-law-reform-commission-act-1996/history","analysis":"/api/acts/australian-law-reform-commission-act-1996/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/australian-law-reform-commission-act-1996/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/australian-law-reform-commission-act-1996/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/australian-law-reform-commission-act-1996/documents"}}