{"id":"F2006B07460","name":"AD/TPE 331/49 - Fliteline Maintenance","slug":"ad-tpe-331-49-fliteline-maintenance","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":49818,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B07460-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-02","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"AD/TPE 331/49 - Fliteline Maintenance","content":"COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 \\- 106 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY\n\nSCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES\n\n![](image.001.png)  \nAlliedSignal (Garrett/AiResearch) Turbine Engines \\- TPE 331 Series\n\nAD/TPE 331/49 Fliteline Maintenance 3/95\n\nApplicability: TPE331-25,-43,-1,-2,-3,-5,-6,-8,-10,-11,-12 series & \\-55B & \\-61A model engines.\n\nRequirement: 1. Carry out an examination of engine records to identify any maintenance carried out and/or released by Fliteline Maintenance, Houston Texas USA, Domestic Repair Station certificate number GR2R8S6K or Mr Eugene E. Shanks, mechanics certificate number 1914482 or his associate, Mr Carl Ramirez, mechanics certificate number 466432551.\n\n    2. For those engines identified as having maintenance carried out and/or released by Fliteline Maintenance or Eugene Shanks or Carl Ramirez;\n\n    (a) If records or other pertinent information indicates the engine was disassembled beyond shaft nut removal from the rotor tie bolt by Fliteline Maintenance or Eugene Shanks or Carl Ramirez, verify life limited components status by the disassembly of the engine and compare and match each component by part number and serial number against that engine's life- limit records. If life-limited component hours and/or cycles cannot be validated, the component shall be removed from service.\n\n    (b) Verify the requirements of any airworthiness directive certified by Fliteline Maintenance or Eugene Shanks or Carl Ramirez have been carried out by visual examination or reinspection in accordance with the applicable airworthiness directive.\n\n    (c) Verify all engine parts, components or modifications installed or carried out by Fliteline Maintenance or Eugene Shanks or Carl Ramirez are in accordance with AlliedSignal published data or other approved data as applicable.\n\nNote: An FAA notice of proposed rule making (NPRM) has been issued on this subject in which the FAA has advised, in part; \"that the requirements of some applicable airworthiness directives (AD's) had not been performed when the engine records indicated that the work had been performed, the records for life-limited turbine components indicated more useful life than the components actually had remaining, parts were installed that are not approved for aircraft use, and modifications that had been performed without approved data\".\n\nCompliance: Effective 2 March 1995:\n\n1: Within 20 hours time in service. 2: Within 100 hours time in service.\n\nCOMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 \\- 106 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY\n\nSCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES\n\nBackground: This Directive has been issued to address concern that there may be engines in Australia, or which may be imported into Australia, that have been maintained by Fliteline Maintenance in the USA, or by persons acting on behalf of Fliteline Maintenance, in relation to which the accuracy of recorded information may be uncertain. The Authority's concerns are based on the safety-related issues raised by the FAA investigation, and no conclusions or inferences concerning the actions or conduct of Fliteline Maintenance, or persons acting on behalf of Fliteline Maintenance, should be drawn from the issuance of this Directive.","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":4,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This Airworthiness Directive maintains its original narrow scope — targeting specific engines maintained by a specific problematic repair station. The scope is precisely calibrated to address the FAA-identified fraud risk without expanding beyond necessary safety verification."},"complexity_factors":["Multiple conditional branches: different inspection requirements depending on whether records indicate disassembly 'beyond shaft nut removal from the rotor tie bolt'","Specific technical terminology requiring aviation engineering knowledge ('life-limited components', 'rotor tie bolt', 'shaft nut removal')","Cross-referencing to external FAA investigation and NPRM (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking)","Named entity specificity: requires identification of work by specific repair station certificate number (GR2R8S6K) and individual mechanic certificate numbers (1914482, 466432551)","Dual compliance timeline: 20 hours for records check, 100 hours for physical inspections","Nested verification requirements in section 2(a)-(c) with escalating technical demands"],"plain_english_summary":"This AD requires Australian operators of certain TPE331 turboprop engines to check whether their engines were serviced by Fliteline Maintenance (Houston) or by mechanics Eugene Shanks or Carl Ramirez. It was issued after FAA findings of falsified records, unapproved parts, life‑limited parts misrepresented, and unauthorized modifications.\n\nIf an engine was touched by those sources, operators must promptly carry out physical inspections and verification of life‑limited parts, repairs, parts provenance and claimed safety work to ensure continued airworthiness."},"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"A positive credit balance is required for all requests, including BYOK, so fallback providers remain available. Add credits at https://vercel.com/d?to=%2F%5Bteam%5D%2F%7E%2Fai%3Fmodal%3Dtop-up to continue.","source":"analysis-cron"},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":6,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The directive's scope is consistent with its stated aim: identify engines maintained or released by Fliteline Maintenance or the named mechanics and verify records, AD compliance and part approval. It targets the specified TPE331 models and prescribes records checks, inspections and disassembly where indicated to address FAA‑raised concerns about inaccurate or incomplete maintenance records. (Applicability; Requirement 1; Requirement 2; Background)"},"complexity_factors":["Multiple affected engine models listed across TPE331 series (broad technical coverage increases workload). (Applicability)","Cross‑jurisdictional origin of suspect maintenance: foreign repair station and named US mechanics (Fliteline Maintenance, Eugene Shanks, Carl Ramirez), requiring scrutiny of overseas records. (Requirement 1)","Layered verification tasks: records examination, visual reinspections for AD compliance, and component-level verification by disassembly when the engine was dismantled beyond shaft nut removal. (Requirement 2(a)–(b))","Life‑limited component matching: operators must compare part and serial numbers against life‑limit records; inability to validate triggers mandatory removal — practical record‑traceability burden. (Requirement 2(a))","Requirement to confirm parts/modifications conform to manufacturer or other approved data imposes need to source approved data and may require technical interpretation. (Requirement 2(c))","Short compliance windows (20 hours TIS for record check; 100 hours TIS for inspections/disassembly) create operational scheduling pressure and possible service disruption. (Compliance)","Ambiguities and inspector discretion: phrases like 'verify' and 'cannot be validated' leave room for judgement on sufficiency of evidence and acceptable methods of validation. (Requirement 2)","Enforcement motivated by FAA investigation findings cited in the Note and Background — potential for follow‑on actions if noncompliance discovered. (Note; Background)"],"plain_english_summary":"Requires operators of specified AlliedSignal TPE331 engines to check maintenance records for work done or released by Fliteline Maintenance (Houston) or the named mechanics, then inspect those engines — including disassembly where records show extensive work — to verify life‑limited parts, compliance with airworthiness directives and that installations follow approved data. Unverified life‑limited parts must be removed. The directive responds to FAA findings that some maintenance actions and record‑keeping by Fliteline may have been incomplete or inaccurate."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-tpe-331-49-fliteline-maintenance","history":"/api/acts/ad-tpe-331-49-fliteline-maintenance/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-tpe-331-49-fliteline-maintenance/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-tpe-331-49-fliteline-maintenance/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-tpe-331-49-fliteline-maintenance/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-tpe-331-49-fliteline-maintenance/documents"}}