{"id":"F2006B11106","name":"AD/LEARJET 35/27 Amdt 1 - Fluorescent Lighting Inverters","slug":"ad-learjet-35-27-amdt-1-fluorescent-lighting-inverters","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":56766,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B11106-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-02","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"AD/LEARJET 35/27 Amdt 1 - Fluorescent Lighting Inverters","content":"COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 \\- 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY\n\nSCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES\n\n![](image.001.png)  \nGates Learjet 35 and 36 Series Aeroplanes\n\nAD/LEARJET 35/27\n\nAmdt 1\n\n  \nFluorescent Lighting Inverters 6/91\n\nApplicability: All models as listed in the requirement document.\n\nRequirement: 1. Action in accordance with the technical requirements of FAA AD 91-03-08.\n\nNote 1: Learjet Alert Service Bulletins 31-33-2A; 35/36-33-5A; and 55-33-3A also refer.\n\nNote 2: If any fluorescent lighting system components referred to in the requirement documents above are found to be installed in any emergency lighting system, the correct operation of which is a mandatory certification requirement for the aircraft, then the disabling of such a system in accordance with an FAA AD is not permitted.\n\n2. Any emergency lighting system the correct operation of which may have been disabled during compliance with FAA AD 91-03-08 (Requirement 1 above) are to be reactivated.\n\nCompliance: 1. For original issue of this directive, as specified in the Requirement document with an effective date of 12 February 1991.\n\n2. For requirement 2 of this issue, prior to 13 September 1991.\n\nBackground: There have been numerous reports of smoke in the aircraft cabin. The cause has been attributed to failure of certain fluorescent lighting system inverters to protect the wiring against open or short circuit conditions which may lead to arcing. This condition, if not corrected, could result in smoke and/or fire in the cabin, and electromagnetic interference.\n\nAmendment 1 to this AD is issued to include NOTE 2 to the requirement statement in order to prevent disabling of any emergency lighting system in accordance with an FAA AD, and to require re-activation of any emergency lighting systems, the correct operation of which is a mandatory certification requirement for the aircraft, which may have been disconnected during compliance with requirement 1.","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"A positive credit balance is required for all requests, including BYOK, so fallback providers remain available. Add credits at https://vercel.com/d?to=%2F%5Bteam%5D%2F%7E%2Fai%3Fmodal%3Dtop-up to continue.","source":"analysis-cron"},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"Amendment 1 adds Note 2 forbidding the disabling of fluorescent components when they form part of required emergency lighting and imposes an express requirement to reactivate any emergency lighting that may have been disconnected during compliance with the FAA AD. This narrows permissible compliance actions compared with the original directive that relied solely on the FAA AD's remedies."},"complexity_factors":["Dependence on an external FAA AD (FAA AD 91-03-08) as the technical requirement, creating an external-document dependency.","Conditional prohibition (Note 2) against disabling fluorescent components that are part of certified emergency lighting, requiring identification of which components are part of mandatory systems.","Specific reactivation deadline for emergency lighting disconnected during compliance (Compliance requirement 2 — prior to 13 Sep 1991).","Applicability tied to models listed in the Requirement document, requiring cross-reference to the requirement document for exact scope.","Notes reference Learjet Alert Service Bulletins (informative references that maintenance organisations may use), introducing additional non-statutory guidance to interpret technical work."],"plain_english_summary":"This directive requires operators of Gates Learjet 35/36 series to carry out the corrective actions specified in FAA AD 91‑03‑08 for fluorescent lighting inverters that can cause smoke, fire or electromagnetic interference. It also forbids disabling any fluorescent components that form part of certified emergency lighting and requires reactivation of any emergency lighting disconnected during compliance.\n\nAircraft owners/operators and maintenance organisations pay for and must perform the inspections, repairs and reactivations by the stated deadlines (effective 12 Feb 1991; reactivation by 13 Sep 1991), changing maintenance procedures and recordkeeping."},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This is Amendment 1 to an existing Airworthiness Directive. The amendment adds a specific safety exception (Note 2 and Requirement 2) to prevent unintended consequences of the original directive. The scope remains tightly focused on the original safety issue (fluorescent lighting inverter failures) with a narrow refinement to protect emergency lighting systems. No scope creep detected."},"complexity_factors":["Short, single-purpose directive (approximately 300 words)","Only 4 defined/referenced documents (FAA AD 91-03-08 and three Service Bulletins)","Simple two-part requirement structure with one amendment adding a safety exception","Minimal conditional logic — essentially 'do X, unless Y, then do Z'","No nested definitions or extensive interpretation sections","Cross-references to external FAA document rather than reproducing technical content internally"],"plain_english_summary":"This AD orders owners/operators of Gates Learjet 35/36 jets to follow FAA AD 91‑03‑08 to fix fluorescent lighting inverter defects that can cause arcing, smoke, fire, or electromagnetic interference. It bars disabling any fluorescent components that form part of the emergency lighting and requires restoration if they were turned off. It affects Australian operators and maintenance personnel and preserves passenger safety."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-learjet-35-27-amdt-1-fluorescent-lighting-inverters","history":"/api/acts/ad-learjet-35-27-amdt-1-fluorescent-lighting-inverters/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-learjet-35-27-amdt-1-fluorescent-lighting-inverters/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-learjet-35-27-amdt-1-fluorescent-lighting-inverters/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-learjet-35-27-amdt-1-fluorescent-lighting-inverters/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-learjet-35-27-amdt-1-fluorescent-lighting-inverters/documents"}}