{"id":"F2006B09439","name":"AD/ELECT/64 - Nordskog Water Heaters and Coffee Makers","slug":"ad-elect-64-nordskog-water-heaters-and-coffee-makers","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":53860,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B09439-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-02","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"AD/ELECT/64 - Nordskog Water Heaters and Coffee Makers","content":"COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 \\- 107 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY\n\nSCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES\n\n![](image.001.png)  \nElectrical Equipment\n\nAD/ELECT/64 Nordskog Water Heaters and Coffee Makers 10/94\n\nApplicability: Nordskog water heaters and coffee makers, without an integral check valve, identified in Nordskog Industries Inc Service Bulletin SB-93-35 dated 21 October 1993, which were either manufactured between January 1990 and July 1991 or serviced since January 1990.\n\nNote: The water heaters and coffee makers are known to be installed in, but not limited to the following aircraft series:\n\nAirbus Industrie Model A300, A310 and A320; Boeing Model 727, 737, 747, 757 and 767;\n\nCanadair Model CL-600-1A11, CL-600-2A12, CL-600-2B16 and CL-600-2B19;\n\nDassault-Aviation Model Mystere Falcon Model 50, 200 and 900; de Havilland Model DHC-8;\n\nFokker Model F27 and F28; Gulfstream Model G-1159 and G-IV; Lockheed L-1011; and\n\nMcDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, DC-9-80, DC-10 and MD-11;\n\nRequirement: 1. Perform a one time inspection of the water heater or coffee maker, in accordance with Nordskog Industries Service Bulletin SB-93-35, to determine if a NUPRO pressure relief valve having part number SS-2C4-65 has been installed.\n\n    2. If a NUPRO pressure relief valve part number SS-2C4-65 has been installed then either:\n\n    replace the pressure relief valve with a new, improved NUPRO pressure relief valve part number SS-CHF2-65, or\n\n    b. deactivate the water heater or coffee maker and install a placard stating \\`Not to be used’.\n\n    3. NUPRO pressure relief valves part number SS-2C4-65, held as spares are not to be fitted to water heaters or coffee makers identified in Nordskog Industries Service Bulletin SB-93-35 and these water heaters or coffee makers are not to be fitted to an aircraft as replacement items, if a NUPRO pressure relief valve part number SS- 2C4-65 is installed.\n\nNote: FAA AD 94-14-03 Amdt 39-8955 refers.\n\nCompliance: 1 \\- Prior to 15 September 1995.\n\nCOMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 \\- 107 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY\n\nSCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES\n\n    2 \\- Prior to further flight.\n\n    3 \\- With effect 15 September 1994.\n\nBackground: The FAA received a report of injuries to cabin crew members that resulted from an explosion of a galley water heater caused by the failure of the pressure relief valve. Although that heater was fitted with an integral check valve, the FAA has determined that the possibility exists for the pressure relief valve to fail in other water heaters or coffee makers without the integral check valve.\n\nCompliance with this Directive will decrease the likelihood of galley water heaters and coffee makers exploding, causing either injuries to passengers and crew or structural damage to the aircraft.","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The AD stays within the original safety-focused scope: it addresses a specific failure mode of galley water-heater/coffee-maker pressure relief valves by requiring inspection and either replacement or deactivation, and by banning the continued use of the identified older spare part. The prohibition on fitting the older valve as a spare and the placard/deactivation option are variations of remedial measures rather than an expansion beyond the original safety purpose."},"complexity_factors":["Short instrument focused on a single equipment type (galley water heaters and coffee makers)","Three discrete mandatory actions (inspect; if applicable, replace or deactivate; and prohibition on using a specific spare)","Specific part numbers referenced (SS-2C4-65 and SS-CHF2-65) — low interpretive ambiguity but requires accurate parts identification","Reference to an external service bulletin (Nordskog SB-93-35) for the inspection method","Lists a number of affected aircraft types (informational rather than creating separate rules per type)","Several different compliance timing rules (inspection by date; remedial action before further flight; spare prohibition effective earlier)"],"plain_english_summary":"**What this instrument does (mechanically):**\n\n- It requires operators and maintenance organisations to inspect specific Nordskog galley water heaters and coffee makers to see whether a particular NUPRO pressure relief valve (part number SS-2C4-65) is fitted, following Nordskog Service Bulletin SB-93-35. (Requirement 1.)\n- If that old valve is fitted, the heater/coffee maker must either have the valve replaced with the improved NUPRO valve SS-CHF2-65, or the unit must be deactivated and placarded “Not to be used”. (Requirement 2.)\n- It also forbids fitting the older NUPRO valve SS-2C4-65 as a spare or fitting any water heater/coffee maker that contains that older valve to an aircraft. (Requirement 3.)\n\n**Who is affected:**\n\n- Aircraft operators and owners that have Nordskog water heaters or coffee makers that match the identification in Nordskog Service Bulletin SB-93-35 (manufactured Jan 1990–Jul 1991 or serviced since Jan 1990) and that do not have an integral check valve. The AD lists representative aircraft types where these galley units are known to be installed (Airbus, Boeing, Canadair, Dassault, de Havilland, Fokker, Gulfstream, Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas models, among others).  \n- Maintenance organisations and licensed engineers who must carry out the inspection and the corrective work.  \n- Parts suppliers and stores that hold or supply the older NUPRO valve SS-2C4-65 as spares.\n\n**Key timing and procedural points:**\n\n- The inspection must be done by 15 September 1995 (Compliance: Requirement 1).  \n- If the old valve is found, the replacement or deactivation must be completed before the aircraft flies again (Compliance: Requirement 2 — \"Prior to further flight\").  \n- The prohibition on using the older valve as a spare or installing an affected unit that contains it took effect on 15 September 1994 (Compliance: Requirement 3).\n\n**Why the measure exists (stated rationale):**\n\n- The FAA reported an explosion of a galley water heater that injured cabin crew when the pressure relief valve failed. The FAA concluded that even heaters/coffee makers without an integral check valve could have the same failure mode. The AD aims to reduce the risk of an explosion, injury to crew or passengers, or structural damage to the aircraft.\n\n**Practical effects, costs and incentives:**\n\n- Who pays: aircraft operators pay for the inspection, any required replacement valve and labour, and for any aircraft downtime while the work is done. Parts suppliers holding the old valve lose the ability to fit those spares to affected units.  \n- Who decides: maintenance organisations or the operator decide whether to replace the valve or to deactivate and placard the unit; the AD leaves that binary choice.  \n- Behaviour changes required: inspections of identified galley units, replacement of identified valves or deactivation of the unit, and removal/quarantine of the older valve from spare stock for the affected installations.  \n- Incentives and market effects: demand shifts toward the improved valve SS-CHF2-65 (benefit to its suppliers); some operators may choose deactivation to avoid immediate parts/labour costs, trading off passenger service capability for cost and compliance ease; operators face one-off compliance costs and possible short-term supply pressure for the replacement valve.  \n- Compliance burden and implementation risk: the action is a single inspection with a clear binary remedial choice, so administrative burden is limited but depends on correct identification per the referenced service bulletin and on availability of replacement valves. Misidentification or limited parts supply could cause operational disruption.  \n- Trade-offs and opportunity costs: time and money spent on inspection and replacement could otherwise be used for other maintenance; deactivating galley equipment reduces on-board services and might affect ancillary revenues or passenger experience.  \n- Concentrated benefits and costs: the direct safety benefit (reduced explosion risk) is diffuse across passengers and crew; the immediate commercial beneficiary is the maker/distributor of the approved replacement valve. The cost of compliance is concentrated on aircraft operators and their maintenance budgets.\n\n**Source and cross-reference:**\n\n- The AD refers to Nordskog Service Bulletin SB-93-35 (21 Oct 1993) for the inspection procedure and to FAA AD 94-14-03 for the underlying action. The AD sets specific part numbers and compliance dates (see \"Requirement: 1, 2, 3\" and \"Compliance\" provisions)."},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This Airworthiness Directive maintains its original narrow scope — addressing a specific safety defect in specific galley equipment. It has not expanded beyond its original purpose of preventing pressure relief valve failures in Nordskog appliances."},"complexity_factors":["Single, specific technical subject matter (one brand of galley appliance)","Clear three-part requirement structure with straightforward conditional logic (if X, then Y or Z)","Limited cross-referencing — only references one FAA directive and one manufacturer service bulletin","Defined applicability uses specific date ranges and part numbers, but these are clearly listed","No nested exceptions or complex definitional sections","Short document (approximately 300 words) with minimal legislative machinery"],"plain_english_summary":"Australia's Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) requires operators to inspect Nordskog water heaters and coffee makers in aircraft galleys because a faulty pressure‑relief valve can fail and cause explosions. Affected operators (including many common jet types) must check for valve part SS‑2C4‑65 and either fit the improved valve or disable and label the appliance; the faulty valve is banned as a spare or for installation. This prevents injury and aircraft damage."},"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"Unauthenticated. Configure AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY or use a provider module. Learn more: https://ai-sdk.dev/unauthenticated-ai-gateway","source":"analysis-cron"}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-elect-64-nordskog-water-heaters-and-coffee-makers","history":"/api/acts/ad-elect-64-nordskog-water-heaters-and-coffee-makers/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-elect-64-nordskog-water-heaters-and-coffee-makers/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-elect-64-nordskog-water-heaters-and-coffee-makers/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-elect-64-nordskog-water-heaters-and-coffee-makers/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-elect-64-nordskog-water-heaters-and-coffee-makers/documents"}}